ML20209D393
ML20209D393 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | LaSalle ![]() |
Issue date: | 07/07/1999 |
From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20209D390 | List: |
References | |
NUDOCS 9907130127 | |
Download: ML20209D393 (11) | |
Text
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ATTACHMENT Proposed Changes to Technical Specifications for LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 NPF-11 NPF-18 3/4 3-30* 3/4 3-30* 4 3/4 3-30a 3/4 3-30a B 3/4 3-2a B 3/4 3-2a B 3/4 3-2b* B 3/4 3-3*
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l INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) closure of the MSIVs is initiated to prevent the addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the diaphragm installed to protect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident.
As noted (footnote
- to Tables 3.3.2-1 and 4.3.2.1-1), the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, when all turbine stop valves (TSVs) are not full open, since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. Switches are provided to manually bypass the channels when all i TSVs are not full open. TSV position setpoints are controlled by TS 2.2.1 and < ;
surveillances are performed per TS 4.3.1. The TSV closure scram bypass below 30% power (TS Table 3.3.1-1 Note 1) does not affect the TSV position interlocks for the condenser vacuum - low bypass logic.
Except for the MSIVs, the safety analysis does not address individual sensor response times or the response times of the logic systems to which the sensors are connected. For A.C. operated valves, it is assumed that the A.C.
power supply is lost and is restored by startup of the emergency diesel ger,erators. In this event, a time of 13 seconds is assumed before the valve i starts to move. The safety analysis considers an allowable inventory loss which in turn determines the valve speed in conjunction with the 13 second delay. ;
For the sensors associated with MSIV isolation, instrumentation channels are not required to be response time tested. Response time testing for the remaining channel components, including any analog trip units, is required.
This allowance is supported by fiEDO-32291-A, " System Analyses for the '
Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.
3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The' emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that are beyond the ability of the operator to control. This specification provides the OPERABILITY requirements, trip setpoints and response times that will ensure effectiveness of the systems to provide the design protection. Although the instruments are listed by system, in some cases the same instrument may be used to send the actuation signal to more than one system at the same time.
4 Per Note f, the ECCS actuation instrument channels are not required to be response time tested. The overall ECCS res includes diesel generator injection valves,ponse time pumps, requirement, and which still other components,
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applies. This allowance is supported by.NEDO-32291-A, " System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.
LA SALLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-2a Amendment No.124
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BASES 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)
.Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been deterinined in accordance with NEDC-30936P-A, " Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (With Demonstration for BWR ECCS '
Actuation Instrumentation)", Parts 1 and 2, December 1988, and RE-025 Revision 1, " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for the Emergency Core Coeling System Actuation Instrumentation for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2", April 1991. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required surveillances, entry into LCO and required ACTIDNS may be delayed, provided the associated function maintains ECCS initiation capability. #
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LA SALLE - UNIT I B 3/4 3-2 b Amendment No.124
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INSERT FOR UNIT 1 AND 2 BASES PAGE B 3/4 3-2a 1
A reduced voltage condition on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that while offsite power may not be completely lost to the respective emergency bus, power may be insufficient for starting and operating Class IE equipment, such as large motors, without risking damage to the Class IE equipment that are required for the ECCS function. Therefore, power supply to the bus is transferred frorn offsite l
power to onsite DG power when the voltage on the bus drops below the Degraded Voltage Function Allowable Values (degraded voltage with a time delay). This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment.
The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that sufficient power is available to the required equipment. The Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough to provide time for the offsite power supply to recover to normal voltages, but short enough to prevent damage to the connected Class IE equipment.
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INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3 /4. 3. 2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) lead to additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the i diaphragm installed to protect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident.
As noted (footnote
- to Tables 3.3.2-1 and 4.3.2.1-1), the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, when all turbine stop valves (TSVs) are not full open,'since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized.. Switches 'are provided to manually bypass the channels when all TSVs are not full open. TSV position setpoints are controlled by TS 2.2.1 and i surveillances are performed per TS 4.3.1. The TSV closure scram bypass below I 30% power (TS Table 3.3.1-1, Note 1) does not affect the TSV position r interlocks for the condenser vacuum a low bypass logic.
Except for the MSIVs, the safety analysis does not address inoNidual i sensor response times or the response times of the logic systems to which the j sensors are connected. For A.C. operated valves, it is assumed that the A.C. '
- power supply is lost and is restored by startup of the emergency diesel generators. In this event, a time of 13 seconds is assumed before the valve ,
starts to move. The safety analysis considers an allowable inventory loss i which in turn determines the valve speed in conjunction with the 13 second delay.
For the sensors associated wi n MSIV isolation, instrumentation channels are not required to be response time tested. Response time testing for the ,
remaining channel components, including any analog trip units, is required. 1 This allowance is supported by NEDC-32291-A, " System Analyses for the l Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995. I 3 /4.3. 3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION l The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that are beyond the ability of the operator to control. This specification provides the OPERABILITY requirements, trip setpoints and response times that will ensure effectiveness of the systems to provide the design protection. Although the instruments are listed by system, in some cases the same instrument may be used to send _ the actuation signal to more than one system at the same time.
Per note i, the ECCS actuation instrument channels are not required to be
' response time tested. The overall ECCS response time requirement, which includes diesel generator injection valves, pumps, and other components, still applies. This allowance is supported by NEDO-32291-A, " System Analyses for
~ the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.
1~NS5 RT WheoD LA SALLE - UNIT.2- B 3/4 3-2a Amendment No. 109
INSTRUMENTATION BASES E
3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (continued)
Specified surveillance intervals and' surveillance and maintenance outage times have been
. determined in accordance with NEDC-30936P-A, " Technical Specification improvement Methodology'(With Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrumentation)", Parts 1 and 2, l December 1988, and RE-025 Revision 1, " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for the '
Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2", April 1991, When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required surveillances, entry into LCO and required ACTIONS may be delayed, provided the associated function maintains ECCS initiation capability.
3/4.3 4 RECIRCULATION'PUMPTRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) recirculation pump trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient. The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study evsnts in General Electric Company Topical Report NEDO-10349, dated March 1971 and NEDO-24222, dated December,1979, and Appendix G of the FSAR.
The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system is a part of the Rea'ctor Protection System and is an essential safety supplement to the reactor trip. The purpose of the EOC-RPT is to recover the loss of thermal margin which occurs at the end-of-cycle. The physical !
phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity to the reactor system at a faster rate than the control rods add negative scram reactivity. Each EOC-RPT system trips both recirculation pumps, reducing coolant flow in order to reduce the void collapse in the core during two of the most limiting pressurization events. The two I
- events for which the EOC-RPT protective feature will function are closure of the turbine stop valves and fast closure of the turbine control valvas.
Analyses were performed to support continued operation with one or both trip systems of the ,
EOC-RPT inoperable. The analyses provide MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) values which must be used if the EOC-RPT system is inoperable. These MCPR limits are included in the COLR and ensure that adequate margin to the MCPR safety limit exists with the EOC-RPT function inoperablec Application of these limits are discussed further in the bases for Specification 3.2.3. ,
i A fast closure sensor from each of two turbine control valves provides input to the EOC-RPT system; a fast closure sensor from each of the other two turbine control valves provides input to the second EOC-RPT system. Similarly, a position switch for each of two turbine stop valves provides input to one EOC-RPT system; a position switch from each of the other two stop valves
- provides input to the other EOC-RPT system. For each EOC-RPT system, the sensor relay contacts are arranged to form a 2-out-of 2 logic for the fast closure of turbine control valves and a 2-out-of-2 logic for the turbine stop valves. The operation of either logic will actuate the EOC-RPT system and trip both recirculation pumps.
Each EOC-RPT system may be manually bypassed by use of a keyswitch which is administratively controlled. The manual bypasses and the automatic Operating Bypass at less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER are annunciated in the control room. l f
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LA SALLE - UNIT 2 ' B 3/4 3 Amendment No. '114
=
INSERT FOR UNIT 1 AND 2 BASES PAGE B 3/4 3-2a l
A reduced voltage condition on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that while offsite power may not be completely lost to the respective emergency bus, power l may be insufficient for starting and operating Class IE equipment, such as large !
motors, without risking damage to the Class IE equipment that are required for the ECCS function. Therefore, power supply to the bus is transferred from offsite power to onsite DG power when the voltage on the bus drops below the Degraded Voltage Function Allowable Values (degraded voltage with a time ,
delay). This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment.
The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that sufficient power is available to the required equipment. The Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough to provide time for the offsite power supply to recover to normal voltages, but short enough to prevent damage to the connected Class IE equipment.
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