05000313/FIN-2011002-04
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with 4160 Volt Vacuum Breakers |
| Description | The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI for the failure to take timely corrective action to correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee identified an issues the Siemens vacuum breakers plunger operated auxiliary switches (STA device) becoming stuck in mid travel and would prevent the auxiliary switches from working properly, but failed to correct this issue in a timely manner and resulted in the failure of offsite power transfer test from startup transformer 3 to startup transformer 2. The failure of the licensee to take prompt corrective action for a previously identified condition adverse to quality was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee was aware of STA devices hanging up during several breaker tests and identified a cause for this phenomenon, initiated corrective action, but failed to implement the corrective action prior to subsequent de-energization of the 2A2 bus during an offsite power transfer test. This was determined to be a performance deficiency because it was within the ability of the licensee to foresee and correct, and was a violation of NRC requirements. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and is therefore a finding. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Checklist 3, for shutdown operations, and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the core heat removal guidelines associated with instrumentation, training and procedures, and equipment were met. Specifically, both trains of shutdown cooling remained operable with all necessary support equipment. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with work control, in that the licensee failed to appropriately plan work activities by incorporating the need for planned contingencies. Specifically, the licensee failed to incorporate contingency actions to correct any deficiencies discovered during inspection of the STA devices in the 2R20 refueling outage, H.3(a). |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2011002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson W Schaup A Sanchez B Baca C Graves I Anchondo J Clark J Melfi J Rotten |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2011002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||