ML20108C058

Proposed Tech Specs Re Core Alteration to LCO & Surveillance Conditions Associated W/Secondary Containment

ML20108C058
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	05/01/1996
From:	BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20108C027	List: ML20108C026 ML20108C058
References
NUDOCS 9605060153
Download: ML20108C058 (10)

Text

-

Attachment B Amended Technical Specification Paaes I

l l

1 9605060153 960501 PDR ADOCK 05000293 P PDR

1.0 DEFINITIONS (Cont)

Q. Core Alteration - Core Alteration shall be the movement of any fuel sources, or reactivity control components, within the reactor vessel, with the vessel head removed, and fuel in the vessel. The following exceptions are not considered to be Core Alterations:

a. Movement of source range monitors, lor al power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing incore probes, or special movable detectors (including undervessel replacement); and

b. Control rod movement, provided there are no fuel assemblies in the associated core cell.

Suspension of Core Alterations shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

R. Reactor Vessel Pressure - Unless otherwise indicated, reactor vessel pressures listed in the Technical Specifications are those measured by the reactor vessel steam space detectors.

S. Thermal Parameters

1. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) - the value of critical power ratio associated with the most limiting assembly in the reactor core. Critical Power Ratio (CPR) is the ratio of that power in a fuel assembly, which is calculated to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, to the actual assembly operating power.

t 2. Transition Boilina - Transition boiling means the boiling regime between nucleate and l film boiling. Transition boiling is the regime in which both nucleate and film boiling occur interm.ittently with neither type being completely stable.

3. Total Peakina Factor - The ratio of the fuel rod surface heat flux to the heat flux of an average rod in an identical geometry fuel assembly operating at the core average bundle power.

T. Instrumentation

1. Instrument Calibration - An instrument calibration means the adjustment of an instrument signal output so that it corresponds, within acceptable range, and accuracy, to a known value(s) of the parameter which the instrument monitors.

Calibration shall encompass the entire instrument including actuation, alarm or trip.

l

2. Instrument Channel- An instrument channel means an arrangement of a sensor and  ;

auxiliary equipment required to generate and transmit to a trip system a single trip signal related to the plant parameter monitored by that instrument channel.

l 3. Instrument Functional Test - An instrument functional test means the injection of :.

simulated signal into the instrument primary sensor to verify the proper instrument channel response, alarm and/or initiating action.

4. jn.grument n Chec_h - An instrument check is a qualitative determination of acceptable operability by observation of instrument behavior during operation. This I

determination shallinclude, where possible, comparison of the instrument with other independent instruments measuring the same variable.

Amendment No. 15,'40,151 1-4 l

l l

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont) 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

Shutdown Transformer is required to be Secondary Containment C.

operable and capable of supplying power to the emergency bus. 1. Each refueling outage prior to l -Fuel movement will not occur until the reactor refueling, secondary containment capability shall be demonstrated to vessel is flood up to elevation 114'.

-The train of CRHEAF without its safety related

[cuu under cal nd (5 mph) bus or without its emergency diesel generator conditions with a filter train flow will have power supplied from a normal offsite rate of not more than 4000 cfm.

source via a non safety related bus. The normal offsite source consists of either the Startup Transformer or Unit Auxiliary Transformer (Backfeed Mode) l C. Secondary Containment i 1. Secondary containment shall be OPERABLE when in the Run, Startup and Hot Shutdown MODES, during movement ofirradiated fuel

! assemblies in the secondary containment, and i during movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool, and during CORE ALTERATIONS, and i during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

2. a. With Secondary Containment inoperable when in the Run, Startup and Hot Shutdown MODES, restore Secondary Containment to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

b. Required Action and Completion Time of 2.a not met, be in Hot Shutdown in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> >

AND Cold Shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

c. With Secondary Containment inoperable during movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and during movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool, and during CORE ALTERATIONS, and during OPDRVs, immediately

1. Suspend movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND

2. Suspend movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool.

AND

3. Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

E

4. Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Amendment No. 9-M1 3/4.7-16

- U BASES:

i 3/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)  !

C. . Secondary Containment The secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive l matetials which might result from a serious accident. The reactor building provides secondary

! containment during reactor operation, when the dywell is sealed and in service; the reactor building

- provides primary containment when the reactor is shutdown and the drywell is open, as during ,

refueling. Because the secondary containment is an integral part of the complete containment  ;

system, secondary containment is required at all times that primarv containment is required as well i as during refueling.

Tnere are two principal accidents for which credit is taken for secondary containment operability.

These are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a fuel handling accident inside [ secondary]

i containment. The secondary containment performs no active function in response to each of these ,

l limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive i

materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage j rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secondary t containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the emironment. ,

An operable secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure i boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to l l release to the emironment. For the secondary containment to be considered operable, it must have l

adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.

If secondary containment is inoperable (when required to be operable), it must be restored to {

operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> completion time provides a period of time to correct the j problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during Run, Startup, and Hot Shutdown modes. This time period also ensures that the probability of an i accident (requiring secondary containment operability) occurring during periods where secondary i containment is inoperable is minimal. j If secondary containment cannot be restored to operable status within the required completion time, i l the plant must be brought to a mode in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the '

l plant must be brought to at least Hot Shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to Cold Shutdown within 36 i

! hours. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the j required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

! Movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, movement of new fuel over l the spent fuel pool, core alterations, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product l release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier

to release of fission products to the emironment. Core alterations, movement ofirradiated fuel l assemblies, and movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool must be immediately suspended if l the secondary containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a l

component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to i minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release.

Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

initiating reactor building isolation and operation of the standby gas treatment system to maintain  !

[ at least a 1/4 inch of water negative pressure within the secondary containment provides an  !

adequate test of the operation of the reactor building isolation valves, leak tightness of the reactor l building and performance of the standby gas treatment system. Functionally testing the initiating  ;

sensors and associated trip channels demonstrates the capability for automatic actuation.

Performing these tests prior to refueling will demonstrate secondary containment capability prior to

! the time the primary containment is opened for refueling. Periodic testing gives sufficient confidence of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system performance capability.

Amendment No. 46r-444 B3/4.7-13 1

I Attachment C

. Marked-up Technical Specification Paaes 1

P I

l 1

1.8 DEFINITIONS (Cont) r "- e e -~ - n.: = g n. p y_x ,: - .. e . g e :7; e . l Q.

e.; wy ' . !:':; t - ;;:J ;.".L_-2 n'd'- t f_ : ' W ' ;, " -d

, =..; l. ;"f. 6 - ;' ;;;' t.:M !.7 ^'v. " .,!:^ no: z i:,:;".

=::4 f= ": :'n; = : .;- 2 ":--

~

FL,.;. .' w.;;;= d in .;; * ^ r - ^ - - -

R. Rametar Va==*1 Pr***ure - Unless othenvise indicated. reactor vessel pressures listed in the Technical Specifications are those measured by the reactor vessel steam space W

/

t S. 'Ihermal Parameters 1.

Mmimum Critical Power Ratio fMCPR) - the value of critical power ratio associated with the most limiting assembly in the reactor core. Critical Power Ratio (CPR) is the ratio of that power in a fbel maembly, which is calculated to cause some point in the assembly to experience boding transition, to the actual marmbly operating power.

2. Transition Boding - Transition bothng means the bading regime between nucleate and film bothng. Transition boihng is the regime in which both nuclease and Alm boding occur intermittently with neither type being completely grahle. ,

3. Total Pemkins Factor - The ratio of the fuel rod surface heat flux to the heat flux of an average rod in an identical geometry fuel assembly operating at the core average bundle power.

T. Instrumentanon

1. Instrument Calibrabon - An instrument calibration means the adjustmem of an instrument signal output so that it conW6, within acceptable range, and accuracy, to a known value(s) of the parameter which the inst anent monitos.

i Calibration shall encompass the entire instrument including armtion, alann or

\  ;

trip.

2. Instrummt Charmel - An insuument channel means an anangement of a sensor and auxiliary equipment required to generate and transmit to a trip system a single trip signal related to the plant parameter monitored by that instrument channel

3. Instrument Functional Test An instrument fusxtional test means the injeccon of a simulated signal into the instnunent pnmary sensor to verify the proper instrument channel response, alarm and/or initiating action.

4. Instrument Check - An instrument check is a qualitative determination of j

acceptable operability by observation of instrument behavior during operation.

This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the instrument

/ with other independent instruments measuring the same variable.

CORE ALTERA110N shall be the movement of any fuet, sources,a reactiviry contml CORE ALTERATION components. within the reactor vessel j with the vessel head W fuel in the vessel. The q following exceptions are not considered to be CORE Al.TERATIONS: j)

a. Movement of source ranse monitors, local power range monitors. intermediate range monitors. traversing incere probes, or special movable detectors (includins undervessel replacement); and

b. Contiol rod movement. provuled there are no fuel assemblies in the associased core cell Suspension of CORE ALTERA110NS shaR not preclude completaan of movement of a

..yo.w~.t to a safe passtaan Revision 177 ~

14 Amendment No.15, !", if'

-- - - . .. , - . _ . ~ . _ - . .- _ . . . _ . - _ - . _ - - ~ _ _ - - - - . _ _ -

LIMITING CONDITIppS FOR OPERATICE SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS  ;

3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont) 4.7 ColffAIlttINT SYSTEMS (Cont)

Shutdown Transformer is . g

. required to be operable and )

capable of supply power to the emergency bus.

- Fuel movement will not occur until the reactor vessel is flood up to elevation 114'.

- The train of CRHEAF j without is safety related i bus or without its emergency diesel generator 1 will have power supplied l from a normal offsite source via a non safety-related bus. The normal ,

offsite source consists of i either the Startup e Transformer or Unit Auxiliary Transformer _

_ /

(Backfeed Mode).

C. Secondary Containment /

• --containment 1.l

. Secondary containment integrity 1 be performed i

shall be maintained during all Lsurveila fndleated below..

odes of plant operation except t

en all of the following - A preoperational secondary co ditions are met. containment capability test hall be conducted after

a. reactor is suberitical i olating the reactor an Specification 3.3.A is bu iding and placing either met, st y gas treatment system filt train in operation.

b. The r ctor water Such ses shall demonstrate temper ture is below 212

• F the ca bility to maintain and the eactor coolant system i vented, 1/4 inc of water vacuus under ca wind (<5 mph) i conditio with a filter

c. No activi is being train flow ate of not more -

performed ich can reduce than 4000 cf the shutdo margin below that specifi in b. Additional test shall be Specification .3.A. performed during he first i

d. The fuel cask o irradiated f operating cycle un r an adequate number of ffereny fuel is not bein moved in environmental wind 1 the reactor build g. conditions to enable va d extrapolation of the tes

2. If Specification 3.7 C. cannot ...3. .

be met, procedures shal be

~

initiated to establish econdary containment conditions listed in Spec I capability 4to maintain 1/4 ication 3.7.C.1.a through .] neh of water. vacuum undar Revision 179 3

\ Amendment No. 9, 161 3/4.7-16 4

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS

, 3.7 , CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont) 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont) l C. Secondary Containment (Cont) C. Secondary Containment (Cont) bh) calm wind (5 mp}.) conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 4000 i cfm.cfEa11 be demonstrate

( f46)/hchretuelingoutage prior to refueling.

l l

l l

1 l

1 Revision 179 l Amendment No. 0,161 3/4.7 17

~

f f

. , i i

r, l f

/ 1. Secondary containment shall be OPERABLE when in the Run, Startup and Hot Shutdown l MODES, during movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the wWay containment, and during movement of new fuel over the spent fuel -

pool, and during CORE ALTERATIONS, and i

! during operations with a potential for drammg

! the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). i NetM 4 2. a. With Secondary Containment inoperable when in the Run, Startup and Hot Shutdown t

i d,'e ,f., ! MODES, restore Secondary Contamment to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. ,

b. Required Action and Completion Time of 2.a l not met, be in Hot Shutdown in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 1 AMR Cold Shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

I c. With Secondary Containment inoperable >

during movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and during movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool, and during CORE ALTERATIONS, [ ,

j  !

and during OPDRVs, immediately

1. Suspend n.ovement ofirradiated fuel i

assemblies in the wWay containment.

AND i

2. Suspend movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool.

AND

3. Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND i

4. Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

l t

l l

I

m l;, .--

l B&EEE:

1

3/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (cont)

!' C, Secondary Containment l- The secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of '

radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident. The reactor i building provides secondary containment during reactor operation, when the

~

drywell is sealed and in service; the reactor building provides primary I containment when the reactor is shutdown _and the drywell is open, as.during l refueling._ Because the' secondary containment is an integral part of-the j

! complete containment system, secondary containment is required at a11' times'- l l

x that primary containment is required as well as during refueling. l F f Initiating reactor building isolation and operation of the standby gas treatment system to maintain at least a 1/4 inch of water negative pressure ,

i within the secondary containment provides an adequate test of the operation of ,

the reactor building isolation valves, leak tightness of the reactor building j and performance of the standby gas treatment system. Functionally testing the-initiating sensors and associated trip channels demonstrates the capability. ,

for automatic actuation. Performing these tests prior to refueling will i

j. .

demonstrate secondary containment capability prior to the time the primary l l containment is opened for refueling. Periodic testing gives sufficient l- confidence of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system l

performance capability.

There are two principal accidents for which credit is taken for earnarlary contamment operability.

These are a loss of coolant =cewia=* (LOCA) and a fuel handhng accident inside [ secondary]

<=*=== ment. The secondary ca=*=iament performs no active function in response to anch of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of raAaarrive '

9 msserials from the primary containment is restncted to those leakage paths and associated leakage

( rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secanntary 1

cansamment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment As operable secondary contamment provides a control volume into which fission products that '

bypass or leak from primary contamment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary contamment, can be diluted and processed prior to j release to the environment. For the pecanetary contamment to be canawlered operable, it must have i adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be estabbshed and maintained.

If secondary contamment is inoperable (when required to be operable), it must be restored to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> completion time provides a period of time to correct the

\ ,

problem that is commensurate with the W is of spamraimnt earnariasy contamment during Run, Startup, and Hot Shutdown modes. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary contamment operability) occurring during penods where secondary contamment is inoperable is muumal if secondary contamment cannot be restored to operable status within the required completion time, the plant must be brought to a mode in which the LCO does not apply. To actueve this status, the plant must be brought to at least Hot Shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to Cold Shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operatag expenence, to reach the /

/

required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging [

plant systems. g j Movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the sarnantary contamment, movement of new fuel over \,

the spent fuel pool, core aherations, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause 6ssion product twicase to the secondary contamment. In such cases, the secondary contamment is the only barrier e

f i to release of fission products to the environment Core ahcrations, movement ofirradiated fuel

assemblics, and movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool must be immodately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.

/

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves mosing a 'N co vponent to a safe position. Also, action must be immedately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to -j l

. -:ize the probability of a vessel dramdown and subsequent potental for 6ssion product release. ,

Actions must rane==* until OPDRVs are suspended Revision 177 Amendment No, 16v113 B3/4.h-13

_ , _ , . _ , , , _ y -_. --~- --+-g-