05000313/FIN-2010004-09
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Draining Unit 1 Pressurizer to Reactor Building Floor |
| Description | The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation of Unit 1 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the failure to follow Procedure EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging, Revision 12. Specifically, a maintenance tagout holder signed off a tagout prior to all work being complete, which led to the removal of the clearance. This resulted in draining the pressurizer to the containment basement floor instead of to a drain tank. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2010-1013. Failure of station personnel to follow Procedure EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging, Revision 12 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected it could lead to a more significant safety issue. Specifically, the continued failure to follow this procedure could lead to the inappropriate release of systems and equipment to other organizations when these systems or equipment are not capable of performing their function. This is therefore a finding. Using NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination, Attachment 1, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not affect core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control or reactivity guidelines. The finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with work practices in that the licensee did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety is supported. Specifically, instead of supplying appropriate guidance and supervision for the workers in the field, the mechanical war room coordinators actions resulted in the failure to follow procedure by convincing the mechanical lead to sign off on the tagout before the work had been completed. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2010004 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Sanchez C Graves C Osterholtz D Stearns D Strickland J Clark J Josey J Rotton K Clayton L Ricketson T Pate |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2010004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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