ML20133B120
| ML20133B120 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1985 |
| From: | Sinkin L Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power, INC. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#485-660 OL, NUDOCS 8510030028 | |
| Download: ML20133B120 (36) | |
Text
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t P. ELATED Connmunenwien UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9/30/85 USh NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OCT -2 A11 :49 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING B0 DOC T -
_ U ir% <
BRAh VII:I In-the Matter of '(
)
HOUSTON LIGHTING AND ( Docket Nos. 50-498 UL PCWER COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-499 OL (South Texas Project, (
Units l'and 2) (
CCANP MOTION FOR BOARD ORDERED PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, TO REOPEN THE RECORD, FOR NEW CONTENTION, FOR DISCOVERY, BUD EOR EXIENSIONS OE I1ME I. INTRODUCTION On Octcber 9, 1984, Jack Newman, on behalf of Applicants, sent a letter to the ASLB noting that a consultant's report on Erown and Root's engineering work had been delivered to Applicants on October 1, 1984. Mr. Newman also noted that this report + ell within the bounds of a protective order then in place in the law suit between the STNP partners and BLR. In his letter, Mr. Newman stated:
"Although the consultant's report considers some of the same engineering processes and products as the Guadrex Report, we do not believe that it is material to any matter before the Board for adjudication, particularly as the scope of the Board's review is reflected in its clarifying memorandum of July 19, 1984:
'The Quadrex Report, is of course, an evaluation of the engineering practices of Brcwn and Root,
-Inc. (B&R). DLR is no longer associated with the project. Althcugh HL&P's activities in supervising BLR's design engineering efforts may theoretically have some bearing on an overall assessment of HLLP's character, we have already examined those activities to a considerable e'< tent. See, gigg, PID at pp. 40-41, 44. We do not believe that further inquiry _into this subject through the findings of the Quadrex Report would be pr oducti ve.
Memorandum and Order (Denying Reconsideratio'n by
-Clarifying Memorandum and Order of May 22,- 1984), July lo s 1984. at p. 5."
8510030028 850930 PDR ADOCK 05000498.
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In his letter, Mr. Newman then stated:
"Accordingly, we do not plan to provide the consultant's report to the Board or the parties in this proceeding. If, however, the Board believen any other action is required, HL&P will seek the authorization of the court."
At the October 16, 1984 prehearing conference, Nr. Goldstein raised the matter of the engineering report mentioned in the October 9, 1984 l et t er tron Mr. Newman to the ASLB. Mr. Goldstein specifically questicned why the report was under the protective order and whether some parts could be segregated for release. Tr.
10E39. He was told b / Mr . Axelrad that the report was based on di scover ed tvidence and cculd not be segregated such that parts based on other than ciscovered evidence cculd be released. Tr.
loeso, se al_sc2 Tr. 1 ot361 - 52 (Gutterman).
T h c- ASLB i nqui r ed whether the report dealt in any way with HL&P's involvemenc with B&R's design engineerina efforts. Tr.
10960. Mr. Butterman stated that the report did not deal with HL&P's management of engineeriqq. Tr. 10861.
Based on what Mr. Auelrad and Mr. Eutterman said, the AELB concluded that the report was probably not relevant to Phase II.
Tr. 10862. Mr. Gutterman agreed with that assessment. IJ .
On July 11, 1985, at the beginning of the Phase II hearings, CCANP noted that the protective crder covering the engineering report had beer. disacised and suggested-the report should be produced to the Board zin d t he par ti es. Tr. 11263-69.
Applicants argued against the report being produced. Tr.
11269--70.
The Board instructed CC6NP that should CCANP find anything specific in the report that should be brought to the Board's
attention as relevant to the Phase (I hearings, then CCANP shculd file an appropriate motion with the Board. Tr. 11270.
Shortly after the protective order was lifted, CCANP began seeking a copy-of this engineering report. On September 4, 1985, t h e- day CCANP's representative left Texas to drive back to Washington. CCANP finally received a copy and began its review of the report to determine if the report contained material relevant to the Phase 1I heerings.
From itn review, CCANP concluded that Applicants should have sought release of this report from the protective order and
++
provided ccpies to the ASLB and parties to this proceeding.
On September 6, 1985, CCANP learned of a second document which might be relevant to the Phase II hearings. This document is apparently e diary or compilation of events produced by Mr.
Don Jordan of HL&P covering the period of time during which HL&P acted to remove Brown and Root from the project. On September 10, CCANP received a copy of this document, which is attached hereto es Exhibit 1.
From its review of this document, CCANP concluded that this document also should have been produced to the Board and parti es.
t/ CCANP repeatedly requested copi es of this report through the affices of the Mayor and members o -f the Austin City Council.
These requests were unsuccessful until September 4, 1985.
it/ The Applicants, as well as t he Staff and CCANP, are oblicated to timely appri w the Board of newly discovered ;ignificant information or of significant develcoments relevant to this proceeding, tjiege g ia Prawgt Go. (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Pl ant ,
Units 1 & 2), ALAb-291, 2 NRC 404, 408 (1975); Duke Power, Go._
(William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-143, 6 AEC 623, K5-20 (1973); V i_r g i rti a Eleqtric, h Power, Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-22, 4 NRC 480, 491 at n.11 (1976). CCANP worked diligent 1/ to meet its obligation in this regard, including taking time during a previously scheduled one week vacation to work en this motion.
l II. Discussion A. The Sol Levy, Inc. Report The Sol Levy, Inc. " Report on Brown.and Root Engineering on the Scuth. Texas Project"'EHereinafter "SLI Report"lis a 650 page, two volume overview cf B&R'.s design and engineering work on the South Texas Nuclear Project. The SLI Report is described in a recent HL&P communication to NRC Rrgion IV as follows:
"Of the reports prepared by these experts Eretained as part of-the litiaation between the partners and B&RJ, the one most relevant to the technical adeanacy of STP engineering and construction is the Rgggrt, gn BER Eggigggting gg thg Sguth Tettas Pt gjgct, prepared by S.
Lev.y, Inc. (SLI), issued on October 1, 1984. This report was the culmination of an extensive and detailed review of B&R engineering documents, engineering-related correspondence, Bechtel work packages, deposition transcripts and some Bechtel design documents, carried out by highly trained engineers experienced in the nuclear field who were aware of their obligation to. repor t any uncorrected safety deficiencies. The SLI review covered a majority of the saf ety-rel ated sys,t ems engi neer ed by B&R and evaluated the STF' design as of the time B&R was terminated as architent-engineer." Letter to Robert D. Martin.from J.
H. Goldberg dated August 30, 1985, Encloe.tre at 21-22.
The SLI study did not find anv reportable -engineering deficiencies that were not currently being addressed by Bechtel.
Id.
The SLI Report is w-itten after B&R was no longer on the job, after Bechtel had assessed ELR's design engineering, and after Eechtel had begun resolving most of the B&R design deficiencies. The SLI Report also examines the root causes of B&R engineering deficiencies. This report is, therefore, an excellent insight into whether the deficiencies-identified in the Quadrex Report findings did in fact exist and pervade the_BLR engineering work at STNP.
Among the specific tasks given to Sol Levy, Inc. were:
"To establish whether B&R's design and engineering work was carried out in accordance with no mal prof essi onally acceptable standards.
~ To assess the management, organization, and planning of B&R engineering. The capability of key managers and lead discipline engineers was to be evaluated as well as their interf aces wi th otner tunctions.
~
To review the. adequacy of B!<R 's eng i neeri ng , both in terms of the process used to carry out the work and the technical quality 'of the output. Where SLI found deficiencies, their cause was to be. established whenever possible." Vol. I at 1 1-2.
As part of their methodol ogy , the SLI engineers performed a delailed analysis of specific B&R engineering work and developed generic' findings from the=e det= tiled studies.
.The overall concl usions of the SLI Report are:
"1. B&R en0ineering work throughout the project was substandard (i.e., bel ow' normal professianally accepted standards). It resulted in excessive rework and minimal acccmplishment for the time and money spent.
- 2. The most f undamer.tal source of B&R engineering difficulties was the inexperience of its management and its f ailur e to develop the capability to deal with the unique and rigorous demands of nuclear power. BLR management compounded their shortcomings by the failure to anticipate and to accomodate changes or to update and 'to carry out the STF' engineering work in un integrated and systematic way.
- 3. By 1981 eng'ineering was l'ess than 50 percent complete and. disorganized, and BLR was ineffectual.
Major por ti ons of the design work were such as to require removal,. replacement, detailed review and/or rework. Additional major del ays of the project were inevitable as a result.
- 4. By late 1981 B&R had not uncovered all of their engineerinq problems, to say nothing of becoming capable of rectifying then. The only course of action, if the project win to be preserved, was to i mp l e.aen t a comprehensive and thorough review of engineering and to replace B&R with an organization capable of identifying and ccrrecting all BLR mistakes and moving ahead."
Vol. I at 1 1-7; Vol. II at 6-1 6-2.
l
_ l
l In its generic . findings, the SLI Report documents an inability of B&R engineering to perform dating back to the beginning of the project. Vol. II at 3 3-4 In many of its findings, the SLI Peport confirms both generic and specific findings in the Guadrex Report. In the following excerpts from n
Volume II of the SLI Report, various Quadrex findings at iswue l in Phase II as to their reportability are referenced in brackets. !
l 1
For those findings which CCANP believes support the Quadrex i i
Report as a whole being turned over, there is a bracketed notation to that effect which references CCANP's arguments set forth in Appendix 1- to this motion.
-BLR 's inability to perform produced such conditions as:
"' Construction is building from these drawings which were developed from very preliminary information and, therefore, we as B&R engineering stand a good chance of ~
being up a creek without a paddle .... '" Finding 3.2.1.3 at 3-6, quoting a B&R memo dated October 26, 1976. '[3.1 (g ) at 3-7; Report: D3
- The decisicn to start and expand STNP construction before engineering was ready " forced engineering'into a mode of satisfying construction needs rather than carrying out their work in an orderly way." Finding 3.2.1.4 at 3-6 [3.1(g) at 3-9; Report: D,E]
- Drawings were " removed.from the drafting board on the date the drawing was scheduled to be issued whether or not the drawing had been completed." Finding 3.2.1.4 at
~
3-9 quoting a B&R meino dated Augus t 22, 1977. [3.1(g) at 3-9; Report: D,E3 1.ater in t'h e project, SLI found the problems still-persisted, including:
-A review by. NUS which found "there has 'been inadequate interface review of the design to date" and "the involvement of Engineering Management in support -
of this Project has not been adequate." Finding 3.2.3.1 t/ In _the SLI Report, there are'various passages underlined.
CCANP has eliminated all such underlining from the excerpts orovided.
4 I
e i e ?
- at 3-11 quoting. NUS (Salterelli) memo to B&R dated November 5, 1979. E3.1(a) at 3-2; Report: DJ
, - Several_ independent design reviewers were hired in late 1980.and early 1'981 because "B&R lacked qualified discipline engineers." Finding 3.2.3.1 at.3-12 [ Report:
A1
- These reviews led to numerous corrections in both designs and purchased equipment. Fi ndi ng 3. '.. !.1 at 3- .
T 12 13. EReport: DJ
, Also in 'the generic findings, the SLI report documents' numerous technical inadequacies. Volume I contains the details of t=
~ the findings upon which the generic findings are based. In the Volume II generic findings, the report states:
.- - "There were a large number.of problems, many of- a 1 significant technical nature, in B&R*s' engineering of-
] STP." Finding 3.3.1 at 3-18 EReport: C3*
"With- the exception of employing the buildings erected by B&R, all other B&R engineering in RCB, MAB, I and FHB had to be redone practically in its entirety."
Id.
I --
"Significant equipment was discarded and new hardware procured and installed. The ccmplete scrapping of .the.
steam generator blowdown system and pipe whip restraints are excellent examples. HVAC ducts and cable trays underwent substantial, if not total, overhaul." .
Id.
"Some of the B&R designs could not satisfy the design objective," such as " reducing steam generator impurities input to the desired low l evel " and assuring
" adequate steam separation in the flash tank." Finding 3.3.1 at 3-19. EReport: C2 "One key reason for the large number of engineering problems at' turnover was the: failure to update the 4 design as. changes were made, or to even periodically
, _ update it." Finding 3.3.2 at.3-20. E 4. 6. 2.1 (b ) at 4-59;-
{ Report: C,I]
"Many inconsistencies were allowed to creep in among
. , documents, particularly across interfaces." Finding 3.3.2.2 at 3-21. [3.1(a) at 3-2; Report C,I]
L t/ The broad generic- finding is in bold face with the sub-generic' findings following.
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- "For example, t P. 9 System Design Descriptico, the one-line drawing, the purchase specificatidn, the PILD, the calculations and their revision were not consistent at any given time for practically all the systems examined." Finding 3.3.2.2 at 3 3-22. E3.1(a> at 3-2; Poport C,I]
r a z t
- !' An i mpor t an ti discrepancy existed between the purchased speciftcation of the Class IE load center transformer which'used an impedance et 7 percent versus an impedance of 3.6 percent used in the electrical fault analysis and -vol tage drop calcucation. Even the electrical fault calculation did not agree with the electrical load calculation." Finding 3.3.2.2. at 3-22.
C3.1(a) at 3-2; Repor t : I]
- One reason for the failure to systematically or
"' periodically update the drawings was that desi'gns were being carried out within each discipline and there "has been an inadequate interface review of the design to date." Finding 3.3.2.3 at 3-22 quoting an NUS 4# (Salterelli) critique of B&R engineering dated November 5, 1979. E3.1(a) at 3-2]
- Many of Salterelli 's perceptions Leapressed in the NUS critique of E&R's design review process dated November 5, 1979] coincide with one of Quadrex's generic Lindings concerning BLR. The Duadrex Report Ec1te omitiedJ states:
'There is no indication that an effective systems integration and overview function exists within the B&P design process.
'The technical disciplines are organized very tightly. A working interface relationship ~ among
'the disciplines is not routine, particularly regarding follow-through at the discipline input-output-interface.
, 'A major concern is with the achievement cf internal consistency among various design
' and the maintenance of that consistency
- , documents over time with personnel turnover.'"
Finding 3.3.2.3 at 3 3-24. [3.1(a) at 3 3-2; Report: D3
- "Another key reason for the large number of problems at turnover was B&R lack of capability and experience in nuclear areas with special nuclear requirements."
Finding 3.3.3 at 3-24. [3.1 (i ) at 3-11; Report: A3 L
I n
- "One of the most important requirements in the desian of nuclear safety systems is that the safety system be able to sustain a single failure. BLR failed to satisfy the single failure criterion repeatedly in the design of the HVAC systems ...." Finding 3.3.'.[1] at 3-24.
C3.1(e) at 3-7; Report: A,F,I]
- BLR failed to satisfy the " essential requirement" that "all elements of a safety system are safety grade." Finding 3.3.3.E1] at 3 3-26. E3.1(d) at 3-5 6; Report: A,F,1]
- E&R failed to adequately consider radioactive-releases within the plant and to the environment.
Finding 3.3.3.[1] at 3-27. [4.8.2.1.(b) at 4-86; Report l A,F,Il
- BfdR c al cul ated temperatures too low, failed to provide necessary coolir.g, failed to consider missiles i n_ all areas, did an inadequate ALARA analysis, and failed to design to prevent water hammer. Finding 3.3.1.[1] at 3 3-28. E4.1.2.1(b) at 4-6; 4.9.2.1(b) at 4-86; Report A,C,F,I]
- "Fracticall; all DLR nuclear calculations are being redone by Bechtel." Finding 3.3.3.2 at 3-29. C 3.1 (i ) at 3-11., Feport: 4,C,F,f3
- "The B&R Engineering process failed to control input-output at the discipline level." Finding 3.4.1 at 3-31.
[3.1 (b ) (1) at 3-3; Report 13
- "B&R cid not subject calculations to r eviews by other disciplines." Finding 3.4.1.1 at 3-31. [3.1 (b) (1) at 3-3; Report: I3
- System Design Descriptions were not updated or put under design control even though they were the principal design documents. Finding 3.4.1.2 at 3-32 -
3-33. [3.1(a) at 3-1; 3.1 (c ) at 3-4; Report: I3
- The- SSD's were the principal means of communicating across design disciplines and to control input-output parameters. Finding 3.4.1.3 at 3 3-34. E3.1(a) at 3-1; 3.1 (c ) at 3-4; Report: 13
- "There was an apparent lack of adequate procedures covecing the complex interfaces between the various disciplines affected by piping layout, stress analysis, and support design." Floding 3.4.1.3 at 3-34. [ 3.1 ( o )
at 3-2; Repor t : C,I]
- "D&R's engineering documents were not controlled and verified adequately." Finding 3.4.2 at 3-34. [3.1(b) at 3-3; 3.1 (g ) at 3-8; 3.1(j) at 3-13; Report: H,I]
" Safety class equipment was purchased before verification of the supporting documentaticn." Finding 3.4.2.2 at 3-35. C 3.1 (i ) at 3-12; Report: G,I]
" Documents were being released when they should have been known to be wrong." Finding 3.4.2.3 at 3-35.
C 3.1 (i ). at 3-11; 3.1 ( j ) at 3-13; Report: G,I]
-- "When major revisions were being made to documents, there was no system to notify the rest of the organization that they were occurring or when they
-would be completed." Finding 3.4.2.4. at 3-36. C3.1(a) at .3-2; 3.1(b) at 3-3; Report: C,IJ
- "B&R did.not ensure that its subcontractor NPSI was receiving the proper revision of the drawings and design change notices." Finding 3.4.2.6 at 3-36.
C3.1(b) at 3-3; Report IJ
- There were OA difficulties with engineering, including undocumented restrictions on QA independence.
Finding 3.4.2.7 at 3-38. EReport: F]
"BLR management, with a -few exceptions, had not grasped the sericueness of the situation _in 1980 and 1931. They were still in a made emphasizing restart of construction rather than reassessing the situation and trying to correct it." 3.5.1 at 3-40. CReport: G3
- "The problems uncovered by BLR Design. Assurance reviews and its NUS and 11 subcontracters were large
.enough that they should have suggested the need to look at the entire engineering of STP." Finding 3.5.1 at 3-
- 40. EReport: .D ,H',I ,J J ,
- "The Design Assurance Group reviews generally dealt more with document consistency rather than . technical adequacy." These reviews "did not concern themselves with status of equipment and systems interaction."
Redesigns were proceeding without assurance that all comments were taken into account. Finding 3.5.2 at 3-
- 41. C3.1(a) at 3-1; Report IJ
- "In 1980/1981 there was an urgent need to look at and reenamine the entire engineering work to reestablish ccnfidence in it. ... If it had not been done in 1981, the pinat would not have been licensed when it would have been subjected to intensive scrutiny by the NRC and independent design reviews to startup." Finding 3.5.2.3 at 3-41. EReport: H,JJ
- " Engineering personnel was a very big problem. There was a high turnover. ... The engineering organization-was overwhelmed .... Finding 3.5.2.4 at 3-41 42.
C3.1(a) at 3-2; Report: B,H,I]
- "Only a new A/E with no past association wi th STP could have done the re-enginsering of STF." Finding 3.5.2.6 at 3-42. EReport JJ
- Licensing and regulatory changes were not the root cause of B&R's engineering failures. Finding 3.6.1 at 3-43.
- "t1 a n y f unda;nen t al nuclear safety requirements such as single failure criterion, safety grade controls in safety systems, Eand] control of radioactivity wer'e established a long time before the STP constructico permit." Finding 3.6.1 at 3-43. EReport: AJ
- While the NRC regulations may have led to some increased loads, the " key engineering issue, in fact, is failure to upgrade the loads at any time during the course of designing STP." Finding 3.6.2 at 3-43.
E3.1(d) at 3-6; Report: I3
- "B&R failed to enticipate or to cope with licensing changes and when to introduce them into the design.
Most Architect / Engineers have lists identifying the
- i. tt por t an t licensing issue and their position on such isues. BSR Jid not end never imp 1emented such an appesacb." Finding 3.6.3 at 3-44. [3.1(d) at 3-6; Pepi;r i H,TJ
'%R had serious di f f i c' t1 Ly developing workable e -g i neer i ng
-501utions to NRC requirements." Finding 3.6.4 at 3-45. EReport: A,H1
- " I .1 late 1979, it was real):ed the EB&R's previous]
wparation approach Efor control and instrumentation ci rcui tal would not work and B&R started to use teclation devices. Here again B&R's lack of nuclear expertise was evident because they failed to develop a satisfactory electrical separ7 ton approach up to the time of transition to Bechtel." Finding 3.6.4 at 3-45.
E4.3.2.l(n) at 4-23:Feport: A,H:
The SLI Report provides extensive support for the sbcve generic findings, both in detailed enemination cf twenty-nine
'29) ' specific def1ciencies (Volume I) and a compilation of sti11 other de f i ci enc i c s. Volume II, Finding ' . ~ at 3 3-54.
Tb SLI Report also includes an in-depth look at the B&R enginrecing management as to i t.s qualifications, organization, and continutty. 3ccion 4 at 4 4-47. The conclusions of the
n management section are:
"1. Top management and engineering supervision did not have adequate nuclear power plant'enperience which is so. essential to the' success of nuclear projects.
- 2. The changes in key' personnel were r.umer ous and resulted. in very little continuity at important management-and engineering icvels.
- 3. BhR management organizations on STP were unwieldy and ineffective. They were drastically changed 'from t i nae to time. The project was burdened with an
~extraordinatiry' complen accumulation of separate engineering organizations, and little attempt was made to define and control the- relationships among them.
- 4. The project discipline engineers or counterparts in the discipline organization 'did not _ provide Jenough technical managemeni.
- 5. The-acid test of an or gani zati on 's capab_ili ty i s its results. The findings in this section lead to the conclusion that B%R did not poccess or acquire the capability to successfully manage the engineering of STP. One has only to look at the results .of B&R's desi gn work for confirmation that this capability was 1.a c k i r g , " Conclusions at 4-35. EReport: G3 In addition, SLI reviewed contemporaneous B&R internal dccuments'related to engineering perfcrmance.. Section 5 at 5 5-42. This section gives an inside look.at how much trouble BLP was having and the results of those difficulties. The conclusicns of the -sub-section .on B&R's situation prior to turnover to Bechtel-are:
"1. B&R documents an 1931 present a picture of un sch ed u l ed ~,- disorganized, and understaffed engineering." Conclusions at 5-38. [ Report: 4, F, G,_H, I, J3' "E This is the same picture re+1ected in-BLR's desi.gn.
. documents." Conclusions at 5-33. EReport: C, F, G, H, JJ Of.particular note in this section of the SLI Report are the following B&R observations on their own work:
- "What'it' amounts to is that Construction is far ahead
.of design." at 5-17 quoting BLR note dated August 22, 1980. -[3.1 (g1 at 3-9; Rep oi-t : EJ
- "I think there is a very real danger that the client, when engineerings is actually exposed as being as far behind as they are, will shut down the project for si:
months. If they do, I doubt very sericusly that B&R will remain the constructor." at 5-19 quoting BNP internal' memo dated February 24,'198L. EPeport: E, F]
- "It has come to the-attention of Houston Lighting and Power Company that Brown and Root Construction personnel are ash ng for and reteiving ' boot Icg' drawings to- expedite construction." at 5-20 quoting HLOP memo to BLR dated t!n ib 12 L E3.1(q) at 3-9; Report: E, FJ
- "This Project suffers from a never-ending changing fire drill. mode'...." at S-25 quoting B&R memo dated November 10, 1980. [Repert: B, F, G, H3
- "For some ti me r.ow , an in-depth review of STP design work has been conducted by BOR discipline staff engineers as part of the ' Engineering Assurance' program. Manpcwer requirements for the STP project have depleted the discipline staff to the point where they cu-rently cannot support all parts of this effort with adequate number of qualified personnel." at 5-24 quoting BLR memo dated April 2, 1981. [ Report: B3
- "The fundamental problem we'have is a coordination
. problem between the various parts o f the project, i.e.
engineering, construction, and quality assurance." at U-27 quoting B&R memo dated April 9, 1981. EReport: G3 All of the above e:: cerp t s , m: cept where identified otherwise, ccme from Volume II of the SLI Report. Volume. I contains an introduction, an e>;pl anati on of methocology, a work status report, and an in depth Icok at spectfic deficiencies which support the generic fincings of Volume II. Volume I contains numerous findings that also support the reportability of Guadrex findings or the proposition that the Quadrox Report as a
'whole should have been turned over to the NRC.
There i s one finding, however, which appears repeatedly in the detailed studies, e.g. in Finding 2.2 at 2.2-13; 2.2 at 2.3-12; 2.4 at 2.4 2.4-10; 2.7 at 2.7-5; 2.8 at 2.8 2.8-9; 2.10 at 2.10-4; 2.11 at 2.11-U; 2.13 at 2.13-6; 2.30 at 2.30-10,
to-wit:
" Fundamental changes in the design and associated equipment were necessary to correct the error in B&R design of the system ...." [ Report: I, JJ W'ile h CCANP has developed dozens of excerpts from Volume I similar to those from Volume II provided above, CCANP considers the excerpts provided as sufficient to support the motions made herein.
E. The Jordan " Diary" The document attached as Exhibit 1 hereto is apparently. a record.kept or-compiled by Mr. Don Jordan of the period from June 26, 1981, the day HL&P. management decided to seek alternatives to Brown and Root continuing at STNP, through December 16, 1981.
Numerous. entri es rel ated to discussions regarding the removal of Brown and Root. As such, most of this document fell within the discovery set forth in the Board's Memorandum and Order (Enplanation of Euling on CCANP Motion to Reapen-Phase I Record) dated June 18, 1965. At page.34 of.the Order, the Board ~ included as matters- to be-produced by Applicants, the follcWing:
" copies of internal documents or other reccrds (in any
~f or m , including drafts), or correspondence or other communications with outside persons (including but not limited to consultants), concerning (1) the decisicn to seek replacement of and, thereafter, to replace' ELR, including the dates when those decisions were made. ...
These records should cover the time frame from April 1, 1981 through September 24, 1981 ...."
~Th'is document was not, however, produced by Applicants. See Letter from. Jack R. Newman to.the Board dated July 2, 1985 and accompanying documents. On Exhibit 2, CCANP has placed. arrows next. to items which CCANP contends clearly fall within the Board's order through September 24, 1981. There are nineteen (19) 14
such entries.
In addition, CCANP directs the Board's attention to the second entry dated 8-10-31 which states:
"Oprea and Goldberg. All responses from Westinghouse, S&W,. Ebasco, and Bechtel were received in time.
Discussed f oll ow up ev.al uat i on . Determined that specific site discussions with each responsive bid would be necessary. Each meeting would last at least 2 days and would include specific review of resumes- and interviewing individuals proposed for the job. HL&F; team would be composed-of Oprea, Goldberg, & Jack Newman." (emphasis added)
One issue in Phase II is the role played by counsel for HL&P in the removal and replacement of Brown and Root. Of even greater importance is the central issue of the honesty and candor of HL&P management. The above quoted entry is additional evidence to that already in the record that Mr. Jordan was less than candid when answering questicos about the removal of Brown and ' Root, particularly the role of Mr. Neuman in that process.
When asked who' composed the cecision making team.for HL&P on the replacement.for F:r own and Root, 'Mr . Jordan stated that he made the decision in conjunction with Mr. Goldberg and Mr. Oprea.
Tr. 11981, L. 2-9. When asked if.anyone else within HL&P was part of that team, Mr. Jordan said: "No." Tr. 11981, L. 17 - 19. Mr.
Jordan testified he was sure there were other people who assisted in the analysis of replacements, but that they were not part. of the decision making team. Tr. 1 1 9 8 1 , .L.. 14-21. In terms of rating the proposals, Mr. Jordan reiterated that Mr. Goldberg and Mr.
Oprea.made those analyses. T r.. 11981, L. 22 - 11982, L. 7. When asked a fourth question along the same line, Mr. Jordan finally testified that there was another member of the team - Jack Newman
- but Jordan minimizes Mr. Newman's role. Tr. 11982, L. 8-17.
4e - _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .
CCANP has 'not conducted a thorough review of all the testimony provided by HL&P personnel regarding the. role of Mr.
Newman, but.obviously there is a credibility issue regarding that testimony. C ee e ngt Tr. 12464, L. 20 -'12466, L. 14; Tr. 12472, L. 1 - 12481, L. 21; CCANP Ex. No. 90. The quoted passage from Exhibit 1 is Mr. Jordan's own words which are relevant, probative, -and unique in supporting the proposition that Mr.
Jordan. at- least did not testify in a credible manner on this point.
Since honesty and candor is the heart of the character issue in this proceeding, testimony in Phase II.that is less than honest or complete is a critical measure of this central issue.
C. Motion for Board Ordered Froduction CCANP contends that enough information is provided above to satisfy the Board that the SLI Report is relevant to the Phase II iseues and that the Board should, therefore, at least review t.h e material in this report. CCANP is not including a copy of the GLI Report with this motion for the following reasons:
- 1. This document is 650 pages long.
- 2. The Applicants did offer to provide the report ~ to the Board, and CCANP believes the Board would have requested copies be provided had the Board truly understood the substance of this report.
- 3. CCANP considers.the Applicants to have been under an i
obligation to provide this report since October 1, 1984 or as soon thereafter as the judge in Matagorda County would permit release of the report. Even assuming that the judge would not have granted an Applicants' motion for such a- release, the
Applicants' obligation arose the day the protective order was dissolved.
- 4. CCANP does not believe its limited resources should
.be. expended' performing the Applicants' obligations.
For the above and foregoing reasons, CCANP moves the Board to order .the Appl-1 cants to produce the SLI Report to the Board and parties in.this proceeding.
D. Motion to Reopen the Record CLANP moves the Board to reopen the Phase II record to admit both the SLI Report and the Jordan " diary."
The standards for reopening are well established and not disputed previously by the parties to this proceeding. See Memorandum and Order (Explanation of Ruling on CCANP Motion to
. Reopen Phase I Record) , LBP-85-19 dated June 18, 1985 at 16. The three criteria which must be satisfied are:
- 1. The motion was timely filed;
- 2. The motion addresses a' significant safety (or environmental) issue; and
- 3. If a decision has alread been reached on the question for which reopening is sought, the motion must ,
demonstrate that the information offered as an addition to the record would alter the result previously reached. Id. at - l '7 .
t/ To provide copies to the Board and Service list would require reproduction. of 14 copies. CCANP unsuccessfully sought contribution of this copying from other organizations. 'At commercial rates, CCANP would have had to spend $300 simply on copying with additional funds expended on postage.
- 2/ CCANP's copy received through the City of Austin is a borrowed copy which CCANP is to return. CCANP, therefore, asks that.CCANP be included in the production order.
tit / See next page
<, 1
In this instance; the third criteria does not apply since
.none of. the issues subject to hearings in Phase II have been decided.
Regarding the timeliness of the. moti on 'zus it relates to the SLI Report, CCANP.first of all contends that since the Applicants were under an obligation to provide the SLI Report prior to the commencement of and throughout the Phase II hearings, CCANP cannot be faulted for the fact the report was not available to the Board and parties prior to the close of the hearings.
In addition, CCAMP did attempt diligently to secure a copy of the report and finally did so just over three weeks ago. Given
-the volume of material to be analyzed and compared with the issues in Phase II, the filing of this motion within less- than-f our weeks i s c l ear l y t i .r.el y .
Since tne SLI Report is relevant to t h e~ reportability of Guadre:: findings at issue in~ Phase [I and the reportability of the en tirr. Quadre:: report, also at issue in Phase II, and since the issue of reportability is a Phase II issue relevant to the character and competence of the Applicants, the SLI Report obviously addresses a significant cafety issue, i.e. the character and competence of the Applicants.
Regarding the timeliness of the motion as it relates to the Jordan " diary," CCANP again argues that since the Applicants were under an obligation to provide this document to the p ar ti es ,
112/ CCANP reccgntzes that the Board will not rule on the motion to rPopen' until the Board has had an opportunity to review the report, but since the argument on reopening is essentially set forth herein as the reasons'the Board should require production of the report, CCANP makes its motion on this point now.
CCANP cannot be faulted for its unavailability during the hearings. In addition, CCANP is providing this document within 4
three weeks of its receipt. Rather than file a separate frotion earlier, CCANP decided to include the Jordan "d i ar y in this motion. Given the Applicants' clear obligation and the short period since its receipt by CCANP, the filing of this motion to reopen is also timely.
Since the Jordan " diary" is relevant to HL&P's informing the ASLB about the replacement of Prawn and Root and to the credibility of Mr. Jordan's testimony, the document addresses the honesty, candor, and openness of HLLP - a clear character issue in Phase II and, therefore, a significant safety issue.
E. Motion for New Contention CCANP co7tends the failure of the Applicants to provide the SLI Report to the ASLB and parties in Phase II to be a new vi ol at i on of the Mg,gu i_r g r ul e .
The Anp_1_i_g,a n t s argued that the ultimate reportability of a given Quadre:: finding was the appropriate determining factor on potential reportability and would be one m7asure of Applicants' character. Tr. 11472, L.8-18; Sgg al_so Tr. 11474, L. 23 - 1147S, L.S.
CCANP argued to the contrary that the number of ultimately reportable findings was not at issue a r.d moved to strike t es+_ i mon y on ultimate reportability. Tr. 11471, L. 4-23. CCANP's position was that only the number of potentially reportable f i odi t ige was relevant to Phase II. Tr. 11474, L. 10-19.
~1 h e Board accepted lagt;h pcsitions as relevant to its ultimate judgment and denied CCANP's motion to strike on that w
1
' basis. Tr. 11476, L. 6-22 CCANP! has provided above an extensive correlation of SLI r Report findings with Quadrex findings to demonstrate that the SLI Report is a highly relevant document regarding the ultimate reportability Ef the Cu~drex a findings at issue in Phase II and of the Quadren Report as a whole. The SLI Report clearly 4
demonstrates that numerous Quadrex generic findings were correct and 'that deficiences in existing design documents, purchased l equipment, and . constructed items traced directly to the root causes identified in the Quadrex Report.
Furthermore, the SLI Report stands as refutation to the Applicants' position that the Quadrex Report was merely of scheduling and productivity concern rather than a key indicator of the technic-1 inedequacy of the B&R engineering effort.
CCANP contends that it is quite clear that the SLI Report is of major significance to the Phase II Duadrex issues, that the report is particularly significant to the issues as posed by the dagli_cnntg, and that the level of significance is-far higher than that needed to trigger the McGui_re rule.
For the above and foregoing reasons, CCANP moves the Board to admit a new contention, to-wit:
~
The Applicants' failure ta provide the ASLB and parties copies of the Sol Levy, Inc. " Report on Brown and Root Engineering on the South Texas Project"
- a. is a violation of the McGui te Rule;
- b. reflects adversely on the character and competence of Applicants.
Alternatively, CCANP seeks a Board ruling that the failure to provide the SLI Report is a violation of the Mg_Gu i r_e rule which does not require hearings and that the contention will be
1imited to issue "b." as set forth above.
F. Motion for Discovery CCANP seeks discovery on two matters: the handling of the SLI Report as it relates to CCANP's proposed contention and the the Jordan " diary" as to its origin, supporting documentation, and handling. After the latter discovery, CCANP would decide whether the handling of the Jordan " diary" is a suitable subject upon which to request further action by the Board, other than simply reopening the record to admit the document as requested herein.
G. Motion for Entension of Ti n:e Gtven the time.necessary for CCANP to analyze the SLI Report and prepar e this motion, CCANP 1ost more than two weeks of time which would have been available to prepare CCANP's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. CCANP, t her e1F or e , moves the Scard to e;: tend CCANP's desdline for filinc said proposed findings and conclusions until Monday, November 4, 1955.
Re-sp ec t f ul l y submitted,
) .
l Lanny Al an Sinkin Representative for Intervenor, Citizens Concerned About Nucicar Power, Inc.
3022 Porter y,t., N.W. #304 Washincton, D.C. 20008 (202) 966-2141 Dated: September 30, 1935 Wrh 2 ngton,.D.C.
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O APPENDIX 1 For purposes cf the motion related to the Sol Levy, Inc. Report,
-CCANP herein sets forth various reasons why the Quadrex Report as a whole should have been turned over to the NRC. The letters for each reason correspond to the letters set forth in the body of the motion. The Criter'a referred to are those found in 10 C.F.R.
.Part 50, Appendi: B.
A. The Quadrex Report documented the fact that BLR engineering
, lacked the skills to perform adequately, especially in the nuclear area. The absence of such skills is a fundamental def.iciency . The failure to ensure that the engineers designing and engineering the plant had the expertise to perform those functions violates Criterion II of Aopendin B in that the Applicants did not " provide control over activities affecting the quality of the identified structures, systems, and components, to an extent consistent with their importan;e to safety" and did not assure that "all prerequisites for the given activity have been sa ti sfi ed. "
. B. The Duadrex Report found B&R engineering to be overwhelmed by the task of designing and engineering STNP. Qualif,ed or not, the inability of the B%R engineering department to 4.eep control of the engineering process represents a violation of:
- 1. Criterion II in that control of the engineering process was lost;
- 2. Criterion III in that the design process was not being conducted in an orderly fashion;
- 3. Criterion VII in that Applicants did not ensure that the design and encineering services purchased from B&R were being provided in an orderly eashion; and
- 4. Criterion XVI in that the chaotic situation within B&R engineering was a condition adverse to safet;. which Appl.icants failed to prompt 1v identify and correct.
C. The Quadrex Report overall found serious technical inadequacies in B&R's engineering work, including inadequate interface between design disciplines, errors, a systematic failure to update work, and improperly performed work. The existence of these serious technical inadequacies represents a violation of:
- 1. Criterion I in that the Applicants did not effectively execute their quality assurance program; i 2. Criterion III in that the design basis was not " correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and l
instructions" and adequate measures were not " established for the iden ti f ication and control of design interfaces and for coordinaticn among design organizations;" and
- 3. Criterion VII in that Applicants failed to ensure the quality of the design and enuineering services purchased from i BLR.
' D. The Quadrea Report confirmed and expanded upon deficiencies known to ex i st over a long period of time or found in studies
E conducted just prior to the Quadrex study. This confirmation and expansion of .known deficiencies pointed cut a more systematic problem which.would be a violation of Criteria I, III, and VII similar to those noted in item C above.
E. The Quadrex Report explained why engineering could not keep up
, with construction and highlighted the potential quality problems resulting from schedule pressure on engineering. These ccnditions violate Criterion XVI in that excessive production pressures on engineering is a condition adverse to safety which Applicants failed to promptly identify and correct.
F. The Quadr ex Report overall documented a serious quality assurar.ce breakdown in the B&R engineering effort The Guadrex Report, therefore, provided a strong indication that the Quality Assurance Departments of HL&P and B&R were not functioning ef f ec ti vel y in the engineering area. Such disfunctional performance violates:
- 1. Criterion I in that'the quality assurance program,was not effectively implemented; and
- 2. Critorion II in that the quality assurance program was not ef f ectivel y controlling the design and engineering process.
G. The Quadrex Report is a strong indication of a significant
. breakdown in the management of D%R engineering at STNP. This breakdown at the management level is a violation of:
, 1. Critorico II in that management lost control of the engineering process; and
- 2. Criterion VII in that Applicents did not ensure adequate nanagement within BLR's design and engineering occcess.
1 H. The Duadrex Repcrt called into question the entire engineering effort at UTNP and the licensability of the plant. Such a broad and significant challenge to the overall adequacy of B&R's design and engineertng programs contai ns violations of:
- 1. Criterion I in that the quality assurance program was not effectively implemented:
- 2. Criterion II in that the qual i t y essurance program was not effectively controlling design and engineering activtties;
- 3. Criterion III in that adequate design control mer.sures i
were not being effectively implemented;
- 4. Criterion IV i n t h a t- equipment was being procured based on erroneous, unconhrolled, and/or non-conservative design calculations;
- 5. Criterion V in that drawi ngs wer e not adequate to ensure the design would perform satisfactorily;
- 6. Criterion VI in that drawings were not properly controlled;
- 7. Criterion VII in that the design and engineering services purchased from D6R were not of adequate quality;
- 8. Criterian XVI in that adequate corrective measures .aer e not being taken within the design and engineering process; and
- 9. Criterien XVIII in that either auditing requirements were not implemented effectively or audits did not result in effective performance.
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I. Subsequent to the, issuance of the Quadrex Report, confirmation of technical inadequacies in B&.R's design and engineerina process identified in the Quadre>: Report findings supports the. position that the Quadrex Report itself was reportable.
J. As the most significant indicator t'a date of a severely
" deficient design and engineering process, the Quadre>; Report, as a'whole, poli 3t'ed clearly to the necessity of removing Brown and Root as architect-engineer. The NRC should certainly have been provioed sltch a report.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION EEFORE THE ATOf11C SAFETY AND LICCNSING EOARD In the Matter of (
)
HOUSTON LIGHTING AND ( DocLet Nos. O.i-4 % OL POWER COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-499 Ot.
Gnuth Tm as Project, (
Untts 1 and 2) (
MLill.ElG61Ei OE SEEYIM I hereby certify that copies at CCANP MOTION FOR BOARD ORDERED PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, TO REOPRN THE REOCRD, FOR NEW CONTENTICN, FOR DISCOVERY, AND FOR EXTENSIONS OF TIME were e er ,ma tn hand cie l i ver y (*) or deposit in the U.S. Mail, first claec post age paid to the following Individuals and entities en the
- .O t h day of September 1985.
- Eharles betnhoefer, Esquire Brian Eerwi c 6: , Esquire Chairman Asst. Atty. Gen.
Atomic Safety and ticenz.ang Board State of Tenas U . 3. Nuclear Requiator/ Commission Envircrmt1. Protection Wa =iii nat on , D.C. 2U555 P. O. Bo:- 12548, Capitol Sta.
Austin, Texas 78711 im . J ame C. Lamo, III r Jr.i t .15t r at i v u Judco *0reste Russ Pa rto, Esquire J.1 Ucodhaven Road Ofrice of the Exec. Leg. Dir.
C he n :) Hi11, North Car 01ina 27514 U.S. Nuc1 ear Regulatcry Comm.
Washington, D.C. 20555 er.=.4 rick J. Shan Jdcit r.) str ati ve Judge + J ac 6. F. Newman, E s q u i r =-
- u. '. Nuclear Regulatsry Commission 1615 L Street, NW, Sutta 1000 W3 st i nq ton , D.C. D iS55 Washino+or,, D.C. 20036 Melbert Schu=rn, Esqutre Baker and Eotte t1r , Peggy Euchorn 30 > Ono Shell Plaza
- ecut t /e Director, C.E.U. Houston, T i= .< a s 77002 Poute 1. B o .< 1684 Br az or i a , Texas 77422
- Atomic Safety and Liceneing bd.
U.S. Nuclear Recul at or'/ Comm.
Wi111am S. Jordan, III, Esq. Washington, D.C. 20535 Harmon, Weiss & Jordan 2001 S Street, N.W., Sulte 430 + Atomi c Safety and Licensinq Washington, D.C. 20009 Appeal Board U.3. Nuc1 ear Regulatorv Comm.
Fat Coy Washington, D.C. 205S5 S106 Casa Oro Son Antonio, Texas 702r Dec6eting and Service Gection Office of the Secretar h baldeteln U.S. t h tc l ear Regulator / Comm.
1001 'v a u g h n Bldg. Washington, D.C. 20555 CO7 Eraros A+ tin, Texas 7 8 ^701 Lenny tnkin