ML20128C375

Requests Listed Addl ECCS & LOCA Info for Review of Application for Monticello Reactor

ML20128C375
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	03/24/1969
From:	Rosen M US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	Boyd R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 9212040375
Download: ML20128C375 (2)

Text

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l NAR 2 41959 l

66-26 1 R.' 8. Boyd, A/D for Roseter Projects. DEL QM slped t '

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8. Levine, A/D for Raaster Yeahnology, DEL i te+, , < ,

WesTICELLO - Ab81T10EAL BOCs AND lac & Ispenes&TIcu 1-

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The following additiemal informaties is regetred for one review of the '

POL application for the Meetime11e naaster. E ~

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% (1) Dneeribe the provietans that have hoes ande to essene the.,evail;' ~ . #m ability of the B005 is a post-socident perted following a passive failure (water leakage) of the ring header er the accs piping.

Describe the emans availabis to the operater to detect and isolate ,

such failures under post-accident conditions. How much time omst elapse following the design basis LOCA before these previsions aan adequately modef limit the someequences of this postulated ECCS failure '

i 1 (2) Design basis "s" on page 6-2.1 of the PSAR is someoomervative for l cladding exidation and cladding skatter concerns. Provide a more realistic clad temperature limit for the LOCA.

l (3) For clarification of design basis "f" en page 6-2.1 of the PSAR Are the individual systems designed to withstand the sembined LOCA l and seismic loadet  !

(4) I The ds. sign basis for the auto-relief system is not clear. cive the relief capacity, member of valves required, and number of valves to '

be actuated. Is the auto-relief permissive of "no NPCIS sod /or feed-water flow" to be removed as in other usoest applications? If so, ,

how does the combined acties of auto-relief and HPCIS ebange the small-break thCA analyseat following any baeak so as to preclude vessel repressartaatiaatWill We the am currently require an interlmak to prevent amte-solief metenties 'in e

the event a.s. power la met available to drive the les paesasse BCC seesystems--will oesh an interleek he peweidad for this plantt (5) 1g.

surisatian taflammes of the EPCI System for all aut's.We end the The 5 - -

'J tapiaal report, APID-5608,-deserthee testa skish are intended to peevide seek verifiaaties by mid-1969. Will the test resalto-be- .

available te samfits your analyses? If not, them othe wise demon .

strate the adequesy of the BCCB design for that range of internadiata '

breaks w.4., foru which _ _..... EPCIS depressariaation of the vessel is most important.

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9212040375 690324 PDR ADOCK 05000263 A PDR

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1 to a meaningful clad temperature limit (not the Zircaloy melting l targe rature) .

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{ (6) It appears from the drawissa la the FgM that a break in the RCIC i

steam feed line could result in loss of HPCI esoability due to prosimity of systems (the "high eres temperaters" signal veuld -

! isolate both systems). Describe the likelihood sad eensequeness l of this event.

! (7) A bubble rise velocity of 1 f t/see is cited on page 6-2.35 for the i liquid break analysis, while a velocity of 2 ft/sec'io etted en j page 6-2.40 for the steam break analysis. The 1 ft/ses assumption j is less senservative for determining time of core sneevery, while

! the 2 f t/sec is less conservative for determining taatimum icvel <

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! swell in the vicinity of the steam line noszieo. Give the reaan i for using the two velocities and establish the conservatis:a of your i

! selection in each case. ,

! (S) Provide a quantitative assessment of the analyticci conservatist.,

1 that has been retained in the core heetup ca culations for inter-mediate and large break sises (0.1 to 5.5 f t}). Include consideration 1

of such things as transition and film boiling af ter MCurR <1, steam ,

j cooling, residual water levci, and steam availability for the :wtal-

water reaction.

1 gging syndbt

31,lloscu ,

, Morris Rosen, Chief l LT-260A Nuclear 7echnology . Branch j DRL

• NTE :RJ'l Division of Reactor Licensing cc: D. Vassallo, DEL i

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4 Dis tribution :

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, DRL Reading ADRT Reading NIB Reading j bec: S. Levine .

M. Rosen R. J. Mattson t

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