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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20140E9181997-06-0707 June 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 133 to License DPR-43 ML20045C9281993-06-21021 June 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Change to TS Bases Re DG Fuel Oil Transfer & Storage Sys ML20149L4951984-09-21021 September 1984 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Implementation of IE Bulletin 80-11,Items 2(b) & 3 ML20235C0071983-02-28028 February 1983 Evaluation Re Deficiencies Discovered in Facility Tech Specs Concerning Contaoinment Cooling Sys Operability.Recommends Mod to Tech Spec 3.3.b.2 to Correct Deficiencies ML20052G8991982-05-0606 May 1982 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 44 to License DPR-43 ML19254D0071979-09-30030 September 1979 Safety Evaluation Re Steam Generator Water Hammer.Concludes Water Hammer Not Likely to Occur ML19209A1391979-09-30030 September 1979 Safety Evaluation Re Steam Generator Water Hammer.Water Hammer Not Likely During Normal Operation ML19256E5931979-09-29029 September 1979 Safety Evaluation Re Qualifications of Reactor Physics Methods for Application to Kewaunee. Reliability of Each Physics Parameter Acceptable ML19274D8661978-12-0101 December 1978 SER Re Mod of Spent Fuel Pool to Increase Storage Capacity. Health & Safety of Public Will Not Be Endangered ML19259B5741978-12-0101 December 1978 Safety Evaluation Supporting Conclusion That Proposed Mod Is Acceptable Because Increase in Occupational Radiation Exposure Would Be Negligible 1997-06-07
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEAR05000305/LER-1998-003, :on 980203,RCS Low Flow Trip Logic Were Identified as Not Been Tested IAW Tss.Caused by Personnel Error.Testing Was Conducted IAW Requirements of Section 4 of TS1998-03-0505 March 1998
- on 980203,RCS Low Flow Trip Logic Were Identified as Not Been Tested IAW Tss.Caused by Personnel Error.Testing Was Conducted IAW Requirements of Section 4 of TS
ML20140E9181997-06-0707 June 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 133 to License DPR-43 05000305/LER-1996-007, :on 961023,identified Design Deficiency in Containment Isolation Function.Caused by Oversight During Plant Design.Implemented Administrative Controls to Preclude Subject Condition Prior to Plant start-up1996-11-22022 November 1996
- on 961023,identified Design Deficiency in Containment Isolation Function.Caused by Oversight During Plant Design.Implemented Administrative Controls to Preclude Subject Condition Prior to Plant start-up
ML20115J3981996-07-22022 July 1996 Interim Part 21 Rept Re 3/4 Schedule 80 Pipe Furnished to Consolidated Power Supply.Investigation Revealed Only One Nuclear Customer Involved in Sale of Matl 05000305/LER-1995-003, :on 950516,failed to Adequately Assess Consequences During Recovery from Switch Misposition Resulted in Turbine/Rt.Reminded Nco of Importance of Self Checking1995-06-14014 June 1995
- on 950516,failed to Adequately Assess Consequences During Recovery from Switch Misposition Resulted in Turbine/Rt.Reminded Nco of Importance of Self Checking
ML1118201651994-06-28028 June 1994 Knpp IPEEE Summary Rept ML1118201571994-06-0303 June 1994 Probabilistic Risk Assessment ML20045C9281993-06-21021 June 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Change to TS Bases Re DG Fuel Oil Transfer & Storage Sys ML20034D8261993-02-0202 February 1993 Reload Safety Evaluation,Cycle 19 ML20126J5961992-12-31031 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Loss of RHR Cooling During Nozzle Dam Removal.Nozzle Dams May Create Trapped Air Column Behind Cold Leg Nozzle Dam.Mod to Nozzle Dams Currently Underway. Ltrs to Affected Utils Encl ML1118207361992-12-0101 December 1992 Individual Plant Exam Summary Rept ML20113H4871992-07-30030 July 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Surge Line Flooding Which May Occur When Large Pressurizer Vent Used to Support Reduced Rc Inventory Operations.Notification Received from Westinghouse on 920312.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR21 ML20086U0311991-11-30030 November 1991 SG Tube Plugging Criteria for Outside Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking (ODSCC) at Tube Support Plates ML20077K0831991-06-30030 June 1991 Nonproprietary Technical Justification for Eliminating Pressurizer Surge Line Rupture as Structural Design Basis for Kewaunee Nuclear Plant ML1118102861991-05-31031 May 1991 Handbook on Flaw Evaluation Kewaunee,Unit 1 Steam Generators Upper Shell to Cone Weld ML20091E3441991-03-31031 March 1991 Nonproprietary Structural Evaluation of Kewaunee Pressurizer Surge Line,Considering Effects of Thermal Stratification ML20066B2101990-12-31031 December 1990 Generator Mid-Cycle Rept,Dec 1990 ML20062A4641990-09-30030 September 1990 Nonproprietary, Reevaluation of U-Bend Tube Fatique for Kewaunee Plant Steam Generators 05000305/LER-1990-005, :on 900404,intergranular Attack & IGSCC Results in Both Steam Generators a & B Being Categorized as C-3.All Defective Tubes Plugged & Sludge Lancing & Crevice Flushing Conducted1990-05-0404 May 1990
- on 900404,intergranular Attack & IGSCC Results in Both Steam Generators a & B Being Categorized as C-3.All Defective Tubes Plugged & Sludge Lancing & Crevice Flushing Conducted
ML1117803551990-04-30030 April 1990 Generator Tubesheet Crevice Indications Return to Power Rept ML20005G6831990-01-0505 January 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Installation Instructions for Grommet Use Range for Patel Conduit Seal P/N 841206.Conduit Seals in Environ Qualification Applications Inspected for Proper Wire Use Range & Grommets Replaced ML19354D8351989-11-0808 November 1989 Presentation to NRC Re Kewaunee (Wps) SECY-83-472 LOCA Analysis Effort ML20247D3011989-07-12012 July 1989 Part 21 Rept 10CFR21-0047 Re Control Wiring Insulation of Inner Jacket Used on General Motors Diesel Generator Sets Identified as 999 or MP Series.Encl List of Owners of Units Notified 05000305/LER-1989-009, :on 890401,during Repositioning of Ventilation Dampers,Jumper Inadvertently Detached from Terminal Block Contact,Causing Damper Actuation.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Weidmuller Blocks Installed1989-05-0101 May 1989
- on 890401,during Repositioning of Ventilation Dampers,Jumper Inadvertently Detached from Terminal Block Contact,Causing Damper Actuation.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Weidmuller Blocks Installed
05000305/LER-1989-006, :on 890315,audit Identified Failure to Implement Tech Spec Re Testing of Fan Coil Emergency Discharge Dampers & Backfit Dampers.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Procedure Updated1989-04-14014 April 1989
- on 890315,audit Identified Failure to Implement Tech Spec Re Testing of Fan Coil Emergency Discharge Dampers & Backfit Dampers.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Procedure Updated
05000305/LER-1989-005, :on 890310,insp of Diesel Generator Start Up Air Sys Finds Deficiencies That Could Render Both Diesel Generators Inoperable Due to Inadequate Design.Cause Unknown.Generic Implications Will Be Examined1989-04-10010 April 1989
- on 890310,insp of Diesel Generator Start Up Air Sys Finds Deficiencies That Could Render Both Diesel Generators Inoperable Due to Inadequate Design.Cause Unknown.Generic Implications Will Be Examined
ML20235J1941988-11-30030 November 1988 Analysis of Capsule P from Wisconsin Public Svc Corp Kewaunee Nuclear Plant Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program ML20207N4641988-10-12012 October 1988 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Problem W/Emd 20-645E4,Type 999 Excitation Sys Circuit Breaker & Wiring.Potential for Field Circuit Breaker to Trip Due to Combined Air Temps & Field Current Exists at All Plants W/Model 999 Sys ML20206E9801988-06-30030 June 1988 Rev 2 to Handbook on Flaw Evaluation,Kewaunee Unit 1 Steam Generators Upper Shell to Cone Weld ML20196G5251988-06-15015 June 1988 Technical Review Rept T809, Blocked Thimble Tubes/Stuck Incore Detector ML20154H0391988-04-30030 April 1988 Slide Presentation Matl,Nrc Meeting 880331,Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Steam Generator Tube Sleeve Installation ML20196G8881988-03-0303 March 1988 Headquarters Daily Rept for 880303 ML20147B2921987-12-31031 December 1987 Annual Operating Rept for 1987 ML20149J0261987-12-21021 December 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Installation of Relay Part B8002DN in Foxboro 62H Controllers in Facilities.Subj Relay Must Be Replaced by Relay Part N0196ZN.Relay B8002DN Not Used in Any Other Plants ML20236W7341987-11-30030 November 1987 Nonproprietary Kewaunee Steam Generator Sleeving Rept (Mechanical Sleeves) ML20236F3101987-10-31031 October 1987 Nonproprietary WCAP-11620, Addl Technical Bases for Eliminating Large Primary Loop Pipe Rupture as Structural Design Basis for Kewaunee ML20236N3451987-10-31031 October 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1987 ML20235V1161987-09-30030 September 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1987 ML20238F7541987-08-31031 August 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1987 ML20237H6861987-07-31031 July 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1987 ML20235J3101987-06-30030 June 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1987 NRC-87-3236, Part 21 Rept Re Potential Util Failure to Comply W/Component Containment Isolation Licensing Commitment If Proposed Mods to Component Cooling Water Sys Instituted.Utils Advised to Evaluate Containment Isolation Sys1987-06-18018 June 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Util Failure to Comply W/Component Containment Isolation Licensing Commitment If Proposed Mods to Component Cooling Water Sys Instituted.Utils Advised to Evaluate Containment Isolation Sys ML20215A3211987-05-31031 May 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1987 ML20215L8061987-04-30030 April 1987 Nonproprietary Rev 1 to Technical Bases for Eliminating Large Pipe Rupture as Structural Design Basis for Kewaunee ML20213G4341987-04-30030 April 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1987 ML20206H4301987-03-31031 March 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1987 05000305/LER-1987-002, :on 870224,reactor Tripped When Source Range Nuclear Flux Detectors 1 & 2 Erroneously Reached Nominal Reactor Trip Setpoint of 1.0E05 Counts/S.Caused by Seepage of Borated Refueling Water Into Instrument1987-03-26026 March 1987
- on 870224,reactor Tripped When Source Range Nuclear Flux Detectors 1 & 2 Erroneously Reached Nominal Reactor Trip Setpoint of 1.0E05 Counts/S.Caused by Seepage of Borated Refueling Water Into Instrument
05000305/LER-1987-001, :on 870223 & 24,series of High Radiation Alarms Received in Control Room.Caused by Primary to Secondary Leak in Steam Generator 1A.Results of Eddy Current Testing Will Be Submitted1987-03-25025 March 1987
- on 870223 & 24,series of High Radiation Alarms Received in Control Room.Caused by Primary to Secondary Leak in Steam Generator 1A.Results of Eddy Current Testing Will Be Submitted
05000305/LER-1985-015, :on 850617,Fluor Engineers,Inc Notified Util of Inadequate Documentation to Support Seismic Qualification of Diesel Generator Differential Relays.Relays Replaced W/Ge Seismically Qualified Relays on 870120 & 211987-03-0606 March 1987
- on 850617,Fluor Engineers,Inc Notified Util of Inadequate Documentation to Support Seismic Qualification of Diesel Generator Differential Relays.Relays Replaced W/Ge Seismically Qualified Relays on 870120 & 21
ML20207R6091987-02-28028 February 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1987 1998-03-05
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,s p n a u p *1 UNITED STATES
. g j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2066f4001 o
+ . , . ..../
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATING TO AMENDMENT NO. 133 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-43 l
WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION WISCONSIN POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY MADIS0N GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-305
1.0 INTRODUCTION
l By letter dated April 28, 1997, as supplemented on May 19, 1997, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPSC), the licensee, requested a revision to the ,
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) Technical Specifications (TSs). The l proposed amendment would establish a new design basis flow rate for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps consistent with the assumptions used in the reanalysis of the limiting design basis event for the AFW system. The Basis for TS 3.4.b, " Auxiliary Feedwater System," would be revised to reflect the change in AFW flow and to clarify the requirements.for the AFW cross-connect l valves.
The May 19, 1997, submittal provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination ,
published in the Federal Reaister on May 7, 1997 (62 FR 24977).
2.0 EVALUATION During a safety system operational inspection (SS0PI) conducted at KNPP in January 1997, NRC inspectors identified a concern with the AFW pumps not-achieving the flow values assumed in the current safety analyses of record.
The current KNPP Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Section 6.6, describes I the two motor-driven and one turbine-driven AFW pumps as each having a capacity of 240 gpm with up to 40 gpm of the 240 gpm providing continuous recirculation. The same section of the USAR also states that "the feedwater flow rate required to prevent thermal cycling of the tube sheet and for removing residual heat is the same, about 160 gpm for the reactor (or 80 gpm l per steam generator). A 200 gpm flow to the steam generators is, therefore, l sufficient to fulfil the above functions." The Basis for TS 3.4.b also contains these same words. The concerns raised during the SS0PI was that the
. AFW pumps could not deliver 200 gpm to the steam generators (SGs) as designed.
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l 9706120247 PDR 970607 l ADOCK 05000305 PDR
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In response to the staff concerns, the licensee, .in its April 28 and May 19,
- 1997, submittals, stated that a new design basis AFW flow rate of 176 gpm had been established. To support this minimum AFW flow rate, the licensee completed a reanalysis of the limiting design basis accidents and transients involving the AFW system. The licensee concluded that changing the AFW flow rate will not affect the consequences of the most limiting transients; (1) loss of load with respect to peak system pressure, and (2) uncontrolled rod withdrawal with respect to minimum departure from nucleate boiling ratio (MONBR). Changing the AFW flow rate will not impact these transients since, in the time frame of interest for the safety analysis, the AFW system is not operating following these events.
The loss of feedwater transient, however, is affected by the change in AFW l flow rate. The licensee performed a retnalysis of this event assuming AFW !
flow of 176 gpm delivered to SGs and the results of the reanalysis I demonstrated that all acceptance criteria for this event are met. - The licensee stated that the small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) has been previously analyzed assuming 176 gpm AFW flow rate with the results meeting the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix K. The licensee has also evaluate; the impact of the AFW flow change on other licensing basis analysis, including Appendix R design requirements, Station Blackout, and anticipated transient without scram (ATWS). The relevant acceptance criteria continue to be satisfied for these analyses. l To clarify the design basis AFW flow rate of 176 gpm at Kewaunee, the licensee proposed the following:
- 1) The Basis for TS 3.4.b would be modified to remove the explicit values of required AFW flow and pump capacities. A general statement would be '
added to indicate that each AFW pump has 100% of the required capacity assumed in the accident analysis.
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- 2) The USAR would be updated to document the safety analyses performed to support the minimum AFW flow rate of 176 gpm. The USAR will also be revised to clarify references to AFW flow and to reflect a pump capability of 216 gpm (176 gpm + 40 gpm recirculation flow) and accident analysis assumptions of 176 gpm AFW flow to the SGs.
- 3) The acceptance criteria for inservice testing (IST) performed per TS 4.2.a.2 would be revised to assure that the AFW pumps are capable of delivering the minimum required flow to the SGs under the plant conditions assumed in the safety analysis.
- 4) The Basis for TS 3.4.b would also be revised to clarify the restrictions for the operation of the AFW cross connect valves during plant power -
operation.
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The staff has reviewed the licensee's . submittal and finds that the reanalysis of minimum AFW flow is reasonably conservative and, therefore, acceptable.
l The staff also finds that the proposed TS and USAR changes accurately I l incorporate the results of the AFW flow reanalysis and are, therefore, I
- acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Wisconsin State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendnent. The State official had no comments.
14 . 0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or ,
cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously l issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding )
(62 FR 24977). Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for l categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR I 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need !
be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: C. Liang W. LeFave l
Date: June 7, 1997 I
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