ML20140E900

Amend 133 to License DPR-43,establishing New Design Basis Flow Rate for AFW Pumps Consistent W/Assumptions Used in Reanalysis of Limiting Design Basis Event for AFW Sys

ML20140E900
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee
Issue date:	06/07/1997
From:	Richard Laufer NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140E890	List: ML20140E886 ML20140E900 ML20140E918
References
NUDOCS 9706120241
Download: ML20140E900 (6)

Text

. - . . .

[pou gk UNITED STATES g

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. sos 5M001 o

%,...../

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION WISCONSIN POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY MADIS0N GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY l DOCKET NO. 50-305

! KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.,133 l License No. DPR-43 l

l 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Commission) has found th.at:

A. The application for amendment by Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Wisconsin Powsr and Light Company, and Madison Gas and Electric Company (the licensees) dated April 28, 1997, as supplemented on May 19, 1997, complies with the standards nnd requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended ithe Act),

and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the l

provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to tht- common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51

, of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have i been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this licen,e amendment,

, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 is hereby amended to read as follows:

1 9706120241 970607 DR ADOCKOSOOg5

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(2) Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.133, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensees shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications. I

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and )

is to be implemented within 30 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a~c Richard J. Laufer, Project Manager Project Directorate III-3 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: June 7,'1997

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.133 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-43 4

DOCKET NO. 50-305 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by l amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

i BEiqYJ. INSERT TS B3.4-2 TS B3.4-2 TS B3.4-3 TS B3.4-3 TS B3.4-4 TS B3.4-4 l TS B3.4-5 ---

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Auxiliary fcedwater trains are defined as follows

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, i i "A" train - 'A' motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and associated l -.. AFW valves and piping to "A" steam generator, not

.. including AFW-10A or AFW-10B

-*B" train - " B" motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and associated l AFW valves and piping to '8' stear generator, not i

including AFW-10A or AFW-10B i Turbine-driven Turbine-driven AFW pump and associated AFW valves and I train - piping to both 'A' steam generator and "B" steam I generator, including AFW-10A and AFW-10B

! In the unlikely event of a loss of off-site electrical power to the plant,

continued capability of decay heat removal would be assured by the availability j of either the steam-driven AFW pump or one of the two motor-driven AFW pumps, and i by steam discharge to the atmosphere through the main steam safety valves. Each

- motor-driven pump and turbine-driven AFW pump is normally aligned to both steam

! generators; valves AFW-10A and AFW-10B are normally open. Any single AFW pump

! can supply sufficient feedwater for removal of decay heat from the reacter.

As the plant is cocled down, heated up, or operated in a low power condition, AFW flow will have to be adjusted to maintain an adequate water inventory in the i steam generators. This can be accomplished by:

l 1. Throttling the discharge valves on the actor-driven AFW pumps, or f

2. Closing one or both of the cross-connect flow valves, or i

3. Stopping the pumps. I

{ If the main feedwater pumps are not in operation at the time, valves AFW-2A and

AFW-2B must be throttled or the control switches for the AFW pumps located in the control room will have to be placed in the " pull out" position to prevent their continued operation and overfill of the steam generators. _The cross-connect flow valves may be closed to specifically direct AFW flow. flanual action to re-initiate flow after it has been trolated is considered acceptable based on analyses performed by WPSC and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. These analyses conservatively assumed the plant was at 100% initial power and demonstrated that operators have at least 10 minutes to manually initiate AFW during any design basis accident with no steam generator dryout or core damage.

The placing of the AFW control switches in the pull out" position, the closing of one or both cross-connect valves, and the closing or throttling of valves AFW-2A and AFW-2B are limited to situations when reactor power is <15% of RATED POWER to provide further margin in the analysis.

TS 83.4-2 Amendment No.133 L. . _ .

l During accident conditions, the AFW System provides three functions:

!' 1. Prevents thermal cycling of the steam generator tubesheet upon loss of the i main feedwater pump; .

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2. Removes residual heat from the Reactor Coolant System entil the j temperature drops below 300-350'F and the RHR System is capable of l l,

providing the necessary heat sink; l i 3. ' Maintains a head of water in the steam generator following a

loss-of-coolant accident.

! Each AFW pump provides 100% of the required capacity to the steam generators as

asstaned in the accident analyses to fulfill the above functions. Since the AFW

' System is a safety features system, the backup pump is provided. This redundant j motor-driven capability is also supplemented by the turbine-driven pump.

I The pumps are capable of automatic starting and can deliver full AFW flow within

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one minute after the signal for pump actuation. However, analyses from full power demonstrate that initiation of flow can be delayed for at least 10 minutes i with no steam generator dryout or core damage. The head generated by the AFW

! pumps is sufficient to ensure that feedwater can be pumped into the steam generators when the safety valves are discharging and the supply source is at its j lowest head.

l Analyses by WPSC and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation show that AFW-2A and l d

AFW-2B may be in the throttled or closed position, cr the AFW pump control i 4 switches located in the control room may be in the " pull out" position without l

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a compromise to safety. This does not constitute a condition of inoperability I

, as listed in TS 3.4.b.1 or TS 3.4.b.2. The analysis shows that diverse automatic

! reactor trips ensure a plant trip before any core damage or system overpressure

! occurs and that at least 10 minutes are available for the operators to manually j initiate auxiliary feedwater flow (start AFW pumps or fully open AFW-2A and  ;

AFW-28) for any credible accident from an initial power of 100%.

I The OPERABILITY of the AFW System following a main steam line break (MSLB) was reviewed in our response tc IE Bulletin 80-04. As a result of this review,  !

requirements for the turbine-driven AFW pump were added to the Technical  !

Specifications. 1 For all other design basis accidents, the two motor-driven AFW pumps supply sufficient redundancy to meet single failure criteria. In a secondary line break, it is assumed that the pump discharging to the intact steam generator  ;

fails and that the flow from the redundant motor-driven AFW pump is discharging  :

out the break. Therefore, to meet single failure criteria, the turbine-driven l AFW pump was added to Technical Specifications.

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TS B3.4-3 Amendment No. 133

1 The cross-connect valves (AFW-10A and AFW-108) are nomally caintained in the j

open position. This provides an added degree of redundancy above what is required for all accidents.except for a MSLB. During a MSLB, one of the cross-connect valves will have to be repositioned regardless if the valves are

! . nomally opened or closed. Therefore, the position of the cross-connect valves does not affect the performance of the turbine-driven AFW train. However, __

] perfomance of the train is dependent on the ability of the valves to mposition.

! Although analyses have demonstrated that operation with the cross-connect valves 1 closed is acceptable, the TS restrict operation with the valves closed to <l5% '

i of RATED POWER. At 215% RATED POWER, closure of the cross-connect valves renders j the TDAFW train inoperable.

l An AFW train is defined as the AFW system piping, valves and pumps directly j

associated with providing AFW from the AFW pumps to the steam generators. The action with three trains inoperable is to maintain the plant in an operating

condition in which the AFW System is not needed for heat removal. When one train

is restored, then the LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION specified in TS 3.4.b.2 are appliad. Should the plant shutdown be initiated with no AFW trains jl available, there would be no feedwater to the steam generators to cool the plant

to 350'F when the RHR System could be placed into operation.

l It is acceptable to exceed 350'F with an inoperable turbine-driven AFW train.

i However, OPERABILITY of the train must be demonstrated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after

exceeding 350*F or a plant shutdown must be initiated.

i j Condensate Storace Tank (CST)fTS 3.4.c) .

The specified minimum water supply in the condensate storage tanks (CST) is I sufficient for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of decay heat removal. The 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> are based on the

Kewaunee site specific station blackout (loss of all AC power) coping duration 4

requirement. ,

I The inutdown sequence of TS 3.4.c.3 allows for a safe and orderly shutdown of the

] reactor plant if the specified limits cannot be met.

Secondary Activity Limits (TS 3.4.d)

An evaluation was perfomed to detemine the maximum permissible steam generator primary-to-secondary leak rate during a steam line break event. The evaluation considered both a preaccident and accident initiated iodine spike. The results s of the evaluation show that the accident initiated spike yields the limiting leak i rate. This evaluation was based on a 30 REN thyroid dose at the site boundary and initial primary and secondary coolant iodine activity levels of 1.0 yCi/gm and 0.1 pC1/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 respectively. A leak rate of 34.0 gpm was determined to be the upper limit for allowable primary-to-secondary leakage in the steam generator faulted loop. The steam generator in the intact loop was assumed to leak at a rate of 0.1 gpm, the standard operating leakage limit applied for the tube support plate voltage-based pluggire criteria specified in TS 4.2.b.5.

TS B3.4-4 Amendment No.133 9

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