ML20215J056

2 Sqrt, Informal Rept

ML20215J056
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	12/31/1986
From:	Harris B, Singh J, Thinnes G EG&G IDAHO, INC.
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20215J054	List: ML20215J050 ML20215J056
References
CON-FIN-A-6415 EGG-EA-7498, NUDOCS 8705070202
Download: ML20215J056 (50)

Text

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EGG-EA-7498 December 1986 INFORMAL REPORT

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q ldaho

.: National:

Engineering

' Laboratory.- BEAVER VALLEY-2 SQRT REPORT Managed by the U.S.

Department of Energy :

J. N. Kingh B. L. darris

G. L. Thinnes l

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Prepared for the wy,,, ,,, . ll.S. NllCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76lD01570 '

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8705070202 870204 PDR ADOCK 05000412 k PDR

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4 EGG-EA-7498 BEAVER VALLEY-2-SQRT REPORT-J. N. Singh

8. L. Harris G. L. Thinnes 7

Published December 1986 s

EG&G Idaho, Inc. -

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 I

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1 Prepared for the.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Washington, D.C. ~20555 Under DOE Con c No DE-AC07-76ID01570 i

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-4 ABSTRACT EG&G Idaho is assisting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in evaluating Duquesne Light Company's program for the dynamic qualification of safety related electrical and mechanical equipment for the Beaver Valley Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2.

Applicants are required to use test or analysis or a combination of both to qualify equipment, such that its safety function will be ensured during and after the dynamic event, and -

provide documentation. The review, when completed, will indicate whether an appropriate qualification program has been defined and implemented for seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment which will provide reasonable assurance that such equipment will function properly during and af ter the excitation due to vibratory forces of the dynamic event.

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SUMMARY

A seismic qualification review team (SQRT) consisting of engineers from the Engineering Branch PWR-A of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and gg .

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory made a site visit to the Beaver Valley Electrical Generating Plant, Unit 2 of Duquesne Light Company located in Shippingport, Pennsylvania. They observed the field installation and reviewed the qualification reports for twenty-four selected pieces of seismic Category I electrical and mechanical equipment and their supporting structures. Four generic and three equipment specific concerns were identified for which additional information is needed in order for the SQRT to complete the review. These are referred to as open items. Although the open items need to be resolved, the review indicated that the equipment was adequately qualified for the dynamic environment at Beaver Valley.

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CONTENTS ABSTRACT .............. ..

.. ...................... .... ........... 11

SUMMARY

.......... .... . ... ... ....... .. . ...... .... .......... iii

1. INTRODUCTION . .. .......... .. .. ..... ........................ 1

2. NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM (NSSS) EQUIPMENT ........... ......... 2

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L 2.1 Steam Generator Flow Transmitter (NSSS-2) ...... .. ........ 2 ,

2.2 Reactor Vessel Letdown Modulating Valve (NSSS-3) ....... ... 2 l 2.3 Motor Operated Gate Valve (NSSS-4) ......................... 4 2.4 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger (NSSS-8) ........... .. 15 2.5 Reactor Coolant Pump and Seals (NSSS-11) ................... 7 2.6 Reactor Vessel Letdown Isolation Valve-8035A (NSSS-12) ..... _10 2.7 Low Head Sa fety Injection Pump (NSSS-13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.8 Plant Safety Monitoring System Cabinet (NSSS-14) ...... .... 15 2.9 Loop Stop Valve Protection Cabinet (NSSS 15) ............... 16 2.10 8 In. Motor Operated Gate Valve (NSSS-16) .................. 18 2.11 Nuclear Instrumenta tion System Cabinet (NSSS-19) . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.12 Centrifugal Charging / Safety Injection Pump (NSSS-20) ....... 21 2.13 Position Transmitter - 7300 Printed Circuit Card (NSSS-21) ........ .................................... 23 3.

BA LAN C E O F P LANT ( 80P ) EQU I PMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 3.1 Motor Operated Butterfly Val ve (80P-1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.2 Feedwater Isolation Valve (B0P-5) .......... ...... ....... 26 3.3 Alternate Shutdown Panel (80P-8) ............. ............. 27 3.4 Central Sta tion A/C Un i t (BOP-9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 ,

3.5 Vital Bus Distribution Panel Board (B0P-14) ... ............ 30 iv

3.6 Air Operated Control Valve (BOP-15) ....... ... ..... ...... 31 3.7 Vital Bus Uninterruptable Power Supply System (80P-17) ..... 32 3.8 Quench Spray Chemical Injection Pump (BOP-19) .. ........ 34

. 3.9 Service Water Pump (BOP-20) ... ........... . ............. 34 3.10 Moto r Ope ra ted Damper (80P-23) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 3.11 Fuel Oil Pressure Switch (B0P-24) ...... .. ................ 37

4. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ..... .............. ... .... ......... 38 4.1 Generic Issues .... ............... ..... ......... ....... 38 4.2 Equipment Specific Issues ......... ... . .... ............. 39 4.3 Conclusion .......... .. ...... .... ....................... 40 LIST OF ATTENDEES . . .... . ... ... ........................ ..... 41 V

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B_EAVER VALLEY-2 SQRT REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

. The Engineering Branch (EB) of the Nuclear. Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the lead responsibility in reviewing and evaluating the dynamic qualification of safety related mechanical and electrical equipment. This equipment may be subjected to vibration from earthquakes and/or hydrodynamic forces. Applicants are required to use test or analysis or a combination of both to qualify equipment essential to plant safety, such that its function will be ensured during and after the dynamic event.

These pieces of equipment and how they meet the required criteria are described by the applicant in a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). On completion of the FSAR review, evaluation and approval, the applicant receives an Operating License (OL) for commercial plant operation.

A Seismic Qualification Review Team (SQRT) consisting of engineers from the EB of NRC and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), made a-site visit to the Beaver Valley Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2 of Duquesne Light Company, Shippingport, Pennsylvania, from September 30 through October 3, 1986. The purpose of the visit was to observe the field installation, review the equipment qualification methods, procedures (including modeling technique and adequacy), and documented results for a list of selected seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment and their supporting structures. This report, containing the review findings, indicates which of the items are qualified and require no additional documentation. It also identifies some equipment aad certain general concerns for which additional information is needed in order for the SQRT to complete the review. These are referred to as open items. The applicant is to further investigate and provide additional documentation to resolve these issues.

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2. NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM (NSSS) EQUIPMENT 2.1 Steam Generator Flow Transmitter (NSSS-2)

This transmitter (tag No. 2 MSS *FT475) was an ITT Barton transmitter, E model Number 764. It is located in containment at the 772 ft level and measures steam generator flow rate in the main steam system. The transmitter and flow manifold are mounted by its support brackets to a '

structural support anchored to a wall.

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The transmitter, manifold, and bracket were seismically qualified by test at Westinghouse and documented in the report " Equipment Qualification Test Report--Barton Differential Prassuro Transmitters--Group A,"

WCAP 8687, Supplement 2-E03A, Rev. 2, March 1983. Further detail on qualification is described in " Equipment Qualification Data Package--Differential Pressure Transmitters: Qualification Group A,"

WCAP 8587, EQDP-ESE-3A, Rev. 4, March 1983.

A multiaxis sine sweep test was performed for the resonance search from 1-33 Hz. The qualification test was performed by pseudo triaxial sine beat tests which enveloped a 10% margin on the RRS. Five OBE level and twelve SSE level tests were performed demonstrating structural integrity and operability of the transmitter. The reviewer questioned the rigidness of the structural support of the transmitter and manifold but calculations by Duquesne Light indicated the support to be well within the rigid range.

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification documents and the applicant's response to questions, this item is seismically qualified.

• 2.2 Reactor Vessel Letdown Modulating Valve (NSSS-3) .

The reactor vessel letdown modulating valve was supplied by Target Rock (Model 79AB-003). It is located inside the containment at the 742 ft elevation and is used to vent hydrogen from the reactor vessel head and to modulate the letdown to the pressure relief tank.

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t The valve was qualified by a combination of test and analysis.

Thermal, mechanical, vibration, and radiation aging were performed as discussed in Westinghouse report WCAP-8687, Supp. H10C, Rev. 1, Equipment Qualification Test Report Target Rock Modulating Valve (Environmental and

. Seismic Testing), dated January 1985. The valve was mounted to an electrodynamic test table using a test fixture that clamped around the pipe stubs near the valve body. The valve was line mounted in the plant with pipe supports some distance from the valve. The acceleration levels used in the testing were 3.2 g and 4.0 g in each direction simultaneously applied for OBE and SSE, respectively. These levels are much larger than the maximum accelerations from the piping analysis, 0.39 g for OBE and 0.642 g for SSE. Therefore the difference between field and test mounting was considered satisfactory. The valve was pressurized before testing was begun. A 0.2 g sine sweep resonance search was performed and the lowest natural frequency of the valve was found to be 40 Hz. Qualification testing consisted of four OBE and two SSE biaxial sine dwell tests at a single frequency of either the natural frequency or 50 Hz, whichever was lower. During each dwell the valve was operated. During one test a wire came loose. This was attributed to excessive handling. The test was rerun after replacement of the wire and the test was successful. After the seismic testing the valve was subjected to a body hydrostatic test, a disc hydrostatic and seal leakage test and a seal weld leak test. The seal leakage was excessive after the seismic testing. The valve was disassembled and examined to determine the cause of the excessive leakage.

The seat leakage was attributed to a buildup of scale around the seat area caused by corrosive material in the test apparatus. The scale was removed and the valve was reassembled. The seat leakage was reduced by a factor of 10 to 65 cc in 10 minutes, which was judged acceptable. The valve was also subjected to a high energy line break environment. The valve did not function due to an unsealed electrical connection. An external seal was then added and the valve functioned as required.

Stresses in the valve body were found in Target Rock report No. 2586, Seismic Analysis Report for the Target Rock Project 79Z-59, dated July 18, 1984. The lowest natural frequency of the valve was calculated as 121 Hz.

A static analysis of the valve was performed using accelerations of 3.2 g 3

2 and 4.0 g applied simultaneously in all three directions for OBE and SSE, respectively. Deadweight, pressure, and loads from the extended structure were included in the stress calculations. All stresses were below the ASME code allowable stresses.

The qualified life of the valve was found to be 9.5 years. The whole valve is to be replaced at that time.

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's response to questions, the reactor vessel letdown modulating valve is adequately qualified for the prescribed loads.

2.3 Motor Operated Gate Valve (NSSS-4)

The PORV 3-in. block valve (tag No. 2RCS*MOV536) is a motor operated gate valve in the pressurizer cubicle built by Westinghouse as model Number 03003GM99FNH00G W750010. The valve has a Limitorque operator with ID Number 877Q2439M-VK. The pipe is supported horizontally by a snubber and vertically by a spring hanger next to the valve. The valve was seismically qualified by a combination of testing and analysis.

The valve body was qualified by an axisymmetric finite analysis performed by Westinghouse and documented in the Westinghouse report,

" Seismic Analysis Report for Westinghouse Class I Nuclear Valves,"

EM-5689. All natural frequencies of the body were above 163 Hz; therefore a static analysis was performed using 4.5 g loading in three directions.

Stresses were highest in the body bonnet bolts: 53,582 psi compared to an 3 ASME code allowable of 53,648 psi. Deflection calculated in the analysis  : -

of the bonnet-stem was 0.002 in. compared to an allowable deflection of 0.013 in. .

The actuator was qualified by testing performed at Westinghouse. Sine sweep resonance search tests indicated no natural frequencies below 35 Hz.

Then single axis sine beat tests were performed in each of three directions 4

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using 5 g input at the OBE level and 7.5 g input at the SSE level. Five l OBE level and one SSE level tests were performed. This testing was documented in Westinghouse report: WCAP 8687, Supp. 2, H01A. Operability of the valve was verified by static deflection tests reported in Westinghouse-WEMD report Number 4995.

As noted in the walk-down, the operator seemed quite large and was unsupported. For this reason a check of the piping analysis input parameters with respect to the valve's C.G. location and weight was investigated in the audit. It was found that the rotational inertia of the valve was approximately 20% below the actual characteristics of the valve as shown on the Westinghouse drawing. Duquesne Light's response was that an ongoing piping audit program, as described in report Number 2BVM-156, Rev. 3, would illuminate and reconcile this discrepancy. According to Duquesne Light, this line had not undergone that audit. This pipe stress reconciliation program uses the following criteria: (a) pipe and valve parameter discrepancies which are more then 20% in error are evaluated for their contributing effects on the piping system of concern; (b) if the discrepancies are significant then a reanalysis is performed.

i In addition to the valve and operator, the motor control cabinet which supplies the power for the actuator and a cabinet containing Agastat and ASEA switching relays for the valve were inspected. The switching relay cabinet (tag No. PNL*REL-269) is a single bay cabinet qualified by test and documented in Acton Environmental Testing's report No. 20046-84N-2. The relays were monitored during the test and ret the chatter criteria of 2 msec maximum discontinuities.

The prime area of concern, however, was that the cabinet was mounted to the floor right next to a similar cabinet. Seismic excitation would cause the cabinets to impact causing high frequency excitations to be imparted to the relays which could malfunction since the qualification tests were concerned with frequencies below 33 Hz only.

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Duquesne Light said that a walkdown of electrical systems as outlined in project procedure BVM236 was in progress and that this system had not been inspected yet. The walkdown would identify interferences and then appropriate action would be taken to maintain equipment seismic l qualification.

As a result of all these findings, the valve and actuator are seisimically qualified but questions of a generic nature arise with respect -

, to: (a) reconciliation of piping analysis parameters with actual valve characteristics and (b) determining interferences between electrical components which might affect their qualification. The programs outlined by Duquesne Light seem adequate to address these problems. Completion of these programs must be verified for seismic qualification of the effected plant components.

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification documents and applicant's responses to our inquiries the motor operated gate valve is qualified pending resolution and confirmation of the completion of the programs.

2.4 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger (NSSS-8)

The residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger (tag No. 2RHS*E21A) was manufactured by Atlas Industrial Manufacturing Co. with Serial No. 3483.

It stands vertically at the 709 ft level, is approximately 30 ft high, and is supported by lugs at the bottom and two trusses in the horizontal

. direction at the top. The heat exchanger was qualified by analysis, i

4 The qualification analysis was performed by Dynatech R/D Company and l . .

is documented in report No. 1318, Rev. 2. Natural frequencies were calculated using beam theory and showed natural frequencies to be above 28.8 Hz. This is in the rigid range of the Beaver Valley spectrum so that a static analysis was performed for the seismic conditions. The computer codes, N0ZZLE, REACT, and REACT 1 were used to calculate nozzle loads on the heat exchanger. Stress conditions around the nozzles and the support lugs were determined by the Bijlaard method described in the Welding 6

Research Council Bullet'- 107. Streu criteria for the analysis was based on Section VIII, Div. 1 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

Stresses calculated around the 24 in. nozzles were 41,060 psi while the allowable was 42,000 psi. The Bijlaard rethod which is based upon

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parametric curves derived fro.7 tests of nor:le-shell configurations is

. predicated upon the nozzles being well away from shell discontinuities such '

as the shell flanges and shell heads as found on the RHR heat exchanger.

Since stresses are so high and the stress calculation method questionable for these nozzles the vendor was asked to further justify the calculation.

Inspection of the drawings indicated no weld sizes were dimensioned for the lugs supporting the vessel vertically. Furthermore, no weld sizing calculations were found in the report. A Bijlaard analysis was also

} performed for the lug-shell junction but the lug dimensions used seem totally inappropriate for such an analysis. These two areas of the analysis must also be resolved.

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification documentation and applicant's responses to questions this item is qualified pending satisfactory resolution of the following three concerns: (a) the appropriateness of using Bijlaard analysis for the 24-in. nozzle-shell junction stresses; (b) sizing calculations of the support lug welds; and (c) the usage of specified lug dimensions in the support lug-shell junction stress analysis.

2.5 Reactor Coolant Pump and Seals (NSSS-11)

The reactor coolant pump (RCP) assembly and seals (MPL No. 2RCS*P21A; pump: model Number W-11001-A1(93A) and motor: serial No. IS-86P389, type and frame CS-62-1/2-SPL) was supplied by Westinghouse Electro-Mech. Div.

according to purchase order No. 546-GPT-1671d7-BN. The equipment specification number for Beaver Valley-2 is 952204, Rev. 5, dated January 14, 1977; which is a part of general specification Number G-677188, Rev. 4, dated January 15, 1976. This unit is located at the 732 ft 7

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elevation of the containment building. It is a part of the reactor coolant system. The pump is only needed for power production. In an accident situation the safety requirements for the pump is to be able to coast down and then natural circulation takes over. It does not need to run for accident mitigation.

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The Pump: The pump assembly was mounted in the vertical position and supported by three 4-1/2 in. A579 grade 72 bolts. The qualification of -

3 this assembly is based on static and dynamic analyses of various components  !

of the assembly. Seismic loads are considered in the analyses. The qualification package of the assembly consists of an overall summary report and several other component-analysis reports. A listing of these reports is 9fven below.

1. 93A Reactor Coolant Pump Pressure Boundary Component Summary Report for the Duquesne Light Co., Beaver Valley Power Station #2, No. EM5129, Rev. 2, dated January 15, 1982.

2. Stress Analysis of the Casing, Main Flange, Main Flange Bolts, and Thermal Barrier of the 93A Shaft Seal Pump, No. EM4487, Rev. 1, dated August 16, 1974.

3. Dynamic Seismic Anlaysis of the Model 93A Reactor Coolant Pump with Seal Maintenance System for Duquesne Light Co., Beaver Valley No. 2 Power Station, No. E4990, Rev. 1, dated January 18, 1982.

4. Static LOCA Analysis of the Model 93A Reactor Coolant Pump with Seal

Maintenance System for the Duquesne Light Co., Beaver Valley Unit l No. 2 Power Station, No. EM5004, Rev. 1, dated January 18, 1982.

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5. Structural Analysis of the Seal Housing, Ring Clamps and Bolts for the ,

93A Controlled Leakage Pump (Spool-less Design), No. EM4556, Rev. 1, dated June 1975.

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6. Stress Analysis of the 93A Controllad Leakage Pump Thermal Barrier Heat Exchanger, No. EM492, Rev. O, dated June 25, 1975.

7. Structural Analysis of the Weir Plate for the 93A Discharge Nozzle,

. No. EM4542, Rev. 1, dated June 1974.

8. Structural Analysis of the Suction and Discharge Nozzles of the Model 93A1/93A Reactor Coolant Pump Under Umbrella Loads, No. EM4962, Rev. 1, dated August 3, 1977.

9. Stress Analysis of 93A Pump Nonpressure Components for the Duquesne Light Co. Beaver Valley Unit No. 2 Station, No. EM5017, Rev. 2, dated May 23, 1985.

10. Analysis of 93A Casing Feet Using Umbrella Loads, No. EM4503, Rev. 1, dated February 8, 1974.

All the above reports were prepared by Westinghouse (WEMD). The following computer codes were used (individually or in groups) in these analyses: SEAL SHELL-2; BARTON, WECAN, FEASS, ANSYS, WISEC, NUMBRA, LUG 1.

The Motor: The motor supplied by the Large Rotating Apparatus Division was also vertically mounted. The general specification and supplementary ordering information for this induction motor for shaft seal type pump are contained in E-569700, Rev. K and E-565698, Rev. E, respectively.

The seismic qualification of the motor is based on static analysis as documented in the report: Seismic and Loss of Coolant Accident Stress Analysis of Non-rotating Parts on Nuclear Reactor Coolant Pump Motor, Memo i No. 769, Rev. O, dated February 15, 1976. This is a 20 elastic stress analysis using the QUAKER computer code.

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The Seals: According to the applicant the RCP seal is a film riding element which does not carry any seismic load. It is contained in the RCP seal housing which is seismically qualified. However, it should be noted that the pump seals at Beaver Valley Unit 2 have undergone generic and specific plant performance tests to demonstrate seal integrity.

] Additionally, the Westinghouse Ow..ers Group has been involved in an '

extensive seal testing program over the last several years. It should also be noted that the integrity is not a concern during a LOCA since the seal -

leak would be virtually negligible when compared to the LOCA. The RCPs are not required to function during a LOCA.

The Assembly: The static and dynamic analyses performed on the pump and the motor are adequate. The resulting stresses for the pump are, however, compared to faulted condition criteria. These criteria do not ensure the operability of the pump. Technically, this is unsatisfactory.

However, the calculated stresses are quite low and well within the allowables of nonfaulted condition. On an equipment specific basis, therefore, the results are sr.tisfactory. The calculated stresses for the motor are compared to allowables which ensure operability.

Based upon observation of the field installation, review of qualification documentation and responses by the applicant to our questions, the unit is adequately qualified for Beaver Valley-2 application.

2.6 Reactor Vessel Letdown Isolation Valve-8035A (NSSS-12)

The reactor vessel letdown isolation valve (model No. 79AB-001, MPL No. 2RCS*S0V200A) was supplied by Target Rock according to purchase order No. 413910 and equipment specification No. G-955186. It was located at the .

746 ft 10 in. elevation of the containment building. The valve was socket welded to a pipeline. This post TMI modification vents hydrogen from the reactor vessel head. It allows 50 gpm letdown to the pressure relief tank (PRT). It is a part of the reactor coolant system and must maintain a pressure boundary.

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This valve is seismically qualified based on a combination of analysis and tests performed on a similar unit. The field unit is 79AB-001 serial No. 470, whereas the specimen was 79AB-001 serial No. 55. The test portion of the qualification is described in the report: EgTR Target Rock

. Isolation Solenoid Valves, No. WCAP-8687, Supp. 2-H10A, Rev. 2, dated January 1, 1985, prepared by Westinghouse. Seismic Analysis Report for the Target Rock Project 79Z-59 1-in. Solenoid Operated Globe and Modulating Valves, No. 2586, Rev. O, dated April 16, 1980 has the analysis details.

The laboratory mounting for the tests consisted of socket welding the valve to one inch Sch. 160 pipe on each end. This pipe (6 in, long) was in turn bolted to the test table using mounting blocks. A resonance search l

with 0.2 g magnitude sine sweep at 1/2 octave per minute did not indicate any frequency below 50 Hz. Subsequently, a series of qualification tests with sine dwell were performed. They had phase incoherent biaxial inputs.

The magnitudes at 50 Hz were as follows:

s/s f/b v OBE 3.9 g 3.9 g 3.9 g SSE 4.9 g 4.9 g 4.9 g.

The required piping accelerations for the valve interface were:

s/s f/b v OBE 0.17 g 0.13 g 0.21 g SSE 0.31 g 0.24 g 0.39 g.

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8; The seismic loads were combined with other loads by SRSS (square root of the sum of the squares) technique. There were four OBE followed by two SSE level tests performed. Operability was monitored. Visual inspection indicated that the top cover gasket developed a radial tear which had to be repaired during the tests. It was determined to be caused by excessive handling. This was confirmed by supplemental testing. It was stipulated, '

however, that if handling occurs in the field the gasket should be examined each time and replaced as necessary. It has been noted in the instruction .

manual. It was further discovered that the switch potting had shrunk.

This was attributed to excessive thermal aging temperatures as supplemental aging at correct temperature showed no such anomaly.

The analysis consisted of hand calculations for stresses in the l

internal and external bonnet walls and plunger deflections. They were calculated for seismic plus dead weight plus operating loads. The results were compared to the respective allowables.

The stresses and deflections are acceptable. Operability was verified. Anomalies were satisfactorily resolved. The applied loads were greater than required.

Based upon our observation of the field installation, review of qualification document and responses provided by the applicant to questions, the unit is adequately qualified for 9.5 years. However, final system qualification reconciling as-built loads is pending. This

! reconciliation is not complete on a generic basis.

I 2.7 Low Head Safety Injection Pump (NSSS-13)

The low head safety injection pump was supplied by Goulds Pumps (Model 3405L, size 10 x 12-170V) and the pump motor was supplied by ,

Westinghouse Large Motor Division (Model 77F14111 with a 5008-S frame).

The pump and motor were mounted to a bedplate which was bolted to the floor. The pump and motor are located in the safeguards area at the 720 ft 4 in, elevation. The pump provides emergency core cooling system injection.

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i The pump was qualified by analysis in Mcdonald Engineering Analysis l

Co. Report ME-468, Seismic-Stress Analysis of ASME Section III Class 2 -

Pumps Model 3405L, Size 10 x 12-170V, Manufactured by Goulds Pumps, Inc._,

dated March 15, 1978. A three-dimensional dynamic analysis was performed

. using the ICES-STRUOL II program. The pump, motor, and bedplate were included in the model. The first two natural frequencies were 45.2 Hz and 66.8 Hz. Seismic stresses were found for OBE and SSE using these two modes. The accelerations used for OBE and SSE are shown below.

OBE: 1.0 g vertical and 1.5 g horizontal (each direction)

SSE: 2.0 g vertical and 3.0 g horizontal (each direction) l The seismic loads were applied separately in each of the three 1

directions. Stresses from the worst case horizontal loading were then combined with the vertical loading by square root of the sum of squares.

Nozzle loads and operating loads were also included. All OBE stresses were below the normal condition allowable stresses. All SSE stresses were below I the faulted condition allowable stresses.

The method of load combination was thought to be possibly nonconservative since the highest stresses may not be caused from the direction chosen for application of the acceleration. However, the accelerations used in this analysis had large margins over the required l accelerations. The generic Westinghouse specification requires 2.1 g simultaneously applied in all three directions. This analysis was done l

l using accelerations that were roughly equivalent to the generic specification. The required accelerations for the Beaver Valley plant were 0.2 g horizontal and 0.175 g vertical. Therefore, the load combination method used in the analysis of the pump was considered satisfactory. The i load combination method was considered in the review of other pumps during the audit. No example of the use of the load combination method without l

l large margins between applied accelerations and required accelerations was l observed.

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- if The functional capability of the pump was shown by finding bearing loads, coupling misalignment due to bending in the pump and motor shaft, stresses in the impeller key and impeller clearance. The impeller was found to contact the casing wear ring. The contact force was 122 lb or 54 lb/in over the 2.25 in. wear ring width. This resulted in a stress of about 300 pst which is well below the allowable stress of 12,000 psi. The contact was predicted using an acceleration of 3 g. This acceleration is much greater than the required acceleration. Also, no hydrodynamic spring

• effect of the water in the pump was considered. This effect would tend to

. prevent contact. Since these two effects are conservative it was concluded i by the reviewer that contact would probably not occur and if it did occur, the stresses would be very small. All other results of calculations mentioned above were satisfactory. Therefore, the pump was considereJ qualified for its application.

The motor was qualified by a combination of test and analysis.

Thermal and radiation aging of the stator were performed as discussed in Westinghouse report WCAP-8687, Supp. 2-A02A Environmental, Rev. 2 Equipment Qualification Test Report Westinghouse LMD Motor Insulation, March 1983.

An electromagnetic shaker was used to excite the motor in the 5 to 33 Hz range. No natural frequencies were found. Bump tests were also performed to verify that no frequencies below 33 Hz existed. For qualification testing the motor was mounted rigidly to a test table at a 45 degree angle. Pseudo triaxial, multifrequency input was applied with all TRSs exceeding the RRSs for all tests except one SSE test. Five OBE tests and three SSE tests (one in each orientation) were performed. The damping was 2% for OBE and 5% for SSE.

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Operability of the motor was shown by analysis in Westinghouse Shop -

' l Order 77F14113, Seismic Analysis of Low Head Safety Injection Motors for Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. _2_Duquesne Light Power Co. , dated ,

June 25, 1979. Shaft and rotor deflections due to horizontal and vertical seismic loads, weights, and magnetic f6rces were found. Shear and bending deformations were included in the analysis. Bearing loads and shaft 14

stresses were below the allowable values. The. rotor deflection was 0.002 in, for SSE compared to a gap of 0.044 in. Therefore, the motor 1 operability was demonstrated.

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the t qualification documents, and the applicant's response to questions, the low head safety injection pump and motor are adequately qualified for the t prescribed loads.

! 2.8 Plant Safety Monitoring System Cabinet (NSSS-14) 4 I The plant safety monitoring system (PSMS) Cabinet, Model 2032338G01,

' was supplied by Westinghouse and is located in the control building at the

] 707 ft 6 in. elevation. The cabinet is part of the system that performs 4

postaccident monitoring of reactor vessel level and core cooling j thermocouples.

The PSMS cabinet was qualified by test in Westinghouse Report WCAP-8687, Supp. 2ES3A, Rev. O, Equipment Qualification Test Report

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i Plant Safety _ Monitoring System (Seismic and Environmental Testing), dated

! March 1983. The cabinet was bolted to a rigid (4 in. plate) base with-8-3/4 in, bolts, two at each corner of the cabinet, during the tests. The base was then welded to a biaxial test table. The.4 in. base was removed for the mounting in the Beaver Valley 2 plant to allow access beneath the cabinet. Westinghouse designed a mounting frame made from channel sections with a web thickness of 0.15 in, which Beaver Valley could use and not i invalidate the testing. This design was discussed in Westinghouse Report' EQ&T-EQA-837, Base Modification for_ Beaver Valley (DMW) PSMS Cabinets,

~

a dated April 27, 1984. Beaver Valley, however, used a plate approximately

2 in. thick with the center part removed for mounting the cabinet. This l* plate appears to have approximately the same stiffness as the frame.

Therefore, the field mounting was judged to be satisfactory.

l 4

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..O A 0.2 g resonance search was performed from 1 to 50 Hz at a rate of 1 octave / minute. Two resonances were observed: 14-15 Hz fecnt/back and 12-13 Hz side / side. Multifrequency pseudo triaxial input was applied to the test table in the qualification testing. Five successful OBE tests and four successful SSE tests were performed. All TRSs exceeded the required RRSs. During one unsuccessful OBE test an electrical malfunction occurred -

due to frayed wires. The test was repeated successfully after repairing the wires. Some SSE tests to an acceleration level of about 15 g were .

unsuccessful but four SSE tests to a level of about 12 g were run. No structural d= mage occurred during the tests. The equipment functioned during both OBE and SSE testing.

The PSMS cabinet is located in a mild environment area. The qualified '

life is presently being evaluated. An interim 5 year qualified life has been established until completion of the short term component aging program scheduled for completion in March 1987. The qualified life is discussed in Westinghouse letter ENG/1ES(86)-554, Position on 5-Year Q/L of Microprocessor Systems, dated September 19, 1986.

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's response to questions, the

. PSMS cabinet is adequately qualified for the prescribed loads.

2.9 Loop Stop Valve Protection Cabinet (NSSS 15)

The loop stop valve protection cabinet (Orawing No. 1060E29G01, MPL No. RK*2VV-REL-A) was supplied by Westinghouse according to purchase order No. 206544 and equipment specification No. 953210. It was located on the 707 ft 6 in. elevation of the control building. The field mounting ,

consisted of welding it to the structural steel raised floor with 1/4-in.

fillet welds 3 in. long at each corner. It is a part of the reactor protection system. It is an interlock system to prevent reopening of loop stop valves and reactor coolant pump protection. It had only a temporary paper tag.

16

The qualification of this equipment is based on a combination of tests and analyses. These tests and analyses are documented in the following reports:

. 1. Equipment Qualification Test Report Loop Stop Valve Cabinet, No. WCAP-8687, Supp. 2-E23A, Rev. 0,-dated October 1985 by Westinghouse.

2. Equipment Qualification Data Package Loop Stop Valve Cabinet, No. WCAP-8587, EQDP-ESE-23A, Supp. 2, Rev. O, dated October 1985 by Westinghouse.

3. Finite Element Seismic Analysis of the Aux. Safeguards Cabinet, Loop Stop Valve Cabinet, and Modified Safeguards Cabinet, No. WCAP-9838, Rev. O dated April 1981 by Westinghouse. -

4. Seismic Qualification of the Rotary Relay for Use in the Trojan and Diablo Canyon Auxiliary Safeguards Cabinets, No. WCAP-8941, dated October 1977 by Westinghouse.

The loop stop valve cabinet was analyzed for structural adequacy. The analysis consisted of a three-dimensional, finite element model of plates, lumped masses, beams and springs. The model was restrained at the base nodes. The WECAN computer code was used in the analysis. The model was authenticated with a partial test which exhibited good correlation with the calculated frequencies. The following frequencies were found by analysis (below 50 Hz): s/s = 17.44 Hz, f/b = 21.60 Hz, y = none, torsional = 28.92 Hz. This model was also used to generate in-equipment' response spectra. These spectra were generated with the help of synthetic time histories. The response spectra for these time-histories enveloped the generic required response spectra. Generic required response spectra enveloped the Beaver Valley-2 required spectra. All these analyses used a 5 % damping. An all-enveloping in-equipment spectrum was generated from the individuals. This spectrum was used for the components' 17

r .g qualification. The~ acti.ve components of the l'oop stop valve cabinet were either tested individually or in another (but similar) . cabinet. MOR 131-1

~

and MDR 134-1 were tested on the Safeguard test cabinet. These'showed adequate structural integrity and operability was verified.

MIDTEX 156-14T200 relays were tested independently.with pseudo triaxial sine beat. input. One of-the specimen showed contact chatter greater than -

2 millisecond during SSE level testing. However,.this contact bounce was

'within the acceptance criteria. .

- The analysis model is correlated with test results. The analysis j results are within allowable limits. The active components tested out to be acceptable. The components are qualified for a life'of 5 years. The i procedure to ensure the operability of the equipment throughout its ,

qualified life is being addressed by the utility surveillance and maintenance program. The field inspection, however, indicated that this '

cabinet was quite close to another one which raises the possibility of interaction during a seismic situation. This problem.is generic in nature, ,

Based upon the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification documentation and applicant's response to our questions, the loop stop valve protection cabinet and its components are adequately qualified pending satisfactory resolution of the generic problem of adequate clearance between cabinets.  ;

2.10 8 in. Motor Operated Gate Valve (NSSS-16)

The'8-in. motor operated gate valve (model No'. 08000GM82FBB000, MPL No. 2CHS*LCV115B) was supplied by Westinghouse according to' purchase. order No. 546-CCC-173659-BN and specification No. 952173 Rev.~6 and G678852 ,

Rev 2. -The assembly has a Limitorque S8-00, ID No. 714572WC, Serial No. 264170 operator. It'was butt welded into the piping locatedLat-the 721-ft elevation of the auxiliar9: building. The stem was vertical forithis

, mounting<- $ This valve, a part of the chemical and volume control system,

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opens a path from the' refueling water storage tank to the charging" pumps'

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The seismic qualification of the assembly is based on a combination of.

tests and analyses. These are documented in the following reports:

1. Operability Test Report of Westinghouse Nuclear Gate Valves, No. 4995, Rev. O, dated January 28, 1977, prepared by Westinghouse.

2. EQTR--Equipment Qualification Test Report Limitorque- Electric Motor Operator (Environmental and Seismic Testing),

No. WCAP-8687 Supp. 2 H04A,-Rev. 2, dated March 1983 by Westinghouse /Limitorque.

2

3. Design Report for Westinghouse Class I Nuclear Valves, No. EM-4981, Rev. 1, dated November 15, 1975, by Westinghouse.

.i Seismic loads are considered in the qualification. 'The required J

accelerations at the valve location are: ,

4 k

- s/s f/b v

- OBE(actual / generic) 0.195/1.05 g 0.283/1.05 g 0.201/1.05 g SSE (actual / generic) 0.515/2.1 g '0.558/2.1.g 0.396/2.1 g.

LOCA loads are transmitted to the valve through piping. Allowable' nozzle loads on the valve account for it'.

7 The qualification consists of a static,'two-dimensional _, finite element analysis for stresses and displacements. The stresses are compared

- to ASME allowables and the' deflections are governed by'available-clearance. They are within the allowable limits. The valve calculat'ed ..

.- frequencies ~ indicate that it is relatively rigid.

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19

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The Limitorque operator was tested. For the- test the actuator was bolted to a fixture in the same manner as it would be to a valve. In turn the fixture was bolted to the table. A resonance search test from 2 to 35 Hz with a 0.75 g magnitude, single axis, sinusoidal sweep input did not indicate any frequency below 35 Hz. Subsequently, single axis RIM (required input motion) tests with sine-beat inputs were performed. There

• were five OBE and one SSE level tests performed. Aging was performed before the tests. Structural integrity and operability were verified. -

Inputs levels were as follows: ,

s/s f/b v OBE 5.0 g 5.0 g 5.0 g SSE 7.6 g 7.6 g 7.6 g.

There was another set of tests performed on assemblies with valves of sizes 4 and 12 in., mounted on pipe stubs 10.2 in. in length on each side and the stubs then bolted to the test- fixture. This series was static bend tests. The input level was:

s/s f/b v 4.5 g 4.5 g 4.5 g.

Structural integrity and operability were verified. The present'8-in.

valve is qualified by similarity and interpolation. The valve was leaking significantly when observed in the field. On inquiry, the applicant indicated that it was being tested and would be repacked to eliminate the leak. .

), .

Based upon our observation of the field installation, review of -

qualification reports and applicant's responses to our questions, this unit ,

is adequately qualified for Beaver Valley-2 application.

20 1

2.11 Nuclear Instrumentation System Cabinet (NSSS-19)

This NIS cabinet (tag. No. RK*2NUC-INS) was built by Westinghouse with model No. 1061E43G01. It is a four bay cabinet located in the control room

. containing equipment for the reactor protection system which provides alarm functions, secondary control of indicating reactor status -during startup, and functions in power operations and overpower trip protection. The cabinet was qualified by testing.

Westinghouse documented its testing of the cabinet in WCAP-8687, Supplement 2-E47C. In this testing a resonance search was performed using multiaxis swept sine tests at 0.2 n from 1-50 Hz. Resonances were found'in the 3 Hz region (side-to-side) and 5 Hz region-(front-to-back).

Subsequently, pseudo triaxial sine-beat tests were performed developing a TRS which when plotted with 5% damping enveloped with considerable margin the RRS plotted at 4% damping.

The testing on the four bay cabinet did not include environmental qualification of the cabinets components. Therefore, Westinghouse Report WCAP-8021 which included the seismic and environmental qualification tests of a two bay cabinet was added to the qualification package.

Based on the observation of the field installation and review of the qualification documentation, this cabinet is seismically qualified 2.12 Centrifugal Charging / Safety Injection Pump (NSSS-20)-

The centrifugal charging / safety injection pump was manufactured by Pacific Pumps (Model 2-1/2 in. RL/IJ, 11 stage). The motor and gear unit was supplied by Westinghouse. The pump, gear unit, and motor are located in the auxiliary building at the 737 ft 8 in. elevation. .The pump is used for safety grade cold shutdown and high head safety injection.

21

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The pump unit was qualified by a combination of test and analysis. A list of test reports u' sed to qualify the pump' unit is contained in Westinghouse Letter MED-PVE-4617, Beaver Valley Unit 2 Charging Pump Natural Frequencies, dated October 2, 1986. A similar motor, about 4 in.

longer. and 400 lb heavier, was tested as reported in Westinghouse Seismic

~

Shop Order No. 75F32351, Seismic Analysis of Charging Pump Motors' for Blackhawk Nuclear Stations, No. I and-2 and Braidwood Nuclear Stations No. 1 and 2 Commonwealth Edison Co., dated-9/16/76. An electromagnetic --

j shaker was used to excite the motor from 5 to 180 Hz. The lowest natural '

frequency was-found'to be 61 Hz. ~ Stresses and rotor deflections were found i for OBE and SSE by a static analysis as reported in Westinghouse Report No. M030601, Seismic Analysis Report for the OMW Charging / Safety Injection Pump Motors, dated 8/29/83. The shaft deflection was 0.00275 in. compared

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to'a clearance of 0.051 in. All stresses in the motor were found to be below allowable values. A 2.1 g acceleration was applied in all three

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directions simultaneously in this analysis. This acceleration is much greater than the maximum required acceleration of 0.4 g. Therefore, operability of the motor is demonstrated.

Thermal and radiation aging of.a similar motor insulation was-performed and discussed in Westinghouse Report No. WCAP-8687, Supp. 2-A05A,

_ Rev. O, Equipment Qualification Test Report We'stinghouse large Pump Motors-for Use in a High Energy Line Break Environment Outside Containment (Environmental and Seismic Testing), dated November 1985. - Five OBE and four SSE qualification tests were performed with all TRS: exceeding generic RRS.

1 The lowest natural frequency.of a similar gear: unit was 66 Hz as 't

.I reported in Westinghouse Shop Order 79-R-52594. Stresses in' the -gear box

• i were found in Westinghouse Shop Order 75-R-40761, dated 10/21/76. All' stresses were below allowable values. ., ,

1 22

1 a

The lube oil piping system was tested as reported in Westinghouse Order No. B-48901, Natural Frequency Test, dated April 27, 1982. No frequencies below 35 Hz were identified. Stresses in the piping were reported in Pacific Pumps Design Report K-156. This report was not

. reviewed.

Stresses in the pump were found using a static analysis in Pacific Pumps Design Report No. K-362-7, Rev. 2, Nuclear Service Pump Design Calculations, Class 2, Pump Size 2-1/2 RL/IJ, dated 11/30/81. The SSE.

stresses were found using 3 g horizontal and 2 g vertical acceleration acting simultaneously along with pressure loads. The highest. stress (15,935 psi) occurred in the fiattened section of the suction nozzle. The normal allowable stress was 16,600 psi and.the faultedLallowable stress was 29,800 psi. The shaft deflection was 0.002 in. compared to' a clearance of 0.006 in. Therefore, operability of the pump was demonstrated.

The nozzle loads considered in the analysis'were reporte'd in I Westinghouse Equipment Specification 678815, Rev. 2, Class 2 Pumps Based on

! ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III - Rules for Construction-of Nuclear Power Plant Components, dated 9/6/73. :These loads were found by an empirical method based on experience. Beaver Valley 2Lis in a process of reconciliation of nozzle loads on equipment'and piping. We request confirmation of the completion of this program.

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's response to questions, the centrifugal charging / safety injection pump is adequately qualified for the prescribed loads. .

2.23 Position Transmitter - 7300 Printed Circuit Card (NSSS-21) .

The printed circuit (PC) card (model No. NCT1, MPL No. 2RCS*ZT2508) was-in slot 50 of cage 41, channel ID-2HS/443B. It was supplied by Westinghouse according to purchase order No. 180506 and 'speci fication q No. 952255. It was located in the control room at the 707 ft 6 in.

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. ' _ ,# ? 'h y,s g elevation. The PC card was mounted within a card frame secured with two set screws. The card frame was in the 7300 cabinet. The cabinet was mounted onto the structural steel raised floor. The mounting of cards in the cabinet (all of them) was not complete.

This item was picked as a surprise item to evaluate the efficiency of the retrieval system. The retrieval system is adequate. It was only briefly reviewed for completion. The review established that a complete -

qualification documentation package was in place but did not establish the merit of the qualification due to lack of time.

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24

3. BALANCE OF: PLANT (B0P) EQUIPMENT 3.1 Motor Operated Butterfly Valve (80P-1)

The valve with tag No. 2CCP*M0V150-2 is model No. 1400 from the

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Henry Pratt Co. Its actuator is a Limitorque model No. SMB-00-5/H3BC. The valve is bolted to a 14-in. component cooling water line at elevation 724.ft, inside containment,_and functions for containment isolation.

Seismic qualification was performed by a combination of testing of the actuator and structural analysis of the valve. Acton Environmental Testing i

Company documented their tests on this actuator model in report No. 19913-84N. This actuator was required by specification to meet' 3 g acceleration in all three directions. A swept sine resonance search was-performed indicating no natural frequencies below 33 Hz. Single axis swept-sine tests at 3 g were performed for the OBE level of tests. Sine dwell

- tests were performed for the SSE level of tests, dwelling.at twenty discrete frequencies below 33 Hz with input levels'at 3 g at 2 Hz and 4.5 g at the remaining dwell frequencies. Piping accelerations were then required to be kept below these acceleration levels. Six OBE and three'SSE tests were performed.

Henry Pratt Co. performed the analysis on the valve itself and-documented their calculations in report Number A-0027-2. A' static analysis was performed on the valve with the 3 g imposed since this is rigid with

- respect to the 33 Hz cutoff. Stress criteria was based on ASME_Section III.

allowables. The highest stresses were located in the trunnion bolts with a

' calculated stress of 29,604 psi and an allowable of 30,000 psi.

As part of this system the motor control cabinet which-houses the power supply for the actuator was also inspected during the walkdown. -This cabinet with tag No. MCC*2-E05 was a _Gould cabinet ITE motor control center. Upon inspecting the cabinet-it was discovered _that a large cable-tray was routed very closely along the top, backside of the cabinet and actually-touching the cabinet at one location. Concern for the inducement 25' 4

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of impact loads into the cabinet during a seismic event was expressed.

Duquesne Light indicated that this was another example of interference which would be addressed when the electrical systems are walked down according to Beaver Valley 2 Project procedure BVM-236.

Based on the observation of the field installation and review of the qualification documentation the valve and actuator are considered qualified. However, the addressing of the specific as well as the generic -

questions of component interference must be verified before qualification is complete.

3.2 Feedwater Isolation Valve (BOP-5)

The feedwater isolation valve was supplied by Borg-Warner /NVD, model No. 435XABS-001. The valve is located in the main steam valve area at the 775 ft 8 in, elevation. The valve provides rapid stoppage of feedwater flow in the event of a main steam line break.

The feedwater isolation valve was qualified by a combination of test and analysis. The operator was qualified using a test of an identical operator but with the addition of two small manifolds consisting of a shutoff valve, a pressure gauge, and several 0-rings. These manifolds were.

installed on the hydraulic and pneumatic sides of the system. The testing is reported in Borg-Warner Nuclear Valve Division Report No. 1736, Rev. C, Qualification Test Plan and Test Results Report for a Pneumatic-Hydraulic Operator P/N 38991, dated 2/22/83. Thermal and radiation aging of the operator were performed before vibration testing. The operator was-installed on a production yoke which was mounted on a section of carbon steel pipe to closely simulate an actual valve. The yoke was then attached .

to the pipe using the production. clamp ring. A hydraulic cylinder coupled to an operator rod end was used to simulate operator loading. This ,

mounting adequately simulated the plant mounting. A 0.2 g resonance search was performed from 1 to 100 Hz. One natural frequency (28 Hz) was identified below 33 Hz. Qualification testing is reported in 26

1 Wyle Laboratories Report 57530, Nuclear Environmental Qualification Testin; of One Hydraulic Valve Operator P/N 38991 for Nuclear Valve Division, dated April 13, 1978. Random motion biaxial input from 1.2 to 35 Hz was applied to the table. It was necessary to superimpose sine beats on the

- random input because of the high acceleration levels required for qualification. The TRSs exceeded the RRSs'for all tests above a frequency of about 4 Hz. Five OBE tests and five SSE tests were performed in two horizontal orientations. Operability of the operator was monitored during testing.

Stresses in the valve body were found from a static analysis as reported in Borg-Warner Nuclear Valve Division Report No. NSR435XA35, Rev. A, Static Deflection Test Procedure, dated 7/27/78. The lowest natural frequency was calculated as 60 Hz. A static analysis was performed using 5.83 g horizontal and vertical accelerations applied simultaneously.

The highest stress for the faulted condition was 19 ksi compared to an allowable stress of 21.6 ksi for the condition. A static deflection test was performed. The opening and closing times of the valve were checked and found to be within allowable limits. Leakage rates under pressure were also checked and found to be within allowable values.

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's response to questions, the feedwater isolation valve is adequately qualified for the prescribed' loads.

3.3 Alternate Shutdown Panel (80P-8)

The alternate shutdown panel (no model number, MPL No. PNL*2ALTSHUTDN) was manufactured and supplied by Systems Control Corporation according to purchase order No. 2BV-731 and specification No. 2BVS-731. It was located at the 755 ft elevation of the auxiliary building. It was vertically mounted on the floor. The attachment to the floor consisted of welds 1/4 in. x 2 in. on 6 in. center (inside and outside) on front and back of the cabinet. This panel is a part of the control system and intended for 27

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fb%n. $a ku- , , ,, .

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-use in case of fire o'r other disabling situations o'f the main shutdown panel. The. panel had only a temporary paper tag on it for-identif_ication.

'Th'e qualification of this panel is based on a combination of' tests and--

~ analysis. - Details of the analysis and tests are in the reports: Seismic Structural Qualification of Systems Control Emergency' Shutdown Panels for

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+-

Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit #2 Per Stone Web' ster Engineering Specification No.12BVS-731, No.16239-81N-3, Rev. 4, dated . -

.t December 10, 1985 and Report of Test for Class IE Equipment Seismic .

i Qualification, No. 2004-84N, Rev. 0, dated July 23, 1986, prepared by

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NTS/Acton and reviewed by System Controls.

W, The cabinet'is analyzed based on a two-dimensional;(a 2-D vintage plant) finite element model. The model is comprised of beam and plate elements. The calculated lowest frequencies are in the 13 to'20 Hz range.-

Thirteen Hz frequency.is judged to be local. Hence, the 20 Hz frequency,is assumed to be the first fundamental mode. It is therefore' concluded that the cabinet-is relatively rigid. Consequently, no magnification takes place through the cabinet. As a result, all the instruments in' side are to 4 be qualified based on floor response spectra (RRS). Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) had not completed.the review of the qualification documents for the internal class IE items. Therefore, a list e

of active IE items in the cabinet was not available and the' qualification of these items could not be established.

! The review indicates the following deficiencies with the qualification of the alternate shutdown panel, and must be completed in order for this item to be qualified:

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1. The finite element model for the cabinet structure was not authenticated and hence the conclusion of no magnification: ,

through the cabinet'is not supported.

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d The authenticity of the model should be established and nonmagnification of the floor spectra may then be demonstrated by

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response analysis.

. 2. A list of all IE internals of this cabinet should be prepared.

Their qualification should be established, reviewed and forwarded-

!, to NRC for-staff review.

3. An auditable trail and identification between theLfield equipment and qualification documents must be established and maintained 'on a ' permanent basis.

l Based upon the observation of the field installation, review of the I qualification documents and the responses provided by the applicant, the .

1 1-alternate shutdown panel is qualified for Beaver Valley-2-site pending the-l satisfactory resolution of the above three items.

3.4 Central Station A/C Unit (80P-9)

, This unit (tag No. 2HVR*ACU207B) is model No. 39E021. manufactured by Carrier Air Conditioning Company 'and is located in the Safeguards Building at the 743 ft elevation. The unit sheet metal housing is roughly 10 ft square and 3 ft deep and anchored on its skids by 16-1/2 in. bolts. Its function is to remove equipment heat load during a design basis accident.

John Henry Associates, Inc. d v umented the unit's seismic-

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qualification by analysis in tht: eport No. JHA-85-263, Rev. 1. _A NASTRAN finite element beam and plate model of the unit indicated-its

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lowest natural frequency to be 25.9'Hz (f/b).while the ZPA for the-support location starts at 10 Hz. Therefore,'a static analysis of the unit was performed with a 0.204 g ZpA horizontal and 0.122 g vertical for OBE and 0.44 g ZPA' horizontal and 0.231 g vertical for.SSE. The anit_ boundary conditions were assumed pinned at the anchor bolting locations. Calculated-stresses were 30% of the allowables while maximum deflections were 20% ~of those required for operability.

29  :

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Based upon the observation of the field installation and review of the qualification documents this unit is seismically qualified.

3.5 Vital Bus Distribution Panel Board (BOP-14)

The-vital bus distribution panel board was supplied by Systems Control. The model number was not attached to the panel but the Beaver Valley mark number (PNL*VITBS2-1C) was attached. The qualification. -

package included a drawing which showed this mark number. Therefore, traceability was established. This. panel supplies power to the chlorine gas monitor and to the plant safety monitoring. system. The panel is slocated in the control building at the 736 ft 2 in elevation.

4 The vital bus panel was qualified'by analysis in Acton Environmental Testing Corporation Report 15902, Rev. 4, Seismic Structural Qualification of Distribution Panels for Beayer Valley Power' Station Unit No. 2, dated 4/25/86. A finite element model of a similar panel--the 120/240 Vac emergency distribution panel--was developed using the STARDYNE program.

Three natural frequencies were identified below 33 Hz. They were 22.11 Hz, 23.22 Hz, and 30.54 Hz. All three of these frequencies were attributed to-vibration of the small door on the panel. No components are, mounted on the small door so.the local modes of the door were considered to not have any effect on the rest of the panel structure. Stresses in the panel were-found using a static analysis. The accelerations used in the analysis.were 0.53 g horizontal and 0.32 g vertical. The highestLstress in the panel was 1,068 psi compared to an allowable value of 24,000 psi.

The circuit breakers inside the panel were qualified by testing in. g Acton Environmental Testing Corporation Test Procedure 15891, Rev. 4, 4 -

Qualification Testing of Class 1E Electrical Equipment Used for Nuclear Power Generating Stations per the Guidelines of IEEE Std. 323-1974 and IEEE. ,

Std. 344-1975, dated 6/30/84. Thermal, radiation, and mechanical: aging were performed. The vital bus panel board contains 8 Heineman Model CD1-G3-U15-120/240-AC-1 breakers and one Heineman Model CD3-AO-DU-240 VAC 30 l

breaker. The report stated that a circuit breaker similar to the former, Model C01-G3-U-40-120/240 AC-1, was used in qualification testing. The report did not specifically mention the CD3-A0-DU-240 VAC breaker. During the audit, Beaver Valley personnel found that a similar- breaker, a 3 pole

, breaker with one pole used for an alarm function, was ' tested. The breakers were tested to SSE peak level of about 8 g. This acceleration level exceeds the required valve.

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's response to questions, the vital bus distribution panel board is adequately qualified for the prescribed loads. However, the issue of permanent link between the field equipment and qualification documentation (involving the use of mark number) remains open. It would be handled on a generic basis.

3.6 Air Operated Control Valve (B0p-15)

The air operated control valve, supplied by Masoneilan (model No.38-20571), is located in the reactor containment building at the 692 ft 2 in. elevation. The valve is a passive component which is located on a drain line. It is normally closed to preserve the pressure boundary for the accumulator system. It is opened periodically for the accumulator leak test.

The qualification documentation referred to the Beaver Valley mark number rather than the manufacturer's model number. The mark number for this valve had been changed from 2-SSR-A0V-106C to 2-SIS-A0V-8508. The qualification package referred to the former number instead of the latter number. Documentation of the change was not in the " mini". package which was prepared specifically for the SQRT audit. However, Beaver Valley personnel located the documentation of the change in the complete package.

The reviewer examined the change documentation and considered it adequate.

Therefore, traceability between the valve and its documentation was identified.

31

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The actuator testing is contained in Masoneflan Nuclear Division Seismic Report 1007, Rev. C, Seismic Qualification of Masoneilan Control Valves for Duquesne Light Company Beaver Valley Unit 2 Test Valve Number 805, dated December 15, 1977. A resonance search identified two natural frequencies at 31 and 33 Hz. Amplification factors were found at these two frequencies by dividing the response accelerations at the center of gravity

• of the valve by the input accelerations. These two factors were found to be between 3 and 4. Stresses were calculated in the valve for -

t accelerations which were multiplied by these amplification factors. All stresses were found to be acceptable. The maximum amplified acceleration '

was 14.2 g. The test mounting is discussed in Acton Environmental Testing Corporation Report 13374, Seismic Vibration Testing of One 1" 600 # Valve N-00168-12 for Masoneflan International, Inc., dated August 15, 1977. The valve was bolted to O test fixture which was securely attached to a 45 degree biaxial test table. The valve is actually line mounted with no supports in close proximity of the valve. The mounting was considered to be satisfactory because of the application of the amplification factors to give a maximum acceleration of 14.2 g and also because the valve is passive.

The requirements of a seismic operability test for this valve are given in Masoneilan International, Inc., Report NE-126, Rev. D, General Operability Test, dated 2/11/76. The results of these tests were not available. Beaver Valley personnel stated that the results of the operability test are not required since the valve is passive. The reviewer agreed with this statement.

The NAMCO limit switch was qualified to an acceleration level of 14.2 g. The documentation was not reviewed.

3 Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's response to questions, the air ,

operated control valve is adequately qualified for the prescribed loads.

3.7 Vital Bus Uninterruptable Power Supply System (BOP-17)

The vital bus uninterruptable power supply (UPS) system was manufactured by Elgar Corporation (model UPS-253-1-110). It is located in 32

the service building at the 730 ft 6 in, elevation. The UPS supplies 120 Vac power.for engineered safeguard. protection channels and other Class IE 120 Vac electrical loads.

'l

• The qualification procedure for the UPS is discussed in_Elgar Document 3

No. 1006589, Qualification Procedure to Demonstrate a' Forty Year Qualified Life Plus One Year for Elgar Model UPS-253-1-110 Vital-Bus Uninterruptable Power Supply System Under Stone and Webster Purchase Order 2BV-361A, dated:

July 1984. A similar bus was tested (model No. UPS-253-1-101). The cabinets of the two buses were identical but some'of the electrical

~

components were-different. A comparison of_the two buses is. included.in

-Appendix A of the above report. Two types of integrated circuit

, operational amplifiers, models LF356H and LM308AH, present in the model 110 but not in the model 101 were not tested. Beaver Valley personnel found i that these amplifiers did not perform a Class 1E function.

.The Model 101 UPS cabinets were qualified by testing as described in Wyle Laboratories Report 58733,l Seismic Testing of One Static Uninterruptable Power Supply Model UPS-253-1-101, Serial No. 101 for Elgar Corporation, dated March 11, 1982. The bus system consists of two

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cabinets bolted together and welded to a channel embedded in the floor.

The cabinets were welded to a test fixture which was welded to a biaxial' test machine in a manner adequately simulating the field ~ mounting. Tests were performed with the cabinets bolted'together and also separated. The cabinets were tested in two different horizontal-orientations (90 degrees

~

4

- apart) with vertical excitation included. ~ A 0.25 g sinusoidal resonance search was performed in each direction from 1 to.35 Hz. Several natural

~

frequencies below 33 Hz were observed, the lowest being about 8 Hz. The

. qualification tests were performed using biaxial random motion input from 1.2 to 35 Hz in one-third octave intervals. Five OBE and one SSE tests were completed. All TRS exceeded the RRS. The damping was 0.5% for OBE

-and 1.0% for SSE. Thermal aging was performed as described in Wyle Laboratories Test Report 56872, February 1982.

33

, , - , -~ - --

( '

F M l' ,

,pwk & y 9 l

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's response to questions, the vital bus uninterruptable power supply system is adequately qualified for the prescribed loads.

3.8 Quench Spray Chemical Injection Pump (80P-19) -

This pump with tag No. 20SS*P24A is manufactured by Crane Deming with -

its model referenced by catalog Figure 1549 size 3WF. It is bolted to its-rigid support by means of 4-7/8 in, anchor bolts. The horizontally mounted pump injects sodium into the quench spray system at the 728 ft elevation of the safeguards building.

Mcdonald Engineering Analysis Co. documented in its report No. ME-981 the analysis that was performed to qualify the pump seismically. An ICES-STRUDL beam finite element model indicated that all natural frequencies were above 33 Hz; therefore a static analysis of the pump was performed. The RRS ZPA for the OBE was 0.137 g horizontal and 0.075 g vertical while the SSE ZPA was 0.282 g horizontal and 0.156 g vertical.

Stress criteria was based upon ASME Code Appendix XVII and showed the maximum calculated stress to be 20,291 psi in the base plate with an allowable stress of 21,600 psi. Critical deflections were calculated to be 0.001 in. with an allowable of 0.0023 in.

Based on the observation of the field installation and the review of the qualification documentation, the pump is seismically qualified.  !

3.9 Service Water Pump (80p-20) ,

This deep-draf t Byron Jackson pump (tag No. 2SWS*P21A) is model No. 36RXM/Two Stage VCT and is located in the Primary Intake Structure at the 705 ft level. The pump is flange mounted using twelve 1-1/2 in bolts into a steel plate embedded in the concrete floor. The casing has 34

,w +.-

5 11

,t horizontal seismic restraints located at two elevations. The. service water pump supplies water for.various-cooling purposes throughout the plant.

The lower pump section was qualified by the analysis of Stress

. - Analysis Associates, Inc., and reported in their report No. 731-N-0027,

. Rev. 2/1. The analysis was performed using the computer codes BMDAT, CAMBM, MDLDF ar.d stresses were compared to the allowables of the ASME Code Section_III. Since no frequencies were calculated below the ZPA cutoff

[ frequency, which was 10 Hz.in this case, a static analysis was performed.

applying 0.213 g horizontal and 0.198 g vertical for OBE and 0.37 g horizontal and 0.296 g vertical for SSE. The largest stresses calculated were 13,167 psi and allowable- stress was 15,000 psi. for normal plus SSE.

~

level loads. Deflections were 0.0003 in versus.the allowable deflection

of 0.004 in.

Mcdonald Engineering Analysis Co. analyzed the upper pump portion with.

the finite _ element code ICES-STRUDL. This analysis'was documented in.

report No. EL-8-5117-90377, Rev. 1. The lowest natural frequency calculated was 27 Hz which is well above the 10 Hz ZPA cutoff. However, quite conservative acceleration loads of_1 g horizontal and vertical were.

, applied. The largest normal operating plus SSE loads were located in the lower stator yoke bolt (29,783 psi calculated versus 32,000 psi allowable) and the lower bearing housing (8365 psi- calculated versus 9375 psi allowable). Operability was indicated by a calculated displacement of 0.003 in. compared to an allowable of 0.060 in.

1 Based on the observation of the field installation and~ review of the qualification documents, the pump is seismically qualified.

3.10 Motor Operated Damper (BOP-23)

The motor operated damper (vendor model No. DAA-P-7402, manufacturer model No. NH95 reverse. type, MPL No. 2HVC*M00206B) was supplied by ITT Gen.

Contr. according to purchase order No. 2BV-185, specification

, 35 i

44. o 4 ,c,- w qm (4 .< :i m. ; y ,.

e

~

No. 2BVS-185. The vendor model number could not be verifled in the field.

However, the qualification report was for DAA-P-7402 which covered' drawing.

'Nos. 14130 and 14130-2. According to'the: applicant, 14130 and 14130-2 are the drawing numbers for damper and operator in the' field. This identification trail does not provide a direct auditable link between the j field unit and the documentation. This deficiency has been included in the'

' generic findings. The mounting consisted of thirty two 5/8 in, diameter grade 5 bolts attached to a rigid duct and a support. It is.a'part of the -

{ control . room air conditioning system. It was located at the 735.5.ft j k elevation of the control building.

The qualification of the unit is based on a combination of test and-analysis. The damper is analyzed for stresses and the actuator is tested.

The analysis is documented in the report: Revised Seismic Qualification Report of DAA-P-7402 Dampers, No. 90247-1-A, Rev. A, dated March 7, 1979, prepared by American Warming and Ventilation and-reviewed by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation. The tests are discussed in_the following two reports: Qualification Test Program on Hydromotor Actuators NH90 Series (Model B)' for ITT General Controls, No. 58784, Rev. -B,- dated April 12, 1984, prepared by Wyle Laboratory and Stone & Webster Engineering '

Corporation and Test Report for Requalification of ITT GC NH90 Series Hydromotor' Actuators, No. 730-1-140, Rev. 1, dated April 24, 1984, prepared by ITT General Controls and reviewed by American Warming and j Ventilation. For the damper a static analysis:(analyzed with only two directional loads at a time due to older vintage plant) with one horizontal (E) and one vertical (V) load-of I g and '1 g, respectively, was

performed. Another analysis with another horizontal (W) and vertical (V)_ f=

l having the same magnitude followed. The stresses and deflection are within j the allowable limits. -[ .

{

F The actuator was tested for qualification. For the tests, the_ .,

specimen was bolted to a flat plate and book-end which was welded to test table. The first series of tests was resonance search with an input'of 0.25 g at two octaves per minute from 1 to 200 Hz. . Resonances found were:

s/s = 24 Hz, f/b = 26 Hz, v = 24 Hz.

36

Subsequently, the qualification tests were done with phase incoherent, biaxial, random inputs. Test response spectrum (TRS) was generated for each case using 5% damping. The TRS enveloped the RRS for each case adequately. The RRS were generated using 0.5% and 1.0% damping for OBE and

, SSE, respectively. Vibration aging was performed. There were five OBE and one'SSE level tests performed.

The stresses from the analyses are within allowables. .There were an adequate number of tests performed. The TRS and RRS comparisons;from the tests are satisfactory. However, there were 18 deficiencies recorded (too.

many to list here)-during the test. Some of them.are not relevant and easily disaosed of. But the resolution of deficiencies as reported in report No. 730.1.140 by ITT Nos. 7, 8,11, - 12,13,17 and 18 are eithe'r not complete or unsatisfactory.

Based upon the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification reports and applicant's response to our inquiries the motor operated damper is adequately qualified for Beaver Valley-2 pending satisfactory rerolution of the deficiencies above.

3.11 Fuel Oil Pressure Switch (BOP-24)

The fuel oil pressure switch (MPL No. 2EGF*PS202-2).was supplied by Colt Industries according to purchase order No. 2BV-230 and specification No. 2BVS-230. It was located at the 732 ft elevation of the diesel generator building. The mounting consisted of two 3/16-in. diameter bolts.

This item was picked as a surprise to monitor-the efficiency of the retrieval system and the completeness of the documentation retrie';ad. The documents were retrieved in due time and the documentation was found complete. However, the adequacy of the qualification- could not be verified due to limited time available for the audit.

37

4. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The review of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 will be completed when the following open items are closed.

4.1 Generic Issues 4.1.1 During the field observation, it was found that several of the equipment items did not have a model number or a serial number for identification. They, instead had a mark number put on by the utility.

This made it very difficult to establish a permanent auditable link between the field equipment and the qualification documentation. On inquiry, the applicant indicated that, in the documentation, the utility has the linkage established between the mark numbers and the model or serial numbers.

This, however, puts an extra layer of paper work between the field item and the qualification documentation and has the potential of loosing the direct traceability. Therefore, the utility should install the model or serial numbers (as the case may be) provided by the suppli,er on the equipment in the field for positive identification and traceability.

4.1.2 During the field observation of the loop stop valve protection cabinet (NSSS-15), it appeared that the clearance between this unit and the adjacent cabinets was not adequate. On inquiry, it was learned that this problem may be associated with other cabinets. Therefore, this problem of adequate clearance between adjacent cabinets should be addressed on a generic basis. The response should include the examples of resolution for typical cases.

4.1.3 The completion of the program of verification of as built loads for -

pumps and valves is to be confirmed.

4.1.4 The applicant is to inform the staff of the completion of the seismic and dynamic qualification program. The completion and confirmation must occur prior to fuel load.

38

1 4.2 Equipment Specific Issues 4.2.1 The review of the qualification documentation for the R;iR heat exchanger raised the following concerns:

(i) The appropriateness of using Bijlaard analysis for the 24 in, nozzle-shell junction stresses, (ii) Sizing calculations for the support lug welds, and (iii) The use of specified lug dimensions in the support lug-shell junction stress analysis.

The above concerns must be resolved for the RHR heat exchanger to be qualified.

4.2.2 The field observation and the review of qualification documents indicated the following issues with respect to the alternate shutdown panel (B0P-8).

(i) Finite element model used for the analysis was not authenticated, (ii) There was neither a list nor qualification of internal IE instruments, and (iii) There was no permanent auditable link between the field item and the documentation.

The qualification is pending and requires resolution of the above issues of concern.

4.2.3 The review of the qualification documentation for the motor operated damper indicated that there were a substantial number (too many to enumerate here) of anomalies detected. In some cases the acceptance criteria were changed. The applicant made an initial response to the 39

u.

anomalies at the time of the audit. However, most of these responses do not explain the reason for acceptability by the applicant.

The list of anomalies in report no. 58784 by W yle Laboratories should be resolved and the reason of the acceptability discussed in each case.

Also, the change of acceptance criteria should be justified wherever it was '

done.

4.3 Conclusion Based on our review, we conclude that, although the open issues need to be resolved, an appropriate qualification program has been defined and implemented for the seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment which will provide reasonable assurance that such equipment will function properly during and after the excitation due to the vibratory forces imposed by the safe shutdown earthquake in combination with normal operating loads.

9 I

40

LIST OF ATTENDEES R. Barry SWEC J. Beall NRC G. L. Beatty DLC G. M. Byrnes SWEC P. A. Cadena DLC J. J. Carey DLC R. Coupland . DLC E. T. Eilmann DLC D. Esielionis SWEC R. W. Fedin DLC B. S. Goff- DLC W. F. Guerin W Nuclear Safety J. Gwinn SWEC B. L. Harris EG&G Idaho, Inc.

C. Hill DLC S. Hou NRC J. A. Hultz DLC M Jafarnia DLC J. R. Kasunick DLC W. N. Kennedy SWEC Clarke Kido EG&G Idaho, Inc.

K. W. Kirkman SWEC P. M. Kolich DLC A. M. Lerczak DLC M. Lynch DLC H. Lowell Magleby EG&G Idaho, Inc.

A. S. Masciantonio NRC R. Martin DLC M. J. O'Neill DLC V. C. Ruppert DLC W. R. Rutherford DLC N. Sacco SWEC J. N. Singh EG&G Idaho, Inc.

t G. B. Skinner DLC H. Stromberg EG&G Idaho, Inc.

J. D. Sutton SWEC G. L. Thinnes EG&G Idaho, Inc.

J. P. Thomas DLC R. Urban NRC L. P. Williams DLC K. W. Woessner DLC T. J. Zogimann DLC 4

41

v., a.. .

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acroa=:

/g,'- BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET EGG-EA-7498 sie INsTavCrsONS o rat atvEast J 40.vtSt.NK 2 f tTLt .No sve fitte

. o.n awoar co uno BEAVER VALLEY-2 SQRT REPORT oo=1a E.a l

December 1986

• au'aoa* 6 o.Teatroate55uto "oa'a ^"

J. N._ Singh, B. L. Harris, G. L. Thinnes l 1086 December

. ,noact,1.sa oaa v=,i nv ta 1.ta.oa.i coas.~.a.1,o==..t.=o ..u a .oo.Es ,, . eec ,

EGAG Idaho, Inc. . ... on oa 1 =v ta P.O. Box 1625 A6415

• Idaho Falls, ID 83415_

s t. f vPS OF atPoaf

?0 $7oN5oa*NG OaG.=*z.Tio= N..t .No ..ekt4G .contSS traesvale cs.s Division of Pressurized Water Reactor Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,_,,,,,,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 t

02 SUPPLE.647.av NOf ts i3 857 4.cf s/00 w.res se 'esst EG&G ' Idaho, Inc., is assisting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in evaluating Duquesne Light Company's program for dynamic qualification of safety related electrical and mechanical equipment for the Beaver Valley Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2. Applicants are required to use test or analysis or a combination of both to qualify equipment, such that its safety function will be ensured The review,

'during and after the dynamic event, and provide documentation.

when completed, will indicate whether an appropriate qualification program has been defined and implemented for seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment which will provide reasonable assurance that such equipment will function properly during and after the excitation due to vibratory forces of the dynamic event.

. . oceu.. ,, .~. . .. . .t. oao,o uca...oa, ,5 .,.,.g.s' ~0n 1 y is specifically approved by NRC , l 3rogram office j is secumirv ct.ssis:c.rio%

t ra. ,.,

. .ot 7,..laszoet~ tweto rta.: Unclassified iv. ro Ifnclassified i, ..Eao...ots is ea,ct

new y" I J+ .. < 5 s + n. 3 i

DO NOT PRINT THESE INSTRUCTIONS AS A PAGE IN THE NUREG REPORT INSTRUCTIONS NRC FORM JJS,818LIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET,15 BASED ON GUIDELINES FOR FORMAT AND PRODUCTION OF SCIENTI AVAILA8LE FROM AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE,1430 AND TECHNICAL REPORTS, ANSI Z39.18-1974 BROADWAY, NEW YORK, NY 10018. EACH SEPARATELY 80UND REPORT-FOR EXAMPLE, EACH VOLUME IN A MULT SET-SHALL HAVE ITS UN4QUE BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET. s

10. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION. List NRC Division, Office,

1. REPORT NUM8ER. Each individually bound report shall U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Weshington,0C 20555.

carry a unique siphanumefiC des gnetton (NUREG) assigned by the Division of Technical information and Oocument 11, s. TYPE OF REPORT. State draf t, final, preliminary, topical. .

Control, ADM, in accordance with American Netional technical, regulatory, quarterly, etc., and, if applicable, Standard ANSI Z39.23-1974, Technical Report Number inclussve detes.

(STRN). Use uppercase letters Arabic numerals, slashes, and t hyphens only, as in the following exampfes. NUREG-0100, l NUREG/CP-0010, NUREG/CR.0100, and NUREG/8R-0010. b. PERIOD COVERED.

For reports in a series add Vol., Supp., Revision, and Addendum, when necessary. Add contractor cross-reference 12. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. Enter information not included elsewhere but usef ul, such as: Propered in cooperation with . ,

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report supersedes or supplements the older report.

2. TITLE AND SU8 TITLE. Titie should indicate clearly and briefly the subtect (coverage) of the report; including any subtitle to the main title. When a report is prepared in more 13. ASSTRACT. Include a brief (200 words or less) factual sum-than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number mary of the most significant information contained in the and include subtitle for the specific volume. Use upper and report. If the report contains a significant bibliography or literature survey or multiple volumes, mention it here. Abstract lower case letters, but capitalize computer code names. Do not use acronyms and initialisms in titles, may be odded in is to be propered by author or protect manager.

parenthesis.

14. DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

3. LEAVE BLANK,

s. KEY WORDS/DESCRiPTORS. Select from the Energy DATE REPORT COMPLETED. Each report shall carry a date Data Base Sublect Thesaurus DOE / TIC.700R R S, the 4,

meticating month and year protect / task completed proper authors 2ed terms that identify the major concept of the research and are sufficiently specific and precise to be used as index entries for catalogmg.

5. AUTHOR (S). Gae game (s) in conventional order le g., John R Doe J. Robert Doe) List author s af filiation if it is differ.

ent from the performing organization. b. IDENTIFIERS AND OPEN. ENDED TERMS Use identi-fiers for project names, code names, equipment designators, DATE REPORT ISSUED. Each report shall carry a date etc. Use open-ended (keywords) terms written in descriptor 6.

indicating month and year published.

form 114a) for those subsects for which no descriptor exists in the thesaurus.

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS. Give name, street, city, stare, and ZIP code. 15. AVAILA84LITY STATEMENT, Denote public releasability, List no more than two levels of an organizational hierarchy. for example " unlimited, or limitation for reasons other Display the name of the organization enactly as follows. than security.

Division, Office, Organization or Government agency, and

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. Enter U.S. Security Classifi-address cation in accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e.,

8. PROJECT / TASK / WORK UNIT NUMBER. Use the project, unclassified).

task and work unit numbers under which the report was prepared lit any) 17. NUMSER OF PAGES. Leave blank. (Added by NTISI 4 1'

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under n'uch report was prepared I #

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