ML20214R233
| ML20214R233 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1987 |
| From: | Magleby H, Trojovsky M EG&G IDAHO, INC., IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214R230 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-6415 EGG-NTA-7624, NUDOCS 8706080036 | |
| Download: ML20214R233 (77) | |
Text
___
1 i .
EGG-NTA-7624 April 1987 l
- INFORMAL REPORT l
- 3. ;
3 4 Idaho ~- .
National- AUDIT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-Engineering. . RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT FOR THE BEAVER VALLEY Laboratory _ POWER STATION UNIT 2 l
Managed .
by th_e U.S.
Department. _,
H. Tro3ovsky l NEnergy l ; H. L. Magleby l
4
~i !
1 l
f I
+
9 4
'T; ;
U (q EGsG,- <
Prepared for the coE c-ee U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION No. DE.ACG7 MID015?O 8706080036 87d420 PDR ADOCK 05000412 A
_ S.N , <
L._ . .___ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _
3
. j DISCLAIMER This book was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, not any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or impled, or assumes any legal habihty or responsibihty for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not intnnge pnvately owned nghts. References herein to any specific commercal product, process, or service by trace name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessanly constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favonog by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and ooinions of authors expressed herein do not necessardy state or reflect those of the Uruted States Govemment or any agency thereof.
as i __ .
. q EGG-NTA-7624 4
^
AUDIT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT FOR THE BEAVER VALLEY POWER. STATION UNIT 2 Docket No. 50-412 Hi L. Magleby M. Trojovsky .
Published April 1987 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory EG&G Idaho, Inc.
.. d l
Prepared for the ,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission q Washington, D.C; 20555 <
Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 1 Fin No. A6415 l
L 4
ABSTRACT i..
The Beaver Valley ' Power Station Unit 2 was audited to determine the environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment.
Results of the audit are summarized in this report.
1 -
m >
4 i
4 I
t
-t i
i i
i i
}
a f
1 4
f.
, 11 i
s b'
, , - - - ., , , ,.r.. ,, w, ,n,., , m . . , . . , ,, e,,. ,.,n. -en., -e ,-e-- n..- , - ~ < , - ,~,- --.- - - -- e- e , ~ - , - -
SUMMARY
An audit of the environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment for the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 was conducted by a team comprised of representatives of the NRR and I&E Support
- Branch of EG&G Idaho, Inc., and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. Deficiencies, and resolutions to these deficiencies, found during
~
the pre-audit review are provided in Appendix A. Summaries of the central file review are provided in Appendix B. As a result of the audit it was concluded that when the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 resolves the concerns noted in this report, their electrical qualification program will be complete and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49.
4 3
t iii
i' FOREWORD' This report is supplied as part of the " Equipment Qualification Case i- Reviews" being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Pressurized Water Reactors Licensing-A, Electrical Instrumentation and Control System Branch, by EG&G -
1
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under the authorization, B&R 20-19-40-41-2.
I 1
i 2
i i
+
4 i
4 l iv
CONTENTS 1
l ABSTRACT .............................................................. 11
SUMMARY
............................................................... iii
. FOREWORD .............................................................. iv
- 1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1-
- 2. BACKGROUND ....................................................... 2
- 3. PURPOSE .......................................................... 3
- 4. -SCOPE ............................................................ 4
- 5. EVALUATION ....................................................... 5
- 6. CONCLUSION ....................................................... 12
- 7. REFERENCES ........................................................ 13 APPENDIX A--BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT 2 ENVIRONMENTAL I
QUALIFICATION SUBMITTAL REVIEW'...................................- A-1 APPENDIX B--
SUMMARY
OF THE CENTRAL FILE REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1 i
1 4
P 4
i 4
I
)
i 3
a e
e 1
i f.
Y A
, V I
i i
4
, , - - .e-. r-w , ---*= ,- - - , - .y ,mw, - - , , .,- , -- - , - r ==4 ,e
AUDIT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT FOR THE BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT 2
- 1. INTRODUCTION
- Equipment which is used to perform a necessary safety function must be demonstrated to be capable of maintaining functional operability under all service conditions postulated to occur during its installed life for the time it is required to operate. This requirement, which is embodied in General Design Criteria 1 and 4 of Appendix A and Sections III, XI, and XVII of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, is applicable to equipment located inside as well as outside containment. More detailed requirements and guidance relating to the methods and procedures for demonstrating this
- capability have been set forth in 10 CFR 50.49, " Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," and NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment" (References 1 and 2). This NUREG supplements IEEE Standards 323-1971 and 323-1974 (References 3 and 4), and various NRC Regulating Guides and industry standards.
On November 18-20, 1986, a team comprised of representatives of the NRR and I&E Support Branch of EG&G Idaho, Inc., and the NRC staff conducted dn audit of the environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment for the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2. The work effort consisted of: (a) a pre-audit review of the licensee's submittal (Reference 5), (b) an audit of the licensee's central files for selected equipment items, and (c) an on-site visual inspection of the equipment items for which the central files were audited. Deficiencies, and resolutions to these deficiencies, found during the pre-audit review are provided in Appendix A. Summaries of tFe central file review are provided in Appendix B.
l
, 1 1
, .. . ~
1 l
l
- 2. BACKGROUND NUREG-0588 was issued in December 1979 to promote a more orderly and systematic implementation of equipment qualification programs by the industry and to provide guidance to the NRC staff for its use in ongoing licensing reviews. The positions contained in NUREG-0588 provide guidance .
on (a) how to establish environmental service conditions, (b) how to select methods which are considered appropriate for qualifying equipment in different areas of the plant, and (c) other specific topics such as margin, aging, and documentation.
In February 1980 the NRC requested certain near-term Operating License (OL) applicants to review and evaluate the environmental qualification documentation for each item of safety-related electrical equipment and to identify the degree to which their qualification programs comply with the staff positions discussed in NUREG-0588. IE Bulletin 79-018 " Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment," issued January 14, 1980, and its supplements dated February 29, September 30, and October 24, 1980, established environmental qualification requirements for operating reactors. This bulletin and its supplements were provided to OL applicants for consideration in their review. A final rule on environmental qualification of electrical equipment important to safety for nuclear power plants became effective on February 22, 1983. This rule, Section 50.49 of 10 CFR part 50, specifies the requirements to be met for demonstrating the environmental qualification of electrical equipment important to safety located in a harsh environment. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.49, the electrical equipment at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 may be qualified to the acceptance criteria specified in Category 2 of NUREG-0588.
The qualification requirements for mechanical equipment are principally contained in Appendix A and 8 of 10 CFR 50. The qualification ,
methods defined in NUREG-0588 can also be applied to mechanical equipment.
2
- 3. PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to evaluate the adequacy of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 environmental qualification program for electrical equipment important to safety as defined in 10 CFR 50.49. A discussion of open items, as well as any unresolved issues, is provided in this report.
e e
3
- - . _ _ - . -. . .__. = _ . . . . - . .. - . - . - - . -
G i
- 4. SCOPE The scope of this report includes an evaluation of the completeness of the list of equipment to be qualified, the criteria which they must meet, the environments in which they must function, and an assessment of the-qualification documentation for the equipment. The principal area of
!- review was the qualification of safety-related equipment which must function in order to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a loss of
- of containment, while subjected to the harsh environments associated with l these accidents. It is limited to electrical equipment important to safety l within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
l 1 ,
k a
q .
j l
I l
l 1
-l 1
I i
t 4
1._._._ . _ . . - _ - - _ . _ _ . .- _ - - . . _ - - - . _ _ . , . _ , , _ , . _ , _ . _ _ _ . , . . _ _ . ,. ___ _., _ ,. _ - - . , , . - _ - _ . - . . . _ ,
- 5. EVALUATION The evaluation of the applicant's environmental qualification program included an on-site examination of electrical equipment, a review of the qualification documentation for these components, and a review of the applicant's Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Report (EQ submittal) for completeness and acceptability of systems and components, qualification methods, and accident environments. The criteria described in NUREG-0800, Revision 2, Section 3.11 (Reference 6), NUREG-0588, Category 2, and Regulatory Guide 1.89, Revision 1 (Reference 7), form the basis for the evaluation of the adequacy of the applicant's qualification program.
An audit of the applicant's qualification documentation on selected equipment and a visual inspection of this equipment was performed by the staff on November 18-20, 1986. The audit consisted of a review of ten files (four by the NRC staff and six by EG&G Idaho) containing equipment qualification docamentation. The staff's findings during the audit are discussed in detail in Section 5.4 and in Appendix B of this Technical Evaluation Report (TER).
5.1 Completeness of Equipment Important to Safety The applicant was directed to (a) establish a list of systems and components that are required to prevent or mitigate a LOCA or HELB and (b) identify components needed to perform the function of safety-related display instrumentation, post-accident sampling and monitoring, and radiation monitoring.
Based upon information in the applicant's EQ submittal, systems and components included in the applicant's EQ program are those required to achieve and support: (a) emergency reactor shutdown, (b) containment isolation, (c) reactor core cooling, (d) containment heat removal, (e) core residual heat removal, and (f) prevention of significant release of radioactive material to the environment.
5 t
I Also supplied in the applicant's EQ submittal were those components that are needed to perform the function of safety-related display instrumentation, post-accident sampling and monitoring, and radiation monitoring (i.e., those components required to meet the guidelines of Regulator Guide 1.97, Reference 8). Note: BVS2 has taken exception to the accumulator tank level and pressure requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97.
This is considered an open item (Reference 9) in regard to the applicant's conformance to Pegulatory Guide 1.97. Also, because of the extreme temperatures predicted in the zones affected by the new mass / energy release calculations, alternate methods may have to be established to monitor some of the parameters required by Regulatory Guide 1.97.
5.2 Qualification Methods 5.2.1 Electrical Equipment in a Harsh Environment Detailed procedures for qualifying safety-related electrical equipment in a harsh environment are defined in NUREG-C588. The criteria in NUREG-0588 are also applicable to other equipment important to safety as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 paragraphs B(2) and B(3). Type testing of equipment in a sequence consisting of pre-aging, seismic and dynamic loading, and exposure to LOCA/HELB conditions is the preferred method of qualification.
5.3 Service Conditions NUREG-0588 defines the methods to be utilized for determining the environmental conditions associated with loss of coolant accidents or high ,
energy line breaks inside or outside of containment. The analytical ,
methods used by the applicant to postulate environmental conditions were still under review by the NRC staff at the time of the on-site audit. The qualification documentation has been reviewed to ensure that the ,
qualification conditions envelop the specified conditions established by the applicant as presented in their EQ submittal.
6
5.3.1 Temperature, pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside the primary Containment The applicant provided the LOCA/HELB profiles used for equipment qualification. There are three harsh environmental zones located inside containment. The peak values resulting from these profiles are as follows: temperature, 333*F, pressure, 59.4 psia; and relative humidity, 100%/ steam.
5.3.2 Temperature, Pre' are, and Humidity Conditions Outside the Primary Containment The applicant has provided the temperature, pressure and humidity conditions associated with normal / abnormal operation, and, high and moderate energy line breaks outside the containment. See Table A-1 for a summary of the peak environments resulting from these postulated events.
Because of the extreme temperature predicted in zone HMV-773 (535*F),
the methodology incorporated by the applicant to address the concerns of IEIN 84-90 can best be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. The summary of files 2BV-67, 2BV-92, 2BV-312, and 001/ESE-01A, found in Appendix B of this TER, present a case-by-case review of the impact of superheated steam on the qualification of the applica' ole components in these files.
As a result of the review of these files and a reassessment performed by DLC personnel, it was found that alternate methods may have to be established to monitor some of the parameters required by Regulatory Guide 1.97. Because of this, it is recommended that OLC resubmit their Regulatory Guide 1.97 submittal in order for the NRC staff to approve these alternate methods.
O 7
i
5.3.3 Submergence ,
The flood level inside the containment that would result from a LOCA/HELB has been established by the applicant to be 15 ft 2 in. Flood levels resulting from a HELB/MELB outside containment have also been established by the applicant. See Table A-1 of this TER for a summary of the flood levels established by the applicant in the various zones outside ,
containment. In all cases the applicant has evaluated the flood elevation 4 and the component elevation. The result of this evaluation is presented on the applicant's System Component Evaluation Worksheets (SCEW sheets).
. Where components may be submerged and the component is not qualified for j submergence, the consequences of the component failure is documented in the SCEW sheet summary section associated with each EQ file.
5.3.4 Aging 1
The aging requirements for Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 electrical equipment are defined in Section 4, Category 2 of NUREG-0588.
For valve operators and motors, the degrading influences of temperature, radiation, vibration, and mechanical stresses should be i considered and included in the aging program. This requires the j establishment of a qualified life and maintenance and replacement schedules l based on the findings, iI
- For other equipment, the qualification programs should address aging j only to the extent that equipment that is composed, in part, of materials i susceptible to aging effects should be identified, and a schedule for
! periodically replacing the equipment and/or materials should be established, i .
5.3.5 Radiation (Inside and Outside Containment)
The applicant has provided values for the radiation levels postulated to exist following a LOCA. The application and methodology employed by the
- applicant to determine these values are those methods found in NUREG-0588.
8 i
The maximum value postulated for inside containment, based on 40 years i normal operation and one year post-DBA operation, is 3.4 x 107 rads TID 8
gamma and 1.7 x 10 rads TID beta.
Outside containment, values ranging from 3 x 10 3 to 2 x 108 rads gamma TID have been specified; for use in qualifying components. One zone, 8
zone HAB25-37, has 3 x 10 rads TID specified, however, no components in the applicant's EQ program are located in this zone. See Table A-1 for a 3 summary of the TIDs established by the applicant for those zones' outside containment.
5.3.6 Containment Soray Chemical spray is used for containment heat removal following a design basis accident. The composition of this spray has been specified by the applicant to be 2000 ppm boron with NaOH to maintain a pH between 8.5 to 10.5.
5.4 Environmental Oualification Audit An audit was conducted of the applicant's qualification documentation and installed equipment on November 18-20, 1986. Ten files were reviewed (four by NRC personnel and six by EG&G personnel) to determine if the test data and analysis in the files supported the qualification status determined by the applicant.
The following files were reviewed during the on-site audit:
- 1. File No. 001/ESE-01A, Barton Transmitter, Model 763, Component Id. 2 MSS *PT474.
- 2. File No. 001/ESE-06, RDF Corp RTD, Model 21205, Component Id.
2RCS*TE410.
9 l
- 3. File No. 001/ESE-42A,-Minco RTD, Model S8809, Component Id.
2RCS*TE1317.
- 4. File No. 001/HE-02/5, Asco Solenoid Valve, Model 2063816RF, Component Id. 2063816RF, and Model NP831654E, Component Id.
2CHS*S0V200A1.
- 5. File No. 001/HE-08, Conax Connector, Model N11007,. Component Id.
2CONAX*HE08-1.
- 6. File No. 2BV-24, Westinghouse Pump Motor, Model 5009, Component Id. 2QSS*P21A.
- 7. File No. 28V-67, Limitorque Actuator, Model SMB-000, Component i Ids. 2CCP*MOV118'and 2HCS*MOV113A.
- 8. File No. 2BV-92, Borg Warner Valve Actuator, Model 38878-3, Component Id. 2FWS*HYV157A.
, and Splices, Component Ids. 2NKZ-23 and 2 SPLICE *312.
i'
- 10. File No. 2BV-635A, Fluid Components Inc. Level Indicator,
, Model 8-66MA, Component Id. 2RSS*LE151A.
i j- During the course of the on-site audit, many concerns were brought to
) the attention of the applicant regarding the test data and analysis used in their files to establish qualification. In all but one case these concerns were resolved during the on-site audit. However, recurring problems were encountered by the NRC audit team members in determining the criteria the applicant was incorporating in establishing a component'.s susceptibility and/or qualification to spray and submergence. Because this problem occurred in four of the ten files reviewed (items 6, 8, 9 and 10 above),
. the applicant was directed to review all of their files to address this i concern.
i l
i 10'
As stated earlier, there was only on case where a concern was raised and not resolved. This case occurred in the review of File No. 2BV-92, the file that establishes qualification for the Borg Warner Valve Actuator (item 8 above). It was determined that there was insufficient evidence in the test report to establish qualification for this actuator under spray conditions. ,
Appendix B contains summaries of the central file review performed by EG&G personnel. These summaries present an in-depth discussion on the concerns raised during the on-site audit including the resolution (if any) to these concerns.
Prior to the on-site audit, approximately 700 SCEW sheets were reviewed along with the methodology incorporated by the applicant to comply to 10 CFR 50.49 and ancillary standards. Many concerns were noted as a result of this review. For the most part these concerns were addressed by the applicant during the course of the on-site. The concerns noted during this review along with the resolution to these concerns can be found in Appendix A of this TER.
5.5 Outstanding Equipment The applicant is required to have all safety-related equipment qualified by the time their permit for fuel load is issued. As of the time of the on-site audit, the applicant identified 14 files that needed some additional documentaticn to support qualification for the components covered in the files. See Appendix A for a summary of the qualification status of the various files in the applicant's EQ program.
S 11 l
l
- 6. CONCLUSION The electrical equipment environmental qualification program for the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 has been reviewed. The review has included the systems and components selected for qualification, the -
environmental conditions resulting from design basis accidents, the methods used for qualification, and the documentation for specific items of
- equipment.
In conclusion, pending the satisfactory completion of the following corrective actions, compliance to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 and relevant parts of General Design Criteria 1 and 4 of Appendix A;Section III, XI, and XVII of Appendix B,10 CFR 50.49; and the criteria specified in NUREG-0588, can be assured.
- 1. The outstanding items identified during the on-site audit by the staff are resolved,
- 2. The outstanding items identified by the staff in the applicant's submittal are resolved, and
- 3. Full qualification status is obtained for all equipment items in the applicant's EQ program.
4 12
- 7. REFERENCES
- 1. " Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50.49, February 22, 1983.
- 2. Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment, NUREG-0588, Revision 1.
- 3. IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, IEEE Standard 323-1971.
- 4. IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Genarating Stations, IEEE Standard 323-1974.
- 5. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Report, Revision 2, September 1986.
- 6. " Environmental Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment, Revision 2," Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Section 3.11, July 1981.
, 7. " Environmental Qualification of Certain Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1," U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.89, June 1984.
- 8. " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident, i
Revision 2," U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97, December 1980.
- 9. Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Beaver Valley Power Station. Unit No. 2, EGG-EA-6865, November 1985.
l 3
I 13
0 e
APPENDIX A BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT 2 EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION SUBMITTAL REVIEW e
6 e
l
CONTENTS A-1
SUMMARY
OF BEAVER VALLEY 2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-6 A-2
SUMMARY
OF BEAVER VALLEY 2 COMPONENT EVALUATIONS (IN HARSH ZONES) ........................................................... A-10 -
A-3
SUMMARY
OF BEAVER VALLEY 2 COMPONENT EVALUATIONS (IN MILD ZONES) ........................................................... A-29
- 3 i
l i
A-ii
APPENDIX A BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT 2 EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION SUBMITTAL REVIEW One of the purposes of this report is to summarize the review that has been performed, as to date, on the Beaver Valley Power Station-Unit 2 l
. (BVS2) Equipment Qualification of Electrical Equipment (EQ) program. This report provides both a brief history and the current status of the review along with any unresolved issues and the positions of the the applicant and the NRC staff where any unresolved issues are present.
On May 28, 1986, EG&G Idaho, received Duquesne Light's EQ Submittal.
The text of this submittal was reviewed in order to determine the applicant's methodology in achieving compliance to 10 CFR 50.49 and current NRC staff positions. As a result of the review many concerns were raised regarding the applicant's submittal and a meeting was scheduled to discuss ,
these concerns in Bethesda on July 1, 1986.
On September 25, 1986, Revision 1 of BVS2's EQ Submittal, dated September, 1986, was received. Along with the submittal the applicant supplied notes of the meeting that was held in July. In these notes the applicant presented their positions on the status of their response. After a review of (a) these positions, (b) the revised submittal (which also covered approximately 1/2 of the SCEW sheets), (c) 2BVM-114, and (d) telephone conversations with NRC and Duquesne Light personnel, it can be concluded that the applicant's methodology in achieving compliance to 10 CFR 50.49 is sound provided that the unresolved concerns of this review ,
are addressed by the applicant. It should be noted here that this review points out concerns that were raised during the review of the applicant's
, EQ submittal. Concerns raised during the on-site audit can be found in the f main body and Appendix B of this report. BVS2 has committed to the
. NUREG-0588 Category 2 guidelines to establish the requirements for qualification tests and analysis performed on the electrical equipment. !
f A-1 l
i
Applicant's Concern Status Reviewer's Status Margins Resolved The reviewer was under the impression that the purpose of the design envelope was to account for margin. A review of the
- accident specific profiles and cursory review of the SCEW sheets indicates that -
the appitcant is applying margin not at the
- point in establishing the parameters but at '
the point of determining whether a test i profile envelops the design profile.
- Conclusion--Resolved.
Master List Resolved Concern--There is no auditable link between i
the Master List and NSSS SCEW sheets and/or i' files. This concern was resolved by providing a separate listing of'the NSSS supplied components by file number, in the SCEW sheet section of the submittal, i
Concern--The Master List fails to show the installation and qualification status, and category of each component.
Conclusion--Unresolved. Concern--Many
- instances can be found where pertinent I
information such as the type of component, manufacturer, vendor, and location, is i missing from the Master List. To resolve this concern the applicant stated that these types of deficiencies may indeed exist for those components that are not considered fully qualified, and that these deficiencies are identified and corrected during the course of qualifying each separate component.
Normal Resolved Using the normal average temperature may Average not be an acceptable means of establishing i
Temperature the qualified life.
Conclusion--Unresolved.
NSSS 1 Hour Resolved Applicant should also provide the BOP Time Margin supplied components that have less than the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> minimum time margin (if any) and the
- justification for these components. .
i Conclusion--To be resolved. Applicant is to provide justifications for components with less than a 100 day demonstrated -
1 post-accident operability time.
Beta Reduction Resolved The applicant is using three different levels of addressing this concern:
(a) calculating equivalent beta and gamma A-2
P doses from the demonstrated TIDs of tested equipment, (b) component analysis in the form of the components' susceptibility to beta radiation,.and (c) none. During the course of the on-site audit new calculations were presented to the NRC staff with the results of the combined gamma and beta TID being approximately 8 8 2 x 10 rads (2.04 x 10 rads).
Conclusion--Resolved.
IE Bulletin / Resolved With the possible exception of BVS2's Notice response to IEIN 84-23, and pending the Documentation NRC's acceptance review of BVS2's response to IEIN 84-90, it can be concluded that this item is resolved.
The applicant has identified the environmental conditions resulting from various postulated design basic accidents (OBA) which include the following:
o LOCA and MSLB inside containment, o HELB (including a MSLB) and MELB outside containment.
o Non LOCA events which result in higher than normal radiation levels.
Table A-1 is a summary of the environmental conditions estabitshed by the applicant by zone. The main reference for Table A-1 is Table B.1 of.
Appendix B of the applicant's EQ Submittal. Not all zones from Table B.1 appear on Table A-1. If no Class IE components were in a zone on Table B.1, then the no zone will appear on Table A-1. If the zone from Table B.1 was considered " mild" and had no spray or submergence potential, then again, the zone will not appear on Table A-1.
Prior to the on-site audit approximately 1/2 the SCEW sheets supplied in Revision 1 of the applicant's EQ submittal were reviewed to ensure that the applicant had supplied the information recommended in Appendix E of Regulatory Guide 1.89. During this review the following items were also checked: (a) the accuracy of the specified parameters found on the SCEW A-3
s, L
sheets with those found in Appendix A of the EQ submittal, (b) the accuracy of the information found on the master' list and that which was found on the
,t SCEV sheets regarding pertinent information such as component id., type, manufacturer, model, and component location, (c) the proper assignment of
~
Regulatory Guide 1.89 Appendix E categories, and (d) the methodology employed by the applicant in~ addressing tne concerns of IEIN 84-90 on a case-by-case basis. Table A-2 is a summary of this review by BVS2 file ,
number.
As a result of the above revfew only one major area of concern was raised. The methodology incorporated in the assignment of Regulatory Guide 1.89 Appendix E cctegories resulted at times with inconsistencies in this assignment and at other times the category assignment was actually wrong in the nonconservative direction (i.e., Category A components had Category B or C assigned to them). During the course of the on-site audit evidence was presented to the reviewer that indicated that DLC personnel had recognized this area of concern and were-in the process of correcting it.
Although possible, it was rather time consuming to evaluate the impact of superheat on the individual components from the SCEW sheets. In general components that are sffected by superhe'at fall into one of two groups:
those that are locateo in zone'HMV-773, and those that that are located in the Service and Auxiliary Buildings. Within the first group there are
'again two subgroups of components: those that-are required to operate to-mitigate the effects of the MSLB inside zone HMV-773, and those that.are not required to mitigate the effects of a MSLB inside zone HMV-773 but are required to operate under other postulated events. All of those components located in the Service and Auxiliary Buildings are not required to function i
to mitigate the affects of a MSLB.in,their respective zones,~however, are-required for other postulated events.
6 For environmental qualification purposes Stone & Webster stated in the ,
applicant's submittal that for those components that are not required to function during a MSLB in their respective zones, the profiles-that were i
f i
f L.
A * ,K h!
previcusly generated using the old Westinghouse mass / energy releases (which results in less superheat temperatures) envelop all known profiles resulting from'any other postulated event. All qualification profiles of the affected components were then evaluated against these old specified profiles with the result being that all components were qualified to the
- old specified profiles and, therefore, qualified to any other postulated event.
Although the reviewer reluctantly finds this approach to be acceptable, it is felt that it would be better if new profiles were generated based on a spectrum of breaks that exclude the effects of the MSLB to more accurately depict the accident conditions resulting from these other accidents.
In order to satisfy the concerns of IEIN 85-39 (auditability of licensee's equipment qualification files) concurrently with providing the suggested information called for in Regulatory Guide 1.89 Appendix E Paragraph 5, it is recommended that instead of the peak parameters that are presently depicted on the SCEW sheets, that'(a) for those components that are not required to function for MSLBs in their respective zones, the actual peak parameters of the accidents for which the components are required to function be presented on the SCEW sheet in order to provide the ability to verify these components being qualified for the "other" postulated events, and (b) for those components that are required to function for MSLBs in HMV-773, the actual temperature the component will be required to operate under at the completion of its required safety function, or the peak temperature in this specified time frame, be given on the SCEW sheet in order to provide the ability to verify that these components can function to the completion of their safety function.
1 As discussed with DLC personnel during the on-site audit, although )
apparently already performed, the submittal needs to document the technical l i
justifications that show compliance to Regulatory Guide 1.89 Paragraphs C.4.(2),(3), and (4), and Appendix E Paragraph 4.d.
I 1
A-5
TABLE A-1.
SUMMARY
OF DEAVER VALLEY 2's ENVIRONMENTAL CONOITIONS BY ZONE 40 Yea r No rma l +
Tempe ra tu re Pressure 1 year post-DBA Subme rgence Bu i ld ino/A rea Zone ("Fl fosial (Rads 1 Humidity .,_$ntgy__ Eleva t ion /Repth Auxi l ia ry Buildina EL 710'-6" HAB6-72 190 Mild IE7 Camma 100 -Potential 711'-05"/O'-11" HAB6-74 190 Mild 1E7 Camma 100 Potential 711'-05"/O'-11" EL 718'-6" llAB1-76B 160 Mild 1E7 Camma 100 Potential N/A HAB2-76 250 Mild IE7 Camma 100 Potential 719'-02" O'-08" HAB26-19 220 Mild IE7 Camma 100 Potential 719'-02" O'-08" HAB3-76 245 Mild 1E7 Camma 100 Potential 719'-02" O'-08" HAB4-21 204 Mild IE7 Camma 100 Potential N/A EL 735'-6" HAB10-42 280 Mild 3F6 Gamma 100 Potential N/A HAB11-77 125 Mild IE6 Camma 100 Potential. 735'-10"/0'-04" HAB18-42 .280 Mild 3E6 Camma 100' Potential 735'-10"/0'-04" HAB19-43 280 Mild 3E6 Camma 100 Potential N/A EL 735'-6" HAB8-77 130 Mild 1E6 Camma .100 Potential 735'-10" O'-04" HAB9-77 230 Mild 1E6 Camma 100 Potential 735'-10" O'-04"-
HABCP-C 150 Mild IE7 Camma 100 Potential 736'-05" O'-11" EL 755'-6" l!AB12-47 130 Mild Mild 100 Potential 756'-01" O'-07" HAB12-48 130 Mild Mild 100 Potential 756'-01" O'-07" HAB12-53 130 Mild 3E6 Camma 100- Potential 756'-01" O'-07" HAB12-78 130 Mild IE6 Camma 100 Potential 756'-01" O'-07" 3* MAB12MCC Mild Hild Mild Mild Potential N/A
$n EL 773'-6" HAB27-79 MSLB 265 Mild Mila 100 Potential 733'-11"/O'-05" Others 125 HAB28-81 MSLB 265 Mild Mild 100 Potential 774'-03"/O'-09" Others 125 HAB29-79 MSLB 265 Mild Mild 100 Potential 773'-11"/O'-05" Others 125 HAB29-80 MSLB 265 . Mild Hild 100 Potential 773'-11"/O'-05" Others 125 MAB-VENT Mild Mild Hild Mild Potential 773'-11"/O'-05" North Cable &
Relay Area of the Aux i l ia ry Buildina EL 735'-6". HCV755 Mild Mild IE6 Camma Mild N/A 735'-08"/0'-02" EL 755'-6" HCV-ASPR Mild Mild 1E5 Camma Mild N/A 755'-08"/O'-02" HCV755 Mild ' Mild IE6 Camma Mild N/A 755'-07"/O'-01" Cont rol Buildina l EL 735'-6" MCB735A Mild Mild- Mild Mild Potential 736'-02"/O'-08"
J TABLE A-1. (continued) 40 Yea r No rma l +
Tempera ture Pressure 1 yea r post-DBA . Subme rgence Bu i ld i na/A rea Zone (*F1 fosial (Rads) Humidity So rav . Elevation / Death Cable Vaults'
& Rod Control Buildina EL 718'-6" HCV-ACUG Mild Mild SE6 Comma Mild Potential 719'-06"/1'-00" HPT718CA 180 Mild S E6 Ga mma . 100 Potential 719'-01" O'-07" HPT718SA 220 Mild IE8 Gamma 100 ' Potential 719'-04" O'-10" EL 735'-6" HCV735 Mild Mild 1E6 Gamma Mild N/A 735'-08" O'-02" EL 755'-6" HCV755 Mild Mild IE6 Gamma Mild N/A 755'-07" O'-01" EL 773'-6" HCV773 Mild Mild IE6 Gamma 100 N/A. 773'-08" O'-02" Diesel Gene ra to r Buildina EL 732'-6" MDG-ALL Mild Mild Mild Mild Potential 733'-03"/O'-09" -
Fuel Buildino EL 729'-6" HFBFPPC Mild Mild 2E6 Gamma Mild Potential 730'-08"/1'-02" EL 735'-9" HFBGEN Mild Mild. 2E4 Gamma Mild Potential- N/A 3E3 Beta i nta ke St ruct u re MITALL-A Mild Mild Mild Mild Potential Evaluated on a case-by-case basis i
Main Steam Valve Area EL 773'-6" HMV-773 MSLB 535 Mild SE6 Gamma 100 Potential 773'-09"/O'-03" Others 327 Containment Buildino EL 692'-11" HRC-ICW .MSLB 333 59.4 8E7 Gamma 100 2000 ppm 708'-01"/15'-2" LOCA 270 1.5E8 Beta Boron pH=10.5 HRC-0CW Same Same 2E7 Gamma Same same 708'-01"/15'-2" 1.5E8 Beta
f TABLE A-1. (continued) 40 Yea r No rma l +
Tempe ra tu re Pressure 1 year post-DBA Subme rgence Building / Area Zone f*F1 _1gslai_ (Rads 1 flueldity Sp rav Elevation /Deoth EL 718'-06" HRC-PENA Same Sa me 2E7 Gamma Same Same N/A 1.5E8 Beta Se rvico Building EL 730'-6" MSB730GA Mild Mild Mild Mild N/A 730'-10"/0'-04" EL 745'-6" HSB745-6 MSLB 230 Mild Mild 100 Potential 745'-10"/O'-04" Others Hild EL 760'-6" HS8760-6 MSLB 230 Mild Mild 100 Potential 760'-10"/O'-04" Others Mild EL 780'-6" HSB780-6 HSLB 450 21 1E4 Gamma 100 Potential 781'-08"/1'-02" Others 340 27 1E5 Beta Sa fegua rds Buildinq oo EL 692'-6" HSG-RSSD Mild M!1d 2E8 Gamma Mild Potential Evaluated on a case-by-case to EL 769'-0" basis EL 718'-6" HSG718HE Mild Mifd IE6 Comma Mild Potential 719'-05" O'-11" HSG718NW Mild Hild IE6 Gamma Mild Potential 719'-05" 0'-11" HSG718SE Mild Mild IE6 Gamma Mild- Potential 719'-06" 1'-00"
.HSG718SW Mild Mild 1E6 Gamma Mild Potential 719'-06" 1'-00" EL 737'-6" IISG737H2 Mild Mild IE6 Comma Mild N/A 737'-09" O'-03" HSG748AG - Mild Mild 1E6 Gamma Mild Potential NA EL 741'-0" HSG741HC Mild- Mild 2E6 Gamma Mild Potential 741'-01[' 0'-01" HSG741SC Mild Hild 2E6 Gamma- Mild Potential 741'-01" O'-01" Turbine Buildina MTB-752 Mild Mild Mild Mild Potential N/A 1
e a 6 8
. .. . . -~ -_. __.. -_ _. - . . - -
TABLE A-1. (continued) 40 Yea r No rma l +'
Tempe ra ture Pressure 1 year post-DBA Subme rgence Buildino/ Area Zono __,
(Decrees F1 iPSIAl (Rads) Humidity Sn ray Eleva t ion / Des ;h Valve Pit A rea MVPAREA Mild Mild Mild . Mild Potential Evaluated on a case-by-case basis ,
NOTES: Zone HE-8, used as the Westinghouse Supplied Conax connector qualification zone, envelopes the following zones: HAB4-21, itAB6-72, HMV-773, HPT718CA, HPT718SA, HRC-ICW, HRC-OCW, HSB780-6, HSG-RSSD, HSG718SW, and HSG741SC. Because none of these are required to operate during a MSLB inside HMV-773 the worst case temperature of 340*F is presented for the specified peak temperature. 340*F was the peak temperature predicted in zone HSB780-6 using the old mass / energy release data. Zone HCONAX and EQ package 2BV-931(K) are being developed for the SWEC supplied Conax connectors.
HWORST is the combined worst conditions for BVS2 excluding zones HMV-773 and HSB780-6. HWORSTOC is the combined worst conditions for outsido containment based on the old predicted environments of zone HSB780-6. Because the effects of the new environments for those components in HWORSIOC and HWORSTOC a re 3,
considered on a case-by-case basis in Appendix E of the EQ. submittal, these zones do not reflect the now .
a superheated conditions in zones HMV-773 and HSB780-6.
e Zone TZ#5 is the combination of worst case parameters for heat tracing cable in EQ package 2BV-555 made up f rom zones HSC741NC and MYARD.
Unless otherwise noted the bounding environmental. conditions are prasented.
4 i
r d
TABLE A-2.
SUMMARY
OF BEAVER VALLEY 2 COMPONENT EVALUATIONS (IN HARSH ZONES)
NSSS Supplied Components File Number / Number of Components Test Report Type of Component Location and Category ,
AE-01/ Westinghouse Boric HAB12-47 and 2 Category 0 00-146F and Acid Pump Motor, HAB12-48 -
CWAPD-296 Model 82D55621 Comments: Master List has Gould as the manufacturer.
Resolved during on-site audit. Master List has the pump manufacturer, not the motor manufacturer.
AE-05/ Westinghouse Charging HABCP-C,HSG718SE 5 Category B WCAP EQTR- and LHSI Pump Motors and HSG718NE AE05A Comments: Master List has Gould or Pacific as the manufacturer. Resolved during on-site audit. Master List has the pump manufacturer, not the motor manufacturer.
Category needs clarification. Post-accident operability time, both specified and demonstrated, less than-100 days.
ESE-01A/ Barton Pressure HRC-0CW and 13 Category A
. WCAP EQTR- Transmitter, Model HMV-773 E01A 763 Comments: None. Note: Appendix E of EQ submittal referenced on SCEW sheet summary sheet.
ESE-01B/ Veritrak Pressure HRC-0CW 1 Category A WCAP EQTR- Transmitter, Model E01B 76PH2 Comments: None.
ESE-02/ Barton Pressure HCV735 and 1 Category A WCAP E-02A Transmitter, Model HTB-752 2 Category C -
753
~
Comments: The term " continuous" for specified and demonstrated post-accident operability time needs clarification. Resolved during the audit. This term used primarily to describe operability requirements for components in mild environments following a seismic event.
, Note: Justification present to classify these zones as mild in this particular case.
A 10
TABLE A-2. (continued)
NSSS Supplied Components (continued)
File Number / Number of Components Test Report Type of Component Location and Category ESE-02C/ Tobar Pressure HCV735 2 Category D
- E02C Transmitter, Model
. 32PA2 Comments: See comments for ESE-02.
ESE-03A/ Barton DP Transmitter, HAB1-768,HAB4-21 29 Category A WCAP EQTR- Model 764 HAB6-72,HAB12-78 8 Category D E03A HCV735, HPT718GA HSG718NW, HSG7185W,HRC-0CW Comments: The qualified life for some of these needs clarification. Resolved during on-site audit. SCEW sheets changed to reflect correct qualified life. Not all of those components in Comment 1.I.G of the SCEW sheet summary have corresponding SCEW sheets. Resolved during on-site audit.
The submittal had been revised to correct this deficiency.
The post-accident operability time and category,.taken together, needs clarification for those category D components.
ESE-04/ Barton DP Transmitter, HAB12-78,HCV-735 4 Category C
< WCAP E-04A Model 752 HRC-0CW,MSB760-6 21 Category D Comments: Category requires clarification.
ESE-05/ RDF Corp RTD with HRC-ICW 12 Category A Cable, Model 21204 WCAP E-05A ,
Comments: Qualified life of only 1.4 years. Resolved during on-site audit. Qualified life has yet to be determined. I Post-accident operability time, both specified and i demonstrated < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. i ESE-06/ RDF Corp RTD with HRC-ICW 6 Category A WCAP E-06A Cable, Model 21205 Comments: Qualified life of only 1.4 years. Resolved during on-site audit. Qualified life has yet to be determined.
A-11 l
l l
TABLE A-2. (continued)
NSSS Suoplied Components (continued)
File Number / Number of Components Test Report Type of Component Location and Category ESE-088/ Westinghouse PWR SPECIAL2 8 Category A WCAP ESE- Neutron Detectors, (inside neutron 08B Model WL-23688 shield area) -
Comments: Post-accident operability time, both specified and demonstrated < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Notes 5 and 10 need clarification.
ESE-14 Westinghouse Post-Accident Monitoring Indicator Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not reviewed.
ESE-20/ Westinghouse Reactor HCV755 1 Category 0 WCAP E20A Trip Switchgear, Model DS-416 Comments: Specified TID dropped to below 1x104 rads TID to juttify mild environment criteria and category.
ESE-40A/ Barton Flow Indicating HSG718NE and 2 Category D WCAP EQTR- Switch, Medel 581A-0 HSG718SE E40A Comments: Category needs c!arification. Note specified TID.
ESE-42A/ Minco RTD, Model S8809 HRC-ICW 14 Category A WCAP EQTR-E42A Comments: Comment 1 on the SCEW sheet summary lists components that have no corresponding SCEW sheets. Resolved during audit. One component was down graded to a non-Class The other two are spares. How does a letter
~
1E component.
certify a component qualified to submergence? Resolved during the file review of these components. .
ESE-43C Westinghouse-NSID Thermocouple Adaptor Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not reviewed. ,
A-12
TABLE A-2. (continued)
NSSS Supolied Comoonents (continued)
File Number / Number of Components Test Report- Type of Component Location and Category ESE-43E/ Westinghouse Mini HRC-ICW 1 Category A WCAP EQTR- Thermocouple Connector E43E and Potting Adaptor /
Cable Splice Assembly Comments: Master List missing manufacturer, make and zone.
The mark number is either wrong on the Master List or SCEW sheet.
ESE-44A/ Westinghouse Incore HRC-ICW 2 Category A WCAP EQTR- Thermocouple Junction E44A Sox, Model WX-34794 Comments: Specified gamma TID appears to be to high.
Shouldn't it be 8 x 107 ? What are the units for the accuracies?
ESE-47B/ Westinghouse Source HCV735 2 Category 0 '
WCAP EQTR- Range Preamplifier, E47B Model MK II Comments: What does the "SP" stand for in the units of accuracies? Set point or Span? Regarding Comment 5, shouldn't this be a category C type component if it not required for any accident?
ESE-470/ Nestinghouse Source / SPECIAL2 (inside- 4 Category C Not Supplied Intermediate Range neutron shield)
Excore Neutron Detector Model WL-2415S Comments: Again, what does the "SP" stand for in the units
. of accuracies? Set Point or Span?
ESE-47E/ Westinghouse Crimp On-Triaxial Connector Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not Reviewed.
A-13
a TABLE A-2. (continued)
NSSS Supplied Comoonents (continued)
File Number / Number of Components Test Report Type of Component Location and Category ESE-62A Westinghouse Shunt Trip Attachment / Auto Panel Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not Reviewed.
HE-01/ Limitorque Valve HABCP-C,HSG718NW 25 Category A B0212 Actuator, Models SB HSG718SW,HRC-ICW 1 Category C and SBD and HRC-0CW Comments: Demonstrated radiation deficiency. Concern resolved during on-site audit. Specified radiation reduced.
The category C component is flooded for some accidents.
Justification presented.
HE-02/05/ ASCO Solenoid Valve HAB6-72,HPT718SA 25 Category A WCAP EQTR- Models NP8316E and HRC-ICW and H02/5 Rev 2 2063816RF HSB780-6 Comments: BVS2's response to IEIN 84-23 may not be sufficient. The category for those inside HSB780-6 should be changed. The functional requirements in. Appendix E of the submittal and 1 year post-accident operability time requirement is misleading. See comments for file 2BV-185 for a possible resolution to this coacern.
HE-03/06/ Namco Limit Switch HAB4 <1, HAB6-72 87 Category A WCAP EQTR- Model EA-180 HABCP-C,HPT718GA H03/6 HPT718SA,HRC-ICW HRC-0CW,HSB780-6 HSG7185W, HSG741SC,and HSG-RSSD Comments: Demonstrated radiation deficiency. Concern resolved during on-site audit. Specified radiation reduced.
Several components had SCEW sheets but were not on the Master -
List. Concern resolved during on-site audit. These have been down graded to non-Class 1E. The SCEW sheets were removed from the package for these components. The functional requirements in Appendix E of the submittal and 1 year post-accident operability time requirement is misleading. See comments for file 2BV-185 for a possible resolution to this concern.
A-14
, TABLE A-2. (continued)
NSSS Supplied Components-(continued)-
File Number / Number of Components' Test Reoort Type of Component Location -and Category ,
1 HE-04/ Limitorque Valve HAB4-21, HAB6-72 42 Category A' B0003, B0058 Actuator, Models SB, HAB6-74, HABCP-C
'and B0119 SBD and SMB HPT718SA,HPT718GA l HSG718NE,HSG718SE HSG7185W and HSG-RSSD Comments: Demonstrated radiation deficiency. Appendix B of
. submittal shows that the specified TID was decrease to ;
1 x 107' rads TID. A reference to Appendix B should be
! provided. Better yet to have 'the ' result of Appendix.B's calculation on the SCEW sheets somewhere. A soft parts or.
. age sensitive parts analysis should be incorporated into the 2
file similar to that presented during the ; review of 2BV-67.
Demonstration to spray being done by analysis. This was a 4
general open item found during the on-site audit.
Justification found on the SCEW sheet summary may be sufficient in this case.
HE-07/ Crosby RV Position HRC-ICW -3 Category A WCAP EQTR- Indicating Device, H07A Model 65322 Comments: Demonstrated radiation aeficiency. Concern resolved during on-site audit. Specified radiation reduced.
HE-08/ Conax Seal, Model HE-08 1 Category A i WCAP EQTR- N11007 i H08A 1 Comments: Used in 12 zones on 65 components (Asco and Namco). Demonstrated radiation deficiency. Concern resolved during on-site audit. Specified radiation reduced.-
Shouldn't these be mentioned in Appendix E of the submittal?
HE-09/ Garrett PORV, Model HRC-ICW 3 Category A WCAP EQTR- 3750020 HE09A Comments: Demonstrated radiation deficiency. Concern
- resolved during on-site audit. Specified radiation reduced.
) A-15 i .. - _ _ _ _ ._ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _, _.
TABLE A-2. (continued)
NSSS Supplied Components (continued)
HE-10A/ Target Rock Solenoid HRC-ICW 4 Category A WCAP EQTR- Valve, Model 79AB001 HE10A -
Comments: Specified gamma TID appears to be to high.
~
Shouldn't it be 8 x 10 7?
HE-10C/ Target Rock Solenoid HAB6-74,HPT718GA 4 Category A WCAP EQTR- Valve, Model 79AB003 HRC-ICW HE10C Comments: Demonstrated radiation deficiency. Concern resolved during on-site audit. Specified radiation reduced.
BOP Supplied Components 2BV-10/ Westinghouse Component HAB8-77 3 Category B WCAP EQTR- Cooling Water Pump AE05A Motors Comments: Category needs clarification. Resolved during on site audit. Category was changed to A prior to on-site audit. Post-accident operability time, both specified and demonstrated, less than 100 days.
2BV-11/ Westinghouse Fuel Pool HFBFPPC 2 Category A MM-9112 Cooling Water Puitp Motors, Model 284T Comments: Demonstrated post-accident operability time does not envelop required post-accident operability time.
Resolved during on-site audit. New calculations were performed and file updated to resolve this concern.
2BV-15/ Reliance RSS Pump HSG-RSSD 4 Category A MM-9112 Motors, Model 5010P -
Comments: The SCEW sheets indicate that these motors are qualified for submergence. Resolved during on-site audit. -
The SCEW sheets were found to be in error and consequently revised to resolve this concern.
A-16
TABLE A-2. (continued)
BOP Supplied Components (continued) 2BV-24/ Westinghouse Quench HSG718NE 2 Category B WCAP EQOP- Spray Pump Motors, j . AE-5 Model 5009' Comments: Category needs clarification. Resolved during on-site audit. Category was changed to A prior to on-site audit. Post-accident operability time, both specified and demonstrated, less than 100 days.
- 2BV-67/ Limitorque Valve HMV-773,HSG737H2 13 Category A B0058, 600456 Actuator, Model HSG-RSSD and
'80027 and Model SMB-000 MITALL-A B0003 Comments: See writeup for this file in Appendix B of this TER for the concerns raised and how they were. resolved.
Note: Comments on SCEW sheets reference Appendix E of EQ submittal.
2BV-76/ Limitorque Valve HAB1-76A 54 Category A 80003, B0058, Actuator, Model SMB HAEl-768,HCV-775 600456 and HPT718GA,HRC-0CW B0212 HSG-RSSD MCB-735A MITALL-A and MVPAREA Comments: Some of these valves-(those located in MVPAREA) are submerged, however, justification is presented in the i SCEW sheet summary sheet. A soft parts or age sensitive parts analysis should be incorporated into the file similar to that presented during the review of 2BV-67 for those not ,
qualified to B0212. Unlike file HE-04 nothing in this file is presented to justify demonstration to spray for:those i
qualified to B0003. This was a general open-item found during the on-site audit.
~*
2BV-76A/ Limitorque Valve HAB1-76B,HCV-773 20 Category A B0058, 600456 Actuator, Model SMB HPT718GA,HRC-0CW and 80212 and MCB-735A Comments: A soft parts or. age sensitive parts analysis
. should be incorporated into the file similar to that presented during the review of_2BV-67 for those not qualified
- . to B0212.
I
! A-17 -
e
- - - - - o ,-my-----s,-- -i g 3m , - ee -, sp - y- ~g- p ,7wy--rm -
gr,g- - y-f
- y--y - - - - - %+-s
TABLE A-2. (continued)
B0P Suoplied Components (continued) 2BV-77/ Limitorque Valve HSG718SW, 12 Category A B0058, Actuator, Model SMB HSG-RSSD and and 600456 MDG-ALL .
Comments: A soft parts or age sensitive parts analysis should be incorporated into the file similar to that -
presented during the review of 2BV-67.
2BV-82A/ Limitorque Valve HAB6-72,HSG718NE 13 Category A B0058, Actuator, Model SMB HSG718NW
, and 600456 HSG718SE and HSG-RSSD Comments: A soft parts or age sensitive parts analysis should be incorporated into the file similar to that presented during the review of 2BV-67.
2BV-91/ Limitorque Valve HAB26-19, 11 Category A B0058, Actuator, Model SMB HPT718GA and 600456 HSG737H2,HRC-0CW and MVPAREA Comments: A soft parts or age sensitive part!, analysis should be incorporated into the file similar to that presented during the review of 2BV-67. Sum of these valves (those located in MVPAREA) are submerged; however, justification is presented in the SCEW sheet summary sheet.
2BV-92/ Borg-Warner Valve HMV-773 21 Category A NTS 548-9315, Actuator, Models Borg-Warner # 38878, 39521 and 38558 1736, and Addendum A to 1736 Comments: Partial type test referenced to extent qualified life of Tefzel from 4 to 40 years? Concern resolved during ,
review of file during the on-site audit. As a result of the review of this file it was determined that the test report did not support qualification of this operator to spray and .
is considered an open item. This was a general open item found during the on-site audit.
~
Note: Comments on SCEW sheets reference Appendix E of EQ submittal.
A-18
TABLE A-2. (continued)
BOP Supplied Comoonents (continued) 2BV-116 Excore Neutron Flux Monitoring System Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not reviewed.
2BV-135/ Reliance Chem Pump HSG718NE and 2 Category A Nuc-9 and Motor, Frame 254T HSG718SE Supplement to Nuc-9 Comments: None.
2BV-150/ Reliance Fan Motor HAB12-78,HCV-773 17 Category A Nuc-9 and HMV-773, HRC-0CW 5 Category C Supplement MDG-ALL and ,
to Nuc-9 MITALL-A Comments: None. Note: Comments on SCEW sheets reference Appendix E of EQ submittal.
2BV-157 American Air Filter Vent Filter Assemblies Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not reviewed.
2BV-162/ Westinghouse Fan Motor HAB27-79,HCV-773 10 Category A D0-146F and MAB-VENT, and CWAPD-296 MCB-735A 2BV-162/ ITT General Controls HAB27-79 2 Category A 730.1.140 and Actuator, Model NH-91 730.1.123 Appendix B Comments: None. Note: Comments on SCEW sheets reference Appendix E of EQ submittal.
2BV-179/ Westinghouse A/C Units HCV-ACUC 6 Category A 9112 HSG741SC HSG741NC and MCB735A Comments: None.
A-19
~)
i TABLE A-2. (continued) l BOP Supplied Components (continued) 2BV-185/ Asco Solenoid, Model MAB-VENT 6 Category A AQR67368 NPK8320 Comments: None.
2BV-185/ Namco Limit Switch, HAB9-77,HAB29-79 26 Category A -
American Model EA-740 HAB29-80 and Warning HPT718GA 90247-28 Comments: None. Note: Comments on SCEW sheets reference Appendix E of EQ submittal however these appear to be qualified to the elevated temperatures.
2BV-185/ Namco Limit Switch, HMV-773,MOG-ALL 5 Category A QTR 111 Model EA-740 and MITALL-A 4 Category C Comments: None. Note: All category C components in HMV-773. Comments on SCEW sheets-reference Appendix E of EQ submittal. SCEW sheets for these category C components have NR for the specified and demonstrated temperature.
2BV-185/ ITT General Controls HAB9-77,HAB27-29 52 Category A 730.1.140 Damper Actuator, HAB29-79 6 Category C Model NH HAB29-80,HCV-773 HMV-773,HPT718GA MCB735,MOG-ALL and MITALL-A Comments: Justification for temperatore margin presented (where applicable). Note: Comments on SCEW sheets reference Appendix E of EQ submittal. All category C components in HMV-773. SCEW sheets for these category C components have NR for the specified and demonstrated temperature; however, those in HAB29-79 have the elevated specified temperature (265 F) caused by superheat with a demonstrated temperature of only 235 F and category depicted as A. The last has been found to be consistent throughout SCEWs. If the 4
component is required to operate' in HMV-773, then 535 F is depicted on the SCEW sheets. If the component is not -
required for a MSLB, then NR can be found in all the specified parameters. In the Service and Auxiliary Buildings all components exposed to the elevated temperatures of the '
new calculations have category A assigned to-them with these 1 elevated temperatures depicted on the SCEW sheet. Many times the demonstrated temperature is less than the specified, in
, this case, with Appendix E being referenced. All components in the Service and Auxiliary Buildings are not required, or category C, in.this case.
A-20
7 TABLE A-2. (continued)
[ B0p Supplied Components (continued) 2BV-186/ American Air Flow HAB27-97 and 8 Category A AMC Summary, Indicators and HAB29-79
. and Wyle No. Controls, 58800 Model VELT./E AEMOV Comments: Typo found in category designator. Resolved during on-site audit. Note: Comments on SCEW' sheets j reference Appendix E of EQ submittal.
2BV-192 Ellis and Watts Self-Contained Air Conditioning Units, Includes Rockwell International Heater,
, and Limitorque Valve Actuator Comments: Not considerad qualified by applicant. Not reviewed.
28V-208/ Westinghouse Auxiliary HSG718NE and 2 Category B WCAP EQDP- Feedwater Pump Motor, HSG718SE AE-5 Model 5010H Comments: Category requires clarification. Demonstration to spray being done by analysis. This was a general open item 4
found during the on-site audit.
2BV-209A/ Borg-Warner Valve Actuator
- Comments
- Not considered qualified by applicant. Not
- reviewed.
2BV-211/211A Crosby Main Steam Valve Actuator Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not
, reviewed.
2BV-225 Trans-Tek Valve Position Indicator '
Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not reviewed.
A-21 1
1 TABLE A-2. (continued)
BOP Supplied Components (continued) 2BV-309(931A) Kerite 5 kV Cable and HWORST 13 Category A Isomedics Splices I-R975-01 -
- Comments
- Demonstrated radiation deficiency. Concern resolved during on-site audit. This may be irrelevant for -
these cables / splices. Comments in SCEW sheet summary indicate that there are no safety-related cable inside containment. If this is the case, then why are inside containment parameters being presented on the SCEW sheet?
Note: The demonstrated parameters bound the specified parameters, however, the temperature margin is only 7 F if there are any that need be qualified inside containment. A
- review of Appendix E of the EQ submittal indicates that none of these cables / splices are inside the areas affected by the new mass / energy release calculations. A review of Table B-1 of the EQ submittal indicates that these should be qualified in all other zones except for HAB25-37, which has a specified TID of 3 x 108 rads. This was resolved during the on-site audit. Zone HAB25-37 has no " Cat.1" equipment located in it.
2BV-310(FUSE)/ Gould Fuses, Model HCV735 5 Category D Gould Report ATM/NFT-Fi CC-74-343 Comments: Vendor, manufacturer, and make are not consistent between Master List and SCEW sheets. Resolved during the on-site audit. Master List to be revised. Two of these are submerged. Justification presented on SCEW sheet summary sheet. Category and specified TID, taken together, needs clarification.
2BV-310(MCC)/ Gould Series 5600 MCC HCV735,HCV755 23 Category A Gould Report HSG748AC,MAB12MCC C-74-22 MCB7070 MDG-ALL
, MITALL-A and MSB730GA Comments: Vendor, manufacturer, and make are not consistent between Master List and SCEW sheets. Resolved during the on-site audit. Master List to be revised. Four of these are -
submerged and eight are subjected to spray. Justification presented on SCEW sheet summary sheet. Two different demonstrated temperatures? See 2 CAB *RCPBP-07 and MCC*2-E08.
4 A-22
TABLE A-2. (continued) i B0P Supplied Components (continued) 2BV-312 Okonite 600 V Power HWORST 16 Category A (CABLE)/ Cable
. SWBV-1180 and NQRN-1A
- Comments: Demonstrated radiation deficiency. Concern resolved during on-site audit. Specified TID reduced.
Submergence study being referenced. Resolved during on-site audit. Master List only has 11 components. NKZ*28 is in this group of SCEWs but the Master List has it as a splice.
Resolved during the file review of this file. From Table III
, of Appendix E of the EQ submittal: There are 3 cable mark numbers listed under 2BV-312 but only one of these (NKZ-23) can be found on the Master List. Is it because the other two aren't safety-related? Note: Comments on SCEW sheets reference Appendix E of EQ submittal.
2BV-312 Okonite Splices HWORST 1 Category A (9318)/
i Okonite 407, SWBV-1180 and NQRD-3 Comments: Demonstrated radiation deficiency. Concern resolved during on-site audit. Specified TID _ reduced.
Submergence study being referenced. Resolved during on-site audit. Master List has 2 splices, only one had a SCEW sheet.
2BV-317 Westinghouse Electrical Penetration
~
Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
i 2BV-324 Cleveland 300 V.
Instrument Control Cable Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-326 Rockbestos High Temperature Cable Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
A-23
l TABLE A-2. (continued)
BOP Supplied Components (continued) 2BV-337 Power Conversion Isolating Regulating Transformer .
Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-363 System Controls AC/DC Distribution Panels Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-389 Rockbestos 600 V Control Cable Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-509A GA Technologies Radiation Monitor Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not reviewed.
2BV-555 Thermon Heat Tracing Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-611 Conax RTD Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-635A Fluid Components Sump Level Indicator Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed. ,
Note: This file was reviewed during on-site audit.
2BV-636 Pyco RTD Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
A-24
TABLE A-2. (continued)
B0p Supplied Comoonents (continued) 2BV-648A Rosemount DP Transmitters Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-651 Masonellon Air Operated Valve Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-666A ITT Hammel Dahl Bellows Seal Control Valve Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-676 Exosensors Hydrogen Analyzer Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not reviewed.
2BV-689 Fluid Components Temperature Switch Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-693 Barton Op Indicating Switch Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not reviewed. Are these located inside containment? If so, are they affected by IEIN 86-657 2BV-719 Target Rock Solenoid Valve Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
A-25 i
TABLE A-2. (continued)
B0P Suoplied Comconents (continued) 2BV-731 Systems Control Control and Relay Panel .
Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not reviewed. -
2BV-739 Struthers Dunn Isolation Devices Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-816 Okonite 600 V Control Cable Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-816A Rockbestos 600 V Shielded Control Cable Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-821 Marathon 1500/1600/142 Nuc Series Terminal Blocks Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not reviewed.
2BV-827 Brand Rex 300 V Instrument Cable Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-828 Okonite 600 V Power Cable Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
A-26
1 TABLE A-2. (continued)
BOP Supolied Comoonents (continued) 2BV-835 Square D Emergency Distribution
. Transformers Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-847 Airpax Circuit Breaker Comments: Not considered qualified by applicant. Not reviewed.
2BV-931(C) Raychem Splice Kit Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-931(0) Rockbestos SIS Wire Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-931(H) Amp Terminal Lug Comments: Considered qualified by applicant but not reviewed.
2BV-931(J) Rosemount Seals Comments: New item. Not considered qualified by applicant.
Not reviewed. Unknown as to whether this is in a harsh or mild environment.
2BV-931(K) Conax Connectors Comments: New item. Not considered qualified by applicant.
Not reviewed.
O e
A-27
Because of the general open item regarding submergence and spray found during the on-site audit, and because some of the components in " mild" environments may be susceptible to spray or submergence, a cursory review of these packages was performed to flag additional components that may be susceptible to spray or submergence. Table A-3, Summary of Beaver Valley-2 -
Component Evaluations (In Mild Zones), presents the results of this review. It should be noted that none of these packages / components are considered fully qualified by the applicant.
l k
e 4
i a
A-28
TABLE A-3.
SUMMARY
OF BEAVER VALLEY 2 CCMPONENT EVALUATIONS (IN MILD ZONES)
NSSS Supplied Components Susceptible to File Number Type of Component Spray or Submergence ESE-10 Westinghouse Yes Nuclear Instrument System (NIS) Console Comments: None.
ESE-12A Westinghouse Operator Interface Modules Yes Comments: Four components (2 SIS
- HIC 868A & B, two each) can be found on the WNES index for file identification (page 8) but only two are on the Master List. (This comment also applies to HE-10B).
ESE-13 Westinghouse Process Protection System No Comments: None.
ESE-16 Westinghouse Solid State Protection No System Comments: RK*2RC-PRT-B could not be found on the Master List.
ESE-47C Westinghouse NIS Source and Intermediate No Range Cabinet Comments: None.
ESE-53 Westinghouse Microprocessors No Comments: None.
ESE-55 Westinghouse Auxiliary Safeguard Cabinet No Comments: None.
A-29
. ~ . -._ . . . .. . . .
I Nl TABLE A-3. (continued) l NSSS Suoplied Components r ,
Susceptible to File Number Type of Component Spray or Submergence-ESE-63A Westinghouse Plasma Display Unknown Comments: Component Ids. PNL*PSMS-A and B can can be found -
on the WNES index for file identification (page 10) but not on the Master List.
HE-10B Target Rock Reactor Head Vent System .Yes Comments: Four components (2 SIS
- HIC 868A & B, two each) can be found on the WNES index for file identification (page 8) but only two are on the Master List. (This comment also applies to ESE-12A.
2BV-94 Gould Fire-Water Booster Pump Yes Comments: None.
2BV-98A Zurn Industries Self-Cleaning Strainer Yes Comments: None.
1 2BV-160 Carrier Refrigerant Condensing Units Yes Comments: None.
2BV-209A(PNL) Control Panel for Borg-Warner Valve Yes Actuators Comments: None.
2BV-224 Byron Jackson Service Water Pumps Yes ,
Comments: None.
A-30
- - ~ ,
, . . _ - . - --, 7
- . - -. - , e
TABLE A-3. (continued)
NSSS Supolied Components Susceptible to File Number Type of Component Spray or Submergence 2BV-225(PNL) Vortech Main Steam Valve Position Yes
, Indicating Process Cabinet Comments: None.
2BV-230 Colt Industries Emergency Diesel Yes Generator Comments: None.
2BV-245 Westinghouse Emergency Diesel Generator Yes Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Motor.
Comments: None.
2BV-304 Gould 4160 V Switchgear Yes Comments: None.
2BV-307 Gould 460 V Unit Substation Yes Comments: None.
2BV-311 York Electric Main Control Board No Comments: None.
Condor Isolation Power Supply Yes Comments: It appears that the zone designator is wrong for these components. Shouldn't it be MSB730GA instead of MSB731GA?
i 2BV-328 ASEA Relays Unknown l Comments: Not on Master List.
I 1
i A-31
TABLE A-3. (continued)
NSSS Supplied Components
, Susceptible to File Numbfc Type of Component Spray or Submergence 2BV-350 Reliance 125 Vdc Switchboards. Yes Comments: None. .
2BV-358 Gould and System Control Corporation Yes 125 Vdc Battery Breaker Switchgear Comments: None.
2BV-361A Elgar Corporation Vital Bus Inverter Yes Rectifiers Comments: None.
2BV-363 System Controls Corporation Spare Yes (RECPT) Battery Charger Receptacle Comments: None.
2BV-672A Anacon Incorporated Chlorine Cetector No Comments: None.
2BV-676(PNL) Exosensors Hydrogen Monitor Panel Yes Comments: None.
2BV-719(MILD) Target Rock Solenoid Valve Yes Comments: None.
2BV-723 Westinghouse Analog Instruments and Racks No Comments: Component Id. RK*2SEC-PROC-LTR has no zone designator. Assumed it was in MCB7070 or MCB735B.
A-32
TABLE A-3. (continued)
NSSS Supplied Components Susceptible to File Number -Type of Component Spray or Submergence 2BV-931(E) Marathon 1500 DJ Terminal Unknown
- Comments: Cannot find on Master List.
2BV-931(F) Various Switches (Westinghouse, Unknown i Minalites,etc.)
4 Comments: Cannot find on Master List.
l l
- 4 l
, A-33 w,-- + 1 ~ . , . ,,.,y,_ . - _ _ _ , , ., _ , _ _ ,,.
A m n ' o,,n- a & w e ew --v- vm: - -
.w w,v -
w,- <.mw a~ e ,wam,- e- ,w- m
& 4__aAa 3 _,
I -_ _ _ __
4 1
e w
4 4
9 9
9 9
9 -
i O
l A-34
- "--- Wh-m, __m,,_ , _
- P-'*v --yr1 , . , _ _ __ '" "' W W MM"tw%M- o .q_ y ,,,, , __ _ _
- 'T"""*T -w m yeeve,--,,_,,.,, ,_
6 O
APPENDIX B
SUMMARY
OF THE CENTRAL FILE REVIEW 9
?
i 1 CONTENTS l 1
i .
File' No. 001/ESE-01A, Barton Transmitter, .Model 763,
- Component Id. 2 MSS *PT474 .............................................. B- 1.
File No. 001/ESE-06, RDF Corp RTD, Model 21205,
~ Component.Id. 2RCS*TE410 .............................................. B-3 -
1 File No. 2BV-67, Limitorque Actu'ator, Model-SMB-000, Component Id. 2CCP*MOV118 ............................................. B File No.;2BV-67, Limitorque Actuator, Model SMB-000, Component Id. 2HCS*MOV113A ............................................ ' B-9 File No. 2BV-92, Borg Warner Valve Actuator, Model 38878-3, Component Id. 2FWS*HYV157A ............................................ B-11 File Nos. 2BV-312 and 2BV-312(9318),
Okonite 600v EPR Power Cable and Splices, Component Ids. 2NKZ-23 and 2SP LICE *312 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-13 File No. 2BV-635A, Fluid Components-Inc. Level Indicator, Model 8-66MA, Component Id. 2RSS*LE151A ..............................................B-16 F
8 I
4 4
i .
J L
4 r
B-ii I
- , , - ~ c n.,, ,,m .. - , , . - ~ . , e..,.., -.-- , - , , . . . , , -
n~-. ,,-, - - - . , +-. - , , - v. - - - --.,-n= .
-,v-,
i t
2 BARTON TRANSMITTER:
- MODEL 763-
, _ COMPONENT ID. 2 MSS *PT474 FILE NO. 001/ESE-01A The Barton pressure transmitters model 763 are used in several locations throughout.the plant. A transmitter located in_the main steam
_ isolation l area, HMV-773, was selecte'd for review because in the unlikely-event 'of a main steam line break (MSLB), .the temperature in this area .would exceed the qualification temperature of these transmitters. These transmitters monitor the main. steam line pressure and provide a signal to initiate safety injection, auxiliary feedwater actuation and main' steam j line isolation on low steam line pressure. The transmitters in'this area-l ' have been insulated to maintain the temperature of the actual. transmitter below the qualification temperature and consequently well below the temperature predicted for HMV-773 during a MSLB (534*F). The actual temperature these transmitters will see during this event, as found in calculation no. 12241-US (B)-196,~has been estimated to reach only 150*F, which is well below the demonstrated temperature of 450*F.~
The cable and splices supplying these transmitters, however, are only j qualified to 430*F and 410*F, respectively. : Appendix E of the applicant's l EQ submittal presents an evaluation showing that the cable and splices .will remain functional until the transmitters. provide the signal for main steam line isolation at a time when the area temperature is 376*F. Failure of the cable and splices after this time was evaluated and shown not to have any detrimental effects to components which may be needed to mitigate the consequences of the accident nor mislead the operator. For post-accident monitoring, alternate indication was stated by.DLC personnel to be available; however, the applicant's Regulatory Guide 1.97 and 10 CFR 50.49 i*
submittals need to be revised to reflect what- the alternate indication is
- and resubmitted to the NRC staff for approval.
- The documents in the applicant's files'to support qualification of these transmitters were Westinghouse reports WCAP 8587 EQDP-ESEIA, Rev. 5, I
i
! B-1 i
f t
a 4 g -. m . - . ,
.&.w4+
l
~
and WCAP 8687 EQTR-E01A, Rev. 2. These documents report'that.the transmitters were thermally. aged to simulate a qualified life of 10 years 7
at 104'F, irradiated to 6.8 x 10 rads TID, and exposed to a DBE stimulation with the peak temperature reaching 420*F; pressure, 72 psia; -
chemical spray, caustic for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; with a post-accident operability time demonstrated of 15 days at'250*F. The TID received during testing was -
estimated to simulate a qualified gamma / beta equivalence of 5x107 rads-9 gamma and 9 x 10 rads beta. For BVS2's ambient conditions, a qualified -
~
life of 6 years with a-four month post-accident operability time was established by the use of the Arrhenius Methodology, provided that the 0-rings are replaced every two years or every time the. cover is removed.
When questioned how the concerns of IEIN 83-72 were being addressed, DLC personnel presented Westinghouse Letter RCS CIEI (86)-640 which confirmed that all Model 763 Barton Transmitters in their EQ prograra were
! manufactured after February 1983.
In conclusion, these transmitters are considered qualified for the ,
conditions specified at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2.
- Documentation is contained in the applicant's files.to support this 1
conclusion provided that the alterr. ate methods being used to satisfy the requirements specified by Regulatory Guide-1.97 (for which these j transmitters were originally being claimed to satisfy) are approved by the NRC staff.
t j B-2
RDF CORP RTD MODEL 21205 COMPONENT ID. 2RCS*TE410 g FILE NO. 001/ESE 4 .
This RTD, and five other'similar RTDs, are located in zone HRC-ICW
.(inside containment, inside the crane wall) above flood level. Their 4 primary function is to provide reactor coolant loop temperatures for post-accident monitoring. These RTDs are of the well-mounted type.
These RTDs are required to operate under the following set of peak environmental conditions: temperature, 333*F; pressure, 59.4 psia; humidity, 100%; chemical spray, 2000 ppm boron with pH=10.5; radiation, 2 x 108rads TID; accuracy, 0.2*F with a 11.0*F drift factor; with a post-accident operability requirement of four months.
Testing of similar RTDs is described in Westinghouse Test Report EQTR WCAP 8687, Supplement 2-06A, Rev. 3. RTDs in this report were thermally aged, cycled between'120*F and 650 F to simulate 10 years of inservice thermal cycles, irradiated (2.47 x 10 8rads TID gamma to the tip and 8
i 1.22 x 10 rads TID gamma to the cable with the cable receiving an additional 9.2 x 108rads TID beta), subjected to flow induced vibration, seismicly stimulated, then subjected to the following set of peak' environmental conditions: temperature, 420*F; pressure, 89.7 psia; humidity, 100%; and chemical spray, 2750 ppm boron with pH=10.7. The demonstrated accuracy of the RTDs along with the leakage currents of the cables was shown to be within the acceptance-criteria.
A qualified life of 1.4 years to 40 years (dependent upon the amount of air flow at the RTD head which will be determined during hot operations) was established by use of the Arrhenius Methodology. The demonstrated post-accident operability time of the RTD was also extended from 16 days to four aonths by use of the Arrhenius Methodology as per WCAP 8587. Appendix D.
1 f
- B-3
In conclusion, these RDF Corp RTDs are considered aualified for-use for the conditions specified at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2, and documentation is present in the applicant's files'to support-this.-
1 i' e e
4 i
r i
.i l
l a
e e
4 i
l B-4 4
e - y ,,,, # , - .c- ,-a,- -
,,y---. -- . ,,.y-,.- .. . - ,--- y .-, y --.y -
. ,. =. .
i LIMITORQUE ACTUATOR MODEL SMB-000 COMPONENT ID. 2CCP*MOV118 FILE NO. 2BV-67 This valve is located in the main steam valve _ area (HMV-773) and is used to isolate the component cooling water safety /nonsafety header on a containment isolation phase A (CIA) actuation signal.
Because this valve is located in zone HMV-773 where the predicted temperature is 535*F during a MSLB, and because Limitorque Report 600456 (the report that forms the basis of qualification of this actuator) only demonstrates a peak temperature of 315 F, special consideration must be given to the actual temperature of area HMV-773 and the surface temperature of this actuator at the time its safety function is accomplished.
In establishing the peak temperature at which various components are required to operate, there are two distinct temperature nodes that are identified by the applicant in making this determination: (a) 336*F, which is the temperature of zone HMV-773 prior to tube bundle uncovery, and (b) 376*F, which is the temperature of zone HMV-773 at the time the steam line actuation signal is generated.
At the time of tube bundle uncovery the steam exiting the steam generator is considered to be superheated, allowing the temperature of the steam to increase. The temperature in zone HMV-773 is predicted to reach 535 F for 30 seconds as a result of this superheated steam condition.
Apnendix E of the applicant's EQ submittal identifies four safety functions that are performed prior to tube bundle uncovery: (a) reactor trip, (b) feedwater isolation, (c) safety injection actuation, and (d) auxiliary feedwater actuation. CIA, which is the safety function associated with this particular actuator, 2CCP*MOV118, was noted in Table 1
- of Appendix E of the applicant's EQ submittal; however, the correlation between time and temperature at which this function was to have completed B-5
~- ,,- -e . - , . .,_ _,. --
, 4 -- --,-au g-vp~e. <+wr,-n--
its safety function was not part of the discussion presented for the above four safety functions. Discussions with Stone & Webster personnel revealed that this was merely an oversight and that the CIA was considered similar to the above four safety functions in relationship as to when the CIA will have completed its safety function (i.e., before tube bundle uncovery).
It should be noted here that Appendix E of the applicant's EQ submittal gives the temperature of zone HMV-773 at the time of SLI initiation. It does not, however, give the temperature of zone HMV-773 at the completion of the SLI function. (Note: SLI is the only safety function that has not been initiated / completed prior to tube bundle uncovery.)
In order to show that this actuator was qualified to the temperature of 336 F, note 7 was placed in Table 1 of Appendix E of the applicant's EQ submittal in order to establish that the internal components never exceeded 315 F when exposed to an environment of 385 F, as per Limitorque Report 80027. The NRC audit team felt that this note alone did not adequately qualify this actuator to 336 F. When requested to provide the surface temperature of this actuator at the time it is required to' function, the applicant provided the results of a thermal lag analysis for a Namco limit switch that showed that the surface temperature of the switch did not exceed 315 F during the MSLB inside zone HMV-773. Along with this analysis, a comparison was made between the thickness and surface area of the metal surrounding the two components and the mass of the two components, with the Limitorque actuator obviously having more of each of these attributes desirable to heat sink capabilities ensuring that the thermal response of the actuator to be less that that of the switch. It can be concluded that the above analysis in conjunction with Limitorque Reports 600456 and B0027 qualifies the actuator for the time / temperature profile in zone HMV-773 at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 and
- documentation is present in the applicant's files to support this conclusion.
B-6
The other peak environmental parameters under which this valve may be required to operate under are: pressure, atmospheric; humidity, 100%;
potential spray from the service water system; radiation, 1 x 100 rads TID; with a post-accident operability time requirement of one ye,ar.
As stated earlier, Limitorque Report 600456, AppendixCofB0058,is being used to form the basis of qualification of this actuatof. i This
~
report describes testing of a similar valve actuator that dep$onstrated qualificationunderthefollowingpeakenvironmentalcondit/ons:
temperature,315F; pressure,60psig; humidity,100%;chedicalspray,1.7%
wt. boric acid with pH=10.5; radiation, 2 x 10 8 radsTID;j!witha demonstrated post-accident operability time of one month The test sequence found in Limitorque Report 6004 omitted two steps inthepreferredsequencedepictedinIEEEStandard3g3-1974. One area of concern is that normal vibration aging was not perfop/.ned on the actuator in 600456. The file addressed this concern by referen-ling Limitorque Report 80212 which describes a LOCA test performed on a sinilar actuator where vibration aging was a part of the overall test sepuence. The second area d
of concern is that the thermal aging was only perWormed on the actuator motor (180 C). As of the time of the on-site afflit this file did not contain adequate justification for the omission [of thermally aging the actuator. Duringthecourseoftheauditthef.pplicantdidprovideample 4
justification for this omission in the form c[ referencing other test reportsperformedonsimilaractuatorswhere[thermalagingoftheactuator k
was a part of the overall test sequence pr%r to DBA stimulation. The test reports referenced and associated " age-sensitive" or "non-metallic" components of interest were as follows: Westinghouse Test Report HE-01 was referenced for the malimine switch material and Limitorque Report B0212 was referenced for the viton seals and fibrite switch materials. Both of these test reports envelop the specified conditions of 2CCP*M0V118 when thermal lag is accounted for.
The remainingd age-sensitive" or "non-metallic" component, the phenolic terminal strips, were qualified by Limitorque report 80119. This B-7
report was part of the applicant's files at the time of the on-site audit.
This report describes testing of various terminal strips and crimp connectors found in the applicant's actuators. These terminal strips were thermally aged at 138 C for 300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br />, electrically aged by simulating 2,002 valve cycles, exposed to 2.11 x 10 6rads gamma TID, seismicly stimulated, and exposed to the following peak environmental parameters:
temperature, 312 F; pressure, 70 psig; humidity, 100%; chemical spray, 2950 '
ppm boron with pH=11.2; and radiation, 2 x 108 rads TID.
The post-accident accident operability time requirement was demonstrated by test to 30 days (600456) and extended to one year by use of the Arrhenius Methodology. Initially the calculation used to extend the post-accident operability time incorporated an unacceptable extrapolation of the Arrhenius Methodology: equivalent times at post-accident temperatures were being extrapolated from the transient portion of the required and demonstrated profiles. Discussions with OLC personnel and a review of the other files audited revealed that this type of extrapolation was not typical and therefore not considered a programmatic problem.
Values taken from the steady state portion of the test curve (200*F for 624 hours0.00722 days <br />0.173 hours <br />0.00103 weeks <br />2.37432e-4 months <br />) was shown to adequately envelop Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2's one year post-accident conditions with sufficient margin.
In conclusion, provided that thermal lag is accounted for, the terminal strips and crimp connectors covered by Limitorque Report 800119 are considered qualified for use inside Limitorque Actuators for the conditions specified at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2, and documentation is present in the applicant's files to support this.
Rockbestos Firewall III and Raychem Flamtrol cable are used for the internal wiring of the Limitorque actuators at Beaver Valley 2.
Qualification for the Rockbestos cable is contained in file 2BV-931(D).
The qualification documentation for the Raychem cable has been reviewed by ,
the applicant and found acceptable, however, as of the time of the audit had not been formalized and placed in the Limitorque files.
B-8
- - . .~ -.- . - - - . . . - -
i LIMITORQUE ACTUATOR i
MODEL SMB-000-COMPONENT ID. 2HCS*MOV113A FILE NO. 2BV-67 4 -
This actuator is located in zone HSG737H2 (safeguards building), above flood level and is used in the hydrogen control system. The only harsh environmental parameter associated with this actuator is the specified radiation - 1 x 10 6rads TID. The required post-accident operability-
- time for this actuator _is one year. ,
i-Limitorque Reoort 80003 is being used to form the basis of qualification _ for this actuator. Although this test describes a test I- sequence in_which the actuator and motor both were thermally aged, it was
- not apparent that a sufficient material analysis had been performed to establish the motor insulation was indeed the " weak-link" to use in establishing the qualified life based on inservice temperature conditions.
When this concern was presented to DLC personnel, they referenced WCAP Test j Report EQTR-H04A to address the " age-sensitive" or "non-metallic" buna-n
! seals and durez switch material to establish the qualified life of 40 years
- for these materials. Although the insulation material of the-installed-l actuators (class H) is different from that of the tested motors-(class B),
i sufficient material analysis was present in the. files to justify that the j installed configuration was different from that which was tested.
i The actuators in Limitorque Report B0003 were also cycled 2200 times j for mechanical wear aging. The peak environmental parameters these actuators were subjected to were: temperature, 250*F; pressure, 25 psig; humidity, 100%; and radiation, 2 x 10 6rads TID for the actuator and i 2 x 108 rads for the motor.
1 1
., A qualified life of 40 years with a one year. post-accident operability f' time was established by the Arrhenius Methodology for all' components other than the motor insulation which was established by using the life curve l (regression analysis) for class B insulation.
[
j B-9
--mw.n, ,--e > , ,,n ,-, ~ - - - s. ,,-w ,wr. 7-,--,-,.,,-,e ,_,-m,g,g-,ns.,g ,,,,m,-,.ngn-,-- ,,-,-g-r,rwp,m-- n,v---mm,,vu~,~,-e,ome--aw se -
I The concerns and resolution regarding the phenolic terminal strips and )
internal wiring of these actuators can be found in the writeup for
- 2CCP*MOV118, File 2BV-67, of Appendix B of this TER.
i In conclusion, the actuator for 2HCS*MOV113A is considered qualified for use at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2, and documentation in the .
applicant's files supports this.
i 1
y 1
e e
1 B-10
BORG WARNER VALVE ACTUATOR MODEL 38878-3 COMPONENT ID. 2PdS*HYV157A FILE NO. 2BV-92
- This valve actuator, and two similar actuators, are located in zone HMV-773 (main steam valve house). Various electrical safety-related subcomponents of this actuator include the following: solenoid valves, pressure switches, and control and power cables along with associated interfaces such as conduit, conduit connectors, and junction boxes. All of these components are to remain functional in order for the actuator to perform its intended safety function which is to close, and remain closed for feedwater isolation on a SIS actuation signal. The motor for this actuator is used only to open the valve. This actuator is not required to operate the valve to the open position to mitigate the consequences of an accident; therefore, the motor is not considered a safety-related or Class 1E component.
This actuator is required to function under the following set of peak environmental conditions: temperature; because this valve operator is actuated by the SIS signal, the maximum temperature this actuator sees when required to function during a MSLB inside zone HMV-773 is 336 F, (i.e.,
prior to tube bundle uncovery); pressure, atmospheric; humidity, 100%;
potential spray from the service water system; radiation, 1 x 10 6rads TID; submergence, NA; with a post-accident operability requirement of one hour.
Testing of a similar actuator is documented in Borg Warner Test Report 1736 and Nation Technical Systems Report 584-9315, Rev. 3. During testing of this actuator, the actuator was thermally aged at 180*C for 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />, wear aged by subjecting the actuator to 1800 full stroke cycles and 6500 6
10% full stroke cycles, irradiated to 1.2 x 10 rads TID, subjected to plant induced vibration aging, seismicly stimulated, then subjected to the following set of peak environmental conditions: temperature, 390*F for three minutes and 340 F for three hours; pressure,125 psia; humidity, l
B-11 l
100%; spray, not demonstrated; with a four hour post-accident operability.
time demonstrated by test and analysis.
A qualified life of 40 years was established for this actuator provided that the replacement schedule depicted in the file for the various subcomponents is incorporated into Beaver Valley 2's maintenance schedule. '
In conclusion, the Borg Warner actuator is considered qualified for use for the conditions and time duration specified at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 provided that ample justification is added to the file to address the lack of demonstrating this actuator to ' spray.
o i
t t
b l
B-12
OKONITE 600 V EPR POWER CABLE AND SPLICES COMPONENT IDS. 2NKZ-23 AND 2 SPLICE *312 FILE NOS. 2BV-312 AND 2BV-312(9318)
These cables and splices are used throughout the plant for power and control apnlications.
The maximum environmental parameters, excluding those associated with a MSLB outside containment, for which these cables and splices are required to operate are: temperature, 333 F; pressure, 59.4 psia; humidity, 100%;
8 radiation, 2 x 10 rads TID; chemical spray, 2000 ppm boron with pH=10.5; submergence, NA for the splices, potential for the cables; with a specified post-accident operating time of one year.
Cables purchased for use at BVS2 include the following types: 7, 19, and 37 conductors with insulation thicknesses of 30, 45, 55, and 65 mils, with individual Jacket thicknesses of 15, 30, 45, and 65 mils. As documented in Okonite Reports SWBV-1180 and NQRN-1A, two representative cable samples were tested. These were a 600 V cable with seven #12 conductors and 30 mils of EPR insulation and a 2 kV cable with seven #5 ,
conductors and 30 mils of EPR insulation. Testing on the splices is documented in Okonite Engineering Report 407 and Okonite Reports SWBV-1180 and NQRN-3.
The tested cables and splices were thermally aged for three weeks at 150*C, exposed to 2 x 108 rads TID and exposed to the following peak environment conditions: temperature, 345"F; pressure, 112 psig; and humidity, 100%. Chemical spray was introduced during the onset of the initial transient and maintained for 30 days. To demonstrate the post-accident operability capability of these cables, the test temperature was held at 212*F for 126 days. A load of 600 V and 18 amps was maintained through the test. A qualified life of 40 years was established by use of
~
the Arrhenius Methodology. Although not present in the files at, the time of the on-site audit, an Arrhenius calculation was performed and presented B-13
to the NRC audit team that showed the 126 days at 212 F performed during testing was more than equivalent to BVS2's one year post-accident conditions.
Because the peak temperature demonstrated by the test did not envelop the specified temperature with sufficient margin a thermal lag calculation was performed (reference calculation US (B)-207) which predicted that the -
insulation material would only reach 319 F.
Conflicting data was found in the file in regard to the specified submergence criteria for the cable. The SCEW sheet indicated that none of the cable will be subjected to submergence; however, the SCEW sheet did reference a note that implied that some of the cable may be subjected to submergence. This conflict is considered a contributor to the general open item in regard to submergence and spray. The note indicated that a study had been performed to address the feasibility of those cables that may be submerged and the safety implications, if any, for each case where the cable may be submerged. For those cables inside containment it was concluded that either the cables performed their safety function prior to becoming submerged or that the cable had no safety function during a LOCA (the only event that causes such flooding inside containment). It was concluded that all failures postulated to occur after the cables were submerged did not cause any spurious component operation, mislead the operator, nor have any adverse effects on components that were required to operate to mitigate the effects of a LOCA. Cables located outside containment were considered qualified for submergence with Okonite Report NQRN-1 providing the documentation to support qualification of these cables submerged in relatively mild environments.
The impact of a MSLB outside containment on the qualification of the Okonite cable is discussed in Appendix E of the applicant's EQ submittal.
The peak temperature in HMV-773 is predicted to reach 535 F, well above the '
qualification temperature of the Okonite cable. A thermal lag analysis performed on the cable predicted the insulation temperature to reach 431*F during this transient, still above the qualification temperature of the B-14
cable. This analysis also indicates that the insulation temperature will be 336*F at the time the SLI signal is generated (HMV-773 area temperature will be 376 F at this time). This is the maximum temperature the cable will see for which it is required to remain functional.
Although the demonstrated temperature (345*F) only envelops this temperature by 9*F, additional testing was performed on cable samples at temperatures as high as 410 F to verify that no other degrading mechanism would be activated that would lead to rapid failure at slightly higher temperatures. After the cable perfort ed its safety function, it was assumed to have failed, and a failure analysis was performed to assess the impact of such a failure. This analya !s showed that all components remained in their required position an) that some valve position indicators would be lost. Alternatemethodsofykifyingthesevalvepositionshave been established; however, some of thes; are used for parameters required by Regulator Guide 1.97. The use of alt;rnate indications was found to be acceptable provided that the applicant's .egulatory Guide 1.97 and 10 CFR 50.49 submittals are revised and resubmitt d to the NRC staff for approval.
In conclusion, this cable is considered gualified for the conditions specified at the Beaver Valley Power Station b it 2, and documentation is contained in the applicant's files to support ti 's conclusion, provided that the alternate methods that will be used to v -ify the affected valve position indicators can be used to satisfy the regt. rements specified by Regulatory Guide 1.97. \\
\
w s
B-15
i 1
FLUID COMPONENTS INC. LEVEL INDICATOR j MODEL 8-66MA j COMPONENT ID. 2RSS*LE151A FILE NO. 2BV-635A The Fluid Ccmponent level indicators, model 8-66MA, are used in several locations throughout the plant. They are used for sump level ,
indicators for the unidentified leakage monitoring system. The specific item selected for review was one of the redundant wide range containment sump level indicators supplied by Stone and Webster. One of the functions of this indicator is to provide for measurement of post-accident containment level in fulfillment of the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97.
The level indicator is composed of two components. The standpipe (component id. 2RSS*LE151A), which includes the internal electrical wiring and Conax connector, is located inside containment in the containment sump and will see the harsh environment of the Design Basis Event (DBE). The electronics package (component id. 2RSS*LT151A) is located in the safeguards building in a mild environment.
Review of the submittal indicated two problems with the data for this item. The listing of post-accident monitoring (Regulatory Guide 1.97) instrumentation requiring environmental qualification in Table 1-3 of the applicant's submittal only includes the component designation of the electronics package. The standpipe, however, is the component located in the harsh environment and is the component requiring environmental qualification. Similarly only the electronic packages are listed in Table 1-3 of the EQ submittal for the redundant wide range indicators (2RSS*LT1518) and the two narrow range indicators (2DAS*LT220 and 2DAS*LT222). Also, the System Component Evaluation Work (SCEW) sheet for this component (and also the redundant wide range and both narrow range ,
indicators) lists the NUREG-0588 category as B. The B category is for components that need not function for mitigation of the design basis accidents but must be qualified to demonstrate they will cot fail in a B-16
manner detrimental to plant safety or accident mitigation. Category A is for components that must be qualified to demonstrate they will perform their intended function throughout the accident. The level indicators are required for post-accident monitoring and must continue to function and, therefore, should be category A.
The review of the qualification documentation was limited to the
~
standpipe because it is the component that will potentially experience a harsh environment. The maximum environmental parameters for which this component is required to provide indication are: temperature, 333 F; 8
pressure, 59.4 psia; humidity, 100%; radiation, 2 x 10 rads TID; and chemical spray, 2000 ppm boron with pH=10.5. The specific component selected for review is above the flood level for the containment. .Several of the the level indicators, for example the containment sump narrow range, are located below flood level and could potentially be submerged.
Qualification for submergence was, therefore, included in the review.
The document in the applicant's files to support qualification of the level indicators was Fluid Components Inc. Report FCI 708394. This document reports a level indicator of the same model was thermally aged for 100 days at 200*F and eight days at 275'F. It was irradiated to 2.13 x 100rads TID and exposed to a DBE to 350*F, with a short excursion to 382*F,137 psia, and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of chemical spray. An Arrhenius calculation using an activation energy of 1.43Ev for the limiting material Kapton lead wire demonstrates that the eight days at 275'F is equivalent to much more than 40 years at 120 F normal temperature and 2.5 days per year at 135 F for the anticipated operational occurrence.
Qualification to submergence was not demonstrated by a long time test with the junction box subtrerged. The lack of a specific submergence test was considered a contributor to the general open item in regard to submergence and spray. However, arguments were presented in the EQ submittal and reinforced by DLC personnel at the audit that alternate tests and analysis adequately demonstrated the indicators are qualified for intermittent submergence. The arguments presented were that the sensor B-17
I I
including the junction box is a completely welded structure except for one electrical penetration which is sealed by a submergence qualified Conax electrical conductor seal assembly. Also, the complete sensor including the junction box was plunged in hot oil at 346*F prior to the DBE test.
These arguments were accepted as adequate justification for submergence qualification.
~
Accuracy measurements were made for the initial functional test, after thermal aging, after the radiation aging, before and after the seismic testing, and before and after the DBE test. The accuracy was within 2 to 4% of the full scale reading which was reported to be within the required limits.
In conclusion, the FCI level indicators are considered qualified for the conditions specified for the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2, and documentation is contained in the applicant's files to support this conclusion.
O t
B-18
u..ve6 .. or .-
. ...oa, =v . , ie. r, c. ve, . . ., ,
g, =
E*,"2'- BIBUOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET EGG-NTA-7624 See sR $tmuCis0NS om twa mgytast
'dblT 05 HE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT FOR THE BEAVER VALLEY
. oari = oar Co- 'ino POWER STATION UNIT 2 aposeTM vtam
- avvaoaisi April 1987 M. Trojovsky.
- oa's a' oar 'auso
"**'" " ^a
. H. L. Magleby l April 1987 7 PGmf OnessNG ORGassi2afloss maass asso Mastiaso A0omess reassem to sam # 8 PROJECTitmentimoan vasit Nues.sA NRC Technical Assistance Division e '= oa oaaar v aa NRR & I&E Support EG&G Idaho Idaho Falls. ID 83415 A6415
- 10. SPON50m mo onGAN#2atsoes maast am0 wastamo ao0 mess riassism te came i1afYPt08 u m ?
Division of PWR Licensing - A Technical Evaluation Report Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission *""'***""'"~*'"'
Washington, DC 20555 June 1986 to April 1987 5
93 SUPPLEWGNT ARY Nof tS l3 L8s1n AC11200 weren er *ener Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 was audited to determine the environmental 1
qualification of safety-related equipment. Results'of the audit are summarized in this resort.
s . ooco . ~ , . a s . ... . ....o.o. . c.......
,. p,.g,3, .
Unlimited I4 90CualtyCLAS$ificaflom a r., ,,,,,
. . ~ e,. .. ,on ~ e ~o s o n ==* Unclassified a r..e ,-,
Unclassified 19 NUMetR OC O AGES it PneCl