ML20148Q953
| ML20148Q953 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1988 |
| From: | Condit R GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| CON-#188-5435 2.206, OL, NUDOCS 8802020014 | |
| Download: ML20148Q953 (47) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ch c BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'88 JAN 26 P3 :36 0FFeCi: . .: .: n ;: .
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In the matter of ) UR A NC.
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South Texas Nuclear Project ) Petition pursuant to
) 10.C.F.R. 52.206 Units One and Two )
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PETITION OF THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT Prepared by:
Government Accountability Project
- 25 S Street, N.W., Suite 700 l Washington, D.C. 20001 l 202-347-0460 Dated: January 26, 1988 l
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s TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. BACKGROUND / FACTS 2 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 4 A. The NRC's first obligation is to protect public health and safety. 4 B. The NRC's limited review of the STNP allegations jeopardizes public health and safety. 6 IV. CONCLUSION 10 l
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I. INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. SS2.202, 2.206, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) requests that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) delay voting on a full power operating license for the South Texas Nuclear Project (STNP) until the following are completed:
- 1. A complete investigation of all allegations regarding the STNP.
- 2. Release to the public of an investigative / inspection report dispositioning each allegation.
GAP is making this request in order to prevent a potential health and safety problem from occurring as a result of the NRC's failure to fully or properly investigate the 600 to 700 l
allegations provided by current and former STNP workers and persons affiliated with the nuclear industry, i
We had hoped that by cooperating with the NRC the STNP l
l allegers would have their allegations thoroughly investigated.
l Unfortunately, it is clear to us now that no such investigation was intended by the agency. In fact, it came to our attention very recently that the NRC had prepared a draft of the findings of the Safety Significance Assessment Team (SSAT or Team) even before the team returned from its inspection trip to the STNP.
This demonstrates very vividly that NRC has little interest in facts, and that the investigation was probably doomed from the start.
II. BACKGROUND / FACTS Just over one year ago GAP brought to the NRC's attention that numerous safety allegations were being raised about the STNP. In a January 20, 1987 letter to Victor Stello and Texas Attorney General James Mattox, GAP announced its preliminary investigation of the allegations and requested an independent (non-Region IV) review. (Exhibit A). Responding for the NRC over the next few months, Mr. Stello refused to consider the idea of an independent review of the allegations, and eventually subpoenaed GAP for all information pertaining to the STNP.
(Exhibit B). GAP refused to turn over any information, believing the subpoena to be illegal. Subsequently, the NRC brought an action in federal court to enforce the subpoena. Enforcement was denied, causing the NRC and GAP to develop a cooperative arrangement that would permit review of the allegations by an l independent NRC team, while protecting the confidentiality of the allegers.
l l This arrangement was worked out following a November 19, l
l 1987 meeting with NRC technical personnel. The substance of the agreement is reflected in two pieces of correspondence.
1 (Exhibits C and D).
During the NRC team's review, it became clear that time and l scheduling constraints were being placed on the review. GAP l advised the NRC that such constraints were prohibited under 10 C.F.R. S50, Appendix B, Criterion I. (Exhibit D). Nonetheless, the NRC team quickly reviewed most of the allegers' files without substantively reviewing the available supporting documentation.
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During the first week of January 1988, the NRC team completed its initial review. Without interviewing any of the allegers, the team concluded that the allegations were "not of immediate safety significance." (Exhibit E). This conclusion is outrageous on its face because GAP staff advised the team that "our working files were not prepared for the purpose of NRC review. Nor can these files take the place of a technical interview with the alleger. Consequently, our files should only be used to complement a more thorough NRC technical interview, and must not be used to make a definitive technical assessment of any allegation." (Exhibit D, emphasis added).
Despite the ill-perceived lack of safety significance, the NRC team chose 10 primary and 50 secondary allegations to review further. (Exhibits E and F). Arrangements were made for anonymous on-the-record phone interviews to be conducted with some of the allegers having knowledge about the 60 selected allegations. During one interview the NRC team agreed to take the alleger (John Corder) on a site tour so he could show the NRC specifically where the problem areas were located.1/ However, upon reaching the STNP site he was permitted to show the NRC only one of the ten allegations of his that the NRC team had selected.2/ That single allegation involved Unit Two. The l 1. Mr. Corder no longer wishes to remain confidential.
l 2. All together, Mr. Corder has brought more than 100 l allegations to the NRC's attention through GAP.
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other nine allegations involved Unit One, which is the unit the NRC is about to license. Mr. Corder was apparently denied access to Unit One for "security reasons." (Exhibit G).
The NRC team conducted its review of 60 of the STNP allegations during the week of January 18, 1988. Essentially, the team was given four days to complete the task and report back to NRC management and the Commissioners. Current press reports indicate that no significant safety problems were found. This conclusion is not surprising, considering the NRC team made the same determination prior to its on-site inspection. Obviously, the result was pre-determined.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. The NRC's first obligation is to protect public health and safety.
The NRC has a mandatory duty to exercise its authority when necessary. The foremost priority for the NRC is to determine that there will be adequate protection of the health and safety l
of the public. The issue of safety must be resolved before the Commission issues a construction permit. Porter City Ch. of l Izaak Walton League v. Atomic Energy Commission, 515 F.2d 513, 524 (7th Cir. 1975).
"[P]ublic safety is the first, last, and permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction permit or a license to operate a nuclear facility." Power l
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Reactor Development Corp. v. International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 402 (1961). See, also, Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, 7 NRC 400, 404 (1978).
The NRC has broad authority to revoke, suspend, or modify the construction permit of an NRC licensee. 42 U.S.C. S2236 states that:
Any license may be revoked for any material false statement in the application or any statement of fact required under section 2232 of this title, or because of conditions revealed by such application or statement of fact or any report, record, or inspection or other means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application, or for failure to construct or operate a facility in accordance with the terms of the construction permit or license of the technical specifications on the application, or for violation of, or fialure to observe any of the terms and provisions of this chapter or of any regulation of the Commission.
See, also, 42 U.S.C. SS2133, 2134.
The same criteria for the revocation, suspension, or modifi-cation of a construction permit exist under NRC regulations.
See, 10 C.F.R. 50.100 (1987).
The NRC has a variety of powers it can exercise to protect the public's health and safety. The NRC has recognized its statutory authority to: (1) issue orders to promote or to protect health or minimize danger to life or property; (2) impose civil penalties for the violation of certain licensing provisions, rules, and orders, and for violations for which licenses can be rovoked; (3) seek injunctive or other equietable relief for violation of regulatory requirements; and (4) seek criminal penalties. See, 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix C, II (1987). In l
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addition, pursuant to regulations the NRC can "institute a proceeding...to modify, suspend, or revoke a license, or for such other action as may be proper." 10 C.F.R. S2.206 (1987).
B. The NRC's limited review of the STNP allegations jeopardizes public health and safety.
At the outset it is critical to note that GAP and the allegers attempted to have the NRC review the allegations more than one year ago. Therefore, any concern by the NRC as to the timeliness of the allegations and interference with licensing schedules is meritless.
Even a cursory review of the ,omewhat limited allegers' files should cause any investigator to be concerned about the status of the STNP. The information that several allegers have brought to the attention of GAP, and now the NRC, points to a major quality assurance breakdown at STNP. For example, there is now information in the possession of the NRC which suggests that STNP is experiencing the following problems:
- 1. Lost material traceability
- 2. High rate of errors on permanent plant records
- 3. Failure to report and documents, and/or failure to report and document in a timely manner, all non-conforming conditions
- 4. As-built conditions do not comply with blue-line drawings or other applicable documentation
- 5. Falsification of records
- 6. Code, FSAR, specifications, and procedural violations
- 7. Lack of freedom to report non-conformances and not be subject to reprisals
- 8. Invalid N-5 Code Data Reports and Code Data Plates
- 9. Willful cover-up of serious design, hardware, and documentation discrepancies or inadequacies
- 10. Material false statement (management knew, or should have known, of non-conformances).
Other areas of concern include engineering design (numerous as-built interferences in some systems are causing components to be inaccessible, or are causing specific items to be subject to damage); hardware (welding deficiencies); procurement (it is likely that counterfeit fasteners, and/or fasteners that do not meet ASME/ ASTM specifications have been used); and intimidation and harassment (many employees acknowledge that they are not able to identify safety problems or acts of wrongdoing without being subjected to retaliation).
It is impossible for the NRC to disposition the potentially significant generic concerns reflected in the allegations in a four-day site inspection. Obviously, the NRC could not legitimately expect to thoroughly address even the 60 selected allegations which were the focus of the team's review.
l l Furthermore, one incident that occurred during the team's i
l site visit clearly demonstrates either (1) that the NRC team's i
l hands were hopelessly tied, preventing them from conducting a l thorough review of the allegations, or (2) that the team never 1
had any intention of conducting a thorough investigation.
The incident involved an on-site inspection with one of the allegers, i
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John Corder. Mr. Corder contended that he could more effectively show.the NRC team where the problems were at STNP, rather than explain to them in an interview. It was agreed that he could accompany members of the team on a half-day review of the problems at the STNP site. He was limited to the ten allegations of his that the NRC had picked to review. When he got to the site with the NRC team, he was permitted to show them only one of the ten allegations. Oddly enough, that one allegation had nothing to do with Unit One. Of course, Unit One is the unit that the NRC plans to permit to operate in the near future. Why would the NRC team not allow Mr. Corder to identify his concerns in that unit? Mr. Corder was told that it would be "too difficult" to get him into Unit One. It was also implied that he could not gain access to Unit One for security reasons.
The NRC's failure to provide Mr. Corder with access to Unit One is one clear example of the team's ineffectual handling of .
the STNP allegations. Who decides which personnel can ha/e access to a nuclear facility? If the licensee played any role in denying Mr. Corder access to Unit One, then something is seriously wrong with the nuclear regulation process. Is the public to believe that NRC officials cannot gain access to a nuclear facility in order to inspect safety concerns?
An additional problem with the NRC team's review is that it was constantly subjected to overwhelming scheduling pressures.
Such pressures are not permitted to be a factor when matters affecting safety are at issue. NRC regulations (10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B, Criterion I) state in pertinent part:
The persons and organizations performing quality assurance functions shall have sufficient authority and organizational freedom to identify quality problems; to intiate, recommend, or provide solutions; and to verify implementation of solutions. Such persons and organizations performing quality assurance functions shall report to a management level such that this required authority and organizational freedom, including sufficient independence from cost and schedule when opposed to safety considerations, are provided.
The NRC team's review of '.he allegations amounts to a quality assurance verification of the STNP. Particularly Unit One. A proper analysis of the allegations, thorough interviews with allegers, and a comprehensive inspection of the site could not be accomplished in the time the team was allottec. Even the team's reduction of the number of allegations to investigate from over 600 to 60 was not sufficient to allow a thorough inspection to be completed in four days. The obvious scheduling constraints placed upon the team seriously hampered its ability to properly investigate the STNP allegations. Because of these problems the team's investigt; tion does not comply with NRC regulatidns.
Finally, no issues of wrongdoing have been investigated by the NRC. The NRC technical team was unable to address STNP allegations involving wrongdoing. These allegations were supposed to be addressed by the NRC's Office of Inspections (OI).
To date, no arrangements have been made to accommodate an OI review of wrongdoing allegations. Information on wrongdoing will provide the Commission with significant insight into the corporate competence and character of the licensee. Such information must be fully evaluated before the Commission reaches a final decision on licensing.
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IV.- CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, the Commission should delay the vote on licensing the STNP until a thorough investigation of all allegations is completed and a public report is issued.
Respectfully submitted, Billie P. Garde d t'l Richard E. Condit Government Accountability Project 25 E Street, N.W., Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20001 202-347-0460 Dated: January 26, 1988-i 079AA23 l
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EXHIBIT - A --~
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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTADILITY PROJECT 1555 Connecncut Acue. N W. Sune 202 Woshington. D.C. 20006 (202)232 6550 January 20, 1987 Victor Stello, Executive Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory C:m.m:ss: On Washington, D.C. 20555 James Mat:ox Attorney General for :ne State Of Texas Supreme Court Suilding 14th & Colorado Austin, Texas 78711 Re: South Texas Nuclear Pro;ect
Dear Messrs. Stello and vat:
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This letter is to .nform your respec:ive agencies that the Government Accountabil y Pro:ect (CAP) has formally begun preliminary investigat.cn Texas nuclear projec .
- n:o worker a' legations at the South Since 1980, GAP nas p'ayed a significant on behalf of wnis:1.eblewers and concerned ett'zens onrole in issues advocating involving safety-rela:e: pr:o' ems at varicus nuclear power facilities.
the same: Our appecaca to nuclear power nas seen steadfastly to ensure ana: :.e governe.en: enf::ces the nuc3. ear safety laws and regula:::ns. As a resu': of ;AP's efforts (alone or in concert with cener crgant:at ns! to e.<=:se safety-rala:ed problems, the construe:.:n and/or Opera..:n ci several nuclear power facilities -
prev; usly :noug.n: :o ce f : :o Operate --
were cancelled or postponed for fur: er l
rev.ew. The cancelled i
facili:les include :ne 98 percent c:mp.e:+d 2 ; .m e r nuclear power
! plant and the 85 percent c:mp.'e ed u.:.'amc p.'a :. T*:ce wh;cn were postponed for fur:ner rev.ew ; c..:e e :: anene Pea < ,
Three M le :sland, 3:40;; Canyon, and aa:er:: : :ac...:.es.
l GAP current'y e::.ner represen 3 :
. .; .:rs.- . n approximately 36 current and/or former emp':yees o;f.
.e scu:n Texas project. The al'.ega::: s fr:., : e
- r<ers range from grand theft of nuclear grade steel :: eng; .eer:ng def ec s major safety componen s. The al'ega:::ns concern :ne.nfatture severa.'
. Of Houston Light & Power .: guarantee succ:ntrac :: cc.?.p1;ance st:n industry and federal safety require.ments, .nclud:ng out not l limited to: defects .n :. e tnst rumentat; n and cont rol dtvision:
I defects and lack of ec.?p; ance wt:n federal regula:: ens in the l heating, ventilating, and a;r condt:::n; g system: '.ac< of compliance with quali:y standards .n :ne area of so:1s compaction; failure :o c:. pie:e requ red QA or QC documentation:
falsification of required GA Or QC docu.?entat:cn: and harassment and intimidation of pers:nnel wno atte.mp: to adhere :o federal safety standards.
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January 20, 1987 - Page Tw0 Additionally, and Of spec:f;c c ncer- : .e 5 tate of Texas, there are allegations that '
the subcontractors at ine.ude deli era:e act;;ns of s me :f goods and services by "cnargtng Off" vercnarge ne:rSTPMc.s.:nto L;gn: 5 p0wer for to Brown & Root, Inc. Tnere :wn unaccep:acie work that is a.'so .nfer a: ion wnten suggests subcontractors not worked, and for have fraudulent'y por:;:ns :f enarged STP for mann0urs completed as claimed. :Ne pro;ec: wnten were no:
GAP is currently c: :.c- q former workers who are c: cerneo a.-.erv.ews co wt:n both current and GAP investigators are accep .~.g ca;;u: :n.e Scutn Texas pro;ect.
Washington, D.C.
office anc Our v:dwest s fr:m wer<ers at our ff:ce.
Once our prelim: nary issue a formal public repor:.nvest; gat:en :s ccmplete, we plan to L'nfortunately, in the interim, we cannot advise our clients or those we wor < ut h to provide their concerns to the Region :'/ Off:ce of One NRC. Our experience nas been (and recently released the Arlington office .3 .
.nternal agency reports confirm) that its regulatory require.ents as cutt:nede' ner unao'.e or unwilling to comply with procedures. ;n governing agency Thus, ur.less e.ne NFC .s w:;;tn inspectors to process - e a.ega:::e ns
. *o orov.de independen pursua : :o tnternal NaC regulations, GAP will pr: vide :ne at;ega::: 3 directly to tne state Attorney General Off.ce, and/or o :ne acpropriate congressional committees, and/or ::
bodies which have an ; steres c ner re:.;a:Or' or muntcipai plant is designed, construc:ed, andmf ensuring . n a c.c t.: a:;n :Ne Scu:n Texas protects the pubite. a manner inat Please rect any . cute;es a:ca: ::? s i:. - Tetas investigati 202-232-8550, or :o911.'.e Ricnard COnd;;,
Carde, DAP v.1-es Staf' A:+/ ' vest;;a:Or,
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cc: Chairman Lando Zecn 1
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EXUIBIT - B
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Unitch 9tates of America NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O
in the matter of: Houston lighting and Power Company
> DOCKET NO. 50-498 50-499 TO l's. Billie Pirner Garde Government Accountability .
Project 1555 Connecticut Avenue, fl.W.
Suite 202 Washingtun, D.C. 20036 YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear at Room 6507, Nuclear Regulatory Comission, 7735 Old Georgetown Road, Bethesda, Maryland on the 26th day of f%y 1987 at 9:00 o' clock A.M. to continue as necessaFy-for the purpose of testifying before NRC personnel concerning allegations of current and/or former employees of the South Texas Project concerning ,
the safety o' *he South Texas Project, as described in your letter of January 2J. t h.7 to Messrs. Victor Stello and James l'attox, and any other allegations Wch you have received concerning the safety of '.he Soutt' Texas Project, and to provide any records or other docunents in your possession or under your custody or control concerning such allegations.
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Executive Director for Ooerations tiuEeYRNulatory Comission MA/ 9 4 , 1987
.12rk o - nnidherg /
net (301) 492-7619 On sotion made promptly, and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance by the person to whom the subpoena is directed, and on notice to the party at whose instance the subpoena was issued, the Comission may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable or requires evidence not relevant to any matter in issue, !
or (2) condition denial of the motion on just and reasonable terms. Such action should j 1
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' .p %9 h UNITED STATES ga' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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- g NOV 2 41987 % bgqgh Hs. Billie Pirner Garde Government Accountability Project Midwest Office
'424 Marcos Lane impleton, Wisconsin 54911 Crar Ms. Garde:
Ws will confirm the results of our meeting of Thursday, November 19, 1987, at a ch we discussed certain allegations GAP has developed concerning the
. .th Texas nuclear power plant.
N meeting began by your tabling a series of talking points concerning your
. "i of the objectives of the meeting, as well as a sumary of how GAP handles m'...sations received. We found the discussion useful, but neither agreed nor
't , treed to the points you raised. You retained all copies of the briefing s . You then proceeded to table a tabulation of allegations in summary c t (all copies of which you retained) which we reviewed on the spot.
.)nclusion was that insufficient data was available in the sumaries to
, for a deliberate and reasoned evaluation of the allegations. In furtt o
.;sion you agreed to make your files on these allegations available to us.
,.quent to the .T.aeting staff has made a preliminary visit to GAP Headquarters
. .de arrangements to begin detailed review of the process on November 30,
.: We will accord confidential treatraent to the identity of any allegers A .: names may surface during this review. Followirg our review, we will m . you of the allegations which we feel are appropriate to review further.
fim.i(reed to provide us data on which such 101109 up can proceed, subject, in
+.e ases, to your contacting allegers to assure that they will agree to be s.s ad by thc NRC.
- s. a) indicated that one set of allegations was in process in Wisconsin. We p., -
- nat you will simply provide us that information during the time we are d' . , g the other files at GAP Headquarters. Separately, I also understand
.ed some allegations on wrongdoing directly to the Office of j".J " r
- gations which is dealing directly with you on those matters.
. cing was quite satisfactory from our point of view. We appreciate your a ice and cooperation and that of the allegers you represent. With your
'd cooperation we should be able to give a proper review of the
. ons GAP has acquiroJ. Needless to say, obtaining any information which have on alleged defec1.s in the South Texas nuclear power plcnt will
- .' s in assuring that the public health and safety is protectud at that j .
Sincerely.
wt l lT. A. ehm>AsTdant for Operations Office of the Executive Director for Operations
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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 25 E Street, N.W., Suite 700 VVashington, D.C. 20001 (202) 347 0460 December 4, 1987 HAND-DELIVERED Jose Calvo U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Phillips Building Bethesda, Maryland
Dear Jose:
We are writing to discuss the status of the review of the South Texas Nuclear Project (STNP) worker allegations. This review follows our preliminary meeting of November 19th. In that meeting it was agreed that a team of non-Begion IV,NRC personnel would be permitted access to the STNP allegers' files under certain conditions and with the allegers' permission. These conditions included that the identity of any alleger would be kept confidential and that no one at the STNP site will be contected about the information revealed during the review. In addition, it was agreed that the allegars' information would only be revealed to NRC persennel not participating in the review on a need-to-know basis. The development of this working protocol was necessary to permit NRC Leview while protecting our interests and the interests of the allegers.
We appreciate the diligence and courtesy that the -
Washington-based NRC personnel have exhibited in working at our office. We have tried to work c.'.osely with them to allow the review to proceed as efficiently as possible.
However, over the lasc couple of days it has become clear to us, through the actions and comments of Paul O' Conner, that there may be problems with the review of the allegations. We understand that Mr. O' Conner's background is in project management, not QA/QC and technical review. We believe that his l
background may be a limitation on the review process. In our opinion, his approach to the allegations may be hampering a l thorough and independent technical review.
Yesterday, we were particularly disturbed by Mr. O' Conner's I comments to other NRC personnel that a deadline (of December 12th) would control the review instead of the substance determining the amount of effort required. Such deadlines may l violate 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion I. We are aware of l STNP's licensing schedule, but we must strongly object to this l review being controlled by any licensing timetables.
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Jose Calvo December 4, 1987 Page Two
. As we have already discussed, it is essential that the allegers' files receive a detailed QA analysis. Each file must be read through in order to get an overall view of the possible QA/QC breakdown at STNP.
Our other concern with Mr. O' Conner's approach is that he seems to take a very narrow view of the allegations. On several occasions he has appeared to minimize the significance of some allegations before the reviewer could analyze it in its entirety.
This approach may prevent the reviewer from making an independent assessment of an allegation based on his technical expertise. This concerns us because tne initial review of the allegations will determine the universe of information from which the NRC can investigate. Therefore, it is important that no allegation is dismissed too quickly.
In reviewing a file, if the alleger's intent is somewhat ambiguous, then the interview tapes should be reviewed or the alleger should be questioned if possible. As we explained in the November 19th meeting, our working files were not prepared for the purpose of NRC review. Nor can these files take the place of a technical interview with the alleger. Consequently, our files should only be used to complement a more thorough NRC technical interview, and must not be used te make a definitive technical assessment of any allegation. -
Another issue that troubles us is that little, if any, attention is being given to the documentation that supports some of the allegations. This is ironic because the supporting information was the subject of the NRC's subpoena. Frankly, it has always been our concern that the NRC was not interested in these documents but only wanted to review our summaries, which may not be technically complete. We realize that it is much i easier to dismiss an allegation if there are no supporting documents. We hope that you and the other members of the review team will begin to take full advantage of any supporting documentation that accompanies an alleger's file.
Finally, in the last two days we have finished preparation of approximately 50 allegations that were in files that we were unable to prepare previously. We advised you that some files had
, not been completed at the November 19th meeting. No one from NRC objected when we indicated that there would be a delay in producing these allegations. Yesterday, upon our mentioning that the add'.tional allegations were prepared, Mr. O' Conner stated that it may not be possible to review these allegations because some members of the technical review team have already completed their review and could not return.
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Jose Calvo December 4, 1987 Page Three As you know, this effort has consumed many hours and other resources -- which are extremely limited. It would be unfair to everyone involved to compromise the integrity of the review effort simply because of 50 additional allegations. There must be appropriate NRC staff members who could properly review these allegations.
We hope that you will take these comments in the constructive spirit in which they are offered. We trust that you will take all necessary steps to protect the hard work that has been done by everyone to date. Our recommendation is that you institute a conference call with us to help work out our concerns, and rectify the problems which have developed from today's Houston Chronicle article.
Yours truly, A),,
Billie P. Garde 4
Richard E. Condit till.)
- JU Edna F. Ottney b l 079EE01 i
! cc: Tom Rehm U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Maryland National Bank Building 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda , 11a ryland l
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EXHIBIT ,-
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[ % NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 f WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
\...../ m n tas Ms. Billie P. Garde Government Accountability Project 3424 N. Marcos Lane Appleton, Wisconsin 54911
Dear Ms. Garde:
As you are aware, the NRC team has completed its initial review of the Government Acccuntability Project's (GAP) files pertaining to allegations of safety problems at the South Texas Project. As agreed, the NRC team reviewed GAP's records at GAP's Headquarters in Washington, D.C. These records consisted of audio tapes of the interviews with the allegers (concerned individuals),
hand-written text extrapolated from the tapes accompanied with supporting information, and allegation data sheets that contained the alpha-numeric identification and brief description of each allegation. As agreed, all the records examined by the NRC remained at GAP's Headquarters. During this initial review, the NRC team focused on the technical content and specificity of the alleghtions and there was no need to involve the concerned individuals at this time. The NRC team wrote brief descriptions of each allegation reviewed which are presently being treated as confidential. 1 As we discussed on December 30, 1987, the NRC team has selected 10 primary allegations for investigation at the South Texas Project site. Each primary allegation is accompanied by secondary allegations that convey similar concerns as the primary one. A listing of these selected allegations was provided to
, Mr. Richard E. Condit of GAP.
The NRC team has determined that the dats review d indicates that the allegations are general in nature and not of innediate safety significance.
Nevertheless, we would like to pursue th 10 selected allegations further. In order to do this, it is important to make arrangements with the concerned individuals involved so that the NRC team can contact them and detenaire if they can identify locations or components which concern them. This letter is to confinn NRC's previous verbal arrangements with GAP to arrange contacts with allegers. We will start the onsite inspections at the South Texas Project Site during the week of January 18, 1988 and desire to make contact with your clients as soon as possible.
The NRC tean will protect the identity of those concerned individuals requesting it and will draw-up confidentiality agreements with the concerned individuals, if reovired. In addition, the NRC team inspection plan will consider combining other related or unrelated concerns with the selected GAP allegations to ensure that the substance of the selected allegations does not reveal the identity of the concerned individuals requesting confidentiality.
Mr. Richard E. Condit of GAP and Ms. Edna Ottney (GAP's consultant) have been very cooperative and, on behalf of the NRC team, we would like to express our apprecietion for their excellent support.
Ms. Billie P. Garde With regard to the notice of appeal from the U.S. District Court's refusal to enforce the original NRC subpcena for certain safety information and identities of concerned individuals related to the South Texas Project, see the attached memorandum from the NRC Solicitor to me which provides the reasons for taking such an action.
Should you have any questions regarding these matters, please contact me at (301) 492-7781.
Sincerely, (signed) T. A, Rehm Thomas A. Rehm, Assistant for Operations Office of the Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
As stated DISTRIBUTION Central File PO4 Reading J. Calvo, NRR D. Crutchfield, NRR W. Briggs , OGC T. Rehm EDO V. Stello, EDO W. Parler, OGC T. Murley, NRR
. F. Miraglia, NRR X. Snith, 0GC R. Brady, NRR l
4 R<-Condit, GAP E00 r/f
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE PD4/D OGC/S OED0/A0 JCalvo* WBriggs TRehm 01/11/88 01/ /88 01/$?788
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EXHIBIT - F 4 asseumssenserwesesis - imy l
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R, Cost 649
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~g UNITED STATES .-
i n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f, I wAsmNGTON, D. C. 20666 January 4, 1988
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FEPORANDUM FOR: Thomas A. pehm, Assistant for Operations Office of the Executive Director for Operations Themas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Peactor Regulation Frank J. Miraglia, Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Pegulation Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Peactor Regulation 4
FROM: Jose A. Calvo, Director Project Directorate - IV Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
SOLITH TEXAS PROJECT (STP) PLAN FOR EVALUATION AND RESOLUTION Or ALLEGATIONS PROVIDED BY THE GOVFPNMENT ACC0tlNTABILITY PROJECT (GAP)
The plan for the evaluation and resolution of STP allegations provided by GAP is presented in Enclosure 1.
The NPC Safety Significance Assessment Team .) (Enclosure 2) has completed a preliminary review of the allegations and .ociated materials at GAP offices in Yashington, D.C., and has compiled, sumari:ed, and categorized them by discipline or topics (see Enclosure 4). It is importart to note that the SSAT had difficulty during its review in assessing the safety significance of many of the allegations due to the lack of specificity and detail of the identifica-tios of a particular component or system provided by the allegers (referred to by GAP as concerned individuals - Cis).
Because of the general lack of specificity of the allegations, it is imperative that the $$AT contact the allegers and detemine if they can identify locations or components that exhibit the conditions that they have a concern over at STP.
This will facilitate the SSAT subsequent inspection to substantiate the concerns or determine that the concern has been satisfactorily corrected. If an alleger cennot be contacted or if the contact yields no additional specific infomation to focus the inspection on a particular area or component, the individual allegation will be dispositioned as unsubstantiated and the general subject matter will be pursued further only if other related allegations provide some basis to assume that there is validity to the concern.
2 The SSAT wrote a brief description of each allegation reviewed. We feel that the subject matter used in some of the allegation descriptions might reveal the identity of the alleger. Thus, the GAP allegatier descriptions prepared by SSAT must tiality of theremain allegersconfidential until required.
is no lont;er such a time that the need for the confiden-Enclosure 5 lists the 10 primary alleget' ns that the SSAT will investigate at STP. Enclosure 6 lists the secondary allegations that will also be considered along with the primary allegations due to their similarities to the primary allegations.
The preposed SSAT inspectinn team (Enclosure 7) are the same individuals that perforced the initial review, evaluation, and screening of the allegations.
Given the time remaining to prepare for the inspection and the general non-specific rature of the allegations, the utilization of these experienced reviewers or inspection team nembers will greatly facilitate the effort.
GAP has been contacted and given the primary and secondary allegation lists to allow them to contact the appropriate allegers and any others that ne.y provide any additional information concerning the allegations selected for inspection.
Depending on the results of GAP contact with the allegers, the proposed tenta-tive schedule for the inspectinn effort will consnence during the week of January M,1988.
Should you have any questions regarding these natters, please contact re at X27460 M '
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Jose A. Calvo, Director Project Directorate - IV Divisier ef Reactor Projects - III.
IV, and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Peactor Regulation cc w/ enclosures:
SSAT Members V. Stello, EDO W. Parler, OGC J. Sniezek, HRR P. Partin, PIV W. Pussell, RI W. Johnston, RI L. Shao,I4RR J. Roe, hRR J. Partlow, NRR B. Hayes, OI W. Briggs, OGC K. Smith 0GC J. Lieberman, OE R. Brady, NRR T. Martin, EDO B. Garde, GAP 7 R. Condit, GAP
9 Enclosure 1 SOUTH TEX 4? PP0 JECT ALLEGATIONS REVIEW SAFETY SIGNIFICAPCE ASSESSMENT STATUS REPORT
- 1. BACKGROUND Direct interaction between NRC staff and The Government Accountability Project (GAP) on the matter of South Texas Pro.iect safety concerns outside of the litigation arera, began on November 19, 1987. A neeting was held in the Office of the Executive Director of Operations (EDO), Bethesda, with Thomas A. Rehm leading the NRC staff representatives and Billie P.
Garde leading the GAP representatives. The backdrep for this meeting was' the decision by the US District Court dated October 27, 1987. The Court had ruled to deny enforcement of a NpC subpoena on Ms. Garde because of the possibility of "abridgement of constitutionally protected associational rights."
In addition, the court stated that, "Alternatives minimizing the intrusion on associational rights must be carefully and conscientiously explored before resort nay be had to the court's process."
Prior to the meeting of November 19, 1987, agreement hari t'een reached between the EDO and Ms. Garde on the mein elemants of a process that would provide the NRC staff limited access to infomation which might be of relevance in the forthcoming licensirg decisions regarding South Texas Project. Consequently on November 19, 1987, NRC staff reviewers were permitted to see brief sumaries of the allegations in the pnssession of GAP. An attempt was made by the technical experts present to assess the safety significance of the allegations. Unfortunately, the infomation made available to the staff was so lacking in specificity that no conclu-l sions on safety significance could be reached. In order for the NDO staff to gain access to more detailed infomation, arrangements were agreed upon j
for the NRC technical staff to visit the GAP offices in Washington, D.C.
The protocol for the NRC staff's work at the GAP offices was agreed upon to protect, to GAP's satisfaction, the identity of individuals who have made the allegations. The NRC st.aff has completed its preliminary review of the infomation made available by GAP as described below within the framework of agreements reached with GAP thus far. In addition, it is understood that GAP has provided the Office of investigations (01) alleoa-tions of harassment and intimidation and wrongdoing. To assure that all GAP identified allegations are reviewed and evalueted, the NRC Safety Significance Assesrment Team (SSAT), which was assembled to perfom the initial review of CAP's records, will forward to Of all allegations that they reviewed and entegorized as harassrent and intimidation or vrongdoing.
?. INITIAL NP.C STAFF REVIEW OF ALLEGATIONS An NRC team was esseeled, referred hereinafter as the SSAT (sefety sicnificance assessment team), to review GAP records of interviews with allegers (referred by GAP as concerned individuals (CIs)) and individual allegations that GAP enumerated from the interviews. Enclosure P. presents the NRC SSAT participants as well as the disciplines that were involved in this initial review of GAP's allegations documentation. As agreed, NRC SSAT reviewed GAP's records at GAP's offices in Washington D.C. These records consisted of audio tapes of most of the interviews conducted by a GAP consultant with the CIs, the consultant hand-written text extrapolated from the tapes, and allegation data sheets that contained each allegation's unique alpha-rumeric code and a brief description of the concern.
The GAP consultant's hand-written text was assembled in numbered files which contained reference materials related to allegations. There are approximately 30 files with varying quantities of text and reference '
materials and two-3 ring binders containino the 576 individual allegation data sheets. GAP has categori7ed the allegations into the following areas: safety-related, intimidation end harassment, wrongdoing, and non safety-related. Enclosure 3 presents the categorization and designa-tion of allegations used by GAP.
The NRC initial screenino was per'ortned by NRC SSAT members with expertise in particular areas of concern: mechanical enoireering, electrical engineering, civil / structural engineering Ouality Assurance and Control, and management (including the safety-related aspects derived from harassment and intimidation, and wroncdoing cnneerns).
The GAP consultant was available to the team to explain where and how the records were kept and acsembled end to answer any questions for the team.
SSAT morbers reviewed each allegation, its associated interview text and reference material file in their area of expertise. Screenirg also included listening to selected audio tapes to verify the accuracy of the written text extrapolated from them.
The results of the SSAT review and initial screening were docurented and identified by allegation number. Each SSAT member wrote a brie' description of each allegation as identified by GAP's consultant ard indicated if the concern sppeared to be safety-related o non safety-related.
Also, SSAT men.bers noted if other disciplines ray be involved with a particular allegation and whether the CI needs to be contacted for additional information.
Generally, the SSAT's initial screening determined that a large ma,iority of the allegations lacked specificity in identifyinc a particular location, component, or system about which the CI was concerned.
The individual SSAT rember's data was combined and recategorize into allegation groups: Mechanical; Flectrical; Civil / Structural; QA/QC; Parassment and Intimidation; Wrongdoing; NRC Region IV; and Manacement
irsues. Each category has several subsets that was used to specify nere
' closely, issues that each allegation appears to be addressing. Enclosure 4 identifies the allegation groups used by the NRC SSAT.
- 3. CCMPILING ALLEGATION DATA A brief sumary was prepared for each allegation that was made availeble by GAP. Three files containing approximately 50 allegations have been withheld by GAP due to confidentiality concerns on the part of the alleger.
The allegation summaries have been entered into a computerized data base along with the SSAT's preliminary categorization of the safety significance of the allegation, the grouping of comon or similar allegations, and detennination whether the alleger must be contacted to provide specific information needed by the SSAT to determine the safety significance of the allegatier.
- GAP's inittel categorization of these allegations listed duplicate concerns under different review disciplines. Because of this, the SSAT inittelly had to consider approximetely 700 concerns. When these duplications were reconciled there were 576 concerns, representing the same number of allegations, identified by GAP. Of these, 159 corcerns are variations cf an initial concern relatino additional facets of the original concern such as possible documentation problems, or intimidation or harassment related to or caused by the initial concern.
The remaining concerns have been combined into groups with similar cercerns (allegations) and will be revieved together to assure that the magnitude of each issue is recognized and that corron concerns are detected. Also, the grouping of the concerns will ensure a certain degree of protection of the identity of allegers. In addition, GAP will advise whether the allegations withheld from NRC review because of reasons of cenfidentiality or because they involved members of the NRC staff, are covered by the established NRC SSAT allecation groups. The NPC allegation (concern) grouping scheme is shown in Enclosure 4 The SSAT's primary effort will be expended on these allegations that are identified as safety-related concerns. These issues will be initially examined to determined whether they could affect criticality or pcwer ascension either because these operations could represent unacceptable safety risks due to the alleger's concerns or because t'e allegation would be uninspectable after the plant starts up. Following this, the most safety significant allerations will be identified and reviewed in detail by the SSAT.
Pecause there is very little specificity included in the GAP allegatiers, it is imperative that the SSAT contact the allecers and ask then to identify specific locations, systems, or components that exhibit the con-ditiers that they allege to exist at South Texas Pro,4ect so that the staff can substantiate the allegers concern or conclude that the concern has been satisfactorily corrected.
k 4
4 ALLEGATIONS SELECTED FOR SITE INSPECTIONS Enclosure 5 lists the 10 primary allegations that the SSAT will investigate at South Texas. Enclosure 6 lists the secondary allegations that will also be considered along with these primary allegations due to their similarities to the primary allegation.
Out of the 576 GAP allegetions enur.erated, only those 16 concerns identified in Enclosure 6 as "specific" can be tied to a specific location, system, or component. The rest refer only in general tems to items of concern. It is therefore imperative that the SSAT contact the allegers in the remaining concerns to cbtain enough specific infomation to conduct a detailed review. Some of the GAP's allegers will require that a confidentiality agreement be completed by NRC before they agree to deal with us.
If an alleger cannot he contacted or if the contact yields no additionel '
specific information to focus the investigation or a particular system, component or location, the individual allegation will be dispositioned as unsubstantiated and the general subject matter will be pursued further only if other related allegations provide some basis to assume that there is validity to the concern.
In addition to the SSAT inspection on site, other sources of infomation such as Regional irspection reports pertaining to the resolutfor of South Texas Project allegations, PRR inspections data and safety evaluation reports, the licensee's SAFETEAM records, and other documentation that i
' currently exists will be reviewed to determine whether they provide any additicnal information related to an alleger's concern. These supplemental investigations will not focus explicitly on an individual allecer's l corcern, they will also include other unrelated issues such that the alleger's identity will be protected, if recuired.
- 5. SSAT INSPECTION ROLE The SSAT will inspect the selected GAP allegations at the South Texas Project (STP) site. The SSAT consists o# experts in construction and inspection activities in nucletar power plants. The proposed organi7ation o' the NRC inspection teen, as well as the inspectors names and their assignments are presented in Enclosure 7. The staff selected for the inspection team are the same individuals that perfomed the initial review, evaluation, and screening of the allegations. Given the time remaining to prepare for the inspectier and the general non-specific nature of the allegations, the use of these experienced reviewers as inspection team members will greatly facilitate the effort.
A major concern o' the allegation review and inspection process is the protection of the confidentiality of the allegers (concerned individualsl.
Arrangements will be made to contact the allegers by GAP. If reouired,
, the NRC will draw-up any confidentiality agreerents with the allegers.
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' In addition, the inspection plan will consider combinirp other related or unrelated concerns with the selected GAP allegations to ensure that the substance of the allegations does not reveal the idertity of these allegers 4
reouesting confidentiality.
A detailed inspection plan will be prepared by the SSAT leader and its deputy with assistance from the team members. Inspector guidance will be established prior to the comencement of the inspection to assure consis-tency in the inspection process. Erphasis will be placed en root cause determinations of any substantiated ellegations including the identifica-tion of any generic implications. To further facilitate the selected allegation resolution process, the $$AT will utilize available Region IV inspection reports on disposition of allegations, as well as any NRR inspection reports and safety evaluation reports for FTP.
The follewing tentative schedule is proposed for this inspection effort:
j Decetaber 28, lop 7 - January 1,1988
- Initial planning
- Selection of GAP allegations to be inspected
- Selection of inspection teem members
- Present identified allegations to be inspected to GAP (All the above actions have been cefapleted)
January 4 - 8, 1988
- Detailed inspection planning and inspector guidance preparation
- Arrangements with GAP to contact allegers January 11 - 15, 1988 l
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- Interview allegers i' flPC is successful in arranging interviews j threugh GAP i
- Tentative start of onsite inspection depending on number of allegers to be interviewed l January 18 - 22, 1988
- Onsite inspection of selected allegations January 25 - 76, 1988
- Sumary of allegation inspection results January 25 - February 3, 1988
- Allegation inspection report preparation i
Februery 1, 1988
- Tentative Cemission briefing on full power license for STP, Unit 1 l
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Fnclosure ?
SOUTH TEXAS PPOJECT ALLEGATIONS NPC SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ASSESSHENT TEAM (SSAT) PFMBERS INVOLVED IN THE INITIAL REVIEW OF GAP RECORDS MEMBER ORGANIZATION DISCIPLINE Paul O'Connor PO .fV/NRR Project Panager Edward Tomlinson PD-IV/NRR Elec., Inst. & Misc.
Jai Fajan EMEB/NRR Mechanical Pomuald Lipinski ESGB/NRR Civil /Structurel Hansraj Ashar ESGR/NRP Civil / Structural
- Jacue Durr Region I QA/QC Patrick Milano OE OA/QC Richard Correia LQAB/NPR OA/QC George Johnser FFTB/NRR Welding Jose Calvo PD-!V/NRR Pro,iect Director 4
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s Enclosure 3 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ALLEGATIONS GAP ALLEGATION CATEGORIZATION AND DESIGNATION SECTION* DISCIPLINE CATEGORY ALLEGATION RELATED ALLEGATIONS I - Safety Related A- Piping / Mech / Inst a. Hardware 0001 -9999** .1, .2, .3, etc.
8- Electrical II - Intimid/ Harass. C- Civil / Structural !
D- HVAC b. Doc./Drwgs.
III - Wrongdoing E- Engr / Design c. Insp./ Testing l F- Procurement /Purchas IV - Non-Safety Rel. G- Equipment Qualif. d. Other H- Fire Protection I- QA/QC/N-5/ Systems Completion J- Welding K- Safety / security L- HP M- Seismic & Environmental EXAMPLES N- Generic (all disc) 0- Personnel I A a - 0001= Safety related/ Piping / hardware P- Management specific allegation number Q- Training R- NRC S- Safeteam T- E8ASCO I A b - 0001.1 (same), subset documentation U- HL&P V- S.C & T/0 W- ANI X- Qualification of Personnel Y- Bechtel Z- Document Control Note: NRC allegation numbers use Arabic numbers 1 through 4 rather than Roman numerals to facilitate use of a computerized data base.
Allegation numbers are cross referenced to actual GAP allegation number.
Enclosure 4 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ALLEGATIONSS NRC SSAT ALLEGATION GROUPS A. MECHANICAL AND PIPING
- 1. PIPING A. Pipe C. Configuration B. Hydro D. Chloride Contamination
- 2. VALVES A. Limitorque C. Missing B. Installation
- 3. MATERIALS A. Traceability B. Compatability
- 4. HVAC A. Procurement C. Fabrication B Installation D. Testing ,
S. SESIMIC QUALIFICATION
- 6. FASTENERS A. Counterfeit / Foreign
- 7. WELOING A. Weld Rod C. Wolder ID B. Qualifications D. Traceability O. OTHER B. ELECTRICAL i 1. SPLICES A. Raychem
- 2. CABLE AND CONOUIT
- 3. INSTRUMENTATION
- 4. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION
- 0. OTHER -
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CIVIL / STRUCTURAL
- 1. CONCRETE i O. SOILS
- 3. COATINGS
- 0. OTHER
- 0. QA/QC
- 1. DESIGN CONTROL
- 2. PROCUREMENT
- 3. DOCUMENT CONTROL
- 4. QC INSPECTION A. Inspection Records B. Travellers C. Hold Point D. Authorized Nuclear Inspector E. NCRs
- 5. ASBUILT vs OESIGN
- 6. SYSTEM TURNOVER
- 7. FSAR/ SPECIFICATIONS
- 8. PROCEDURES
- 0. OTHER E.
HARRASSMENT & INTIMIDATION (SAFETY RELATED ISSUES ONLY)
F. WRONG DOING (SAFETY RELATED ISSUES ONLY)
G. NRC H. MANAGEMENT
- 1. HL&P
- 2. BECHTEL
- 3. EBASCO
- 4. INTERMECH
- 5. PERSONNEL PRACTICES
- 6. TRAINING
- 7. SAFETEAM
- 0. OTHER
- 0. OTHER
Enclosure 5 S0tlTH TEXAS PROJECT ALLEGATIONS PRIMARY ALLEGATIONS SELECTED FOR IMSPECTION I. Pechanicel Piping 1Aa-0560 - CI cencerned with the cuali+y of pipe joints.
II. Valves - 1Aa-0563 - CI coreerned that many valves are installed backwards.
III. HVAC - 1Ja-0356 - CI concerned with adequacy of HVAC welds.
IV.
Fasteners installed at- STP.
IFa-0082 - CI concerned that counterfeit fasteners are V. Welding - 10a-0130 - CI concerned with the adequacy / quality of weld -
red used at STP.
VI. Electrical Cable / Instrumentation - ipa-0119 - CI concerned with the adequacy of Raychem splices at STP.
VII. A) Civil / Structural 1Ca-0638 - CI concerned with concrete drilling through rebar.
E) 1Ca-0494 - CI concerned with crack in bottom of fuel handling building.
VIII. Coatings - 10a-0059 - CI concerned with coatings used on the structures and equipment.
IX. QA/QC 11a-0601.1 - CI concerned with "as built" vs. "as designed" configurations of valves.
X. NRC/ Region IV - 1Aa-0554 - CI called NPC several times cencerning l certair problems and had no return response.
_ Enclosure 6 SOUTH TFXAS PROJECT ALLEGATIONS SELONDARY ALLER.ATIONS CATEGORY - MECHANICAL /PIPlNG A11ecation No. nescription 1Aa-0560 Deficient Pipe Joints 1/a-0162 Pipe to Tank Connections 1Ba-0307 1Eg-0754 Filter Screens in NSSS Loop - Specific (sp.)
1Pa-0079 Installation of Pumps, Valves, Instruments 1Ea-0556 Installation of Pumps, Valves, Instruments 1Ga-314 Installation of Pumps, Valves, Instruments 1Ea-0556 Steam Generator Installation (sp.)
Inste11ation of Pumps, Valves, Instruments 1Ea-0432 Pipe Materials (sp.)
VALVES 1Aa-056? Valve Installation (See 1Eg-0754 above) 1Aa-008i Valve Maintenance (sp.)
1Ga-0305.1 Valve Installation 1Aa-0445 Valve Installation
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MATEPTALS (Covered under other categories)
HVAC 1Ca-0046.1 Ouctwork Welds 1Da-0109 HVAC Installations 10a-0117 HVAC Material Traceability IDa-0296 HVAC Installations 10a-0337 HVAC Seal Material /sp.i 10a-0356 HVAC Welds 10a-0450 HVAC Damper (sp.I 10a-0504 HVAC Material
, IAb-0714 HVAC Inste11ation 1Mc-0619 (!ee 10a-0296) l l
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FASTENERS Allegations No. Description 1Aa-0036 1Fa-0048 Bo'ts Installation 1Fa-0084 Bolt Traceability Bolt Traceability iia-0387 ~
1Fa-0011 Polt Insta11ation 1Fa-0082 Bolt Traceability iia-0082 Bolt Traceability 1Ya-0087 Bolt Traceability (sp.)
1Ac-0132 Bolt Traceability 1Fa-0164 Bolt Traceability 1Fa-0488.1 Bolt Traceability Bolt Traceability WELDIEG Ida-0104 Weld Rod Traceability 1Ja-130 Weld Rod Trareebility lyd-0571 Welders 1Ja-0687.1 Velders (sp.)
10a-01?O Velders 1la-0107 Welders 10a-0354.2 Welders 1Jb-0053 Velders h'd-0064 Weld Rod Traceability -
ELEffPicAL TAC CCMPONENTS IBa-0110 Cable Installations 1Ra-0175 Cable Insta11atiers 1Ba-0449 Cable Installations 1Ba-0008 Cable Installations 1Ba-0409 Cable Insta11atiens 1Aa-0126 Incore Instrumentation IEa-0465 Shielding for Panels (sp.)
14a-0566 Instrument Valves (sp.)
it..-128 Flow Transnitter Installation (sp.)
C,vil/ STRUCTURAL 1Ca-0638 Concrete Orillina 1Ca-0494 Concrete Settlements (sp.)
! 1Cc-0114 Fill i 2Id-0121.1 Fill l
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3 C0ATINGS Allegation No. Description 1Ga-0059 Coating Traceability / Application (sp.)
OA/QC IId-0040 Configuration Control 1Fb-0094 Configuration Control 11a-0601.1 Configuration Control 1Eb-0612 Configuration Control iib-0705 configuration contrn1 iib-0751 Configuration Control 1Db-CP90 Records 1Ga-314 S. G. Inspection 1Eb-159 Pipe Whip Restraint Inspection 1Eb-0159.2 Pipe Whip Restraint Inspection 1Ja-0254 FVAC Weld Intrection 1Eb-061? Support Installation Inspection 1Ab-0174 HVAC Installation Inspection 1Cb-0638.1 Concrete Drilling Inspectier NRC/P.IV 1Sd-0267.1 Confidentiality 1Aa-0554 Deficiencies (sp.)
11a-0555 Deficiencies (sp.1 1
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) . .o Enclosure 7 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ALLEGATIDNS NRC SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ASSESSMENT TEAM (SSAT)
PROPOSED FOR INSPECTION EFFORT Project Director Administrative Team Leader (T.L.) Support J.A. Calvo J. Durr PD4/NRR Region I '
1 Person Deput y Region IV Project Manager Team Le ader (DTL) Support P. O'Connor - Lead ; R. Correia P. Kadambi - Alt. 1 Person LQAB/NRR PD4/NRR AREAS STAFF
- NRR Mechanical Support
- Piping J. Rajan (EMEB/NRR) k-P. Kadambi
- Valves J. Rajan
- HVAC- E. Tomlinson (PD4/NRR:
- Fasteners- J. Rajan Support
- Welding-- G. Johnson (EMIB/NRR)i
- 1 Lawyer Electrical--
- Cable- E. Tomlinson
- Instrumen-tation-- K. Naudu (DRIS/NRR)
Civil /Struc-tural R. Lipinski (ESG8/NRR)
- Concrete-_ R. Lipinski Coatings- R. Lipinski QA/QC- P. Milano T. L.
D.T.L
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EX11IBIT - G M ' 6 T a s s r A 4 -4. w T e m w Y 6 l
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'*- "'**"*c*a* d SUNDAY. JANUARY 24,1988 s
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Texas Nuclear Plant Probed for Violations WbrkeMTied Hundreds of Complaints By Ces Peterson
% M SW IPreer The Nucwr .ne.wy Com. Brown & Rot, and iu,eche Bech. "If10 percent of
& haa'leienched a last minute tel engineenng and construct.ct) N8 OIO mapection of a, Texas acelear power firm to complete the plant. [h00 0((080 Q, aftet 4 viewing NRC officials sent an inspection fTUe,lblD[r ant [3
& from dosens cdhundreds workers or team to Bay City last week after u= m. w is perty engmeer.d. revieweg mee than 600 am-coneepected with autetandard plamts of wrongdomg under Bech-not safe .. . . I would
' sed may violate safety tel's management, about half in- NOlllUe CloSe lO the
'We BKewners of the South Texas volymg potential safety defects.
Accordmg to an NRC document, OoUth [eyas p[ ant,"
Nuedar PtWect hear Bay City said the alleged problems range from -Edna Ottney, nuclear consultant the NRC lens told them the inspec. valves bemg mstalled backward to tion wi6 rul(e5ect their application . the use of webing matenals, nuts for a full-power license, which may and bolts that may not have been be approved as early as next month, designed to handle the stress of a nuclear plant.
The South Texas Nuclear Prosect is one of a handful of nuclear plants The allegations were made by awaiting licensing by the NRC. The more than 50 plant workers two-unit power station is owned by through the Government Account-a four utility consortium headed by ability Proyect (GAP), an organiza-the Houston Power & Light Co. tion that defends whistle-blowers.
(HP&L) and has been under con, GAP has refused to divulge names of the workers, who fear retaliation.
struction for more than 12 years.
The first urut of the $5.5 bdhon pro- but allowed the NRC to examme ject was fueled last month and is the complaints after a federal judge expected to beam low power oper. rebuffed NRC's effort to get the ation this month, workers' names through a subpoe '
Un!ake the Seabrook and Shore- n2-ham nuclear plants still awasting HP&L spokesman Graham Paint-NRC incenses in the Northeast, the er said the utthty had not been rd-South Texas plant has not been a lowed to see the allegations but saxi target of antmuclear activists or plant officials think that they are commumty opposition. However, it old complamts."
has been dogged by allegations of "If that's the case, we're not con-shoddy construction and inept man, cerned." Pamter said. "If we looked agement as its cost soared to more at it. either we took corrective ac-than 400 percent of the initial $1 tion or it didn't amount to much,"
billion est2 mate. Edna Ottney, a nuclear consul.
The NRC fined HP&L $100,000 in 1980, citmg inadequacies in qual-ity-control programs. A year later the utility fired its main contractor,
)
w- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
NRC spoEesman Joe Gatand confirmed that Corder had earlier pointed out construction defects to tant'who investigated the core. an agency inspector Gilbland sam plaints for GAP, saw the *"r-72 he did not know how senous the "toesh just about everytlung,' from defects were or what correctzns, if keproper of sensey do, any, the agency had ordered.
- en to og According to NRC and GAP doe- -
quakty <oetrol ' g -
uments, other workers have raised the NRC reues to questions about the adequacy of licenses, n p electrical sphcea, pipe joints and "If 10 percent of these h welds. Whi% the individual com-are true, that plant is not sede," sam - plainta may appear minor, Ottney Ottney, who has investigated sin,, said, they suggest that. the plant's ilar compiamts for the NRC. As an quahty<ostrol program is defec-employee of a consulting firm under trve.
contract to the NRC, Ottney sev. The NRC inspects relativelylittle eral years ago investigated worker of a nuclear power plant before de-complaints about the Tennessee ciding whether to grant it an opers VaDey Authonty nuclear plants, an ating license. Instead, the agency of which are now closed for safety rehen hoevdy on a ' paper trair' of l
reasoon, qus4ty aseursaco domenents that South Texas, she sam *le worse are supposed .td ensure the plant than TVA. I wooki not live elese to , meeta NRC stessards as it is being the South Texts plant.' built.
John Corder, a former South Ottney sam sevesel quality con-Texas worker who agreed to be trol inapoctors told her that they interviewed on the record, acknowl- were instructed not to venfy coo-edged that he reported problems to struction deammaman and that most plant and NRC officials before tab. seM they compued for lear atnseing ing them to GAP, but he contended their jets, 'The teamen s
that nothing was done to correct rolllag eseJoser la p, J them. South Tazes are 'abset '
Corder, a 27 year Ikchtel em. nuclear jobs," she saMr ployee who desenbes himself as a no other jobs for them. R' '
' good company man," was a super. last leurrah *_ y intendent at South Texas untd he 1 esqleet that's a was disnussed last November as, Corder,who worked on si part of what the company said was a half 4osen seclear plants-work force cutback, tel dausg back to the seg ,
'Nobody cares," he said. *Nobody 1 how pointed out, .
wants to hear it. They're behind flaws before, and it wee a6seys an schedule and out of money. They arm wrestle. But it never bedbre led say they'll fix it after the plant is to a vendette against employees runrung.' like it has here."
Corder accompamed the NRC Painter sam NRC officials had inspection team on a tour Tueeday told the utdity that "it's typical to of the South Texas plant, whm he have these a3egations at the last had mmniabad of numerous con. mmute' and that the review *should struction dad ~nenes in the recent. have rn e6ect on licedsing.'
17 compiesed Unit 1. Althoesh he NRC spokesman Gilhiand said was not allowed to enter Unit 1 of the agency may have told HP&L the plant for what the NRC said that the latest inspection *has not were security reasons, Corder said been a delaymg factor
- in the licew he was able to point out identical ing process because a commissiun problems with metal fasteners on vote on the license has been post-an electnca: panelin Unit 2. poned for other reasons, i
'The fasteners are gone. Miss. LeWooer tests were deleyed '
l ing," he sam. 'The panel is just last month when the plant devel.
stuck up there.' The panel is a pro- oped an unexplaamed vibration in its tective covering our high voltage cooling systern, and the NRC is an-sw:tch plates that control electncal alynng a potential problem with its equipment in the plant. ' thimble tubes,' shafts that are Corder decimed to characterine used to introduce sampling equip-the plant as safe or unsafe. *lt's ment into the reactor. The tubes muddled,' he said. "I still worry corroded in a similar plut in Bel.
about it at night.' glum, allowing radioactive water to
, spillinto the reactor building.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the addressees listed below, by hand delivery on January 26, 1988.
- 1. NRC Commissioners:
L. W. Zech, Jr., Chairman Thomas M. Roberts Kenneth Rogers Frederick M. Bernthal Kenneth M. Carr U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
- 2. Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
~ #
T! Jo Richard E. Condit ~
d 079AA23 cert 6