ML20140D845
| ML20140D845 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1984 |
| From: | Shewmaker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140D809 | List: |
| References | |
| ALAB-786, OL, NUDOCS 8412190225 | |
| Download: ML20140D845 (24) | |
Text
I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of )
)
LOUISIANA POWER AND L1dHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-382
) .
(WaterfordSteamElectricStation,)
Unit 3) )
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT E. SHEWMAKER Q.1. Please state your name, title and by whom you are employed?
A.1. My name is Robert E. Shewmaker. I am employed as a Senior Civil-Structural Engineer in the Engineering and Generic Communications Branch of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A statement of my professional qualifications is attached.
Q.2. What is the purpose of this affidavit?
A.2. The purpose of this affidavit is to respond to several questions raised by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board in its Memorandum and Order of October 2,1984 (ALAB-786), regarding (a) the conclusions reached by the civil / structural allegation review team concerning base mat-related issues, as reflected in my previous affidavit filed on August 7, 1984; (b) a discrepancy in Harstead Report 8304-3 relating to the ,
location of a Cadweld; and (c) a summary of the views of Staff consultant Robert E. Philleo concerning the nondestructive testing of the basemat performed by Meunow and Associates, Inc; Mr. Philleo's report and further o!oohh PDR
I information in I.his regard are provided in the affidavit of James Knight which.is being filed herewith. In addition, I wish to provide the Appeal Board with further information and conclusions concerning base mat issues which the civil / structural allegation review team has evaluated since the time my previous affidavit was filed.
Q.3. Please respond to the Appeal Board's comments concerning what it described as an apparent inconsistency between the conclusions reached in your prior affidavit with regard to irregularities in the certification records for concrete inspectors (ALAB-786, at 8-9), and the prior identi-
- fication of this issue as one having potential safety significance in Mr.
Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 1984.
A.3. The issue of inspector certifications was identified as having potential safety significance insofar as the base mat is concerned, based upon the allegation review team's having found 'that four J. A. Jones inspectors (out of the five reviewed by the team) failed to meet the applicable certification requirements concerning relevant experience (Item 10 in Enclosure to Eisenhut Letter, at 7). As indicated in Mr.
Eisenhut's letter, inasmuch as these inspectors were involved in the inspection of safety-related activities, "the fact that they may not have been qualified to perform such inspections, renders the quality of the inspected construction activities as indeterminant" (Id.). Not-withstanding the identification of this matter as having potential safety sig'nificance, at the time my prior affidavit was filed on August 7, 1984, I stated (at p. 13) that "the civil / structural team believes that, to the
F I l
l l
1 extent that these items relate to the base mat, they are likely to be resolved in a satisfactory manner and will not be found to have any safety significance. Accordingly, these items are considered to be confirmatory in nature."
My previous affidavit reflects the civil / structural team's views on this issue as of August 7, 1984. Those views were based upon new infor-mation which became available to the Staff after Mr. Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 1984, had been prepared. For this reason, there is no inconsist-ency between the two documents. The further information which was avail-able to the Staff at the time my previous affidavit was prepared, and upon which that affidavit was based, was as follows.
The applicant commenced working on this issue even prior to the issuance of Mr. Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 1984. During the months of June and July, 1984, I and other members of the Staff received certain preliminary verbal information relating to the applicant's progress in addressing this issue. In addition, on June 28, 1984, the applicant submitted a draft program plan outlining its approach to resolving this and other issues, tehich plan was revised in the applicant's submittal of July 27, 1984. In its revised program plan, the applicant indicated that the facts concerning this issue were yet to be determined. However, the applicant's approach to resolving this issue was known to the Staff; that approach essentially required a strict interpretation of the applicable sertification standards which LP&L had comitted to meet, and classifi .
cation of all J. A. Jones inspectors as either qualified or unqualified for certification. For each inspector who was found to be unqualified for certification, the applicant would determine which work functions the
a individual had performed and how extensive that work had been, and would then evaluate the safety significance of that task on plant design, con-struction, and operation.
In addition, at the time my previous affidavit had been prepared, I knew that there generally had been double coverage on inspection act-ivities in this area. While J. A. Jones pe.rsonnel were assigned primary inspection responsibilities, EBASCO had been performing a second and duplicative inspection function. What I did not know for certain was whether such double coverage existed for each inspection checkoff item on all preplacement and placement inspections.
Further, the sample of five inspectors reviewed by the Task Force represented only a fraction of the total number of J.A. Jones concrete inspectors involved in the project, and verbal information received by the allegation review team indicated that for the entire population of inspectors, better results were shown. In addition, the problems which had surfaced in our sample involved the the length of the individuals' inspection and quality control experience, and did not involve a ques-tion of whether the inspectors had been properly trained. Because the Task Force's review of inspection procedures revealed very detailed pro-cedures specifying distinct parameters and observations to be made, we did not view the experience factor as being highly important for Level I inspectors.
~
For all of the reasons discussed above, the civil / structural allega-tion review team was able to conclude as of August 7,1984, that this matter is "likely to be resolved in a satisfactory manner and will not be found to have any safety significance."
l l
a Q.4. Has ddition'al infonnation become available to the Staff since August 7, 1984, concerning the qualifications of the J.A. Jones concrete inspectors?
A.4. Yes. The applicant has now provided its response on the issue of inspector qualification and certification, in letters from J.M. Cain to D.G. Eisenhut dated October 31, and December 6,1984.
Of the nearly 70 J.A. Jones concrete inspectors, the applicant has determined that 28 inspectors were " unqualified", and that their work was in question. Twenty of these individuals had perfonned safety-related inspection functions on concrete placements. In October 1984, members of the Task Force were present at the Waterford site and reviewed a matrix-prepared by the applicant describing the specific inspection activities with which each of the " unqualified" inspectors had been associated.
This review verified the number of inspectors who had been associated with safety-related work on the basemat concrete placements. Further study into this matter by the applicant, as verified by members of the Task Force, has resulted in the determination that qualified EBASCO inspectors had performed a double inspection effort on this work, using EBASCO procedures. Thus, the work activities called into question as a result of inspections having been performed by " unqualified" J.A. Jones inspectors were, in fact, inspected by qualified inspectors.
Q.5. Has the Staff reached a final conclusion as to whether any remaining unresolved or potential safety question exists with regard to, the qualification of concrete inspectors associated with construction i
_ . . . , . . . . . . . - - . . , _ _ . . _ , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ . . _ . _- . _ . . _ _ _ . . . ~ . . , . , _ _ . . _ . . - . _ _ . . _ . . .-
D of the basemat, identified as item 10 in Mr. Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 1984?
A.5. Yes. Based upon the information discussed above, the Task Force has concluded that inspections were performed on all basemat con-crete construction by qualified inspectors. The Staff has confidence in the qualifications of the inspectors and the inspection effort per-formed on the basemat during its construction, and is satisfied that the resulting structure meets the intent of the construction specification requirements. To our knowledge, there are no unresolved safety issues relative to the issue of " unqualified" inspectors associated with the concrete basemat. Further detailed information concerning the closure of this issue will be provided in Supplement 9 to the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report.
Q.6. Please respond to the Appeal Board's coninents concerning the conclusions reached in your prior affidavit with regard to missing soil ,
backfill records (ALAB-786, at 10-11), indicating the basis for those conclusions in light of the Staff's having identified this issue as one
, having potential safety significance in Mr. Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 1984.
A.6. The issue of soil backfill records was identified as having potential safety significance based upon the civil / structural allegation review team's having found that such records were missing for the in-place backfill density tests in Area 5 (the first 5' starting at El. -41.25').
(Item 7 in Enclosure to Eisenhut Letter, at 6). As indicated in Mr.
Eisenhut's letter, "[t]'hese documents are important because the seismic response of the plant is a function of the soil densities" Q_d,.).
d In my affidavit of August 7,1984, I indicated (at p.11) that "the -
team's findings relative to missing soil backfill documents leaves open a question as to the adequacy of backfill placement and compaction," and noted that the applicant had been requested to take action on this matter.
Nonetheless, I concluded as follows:
[T]he team does not believe that the fact that soil records are missing will have any impact on plant safety, due to the limited soil volumes involved and the absence of any reason to believe that compaction results were obtained in those areas which were significantly different from the compaction results reflected in other records. This item does not entail any generic implications, since all other soil data appeared to be accurate and indicated that the soils criteria had been met.
(M.). Accordingly, I concluded that while further efforts are required on the part of the applicant to resolve this matter, the civil / structural allegation review team believed that this item "is likely to be resolved in a satisfactory manner and will not be found to have any safety signifi-cance"(M.,at13).
My previous affidavit reflects the civil / structural allegation review team's views on this issue as of August 7, 1984. Those views were based upon inforraation which became available to the Sta'ff after Mr. Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 1984, had been prepared. For this reason, there is no inconsistency between the two documents. The further information which was available to the Staff at the time my previous affidavit was prepared, and upon which that affidavit was based, was as follows.
The applicant had commenced working on this issue prior to the issuance of Mr. Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 1984. During the months of June and July,1984, certain preliminary verbal information became available to myself and others relating to the applicant's progress in in addressing this issue. In addition, the applicant submitted a draft program plan outlining its approach to resolving this and other issues, on June 28, 1984; this plan was revised in the applicant's submittal dated July 27, 1984. The revised program plan stated that "[t]he soil density is in compliance with specification requirements," and that "a complete set of soils test data exists at the site." In this regard, verbal information became available to the allegation review team, indi-cating that the missing records were located in the trailer facilities which continued to be utilized by the subcontractor responsible for per-forming the soil tests in question, and that these records had orter been transmitted to EBASCO for inclusion in the final quality document packages.
At the time I prepared my affidavit of August 7, 1984, I was aware of the applicant's statement that a complete set of soils test data was l in existence, although neither I nor other Staff members had seen or L
examined the newly located records. Nonetheless, I recognized that, at the time the allegation team performed its sample, following a total re-review by the applicant, backfill soil test records were missing only I
for the first five feet of backfill soils in Area 5. Accordingly, it was my professional judgment that, due to (a) the limited soil volume represented by the missing records and (b) the existence of some 50 feet of adequately compacted backfill on top of that five foot layer, the L__
fact that these records were missing was not likely to have an impact on the structure's seismic response.
Q.7. Has additional information become available to the Staff since August 7, 1984, with respect to the question of missing backfill soil records?
A.7. Yes. The applicant has now pro,vided its response on this issue, in letters from J. M. Cain to D. G. Eisenhut dated August 27 and November 21, 1984. The applicant's response indicates that, as a result of its review effort, it has located the records which the Task Force identified as missing; these records involve 34 test sample locations. The applicant's review effort also revealed that no other test records are missing.
The Task Force has reviewed the records which the applicant states were relocated; these documents appear to be authentic, and have now been transferred to the QA vault for storage along with the other Class I soils records. In reviewing these records, the Task Force noted instances demonstrating close adherence to the quality procedures for placement, compacticn, testing, and documentation of soils work in the 1976 time frame. The documents reveal that where changes were made, the initials of the individual making the change and the date of the change were provided. This corrective work was done in 1976, the same year in which the work reported in the document was completed, demonstrating that the quality review of documentation was taking place and was effective in ,
the same time frame as that in which the work was being completed.
The Task Force has also verified that the remainig soils test records are complete, by examinatior. of the hardcover, bound notebook maintained
~
by the test laboratory to log and index each test completed. All field density test records are available.
In addition, the applicant has examined the completeness of the inspection records for backfill soil placements. This review disclosed that approximately 30% of the J. A. Jones inspcction records are missing.
However, as a result of the double inspection coverage performed by EBASCO on backfill soils work, the applicant has determined that nearly all such activities were addressed by an available inspection report, based upon a comparison of the number of field density test results reported. (A field density test is one of the elements called for in an inspection, so that the number of field density tests performed should equal the number ofcorrespondinginspections.)
The applicant has concluded that, based upon available data, the percentage-of-inspection coverage for 80% of the backfill volume fully met the requirements, and all inspection records are available for those areas. For the remaining 20% of backfill volume, approximately 81% of the necessary inspection reports are available, as generated either by J. A. Jones or EBASCO. For the areas where all inspection reports are not available, only 0.2% of the backfill volume is not represented by any inspection report; those volumes were all located below elevation
-37 (i.e., below the top of the basemat), along the bottom or slopes of the excavation where small construction drainage ditches or trenches
. had be'en cut early ir. the construction sequence. Even for these voluir.es, however, as noted above, in-place field density test records are avail-able, and indicate that the field density tests were run and found to be acceptable.
The applicant has'also reviewed the frequency with which backfill inspections and tests were performed. In general, these activities were performed at the rate of approximately one per each 200 cubic yards of backfill material placed. After reviewing the data provided by the applicant and confirming its accuracy, the Task Force compared these rates to the rate used by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for controlling theconstructionofearthendams;ll that rate is 1 per 1,000 cubic yards at the outset, dropping to 1 per 3,000 cubic yards thereafter.
Finally, the applicant has provided information resulting from statistical studies of the values obtained from in-place field density testing, for all backfill soils relevant to the seismic response of the facility. Those studies indicate that the mean value of the soil density is at least 8% higher than the minimum required relative density of 75%. The range of the relative densities were also found to be within the tolerance band specified, indicating that relatively uniformly material has been placed.
Q. 8. Has the Staff reached a final conclusion as to whether any remaining unresolved or potential safety question exists with regard to the documentation and results of backfill soils construction and testing?
A.8. Yes. The Task Force has reviewed the applicant's data and l
1 other information relevant to issue of missing backfill soil records.
We have determined that all in-place soil density test results are avail-l
~1/
Manual EM-1110-2-1911, January 17,1977, " Construction Control for
! Earth and Rock-Fill Dams," U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers.
able, reflecting both the testing frequency and test results; these records demonstrate that the applicant's construction specification and Safety Analysis Report commitments have been met. While inspection records were not available for approximately 0.2% of the total backfill soil volume, it appears that the inspections were completed, based upon the fact that one step in the inspection process is to request that in-place field density tests be performed, and documentation exists showing that such tests were performed. Because it is the quality of in-place soil backfill materials that would be of final concern from a safety standpoint, and the quality of these materials has been adequately demonstrated, the Staff has concluded that soils issues have been fully resolved. Further detailed information concerning the closure of this issue (Item 7) will be provided in Supplement 9 to the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report.
Q.9. Please provide your views with respect to the Appeal Board's observation of an apparent discrepancy in Appendices I and II to the applicant's Harstead Report No. 8304-03, concerning the location of Cad-weld No. 2W120 (ALAB-786, at 14-15).
A.9. At the Staff's request (Item 11 in Enclosure to Eisenhut
! Letter of June 13, 1984, p.8), the applicant has provided a complete I
compilation of Cadweld data from a computerized data bank, related to Cadweld installations made by J. A. Jones Co. A review of this informa-l tion by the Staff, performed during the week of October 22, 1984, has
! ~
disclosed that Cadweld No. 2W120 is located in Block 1 of the basemat, ,
l not in Block 16 as had been indicated in Appendix II, Sheet C-1, of HEA
[ Report 8304-3. This splice was cut out and tested in a random production l
, , ., .~. _
test, and test data indicate that it met the design criteria. As indi-cated in Appendix I to the Harstead report, no Cadwelds are known to have been made by J. A. Jones Co. in Block 16 of the basemat.
In response to an inquiry made by the Staff by letter of October 19, 1984, the applicant also stated that Cadweld 2W120 is located in Block 1 of the basemat (letter from K. W. Cook to D. M. Crutchfield, dated Octo-ber26,1984). In addition, the applicant's letter explained that "[i]t appears as though there may have been an error on the part of HEA in transposing the data while generating Appendix II." The Staff is satis-fied that this statement provides a reasonable explanation for the noted discrepancy.
Q.10. Please respond to the Appeal Board's inquiry (ALAB-786, at 15) as to whether the discrepancy discussed in Question 10 above is indicative of broader problems with the reliability of data supplied to Harstead Engineering Associates by the applicant's contractors?
A.10. In the Staff's letter of October 19, 1984, referred to in response to Question 10 above, the Staff requested that the applicant i explain the noted Cadweld discrepancy and provide " assurance that it is not indicative of a reliability problem with data supplied to Harstead by LP&L contractors." In Attachment A to a letter from K. W. Cook to Dennis M. Crutchfield, dated October 26, 1984, the applicant provided I the results of its review of Cadweld data utilized by the Harstead firm
. to' generate Harstead Report 8304-03. This review disclosed four other ,
l errors which were found to be typographical in nature; and the applicant l
l concluded that "the inconsistency was a typographical error and is neither w-wg -- , - -
indicative of unreliable data being supplied to HEA nor would it have anyimpactontheconclusioninthereport"(M.,at2).
While the scope of the review performed by myself and other members of the Task Force did not encompass a review of the Harstead reports, I have noted certain errors in those reports. Specifically, in HEA R port No.8304-2(October 12,1983), Sheet C-2-1-15, listing moment capacities, contains an error in the sixth entry for #11 at 6 and #11 at 12 in the N-S direction, in that the 2847 k-ft/ft is for bottom reinforcing, not top reinforcing; this should also be reflected on page 11, Item (c), where moments greater than 2847 k-ft/ft should be listed as the criterion.
4 This change would cause element 190 to be added to the list of the four elements mentioned on page 11. I do not believe that this error has any impact on the conclusions contained in the report. Additionally, in HEA Report 8304-3 (dated January 9, 1984), I noted a typographical error; on page 4, under Item 2.6, line 4, NCR W3-7252 should read NCR W3-7152, as ,
shown in Appendix III.
I do not believe that these errors resulted from any problem with the reliability of data supplied to Harstead Engineering Associates.
Rather, the errors probably resulted from errors in transcription and clerical oversight. I am not aware of any other errors in the data con-tained in the Harstead reports. ,
Q.11. Has Mr. Robert E. Philleo, the Task Force's independent consultant on the concrete constrwtion of the basemat, reexamined his earlier conclusions in light of thi 'andestructive testing results pro-
vided by Muenow and Associates, Inc., as the Appeal Board has requested (ALAB-786,at14)?
l A.11. Yes. Mr. Philleo has reviewed the Muenow Report from the i 4 standpoint of determining whether it has an effect upon his prior conclu-sions, as set forth in his report, " Evaluation of Concrete Construction Adequacy in the Basemat, Waterford Unit No. 3," dated May 18.-1984. l In a letter dated November 10,1984 (attached to the Affidavit of James Knight, dated December 17,1984), Mr. Philleo stated as follows:
As a result of reading this report I believe we know with confidence little more than we knew before receiving the report. However, even if all the conclusions are accepted, there is nothing to cause concern about the structural per-formance of the basemat. All the cracks are found to be nearly vertical and are probably the result of thermal stresses formed during cooling of the concrete after the early hydration of the cement. There is no evidence of shear cracks resulting from unusual loading conditions or adverse foundation support.
Further information concerning Mr. Philleo's evaluation of the Meunow report are contained in Mr. Knight's affidavit of December 17, 1984, referred to above.
Q.12. Has the Staff reached a final conclusion as to whether any remaining unresolved or potential safety issue exists with regard to Cadwelds used in the construction of the basemat (identified in Mr.
Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 1984, as Item 11)?
l A.12. Yes. Members of the Task Force have completed a compre-hensive review at the site of information assembled concerning the Cad-l welds made by J. A. Jones Construction Co., and of the Cadwelders' quali-l
- fications. The Staff has determined that the installed Cadweld splices l
l I
i exceed design strength requirements by a significant margin, and that all questions relative to test frequency, personnel qualifications, and production samples have been satisfactorily resolved. Accordingly, the Staff has determined that no safety-significant issues remain unresolved relative to Cadwelding activity. Further detailed information concerning these matters and the closure of Item 11 will be provided in Supplement 9 to the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report.
Q.13. Has the Staff reached a final conclusion as to whether any remaining unresolved or potential safety issue exists with regard to the water-filled conduit or other pathways through the basemat which might permit groundwater to flow freely into the structure (identified in Mr. Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 1984, as Item 19)?
A.13. Yes. The Task Force has completed its review of basemat conduits and their potential for causing flooding in the lower levels of the auxiliary building. In its review, the Task Force noted that the -
applicant has committed to perform the following actions. Pressure grout-ing of the piezometer riser, noted by the Task Force as being filled with water, will be completed over its entire embedment in the basemat prior to fuel load. Seals in the conduits will be replaced as maintenance items, since any leakage is fully controllable. Based on the information it has reviewed concerning this issue, the Task Force has concluded that the issue has been satisfactorily resolved. Further detailed information refating to the closure of this issue will be provided in Supplement'9 to the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report.
~
Q.14. Has the Staff reached a final conclusion as to whether any remaining unresolved or potential safety issue exists related to the ..
documentation of GE0 personnel qualifications in the area of construction materials testing, identified as Item 20 in Mr. Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 1984?
A.14. Yes. The Task Force has co,mpleted additional work at the Waterford site during the period that the applicant was developing and finalizing its response to Issue 20. The Task Force is in agreement with the number of inspectors which the applicant has placed in the "unquali-fied" category, as a result of those individuals' having generally failed to meet the precise requirements for certification. In addition, the Task Force has reviewed the applicant's disposition and resolution of the deficiencies which were identified as a result of this categorization of the inspectors. Based upon these efforts, it is our conclusion that the testing and inspection results obtained by GE0 personnel for the project correctly reflect the materials used and the as-built conditions at the plant. Accordingly, we have determined that there are no unresolved or potential safety issues relative to GE0 personnel qualifications. Further detailed information concerning the closure of this issue will be provided l in Supplement 9 to the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report.
j' Q.15. Did Items 7,10,11,19 and 20 as highlighted in your i
l previous affidavit represent all of the items in Mr. Eisenhut's letter l
of June 13, 1984 which could impact on basemat issues?
A.15. No. While those five items represented the major items having direct relevance to the basemat, during my closecut review of l
l l
the items listed in Mr.- Eisenhut's June 13, 1984 letter, I realized that I had inadvertently not included Item 14 in my previous affidavit, as a basemat-related issue which Mr. Eisenhut had earlier identified as having potential safety significance.
Item 14 arose from the Task Force effort on Allegation A-132, which relates to several different structures, including the basemat; most of these did not relate to the construction of the basemat. See SSER 7 at
- p. 140. This issue addressed J. A. Jones Construction Company " speed letters" and engineering information requests for the entire project, and the issue of whether they contained information which should have been reported in deficiency notices (DNs) or nonconformance reports (NCRs) thereby receiving subsequent engineering review.
Based on the work completed by the applicant and the sampling by the Task Force, the Staff has now concluded that some of the speed ,
letters and engineering information requests involved issues which required engineering review, and that all such items have now received proper engineering review. This review resulted in a finding that there are no needed physical changes to the facility. Further detailed information concerning these matters and the closure of Item 14 will be provided in Supplenent 9 to the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report.
Q.16. Did the Task Force review any allegations relating to the Waterford basemat, other than those embraced by Items 7, 10, 11, 19, and 20"in Mr. Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 19847 .
A.16. Yes. Supplerent 7 to the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report identified numerous allegations which were reviewed by the Task Force,
relative to the Waterfo'rd basemat. Board Notification No.84-170, dated October 12, 1984, identified these as Allegations A-107, A-109, A-110, A-111, A-112, A-113, A-114, A-115, A-116, A-129, A-132, A-134, A-136, A-138, A-139, A-141, A-145, A-146, A-147, A-156, A-158, A-171, and A-270.
Included among these allegations are those which are addressed in Items 7,10,11,14,19, and 20 in Mr. Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 1984.
Q.17. Have all of the allegations relating to the Waterford basemat been resolved to the satisfaction of the Task Force?
A.17. Yes. The resolution of many of these allegations was documented in SER Supplement 7; the resolution of the remaining basemat-related allegations will be documented in SER Supplement 9, scheduled to be issued shortly. Included among the allegations whose resolution will be documented in SER Supplement 9 are those embraced by Items 7,10, 11,14,19, and 20 in Mr. Eisenhut's letter of June 13, 1984. A sumary of how those six particular items have been resolved is set forth above.
There are two other allegations related to basemat issues, other than those embraced by Mr. Eisenhut's letter, whose resolution will be i documented in SER Supplement 9 -- these are Allegations A-109 and A-141, which concern the interruption, in June 1983, of a review of concrete
! placement packages which was being perfonned by the Quality Assurance Installation Review Group. In SER Supplement 7, t.he Staff noted that I additional NRC Staff work was required on these issues (see SSER 7, at pp. 122 and 149). The Task Force has now completed its review of these.
matters, and has determined that they do not present an unresolved safety issue.
l
Q.18. Please provide a summary of the manner in which Allegation
.A-109 has been found to be resolved.
A.18. With respect to Allegation A-109', the Task Force has com-pleted its review of the available information, for the purpose of reaching a judgment as to the allegation's technical and safety implications.
Based upon this review, the Task Force has determined that the records review process was subject to starts and stops, after the Quality Assur-ance Installation Review Group (QAIRG) initiated its review of concrete record packages in the Fall of 1982. Through the various stages, from a sampling review, to a 10% review, to a full 100% review, a nine-month period transpired during 1983 before a full review was undertaken.
At this point in time, the Task Force focused mainly on the adequacy of the final 100% review, and not on the question of whether too long a period had been allowed to elapse before the 100% review was initiated.
Based upon its review of this issue, the Task Force has found the 100%
records review performewd by the applicant to be satisfactory. For example,
~
. sampling completed by the Task Force of over 70% of the basemat concrete placement packages revealed only three minor discrepancies; one of those
. discrepancies has now been corrected, while the others involve either a missing page or a failure to meet a precise test sampling frequency requirement. Both of the latter items have been assessed to be of no ,
consequence for safety margins. In the Staff's opinion, the concrete placement package records are now adequate and supportive of the con- ,
clusion that the quality of construction meets design intent. Further detailed information concerning the resolution of Allegation A-109 will be provided in SER Supplement 9.
Q.19. Please provide a summary of the manner in which Allegation A-141 has been found to be resolved.
A.19. The Task Force has completed its review of the available information concerning this allegation, for the purpose of reaching a determination of whether the discrepancies identified on the 70 concrete placement packages, which were asserted to have been listed on log, were in fact considered by the applicant's quality review. The Task Force ascertained that the log referred to in the allegation was available for review and, after breaking this listing down, the Task Force identified 71 individual items, 56 of which related to Cadwelding and concrete pro-duction, placement and curing.
The Task Force also found other documents identifying deficiencies; these documents, however, had not been fully completed or transmitted for resolution (as provided in the quality procedures) before the QAIRG work was halted. The Task Force believes that these documents reflected
~
work in progress at a time when QAlkG was undergoing changes and manage-ment was in the process of considering actions to be taken on the sample document review that had been completed. In other cases, the Task Force located only the forms which were used in the transmittal of documents defining deficiencies; however, these contained sufficient information for follow-up to ascertain whether or not an unresolved safety item remained.
'~The applicant and ESASCO have completed a detailed review of these documents and the information contained therein, for the purpose of iden-tifying any deficient conditions; this work was perfcrmed under the close scrutiny of the Task Force. It was determined that several of the defi-
ciencies listed on the' log had in fact been closed, while others were being addressed by individual nonconformance reports (NCRs) or were discrepancies to be corrected. For each item in which a discrepancy had been noted in the review process at any point in time, and which had not clearly been closed and resolved, the Task Force required the applicant to review the situation, gather the facts, provide conclusions as to the item's impact on safety, and render a determination on whether the item may be considered to be closed. Based upon this effort, and in consider-ation of the facts contained in the applicant's responses, the Task Force has concluded that the deficiencies have been addressed satisfactorily, and that there are no remaining unresolved safety items. Accordingly, the Task Force has concluded that the deficiencies which were identified as having been contained in the 70 concrete placemnt packages, as well as the other deficiencies which were found during this review process, have been satisfactorily resolved, and there are no remaining open safety _
issues. Further detailed infomation relating to the resolution of Allegation A-141 will be provided in SER Supplement 9.
obett E. Shewmaker Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of December, 1984 W h& '
Notary Public My commission expires:
Robert E. Shewmaker Statement of Professional Qualifications Education:
B.S. degree in Civil Engineering (Structures) at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, Illinois (September 1958 - June 1962).
M.S. degree in Civil Engineering (Structures) at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, Illinois (June 1962 - June 1963).
Registration:
Registered Professional Engineer in the Comonwealth of Virginia since 1967.
Registered Professional Engineer in the State of Maryland since 1968.
Experience:
of Illinois, Department of Civil Research Engineering,Assistant and Fellow, University Champaign-Urbana, Illinois (January 1962 - June 1963).
Research and testing of small scaled reinforced concrete models for flat slab structures.
Construction Engineer, Lieutenant, US Army Corps of Engineers, 146th En-gineer Detachment, 8th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Ft. Gulick, Canal Zone (July 1963 - June 1965). Project engineer for airborne training school facilities, roads, airfields and training facilities and instructor in military engineering at the U.S. Army School of the Americas, Canal Zone.
Structural Engineer at Anderson, Birkeland, Anderson and Mast, Structural Consulting Engineers, Tacoma, Washington, (July 1965 - May 1966). Design and analysis of commercial and industrial facilities, including offices, port and pier facilities, bridges, dormitories, elevated monorail systems
- etc. in Seismic Zone III, and computer applications. Extensive reinforced '
and prestrg; Hied concrete design.
Senior Structural Engineer. at Bechtel Power Corporation, Gaithersburg, Paryland (May 1966 - May '1969). Structural analysis and design of struc-tural steel frames and transmission towers, and concrete structures for circulating water system and chimneys for Turkey Point I and 2, and Cape
a
~
. 2 .
Cape Kennedy 1 and 2. Lead of structural analysis and design section for prestressed containment structures at Oconee 1, 2 & 3, and Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2. Assistant Lead Civil-Structural Engineer for Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2.
Senior Structural Engineer at USAEC and USNRC, Bethesda, Maryland (May 1969 to present) in the Division of Reactor Licensing, the Division of Reactor Standards, and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement. Performed tech-nical review of nuclear power plant applications for civil-structural aspects, developed structural criteria and standards, provided input as a member of national code committees, and provided technical support for construction problems, inspection activities, and inspection and enforce-ment programs.
Professional Affiliations:
Fellow,AmericanConcreteInstitute(ACI) ..
Member of ACI 349 - Concrete Nuclear Structures Member of ACI 359, Joint Committee with the American Society of Mechan-ical Engineers,Section III, Division 2, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and Containments.
Member of ACI 364 - Rehabilitation of Concrete & Masonry Structures Member, Prestressed Concrete Institute Member, American Society of Civil Engineers
[
l
- O l
l l
l