05000313/FIN-2011002-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Depressurizing One Emergency Core Cooling System Suction Header |
Description | The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation of Unit 1 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the failure to follow procedure OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation, Revision 69. Specifically, while draining to depressurize the emergency core cooling system suction header from 55.6 psig to approximately 20 psig to support testing BW-2, P-36 B/C suction stop check isolation valve, operations personnel monitored the incorrect suction pressure indication, drained and depressurized significantly longer than specified in the procedure resulting in the suction header pressure lowering to approximately 1.6 psig before securing the draining evolution. Immediate actions taken to restore compliance included operations personnel filling the emergency core cooling system suction header and subsequent ultra sonic testing on the effected piping to verify no voids existed. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2011-0290. The inspectors determined that operations personnel failed to follow the requirements of procedure OP-1104.002, by failing to monitor the correct pressure indication and by draining significantly longer than the procedure specified. This resulted in inadvertently depressurizing the emergency core cooling suction header to approximately 1.6 psig. This was determined to be a performance deficiency. Specifically, the failure to follow OP-1104.002, as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, and inadvertently depressurizing the emergency core cooling system header was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and is therefore a finding. Specifically, lowering pressure below 20 psig potentially voided the emergency core cooling system suction header which would affect the availability of the emergency core cooling system train. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance, Green, because: (1) the finding was not a qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss functionality of the emergency core cooling system header, (2) it did not lead to an actual loss of safety function of the system or train, (3) it did not result in an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, (4) it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant per 10 CFR 50.65, for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and (5) it did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with work practices in that the licensee failed to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities were such that nuclear safety was supported when the control room supervisor unknowingly became involved in the task and did not maintain supervision, H.4(c). |
Site: | Arkansas Nuclear |
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Report | IR 05000313/2011002 Section 1R22 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson W Schaup A Sanchez B Baca C Graves I Anchondo J Clark J Melfi J Rotten |
CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2011002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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