05000313/FIN-2011003-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Provide Adequate Procedural Guidance Results in Control Element Assembly Shaft Extension Damage |
| Description | The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation of Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.4.1.a for an inadequate procedure that resulted in damaging a control element assembly shaft extension. Specifically, station Procedure OP-2505.007, Unit 2 Upper Guide Structure Installation, Revision 18, failed to give adequate guidance on aligning the center control element assembly shaft extension with the in-core instrumentation thimble support plate lifting frame funnel. This misalignment resulted in damaging the shaft extension, and required additional inspection and analysis for possible damage to the control element assembly and reactor fuel. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2011-1284. The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate procedural guidance for installing the thimble support plate into the Unit 2 reactor vessel was a performance deficiency because it was within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and also violated technical specifications. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that the physical design barriers will protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events, and is therefore a finding. Specifically, inadequate procedural guidance resulted in the damaging of a control element assembly shaft extension and could have resulted in fuel cladding damage. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), because the finding did not prevent or degrade core heat removal, inventory control, electrical power, containment control, or core reactivity capabilities. The finding was determined not to have a cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency occurred in 2002 and is not indicative of current plant performance. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
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| Report | IR 05000313/2011003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Powers G Werner J Clark J Rotton M Haire M Hay N O'Keefe R Azua T Farnholtz W Schaup A Sanchez |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2011003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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