ML20137G398

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Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.7.P Re Standby Gas Treatment & TS 5.2.C Re Secondary Containment
ML20137G398
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/26/1997
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20137G385 List:
References
NUDOCS 9704010389
Download: ML20137G398 (6)


Text

__ _ - . - - . . .

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

] SBGT 3/4.7.P 3.7 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.7 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS P. Standby Gas Treatment System P. Standby Gas Treatment System Two independent standby gas treatment Each standby gas treatment subsystem subsystems shall be OPERABLE. shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

1. At least once per 31 days by initiating, APPLICABILITY: from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and OPERATIONAL MODE (s) 1,2,3 and *. verifying that the subsystem operates i

for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with the heaters operating.

ACTION:

2. At least once per 18 months or (1) after
1. With one standby gas treatment any structural maintenance on the subsystem inoperable, restore the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber inoperable subsystem to OPERA 8LE housings, cr (2) following painting, fire status within 7 days, or: or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the
a. In OPERATIONAL MODE (s) 1,2 or subsystem by:

3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in a. Verifying that the subsystem COLD SHUTDOWN within the satisfies the in-place penetration l following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and bypass leakage testing

( acceptance criteria of < 1% and

b. In OPERATIONAL MODE *, uses the test procedure guidance in suspend handling of irradiated fuel Regulatory Positions C.S.a, C.5.c in the secondary containment, and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide CORE ALTERATION (s), and 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and operations with a potential for the system flow rate is 4000 cfm draining the reactor vessel. The 110 %

provisions of Specification 3.0.C are not applicable. b. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis

2. With both standby gas treatment of a representative carbon sample subsystems inoperable in obtained in accordance with
OPERATIONAL MODE (s) 1,2 or 3, Regulatory Position C.6.b of restore at least one subsystem to Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, OPERABLE status within one hour, or March 1978, meets the laboratory be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within testing criteria of ASTM-D-3803-the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD 89, for a methyl iodide penetration SHUTDOWN within the following nf .-@, when tested at 30*C 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. M and 70% relative humidity; and

/ 2. 5 When handling irradiated fuelin the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATION (s), and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

- QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.7-24 Amendment Nos. ht-sQ 9704010389 970326 PDR ADOCK 05000254 p PDR

bONTAINMENT SYSTE'MS S8GT 3/4.7.P i

3.7 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.7 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3. With both standby gas treatment c. Verifying a subsystem flow rate of subsystems inoperable in 4000 cfm t10% during system l OPERATIONAL MODE ', suspend operation when tested in handling of irradiated fuel in the accordance with ANSI N510-1980.

l secondary containment, CORE l ALTERATION (s), and operations with a 3. After every 1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br /> of charcoal i potential for draining the reactor vessel. adsorber operation by verifying within ,

l 31 days after removal that a laboratory  !

l The provisions of Specification 3.0.C are not applicable. analysis of a representative carbon  !

l sample obtained in accordance with  :

Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory ,

Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of f

' ASTM-D-3803 8 for a methyliodide por:etration of , when tested at l hQ 30*C and 70 elative humidity. i

4. At least once per 18 months by:  ;
a. Verifying that the pressure drop l

across the combined HEPA filters j l and charcoal adsorber banks is l

< 6 inches water gauge while  ;

- operating the filter train at a flow i I

{ rate of 4000 cfm 110%.

b. Verifying that the filter train starts j

! and isolation dampers open on

! each of the following test signals:  ;

1) Manual initiation from the control room, and
2) Simulated automatic initiation ,

signal.

c. Verifying that the heaters dissipate 30 i3 kw when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1989.

! This reading shall include the appropriate correction for variations in voltage.

with a potentiel for draining the reactor vessel f

(, OUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.7-25 Amendment Nos. (iib i 7)

. CONTAINMENT 5.2  ;

5.0 DESIGN FEATURES i

5.2 CONTAINMENT Confiouration 5.2.A The primary conte . nent is a steellined concrete structure consisting of a drywell and '

suppression chanw- The drywellis a steel structure composed of a sphericallower portion, a cylindrica ,niddle portion, and a hemispherical top head. The drywell is l attached to the suppression chamber through a series of downcomer vents. The drywell has a minimum free air volume of 158,236 cubic feet. The suppression 1 4 chamber has an air region of 120,800 to 117,300 cubic feet and a water region of  ;

111,500 to 115,000 cubic feet. .

l Desian Temperature and Pressure l i

5.2.B The primary containment is designed and shall be maintained for:

1

1. Maximum internal pressure: 56 psig. )

J 3

2. Maximum internal temperature: drywell 281'F.

suppression pool 281'F.

3. Maximum external pressure: drywell 2 psig.

< suppression pool 1 psig. l Secondary Containment 5.2.C The secondary containment consists of the Reactor Building and a portion of the main steam tunnel and has a minimum free volume of(,%760,00gcubic feet.

+ 716,000 i

OUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 54 Amendment Nos. 171 s 167

ATTACIIMENT C SIGNIFICANT IIAZARDS CONSIDERATION (Page1of3) i The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a no significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10CFR50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license involves a no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment l would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously l evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously  ;

evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. l Comed proposes to amend Appendix A, Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.7.P.2.b and 4.7.P.3 and Section 5.2.C ofFacility Operating Licenses DPR-29 and DPR-30. The purpose of this amendment request is to raise the SBGT charcoal efficiency to address an FSAR discrepancy concerning the free volume of Secondary Containment. It was discovered that the stated value for Secondary Containment free volume is approximately 18% higher than the calculated free volume. A review of the issue was performed under the guidance of 10CFR50.59 which concluded that the safety impact was minimal; however, the reduced Secondary Containment free volume results in an increase in the calculated operator dose in the Control Room during an accident condition. To compensate for the reduction in margin, Comed proposes to change the allowed methyl iodide penetration for SBGT  :

charcoal from 10% to 2.5%. Control Room dose calculations have demonstrated that the increase in  ;

SBGT efliciency results in an acceptable operator dose below the requirements of GDC 19. Therefore,  !

the increase in SBGT charcoal efficiency adequately addresses the FSAR discrepancy in Secondary Containment free volume.

Comed has evaluated the proposed License Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consideration i established in 10 CFR 50.92, operation of Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously i evaluated because of the following:

The consequences of previously analyzed accidents t e not significantly affected by this proposed License Amendment. It was determined that the only impact of the Secondary Containment free volume discrepancy is a small increase in Control Room operator dose. By decreasing the allowed methyl iodide penetration for SBGT charcoal from 10% to 2.5%, calculated operator dose levels remain within GDC 19 limits. Calculated offsite dose levels are not impacted by this issue.

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l ATTACIIMENT C )

l SIGNIFICANT IIAZARDS CONSIDERATION (Page 2 of 3) l

! l The proposed License Amendment will not result in the reactor having the potential for operating in a different condition such that it may adversely affect the initial conditions assumed in any design basis accident analysis.

The associated systems related to this proposed amendment are not affected in a way that could impact the initiation of any accident sequence for Quad Cities Station; therefore, the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not increased by the proposed amendment. No modes of operation are introduced by the proposed changes such that adverse consequences are observed for Quad Station.  :

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2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:

The proposed license amendment for Quad Station does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated for Quad Station. No new modes of operation are introduced by the proposed changes. This change increases the SBGT efliciency in accordance with generic industry guidance. This increase in SBGT charcoal efliciency is required to compensate for the discrepancy in Secondary Containment free volume. As such, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

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3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:

The proposed license amendment does not significantly affect existing plant safety margins or the reliability ofthe equipment assumed to operate in the safety analysis. The proposed changes ensure that Control Room operator dose levels remain below GDC 19 limits considering the ,

impact of the Secondary Containment free volume discrepancy. In addition, the proposed license I amendment for Quad Cities Station will not reduce the availability of systems required to mitigate accident conditions; therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the  !

margin of safety. l Guidance has been provided in " Final Procedures and Standards on No Significant Hazard Considerations," Final Rule, 51 FR 7744, for the application of standards to license change requests for determination of the existence of significant hazards considerations. This document  ;

provides examples of amendments which are and are not considered likely to involve significant hazards considerations.

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ATTACHMENT C SIGNIFICANT IIAZARDS CONSIDERATION (Page 3 of 3) l This proposed amendment does not involve a significant relaxation of the criteria used to establish  ;

safety limits, a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting safety system settings or a i significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting conditions for operations. Therefore, based on I the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c), the l proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.  !

l ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT j Comed has evaluated the proposed amendment against the criteria for identification oflicensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.21. It has been l

determined that the proposed changes meet the criteria for a categorical exclusion as provided under 10 CFR 51.22 (c)(9). This conclusion has been determined because the changes requested do not pose significant hazards consideration and do not involve a significant increase in the amounts, and no significant changes in the types, of any effluents that may be released off-site. Additionally, this request i

does not involve a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. l l

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