ML20079E392

Proposed Emergency Planning Contentions Modified to Reflect Rev 3 of Lilco Transition Plan

ML20079E392
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	01/12/1984
From:	NORTH SHORE COMMITTEE AGAINST NUCLEAR & THERMAL POLLU, SHOREHAM OPPONENTS COALITION, SOUTHAMPTON, NY, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20079E393	List: ML20079E392 ML20079E399
References
NUDOCS 8401170276
Download: ML20079E392 (242)

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Prc, posed ~ Emergency' Planning Contentions:

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North Sh're o Committe.e.Against .

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Proposed Emergency Planning Contentions

, Modified to Reflect Revision 3 of the LILCO Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION.......................... ...................... 2 Contentions 1-10: LILCO's Lack of Legal Authority........... 4 Contentions 11-14: Command and C9ntrol..................... 15 Contention 15: LILCO's Lack of Credibility................ 20 Contentions 16-21: Public Education and Information....... 30 4

Contention 22: Inadequacy of LILCO's Proposed 10-Mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone

("EPZ")..................,............................. 40 Contention 23: The Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon............ 51 Contention 24: LILCO's Lack of Agreements With Organiza-tions and Personnel Relied Upon in the Plan............ 59 Contention 25: Role Conf]ict of Emergency Workers......... 78 i

SE Cantention 26: Notification of Emergency Response Per-sonnel................................................. 84 Contention 27: Mobilization of Emergency Rec,onse Person-nel.................................................... 95 i Contentions 28-34: Communicationc hmong Emergency Re-

! sponse Personnel...................................... 100 i STEv Contentions 35-44: Training of Emergency Workers Preamble to Contentions.35-44......................... 108 l Contentions 45-51: Accident and Dose Assessment and l Projection............................................ 122 Contention 52: Emergency Operations Center................ 129 Contention 53: Security During a Radiological Emergency... 131 Contention 54: ' Medical and Public Health Support.......... 132

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Contentions 55-59: Notification to the Public............ 133 Contentions 60-83: Protective Actions..................... 138 Contentions 60-62: Sheltering............................. 139 Contentions 63-77: Evacuation............................. 146 Contention 65: Evacuation Time Estimates.................. 148 Contention 66: Removal of Obstacles from the Roadway and Provisions for Fuel................................... 157 Contention 67: Evacuation of Persons Without Access to Automobiles........................................... 160 Contentions 68-71: Evacuation of School Children.......... 167 Contention 72: Evacuation of People in Special Facilities. 176 Contention 73: Handicapped People at Home................ 179 Contentions 74-77: Relocation Centers..................... 182 Contentions 78-83: Food, Milk, Water and Livestock Contro1............................................... 186 Contentions 84-91: Recovery and Reentry................... 192 Contention 92: State Emergency Plan......................, 199 Ccatentions 93-96: Lcss of Offsite Power.................. 199 SOC Contention 97: Bad Weather............................ 205 l

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Revised Proposed Emergency Planning Contentions Modified to Reflect Revision 3 of the LILCO Plan INTRODUCTION

'se' Revised Proposed Emergency Planning Contentions Modified to Reflect Revision 3 of the LILCO Plan are filed by Intervenors Suffolk County, Shoreham Opponents Coalition, North

, Shore Committee Against huclear and Thermal Pollution and the Town of Southampton (collectively, "Intervenors"). These con-tentions include modifications, that have been made in the Re-

-vised Fmergency Planning Contentions filed by Intervenors on July 26, 1983, to reflect changes made to the L1LCO Offsite Emergency Plan subsequent to the filing of the July conten-tions. Contentions 23, 25 and 65 have not been modified since, at the time of this submittal, litisation is already in progress on'those contentions. In addition, those contentions which deal with the Information Brochure (i.e., Contentions 16, 18 and 21) have not been modified since Revision 3 of the In-formation Brochure has not yet been provided to Intervenors.

We are informed by LILCO counsel that Revision 3 of the bro-chure is expected to be made available in a matter of days.

Those contentions will be modified promptly after receipt of i the revised brochure. The contentions also reflect, in t

br'acketed notations, the August 1983 rulings of the ASLB on l

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admissibility. Those contentions not admitted by the ASLB have not been modified. Contentions which have been withdrawn by Intervenors are so identified.

The "LILCO Plan" to which thog contentions refer is the Revision 3 (December 1983) of the so-called "LILCO Transition Plan," consisting of the following documents:

"SNPS ' Of fsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan,"

Revision 3, with blue-eelered inserts identified as "LILCO

-Transition" (herein referred to as the "LILCO Plan" or the

" Plan");

"SNPS Otfsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Suffolk County, Appendix A Evacuation Plan," Revision 3, with geld-eelered inserts (herein referred to as " Appendix A");

"SNPS Local Of fsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures," Revision 3, Volumes I and 11, with blue-eetered inserts identified as "LILCO Transition" (herein referred to as "OPIPs"); and

" Emergency Procedures -- Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (Revised)" (herein referred to as "Information Brochure").

Unless otherwise stated, the "EPZ" referenced in the con-tentions is the lO-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ assumed in the LILCO Plan.

CONTENTIONS Contentions 1-10: LILCO's Lack of Legal Authority Preamble to Contentions 1-10. The LILCO Transition Plan specifies that in an emergency, the actions described fu Con-i tentions.1 through 10 below may be ordered to be taken by LILCO

- personnel. Contentions 1 through 10 allege that LILCO person-

- nel do not have the authority to order or to perform those actions.1/ 'Accordingly, as alleged in these contentions LILCO cannot, as a matter of' law, exercise the responsibilities iden-tified in Contentions 1-10, and therefore, contrary to 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) its Plan -could r.ot and would not be imple-mented. LILCO's lack of legal authority to perform actions assigned to LILCO under the Transition Plan also results in noncompliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(3) and NUREG 0654,

- Section A.2.6, in addition to other regulatory requirements as set forth in-the contentions which follow.

Contention 1. LILCO is prohibited by law from directing

. traffic.. N.Y. Veh. & Traf.. Law ((l102, 1602 (McKinney) ; N.Y.

i Penal Law t 190.25(3), 195.05, 240.20(5) (hcKinney); N.Y.

Transp. Corp. Law 30 (hcKinney) . Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO

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1/. See also pages 2-3 of the June 23, 1983 FEMA review of the

! Transition Plan (" FEMA Report") which also questions LILCO's legal authority.

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employees designated " traffic guides" are expected to direct or

" guide" traffic to ensure that evacuees follow the evacuation routes identified and prescribed by LILCO in the Plan and to

" discourage" non-compliance with those routes. (See OPIP 3.6.3,..at 5-6 6a-7 and Attacnments 1 and 4 thereto Appendix A "Traf fic Control," at IV-5 eti seq. ) . These portions of the Plan, therefore, are incapable of bmplementation.

Further, LILC0's lack of authority to direct traffic ren-ders its evacuation time estimates, required under 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix L, Section IV, and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.8 and Appendix 4, inaccurate. LILCO's evacuation time estimates (Ap-pendix A at V-3, V-8; OPIP 3.6.1, Attachment 4 2) and the com-puter model from which they are derived, assume that all persons will use only the prescribed evacuation routes. (See fer-exampler Appendix A, at IV-19 whieh-states 4t-is-essential v-v-v-thee-each-meteeist enter-the evacuatien-netwerk-en-the speesfied-tinker-and-er.-ne ether-netwerk link, if-the-meterist-erre-in-this-respectr-he may-find-st impessible-te-travet-teward-his assigned-destinatien without-disrupting-the flew-ef-evacuating autemebiteer-increasing his-ewn-delay-and-that-ef many-ether evacuees, fbee-alser-hypendix-hr-at, V-2). In fact, however, since LILCO's traffic guides are prohibited by law from directing

traffic, LILCO will not be able to ensure that motorists will us2 only the prescribed routes, rendering the LILCO evacuation time estimates inaccurate. Thus, LILCO does not comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), Part 50 Appendix E Section IV, and NOREO 0654 Sections II.J.8, J.9.5., J.10, and Appendix 4.

Without LILCO's assumption that evaceees will follow prescribed evacuation routes, the LILCO evacuation time estimater would increase substantially.

Contentien 2. LILCO is prohibited by law from blocking

. roadways, setting up barriers in roadways, and channeling traf-fic. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law $1114 '(McKinney) ; N.Y. Penal Law

$190. 25 (3 ) , 195.05, 240.20(5) (McKinney) ; N. Y. Transp. Corp.

630 (McKinney). Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO employees are ex-pected to implement various traffic control measures, including those listed above, to ensure that evacuees follow the evacua-tion routes prescribed by LILCO. (Appendix A at Section IV).

i LILCO's evacuation time estimates assume that traffic control devices such as roadblocks, prescribed turn movements, chan-c nelization treatment, one-way roads and blocking lanes on the 1

Long Island Expressway will be implemented and effective in directing and controlling evacuation traffic. (See Appendix A at bection IV-62) because LILCO and its " traffic guides" lack legal authority to implement such traffic controls (see also l

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FEMA Report at 2-3, 10-11), LILCO cannot rely on the use of traffic control devices to ensure the use of prescribed evacua-

, tion routes. As a result, LILCO's evacuation time estimates are unrealistically low and the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47 (b) (10), Part 50 Appendix E Section IV, and NUREG 0654 Sections-II.J.8, J. 9, J.10, and Appendix 4.

Contention 3. LILCO is prohibited by law from posting traffic signs on roadways. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law $1114 (McKinney) ; N.Y. Penal Law {$190.25(3), 195.05, 240.20(5)

(McKinney) . In addition to its proposed use of signs as traf-

-fic control or channelling devices (see Contention 2), the LILCO Plan also assumes that " trail blazer" signs will be installed as permanent roadway hardware to direct the public in the use of prescribed evacuation routes in the event of an evacuation. LILCO's evacuation time estimates assume that such signs are installed. (Appendix A, at IV-SE 70). In fact, how-ever, such signs will not be installed by Suffolk County and it is unlawful for LILCO to install such signs. Therefore, LILCO cannot rely on such signs to ensure the use of prescribed evac-uation routes, and its evacuation time estimates are, as a result, unrealistically low. Thus, LILCO fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), Part 50 Appendix E section IV, and NUREG 0654 bections II.J.8, J . 9, J.10, and Appendix 4.

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Contention 4. LILCO is prohibited by law from removing obstructions from public roadways, including the towing of l

l private vehicles. N.Y. Penal Law S 165.05 (McKinney). The LILCO Plan provides that " road crews" made up of LILCO employ-ees will remove obstacles from roadways by using LILCO tow trucks and line trucks. (Plan, at 4.4-3; OPIP 3.6.3, at 1 2 and Attachment 2 thereto).Y Because LILCO is prohibited by law from towing private vehicles and removing obstacles from public roadways, this aspect of LILCO's Plan cannot and will not be implemented. As a result, the Plan fails to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.k. [ Remainder of Contention 4 not admitted by ASLB] In addition, LILCO's evacuation time estimates do not include the effects upon evacuation of accidents, breakdowns and other road blockages, apparently based at least in part on an assumption that such obstacles will be removed immediately. (Appendix A at V-2). Since LILCO l

f lacks authority to remove such obstacles from evacuation routes, its evacuation time estimates are thus unrealistically low and the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Section

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50.47(b)(10),.Part 50 Appendix E Section IV, and NUREG 0654 Sections-II.J.8, J . 9, J.10 and Appendix 4.

Contention 5. LILCO is prohibited by law from activating sirens and directing the broadcast and contents of emergency broadcast system ("EBS") messages to the public. N.Y. Penal Law $ $190. 25 (3 ) , 195.05 (McKinney) ; N.Y. Exec. Law $ 20 et. seq.

(McKinney) . Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO employees are expected to order that sirens be activated. They are also expected to determine the contents of EBS messages, to determine that an 1

. EBS broadcast should. be made, and to direct that such broadcast occurs. (See OPIPr 3. 3.4 and 3. 8. 2) Because LILCO employees -

are prohibited by law from performing such actions, the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be implemented, and the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR bection 50.47(b)(5) and NUREG 0654 Section II.E.5 and E.6. Moreover, in assigning such functions to LILCO employees, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appen-t dix E,Section IV.D.3.

L Contention 6. LILCO is prohibited by law from making de-l l

l cisions and official recommendations to the public as to the l

1 appropriate actions necessary to protect the public health and safety, . including deciding upon protective actions which will be communicated to the public. N.Y. Penal Law $ $190. 25 (3 ) ,

195.05 (McKinney) ; N.Y. Exec. Law $ 20 et seg. (McKinney).

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L Under the LILCO Plan, LEbEG-employees-are-identidsed-as-being responsibie-der all command'and control functions, as well as all management and coordination of the entire emergency re-sponse,.are to be performed by various LILCO employees or, in the case of the " Radiation Health Coordinator," by an

. unidentified LILCO " Contractor." (See Plan at 3.1-1; OPIPs 2 .1.1, 3.1.1, 3.6.1). Thus, contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appen-

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dix E, Section IV.A, LILCO employees and contractors rather

- than " State and/or local officials" are identified as responsi-ble for planning, ordering, controlling and implementing the offsite response including appropriate . protective actions. Be-cause LILCO is prohibited by law from performing such functions, its Plan cannot and will not be implemented, and it fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47 (b) (5 ), 50.47(b)(6),

50. 47 ( b) ( 10 ) , and NUREG 0654 bections II.E.5, E.6, E.7, G, J.9 and J.10.

Contention 7. LILCO is prohibited by law from making de-l cisions and official recommendations to the public concerning

. protective actions for the ingestica exposure pathway. N . Y.

Exec. Law $20 et seg. ( McKinney) ; N.Y. Penal Law $190.25 (3 ),

195.05 (hcKinney). The LILCO Plan provides that various LILCO -

employees and an unidentified LILCO "ContractoL" will be re-sponsible for determining, making to the public, and l

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implementing protective action recommendations for the 50-mile ,

ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. (See Plan Section 3.6; OPIP 3.6.6) Because LILCO employees and contractors are prohibited by law from performing these actions, the proposed ingestion pathway EPZ protective actions cannot and will not be imple-mented. Therefore, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50. 47 (b) (10 ), 50.47(c)(2), Appendix E Section IV.A.8, and NUREG.0654,Section II.J.11.

Contention 8. LILCO is prohibited by law from making de-cisions and official recommendations to the public concerning recovery and reentry. N.Y. Exec. Law $20 et., seq. (McKinney);

N.Y. Penal Law $190. 25 (3 ), 195.05 (McKinney) . The LILCO Plan proposes that short-term and long-term recovery and reentry operations will be performed by LILCO personnel and contractors following a radiological emergency at Shoreham (Plan, at 3.10-1 and 3.10-2; OPIP 3.10.1). and-atee-statee-that 8the-initiatien ef-Recevery-and-imphementatien-ef-Reentry-in-a-nen-utility decisien-meking-precesen-40 PEP-Gv49v47-at-44, LILCO identifies no non-utility entity, with necessary authority, which has agreed to undertake the initiation or implementation of the re-covery and reentry processes. Since, under the LILCO Plan, command and control functions are ascumed by L1LCO, and under New York law, LILCO does not have the authority to perform

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z recovery and reentry functions, recovery and reentry cannot be initiated or implemented. The Plan thus fails to comply with l

10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(13), and NDREG 0654 l

l Section II.M.

Contention 9. LILCO is prohibited by law from dispensing fuel from tank trucks to automobiles along roadsides. Suffolk County Sanitary Code, Article 12; Code of the Town of Brookhaven, Chapter 30, Article X. Town-Pire-Peeventien Eedest.3./- Appendix-A-ef-the-LELEO-Plan-fat-IV-19Ety-states-that a gasetine-eentingency-plan-is 8endee-developmentr a-and-the Plan-fat-474-4f-states-that afgteseliney-dieset-fuely-metee eHy-etery-wiH-be-peevided-rrv-by-Peivate-GeseHne-and-Biese1 Fuel-Eempaniesra--Appendix-A-further-states-that afetnee-the methedetegy-fee-previding-gaseline-has-been-determinedy-en-al-toestien-system-wsH-have-te-be-deetved-specifying-the-numbee ef gaHens-aHewedy-ete,a--fAppendix-Ay-at-IV-499+r 4 / Because The LILCO Plan provides that LILCO fuel tank trucks will be

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-mc r e spes-i-E-iea1-1-y -ident-i-6-i-ed v l .&/- -LRGO -has -msoraed--Saf4oM--Goun-t-y -the-t--t-he--fee 1--wi-1-1--be-l

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-r-eed-y--i.n--p 1-ee e--and--tha-t--Er%C-G -fee-1--h -wi-1-1--actuel-1-y

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l stationed along evacuation routes to assist motorists who run out of fuel. These trucks will dispense up to three gallons of fuel per vehicle to vehicles that have run out of fuel. (Ap-pendix A at IV-176.) However, LILCO is prohibited by law from distributing gesetine fuel to motorists on the roadsides, this aspect of the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be implemented.

It is likely that many evacuees will not begin an evacuation with a full tank of gas. Fhny cars may run out of gas, both inside and outside the EPZ, as a result of extended operation times due to congestion, stop-and-go conditions ~and time spent sitting in queues. Cars running out of gas, and the probable abandonment.of vehicles which will follow, will result in obstructions and blockages on roadways in use during the evacu-ation. LILCO's evacuation time estimates do not take cars run-ning out of gas and the resulting road obstructions into r

account. If LILCO cannot effectively prevent or remove such obstacles, its evacuation time estimates will increase. The LILCO Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), Part 50 Appendix E bection IV, NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.8, J.9, J.10, and Appendix 4.

I Contention 10. LILCO is prohibited by law from performing law enforcement functions at the EOC, at relocation centers, and at the.EPZ perimeter. N.Y. Penal Law f il90. 25 (3 ), 195.05, .

240.20(5) (McKinney) ; N.Y. Transp. Corp. {30 (McKinney) ; N.Y.

Veh. & Traf. Law ((l102, 1602 (McKinney); N. Y. Exec. Law { 20 eti seg. ( McKinney) . The LILCO Plan identifica LILCO employees as being. responsible, during an emergency, for establishing and maintaining security and access control for the EOC, directing traffic into the relocation centers, establishing and maintaining security at the relocation centers, and estcblishing and maintaining perimeter / access control to evacu-ated areas. (OPIP 2.1.1, at 547-and-Attachment-Er-at-47t 60-61; Appendix A at IV-8; OPIP 3.6. 3, Attachment 4) . 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(1) requires LILCO to demonstrate that it "has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis." LILCO must also "specify the functions and responsibilities for major elements ... of emergency response,"

including law enforcement response. NUREG 0654,Section II.A.2.a. Without the ability to provide security at the EOC and relocation centers, and provide perimeter control, the l LILCO Plan and the protective actions contemplated therein could not and would not be implemented. The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1) and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.2.a, J.9 and J.10.

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Contentions 11-14: Command and Control Preamble to Contentions 11-14. - 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A requires emergency plans to describe the orga-nization for coping with radiological emergencies, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency organization and identification of the State and/or local officials respon-sible for planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate protective actions, including evacuations. In the LILCO Tran-sition Plan, in place of " State and/or local officials," LILCO employees (including ~in the case of the " Radiation health Coordinator," an unidentified LILCO " Contractor" which, for purposes of these contentions is included in the term "LILCO employees") are identified as being responsible for planning for, ordering, and controlling the entire offsite Emergency re-sponse. Thus, all the command and control functions, as well l

as all management and coordination of the entire emergency re-sponse, are to be performed by various LILCO employees. (Plan,

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at 3.1-1; OPIPs 2.1.1, 3.1.1, 3.6.1). Accordingly, the l

"offsite authorities responsible for coordinating and imple-menting offsite emergency measures," with whom the LILCO onsite emergency coordinator must exchange information ( see 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.Section IV.A.2.c), are fellow LILCO employees.

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In Contentions 11-14 below, the Intervenors contend that there cannot and will not be offsite emergency preparedness that provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event o.i a radiological emergency at Shoreham because LILCO employees are not able to exercise effectively the command and control responsibilities necessary to plan for, order, manage, coordinate and contrcl appropriate protective actions. Each of the deficiencies iden-tified in Contentions 11-14 results in noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3), Part 50 Ap-pendix E, Section It', and NUREG 0654 Section II.A.

Contention 11. The LILCO employees in command and control positions under the LILCO Plan may experience a conflict between LILCO's financial and institutional interests and the public's interest, which may substantially hamper their ability to perform the functions assigned to them in a manner that will result in adequate protection of the public. The Intervenors contend that LILCO employees will have a strong incentive to

! minimize the public's perception of the potential or actual j danger involved in a radiological emergency in order to avoid engendering public or L1LCO shareholder disapproval of LILCO, or anti-Shoreham sentiment. Thus, for example, they may not i

recommend an appropriate protective action in a prompt manner l

because to do so would be contrary to LILCO's financial interest in maintaining a public perception that Shoreham is not a- source of danger. LILCO has failed to institute appropriate measures (comparable to those required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 1 for GA/QC personnel)

[ parenthetical not admitted by ASLB] to ensure the independence of LdRO personnel. Accordingly, there is no assurance that correct and appropriate command and control decisions will be made by LILCO employees.

Contention 12. [Not admitted by ASLB] The LILCO Transi-tion Plan is premised on the belief that LILCO personnel will, in fact, be able to exercise the command and control functions which are specified in the Plan. The Intervenors contend that LILCO personnel will not be able to exercise proper or effec-tive conmand and control of response to a Shoreham emergency because LILCO personnel will not be adequately familiar with the site-specific conditions in Suffolk County. The site-specific conditions as to which familiarity is essential are the County's geography, topograrh t , road network, demography, and the locations, characteristics and capacities of schools and other institutions and volunteer organizations. It is further essential that LILCO personnel be familiar with the legal and jurisdictional limitations of their own authority and

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that of other entities who may assist or participate in response to a shoreham emergency. Familiarity with, and complete understanding of, such facts and conditions are essential to the effective management and coordination of emer- '

gency response. Those in command and control positions must be able to make prompt and informed decisions dealing with 7

circumstances and events that may not be contemplated or spe-cifically provided for in a written emergency plan.

LILCO personnel lack the necessary familiarity with local conditions. Many of the command and contrcl personnel do not reside or work in the Shoreham vicinity and thus will not have the day-to-day f amiliarity with conditions in Suffolk County I

which is essential to effective command and control. The in-tervenors do not believe that such familiarity can be taught to LILCO personnel, because the essential knowledge of such facts can only be obtained if classroom training is reinforced by day-to-day' responsibilities and -experience which require r knowledge of cthe local conditions. LILCO personnel do not have such training or experience. Thus, LILCO command and control 1

personnel will not be aware of how the various entities, j institutions, organizations and the population operate or l interact with each other on a day-to-day basis or in an emer-

gency situation and will be unable to fulfill command and I

control responsibilities effectively during an emergency.

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A Contention 13. [Not admitted by ASLB] The LILCO Plan assigna.to LILCO employees ~the responsibility of command and control over the personnel in the non-LILCO support organiza-tions relied upon in the Plan for performing emergency response functions. Such organizations are the American Red Cross

(" ARC"), Brookhaven National Laboratory ("BNL"), local law en-forcement. agencies, ambulance, fire and rescue organizations, the Long Island Railroad ("LIRR"), the Salvation Army, volun-tary groups such as churches and industries, and an unnamed 1mnber company. (See OPIP 2.1.1; Plan at 2.2-2, 2.2-4, 4.2-1;

-Appendix A at IV-82, IV-186-7). LILCO's attempt to exercise such authority conflicts with the normal chains of command, as-signment of responsibilities, and internal operating procedures according to which these organizations function. For example, support organizations have their own plans and procedures which may differ significantly from the LILCO Plan and its imple-menting procedures. In addition, some local law enforcement officers and firefighters will decline to implement any Plan which is not the Plan of the local government (i.e., Suffolk County). Therefore, there is no assurance that the procedures set forth in the Plan, or other procedures that may be ordered by LILCO personnel during an emergency, will be followed by non-LILCO employees, particularly in the event that the support l'

I i

1 organization supervisors or the individual emergency workers decide that a different procedure would be better or more appropriate in a given situation.

The Plan also fails to indicate that the emergency re-aponse personnel relied upon in the LILCO Plan (i.e., LILCO em-ployees, personnel from non-LILCO organizations, and other unaffiliated support personnel), will be indemnified by LILCO for injuries they incur or for liabilities-to third parties which may be incurred during training drills or exercises, or in responding to an emergency under the command and control of LILCO personnel. As a result, emergency response personnel, particularly those not employed by LILCO, may refuse to obey the command and control directives of LILCO employees, and snus may not carry out tasks and responsibilities assigned to them under the LILCO Plan.

Contention 14.- Withdrawn. The Plan fails to idencify the title of the LILCO officer who will fill the role of Director of LERO (OPIP 2.1.1 at 5 ) . This constitutes non-compliance l

l with NUREG 0654, Section A.1.d. (See FEMA Report, at 2).

i j Contention 15: LILCO's Lack of Credibility Preamble to Contention 15. The LILCO Plan is dependent i

l upon LILCO/LERO personnel providing essentially all necessary f information and recommendations which are required during an l

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l

emergency. Contention 15 addresses the question whether

LILCO/LERO' recommendations for protective actions (and other

'information provided by LILCO/LERO) will be believed and.

followed or whether LILCO will be ' distrusted as a source of in-formation with the result that its protective action recommen-dations (and other information provided) will not be believed or followed by the public.

Contention 15. Intervenors contend that LILCO is not con-sidered by the public to be a credible source of information.

More than 60 percent' of the people in Suffolk County would not trust LILCO officials at all to tell the truth about an accident. See Social. Data Analysts Survey. Persons are more

.likely to question, refuse to believe, disobey or ignore orders, recommendations, or information that come from persons

, whom they.do not believe than that from authorities they trust .

3

-and consider credible.

I' Because the public does not perceive LILCO as a credible source of information, protective action recommendations and other information disseminated by LILCO in an emergency will

-not be followed or believed by the public. Further, LILCO may be. viewed hostilely as th'e source of the problem in the first place,'or skeptically because the public will perceive that it is not in LILCO's financial interest to disclose all pertinent 1

information. - .( Members of the public will perceive that LILCO

.will not disclose the seriousness of an accident due to fears of lower ratings in the financial markets, NRC sanctions, or a lower' public image than already exists. ) Therefore, people will be likely to disregarti or disobey protective action recom-

-mendations or other emergency instructions disseminated by e LILCO during. an emergency. Intervenors thus contend that the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be implemented, and accordingly, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47. The paragraphs which follow set forth the particular aspects of, or operations contemplated by, the LILCO Plan which cannot be Luplemented as a result of LILCO's lack of credi-bility, and the resulting lack of regulatory compliance.

Contention 15.A. LILCO employees are assigned the re-sponsibility of command and control over fat the personnel in the support organizations relied upon in the Plan for emergency response services (ARC, DOE-PAP, Bhbr ambulance, fire, rescue organizations, local law enforcement agencies, and the U.S.

i Coast Guard). th e - 6a t vats en- Armyr- the- LE RRr- a n- un n am ed -l um be r eempanyr-and-groupe-such-as-churches-and-industriesty-and-fbt

~

8 medie nt-pe reenn e& E-wh ose-a ffiliatien-i s-net rid enti fi ed-in-the Phanr-and-seleet-velanteere, (OPIP 2.1.1; Plan at 2.2-1, 2.2-2, 2.2-4, 4.2-1.hypendix-A-at-IV-GEr-IV-t&6-74 w w w - - - - - - , - - . - e m -~ -e-,---,-e . --,e , -,,,-.------~w--.---wa-- n -,,me- - - - - - ,

r-- - - , - - - - - . -

Intervenors allege that such individuals will share the public l

perception that LILCO is not a credible source of information.

Therefore, Lit is likely that orders from the LILCO employees in command and control will not be obeyed by the non-LILCO emer-gency workers relied upon in the Plan. Accordingly, there is no assurance that the portions of the LILCO Plan involving par- *i ticipation of non-LILCO personnel can or will be implemented,  !

and there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Section 1

50.47(a)(1). The likelihood that non-LILCO workers will not j l

obey LILCO command and control orders means that the following aspects of the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be implemented:

(1) Offsite accident and dose assessment and projection, 1

and recommendations to the LILCO Director of LERO as to what  !

I particular protective actions should be recommended to the i public , resulting in noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(9), 50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG L654 Sections R 4

II.I, J.9 and J.lO. I (2) The protective action of evacuation resulting in noncompliance with 10 CFR S'ections 50.47 (b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

(3) Staffing of relocation centers, and the provision of necessary services for evacuees, resulting in noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47 (b) (8 ), 50.47 (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.10 and II.J.12.

Contention 15,B. A protective action recommendation of sheltering could not or wculd not be implemented. Based on a survey of Long Island residenta, a substantial number of the people advised to shelter will choose to evacuate instead as a result of their lack of trust in LILCO's interest or ability to properly and objectively determine and recemmend actions that are in the best interests of the public. Thus, the protective action of sheltering could not and would not be implemented in violation of 10 CFR' Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9. and J.10.

Contention 15.C. The LILCO Plan provides for early dis-nissal, sheltering or evacuation / relocation of students in schools within or near the EPZ, depending on the nature and circumstances of an accident at Shoreham. If protective actions are recommended for the public in the EPZ, schools outside the EPZ having children who reside in the EPZ are ex-pected to retain such children at the schools after the end of the school day. appears-te-assume-that-ite-receumendatien-that seheels-implement-an-early-dismissal-will-resuit-in-ehildren being-pretected-in-the-event-ef-an-evacuatien-erdeer-because children-ceutd-thereby-evacuate-with-their-parents, (See Ap-pendix A, at II-19 through 20). However, under the LILCO Plan, the decision to hnplement an early dismissal or to shelter, evacuate, relochte or retain students rests With the schools.

(See Appendix A, at IV-kSE II-19). The recommendation to dismiss- early or to implement any other protective actions will be made, by LILCO, over the EBS radio (Plan at 3.3-4 through 3.6-6; Appendir A at EV-kBG II-19). The school authorities, being members of the public, are likely to share the perception that LILCO is not a credible source of information. Therefore, they may not believe, or follow, the information or recommenda-tions provided to them by LILCO. As a result, there is no as-surance that any protective actions for school children (including sheltering, evacuation, relocation, retaining chil-dren after school hours, or early dismissal to permit shel-tering or evacuation with parents) can or will be implemented, and there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) or 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.lO.

Contention 15.D. Assuming-that the-traffic control measures specified in the LILCO Plan are not prohibited by law

( nee Contentions 1-4 ), LILCO's traffic guides will be disobeyed by motorists, as a result of LILCO's lack of credibility. Sim-ilarly, LILCO personnel assigned to perform security functions under the LILCO Plan (i.e., performing law enforcement functions at the LOC, relocation centers, and at the EPZ

-perimeter), again assuming they are not prohibited from performing such functions, are unlikely to be trusted or obeyed by the public result of LILCO's lack of credibility. [The fol-lowing sentence not admitted by the ASLB. The remainder of the contention, beginning with "In addition," was admitted. ] Such disobedience and reaction'to instructions from a non-credible source is especially likely in light of the heightened fear and anxiety caused by a radiological emergency, which is perceived to be different from other amergencies. In addition, since the emergency will umanate from an incident at LILCO's own f acili-ty , the public will be likely to hold LILCO and its personnel responsible for the emergency, which will cause LILCO's employ-ees to be vieweu with hostility and suspicion, and will in-crease the likelihood that orders from LILCO employees will be ignored or disobeyed. As a result, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E Section IV.A. and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.8 and Appendix 4, because LILCO 's evac-uation time estimates are unrealistically low (being based on the assumption that all evacuees will follow the evacuation routes and instructions prescribed by LILCO). The Plan also fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10 because i there is no assurance that the protective action of evacuation l

can or will be implementad or that there will be adequate security during an amergency. In addition, the lack of effee-tive perimeter control will result in persons' entering the EPZ, and being exposed to radiation, and impeding evacuation from the EP2.

Contention 15.E. The sample messages for EBS broadcasting Which are contained in the Plan ( Attaehment-Sv8va OPIP 3.8. 2) identify a LILCO employee (Director of LERO) as the source of the information and the protective action recommerMatton.

Since the public does not consider LILCO to be a credible source of information or advice, instructions from a LILCO en-ployee will not hat obeyed. Under the LILCO Plan, the statement in the- sample messages that the LERO Director consulted with

, officials, engineers and scientists, can only be filled in with identities of other LILCO employees or contractors, and thus 4

would not substantially increase the message's credibility.

The EBS messages also lack credibility for the following reasons:

1. The messages refer to the activation of the Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO) without explaining What it is and who comprises it. Many people are unlikely to know who or What LERO is and therefore, lacking knowledge of the

' source of the emergency information, will not find that

- information to be credible.

2. The messages state whether an emergency is classified

, as an Alert, a Site Area-Emergency, or a General Emergency, but l state only that each classification "is one of four possible emergency classifications" without explaining the relative se--

riousness of each classification (e.g., an Alert is the next

• ~

1 east' serious classifiedtion or a General Emergency is the most serious). Using classifications that have no raeaning to the listener detracts from the message's credibility.-

3. Messages D through G set forth the EPA's Protective Action Guides for sheltering and evacuation; however, these '

e guides are unlikely to be meaningful to listeners because the messages do not explain what the health consequences of expo-

' sure'to the projected doses of radiation would be. Fur ther-more, the public's unfamiliarity with technical language such as " millirems" makes it likely that many people will not understand that portion of the message. Messages that are not understood will not be considered credible by the public.

4. Messages E and F both state that schools are being  !

advised to chelter school children, and messages G and h both state that schools are being~ advised to evacuate school chil-dren. The messages offer no assurance that the school dis-tricts have agreed to take LILCO's advice or that the schools are capable of implementing a sheltering ' recommendation or a r.

28 -

J

, e- ,v------- , , . , --r-,--n-, ~ - , - --,--r,- -- ,n -- , , - - - -- - - - - - - -

timely evacuation. On the.__other hand, the messages state that parents should not drive to schools to pick up their children

'f because "the children are protected in school" or "the children are being safely transported outside the zone to relocation

- centers." These inconsistencies are Jikely to raise doubts in the minds of listeners and will cause many parents to seek to pick up their children -- especially in light of the knowledge that most parents will have that none of the school districts in the EPZ have an evacuation or sheltering plan for a Shoreham -

emergency.

5. Messages F and G do not describe the bus routes Where persons without cars can pick up buses for evacuation; nor do they describe Where one can obtain a description of those routes. This lack of information will make LILCO's messages non-credible to people Who are unable to evacuate by private automobile.

Th ere fore , these messages vill not accomplish their intended purpose of providing clear instruction to the public and there is no compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5 ) and NUREG 0654 Sections E.5, E.6 and E.7.

Contention 15.F.. LILCO's proposed rumor control point is to be - manned by LILCO employees. (Plan, at 3.8-5). This rumor control effort will be ineffective and will fail to comply with

, NUREG 0654,Section II.G.4.c, because it relies on LILCO -~ a non-credible source of information -- as the authoritative source for squelching, explaining or otherwise controlling rumors. Rumors cannot be effectively contro11sd if the ocurce of control is itself not credible. Thus, the LILCO Plan does not comply vith NUREG 0654,Section II.G.4.c and 10 CFR Sections 50. 47 (b) (5 ) and 50. 47 (b) (7 ) .

Contention 15.G. LILCO proposes to conduct all public education activities designed to inform the public about Shoreham and about actions to be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. (See Plan at 3.8-1 through av8-8 3.8.4)

LILCO's lack of credibility renders LILCO incapable of effec--

tively. educating the public on these matters. The public will likely disbelieve, disregard or discount purported educational materials regarding preparations for a radiological emergency at Shoreham, if such materials are received from and/or pre-pared by LILCO. Th'a s , the LILCO Plan cannot and does not com-ply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (7 ) or NUREG 0654, Sections II.G.1 and 2.

Contentions 16-21: Fublic Education and Information.

l Preamble to Contentions 16 - 21. The NkC's emergency planning regulations require that the public receive informa-tion on a periodic basis on the nature and effects of P

radiation, protective measures which should be taken in the p

event of a radiological emergency, methods of p:1blic notifica-tion and other such information. 10 CFR Section 50.47 (b) (7 )

and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.2. Public education materials should include written material that is likely to be available in a residence during an emergency, and in addition, measures must be taken to inform transients of the proper action to be taken during a radiological emergency.

NUREG 0654, Sections II.G.1 and G.2. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)($) requires that there be means to provide notifica-tion and clear instruction to the populace within the plume ex-posure pathway EPZ and that the content of effective messages to the public must be established. See also NUREG 0654, Sections II.E. 5 and 7. It is crucial to any radiological emer-gency response effort that the public have accurate and truth-ful knowledge of the nature of the threat, the protective actions available and the effectiveness of such protective actions. Othe rwi se , public confusion and ignorance will hamper i-the emergency response and the public will be unable to take

! protective actions. If information is not provided clearly or.

is not understood or believed, the public will fail to take appropriate protective actions, resulting in increased expo-sure, and noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

l l-i

i Contention 16_. LILCO has ' drafted a public ' education bro-chure entitled " Emergency Procedures Shoreham Nuclear Power Station." The content of L1LCO's public information brochure

'is misleading and incomplete and thus this aspect of the public information program fails to comply with 10 CFR Section

50. 47 (b) (7 ) , 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.2, and NUREG 0654, Sections II.G.1 and 2. In particular:

A. The brochure erroneously states (at page 3 ) that all leaks of radioactive material will be held inside the con-tainment building. Such a statement ignores the fact that se-vere accidents can cause radioactive materials to be released into the environment.

B. [Not admitted by ASLB) The brochure erroneously states (at page 4 ) that all offsite workers will be in place to

~

help the public when, in fact, LILCO cannot guarantee that this t

will be so. (See Contentions 1, 2, 24, 25, 26, and 2 7. )

C. [Not admitted by ASLB 3 With respect to the value of sheltering, the brochure states (at page 6) that:

In most cases, nearby residents would be advised to remain indoors. This provides safety because buildings block the outside radiation. -

l

This statement is incomplete and misleading because it implies that sheltering will offer complete or-adequate protection. In i

32 -

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fact, sheltering will reduce doseL by only a fraction and thus will not provide adequate protection. (See Contention 57) In-deed, according to LILCO, if one shelters in the typical Long Island home, one will still receive (on the average) 70 percent of the dose one would recieve if standing outside. (See OPIP 3.6.1, at 21 (footnote)). Such a dose will result in severe health consequences in many accident scenarios. Thus, the bro-chure needs to be amended to make clear that sheltering will reduce exposure by only a small fraction and thus for many accidents, sheltering will not provide adequate protection.

D. The brochure inaccurately implies (at page 7 )

that a bus or automobile will provide effective protection from radiological exposures. In fact, a bus or automobile provides almost no protection from radiological exposure E. The LILCO brochure's discussion of radiation effects is limited to natural sources and very low levels of radiation. It does not adequately address the magnitude of doses that the public might receive during a severe accident, such as one requiring EPZ evacuation, nor the health-threatening consequences related to such releases. Such inade-quate disclosure of essential facts renders the brochure in-credible. [ Remainder of subpart E not admitted by ASLB]

Fur ther, the brochure does not discuss adequately the health consequences of exposure to low-level radiation, particularly:

1. The detrimental physiological effects of various levels of exposure; 2- The increased risk of cancer both to the population as a Whole and to individuals; and

3. The possibility of genetic defects in future generations.

Such information is necessary so that the public will be aware of the seriousness of exposure to radiation and take all appropriate protective actions to avoid such exposure.

F. [Not admitted by ASLB] The LILCO brochure does not inform the public that LILCO itself, in the form of LERO, will be issuing all information and protective action recommen-dations, as well as performing almost all emergency response tasks. It is important that the public be aware of the source of all emergency information so that it may assess and evaluate the information it is receiving.

G. [Not admitted by ASLB3 Although LILCO has infor-mally advised the County that the brochure will be distributed to all households within 20 miles of the plant, the Plan does not reflect that information. In any event, the brochure fails to inform those outside the EPZ that they may be exposed to levels of radiation in excess of EPA 's Protective Action Guides

, and that protective actions may be required outside the EPZ in l

I i~ -

some circumstances. In addition, the brochure does not address the particular needs of persons on the eastern end of Long Is-land who may seek to evacuate and thus will need routing instructions and directions to appropriate relocation centers.

The East End population should be informed of the danger' of traveling toward the plant and, potentially, toward the plume in the event of a release from the plant. Such information is

. essential so that people outside the EPZ will be able to take appropriate protective actions if so required.

H. The brochure (at page 5 ) states that the public will be notified long in advance of any actual danger. This is inaccurate and ignores the possiblity that in the case of a f ast-moving event (see NUREG 0654, Appendix 1, at 1-16 and 1-17) there may be little time between notification and actual danger.

I. [Not admi_tted by ASLB 3 The brochure does not inform the reader that in the event of an evacuation or after sheltering, he or she should report to a relocation center to be monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated.

J. The brochure is missing much specific detail, particularly: what radio stations are participants in the EBS system other than WALK; detailed zone and evacuation maps; and identification of relocation centers, schools and school districts. See FEMA Report at- 6, citing non-compliance with NUREG-0654,Section II.G.2.

Contention 17. [Not admitted by ASLB] The LILCO public education program is defective for failing to use an effective array of media. For instance, its program ignores the use of radio and television which in many cases are more effective for educating large portions of the population. LILCO instead relies solely on written material such as its brochure, tele-phone book inserts and posters to educate the public. However:

A. A substantial segment of the population will not .

read the LILCO materials because they do not understand their signi ficance, they are not interested or concerned, or they are skeptical of LlLCO. Reasons that persons will not read the materials are:

1. Few people read utility brochures.

2. Few people read telephone books for educa-tional purposes.

3. With respect to a.partment dwellers, LILCO l has left the responsibility of distributing its brochure to individual building managers (Plan, at 3.6-2) who may not per-form that task.

4. Direct mail information will be viewed as l

junk mail and thrown away.

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6

5. Posters in motels, gas stations, etc. and signs on beaches will not be read by the transient population.

B. Others will read the information when they receive it, but will subsequently discard or misplace it and will not remember the contents when a radiological emergency occurs.

C. Still others will read the information but not understand it.

As a result, many people will not be able to take appropriate protective actions, even if they might otherwise want to, because they will not know, remenber, or understand:

that they should tune to radio station WALK; the alphabetical designation of the zone they are in; the evacuation route they are supposed to take; or, the relocation center to which they or their children and relatives are assigned. Therefore, pe o-ple will not know whether they should take shelter and, in the event of an evacuation order, they will not know whether they should evacuate. In addition, they will be unable to follow prescribed routes, thus increasing greatly their evacuation t

! times. LILCO's inadequate information thus will render inef-fective the overall notification and protective action scheme

contemplated in the LILCO Plan. This constitutes noncompliance with the 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a) (1), 50. 47 (b) (5 ) , 50. 47 (b) (7 ) ,

l

(

l t

and 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.E.5, E.6, E.7, G.,

and J.

Contention 18. The proposed LILCO posters, telephone book inserts, and EBS messages do not tell the reader What zone he is in nor do they describe the zones in Which protective actions must be taken or the prescribed routes to take from those zones. (See FEMA Report at 5, citing non-compliance with NUREG 0654, Seetion'II.E.7.) Th ere fore , someone who does not have access to a brochure in the event of an emergency will be unable to identify his or her zone or to follow the prescribed evacuation route out of the zone of danger. Thus, these items are not effective and do not comply with 10 CFR Sections

50. 47 (b) (5 ) and 50. 47 (b) (7 ) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.E. 5, E. 6, E.7, G.1 and G.2. Further, even if people know the pre-scribed -evacuation routes for the zone in Which they live, the LILCO plan does not assure that if such people are visiting other zones (such as to pick up their children at a school which is in ancther zone), they will be able to determine quickly and reliably the prescribed routes by which to evacuate from that zone. Thus, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50. 47 (b) (10) , and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J,10, because protective actions cannot and will not be implemented.

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0 Contention 19. [Not admitted by ASLB3 The sample EBS broadcast messages in the Plan (Attachment 3.8.1) do not provide adequate or accurate information because almost all the messages instruct the public that the release is not expected to pose a serious health hazard, although LILCO cannot make such a determination in advance of an accident. These messages could cause members of the public to fail to take the emergency seriously when, in fact, the situation is serious. The mes-sages should be revised to make clear that a serious health hazard may in fact be likely but that uncertainties make pre-cise prediction impossible. Such an accurate message is required under 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (5 ) and NUREG 0654,Section II.E.7.

Contention 20. LILCO intends that EBS messages will be broadcast simultaneously by WALK AM and FM. (Plan at 3.3-6).

However, WALK AM does not operate at night. Therefore, those persons without FM radios (especially people in cars) will be unable to receive adequate information in the event a radiological accident occurs at night, contrary to the require-i f ments of 10 CFR Section 50. 47 (b) (5 ) .

1 Contention 21. The brochure and other printed educational materials which accompany the LILCO Plan will not be read and/or understood by several segments of the population, and l

l l

the Plan therefore fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47 (b) (5 ) , 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654, Se ction II. B.1, E.5 and II.J.10(c).

[ Subparts A and B not admitted by ASLB].

A. LILCO's materials will not be read or understood by schoolchildren.

B. LILCO's materials cannot be read by the illiterate, the blind, or the severely vision-impaired. The Plan does not indicate that Braille-encrypted materials will be distributed, or that alternative media (such as radio) will be employed to educate the public.

C. LILCO's materials are written exclusively in English. Similarly, the EDS messages to be transmitted by WALK in the event of an emergency will be delivered exclusively in English. However, data from the 1980 census show that there are more than 1,300 Hispanic residents of the towns of Brookhaven and Riverhead who speak English either poorly or not at all. These people will not understand either LILCO's educa-tional materials or its EBS messages.

f L Contention 22: Inadequacy of LILCO's Proposed 10-Mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ")

Preamble to Contention 22. 10 CFR Section 50.47(a) (1) prohibits the NRC from issuing an operating license absent a l

l l

l-t finding that emergency preparedness existe for the offsite area surrounding a nuclear power plant. The Commission must find that the state of emergency preparednece provides " reasonable 5

, assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a' radiological emergency." Id.

A major source of radiation exposure in the event of a radiological amergency is that received as a result of direct contact with a radioactive plume and/or from inhalation of ra-dioactive gases and pcrticles within the plume. Thus, the NRC requires the development of a plume exposure EPZ around each plant as the basis for planning for a radiological emergency.

10 CFR Sections 50.47(b) (10), 50.47(c)(2) and Appendix E, 1

Sections II.N.2 and IV.

"EPZs are defined as the areas for Which planning is l

needed to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken ,

to protect the public in the event of an accident." NUREG 0654,Section I.D.2. The "overall objective" is to provide

! planning and a state of preparedness that will permit imple-mentation of. protective actions if exposure to the public is projected to be above the EPA's Protective Action Guides

("PAGs"). 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (10) requires that planning l

for protective actions must be consistent with Federal guidance

-such as the PAGS. Under the PAGs, protective actions should be l

p l

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['

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commenced in the event of potential exposure of members of the public in the range of one to five rems. NUREG 0654, Section l

l. I.D.l.

Under the NRC's rules, plume exposure EPZs are generally 10 miles in radius.. However,-the 10-mile-size is not an absolute: "[t]he exact size and configuration of the EPZs sur-rounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities os they are affected by such conditions as demography, topogra-phy, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2). See also NUREG 0654,Section I.D.2.

Contention,22. [Although Contention 22 and Subparts A-C were not admitted by the ASLB, Contention 22.D was admitted.]

LILCO proposes a plume exposure pathway EPZ-of approximately 10 i

miles in radius. (See Plan Figure 3.5.1 and Appendix A, Figure 3.) Intervenors contend that LILCO's proposed 10-mile EPZ is inadequate in size. Under the site specific circumstances ex-isting on Long Island, an EPZ larger than 10 miles and perhaps as large as 20 miles is necessary. The bases for Intervenors' contention that a plume exposure pathway EPZ greater than 10 miles is. required are: the site specific consequences which l would be experienced in a severe Shoreham accident; special l

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i topograohic, geographic, governmental and social conditions existing on Long Island; the fact that LILCO's 10 mile EPZ does not. provide a sufficient base for expanding emergency response to larger areas should the need arise; the evacuation shadow phenomenon; and the need to avoid having the EPO divide popula-tion zones and governmental entities. These bases are de-scribed in greater detail in paragraphs A-D below.

Contention 22.A. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The radiological consequences of a severe accident at Shoreham are likely to be experienced at serious levels at distances greater than 10 miles from the plant. A Shoreham-specific consequence analysis (F.C. Finlayson and Edward P. Radford, " Basis for Se-lection of Emergency Planning Zones for the~Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, Suffolk County, New York," (Draft), October, 1982) has been conducted which takes into account, among other things, the meteorological and topographic characteristics of the areas surrounding the Shoreham plant. This analysis based on local conditions demonstrates that in the event of a core-melt accident at Shoreham, there could be doses far in excess of PAG 1evels at the edge of the 10-mile EPZ proposed by LILCO.

In the event of an especially severe Shoreham accident, persons in areas beyond the LILCO lo-mile EPZ would have a 35 percent chance of receiving 200 rems and a 60 percent chance of

.-. . - . . - . __ _ _ . - _ , _ . ,._ _ - . , - . . _ _ . . - , ~ . - _ . . . . _ , . . , , . . . _ . .

receiving 30 rems. (200 rems represents the threshold level for early deaths; 30 rems is the level at which detectable damage to the body occurs). Even in the event of a less severe occident, persons in areas beyond the LILCO 10-mile EPZ would have a 50 percent chance of receiving 10 rems, and a 20 percent chance of receiving 30 rems. These projected doses are well above PAG 1evels. At 20 miles from the plant, t?vre is less than a one percent chance of receiving a 30 ren dose ( d e-tectable physical damage can result from such a dose) for the spectrum of representative core melt accidents. For more se-vere core melt accidents, at 20 miles there is less than a one percent chance of receiving 200 reme.

An EPZ 1arger than 10 miles is necessary in order to provide planning and preparedness for protective actions neces-sary to mitigate doses that could produce early injuries or death, and to ensure that persons will be prepared to take pro-tective actions in those areas most likely to experience radia-l tion doses above the PAG 1evels. NUREG 0654,Section I.D.2.,

l recognizes the need to be prepared to take protective actions l

at distances beyond 10 miles from the plant but appears to as-sume that for most situations a base planning area of 10 miles readily permits expansion of planning to the area beyond 10 miles. This is untrue on Long Island for the reasons described

in parts B and C below and for the additio.nal reason that emergency response is to be undertaken by LERO, a LILCO cre-ation which lacks capability in an emergency to augment its re-sponse needed for the 10 mile area. Hence, detailed advance planning for a larger area is required. The Intervenors believe that given the site specific consequences of a severe accident at Shoreham, an EPZ of approxbmately 20 miles is jus-tified. In any event, in light of such consequences, the 10-mile EPZ proposed by LILCO is inadequate and should be enlarged.

Preparedness beyond the 10-mile EPZ proposed by LILCO is further required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), since

"[g]uidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, [must be)

' developed and in place." The Shoreham-specific consequence analysis demonstrates that under certain accident scenarios, exposures of five rems or more are likely out to 20 miles from i

the plant. The Federal PAGs require the commencement of pro-tective actions at a potential exposure of one to five rems.

In failing to provide for the commancement of protective actions anywhere beyond a 10 mile EPZ, the LILCO Plan is thus inconsistent with Federal PAGs and in violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10).

Contention 22.B. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The NRC has recognized that in the event of certain serious accidents, pro-tective actions would need to be taken beyond a 10-mile EPZ.

See NUREG 0654. .Section I.D. 2 at 11 and 12. The site specific characterisitics nnd consequences of a severe accident at Shoreham would make such protective actions essential to comply with the Federal PAG guidance and 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (10) .

The area of Long Island Which surrounds Shoreham, particu-larly the area Which lies east of the Shorehaic nuclear plant and east of LILCO's proposed EPZ (including the towns of East Hampton, Southold, Shelter Island, most of ,Riverhead and virtu-ally all of Southampton), possesses a number of distinguishing characteristics, Which taken together, contribute to the need to plan beyond the 10-mile EPZ proposed by LILCO. Among these distinguishing characteristics are the following:

1. A significant seasonal increase in population, par-ticularly during the five months of May through September;

2. A highly transient, dispersed seasonal population, much of Which depends upon ihmited public transportation;

3. A road network Which is inadequate to accommodate this seasohal population and which is heavily congested during ordinary seasonal conditions;

a4 . Due to Long Island's configuration, the inadequate road network on the north and south forks connects to two principal east-west arteries, the Long Island Expressway and Sunrise Highway, both of which para through or very close to LILCO's proposed EPZ ;

5. The area east of the LPZ provides no means of exodus to the east, meaning that persons deciding to evacuate must travel toward and through LILCO's LPZ. Studies show that large numbers of people in this area will spontaneously evacuate to-ward the EPZ ;

6. The governmental resources available to control, com-municate with, direct, shelter, provide security and otherwise accommodate this seasonal population are inadequate. Fur ther, as noted in part A, no governmental resources will be available and thus all response is a LILCO responsibility. LILCO's LERO lacks capability to expand response to an emergency from the 10 mile EPZ to a larger area unless detailed advance planning is in place. (This might be different if governmental entities have greater resources and experience than LILCO were participating in the. response);

7. One of the five towns east of the LPZ (Shelter Is-land) is itself an island, which further aggravates its traffic and transportation concerns; and,

6. In addition to the complications caused by seasonal population, transportation east of the EPZ is affected by flooding and snow storms at various times during the year.

Intervenors centend that these site specific characteris-tics Which exist for Shoreham demonstrate that local emergency response needs and capabilities require planning and pre-paredness beyond LILCO's proposed 10 mile EPZ. Such planning and preparedness are necessary to assure the existence of an adequate response base to support expanded response efforts Which may be required in the event of a serious accident.

LILCO has failed to provide planning or preparedness for any area beyond 10 miles from the plant, despite the site specific I . consequences which could result from a severe accident at Shorehsm. Thus, the LILCO Plan does not provide a substantial base for the expansion of response efforts Which is likely to prove necessary and such efforts could not be developed during the course of an accident based on LILCO's Plan. This is con-trary to the guidance of NUREG 0654,Section II.D. 2 and 10 CFR Section 5 0. 47 (b) (10 ) .

Contention 22.C. [Nat admitted by ASLB). An EPZ- larger than 10 miles is required for the additional reason that people from outside the 10 mile EPZ will attempt to evacuate, Whether ordered to do so or not. Without planning and preparedness for f

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L an area beyond 10 miles, Which takes local conditions (see C above) and voluntary evacuation into account, the voluntary evacuation will impede the evacuation of persons within the 10 mile EPZ and will result in inadequate protection for persons ,

both inside and outside the 10 mile EPZ. Thus, in light of local conditions and the voluntary evacuation Which will exac-erbate the effects of such local conditions, an EPZ that is larger than 10 miles is required. LILCO's plan essentially ig-nores any planning for voluntary evacuees and thus is inade-quate. (For a detailed discussion of voluntary evacuation (the

" evacuation shadow" phenomenon), see Contention 23).

An EPZ 1arger than 10 miles is further necessary to provide planning and preparedness for the education, notifica-tion, and safe movement and relocation of the large number of people likely to be on the roads in the event of a Shoreham emergency. A high proportion of the voluntary evacuees will be from the eastern end of Long Island. Due to their perception that they would be trapped if the wind blew to the east, many East End residents will choose to evacuate in the evant of an emergency at Shoreham. In voluntarily evacuating, they will move to the we st, in some cases entering the 10-mile EPZ. In order to protect these people, and to ensure that their volun-tary evacuation does not adversely affect people within 10 49 -

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miles of the plant,' the EPZ must be extended so that detailed planning encompasses the people to the east of the plant.

Fur ther, large numbers of people to the west of the plant ,

may_also voluntarily evacuate, creating congestion for those attempting to leave the 10-mile EPZ proposed by LILCO and also affecting the safety of those people east of the plant who may also voluntarily evacuate. Extension of the EPZ to the west to encompass those persons who may be involved in protective 1

actions is essential.

LILCO has not adequately provided for communications, s e-curity, blockades, relocation centers, medical facilities or any other protective actions for'the area outside the proposed 10 mile LPZ in order to mitigate the impact of spontaneous ,

-evacuation on the adequacy or implementability of protective Octions in LILCO's proposed 10 mile EPZ, or to prevent any such

impact altogether. -Failure to develop at this time emergency planning measures for the area outside the 10 mile EPZ will e f

result in uncontrolled, chaotic evacuation should a serious Occident occur at- Shoreham, thereby affecting LILCO's efforts to manage the evacuation of persons within its EPZ and causing ,

fear, panic, accidents, looting, possible violence and other phenomena beyond the control of the officials in the area east of the EPZ. Thus, an LPZ of larger than 10 miles is necessary to achieve compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(a) (1),

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_ 50 _

Contention 22.D. 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2) provides that two elements essential to defining the configuration of an EPZ are the location of local jurisdictional boundaritas and demographic conditions. Thus, it is good emergency planning practice to include, if possible, the entire area of a local municipality within the boundaries of an EPZ. At a minimum, an EPZ should avoid dividing major population centers within a local municipality. See NUkEG 0654,Section I. L.a .

LILCO's EPZ fails to meet the criteria of 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654 because the proposed LILCO EPZ runs through and divides the villages of Port Jefferson and Terryville and the town of Riverhead. The EPZ should be ex-tended to include all of Port Jefferson and Terryville and ad-ditional portions of Riverhead (those portions in the area 1-2 miles to the immediate east of the proposed EPZ Which contain dense population and Riverhead's business district) .

Contention 23: The Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon Contention 23. Intervenors contend that in the event of an accident at Shoreham, there.would be large numbers of persons Who would evacuate voluntarily (the " evacuation shadow" phenomenon), even if not ordered to do so. LILCO has failed to take into account adequately the evacuation shadow phenomenon, thus resulting in a failure to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10), 50.47 (c) (2 ), and NUREG 0654,Section II.D. The specific deficiencies in the LILCO Plan which result from its failure to take into account the evacuation shadow phenomenon are set forth in detail in paragraphs A-J, below.

t Contention 23.A. A protective action recommendation of sheltering under the LILCO Plan Nould not and could not be im-plemented because a substantial number of the people in the 10 -

i mile EPZ who are advised to shelter will choose to evacuate in-stead. Vehicles provide li+.tle if any protection from a pass-ing plume. Thus, even if a sheltering recommendation were made because plume passage were imminent, a substantial number of people would receive little if any protection from the plume.

Therefore, la protective action recommendation of sheltering will not . constitute an adequate protective measure and the Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and

50. 47 (b) (10), and NUREG 0654 Sections J. 9 and J.10.

Contention 23.E. Even if an initial announcement

, regarding. a Shoreham emergency indicates that persons in certain portjons of the EPZ need not take any protective action, a' substantial portion of the population, upon learning of the existence of an emergency at Shoreham, will decide to evacuate. If the event then were to escalate and a sheltering recommendation were then to be made, the voluntary evacuees L.

would be unable to shelter hecause they would be in transit in their vehicles and sheltering would not be an available protec-

.tive action. .Thus, they would be subject to exposure to the passing radioactive plume. The LILCO Plan thus fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken, in violation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a) (1) and 50.47(b) (10), and NUREG 0654 Sections J.9 and J.lO.

Contention 23.C. The LILCO Plan proposes an EPZ consist-ing of 19 separate zones. In a radiological emergency requiring evacuation of the EPZ, it is LILCO's strategy to conduct "a systematic area-by-area evacuation downwind of the reactor." (Plan, Appendix , A at I-5 ) . The Plan is unrealistic in expecting to evacuate only certain zones within LILCO's 10-mile EPZ without expecting residents of the bordering zone (s) and probably other. zones as well, also to evacuate. People not located in a zone recommended to be evacuated will not wait While their immediate neighbors evacuate in response to a pro-tective action recommendation. This is particularly so for people Who live close to the plant. Accordingly, LILCO's plan for staged evacuation of the inner EPZ zones is unworkable and thus not in compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and

50. 47 (b) (10 ) , and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

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Contention 23.D. Voluntary evacuation will result in a much larger number of people attempting t'o evacuate (and thus c using 'tdua ' limited capacity of. the ' existing road network) than is assumed by LILCO in its evacuation time estimates.5/ The additional vehicles will create congestion within the EPZ and in the regions just outside the EPZ, Which will cause queuing and will impede traffic evacuating from the EPZ. The addition-al congestion caused by voluntary evacuation will cause adverse health consequences -to the public because (a) evacuees from be-yond the 10 mile EPZ will impede the evacuation of those within the 10 mile'EPZ Who are ordered to evacuate, resulting in evacuees' receiving health-threatening radiation doses; and (b)

.those Who choose to evacuate will be unable to do so safely and efficiently.

Moreover, While LILCO acknowleges that persons not specif-ically instructed to evacuate will, in fact, attempt to evacu-ate ( Appendix A, at I-5), the:LILCO evacuation time estimates ignore the number of vehicles which will be on the roads due to such voluntary evacuation.6/ The LILCO evacuation time 5/ The numbers of people expected to evacuate voluntarily, the locations from Which they will evacuate, and the circumstances under which they will evacuate are set forth in 'a survey and studies which the County has provided to all parties. (See " Basis" section of this contention.)

6/ LILCO has recently provided the County with a new KLD study which attempts to take into account voluntary evacu-(Footnote cont'd next page) i

estimates thus are inaccurate for failing to take into account --

the numbers and locations of people who will evacuate voluntar- _

ily contrary to instructions. If voluntary evacuation were s

4 properly taken into account, the LILCO estimates would increase substantially, rendering evacuation an inadequate protective , '[

action for many accident scenarios. Thus, the LILCO Plan fails 4 -

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to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50. 47 (b) (10 ) , Pa'rt ~

50 Appendix E Section IV, NUREG 0654 Sections J,8, J.9, J.10,

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and Appendix 4. -

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Contention 23.E. [Not admitted by AGLB]. Two of the three primary relocation centers designated by LILCO are w 11^

within 20 miles fron. the Shoreham site. Both Suffolk County Co'umunity College and the State University of New York at Stony Brook are only three miles-beyond the EPZ. Many evacuees who need relocation services will not use the relocation centers

. proposed by LILCO because they will observe a large number of voluntary evacuees from the area near the centers leav.ing the area. In addition, NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.h, provi e s, (Footnote' cont'd-from previous page) ations from outside the EPZ. The study is not part o,f the Plan and the County has not had sufficient time to evalu .

ate it completely. As appropriate at a later time, this portion of this contention may be revised to include this KLD study if LILCO's Plan takes it into account.

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L that relocation centers must be "at least 5 miles and preferably 10 miles beyond the boundaries" of the EPZ . Accord-P ingly, LILCO's designated relocation centers, in fact, will not provide the necessary services to evacuees and thus LILCO does.

not comply with HUREG 0654,Section II.J.10 9 and h. Without adequate relocation centers, there is no assurance that the protective action of evacuation can and will be implemented, and therefore there is no compliance with 10 CFR Sactions 50.47(a)(1), 50. 47 (b) (10 ) , and NUREG 0654 Sections J.9 and J.10.

Contention 23.F. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The LILCO Plan provides no estimates of the number of evacuees who may require shelter in a relocation center, but the Plan fails to take into account the large number of voluntary evacuees who will in-crease substantially the demand for relocation services. Ac-cordingly, there is no assurance that the relocation centers designated by LILCO will be able to accanmodate or provide nee-ossary services and facilities for the number of persons likely to require ~ monitoring, decontamination, sheltering, food and other such services. (See also Contention 75) Thus, LILCO fails to comply with NUREG 0654, Se ctions II. J.10.g and J .12, and there is no assurance that the protective action of evacua-tion can or will be implemented, in violation of 10 CFR

s Sections 50.47 (a) (1), 50.47(b)(lO) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

Contention 23.G. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The Plan desig-r.ates LILCO personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, sanitation, security and traffic control services at the relo-cation centers, and personnel from the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, groups such as churches and industries, and sels,ct volunteers to. provide other services at celocation centers. (See Plan, at 4. 2-1 to 4. 2-4 ) . The relocation centers will not be adequately staffed, however, because the personnel relied upon by LILCO to respond to a relocation center are likely to be among the voluntary evacuees who will l

1 eave the area around the relocation centers. In addition, traffic ccngestion resulting from ordered and voluntary evacua-tion will prevent timely staffing of the centers. Although the relocation centers are not within the EPZ, they are in areas where there will be high percentages of voluntary evacuation.

The road systems around the relocation centers -- as well as others which emergency workers would have to use to recch the centers from their homes or other locations -- will be highly congested, thus impeding access to the relocation centers by

'Gmergency staff. Accordingly, LILCO cannot demonstrate that the relocation centers will be available and functioning when

needed, as required by 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a) (1),

50. 47 (b) (10 ) , and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

Contention 23.H. The LILCO plan fails to provide adequate measures at the EPZ perimeter to control access to evacuated areas, contrary to the requirement of NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.j. As a result, voluntary evacuees from the East End whose chosen evacuation routes may cross the EPZ perbneter, may travel into contaminated areas and receive health-threatening radiation doses and add to congestion within the EPZ. Thus, -

the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a) (1),

50.47(b) (10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J. 9 and J.10.

Basis for Contention 23.

There is demonstrated reason to be concerned about the evacuation shadow phenomenon, which is the propensity for peo-ple to evacuate from areas perceived to be dangerous, even though such evacuation may not be ordered or recommended. Dur-ing the TMI accident, large numbers of people evacuated volun-tarily. Whereas the TMI evacuation order recommended that 2500 pregnant women and preschool children within 5 miles of the plant leave as a precaution, in fact over 144,000 people left Gnd traveled long distances. The TMI accident thus documented the existence of the evacuation shadow phenomenon. The reasons for voluntary evacuation are several, including the public's

fear of a radiological emergency, heightened by its perception that such emergencies are unlike other disasters.

A survey of Long Island residents conducted by Social Data Analysts and reviewed by Drs. James Johnson and Donald Zeigler, Suffolk County consultants, has indicated that in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, the evacuation shadow would be quite large. In fact, voluntary evacuees will outnum-ber, by many times, the number of persons who will evacuate be-cause they are ordered to do so. For instance, 31,000 families live within 10 miles of the Shoreham plant. If there were a recommendation to evacuate only the 10-mile EPZ around Shoreham, approximately 432,000 families (about half the popu-lation of Long Island) would attempt to evacuate. Even if a sheltering recommendation were made only for the population within five miles of the plant, approximately 217,000 families would attempt to evacuate.

Contention 24: LILCO's- Lack of Agreements With Organizations and Personnel Relied Upon in the Plan Contention 24. The LILCO Plan relies on several organiza-tions, entities, and individuals for the performance of services required as part of the offsit'e response to an emer-gency. However, contrary to NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3 and C . 4, LILCO has failed to obtain agreenents from the 59 -

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d e

~.. . .

organizations or individuals relied upon Which indicate their

. commitment to and capability of either performing the functions assigned to them, or.providing the facilities expected from

. them in the LILCO Plan. Intervenors contend that in the ab-sence of such agreements, the LILCO Plan does not and cannot comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b) (1), 50. 47 (b) (3 ) ,

50.47(b)(8) and NUREG 0654 Sections A.3 and C.4. In addition, without agreements which ensure both the participation of the various organizations and individuals relied upon in the LILCO Plan, and their capabilities to perform the functions assigned to them by LILCO, there can be no finding that the Plan or the protective actions contemplated therein can or will be imple-mented as required by 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a) (1),

50.47(b)(lO), and NUREG Sections II.J.9 and J.10..

Subparts A-V below set forth the particular organizations or individuals relied upon by LILCO in its Plan, the bases for the contention that agreements from such parties are necessary, the effect of the lack of agreements upon the bmplementability of LILCO's Plan, and additional regulatory requirements Which are not met in the absence of agreements.7/

7/ If in the future LILCO were to obtain agreements with any of the entities identified in this contention, the conten-tion as applied to such entities would not necessarily be-come moot. If and When any such agreements are provided (Footnote cont' d next page) 60 -

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l

[ Rewritten by ASLB as follows:] LILCO has failed to l

l obtain agreements from several of the organizations, entities i

and individuals for performance of services required as part of the offsite response to an emergency pursuant to NUREG 0654, as follows:

Contention 24.A. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The LILCO Plan assigns to LILCO employees the responsibility of command and control over the personnel in the support organizations identi-fied in the Plan (i.e., ARC, BNL, ambulance, fire, and rescue organizations, local law enforcement agencies, the LIRR, and unnamed lunber company, the Salvation Army, voluntary groups such as churches and industries) and medical personnel and select volunteers whose affiliation is not identified in the Plan. (See OPIP 2.1.1; Plan at 2.2-2, 2.2-4, 4.2-1; Appendix A at IV-82, and IV-186-7). However, LILCO has no agreements from these organizations or individuals to follow LILCO's command and control directive. (See also Centention 13). In the absence of agreements from support organizations and individuals which indicate the willingness and ability of their (Footnote cont'd from previcus page) to the Intervenors, the relevant subparts of this conten-tion will be modified, if modification is appropriate in light of the contents of the agreement.

members or of the individuals to follow the LILCO Plan and command and control directives of LILCO employees, there can be no assurance that any aspect of the LILCO Plan can or will be impl emented.

Contention 24.B. The Plan does not include any agreecents with (1) U.S. Department of Energy-Radiological Assistance Pro-gram ( "D OE-RAP " ) BNhr-FRMAPr-er-BNL employees or (2 ) any outside consultant that has agreed to fill the LERO position of

" Radiation health Coordinator," which identify the services to be provided, the criteria for their bnplementation or the ar-rangements for exchange of information, or Which obligate them to perform the functions for Which they are relied upon by LILC O. In the absence of such agreements, there can be no as-surance that the following functions can er will be imple-mented: accident or dose assessaient or projection, funetsens reconmendation of protective actions to the LERO Director, radiological monitoring, decontamination, protection and expo-sure control for the public and LERO workers, ingestion pathway protective action recommendations or Unplementation, or recov-ery and reentry functions. Thus there een-be is no compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50. 47 (b) (9 ), ( b) (10 ) and (b)(11).

Contention 24.C. [Not Admitted by ASLB] . The LILCO evac-uation time estimates and the computer model from which they

i are derived assume that all persons will use only those evacuation routes prescribed by LILCO, at least in part because of rigid traffic controls which allegedly will be imposed by LILCO employees. (See Appendix A, at Part IV). Although the Intervenors disagree with the rigid and complex traffic control strategy envisioned by Appendix A, it is nonetheless necessary for duly authorized officers to be available at important loca-t tions to facilitate traffic flow during an evacuation. LILCO

has no agreement with Suffolk County or any other entity to provide such personnel. Thus, since there are no authorized personnel available to facilitate traffic flow, LILCO 's evacua-tion time estimates are unreslistically low, and the Plan fails to comply 'with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E Section IV and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.8 and Appendix 4. As a result, protective action recommendations made using such inaccurate estimates could be wrong and could lead to increased public exposure to harmful radiation.

Contention 24.D.. Withdrawn. LILCO has asserted that it has general agreements with private fuel companies for the m;

provision of fuel to'LILCO. However, there are no agreenents to provide such fuel during a radiological emergency, and the agreements are not included in the Plan. . There fore , there is no basis for LILCO's assertion that it will be able to provide i.

63 -

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I I fuel for evacuees during an evacuation. In the absence of such agreements with fuel companies, LILCO has no means of dealing ,

with the likelihood that substantial nunbers of vehicles will run out of gas during an evacuation, resulting in evacuees' being stranded without transportation, and blockage of roadways which will impede travel by other evacuees.

Contention 24.E. Under the LILCO Plan, individual schools and school districts are relied upon for bnplementation of early dismissals, sheltering in schools, and evacua-tion / relocation of school children, and retaining of school children in schools beyond the end of the school day. ed-the ,

Shereham-Wading-River-Bistriete (See Appendix A at II-19, 20 480-165). However, LILCO has no agreements, with the schools or school districts, to bnplement any of these proposed protec-tive measures for school children. In addition, LILCO has no agreements with nursery schools or parents of children in nursery schools to permit LILCO employe_es to drive buses trans-porting their children. (See Appendix A at II-21). In the ab-sence of such agreements, there is no assurance that any pro-tective actions for school children can or will be taken.

Contention 24.F. LILCO proposes that all people who do not have access to an automobile at the time of an evacuation order, most invalid and disabled persons re' siding at home, all

school children in-the-Ehereham-Weding-River-Scheet-Bistrict, and large numbers of the residents of nursing and adult hcmes, hospitals and other special facilities vill be evacuated by buses. According to LILCO's estimates, appreuimatety-GG5 333 forty-passenger buses are required to transport those able-bodied persons without access to cars who would need transportation out of the EPZ (see Appendix A, at IV-74b EV-87 te-EV-k78; OPIP 3.6.4). An additional E5 26 forty passenger buses will _ be necessary, according to LILCO, to evacuate most of the homebound residents in the EPZ and a portion of the residents of nursing and adult homes (see Appendix A at IV-175). EV-169-te-19147 And, LILCO esthmates that 14 sixty passenger tuses will be necessary to evacuate nursery schools.

( Appendix A at IV-171. ) These estimates do not include the number of buses that will be needed to enable all other schools to evacuate their students with-an or the additional unspecified number of buses necessary to evacuate and relocate certain of the approximately 630 patients in hospithls should such evacuation be necessary (see Appendix A, at II-28; IV-172). E V-k e 5-t e-1884,-- An-ad ditional-un specifi ed-n um ber-ef bu s e s-is- nec ess ary-te-ev acuat e-th e- childre n-i n-the- Sh er eham-Wading-River-Geheel-Bistrict, However, not even the necessary number of buses estimated by LILCO to be necessary will net be Gvailable for use by LILCO because:

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l. LILCO has no agreements under which such vehicles will be available other than letters of intent to enter into such agreements. (see Appendix B Ar-at-EEE-36). See FEMA l

Report at 9-10, noting this as a violation of NUREG 0654,Section II.J.lO.g.

2. Most buses within a reasonable distance of the EPZ are under contract to school districts or other entities and the letters of intent signed by bus companies indicate that any eventual agreements with LILCO would be subject to any agreements-with-LILGO-woutdr-presumablyr-refheet such pre-existing commitments. Therefore, most buses in the area could not be relied upon by LILCO for use in an evacuation, even if LILCO were to enter into agreements concerning such buses.

3. The LILCO Plan assumes that all schools other than-these-in-the-6hereham-Wading-River-Bistrict will Unplement an early dismissal in the event of any emergency in which no protective actions were recommended for the general public.

The LILCO Plan also assumes that schocls will evacuate and relocate their students to locations outside the EPZ if evacua-tion is recommended for the general public. If such dismissals l

or evacuations were to occur, most bus'es in the vicinity of the EPZ would be required by schools to transport children to their houses.

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4. Many buses within a reasonable distance of the EPZ have capacities substantially less than 40 passengers.

5. LILCO itself does not possess the number of forty-passenger buses will be necessary to bnplement the LILCO Plan.

In the absence of such agreements, LILCO's proposed evacu-ation of persons without access to cars, the homebound, school children in-the-Ehereham-Wading-River-beheet-Bistrict, and residents of nursing and adult homes and hospitals cannot and will not be implemented.

Contention 24.G. According to LILCO's estimates ( see Ap-pendix A, at IV-175 EV-kB9-to-191), it will require sufficient snbulances to make appreximetety-048 113 anbulance trips and enough snbulettes to make 209 trips in order to evacuate the nursing and adult homes located in the EPZ and the homebound who reside in the EPZ. An additional number of ambulances and ambulettes airytanes will be required to evacuate the approxi-mately 630 patients likely to be in the hospitals within (and just outside) the EPZ. (See Appendix A, at IV-172; OPIP 3.6.5). EV-186-te-1884. An-additienet-number-ef-ambuhances-er specially-equipped-vehicles-will-be-necessary-te-evacuate handieepped-peephe-frem-their-hemesv--fSee-OPEP-Ov6,64, Howev-er, LILCO has no agreements with ambulance companies er-rescue

serviceer-er-airaineer to provide such equipment in such quantities. (See FEMA Report at 10) . Even the letters of intent to enter into such agreements which are contained in Ap-pendix B do not relate to numbers of ambulances and ambulettes necessary to meet LILCO's own estimates. In the absence of such agreements, LILCO's proposed evacuation of persons in spe-cial facilities, hospitals, and the handicapped cannot and will not be bmplemented. [ Remainder of Contention 24.G not admitted by ASLB] In addition, there is no assurance ambulances will be available to transport contaminated injured persons, or persons injured during an evacuation to hospitals for treatment, as is required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (12) . In fact, there are only 40 ambulances located within approximately 12 miles of shoreham, some of which, of course, would likely be occupied by duties outside the EPZ at time an emergency arose. The number

.of vehicles necessary to perform a timely evacuation of the special facilities and handicapped persons in the EPZ thus will not be available to LILCO.

Contention 24.H. Withd rawn . The LILCO Plan relies upon the LIRR and an unnamed lumber company to evacuate up to 845 patients of special facilities and hospitals, by converting passenger cars to accommodate patients on mattresses,(Plan, Ap-pendix A, at IV-186). However, LILCO has no agreement with (a) the LIRR to provide the necessary number of trains and to permit modifications to its cars, or (b) a lunber company to provide, on a 24-hour basis, the materials necessary to accomplish the proposed modifications to the LIRR cars. In the absence of such agreements the proposed evacuation of special f acilities and hospitals cannot and will not be Unplemented.

Contention 24.I. The-LELGO-Paan-prevides-that-in-the-many c a s e e - Wh e r e-bu s es - ev a c u a ting - pe ept e- wi thou t- a c c es s - t e-e ar s -- a r e required-te-make-mere-than-ene-runr-the-bus-routes-witt-terms-nate-et-designated 2 transfer-peintsv3--Of-the-285-buses-which LEbEG-estimates-it-will-requirer-499-are-expected-te-perform twe-rune-and-k4-are-expected-te-perform-three-runsv--As-buses finish-the-required-nenber-ef-runsr-peephe-Whe-have-been deposited-at-trsnefer-peints-wiki-be-bused-frem-the-transfer peinte-te-releeatien-centers, The provisions of the LILCO Plan for evacuating persons without access to automobiles are premised on a system in Which some buses pick up evacuees throughout evacuation zones and carry the evacuees to " transfer points." Other buses are ex-pected to take the evacuees from these transfer points to relo-cation centers. According to the LILCO Plan, a total of 333 buses will be required to carry out this process. LILCO 's es-timated route times begin and end with the assumed transfer l

\

C points. (See Appendix A, at IV-73 to IV-165; EV-87-te-EV-178t 465t OPIP 3. 6. 4 ) .

However, the LILCO Plan does not have include agreements with the owners of those designated transfer points not owned by LILCO seheele-er-schoea-distriete permitting LILCO to use the seheele facilities relied upon in the Plan as transfer points. In fact, such transfer points are likely to be unavailable for use by LILCO. if-an-emergency-were-te-eeeur during-scheet heure Moreover, without such transfer points, each bus route would have to terminate at a relocation center rather than at a transfer point, resulting in a substantial in-crease in the estimated route times. In the absence of such Eg reements , LILCO's proposed evacuation of people without cecess to cars cannot and will not be implemented.

Contention 24.J. The LILCO Plan relies upon special facilities, nursery schools, and their employeer to perform several functions necessary to a successful evacuation of such facilities according to the LILCO Plan. (See Appendix A II-28 to II-29, IV-166 to IV-178. ) at-EV-kBO-threug^n-489, (The facilities involved are the nursery-scheele-and nursing and adult homes and the nursery schools in and near the EPZ, Asso-ciation for the Help of Retarded Children ( AHRC) facilities, United Cerebral Palsy facilities, John T. Mather Memorial 1

Hospital, St. Charles Hospital, Central Suffolk Hospital, Maryhaven Center of Hope facilities, and the BOCES Learning Ce nter. ) Millerest-Reet-hsmer-Lane-Hemer-Grimes-hemer-Meere Hemer-Lineein-Reet-Hemevt However, the Plan does not include

. agreements with the special facilities in the EPZ to bnplement the evacuation procedures set forth in the Plan, and thus the proposed evacuation of such facilities cannot and will not be impl emented .

Contention 24.K. The LILCO Plan relies upon vetunteer non-LILCO personnel to drive ambulances and ambulettes rescue vehicles, and to provide the necessary medical and paramedical ,

support services in the buses, ambulances, and snbulettes rastread-eare-and-airphanes to be used in evacuating special facilities and the handicapped. LELGO-alse-appeare-te-rely upen-LERR-persennety-private-airphane-erews-and-employeee-ef-an un n am ed-t um ber- e emp any-te-pe rfo rm-s ub s tantial-a nd-e s s ential reles-in-the-prepened-evacuatiene (See Appendix L, at IV-166 to IV-168, IV-172 to IV-178.) EV-165-te-k924, The LILCO Plan includes no agreements from any such individuals or related l entities to perform such services, under LILCO's direction, in I

l the event of an emergency at Shoreham. In the absence of such i

! ag re ements , LILCO's proposed evacuation of special facilities and the handicapped cannot and will not be Unplemented. There 1

i 1

1 L

is also no assurance that contaminated injured persons, or persons injured during the evacuation, will be transported to hospitals for treatment as required by 10 CFR Section

50. 47 (b) (12 ) .

Contention 24.L. The LILCO Plan relies upon unidentified " dispatch locations" to relay communications between LILCO command and control personnel in the EOC, and those emergency response personnel who are affiliated with hospitals or expected to drive mmbulances and unbulettes v-fire and-rescue-vchieles during an emergency. (See Plan at 3.4-3).

Ef-By The " dispatch locations" are LLLGG-refers-to-these facilities operated by non-LILCO organizations in the course of their day-to-day operations. (Id.) er-persennear-agreements Agreements with such organizations and personnel are necessary to ensure their availability to LILCO during an emergency.

However, the Plan contains no such agreements. In their ab-sence, there can be no fira ding of compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b) (5 ), 50. 47 (b) (6 ) , and NUREG 0654 Section II. F.

Contention 24.M. The LILCO Plan relies upon school bus

! drivers for implementation of early school dismissals and evac-l

( uation/ relocation of schorl children. (whieh-censtitute-the primary-pretective-actien-te-be-recemmended-by-LEbGO-fer-scheel

! ehildrent, However, LILCO has no agreements with school bus i

i I

I l

drivers to perform such a functions in the event of a

. radiological emergency at Shoreham. In the absence of such ag reements , the protective actions for school children outside

'Ahe-Sherehem-Weding-River-Scheel-Bistrict cannot and will not be bnplemented.

Contention 24.N. The LILCO Plan relies on the availabili-ty of non-LILCO f acilities and medical institutions as reloca-tion and reception centers for evacuees. (S ee Plan. at 4. 2-1; OPIP 4. 2.1; Appendix A at IV-166 to IV-174) . EV-189-te-1914, However, LILCO has no agreements with the owners of the pro-posed identified facilities which provide that the facilities will be available as relocation er-receptien centers in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. See FEMA Report at 10 (noncompliance with NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.h) . In cddition, the Plan does not even identify, much less include agreements with, the facilities to be used as relocation or re-ception centers for' school children, patients in hospitals, handicapped individuals, or residents of any special facilities other than United Cerebral Palsey of Greater Suffolk, In c .

l ( Appendix A at IV-166-IV-174 ) . In the absence of such agree-f ments, the protective action of evacuation cannot and will not be bnpl emented.

Contention 24.0. The Plan designates Suffolk County Com-munity College as the relocation center to be used by evacuees from eight of the 19 zones in the EPZ ( zones A-E, H-J ) . and-der th e- chil dr en-i n- the - Eh er eham-Wa d i ng- Riv e r- Sc heet - Di s tric t, LILCO estimates the population of these zones to be 18,599 (26,574 in the summer) . (See Plan, Appendix A, at IV-75 to 162). EV-87-te-k784, Suffolk County Community College is an entity of the Suffolk County government. LILCO has no agree-ment with Suf' folk County to use Suffolk County Community Col-lege as a relocation center. Fur thermore , pursuant to Suffolk County Resolution No. 456-1982 and Resolution No. 111-1983, . he Suffolk County Community College will not be available for use in bnpl ementing the LILCO Plan. Therefore, there is nc! reloca-tion center designated for a significant portion of the antici-pated evacuees. Th us , the proposed evacuation of zones A-E, H -J r - a nd- th e- Eh er ch em-Wa d ing - Riv e r- S c heet- Bi s tri etr cannot and will not be implemented.

l Contention 24.P. LILCO relies upon the ARCr-the-Salvation l

Army r-g roups -s uch- a s-chur che e r-i nd u s tries r-a nd-s eleet-vel un-ceers to provide services, including medical and counselling services, at relocation centers. (Plan 2.2-1, 2.2-2, 3.6-7 and at 4.2-1). However, LILCO has no agreement with the ARCr-the Batvetien-Armyr-any-ether-velunteer grouper-er-individualer to provide such services in the manner or volume, or according to

'the procedures, assumed in the LILCO Plan. Endeedr-many 8groupsE-are-net-even-specificatly-identified-by-LILGO, In the absence of such agreements, LILCO's proposed protective action of evacuation cannot and will not be implemented.

Contention 24.0. [Not admitted by ASlB] The LILCO Plan oppears to rely upon local law enforcement agencies to provide cecurity in evacuated areas. (Plan at 2.2-4; Appendix A at IV-82). However, LILCO has no agreements with police departments to provide such security in the event of a radiological emergency. Thus, despite LlLCO's recognition of the necessity for " security patrols to prevent vandalism or theft," (Appendix A, at IV-82), the Plan fails to provide for such patrols. In. the absence of such agreements, there can be no assurance that the LILCO Plan or the protective actions con-templated in the Plan can or will be Unplemented.

Contention 24.R. The ingestion exposure pathway EPZ includes portions of the State of Connecticut. LILCO has no agreement with the State of Connecticut under which the State agrees to plan for, recemmend or bnplement protective actions for the portions of the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ that are in Connecticut. In the absence of such an agreem:nt, protec-tive actions for the entire ingestion exposure pathway EPZ

~

i i

i cannot and will not be implemented.- Thus, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2).

Contention 24.S. LILCO is required to provide site specific emergency response training and periodic retraining for those offsite emergency organizations who may be called upon to provide assistance in the event of an emergency, 1

including personnel responsible for accident assessment, police, security and fire fighting personnel, first aid and i

rescue personnel, local support services personnel, and medical i

cupport~ personnel. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15); NUREG 0654, Sections II.O.1.a, 4.b, d, f, g and h. In addition, 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(14) an'd NUREG 0654 Section II.N. require that l l

there be periodic drills and exercises of emergency response capabilities. LILCO has no agreements with offsite response or-ganizations'i or individual workers, to attend LILCO training sessions or to participate in drills or exercises. Such agree-ments are necessary because unlike its own personnel, LILCO cannot require non-LILCO personnel to receive training, or to participate in drills or exercises. In the absence of such cgreements, there is no assurance that an adequate nunber of properly trained emergency workers will be available to respond effectively to an emergency at Shoreham, in violation' of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(14) and 50.47(b)(15), Part 50, Appendix E, i

e m, e--- v- -e- -oe s-v -

w,, mwer,r,-- ~ - - . - - - , - - + - - - ,--------,-,w *w,--e.r- --r- - , - e-

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Section IV.F, and NUREG 0654, Sections II.O.1.a, O.l.b. and N.

In the absence of trained non-LILCO emergency workers, no as-pect of the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented.

Contention 24.T. Under the LILCO Plan, the U.S. Coast Guard is relied upon to provide public notification services for the general public on the waters within the 10-mile,EPZ and to restrict access to the EPZ during a radiological emergency at Shoreham. (Plan, at 2.2-2). Since much of the EPZ covers Long Island Sound, prompt notification of boaters and swimmers is important, particularly since the wind often blows offshore.

Although the U.S. Coast Guard has agreed to perform marine traffic control functions and to broadcast warnings to the general public on the waters within the EPZ (see Plan, Appendix B, at App-B-8 ) , Hewever, LILCO has no agreement with the U. S.

Coast Guard to perfeem-the-netifientien-functiene-required under-the-Plan, alert persons on beaches or at the various marinas in and around the EPZ. In the absence of such an ag re ement, a portion of the population in the LPZ will not receive notice of an emergency, and persons inside and outside j the EPZ may receive substantial doses of harmful radiation.

Thus, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Section i

50.47(b)(5), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.E.5 and E.6.

l l

[ i l

j )

1 l

i

, . = . - . .-

Contention 24.U. Withdrawn. The LILCO Plan's provisions for recovery and reentry rely upon the appointment of individuals from FEMA and DOE to the Recovery Action Committee.

(See OPIP 3.10.1, at Section 3.0.) However, LILCO has no agreement with FEHA, or to provide such personnel. In the ab- -

sence of such agreements, there is no assurance that proposed recovery and reentry provisions of the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented. Thus, there can be no finding of compliance with NUREG 0654,Section II.M.

Contention 25: Role Conflict of' Emergency Workers Premnble to Contention 25. Emergency workers relied upon by LILCO will have conflicting duties in the event of an emer-gency. hon the one hand, they will be obligated or expected to perform some emergency function under the LILCO Plan; on the other hand, they will be obligated by preexisting family or oc-cupational relationships, to attend to other matters such as the safety of their spouses, children, or other family members.

Role conflict for emergency workers was a documented problem at TMI, especially concerning medical perscnnel; behavior surveys conducted by Suffolk County demonstrate that this will be a problem in a shoreham emergency as well. Role conflict thus creates the possibility that significant nunbers of emergency personnel will look to the needs of their families or others

._ - ~ _ , _ _ . . _ _ , , _ _

for which they have responsibility (including themselves) before they report (if at all) to their designated emergency response positions or otherwise respond to a request by LILCO for assistance. This factor will be exacerbated by the fact that many emergency personnel will be asked to respond from a relatively safe area outside the EPZ to a more dangerous area within the EPZ.

Contention 25. Intervenors contend that the LILCO Plan f ails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47 (a) (1) , 50.47 (b)(1) and 50.47(b) (3 ), because the Plan fails to address the problem

^

of emergency worker role conflict. Intervenors contend that a rubstantial nunber of the emergency workers relied upon under the LILCO Plan will resolve such conflicts by attending to their other obligations prior to, or in lieu of performing the Gmergency functions assigned to them by LILCO. In the absence

~

of such workers, the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be imple-mented, and there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47 (a) (1) , 50.47(b),and NUREG 0654 Section II. The Gmergency workers likely to experience role conflict, the type of conflict, and the effect of such conflict upon the imple-mentability of the LILCO Plan are set forth in paragraphs A-F below.

- = -

r I

l i

l l

Contention ':25. A. The LILCO Plan is premised on the belief that LILCO personnel in command and control positions, as well l as those assigned to perform other emergency response functions, will be willing to report promptly for duty in the Gvent of a radiological emergency. Intervenors contend that LILCO employees located outside the EPZ at the time of an emer-gency will be reluctant to leave a relatively safe area outside the ETZ to enter a more dangerous area within the EPZ to exer-

-cise command and control, supervisory, or other emergency i

responsibilities. Other LILCO employees, including those lo-cated in the EPZ, or whose families are located in the EPZ, will also be reluctant to report for emergency duty without first having attended to the safety of their-own families. The

" Emergency. Worker Tracker bystem," which LILCO asserts will

" ensure that LILCO-employed the immediate families of all emer-gency workers are provided for throughout the incident" (Plan, at 2.1-7 and 2.1-8), has not even been developed yet, and therefore cannot be relied upon by LILCO to eliminate role conflict of LILCO personnel. Thus, Intervenors contend that LILCO has f ailed to ensure that LILCO-employed emergency workers will in fact report promptly to perform emergency responsibilities and thus the LILCO Plan is not capable of im-pl anentation .

. = . = . -

i Contention 25.B. The LILCO Plan fails to take into account the role conflict that is likely to be experienced by BNL personnel upon Whom LILCO exclusively relies for all offsite accident and dose assessment and projection functions, Ond for all command, control and coordination functions related to offsite accident assessment and the decision to recommend particular protective actions to the LILCO Director of LERO.

Such BNL personnel are likely to have families located in or near the EPZ and therefore are likely to attend to the safety of-their families prior to, or in lieu of, reporting for emer-gency duty. Without BNL personnel, neither offsite accident and dose assessment and projection, nor recommendation of pro-tective actions will be performed.

Contention 25.C. The LILCO Plan fails to take into account the role conflict that will be experienced by school bus drivers. In fact, a substantial number of school bus driv-ers are likely to attend to the safety of their own families before they report (if they report at all) to perform the bus driving duties Which LILCO assumes will be performed. . Role conflict of school bus drivers will mean that neither school buses nor school' bus drivers will be available to implement the LILCO Flan. Without an adequate number of buses or bus driv-ers, LILCO will be incapable of implementing the following protective actions:

1. early dismissal of schools (necessary under the LILCO Plan to permit school _ children to be sheltered or to cvacuate with their parents);

2. evacuation of schools;

3. evacuation of persons without access to cars;

cnd,

4. evacuation of persons in special facilities.

Contention 25.D. The LILCO Plan fails to take into account the role conflict that is likel'y to be experienced by teachers, other school employees, and crossing guards. In fact, a substantial number of such personnel are likely to attend to the safety of their own families rather than re-maining at the schools or at their posts in the event of an emergency. Accordingly, there is no assurance that under the LILCO Plan adequate personnel will be available to supervise children, including those required to walk home, during the sarly dismissal process, during school evacuations, or in the event that children are sheltered in the schools. As a result, the following protective actions could not and would not be im-pl emented:

1. early dismissal of schools;

2. sheltering of school children in schools; and i

t

3. evacuation of schools.

Contention 25.,E. The LILCO Plan fails to take into account the role conflict that is likely to be experienced by (a) the non-LILCO personnel who, under the LILCO Plan, are ex-1 i

'pected to drive unbulances-or rescue vehicles and to provide the necessary medical and paramedical support services in the buses, ambulances, railroad- cars and airplanes to be used in cvacuating special facilities and handicapped persons at home; or'(b) Long Island Railroad (LIRR) personnel, private airplane crews and employees of an unnamed lumber company who, under the  !

I LILCO Plan, are expected to perform substantial and essential roles in the proposed evacuation of special facilities and the

' handicapped . ' -(See Appendix A, at IV-185 to 192). A

.cubstantial number of such individuals will attend to the safe-ty of their own families prior to, or in-lieu of reporting to perform emergency services. Without such personnel, the fol-

. lowing actions could not and would not be implemented:

1. evacuation of specie.1 facilities;

2. evacuation of handicapped persons at'home; and,

3. transport of contaminated injured persons, or persons injured during an evacuation, to hospitals for treat-

ment.

s

~ Contention 25.F. The LILCO Plan fails to take into

~

account the role conflict that is likely to be experienced by the non-LILCO volunteers who are expected, under the LILCO Plan, to staff the relocation' centers. LILCO identifies the ARC as the lead agency responsible'for the total operation of the relocation centers. (Plan, at 2.2-1, 3. 6-7 and 4. 2-1 ) .

LILCO also relies on the ARC for other specific actions in the I

relocation centers, such as medical and counseling support.

(Plan, at 4.2-1). The Salvation Army also is designated as as-sisting the ARC.. (Plan, at 2.2-1). The LILCO Plan also 4 asserts that LILCO will rely on groups such as churches, industries, and select volunteers, to provide additional nervices. (Plan, at 4.2-1). The relocation centers will not be adequately staffed, however, because the . ARC personnel and oother volunteers relied upon by LILCO are likely to attend to the safety of their own families prior to or in lieu of re-porting to perform emergency duties. Without such personnel,

$ the relocation centers will not be available or functioning when needed.

4G- Contention 2 6: . Notification of Emergency Response Personnel Premnble to Contention 26. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (5 )

requires that an offsite emergency plan include procedures for notification of State and local response organizations and of

cmergency personnel. See also 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E Section IV.C. Procedures must be established regarding the bases for notification of response organizations, including means for verification of messages, and for alerting, noti-fying, and mobilizing emergency response personnel. NURLG 0654, Se ction II. E.1 and E. 2. Moreover, there must be the ca-pability of notifying these emergency personnel "within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency." 10 CFR Part 50, Appen-dix E, Section IV.D.3. LILCO is required to establish primary and backup means of communications with local response organi-zations, to ensure that these communication systems are compat-ible with one anotner, and to ensure that there will be 24-hour per day notification to, and activation of, the local emergency response network. NUREG 0654,Section II.F.1.

Without prompt and reliable notification of emergency per-connel, there will be delays in mobilizing them and in imple-menting command and control decisions regarding protective actions for the public. See NUREG 0654,Section II.F.1.e.

Prompt and reliable notification of emergency personnel depends upon an adequate, dependable and workable communications system.

Contention 26. Intervenors contend that the LILCO commu-nications system and procedures for notifying emergency response personnel fail to provide assurance that there will be prompt and reliable notification to such personnel. As a result, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections

50. 47 (b) (5 ) , 50.47 (b) (6 ) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E and F.

Without prompt and reliable notification of emergency response personnel, necessary workers cannot and will not be promptly mobilized, and no aspect of the LILCO Plan, or the protective actions contemplated thereunder can or will be buplemented, in -

violation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.4?(b)(8),

50. 47 (b) (9 ), and 5 0. 47 (b) (10), and NUREG 0654, Sections II. h. 4, I., J.9 and J.10. The specific deficiencies in LILCO's system for notifying emergency workers are set forth in paragraphs A-E below.

Contention 26.A. The LILCO Plan designates the LILCO Cus-i temer Service Office (Hicksville) as the primary notification point of the LERO, responsible for receiving initial and fol-lowup notifications of an emergency from the plent, verifying authenticity and content of inform.ation contained in the noti-fication messages, and notifying key amergency response person-

. nel. (See Plan, at 3.3-1). In addition, Customer service per-nonnel may be responsible for manually verifying emergency worker pager notifications and compiling staffing lists (see, a.g., OPIP 3.3.2, at 13) and for attempting to contact by I

telephone all energency response personnel who do not l acknowledge recaipt of pager notification (see, e.g., OPIP 3.3.2, at 6). The number of emergency personnel to be con-tacted increases with the severity of the emergency. (Ses Plan, at 3.3-1 through 3.3-4 Figures 3.3.2, 3. 3. 3 and 3. 3. 4 ) .

However, LILCO's Customer Service Of fice is not capable of serving as the primary notification point of the LERO for the following reasons:

1. Although the LILCO Plan does not indicate the number of personnel assigned to the Customer Service Of fice, or the training and equipment available to those personnel, LILCO has informally advised suffolk County that there will only be two operators on duty during the eight-hour midnight shift. In eddition, the Plan makes no provision for backup for the on-duty dispatcher (s) in the LILCO Customer Service Of fice ( see Plan, at 3.3-1), other than to instruct the on-duty operator (s) g to call out additional Customer Service personnel "in accor-dance with established restoration procedures" on an "as needed" basis (see, e.g., OPIP 3.3.2, at 2), and to advise the Hicksville _ Cu stomer Service operator ( s) that, in the event of

-failure of the LILCO paging system, assistance in executing manual call outs of emergency response personnel may be re-quested from the LILCO Customer Service staffs in the Hewlett

.. _ _ _._ _ _ _ _ . __ _ .~ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1 and Brentwood offices (see OPIP 3.3.2, at 16-17). However, there is no indication in the Plan of the number of personnsi #

Who could or would respond "in ace _ordance with established res-T toration procedures." Nor is there any indication of hog quickly such personnel could respond. Indeed, the Plan does not even describe LILCO's restoration procedures or What is

- meant by calling out personnel ~on an "as needed" basis. Simi-larly, with respect to seeking assistance from the Hewlett and Brentwood offices, the LILCO Plan does not indicate the number of personnel assigned to those offices, whether the offices are ataffed on a 24-hour basis, or the training and equipment available to those personnel. Thus, there le no assurance that otaffing of the Hicksville Customer Service Office is will be snsufficient to ensure that the necessary notification functions wiki can be performed.

2. The Plan does not indicate that there will be adequate equipment' available to Customer Service personnel to

- permit the necessary notification in a timely manner, i.e.,

within 15 minutes after an emergency is declared. See 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3.

As a result, LILCO's provisions for receiving initial no-tification of an emergency, verifying the information received, and notifying emergency resp o~nse personnel are deficient and

- - - .-_ - .____________J

i provide no assurance that emergency personnel will be alerted, notified and/or mobilized.

Contention 26.B. [Not admitted by ASLB]. Under the LILCO Plan, non-dedicated, commercial telephone lines, with no backup means of communication, are relied upon for notifying essen-tially all categories of emergency response personnel. The notification procedures which are dependent upon commercial telephones are:

1. Notification by the plant and/or LILCO Customer Service of (a) Nassau County, (b) the State of Connecticut, (c) the U.S. Coast Gucrd,'and (d) the Federal Aviation Administra-tion. (See Plan at 3. 4-4 ; Figures 3. 3. 5 and 3. 4.1) .

2. Notification of BNL, Which will provide all offsite dose and accident assessment and projection personnel.

(Plan, Attachment 2.2.1, at 2 ; Figure 3. 3. 5) .

3. Notification of " key" emergency response person-nel who are employed by LILCO, by means of pagers which must be accessed by commercial telephones. (Plan, at 3.4-4 and 3.4-5).

4. Notification of all other emergency response per-aonnel Who are employed by LILCO, by means of telephone calls from other emergency workers. (OPIP 3.3.2).

5. Notification of reception hospitals, ambulance and fire / rescue dispatch stations, bus companies, relocation 89 -

I centers, and, apparently, the American Red Cross and all other non-LILCO organizations and persennel relied upon in the LILCO Plan.: (See OPIPs 3.6.4 and 3.6.5).

LILCO's reliance upon commercial telephones for most noti-fication of offsite response personnel is inappropriate.

Commercial telephones are subject to overload, or may be out of service in the event of an emergency. The possibility of over-load is particularly acute under the LILCO Plan because, in addition to the heavy telephone use by the public which is likely in the event of an emergency, LILCO employees will themselves be making extc esive use of the telephone lines. In addition to using the lines for all the notification purposes listed above, the Plan also contemplates LILCO personnel con-tacting all schools, hospitals, nursing / adult homes, other spe-cial f acilities, and handicapped persons in the EP2, to verify their awareness of an emergency, the need to evacuate, and to arrange for assistance. (See OPIPs 3.6.4 and 3.6.5). If commercial telephone lines were not available to LILCO, practi-cally none of the offsite response personnel could be notified, and no aspect of its Plan could be implemented. Given both the enhanced probability of commercial telephone line overload, and the impact of telephone unavailability on the implementation of the LILCO Plan, LILCO's reliance upon commercial telephones

means there can be no assurance that the Plan can or will be bnpl emented .

Contention 26.C. The LILCO Plan provides for notification of " key" LELGO emergency response personnel by pager. (Plan, at Gv4-4 3.3-2 through 3.3-4 and 3.4-5). According to LILCO, these key personnel "will not leave the LILCO service territory or New York City while on call," and they are to arrange for coverage by alternates during times When they cannot be on call. (See OPIP 3.3.2, at 14-15). Notwithstanding LILCO's as-nertion, however, there is no assurancey-heweveer that these key emergency response personnel can reliably be contacted through the LILCO paging system due to distance 1Luitations on transmission, the fact that batteries for the pagers must-be may run down and not be charged or replaced and or tested on a regular basis, and unavailability of the individuals equipped with pagers (for example, because of illness or travel out of the paging area). In addition, the-LELG6-Ptan-prevides-ne means-fer-determining-Whether-emergency-persennel-in-fact-heve received-the-paged-message /netificatieny although the LILCO Plan provides that emergency personnel equipped with pagers are to call in to LILCO's " automated verification system" upon receipt of notification (see Plan, at 3.4-5), the Plan does not adequately describe this system or how it works. (See OPIP l

l l l 1

l l

l I

l

/

3. 3. 2, at 12-13 ). The limited information provided by LILCO ebout the system and how it works does not permit a determina-tion that there will be adequate means for LILCO to determine whether emergency personnel in fact receive paged mes-pages/ notifications. Nor is there any requirement in the Plan for confirmation of messages by contacted personnel. empheyees, The Plan only provides that emergency personnel are to respond according to the code displayed on their pagers, regardless of whether verification can or cannnot be made. (See OPIP 3.3.2, at 14 ) . Since verification under the Plan is only verification that emergency personnel have received some paged message, the response to the message may not be the response intended and cppropriate (e.g., due to peger malfunction, emergency person-nel may be notified to cp3 to standby status, rat,her than to report). As a result, there is no assurance under the LILCO Plan that key LILGO emergency response personnel will be prcmptly alerted, notified and mobilized.

Contention 26.D. The LILCO Plan provides for key LILGO emergency response personnel, after having been contacted j through the LILCO paging system, to notify, in turn, other LILGO emergency response personnel by telephone. The number of personnel to be contacted increases with the severity of the cmergency. (See OPIP 3. 3. 2) . However, some emergency response

t I

personnel will not be near telephones (such as meter readers and other LILCO employees who may be in the process of per-forming their normal job functions, or persons who are not at home), will be using their telephones or, for other reasons, will not be_able to be contacted. In additi'on, it will take a oubstantial amount of time to place the number of telephone calls necessary to reach the required number of LELGO emergency response personnel. (See, e.g., OPIP 3.3.2, at-74-91 Attachment 5 ) . Thus, under the LILCO Plan there is no assur-once that there will be prompt notification and mobilization of the-LELGO emergency reeponse personnel.

Contention 26.E. The LILCO Plan has no procedures that assure prompt notification of non-LILCO emergency support orga-nizations and personnel, namely, BNLr-the-AREr-Salvatien-Armyr hospitals, and reception and relocation centers, bus companies, and subulance companies, and-fire / rescue-erganizations-the LERRr-an-unnamed-4 umber-eempany-ehurcheer-industrieer-and-ether celeet-velunteers/ Presumably, commercial telephones will be used to attempt to contact these organizations and personnel.

While there are procedures for notifying other non-LILCO emer-I I gency support organizations, namely, the Brookhaven Area Office (which will, in turn, notify DOE-RAP personnel), the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the New York 93 -

Telephone Company (see OPIP 3.3.2, Attachment 4), notification of these entities is to be by way of commercinl telephones, which under the LILCO Plan are assumed to be availablg. Ef commerciat-telephones-are-te-be-used-and-are-assumed-te-be cvastabie-feee-subpart-B-ef-this-eententienty There is, however, no assurance that the necessary personnel will be ca-pable of being contacted by telephone since they may not be near telephones or laay be using their telephones. Further, these same problems make ineffective LILCO's reliance on the Federal Telephone System as a backup means for contacting the Brookhaven Area Office, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal Aviation Administration (see OPIP 3.2.2, Attachment 4). More-over, under the LILCO Plan there is no provision for verifica-tion of messages to non-LILCO emergency these support organiza-tions, as required by NUREG 0654,Section II.E.1. Fur ther, with the exception of the Brookhaven Area Office, the New York Telephone Company, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal Avia-tion Administration (which are notified if an Alert is declared by LILCO), the LILCO Plan apparently contemplates notification of non-LILCO emergency support organisations only if a Site

(

i Area or General Emergency has been declared by LILCO. (See Plan, Figure 3. 3. 4 ) . Thus, there is no assurance that there will be timely notification to the support organizations relied

l upon by LILCO (see Plan, at GrG-4 2.2-1 and Figure 2.2.1), and

~

there can be no finding that the LILCO Plan can or will be im-pl emented .

Contention-26.F. Under the LILCO Plan, the Emergency Broadcast Sy sten ("EBS") can only be activated by communication with WALK radio station. (See OPIP 3.8.2, at 1-2). However, until the local EOC is activated, non-dedicated, commercial telephone, with no backup means of communication, is relied upon for contacting WALK radio station. (See Plan, Figure 3.3.5).- In addition, although once the EOC is activated, pri-mary communications with WALK radio station will be via a dedi-cated telephone line (see Plan, Figure 3.4.1), both LILCO's primary (dedicated telephone) and secondary ( commercial tele-phone) communications means with WALK will have common failure modes under adverse environmental conditions. (See FEMA

" Standard Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Sy stems for Nuclear Power Plants," at F-2). As a result,

( there is no assurance that the EBS can or will be implemented in a timely manner, i.e., within the 15' minutes required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. (See also NUREG 0654, Se ction II. E. 6 and Appendix 3 thereto. )

l l-I

Contention 27: Mobilization of Emergency Response Personnel Preamble to Contenti on 2 7. Once offsite emergency re-cponse personnel are notified of an emergency and instructed as to their assigned functions,8/ necessary emergency actions can-not be taken by those workers, (and therefore many recommended protective actions cannot be taken by the public) until the re-oponse personnel report to their assigned locations, obtain the aquipment or vehicles they will requirc to perform their assigned roles, and report to their emergency posts or dispatch locations. The activities that take place between the determi-nation that particular offsite emergency response personnel should be notified and the reporting of such personnel, with necessary equipment, to the locations where emergency functions will be performed, are referred to herein as " mobilization" activities.

Contention 27. LILCO assumes that LILCO and non-LILCO em-ployees will' be available to implement command and control directives. However,'the emergency response work force upon which the Plan relies will not be promptly available to perform the duties and emergency response functions assigned to them 8/ See Contention 26 which sets forth the reasons prompt no-tification will not occur under the LILCO Plan.

-. , . - . - . = _ - .

under the LILCO Plan due to extended mobilization times.

Although the LILCO Plan fails to provide estimated notification i

or- mobilization times for emergency response personnel (see

, e .g . , NUREG 0654 Section II. Co l. ) , Intervenors contend, based

.on surveys of emergency mobilization of the Suffolk County Police Department, that LERO mobilization will take at least several hours. In some cases, detailed in paragraphs A through F below, mobilization will take even longer because af ter having been . notified of an emergency, workers will have to travel substantial distances, in congested traffic, and will

.have to obtain necessary equipment, before they report to their assigned posts to perform emergency functions. As a result of the extended mobilization times, the LILCO Plan, and the pro-tective actions contemplated therein, cannot and will not be implemented in a timely manner necessary to provide adequate protection to the public. The Plan thus fails to comply with I

10 CFR Sections 50.47 (a) (1), 50. 47 (b) (1 ) , 50. 47 (b) (3 ) ,

50. 47 (b) (8 ) , 50. 47 (b) (9 ) , and 50.47(b) (10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.E.2, F.1.e, H. 4, and I. The reasons for extended h mobilization times are stated in paragraphs A through F below.

A. Many emergency response personnel, particularly

those employed'by LILCO, live and/or work substantial distances from ths EPZ or other emergency services locations.

i l.

t.

B. Emergency response personnel will have to travel through congested traffic resulting from public mobilization and. evacuation travel, in order to get from their locations upon' notification to their initial reporting locations.

C. Many emergency response personnel must report first to a " staging area" or " dispatch location" and then to an assigned post ( see OPIP G,4,2 3. 3. 3 ), Which will require addi-tional travel through-congested traffic. Fur the rmore , once at the staging areas LERO workers with field assignments will have to pick up personnel donLmetry and receive briefings before they leave for their posts, and many LERO workers, such as traffic guides and route alert drivers, will also have to obtain and install in their vehiclec equipment such as mobile radios - and public address systems. (OPIP 3.3.4; OPIP 3.6.3:

- OPIP 3. 6. 4. )

D. Many emergency response personnel must travel from their notification locations tus other locations to obtain equipment or vehicles befere after reporting to staging or dis-

-patch locations. Thus, road crews must obtain tow trucks and other equipment from LILCO storage locations Which are spread throughout Suffolk and Nassau Counties (OPIP avar2 3.6.3); fuel truck' drivers must obtain fuel trucks, go to storage tanks, and fill the trucks with fuel (OPIP 3.6.3); route alert drivers t'

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--,n,,- m,. ,an -.,..,--e..re. . . , . , , , ,- , a

must obtain vehicles and mount loudspeakers on than (Plan 3. 3-4 and-3,3-6; OPIP 3.3.4); bus drivers must be transported from staging areas to bus garages, gain access to the buses fergv-by 2 utilizing-teel-kite-te-gain-entrance-inte-the-Bue-Gempany-ga-regeen-40 PEP-3,6,4-at-644, and prepare the buses for use (e.g.,

by obtaining gasoline and checking oil (see OPIP 3.6.4, at 7 10)). Le ng -E s k and- Ra st read-traine-mus t-be- caphi e d-of-eth e r-pa s-eengere-and-the-traine-and-a-sufficient-number-ef-engineers mu s t-be-br ough t-te-the-Pe r t-Ge f f e r sen-a nd-ha i n-Li ne- St a ti ene fAppendir-A-at-IV-1864t-sumber-must-be-ebtainedr-breught-te-the r

L E RR-t r aine r-a nd-t r ai n- s e ate-mu s t-be-r em eved-a nd-r epl aced-with t umber-f Appendin-Ar-at-IV-1864 In addition, procedures for locating necessary equipment, such as buses and trucks, will require time and will further delay the efforts of response personnel to obtain such equipment. ( See OPIP 3. 6. 4 ) .

E. Emergency response personnel must travel from staging or dispatch locations, through congested traffic, to reach the posts where they are to begin to perform their emer-gency functions.

F. If Many emergency response personnel (e.g. traf-fic guides, bus drivers, and ambulance companies) are not con-tacted or expected to report to field locations until the Site or General Emergency Level, as suggested in the Plan ( sce Plan, Figures 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4). Mobilization times for such workers will be even more extended because the level of traffic congestion encountered by emergency-werkers them will be sub-atantially greater.

Contentions 28-34: Communications Among Emergency Response Personnel Premmble to Contentions 28-34. 10 CFR Section 50. 47 (b) (6 )

requires that an. offsite plan must provide for " prompt communi-cations among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public." Without prompt and reliable means of cammunications among amergency personnel once they

.begin to respond to the energency, there can be no assurance that necessary and appropriate emergency measures, including those necessary to implement protective action recommendations, can and will be taken as required by 10 CFR Section 50 47(a)(1).

Intervenors contend that LILCO does not provide for

, edequate, dependable and wcrkable communications among emergen-cy personnel following notification, and therefore there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a) (1),

50. 47 (b) (6 ) , 50. 47 (b) (8 ) , and 50.47(b) (10), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.2, F., h.4, J.9 and J.10. The specific deficiencies, each of which leads to this conclusion, are set forth in Contentions 28-34.

- 100 -

I Contention 28. No radio or dedicated telephone links to any Federal agencies are described in the LILCO Plan. Thus, l the Plan fails to provide adequate and reliable means of commu-nications with the Federal emergency response organizations relied upon in the Plan (i .e . , FEMA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal Aviation Administration) , as required by NUREG 0654, Se ction II . F .1. c . (See FEMA Report, at 5).

• Contention 29. The LILCO Plan does not specify the nunber of emergency personnel that will be assigned responsibility for manning communications equipment at the EOC, staging areas, transfer points, unbulance dispatch stations, or other communi-cation posts. Fur ther, the Plan does not provide for trained repair technicians capable of keeping communications equipment-operational. As a result, there is no assurance that LILCO's communications system can or will be operated in the event of on emergency.

Contention 30. The LILCO Plan fails to demonstrate that there will be sufficient and adequate communications equipment to ensure effective communications among LILCO field emergency personnel, including those expected to perform security functions. The Plan provides that all field personnel, or a member of each crew, and each staging area, bus transfer point, and ambulance dispatch station will be provided with mobile

- 101 -

rad ios .-4e- une4+er- es- to- whether- por-t.shM--or =^h41 %r=A4ne ar.e to be- peov4ded--co--emee9enoy--44e44--peceonne H See P1an , at

3. 4-3 ) .4/- - I-f- poebeMe -eed4oe et-e--peov4ded e-they rill -heve--e-14mhed--bcoedoeet--eenge e-end- w4-M--opecete- on--b; t te r-y--powe r ,

Bet-ber4ee--ece--e f4ect44e--40r--on-kf--e--ehor-t- time , -but--the--L&LCO-P4en ch: 2 -no -pr-oc4eton--Sor- r-ooher94ng--r-ad4o--batter-Les,---Lf, ,--on.

the- ot-l er--hend c--mob 4.&e--r-ed4os--ace--pr-ov4ded., With mobile radios, communication--e- will only be possible if the field per-sonnel are in their vehicles. Moreover, mobile radios operate

• on battery power, and the vehicles must be_ running, or the ig-nition switched on, for the radios to operate. Batteries are effective for only a limited time, but and the Plan makes no provision for assuring that vehicle batteries are not rundown and remain charced. Thus, there is no assurance that transmis-sion and reception of radio messages will be possible. I_n yddition, the LILCO Plan fails to take into account the fact that persons other than emergency response personnel (i.e., thE p.iblic) will have access to the radio frequencies to be used by

_9,9 -A-1-though--not--eteted--in -the-+1en r-IrHC-O--hee--infor.aelly

-edvteed--the--Gounty--thet--eech- f ie li-survey -teen ,-- ti a f f i c gu rde ,--coed- ocew ,--end--evecue t iarr-coute -spc t te r ,--and--eech

-bue- etegtng--10c+t-isir,--boe- tI a aa f a r -potnt--end--embu--

enoe/-f-i-r+A-eeoue- d-i-spet-oh--et-et-i-on e-w4-1-1--be -equ-i-pped--w-Rh-

-psr-tdie or -meti1e -r edic+.-

102 -

such personnel. Further, the LILCO Plan relies in part, upon a simplex radio frequencies, systemy wh'ich limite the range of the. field radios. As a result, many emergency field personnel will be unable to hear other field personnel who attempt to communicate on the same frequency. It is essential that field workers be able to communicate with co-workers having similar or related functions. For example, LILCO's traffic guides must be able to communicate information to other traffic guides in order to coordinate traffic control strategy and to be aware of

+

what traffic conditions may be coming. LILCO's traffic guides, however, will not have that capability because they will not have adequate radio equipment or frequencies. The result of euch attempted traffic control without adequate means for coordination will result in increased rather than decreased traffic congestion, and extended evacuation times. Other field workers who are unable to communicate information to - co-workers

. performing similar or related functions will be similarly un-t l

able to perform their assigned roles effectively or properly. .

i Contention 31. With the exception of dedicated telephone lines between the staging area coordinators and the EOC emer-gency response coordinators, there is no backup communications

. system for the five-frequency LILCO Emergency Radio System, which is intended = to provide communications between emergency ,

I t 1 103 -

• '" - d e- +- Itey T -rmw-gw c v'w-- p' e g e -- sp--e-ra v' rwr- -i7 =P+s----w-e-, p-- mr= P++t---ve--7wF- e*-* yew ' * - - -v rM-- ' ~7-t-m*-Czt?"'

.,%',o response coordinators at the EOC and field emergency response personnel, including field survey teams, traffic guides, road crew and evacuation route spotters, bus staging area coordinators feestiener-bus transfer points coordinators, and ambulance and-fire / rescue dispatch locations. statiense (See Plan, at 3.4-3). Although the LILCO Plan does not indicate the i

number' of frequencies which comprise LILCO's Emergency Radio Sy st em , LILCO has advised Suffolk County that there are six

' frequencies and four radio channels available to LILCO. The amount of radio traffic anticipated for an emergency at Shoreham could not be adequately handled by these five six frequencies. However, the Plan has no provision for any backup frequencies to those five six which comprise the Emergency Radio System, in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9 and NUREG 0654,Section II. F.1. Moreover, each category of LibG0As field workers will be able to use only a ningle frequency or channel (two sets of-frequencies are paired). ene-ef-the-five-frequeneses. Accordingly, if problems develop on that one frequency or channel, communications will be impossible for all workers in that category. In the absence of. backup systems, there is no assurance that recommended and appropriate emergency actions can or will be bnplemented, since

' command and control instructions may not be communicated to

~

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l

personnel in the field, and the status of the emergency

, response may not be communicated to those in command and control.

Contention 3 2. Under the LILCO Plan, communications between field-persennet traffic guides and bus transfer points and the EOC response coordinators willy-in-seme-easesy be re-layed through the _ LILCO staging areas; thus transfer-peinter meaning-that these field personnel will be unable to communi-cate directly with their respective response coordinators ati the EOC. (Plan, at 3.4-3). This lack of direct communications will result in the delay of implementation of emergency i

actions.

Contention 3 3. The LILCO Plan fails to demonstrate that there will be adequate means of communication between the Shoreham facility, the EOC and BNL the DOS-RAP field monitoring teams, as required by NURF,G 0654,Section II. F.1.d . ( Se e F EMA Report, at 5 ) . The Plan does not provide for any radio commu-l nications between the DOE-RAP field monitoring teams and the EOC or the Shoreham facility. Instead, LILCO has- advised l Suffolk County that personnel in the EOC will be able to commu-l ricate only with the Brookhaven Area office -(via a dedicated telephone line). Apparently, the Brookhaven Area office will l . separately communicate with the field monitoring teams via BNL l.

1

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i

I 4

radio frequencies. Thus, if the Brookhaven Area Office had to  ;

'l be evacuated, there would be no means of communicating with field monitoring teams. As-a-rasult Because, communications

, r between the field monitoring teams and the ECC must be relayed via separate means of communications through the Brookhaven Area office, there is no assurance thet necessary and

- appropriate offsits accident and dose assessment actions, including those necessary to determine the appropriate protec-tive action recommendat?.ons, can or will be taken prompth , au

, +

required by 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b) (9 ) and 50.47(b) (10) .

Contention 34. The LILCO Plan relies on existing radios i

in hospitals and in private ambulance and-fire / rescue dispatch i

locations and vehicles for communications between LILCO command and control personnel and other LILCO emergency workers and

- these response and organizations and their personnel. (Plan, at 3.4-3.) This proposal fails to ensure adequate communica-tions among response personnel because:

1 A. The LILCO Emergency Radio System will not be com-patible with the radio communications equipment used in day-to-day operations by hospitals and by ambulance / fire / rescue

!' vehicles.

B. The LILCO system will not have direct access to

. the radio frequencies used by hospitals and by ambulance / fire / rescue vehicles.

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- - - -- - , - , ...---n. , - - . - - , - - , - , . , , , , .---.n,- -,,- ------.

- .. ..-. -- -. .-- - . - . _ - . _ . - - - . _ - ~ -.

i Y

I 1

I C. LILCO has advised Suffolk County that the EOC l will not even be equipped with fire / rescuer private ambulance vehicle, Emergency. Medical Services, or hospital frequencies. <

There fore, LILCO proposes to relay. communications between the EOC and.the-respense-organisatsens anbulance vehicles and hospitals through st414-unidentified private ambulance dispatch 1

locations. In this regard, the LILCO Plan provides that one of the LILCO Emergency Radio System frequencies is dedicated i for-radio communications between the EOC and private ambulance dispatch locations, r oad_ _c rews , and evacuation route spotters.

}

(See Plan, at 3.4-3 ) . Assuming dispatch locations are in fact available to LILCO, the LILCO's proposal precludes direct com-i munications between LILCO personnel and non-LILCO emergency re-sponse personnel in the field, which will delay the imple-mentation of emergency actions. In addition, LILCO has advised Suffolk County that fire / rescue organizations (i.e. , fire

. departments and fire / rescue vehicles) are not part of LERO, even though they are relied upon for "their normal response i

functions during an emergency." (Plan at 2.2.-4). Thus, there is no assurance that "a coordinated communication link for ,

, fixed and mobile medical s upport facilitias exists," as required by NUREG 0654,Section II.F.2.

1 h

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SvG, Contentions 35-44: Training of Emergency Workers Preamble to Contentions 35-44. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15) requires that radiological emergency response training be provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency. In addition, 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (14) requires that periodic exercises be conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills be conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and that deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills be corrected. See also, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.

Under the LILCO Plan, in order to provide training "to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency," LILCO must ensure that both its own personnel and the personnel of non-LILCO emergency response organizations are adequately trained, and that they participate in drills and exercises that meet the requirements of the regulations. See NUREG 0654,

, Sections II.N. and O. Intervenors allege in Contentions 35 -

44 that LILCO's Plan fails to demonstrate that adequate training can and will be provided to emergency response person-nel.10/

l 10/ LILCO has advised Suffolk County that training materials are still under development. When those materials are developed and produced for the County's review, the County may revise these contentions. More specific contentions (Footnote cont'd next page)

- 108 -

,. - - , . . . _ . . - u . - . , ,

Contention 3 5. [Not admitted by ASLB]. In violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F. and NUREG 0654,Section II.0, the LILCO Plan fails to demonstrate that adequate training will be provided with respect to:

A. An understanding of the LILCO emergency planning basis and emergency classification system:

B. Basic principles of radiation and health effects / health physics; C. Dealing with problems unique to radiological emergencies, such as the high levels of anxiety and distrust a radiological emergency is likely to provoke, leading to both population overreaction (spontaneous evacuation) and underreaction ( failure to evacuate); and D. The specific tasks and duties under the Plan and implementing procedures.

Contention 3 6. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The LILCO Plan f ails to demonstrate that proposed training can or will be ef-fectively Enplemented. Specifically:

(Footnote cont'd from previous page) cannot be formulated at this time, given the lack of the LILCO training materials.

A

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p.

A. There is no indication that training methods will encompass changing needs and circumstances.

B. There is no definition of acceptable standards of performance for each response role during initial and requalification training.

C. Instructor qualifications are not set forth in the Plan.

D. Lesson plans and specific training objectives are not set forth.

E. Despite references in the Plan to the contrary (see, e.g., OPIP 5.1.1, at 9), there is no training manual for emergency response personnel, nor does LILCO intend to develop such a training manual.

F. The only training courses described in the Plan

-- i.e., the FEMA training courses (Plan, at 5.1-1 and Table 5.1-1).and the training courses offered by the ARC (Plan, at 5.1-7 and Attachment 5.1.1) -- will not be used to train LERO personnel.

~

Thus, there is no assurance that there will be adequate training of the personnel relied upon by LILCO, as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (15) and NUREG 0654,Section II.O.l.

(See FEMA Report, at 15.)

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-~ . - - - , , .- . .-

i Contention 3 7. [Not admitted by ASLB]. LILCO is required to provide site specific emergency response training and periodic retraining for those offsite emergency organizations who may be called upon to provide assistance in the event of an emergency, including personnel responsible for accident assess-ment, police, security and fire fighting personnel, first aid and rescue personnel, local support services personnel, and medical support personnel. NUREG 0654, Sections II.O.l.a, 4.b, a d, f, g and h. LILCO has apparently provided no training to the LILCO and non-LILCO emergency response personnel who will be relied upon under the LILCO Plan. The Plan states that LILCO intends to " offer" emergency response training "to all members of LERO support organizations, including fire and ambu-lance companies, police, and private groups." (OPIP 5.1.1, at 3). However, the Plan does not include a list of non-LILCO or-ganizations or personnel who have received or will receive emergency response training, nor does the Plan specify or de-scribe the initial or periodic retraining that has been or will be provided to emergency response organizations and personnel.

Thus, there can be no finding that an adequate number of trained emergency workers will be available to respond to an emergency at Shoreham and to bnplement the LILCO Plan, in vio-lation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b) (15), 10 CFR

- 111 -

= . .-_ . - . . .. . ._

d Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F, and NUREG 0654, Sections II.O.l.a and 0.1.b.

Contention 3 8. .[Not admitted by ASLE]. The training offered by LILCO to non-LILCO personnel may be in direct conflict with the previous training of such personnel. As a -

result, the ability of non-LILCO personnel to perform as ex-t-

. pected under the LILCO Plan, and coordination of the emergency response, will. be significantly impaired, resulting in a fail-

~

ure to accomplish necessary training goals in ~ violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F,'and NUREG 0654,Section II.O.1. There is thus no assur-

[ - ance that the LILCO Plan can or will .be implemented, and there

- can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1).

Contention 3 9. LILCO's Plan fails to deal effectively with the problem of attrition. As a result, LILCO cannot dem- -

onstrate that adequate numbers of trained support organization

- personnel will be available to respond to an emergency at Shoreham. and thus cannot demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a) (1) and 50.47(b) (15) , 10 CFR Part 50, Aopendix E, Section IV.F and NUREG 0654, Section 1I.0.1.

i A. With respect td LILCO personnel, the Plan relies on quarterly general training and semi-annual job-specific-

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J

-.m.. ~ ,, _ . , . - . - . ., -

,m.. , , , . . .. - . . , ,

training to qualify new LERO members for positions opened through attrition. (Plan at 5.1-7, 5.1-8; OPIP 5.1.1 at 6-7. )

Such training for new members is insufficient, because it does not assure that trained LILCO employees will be available to fill positions in LCoo ac the need arises. As a result, there is no assurance that LERO will be fully staffed with trained personnel on a continuous basis. states-that-an-initial-guali-fientien-ceurse 3will-be-scheduled-each-quarter-for-newly a s s ig ned- em e rg e hey- r e s pe n s e- e r g eni sa ti en- s t a f f- des ig ne e s E-v-r-v 49 PIP-5vkvar-at-24v--Hewevery To ensure compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F and NUREG 0654,Section II.O.1, LILCO must denonstrate that all personnel are trained in their designated emergency response organization positions. Thus, LILCO should make satisfactory completion of its emergency response training program a prereq-uisite to the hiring of personnel who will be assigned emergen-cy response duties.

B. With respect to all non-LILCO personnel, except Coast Guard and ambulance personnel, the Plan ignores the issue of attrition. (OPIP 5.1.1, Section 5.1. 3. 2 and Attachment 1.)

And, with respect to the Coast Guard and ambulance companies, LILCO will attempt to counteract the effects of attrition only if notified by'one of these groups that understaffing exists.

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(Plan at 5.1-6; OPIP 5.1.1, Section 5.1.3.3.) However, the Coast Guard and ambulance companies are under no obligation to maintain necessary staffing for LERO, to notify LILCO of "understaffing," or otherwise to assure LILCO's compliance with 10 CFR $ 50.47(b)(15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F and NUREG 0654,Section II.O.1. Th ere fore , there is no assur-ance that hereever LILCO will not know whether personnel in any non-LILCO emergency response support organizations who might have been trained at ene time by LILCO remain with their respective organizations, and thus remain available to respond to an emergency at Shoreham. Thus, there is no assurance that any non-LILCO support organizations will be sufficiently staffed with adequately trained emergency response personnel.

Contention 40. There is no assurance that LILCO personnel can adequately perform the emergency functions and duties they are assigned under the LILCO Plan. The Plan calls upon LILCO personnel to perform emergency functions which, in most in-stances, are unrelated to their LILCO job functions. For exam-pi e , LILCO meter readers are to serve as Traffic Guides (OPIP 2.1.1, at 30 28), Customer Relations personnel are to serve as Evacuation Route Spotters (id., at 37 3G), LILCO maintenance foremen and mechanics are to serve as Radiological Monitoring Personnel (id., at 18 17 ) , and various designers, planners and

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analysts are to serve as Security. Personnel (id., at 61-64 47-54). There is no assurance that LILCO training will compen-sate for this lack of job-related experience, especially when the, tasks to be performed may be accompanied by high levels of stress and fatigue involving life-threatening situations.

Training alone cannot prepare people for the actual stress and trauma that accompany emergency conditions. Experience is also essential.ll/ Moreover, training that is not regularly applied or used will be ineffective. Thus, even if their initial training were adequate, LILCO personnel will forget what was learned during that training. Following their training, LlLCO personnel will be expected to perform their regular job functions, which have no relation to their emergency roles, rather than applying or using their emergency training. This will minimize any benefits gained through the emergency training, especially since general classroom that training is t exercises, and almost all drills are only repeated on an annual basis, job-specific classroom training is only repeated on a semi-annual basis, and there are no incentives for LILCO per-sonnel to learn or to retain the emergency training provided to 11/ For example, doctors and police officers are required to intern as residents and to serve as rookie police officers

'before their training is completed.

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them. Accordingly, LILCO cannot demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15), or that the amergency functions and duties assigned to LILCO personnel under the Plan can or will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) .

Contention 41. All necessary emergency personnel must be trained adequately in the proper use of the communications equipment relied upon in the LILCO Plan. Such training must include instruction in the proper use of radio frequencies, the range of coverage available for each frequency, and proper radio discipline. The LILCO Plan, however, enty-requires-that there-be n eemmunicatien-dritisu -and-that-exercises-shall-testy inter-aliar-emergency-respense-capabilitiesv uineluding-eemmu-nicatiens-eapebilitiesen--fPlanr-at-Sv2-2-and-5v2-34v--The-Plan gives-ne-indicatien-ef-the-seepe-er-centent-of-the-preposed communientien-dritis-and-exercises, does not provido such training. The Plan provides for a " communications drill" that is designed prbnarily to test equipment. (Flan at 5.2-1; OPIP 3.4.1.) Only persons in those selected LERO positions desig-nated as " communicators" will participate in this drill. (Plan at 5.2-2, 5.2-2a). In addition, it is clear from the Plan and drill scenarios that other than the workers assigned to remain at the EOC, ENC, and staging areas, LERO workers will receive

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essentially no practical communications training, and that even the workers assigned to the EOC, ENC, and staging areas will not receive enough. Thus, there.is no assurance that LILCO's Plan satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15) or that emergency response personnel will be prepared and ade-quately trained to initiate and receive communications, as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (6 ) and NUREG U654,Section II.F.

Contention 42. [Not admitted by ASIR]. Many of the LILCO personnel rellid upon to knplement the LILCO Plan, including those in positions of command and control as well as those with cocadinattra and field functions, are not residents of Suffolk County. Th ere fore , they lack a sense of the territorial imperative that is a principal motivating factor for emergency response personnel. Without proper motivation, training will not be effective to ensure adequate emergency response, partic-ularly for persons asked to perform in a potentially life-threatening situation. Thus, LILCO f ails to demonstrate com-pliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F and NUREG 0654,Section II.O.l.

Contention 43. [Not admitted by ASLB ]. Because many LILCO personnel are not area residents, they will not be

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}

familiar.with the geography, topography, road network,

. d emography, school and other facility locations, jurisdictional limits of emergency and volunteer organizations and their capabi11 ties, and other local conditions in and around the EPZ.

Moreover, they will not be aware of the internal workings of the communities within the EPZ. As a result, emergency person-nel may be unable to deal promptly with, and.make correct deci-siens concerning, unexpected situations or contingencies, as required by. 10 CFR Section 50.47(a) (1), including: traffic accidents at key intersections; cbstructions of evacuation routes; situations where persons refuse to evacuate because they fear that their homes / businesses will be unprotected; unavailability of relied upon emergency resources or personnel.

. Training alone cannot serve as a substitute for experience and is even less ' effective when those expected to manage and coor-dinate the emergency response or Lnplement that response in the field are unfamiliar with, and may not have a concerted inter-est in, the area of the emergency. Thus, LILCO cannot demon-strate compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F, and NUREG 0654,Section II.O.l.

l Contention 44. The LILCO Plan fails to demonstrate that 1

drills and exercises will adequately test the training of emer-gency response personnel so as to ensure that personnel are i

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l l

L 1

l'.

l l

'fsniliar with, and capable of performing, their duties under the Plan as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (14), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F, and NUREG 0654, Section Il.N. Specifically:

A. [ Subparts A, B and C not admitted by ASLB]. Sce-narios for the drills and exercises required by the Plan have not yet been developed by LILCO.

B. Even assuming the proposed drills and exercises were to test adequately the training and performance level of emergency response personnel, the Plan provides no assurance that training or performance deficiencies will be corrected.

Exercises test, but do not train, emergency personnel. Thus, retraining should immediately follow the critique of a drill or exercise so as to take into account any identified training deficiencies.

C. The LILCO Plan does not adequately specify the type and the frequency of drills. See NUREG 0654,Section II.N.2.

D. The provisions of the Plan dees-net-previde for quarterly testing of communications with Federal emergency re-sponse organizations er and States witnin the ingestion path-wayv--NUREG-06547-Sectien-IIvNvGraw--Mereeverr-the-Plas-dees dict not provide for testing whether the content of messages is

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understood by emergency response personnel. NUREG 0654,Section II.N.'2.a. }d,v -(See FEMA Report, at 13.)

E. The Plan fails to describe how exercises and drills are to be carried out to allow " free play for deci-sionmaking." NUREG 0654,Section II.N.3. (See FEMA Report, at 14.)

F. Although the LILCO Plan asserts that fails-te previde-fer " official observers from Federal, State or local governments will be on hand to observer evaluate End critique

[an] annual training exercises-t" (Plan at 5. 2-4 ) , there is no indication in the Plan that any such entities have agreed to send observers as required by N'JREG 0654,Section II.N.4. (See FEMA Report, at 14). In addition, although Ner-dees the Plan describes a proposed procedure previde-adequate-means for evaluating observer and participant comments, NUREG-0654r S e c ti en-II vNv 5 v -- f S e e-F EM A-Re pe r tr-a t-14 r t--In s t e ad r -un d e r- th e LILGO-Plany post-exercise / drill critiques will be performed primarily by LILCO, and evaluation of critiques and decisions as to necessary actions will be made by LILCO personnel.

(Plan, at 5. 2-4 Eva-3; OPIP 5.1.1, at 10c-10h 8-and-9 ) . NUREG l 0654,Section II.N.5. ( Se e FEMA Re po rt , at 14.) LILCO, howev-l-

er, will not be able to critique adequately its own Plan, L including the exercises or drills conducted under the Plan, or l

l

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6

I i

- to evaluate and/or act upon such critiques due to its lack of expertise and objectivity. Thus, deficiencies in the LILCO Plan and implementing procedures may not be identified or corrected.

I f

+ .

m e

121 -

}

Contentions 45-51: Accident and Dose Assessment and Projection Preamble to Contentiens 45-51. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (9) requires offsite plans to provide that:

Adequate methods, systems, and equip-ment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.

See also 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, at Section IV.B. Simi-larly, NUREG 0654,Section II.I.8 requires the identification of an appropriate organization which:

shall provide methods, equipment and expertise to make rapid assessments of the actual or potential magnitude and locations of any radiological hazards through liquid or gaseous release pathways. This shall include activation, notification means, field team composition, transportation, communication, monitoring equipment and es-timated deployment times.

Intervenors contend that the LILCO Plan fails to comply with these requirements for the reasons set forth in Conten-tions 45-51.

Contention 45. The LILCO Plan appears to rely exclusively on BNL (a) DOE-RAP perconnel, and (b) personnel from an unidentified "outside consultant," for offsite accident and dose assessment and projection, as well as for all command, control and coordination functions related to offsite accident-assessment and projection and the decision to recommend l

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particular plume exposure and ingestion pathway protective actions to the LILCO Director of LERO (i.e., the Radiation Health Coordinator, RAP Team Captain, Environmental-Assessment Geerdinater, Dose Assessment Teams Function, Environmental Survey Eeerdinater Function, and Offsite Survey Teams). (Plan, Section 3. 5. B; Figure 3. 5. 2; OPIPs 2.1.1, 3.5.1, 3. 5. 2, 3.5.3 and 3,5v6 3.6.6) The Plan does not identify by name, title or qualification the DOE-RAP or other outside consultant BNL and/or-FRMAP personnel who are expected to perform offsite accident and dose assessment functions and thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654, Se ction II. A. 2.a .

Contention 46. The Plan does not identify an individual at-BNL from DOE-RAP or from an "outside consultant" who will be responsible for assuring continuity of technical, administra-tive and material resources. In addition, there is no assur-ance that BNL DOE-RAP or the unidentified outside consultant who is to provide personnel to fill the position of " Radiation Health Coordinator" is capable of providing prompt or continuous services (24-hour) for a protracted period. Thus the Plan fails to comply with NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.4, and C l.b. Indeed, the Plan states that "approximately eight persons" will perform the duties assigned in the Plan to DOE-RAP (Plan at 2.2-3); there is no indication of how many

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individuals are available prevides-fert--enly-ene-BNL representativer-respectivelyr to act as " Radiation Health Coordinator." Environmental-Assessment-Geerdinaterr-and-Envi-r enm e ntal-6ar v ey-Ee er dina te r t -e nly- twe -BN L-e epr e s en t a tiv e s- te eemprise-the-Eese-Assessment-Stafft-and-enly-feur-BNL-represen-tatives-te-eemprise-the-twe-Survey-Teamsv--fPlanr-Figure-Ev2,4 at-24--Thusy Even if the initial staffing for offsite moni-toring and dose assessment were assumed to be adequate, there is no provision for augmentation of initial staffing on a continuous basis as required under 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (1) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.l.e and A.4.

Contention 47. [Not admitted by ASEB3 The LILCO Plan indicates that the information on fission product releases to be used by BNL personnel in' making offsite dose projections is limited to noble gases and iodines. (See Plan, Figure 3.3.3, at 2, and OPIPs 3. 5. 2 and 3. 6.1) . LILCO has failed to comply with NUREG 0654 Section II.E.4.f, which requires information to offsite dose assessment and projection personnel to include the

" chemical and physical form of released material, including estimates of the relative quantities and concentration of noble gases, iodines, and particulates." (Emphasis added).

Similarly, NUREG 0654 Section II.I.10 requires that means l

be established

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i k

1 l

l l

for relating the various measured parameters (e.g., contamination levels, water and air activity levels) to dose rates for key isotopes (i.e., those given in Table 3, page 18) and gross radioactivity measurements. Provisions shall be made for estimating integrated dose from the projected and actual dose rates and for comparing these estimates with the protective action guides.

The referenced Table 3 lists radionuclides with significant contribution to dominant exposure modes, and includes several radionuclides in addition to noble gases and iodines. Neither the release information to be provided by LILCO to BNL or LERO, nor the dose projections to be calculated by BNL personnel, include or take into account isotopes other than noble gases and iodines. (See OPIPs 3. 5. 2 and 3. 6.1) . Thus, LILCO has failed to comply with this requirement of NUREG 0654, and 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (9) . See FEMA Report at 7. The result of LILCO's failure to ' take into account isotopes other than noble gases and iodines is that the dose projections to be used by the Director of LERO in making protective action recommenda-tions to the public will be too low (i.e. , non-conservative).

An example of a rele,3ao isotope Which should be included ,

in dose projection calculations is Tellurium-132, Which may have a life-threatening impact due to external exposure and/or inhalation. It has been predicted that 80 percent of the

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i Tellurium inventory would be released in a severe core melt f

[' -accident; this release isotope is identified as one of the l

largest health risks. (See WASH 1400, Appendix VI, Figure 13.1 and Figure 13.2). The Plan's failure to measure key isotopes

-; 'such as Tellurium-132 (e.g. OPIP 3. 6.1) is thus a significant deficiency contrary to the guidance of NUREG 0654,Section II.I.10.

1

- Contention 48. Withdrawn. The most sensitive scale (0-50mR/hr) of the instrument to be used in offsite radiation surveys (RO-2A) is not sensitive enough to provide accurate low level radiation measurements (i.e. , one mR/hr) au required.

(OPIP 3. 5.1, at 4). Thus, LILCO has failed to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47 (b) (9 ) .

Contention 49. The dose projection worksheets, liquid release worksheets, ground deposition calculations and required computations used for dose assessment projections and downwind

- surveys (OPIPs 3. 5. 2 and 3. 5. 3), require unrealistically accurate communications of complex data from survey teams to assessment teams in order to obtain the required calculated results. There are no provisions in OPIPs 3. 5. 2 or 3. 5. 3 for dealing with missing data, communications failures, the neces-sity of converting measurements from one unit to another, or the need for conversion factors if alternate equipment is used.

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Thus, there is no assurance that those procedures will provide reliable data for use in making protective action decisions and, accordingly, there is no compliance with the 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (9) requireraent that an adequate method be pro-vided for assessing the potential consequencea of an offsite release.

Contention 50. Withdrawn. The Plan provides for inte-grated dose calculation updates once every hour or once every four hours. The Plan also provides for analyses of samples at laboratories in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Maplewood, New Jersey; Rockville. Maryland; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Westwood, New Jersey. (See Plan, at 3. 5-2 to 3. 5-4 ) . The wind speed on Long Island ranges from five to ten miles per hour 70 percent of the time and wind direction changes fre-quently; these factors could cause the plume to travel at a rate of speed and in directions that would make the proposed intervals between dose updates and the time necessary to obtain analyses results far too long. Such delays in obtaining accurate dose assessments could lead to incorrect protective action recommendations since by the time a dose calculation is made for one srea the plume could have already proceeded to other areas. Given the conditions on Long Island, the failure to provide for integrated dose calculations every 15-30 minutes

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is a violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (9) and NUREG 0654 Section II.I.8.

Contention 51. The LILCO Plan identifies preselected dose sampling' locations for areas within 11 miles of the plant.

(Plan, at Table 3. 5.1) . The Plan thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.a, which requires the identification of sampling and monitoring points for areas up to 50 miles from the plant. Sampling and monitoring beyond the 10-mile EPZ is required to ascertain whether doses beyond the EPZ exceed the PAGs, requiring the initiation of protective actions. See NUREG 0654 Section I.D.2.

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l Contention 52: Emergency Operations Center

[Not admitted by ASL8]. Preamble to Contention 5 2. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(8) requires that "[a]dequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained. " Fur thermore, NUREG 0654,Section II.H.3, requires the " establish [ ment of] an emergency operations center for use in directing and controlling response functions." Among other things, the direction and centrol of response functions requires: -prompt communications among principal response organizations, to emergency personnel, and to the public (10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (6 )); the receipt and analysis of all field' monitoring data and coordination of sam-ple media (NUREG 0654,Section II.H.12); and early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the EPZ (10 CFR

.Section 50.47(b)(5)).

The LILCO Plan provides- that the Shoreham Emergency Operations Center ("EOC") will be located at the LILCO Brentwood Operations Facility. LILCO states that "[o]n a day to. day basis, the facility is operated 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day in-volved in LILCO business activities," but that during an emer-gency at Shoreham, "a portion" of that facility will be uti-lized as-the EOC. (Plan, at 4.1-1). The EOC will not be acti-vated until " declaration of an Alert or higher classification"

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(id.), or until the Director of Local Response orders its activation. (OPIP 4.1.1, at 1).

Contention - 5 2. Intervenors contend that the LILCO Plan coes not comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b) (5 ), 50. 47 (b) (6 )

and 50.47 (b) (8 ), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.H.3 and II.E.12, in that an EOC for use in directing and controlling response functions has not been established.12/ Until such a facility has been satisfactorily established, equipped, and rendered op-erational, LILCO is unable to perform any of the following functions required by 10 CFR Section 50.47:

A. Notification of local response organizations and no-tification of emergency personnel by organizations (10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (5 )) .

B. Early notification and clear instruction to the popu-lace in the EPZ (10 CFR Section 50.47 (b) (5 )) .

C. Prompt communications among principal response orga-nizations to emergency personnel and to the public (10 CFR Section 50. 47 (b) (6 ) ) .

l 12/ If LILCO ever establishes an EOC, the Intervenors may have specific contentions regarding its adequacy. Such conten-tions cannot be formulated at this time, however, given the lack of this facility.

130 -

D. Dissemination of coordinated information to the

- public (10 CFR Section 50.47 (b) (7 )) .  :

E. Assessment and monitoring of actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency (10 CFR Section 50.'47 (b) (9 ) ) .

j; Contention 5 3: Security During a Radiological Emergency Contention 5 3. [Not adnj:ted by ASLB]. Intervenors contend that LILCO will be unable to provide adequate security in evacuated areas or other areas where evacuees may congre-gate, and therefore the Plan fails _to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47 (a) (1), 50.47(b)(1), and 50.47(b)(3), and NUREG 0654 Sections-II.A.2.a, J.9 and J.10. Specifically:

A. Despite LILCO's recognition of the necessity for

" security' patrols to prevent vandalism or theft in vacated 4 neighborhoods," (Appendix A, at IV-82), the Plan in fact fails to provide for such patrols.13/ Without security, there may be l

' looting, vandalism, and theft in the evacuated areas. The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1) and

50. 47 (b) (3 ) , NUREG.0654,'Section II.J.10.j., and it cannot be L

'13 / While.the Plan appears to assume that this task will be l performed by local law enforcement agencies, (see Appendix

[ A at IV-82) in fact, no such law enforcement agencies -will E

do so. See Contentions 10 and 24.P.

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L i

I l

U

d impl emented, in violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) and -

NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

B. ' The LILCO Plan fails to provide for security at certain key areas within the EPZ Where security will be essential, including fuel allocation points, staging areas for emergency response personnel and transfer points for evacuees.

The Plan also fails to provide for security at the ENC. With-out adequate security in these areas, adequate protective measures could not and would not be Lmplemented, in violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(a) (1) and NUREG 0654, Sections-II.J.9

. and J.10.

Contention 54: Medical and Public Health Support Contention 54.- [Not admitted by ASLB] 10 CFR Section a

50.47(b)(8) requires that there be adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response, and Section 50.47(b) (12) requires that there be arrangements for

- medical services for contaminated injured individuals. LILCO

. fails to meet these requirements because ambulances will be un-able to respond Where needed due to:

A. traffic congestion which will exist during an evacua-tion, and B. LILCO's proposed use of ambulances for the evacuation of special facilities and the handicapped. (See Contentions 23, 65, 72, 73) 4

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J

, - - , - - . , , . . _ . - . . _ ,,__., _ . ,, ,-,.-._,..,--..,.-----_.-m,. __ - . , - - - - - - < - _ , -

~

b Contentions 55-59: Notification to the Public Preamble to Contentions 55-59. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) requires _that means be established to provide early notifica-tion and clear instruction to the populace within the plume ex-posure pathway EPZ. The public notification system should be capable of essentially completing the initial notification of

.the public in the plume exposure pathway EPZ "within about 15 minutes." 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. (See also NUREG 0654,Section II.E.6 and Appendix 3 thereto).

Intervenors contend that under LILCO's Plan, there is no assurance that the public will receive notification of an emer-

gency within 15 minutes, and as a result, there is no assurance that adequate protective actions can or will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.9 and J.10. The specific deficiencies in the LILCO Plan are set forth in Contentions 55-59.

Contention 55. Under the LILCO Plan, a system of 89 fixed sirens will be used to alert the public to an emergency at the Shoreham plant. (Plan, at G 4-5 3.4-6). However, as a result of the deficiencies noted in Contention 26, LILCO will be un-l able to contact its key command and control personnel in a timely manner, thus potentially delaying the decision to acti-vate the siren system, in violation of 10 CFR Section

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d I

l 50.47(b)(5), Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV.D.3, and HUREG 0654, Sections II.E.6 and Appendix 3.

Contention 56. The LILCO Plan does not provide adequate backup in the event of failure of the LTLCO siren system.

l LILCO relies upon public address systems or loudspeakers, l

mounted on LILCO vehicles driven by " Route Alert Drivers," to provide backup to the sirens. (Plan, at 3.3-4 and 3.4-6; OPIP 3.3.4, at G 4,). However, the proposal to drive vehicles equipped with loudspeakers through the non-activated siren areas to alert the public is impractical, unworkable, and will not provide notification within 45 15 minutes as required by NUREGg 0654 Appendix 3. (See Contention 27.) In addition, some persons will not hear the broadcast message (such as persons with impaired hearing, persons outside the EPZ), and other persons will not understand the broadcast message (such as children, and non-English speaking persons). Route alert drivers are also required to abandon a route if dosimetry readings exceed specified levels. (OPIP 3.3.4, at-57 Attach-ment 1). Accordingly, there is no assurance that persons in the EPZ will be promptly notifed of an emergency, and entire segments of the population may never be alerted at all, in vio-lation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50. 47 (b) (5 ) , Part 50, l Appendix E,Section IV.D.3, and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.6 and Appendix 3. .

i i

l

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I

contention 57. The LILCO Plan provides that these special facilities er and organizations with a large number of person-nel (such as schools, hospitals, nursing homes, handicapped facilities, and major employers) will be equipped with a tone alert radio which,' upon activation by the EEG signal from WALK radio, is to broadcast automatically the emergency message.

(Plan, at 3. 3-47-avg-5 and 3. 4-6 and Table OPIP 3. 4.1, Attach-ment 1). The-Plan-asserts-that-these-tene-alert-radies-will provide-special-facilities-with-additienal-alerting-er-prepara-eien-time, However, since notification would coincide with no-tification to the general public, in-fact these special facilities and or:anizations would not have any additional alerting or preparation time ( for evacuation, sheltering, or implementation of other protective actions) . Moreover, these the tone alert radios depend upon the EBS signal broadcasting from WALK radio station. Should the EBS signal originate from other stations, the radios would not activate and there would not be automatic transmission of the EBS message. Further, WALK radio does not broadcast on its AM frequency 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day. Thus, there is no assurance that tone alert radios will provide adequate notification of an emergency to special l

facilities and other organizations within the EPZ, in violation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a) (1) and 50.47 (b) (5 ), Part 50, l

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1-i l

i I . __ . _ . - ,

Appendix E,Section IV.D and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.5, E.6, l and Appendix 3. ,

Contention 58. Under the LILCO Plan, the proposed evacua-tion of special facilities (such as schools, handicapped facilities, nursing / adult homes, and hospitals) and the handicapped at home requires the Public Schools Coordinator, Private Schools Coordinator, Health Facilities Coordinator and the Home Coordinator, working under the direction of the Spe-cial Facilities Evacuation Coordinatorg and-the-Heme Geerdinater-to verify by telephone that the special facilities and individuals are aware of the need to evacuate and to deter-4 mine their specific needs for assistance. (OPIP 3.6.5). This does not provide an adequate, workable or dependable means of timely notification of or communication with these people, be-cause the process of contacting them will take too long, i persons to be contacted may not be near telephones, and handicapped persons may be unable to communicate by telephone.

Thus, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b) (5 )

l- and 50.47(b)(6), Part 50, . Appendix E,Section IV.D.3, and NUREG

.0654, Sections II.E.1, E.2, E.5, E.6, and Appendix 3.

Contention 59. Under the LILCO Plan, the U.S. Coast Guard l _is relied upon to provide public notification to the general i

public on the waters within the 10-mile EPZ. (Plan at 2.2-2).

136 -

l*

A r

However, the Coast Guard does not have the capability of notifying the public within 15 minutes and thus the LILCO Plan a p falls..to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(5), 50.47(b)(6),

Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV.D and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.5, E.6 and Appendix 3.

i

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Contentions 60-83: Protective Actions Preamble to Contentions 60-83. 10 CFR Section 50.47 (a) (1) requires a. finding.of reasonable assurance that adequate pro-tective measures can and will be taken in the event of-a radiological emergency. In addition, 10 CFR Section i

50.47(b)(10) requires the development of a range of protective actions for the public; guidelines for the choice of protective actions must be consistent with Federal guidance. Such guid-ance includes the Fhnual of Frotective Action Guides ("PAGs") ,

(EPA-520/1-75-001), which sets forth the threshold projected dose levels at which protective actions are to be commenced.

' The PAGs are embraced _ in hUREG 0654, Sections II. J. 7 and J. 9, and are referenced in'the LILCO Plan, at Section 3. 6, and OPIP

3. 6.1. . NUREG 0654, in Sections II.J.9 and J.10, requires that

.there be established "a capability for Unplementing protective

. measures based upon protective action guides and other criteria." (Emphasis added).

i i In Contentions 60-83, Intervenors contend that LILCO's Plan does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate pro-l tective measures can and will be implemented to protect the

. population Efrom the potential health hazards of an accident at Shoreham. Thus, (a) there is no reasonable assurance that the l measures proposed'in the LILCO Plan would, if taken, provide i - 138 -

\;

I adequate protection from the potential consequences of an emergency at Shoreham; and (b) there is no reasonable assurance that the proposed measures could or would in fact be taken in .

the event of an emergency.

Contentions 60-62: Sheltering Further Preamble to Contentions 60-62. The LILCO Plan provides that the protective action of sheltering may be recom-mended (Plan, at 3.6-5), and that it is "the preferred protec-tive action if sufficient protection is offered by sheltering, or if no additional benefit is gained by evacuation." (OPIP

3. 6.1, Section 3. 2) . Intervenors contend that as to the pro-posed protective action of sheltering, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.9, because there is no assurance that sheltering, as a protective action, could or would be effectively implemented in the event of an emergency in a manner which would protect the pub lic . Indeed, the facts indicate that many people will re-fuse to shelter and will, instead, choose to evacuate,14/ and that many other persons, as a practical matter, will be unable to shelter. Thus, sheltering cannot be viewed as an ade.yate 14/ See Contention 23: The Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon, for further discussion of this matter.

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1

protective action, as LILCO appears to believe, for the reasons

' set ~forth in SC Contentions 60-62.

Contention 60. At page 3 6-5 of the LILCO Plan, LILCO states:

.Th[e] protective action [of selective sheltering] may be ordered at projected doses below-the accepted PAGs to minimize radioactive. exposure, particularly to preg-nant we.nen and children v- -v-v in addit >ony i The. Selective Sheltering option may be recommended as an effective option for individuals who could ' not be safely evacu-ated. This would include individuals who have been' designated medically unable.to withstand the physical stress of an evacua-tion, as well as those individuals who require constant, sophisticated medical at-tention.

Tae Plan fails to set forth guidelines to be used by command and control personnel (a) in choosing to recommend the protec-tive action of selective sheltering; or (b) in. determining the individuals who .should or would be subject to such a recommen-dation. Rather, as quoted above, the Plan contains only gener-alized statements which,.in fact, provide no guidance at all.

( In addition, there are no procedures which indicate the means

~

[

[- ~by.which such a recommendation would or could be implemented.

l.

l The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.9 and J.10. '

i I

l

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l lI i

l L' --

Contention 61. Intervenors contend that a protective action recommendation of sheltering would not or could not be ,

implemented. Specifically, a substantial number or the people who might be advised to shelter, as a practical matter, will be unable to do so becauset A. A large number of the homes and other structures in the EPZ are constructed of wood and have no basements.

According to LILCO's shiciding factors (Plan, Table 3.6.5), tha protection offered by such shelter is limited, at most, to a reduction in dose of only 10 percent from that received with no shelter. As a practical matter, persons with access to such structures have little " shelter" available, and thus sheltering should not be considered as a protective action for these persons.

B. Persons who are traveling in their cars or other vehicles at. the time of a sheltering recommendation may not be able to reach shelter fast enough to obtain any protection from a release of radioactive fission products. Vehicles offer es-sentially no protection from radioactive deses.

C. 1. According to the Plan , if sheltering is recommended for the general public, schools in the EPZ are ex-pected to makes-ne-previsien-for sheltering children in schools. (Appendix A at II-20: See also OPIP 3.6.2 at 19, 21).

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However, the Plan fails to There-are-ne-precedures-indicating how r -er-under-What-circumstancesr-a-sheltering-erder-fer seheels-would-be-madet-ner-are-there-any-precedures indicateing how, if at all, such an order could or would be implemented by the schools. Contrary to the assumption in the LILCO Plan ( see OPIP 3.6.5 at 10a), most school officials have not performed

" preplanning" that makes them capable of Onplementing a shel-tering recommendation. Therefore, the Plan provides no assur-ance that sheltering could or would be implemented for children in schools.

Many schools in the EPZ have no basements or other areas suitable for sheltering large numbers of children. Moreover, the Plan contains no information concerning sheltering capacities or shielding factors for schools, in violation of NUREG 0654 Section II, J.lO.m. Therefore the Plan provides no information upon Which those in command and control could de-termine whether sheltering is an appropriate protective action for children in schools, in violation of 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(b)(10).

In addition, the Plan (tates that if schools have initi-ated early dismissals, LILCO will not recommend to the schools that any other protective actions, including sheltering, be taken, even if such a recommendation is made for the general

- 142 -

public. (See OPIP 3.8.2 at 5). Thus, if LILCO were to recommend that schools institute an early dismissal, and school authorities were to follow that recommendation, school children would not have access to shelter for hours (see SC Contention 69), even though a sheltering recommendation could be in effect for the rest of the EPZ population.

2. Patients in hospitals, nursing homes and other_special facilities will not be able to shelter even though the LILCO Plan now characterizes sheltering as "the pri-f mary protective action recommendation" for hospitals (OPIP 3.6.5 at 1), and states that sheltering "may be the preferred protective action" for nursing homes ( Appendix A at II-29).

The Plan contains no procedures or other provisions for the im-plementation of a sheltering recommendation for special facilities, nor does LILCO have agreements with any special facilities to develop or Lnplement such procedures. Th ere fo re ,

the Plan'provides no assurance that sheltering could or would

, be implemented in special facilities.

i. Furthennore sheltering could not in actuality be imple-mented because of numerous practical problems apparently not considered by LILCO, including lack of adequate hallways, base-

.ments and other common areas, lack of equipment and facilities, l

inability to shut down ventilation and air conditioning l

l 143 -

1 l

systems, inability to reinforce or relieve personnel or replenish expended supplies. Finally, the Plan does not de-scribe the sheltering capacities or shielding factors of the special facilities in a manner sufficiently detailed to allow those in command and control of the emergency response to make an informed decision as to whether sheltering is the correct protective action, and thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.M and 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10).

D. Transients who are on beaches, in parks or in other outdoor recreation areas will have no access to shelter.

Contrary to the requirement of NUREG 0654 Section J.10.a, the Plan fails to identify public sheltering areas. (See FEMA Report, at 8).

E. Persons who are in boats in the EPZ will have no access to shelter.

Moreover, even if people were willing and able to follow a sheltering recommendation, there is no assurance that taking such action would provide any significant dose savings and thus prevent persons in the EPZ from receiving health-threatening radiation doses for the following reasons:

F. [Subpart F not admitted by ASLB ]. Those who take shelter in wood frame buildings without basements will receive 90 percent of the dose they would receive from the plume if they were outside the shelter. (See Plan, Table 3. 6. 5 ) .

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I

G. Many other hcmes in the EPZ, even if they provide more shielding than a wood house, will only reduce doses abcut 50 percent. In a severe accident, a 50-percent dose reduction will still result in health-threatening doses.

H. According to LILCO, the average shielding factor available in the EPZ is 0.7, which means that, on the average, those who follow a sheltering recommendation will nonetheless receive 7C percent of the dose they would receive from the plume if they were outside the shelter.

I. The cloud doses resulting from a release of ra-dioactive fission products from the Shoreham plant could be so substantial that even taking into account the 30 percent aver-age dose reduction provided by shelter in the EPZ, persons who follow a sheltering recommendation could still receive doses that would cause adverse health effects.15/

taus, sheltering is not an adequate protective action in the event of an emergency at Shoreham, and the Plan, therefore, fails to. comply with 10 CFR Sectione 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(lO), and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.9.

15/ See Contention 22 discussion of the site specific

- consequences of an accident at Ehoreham.

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l l

Contention 62. [Nct admitted by ASLB]. The LILCO Plan makes no provision for relocation, or for monitoring the radiological exposure, of persons who have taken shelter from a passing plume. Rather, after a sheltering order, the LILCO plan is silent regarding what action (s) a person is supposed to take at a later time. Relocation of sheltered persons and non-itoring are likely to be necessary after plume passage to prevent people from receiving substantial doses, in addition to those received while in shelters, from ground contamination which will remain even after plume passage. Thus, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10),

and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J. 9 and J.12.

Contentions 63-77: Evacuation Contention 63. The LILCO Plan states at pages-Gv6-5-te 3.6-6:

Selective Evacuation may be implemented to evacuate from the affected area of the plume exposura EPZ members of the general public who might have a low tolerance to radiation exposure. Specifically, this would include pregnant women and children 12 years and under.

The Plan fails to set forth guidelines to be used by command and control personnel: (a) in choosing to recommend the protec-tive action of selective evacuation; or (b) in determining, identifying and locating the individuals who should be subject

- 146 -

to such a recommendation. In addition, there are no procedures which indicate the means by which such a recommendation could or would be replemented. The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47 (a) (1), 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II . J. 9 and J .10.

Contention 64. The LILCO Plan proposes an LPZ consisting of 19 separate zones. In the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham requiring evacuation of the EPZ, it is LILCO's in-tended strategy to evacuate all zones within two miles of the Shoreham plant, but only a portion of those zones outside of the two-mile radius. (See OPIP 3.6.1, Attachment 2). eenduct n a- s y s t em a tie- a r e e-by-a r e a- ev a c u a ti e n-d ewnwi nd- e f- the- r e a e te r vu

} fPhanr-Appendixr-A-at-I-5tv LILCO 's Plan, however, fails to account for the fact that the wind shifts quickly on Long Is-land, with average wind speeds of approximately 10 miles per hour. Under such conditions, a shift in wind direction could quickly direct the plume over an area that was not in the original plume pathway, and thus not included in the initial evacuation order, before that area could be evacuated.

Intervenors contend that given wind conditions on Long Is-land, in the event any evacuation due to a radiological emer-gency is required, LILCO must evacuate at least a radius of five to seven miles around the plant. Any partial evacuation

- 147 -

of only certain zones within a five to seven mile radius would expose the population of the nearby unevacuated zones to the risk of a sudden wi'nd shif t and consequent health-threatening exposure to radiation. Under these conditions, the LILCO evacuation plan ef-staged-evacuation fails to constitute an adequate protective action, as required by 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10).

Contention 65: Evacuation Time Estimates Further Preamble to Contention 65. Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that license applicants " provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and pe rmanent populations. " (See also, NUREG 0654,Section II.J.8 and Appendix 4). Accurate estimates of the time necessary to evacuate the Shoreham EPZ (or portions thereof) are essential to evaluating the evacuation route system. In particular, such estimates must be accurate and reliable so that command and control personnel who are considering what protective actions might be ordered for particular persons can estimate whether, given projected release and dispersion of health-threatening fission products from the Shoreham plant, evacuation can be accomplished before such dispersion takes place. (See 10 CFR

- 148 -

Section 50.47(b) (10); NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.m) . A i

decision to crder evacuation, if based on inaccurate evacuation I time estimates, could result in evacuees' being trapped in l l

queues or slow moving traffic inside or outside the EPZ, thus

. i exposing them to a release of fission products from the l

Shoreham plant. l LILCO has submitted evacuation time estimates for the 10- i mile EPZ, which estimates are contained in Appendix A, at V-3,

]

and OPIP 3.6.1, Attachment 4.16/ LILCO estimates that the time

-for evacuation will vary from about two to two-and-one-half hours for only the inner EPZ sectors, to a maximum of approxi-mately six hours for evacuation of the entire EPZ under adverse weather conditions.

Contention 65: Intervenors contend that LILCO's evacua-tion time estimates are inaccurate, unreliable and, in fact, should be far longer. LILCO's evacuation time estimates are so

, underestimated that under the LILCC Plan an evacuation may be l

ordered which realistically cannot be completed prior to i release and dispersion of fission products from the Shoreham l

plant. Evacuees will be caught in queues or delayed in heuvily l 16/ The FEMA Report at 11-12 notes that the time estimates are inadequate in part because the estimates in OPIP 3.6.1 are incomparable to those in Appendix A.

l

- 149 -

l

l congested traffic within the EPZ. Under many accident conditions, there will be a dispersal of radioactive materials while'such traffic conditions s*ill exist, resulting in unacceptable health-threatening exposure to the evacuees. The automobiles of the evacuees will offer essentially no protection from the plume.

The specific deficiencies in LILCO's estimates and further bases for this contention are set forth in paragraphs A-H below.

Contention 65. A. The LILCO evacuation time estimates ig-nore or underestimate the time required for people to mobilize and ready themselves for evacuation. The LILCO estimates in Appendix A include only the time involved in the actual evacua-tion trip out of the EPZ. (Appendix A, Table XIV) . LILCO as-sumes in OPIP 3.6.1 that complete mobilization of the public will take about 20 minutes after receiving notification, which grossly underestimates the time it will take for mobilization, especially during working hours. In fact, it will likely take at least from one to more than three hours for people to mobi-lize before they can begin to evacuate. This mobilization time will be required because:

1. Following activation of the prompt notification s ys t em , it will take time for people to become aware of the

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emergency,_to become informed of the recommended protective actions and to detennine their. own course of action.

2. Where possible, most families will_ seek to evac-uate as a unit. Specifically, working parents will leave work and drive tc schools and/or home to pick up their children prior to evacuating. There will also be travel to and from various locations as family groups are assenbled from work lo-cations, relatives' homes, day care centers, and the like. Mo-bilization time must . include time for the travel necessary to assemble f amily groups. In addition, families with school children who do not pick up their children themselves, will delay the start of their evacuation until all their children have returned home. Given the length of time necessary to im-plement early dismissals (see Contention 69), mobilization times could be increased algnificantly by this fact.

3. It will take time for the evacuees to gather nec-essary provisions before evacuating. (See " Emergency Proce-

, dures: - Shoreham Nuclear Power Station," at 8) . In addition, some persons will seek to go to banks, stores and other such facilities for money and provisions.

'4. Travel within the EPZ during the mobilization period (work /home, home/ school, to banks and stores, etc.)

prior to commencing evacuation will result in heavy traffic D

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i congestion which will lengthen the time necessary to complete mobilization travel.

Contention 65.B. Heavy traffic congestion from mobiliza-tion traffic, due to both high demand and conflicting traffic flow (i.e., some traffic flow in directions different than pre-scribed evacuation directions), will lengthen evacuation tbmes.

LILCO's evacuation time estimates do not appear to take this cause of congestion and resulting evacuation delay into consid-eration. Thus, the LILCO estimates are inaccurate for this ad-ditional reason.

Contention 65.C. The LILCO traffic control plan, as de-scribed in Appendix A, even if assumed to be lawful and capable of being implemented, will, in fact, constitute an additional source of congestion which has been ignored in LILCO's evacua-tion time estimates. If such congestion were taken into account, the LILCO estimates would increase substantially. The Plan will cause additional congestion for the following reasons:

1. LILCO's estimates assume that its traffic guides will screen all motorists moving in a direction contrary to its prescribed traffic flow to determine whether each person has

" good reason" for going in that direction. (Appendix A, at IV-83; see also, IV-8). Thus, a traffic guide presumably would 152 -

l stop or otherwise delay all such motorists, question them, and attempt to persuade or order them not to go in their intended directions if their reasons for doing so were judged not to be sufficient. This screening process will impede traffic flow, resulting in congestion and further increasing the evacuation time estimates. It will also require more traffic guides than LILCO has designated for each traffic post.

2. LILCO's attempted use of traffic controls may cause aggressive behavior on the part of those attempting to take protective actions. This aggressive behavior will stem in part from fear of a radiological emergency (which is perceived by the population to be different from other emergencies) and in part from confrontations that will result when motorists wish to travel contrary to the directions of the LILCO traffic guide, or are stopped by guidec for screening. Conflicts between motorists and traffic guides will result in traffic blockages, confusion, accidents and possibly injuries, all of which will increase congestion.

3. Because under the LILCO Plan neither LILCO's traffic guides nor any other LERO personriel will alter traffic signal lights, traffic guides may attempt to implement a control strategy counter to the direction given by the signals.

(See FEMA Report at 10 citing non-compliance with NUREG 0654,

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Section II.J.10.j). Such simultaneous and potentially contradictory instructions to motorists will cause confusion and congestion, thus further delaying traffic movement. (Id,.)

4. In some cases, LILCO's prescribed routes direct motorists to travel contrary to their perceptions of the most expeditious way out of the EPZ. (See, e.g., Fost #19 described in Appendix A, at IV-56). This will cause confusion and anxi-ety on the part of the motorists and confrontations with traf-fic guides.

Contention 65.D. The LILCO time estimates assume that

"[n]o major vehicle breakdown or other types of incidents

[will] occur which block major routes for an extended time."

(Appendix A', at V-2). This assumption is unrealistic and leads to an underestimation of the time required for evacuation. Ex-amples of factors which increase congestion and thus increase time estimates, and which should have been included in LILCO's

, estimates, include:

1. Anticipated traffic accidents and automobile breakdown s , including running out of gas ( for example, the Suf folk County police responded in 1982 to 10,000 incidents such as accidents and breakdowns on the Suffolk County portion of the Long Island Expressway, thus indicating the potential for this factor to influence severely evacuation times);

~ 154 -

2. The absence of shoulders on some primary or sec-ondary routes which will be used during an evacuation;

3. Road construction / repair work which can be as-sumed to be ongoing at any time; and

4. Abandonment of vehicles under emergency conditions.

Contention 65.E The LILCO evacuation time estimates do not take into account the additional congestion to be encoun-tared by evacuating motorists that will result frem the evacua-tion and early dismissals of schools and the evacuation of those in special facilities and the handicapped. Suc's evacua-tions and dismissals will involve the use of large numbers of buses, ambulances and trains which will be traveling in all di-rections through the EPZ, on prescribed evacuation routes and other roads, making frequent stops. If the impact of special evacuations were taken into account, the LILCO time estimates for evacuating motorists would increase substantially.

Contention 65.F. Behavior research demonstrates that stress and anxiety induced by a radiological emergency at Shoreham will diminish driving skills and awareness, and impede the processing of infonnation necessary for a driver to make decisions and drive properly. The geography of Long Island, with its narrow, limited land area, may create a feeling of 155 -

I being " closed-in," which may increase the likelihood of poor driver behavior. Decreased driving skills and driver awareness will cause confusion, congestion and accidents and, if properly taken into account, would increase LILCO's evacuation tbnes. .

LILC O, however, has failed to take these factors into account in its evacuation time estimates.

Contention 65.G. The LILCO Plan does not include evacu-ation time estimates for evacuation of those with special needs who cannot rely on private transportation, such as school chil-dren, persons without access to cars, persons in health care or other special facilities, and the handicapped. (See FEMA Report at 11, citing noncompliance with NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.1 and Appendix 4, at 4-9 to 4-10 ) . The individuals in charge of making protective action recommendations must know how long it will take to evacuate these portions of the popula-tion. The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Appendix E, l

Section IV, and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.8 and Appendix 4.

Contention 65.H. The LILCO Plan (OPIP 3.6. 3) provides for two evacuation route spotters to report information to the EOC regarding traffic congestion on evacuation routes. (Contrary i

to the requirement of NUREG 0654 Section II. A. 2.a. , the LILCO l

l employees expected to fill these positions are not identified i by j ob title in the Plan. See OPIP 2.1.1, at 32.) Without the

! - 156 -

u ability to spot congested areas effectively, LILCO will be unable to implement appropriate measures for evacuees to avoid such congestion, resulting in increased evacuation times.

LILCO's route spotters will be ineffective because:

1. LILCO has not provided enough route spotters to cover the evacuation routes. (See FEMA Report at 11).

2. The LILCO route spotters will be unable to move expeditiously through heavily congested traffic, especially since the evacuating motorists will not defer to LERO vehicles operating withcut police sirens or flashers. (Id.)

Contention 66: Removal of Obstacles from the Roadway and Provisions for Fuel Contention 66. NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.k requires that an offsite plan provide "[i]dentification of and means for dealing with potential impediments . . . to use of evacuation routes, and contingency measures."

In the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham and subsequent evacuation (recommended and/or voluntary), it is likely that there will be many instances of automobile accidents and vehicle breakdowns caused by the large number of vehicles on the road, stop-and-go conditions, overheating while idling _ in queues, driver inattention, failure to obey the rules of the road and other such conditions. In addition, it is

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likely that many evacuees will not begin the evacuation with a full tank of gas. Many cars may run out of gas, both inside and outside the EPZ, as a result of extended operation times due to congestion, stop-and-go conditions and time spent sit-ting in queues. Such occurrences, along with abandonment of vehicles and construction which may be in progress at the time an evacuation is ordered, will result in obstructions and blockages on roadways in use during the evacuation. Taking such occurrences into account would cause evacuation time estimates to increase. (See SG Contention 65) . In addition, it is essential that such obstacles be removed in a tbnely manner so that evacuation times will not increase even more due to substantial periods of reduced roadway capacity. Under the LILCO Plan, removal of obstacles will be performed by LILCO road crews using 12 LILCO tow trucks and line trucks.and-a-gas-eline-eentingency-plan-is Eunder-development,n Gasoline will be provided by LILCO fuel trucks which are to be dispatched to seven specific locations. (See Plan at 4.4-3 and-4v4-4; Appen-

. dix A at IV-192 176; OPIP 3. 6. 3 at 46a-46b) .

Intervenors contend that the LILCO Ple.n f ails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(lO) and NUREG 0654,Section II.J, because LILCO will be unable to provide for ob-stacles to be removed from the roads, or to provide adequate fuel supplies for evacuees for the following reasons:

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l A. LILCO does not have an adequate number of tow trucks to enable LILCO personnel to remove all potential road ob s t ruc tion s .y-no r-d ee e- the-Plan-s p e cif y- th e-n um be r-e f-s uc h- v e-hietes-et-its-disposaiv (See FEMA Report at 11, citing non-compliance with NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.k). In-additient centrary-te-NUREG-0654-Sectien-IivAvEvavy-the-LILGO-empteyees expected-te-be-part-of-the-read-erews-have-net-been-identified by-seb-titlev--See-OPEP-EvErir-at-90, B. The tow truck deployment points proposed by LILCO are not located so as to allow rapid dispatch of the tow trucks to the aid of disabled vehicles. In addition, once they have been dispatched to an obstruction location, the tow trucks and other LILCO equipment will only be able to move as fast as the traf-fic flow, which will be extremely slow. Th ere fore , they will be uneble to respond to the site of an obstruction in an expeditious manner.

C. LILCO's Plan makes no provision for the evacuation of persons whose cars break down or are in accidents.

D. The LILCO Plan does not provide for snow removal.

( Se e F EMA Re port at 11, citing non-compliance with NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.k). Rather, the Plan ascumes that " snow remov-al will be provided by_ local organizations in their normal fashion during an emergency." (Plan at 2.2-5). This

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i assumption is unwarranted. LILCO has no agreements with local jurisdictions or other entities within and around the EPZ to provide snow removal services during an emergency, nor can it assure that local personnel assigned to snow removal duties will perform those functions during an emergency, for the reasons cited in Contentions 15, 25 and 27.

E. Withdrawn. LILCO's fuel trucks, which are designed for transporting fuel, are not eculpped to pump fuel in ine manner necessary to refuel automobiles. Fur the rmore , LILCO ' s fuel trucks are not equipped with necessary fire prevention equipment, such as is found on gasoline pumps and trucks designed for refueling aircraft. Th ere fo re , the public will be subjected to an unacceptable risk of fire and/or explosions.

F. The seven fixed sites chosen for fuel distribution will be able to service only a small portion of the evacuating population. Therefore, the fuel needs of many evacuees will be unnet. Fur thermore , no provisions have been made to handle queues at fuel allocation sites which may back up into

.evacue. ting traffic, thus causing further congestion and delays.

Centention 67: Evacuation of Persons Without Access to Automobiles Contention 67. LILCO assumes that in the event an evacua-tion is ordered, most members of the population will attempt to 160 -

i leave using their personal vehicles. Ilowever, a substantial portion of the population in the EPZ does not own er have access to an automobile. LILCO proposes that people who do not have access to an automobile at the time of an evacuation order will be evacuated by buses running special evacuation routes, with bus stops purportedly no more than one-half mila from each such person's home. (Plan at 3.6-6; Appendix A, at III-35 and III-36, IV-67 76 to IV-178 163; OPIP 3. 6. 4) . However, LILCO's propcsal cannot be implemented, and LILCO's proposed evacuation of people without access to cars would not provide adequate protection for such people, because the evacuation would take too long. As a result of the time necessary to complete the evacuation, persons may be exposed to health-threatening radia-tion doses. Thus, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10. Specifically:

Contention 67.A. According to LILCO's estimates, approx-imately G85 333 forty-passenger buses are required to transport those able-bodied persons who would need transportation out of the EPZ (see Appendix A, at IV-74b 87-te-IV--k?S; OPIP 3. 6. 4) .

In fact, however, LILCO will either need more than 285 333 buses or these buses will have to make many more runs than an-ticipated by LILCO because LILCO has substantially 161 -

underestimated the number of people Who will need such transportation:

1. LILCO appears-to-base-ite-estimates-selety-en the-number-ef-householde-without-ears,--fSee-Appendix-A-at IEE-3531--Ite-estimatee-thue-ignere underestimate the signifi-cant number of people Who belong to households with automo-biles, but Who may not have access to such vehicles because at the time of an evacuation order, the vehicles are in use by an-other member of the household. LILCO's proposal for evacuating persons without access to transportation must include adequate methods of evacuating the members of vehicle-owning households who may not have access to a car. LILCO's estimates of the number of buses required do not adequately appear-te take such people into account.

2. LILCO's estimates also fail to take into account those persons who rely on public transportation to get into the EPZ but who, in the event of an emergency, may not be able to rely on such means to evacuate.

3. LILCO assumes that its route buses will be filled to 75% capacity however, there is no basis for this as-s umption. In fact, the route bus capacity factors are likely to be significantly lower than 75%, Which will result in a need for many more buses to evacuate people without access to cars.

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Contention 67.B,. Withdrawn. The Plan fails to provide adequate staffing to accomplish the proposed evacuation, in vi-olation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(1). Specifically, it provides for only a single Bus Coordinator, who must maintain contact with all bus drivers. OPII 3.6.4, at 7 (item 9). In addition, the Bus Coordinator must stay in contact with staging area coordinators and bus company operators, among others.

OPIP 3.6.4, at 2. In addition, in violation of NUREG 0654 Section II.A.2.a., the Plan fails to identify by job title the LILCO employees who will serve as bus drivers. (See OPIP 2.1.1, at 42).

Contention 67.C. The staggered departures and multiple bus runs necessary under LILCO's plan to evacuate the people in each zone (Appendix A, at IV-87 76 to IV-478 163; OPIP 3.6.4, at 11-32), even using LILCO's uneealistfeetty-tew estimates of the number of people likely to need such evacuation, will result in lengthy evacuation travel times far longer than those set forth in Appendix A at 8a. Specifically, the LILCO Plan provides that in-the-many-cases-whece-buses-eee-eequired-te make-mece-than-one-euny the bus routes will terminate at desig-nated " transfer points" with each bus in many cases required to make more than one run. As noted in Contenti'en 67.D, several transfer points are in the EPZ. Transfer buses will transport

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the evacuees from the transfer points to relocation centers.

Of-the-205-bases-whieh-EfLEO-estimates-it-will-require 7-409-eee expected-to-perfeem-two-eune-and-14-see-expected-te-peeferm three-runsv--Only-as-buses-finish-the-required-number-ef-cuns7 will-people-whe-have-heen-deposited-et-transfee-peints-be bussed-feem-the-teensfee-peints-te-eeleeatien-centeest LILCO's estimated route times begin and end with the assumed transfer points. (See Appendix A, at IV-87 76 to IV-178 163, V-8a; OPIP 3.6.4). LILCO's estimated evacuation times, however, assume that route buses will be dispatched from transfer points and return to the transfer points at specific intervals (or " head-ways") and that there will be little or no waiting at the transfer points for buses to the relocation centers. Further-more, the last transfer buses are assumed to clear the EPZ 15 minutes after leaving the transfer points. (Appendix A at V-7)

These assumptions are erroneous, however, since they do not consider the oevere traffic congestion that will exist, for reasons set forth in Contention 65 at the same time that the route and transfer buses are attempting to_make their trips.

Thus,'the route times for each route bus will be longer than I

estimated by LILCO. In addition, it is likely to take far l

longer than 15 minutes for the last transfer buses to clear the EPZ after leaving the transfer points. The-time-required-fee l

i l - 164 -

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an-evacuee-te-get-feem-the-bes-step-near-his-heme-to-a releeation-centery-taking-inte-eeeeunt-the-need-fee-muttiple bus-runs-and-waiting-st-a-teensfee-peinty-will-be-substantielty greater-than-the-estimated-reute-timesv--LILGO20 8 estimated cente-times 8-fee-the-eveenetien-buses-te-eeach-the-teensfee points-ace-else-unrealisticatty-lew-in-that-they-fait-te-take inte-eeeeunt-the-eengested-condittens-that-will-exist-due-te the-factees-set-feeth-in-Gententions-65r Contention 67.D. Although-GPIP-Or614-instreets-LILEG-em-pteyees-te-inform-evacuees-et-transfee-peints 8that-they-see outside-ef-the-10-mile-EPB78-in-fact 7 The eleven new transfer points designated by LILCO_do not appear to inave adequate structures which could provide shelter from adverse radiological or weather conditions for evacuees while they are waiting to be transferred to relocation centers. Furthermore, four of the eleven twelve transfer points are inside the EPZy and-thece-eee-pesetically-en-the-beundacy-ef-the-EPBr and one is on the EPZ boundary. In addition, of the remaining five six transfer points, three are located approximately one one-half

! mile or less beyond the EPZ boundary, one is approximately one mile from the EPZ boundary and two are approximately two and a l

! half miles beyond the boundary. Under the LILCO Plan, people are likely to be kept waiting for substantial time periods, l

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because of delays, congestion, etc., before they are transported from transfer points to relocation centers.

Leaving people at the seven eight transfer points within g very close to the EPZ will not provide protection for them.

Leaving them at the other five three transfer points, all less than five miles beyond the EPZ boundary, conflicts with the intent of NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.h, and could result in these people also receiving health-threatening radiation doses.

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l Contentions 68-71: Evacuation of School Children Further Preamble to Contentions 68-71. The LILCO Plan proposes that if schools are in session upon the declaration of an Alert or Site Area emergency in which no protective actions are recommended for the general public, schools are expected to implement their early dismissal plans. (Appendix A at II-20).

If an evacuation, or a combination of sheltering and evacuation were recommended for the general public while schools were in session, the schools in the EPZ are expected to evacuate chil-dren to " predesignated reception centers." If any protective act.;ns are recommended for the general public, schools outside the EPZ which have students living in the EPZ, according to LILCO, "will retain those students at the school when the school day ends." (Id.) two-means-ef-implementing-a-peetective actien-of-evacuation-with-eespeet-to-children-whe-aee-in scheels-at-the-time-ef-en-evaeustien-eedeet--fit-by-eeeem-mending-that-scheels-implement-existing-early-dismissat pelietes-se-children-may-eeturn-to-these-hemes-and-evacuate with-theie-parents-fPlany-at-Sv3-57-376-67-Appendix-A7-at EV-182-te-IV-185tt-and-f23-by-performing-a-bus-evacuatien-of the-chsideen-diceetty-feem-the-eeheels-to-celecatien-centees fPlan7-at-Eva-57-316-E-te-77-Appendix-A7-et-EV-182-te-1857-OPEP 376v5tv For the reasons set forth in Conter' ions 68-71, the

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LILCO Plan does not provide an adequate and implementable means of evacuating school children, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

Contention 68. The LILCO Plan fails to specify the bases upon which LILCO would continue to make a protective action recommendation of early dismissal (as opposed to sheltering or evacuation) to schools if they had initiated an early dismiss-al, even if other protective actions were being recommended for the general public (OPIP 3.8.2. at 5), weeld-be-made7 and thus does not comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.m. Altheugh-Appendix-A-states-tat IV-1823-that-scheets 8will-peebebly-be-advised-te-institute-an early-dismisset 8femphasis-addedt-when-they-receive-a-tene aieet-eadie-netificateny-via-EBS7-ef-the adeeleeetien-es-en s

sleet-ee-above-classificatien78-the-basis-te-be-used-by-EEEGO in-deciding-te-issue-euch-e 8 probablen -advisery-is-net-seatedr-l There-is-alse-ne-basis-peevided-fee-the-pessible-early-dismiss-l at-of-the-Seeth-Eeuntry7-Three-Vittagey-and-Sachem-Scheel-Bis-tesetsv--tSee-Appendix-A-st-IV-183tv Contention 69. LILCO appears to assume that its recommen-i dation, at the time no protective actions are recommended for l the general public, that schools implement an early dismissal, l

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{

will result in children being protected in the event of a subsequent protective action recommendation of sheltering or an evacuation eedeev because children could thereby shelter or evacuate with their parents. (See Appendix A, at II-20, OPIP 3.8.2 at 5.). In fact, there is no assurance that early dis-missal will provide children with adequate protection from health-threatening radiation doses, and therefore the Plan fails to_ comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10),

and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10, for the following reasons:

Contention 69.A. [Not admitted by ASLB]. Under the LILCO Plan, the decision to implement an early dismissal rests with the schools. (See Appendix A, at IV-182). The recommendation ,

to dismiss early will be made over the EBS radio (Plan at 3.6-6; Appendix A at IV-182). The Plan contains no provisions for the transmission of any detailed information to school authorities about the emergency, its anticipated or potential progress, or the possible dangers ir.colved in implementing an

! early dismissal. Therefore, under the LILCO Plan, the l appropriate school authorities will have no means cf obtaining the information necessary to permit an informed and timely de-cision. The Plan'also fails to provide indemnification for the school authorities in the event that their decision with

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1 l

respect to an early dismissal results in injury to children.

- Because they will not have adequate-information or protection from liability arising out of their decision, there is no as-surance that the schools will be.able to, or actually will, make the appropriate decision with respect to early dismissal.

Contention 69.B. The LILCO Plan does not incorporate or provide any essential details of the early dismissal plans for the schools or school districts in or near the EPZ. It is thus impossible to tell whether such plans for a Shoreham emergency actually exist andy or, if they do, ser the extent to which

-they are compatible with the LILCO Plan.

Contention 69.C. Early dismissal will not result in the timely arrival of children at their homes so they can be protected by their parents because:

1. Even under non-emergency conditions it takes hours to implement early dismissals due to the time required to make the necessary decision, to mobilize the necessary person-nel and vehicles, and to perform the necessary number of bus runs. Under emergency conditions, the time required to accomplish an early dismissal is likely to be substantially greater, due particularly to congested road conditons and role

. conflict experienced by bus drivers and other personnel in au-

~.

L thority.. In addition, early dismissal policies rely upon large

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\

numbers of children walking home, distances of up to two to three miles, which can take a substantial amount of time.

2. Under the LILCO Plan, schools will receive noti-fication of an emergency at the same time as the rest of the public (by means of tone alert radios activated by the EBS an-nouncement (see Plan, at 3.3-4; Appendix A at II-19 and 373-5)). Therefore early dismissal traffic, including those children expected to walk home, will encounter early evacuation and moJ ' t :acion traffic.

Contention 69.D. The Plan does not provide for prior no-tification of parents if early dismissal is going to occur.

According to surveys, between 30 and 40 percent of the school children within the plume EPZ return from school to an empty home because both parents hold daytime jobs (or, in the case of single-parent families, the sole parent holds a daytime job).

As a-result,.many children will be sent home to empty houses, and may be uncared for during the emergency.

i Contention 69.E. The Plan fails to provide a means of l

dealing with an escalation of the emergency (and accompanying need to recommend protective actions of sheltering or evacua-

_ tion) that may occur during the lengthy process of early dis-l.

missal. Indeed, the LILCO Plan provides that once schools ini-tiate early dismissal, LILCO will not inform the schools of

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subsequent sheltering or evacuation protective action recommendations. (OPIP 3.8.2 at 5). Thus, in the event of such an escalation, children are likely to be stranded in schools, or en route to their homes (walking or on buses),

without available shelter, means of evacuation or other protection. Children would thus be exposed to health threatening radiation doses.

Contention 70. The-LIEGO-Plan-states-that-the-Sheceham-Wading-River-Scheel-Bistrict ass-the-enly-disteiet-whieh-has the-option-ef-eeteesting-sts-studentsyn--fAppendix-A-at EV-183tv--Thus Although the LILCO Plan states that schools will be advised to evacuate if evacuation or a combination cf sheltering and evacuation is recommended for the general public, the Plan does not identify relocation centers for, or the means or procedures to evacuate, any of the schools. ethee then-these-in-the-Sheceham-Wading-River-Scheet-Bisteietr j (Appendix A at II-20.) Thus, the LILCO Plan has no provision concerning how its proposed evacuation and relocation of chil-dren, or the safe reuniting of children with their families, could or would be implemented. And, contrary to LILCO's as-sumption, there is no evidence in the Plan that school officials have conducted " preplanning" for a Shoreham emergen-cy. (See OPIP 3.6.5 at 10a). Intervenors contend that in

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failing to provide for an implementable evacuation of the school children in the 16-ethee school districts in the EPZ even-in-the-event-of-a-fest-moving-eventy fsee-Appendix-A-at IV-183ty the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and

^

4 II.J.10.

Contention 71. Intervenors contend that the Plan's peevisiens proposed fee evacuation of school children (Appendix A at IV-183-to-186 II-19 to II-21; OPIP 3.6.5) see-deficient could not and would not be implemented for the following reasons:

Contention 71.A. Assuming the availability of relocation centers for evacuated nursery s'chool children (the Plan fails to identify any such centers), under the LILCO Plan, a timely evacuation of the nursery schools in the EPZ (see Appendix A at II-20, II-21; OPIP 3.6.5) could not be implemented because:

1. Even if LILCO had agreements with companies to provide a sufficient number of buses and agreements with schools or parents permitting children to ride in buses beino driven by LILCO employees in for an evacuation of nursery schools (see Contention 24), many of the buses in fact would not be accessible to LILCO employees because they would be in the custody of the normal school bus drivers, or the buses would be located substantial distances away.

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t.

2. The LILCO Plan-has no provision for supervision of children at schools, on buses or at relocation centers,

• em61.. der of subpart A.2 not admitted by ASLB] or for indemni-fication of school authorities in the event children are in-E jured or contaminated in connection with an evacuation.

Contention 71.B. An evacuation of nursery and other schools, even if buses and bus drivers were available (See Con-tention 24) using-LILEO-empseyees-es-bus-desversy would take too long and children would not be adequately protected from health threatening radiation doses because:

1. Evacuating buses would encounter congestion from other mobilization and evacuation traffic, and thus would be substantially delayed.in traveling from schools to relocation centers (assuming the Plan fails to identify any such reloca-tion centers existed).

2. Normal school dismissals require substantial numbers of multiple bus runs as well as staggered dismissal times. In the event of an evacuation, an even larger number of multiple bus runs (requiring several hours) would be necessary I to transport all children out of the EPZ.

Contention 71.C. Although the Plan asserts that "those schools outside the EPZ which have students living in the EPZ will retain those students at the school when the school day

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l ends, if any protective actions are recommended for the general public in any area of the EPZ," (Appendix A at II-20), this as-sertion is without basis. The Plan provides no assurance that this LILCO proposal could or would be implemented for the fol-lowing reasons:

1. The Plan does not incorporate or provide any essential details of any plans of schools for retaining chil-dren in school after the end of the school day. Thus, it is >

impossible to tell whether such plans actually exist or, if they do, the extent, if any, to which they are compatible with the LILCO Plan.

2. The Plan does not provide for prior notification of parents if children are to be retained in school after the end of the school day. Schools are not authorized to retain children without parental consent.

3. The Plan has no provisions concerning how its proposed retaining of children and the safe reuniting of chil-dren with their families could or would be implemented in the event of a Shoreham emergency.

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I Contention 72: Evacuation of People in Special Facilities l Contention 72. The LILCO Plan proposes to evacuate all hospitals, nursing homes and other special health care facilities in the EPZ, using buses, ambulances, the-Leng-Esland i

Raileead-f8EIRRaty-and-airplanes. and ambulettes. (Plan, Appen-dix A at II-28 to 30, 29, III-37, EV-199-te-180, IV-166 to 168; IV-185-to-192; IV-172 to 178; OPIP 3.6.5). This aspect of the Plan cannot be implemented; accordingly, people in special facilities will not be adequately protected in the event of an emergency and the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR

. Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(8), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3, C and J for the following reasons:

Contention 72.A. Assuming the necessary vehicles were available to LILCO and were mobilized, the time necessary, fol-lowing mobilization, to accomplish the proposed evacuation of special facilities will be too long to provide adequate

-protection from health-threatening radiation doses. Evacuation I

will take too long as a result of: the large number of trips necessary to transport persons individually to relocation I centers ee-te-LIRR-statiens; the other mobilization and evacua-  !

l l tion traffic congestion which the evacuation vehicles will en-counter; and the time necessary to load and unload passengers 1

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0

(

from ambulances and-ente-teeine-ee-planes. Thus, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10).

Contention 72.B. Withdrawn. LILCO's plan to use the LIRR

~

, to evacuate up to 845 patients, by converting passenger cars to accommodate patients on mattresses (Plan, Appendix A, at IVel86), is unworkable and cannot be implemented in a timely manner because: .

1. .There is no assurance that any LIRR trains and necessary engineers, much less a sufficient number of them (see Appendix A, at IV-186), will be available at the Port Jefferson and Main-Line stations to participate in the proposed evacua-tion.

4

2. It will take a long time to perform the necessary modifications to the LIRR cars, and the Plan does not provide for personnel to perform such modifications.

3. Limited access and loading conditions at the Port I

Jefferson and Main Line stations make the proposed evacuation impractical.

l l 4. The Plan does not provide for health care person-nel to accompany the patients in the railroad cars, or to meet L patients and provide necessary support and transportation services at points of disembarkation.

i

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Contention 72.C. The Plan fails to identify any reloca-tion or reception centers for persons evacuated from any hospitals, nursing homes, or other special health care facilities other than the United Cerebral Palsey of Greater I

i Suffolk Inc. .

Contention 72.D. The LILCO Plan recognizes that under certain circumstances the evacuation of John T. Mather Memorial, St. Charles and Central Suffolk Hospitals might be necessary, and that LILCO may recommend such an evacuation.

(Appendix A at II-28, IV-172; OPIP 3.6.5 at 8). However, the Plan fails to specify adequately or accurately the circumstances that would necessitate an evacuation of the hospitals, and does not include adequate procedures to permit the person in command and control to make en accurate determi-nation as to whether or not such an evacuation is needed.

Thus, the Plan fails to comply with NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.m and 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10). -

Contention 72.E. Instead of planning to provide adequate l

protection to hospital patients in the event of such an evacua-tion, the LILCO Plan simply provides that "LERO will evacuate

_these facilities using an ad hoc expansion of transportation resources that are presently committed to other aspects of l

evacuation." (Appendix A at II-28, IV-172). Apparently, this l

?

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. - - . - - . . _ . ~ , -_ - -.

ad hoc plan will not be developed until an emergency actua11_y occurs. (See Appendix A at ~II-28; II-172, 173). .The ad hoc plan will utilize the vehicles assigned to implement the evacu-ation of other segments of the population, but such vehicles will be supplied for the purpose of evacuating hospital patients only "on an as available basis," and only "as the rest of the affected population evacuation nears completion." (Ap-pendix A at IV-173). Thus, there is no assurance that adequate protective measures could or would be taken for hospital patients and LILCO has thus failed to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)'l) and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654,-Section II.J.10.d Contention'73: Handicapped People at Home

-Contention 73. The LILCO Plan proposes to use ambulances to evacuate handicapped people who are not in special

. facilities. (OPIP 3.6.5). Intervenors contend that this as -

pect of the LILCO Plan cannot be implemented in a timely manner and therefore will not provide adequate protection to I handicapped persons in the EPZ. Thus, this aspect of the Plan l

fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1),

50.47(b)(3) and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3, C.4 and J, as specified in paragraphs A and B below.

l

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,. _ ._ _. ._ . . _ _ .~. -__ . . , _ ._ . . _ . . - _ . - - - . - . - - . - - . _ - _ . . - _ - _

i contention 73.A. All handicapped persons in need of spe-cial evacuation services will not be known to LILCO and there-fore will not be evacuated in the event of an emergency. The preregistration system proposed by LILCO (Plan, Appendiy A, at II-18; see also Information Brochure), will not result in iden-tification of a substantial number of persons who may need as-sistance in order to evacuate because:

1. Many people who will require assistance will not return the postcards to LILCO because they do not: (a) per-ceive themselves to be handicapped; (b) desire to be identified as handicapped; (c) understand the reason or need to return the cards; (d) remember to return the cards; and/or (e) desire to rely on LILCO assistance in the event of an emergency.

2. There is no provision for verifying the com-pleteness of the LILCO listing to be compiled from the returned postcards.

3. There is no provision for regularly updating the listing.

Contention 73.B. The LILCO Plan does not provide for the assistance and equipment necessary to accomplish an evacuation of handicapped persons at home, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(o)(3), 50.47(b)(5) and 50.47(b)(8), and NUROG 0654, Sections II.A.3, C.4, E and J.

Specifically:

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1. The only provision for notifying non-deaf handicapped individuals of a pending evacuation is by means of a telephone call from the LILCO Home Coordinator. (OPIP 3.6.5). This is an inadequate and ineffective means of noti-fying many handicapped individuals such as those who are deaf 7 bedridden, unable to get to a telephone or unable to communi-cate on a telephone, and thus LILCO fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.5 and E.6.

(See FEMA Report at 9).

2. [Subpart B.2 not admitted by ASLB.] There is no provision in the Plan for assisting handicapped individuals with the preparation necessary prior to evacuation (such as locating and packing clothing and medication, notifying rela-tives or friends).

3. One LILCO employee -- the Home Coordinator -- is supposed-te-eentact responsible for contacting all the handicapped persons and identifying and contacting all recep-tion centers (none of which are identified in the Plan). (OPIP 3.6.5, Section 5.1.2). One-peesen-will-net-be-eble-te-peefeem these-functions While OPIP 3.6.5 provides that the Home Coordinator should "[d] raw on Communications and Administrative Support personnel to assist in this effort," there is no indi-cation that such personnel will be available. Thus, there is

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no-assurance that disabled persons will be notified promptly enough to permit ~ timely evacuation.

4. The proposed evacuation would take far too long, and as a result, handicapped people would be likely to receive health-threatening doses of radiation because evacuating vehi-cles would encounter congestion from other mobilization and evacuation traffic, and thus would be substantially delayed in traveling to the homes of handicapped individuals, and to relo-

. cation. centers.

5. The LILCO Plan calls for the deaf to be alerted of an accident, and advised of the appropriate protective action, by LILCO route alert drivers who are expected to drive to the home of each deaf resident within the EPZ (OPIP 3.6.5).

-This proposed notification will not be timely, however, since route alert drivers will be delayed by mobilization and evacua-tion' traffic. Furthermore, even disregarding expected traffic conditions, there is no assurance that enough route alert driv-ers will be assigned to this function to enable LILCO to carry out such notification promptly.

Contentions 74-77: Relocation Centers Further Preamble to Contentions 74-77. An cffsite emer-gency-plan must include means of relocating evacuees and must provide for relocation centers located at least five miles and I

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l preferably 10 miles beyond the EPZ. NUREG 0654, Sections II J.10 9 and h. Such relocation centers are essential to provide food and shelter to those evacuees who have no alterna-tive places to stay and also to provide radiological monitoring and decontamination for evacuees and their vehicles. The relo-cation centers must have sufficient personnel and equipment to monitor evacuees within a 12-hour period. NUREG 0654,Section II.J.12.

The LILCO Plan calls for the establishment of relocation centers outside che EPZ at the following facilities (Plan, at 4.2-1; OPIP 4.2.1):

Suffolk County Community College (primary)

BOCES Islip Occupational Center (primary)

State University of New York at Stony Brook (primary)

State University of New York at Farmingdale (backup)

St. Joseph's College, Patchoque (backup).

The Intervenors contend that LILCO will be unable to provide adequate relocation centers and services for evacuees, and thus the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(8), 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Section J. The specific deficiencies which lead to this conclusion are set forth in Contention 74-77.

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I 1

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)

Contention 74. Two of the three primary relocation centers designated by LILCO are well within 20 miles from the Shoreham site. Both Suffolk County Community College and the State University of New York at Stony Brook are only three miles beyond the EPZ. In addition, many evacuees who need re-location services will not use the relocation centers proposed by LILCO because they will perceive those centers as being too close to the plant (e.g., only 13 miles). Accordingly, LILCO's relocation centers will not provide the necessary services to evacuees and accordingly, the LILCO Plan does not comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.h.

[ Rewritten by ASLB to state as follows:] Two of the three primary relocation centers designated by LILCO are well within 20 miles from the Shoreham site. Both Suffolk County Community College and the State University of New York at Stony Brook are only three miles beyond the EPZ boundary contrary to the re-quirements of NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.h.

Contention 75. The LILCO Plan provides no estimates of the number of evacuees who may require shelter in a relocation j center, and the Plan fails to demonstrate that each such facil-

ity has adequate space, toilet and shower facilities, food and L

food preparation areas, drinking water, sleeping accommodations and other necessary facilities. Accordingly, there is no l

l - 184 -

I m

. _ . . _. ..~ .

assurance that the relocation centers designated by LILCO will be sufficient in capacity to provide necessary services for the l

number of evacuees that will require them.- Thus, LILCO fails

-to comply with NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.10.g and J.12.

Contention 76. [Not admitted by ASLB]. LILCO's Plan limits the facilities for radiological monitoring and decontamination of the evacuated public to only the five relo-cation centers designated in the Plan. (See Plan, at 3.6-7, I

4.2-2 to 4.2-4). The Plan provides for monitoring and decontamination only-of those evacuees who stop at the reloca-('

tion centers. .Thus, there is no provision for monitoring or 1

, decontamination of evacuees and vehicles who leave the EPZ but r choose not to 1p) to relocation centers. However, based on the TMI-experience, it appears likely thac many evacuees will bypass the centers in favor of a destination more distant from the radiation hazard.- In order to provide adequate protection

-to the public as required by 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10), LILCO must provide a means for monitoring and l

decontaminating all evacuees.

Contention 77. The equipment used by LILCO to measure thyroid contamination at relocation centers -- RM 14 with HP270 probe -- (see OPIP 3.9.2) will be incapable of differentiating the required signal fror. background readings. The instrument's

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l most sensitive scale (0-500 cpm) is insufficiantly sensitive for the accurate measurement of e-75 150 cpm or 0.13 mR/hr eer. ding (the threshold for requiring hospital care) ee-a 250 epm-above-backgrounda-reedingr--fSee-Plan 3-at-329-47-OPIP 3-9-Etv--In-additien7-the-instrument-is-net-sufficiently-sensi-tive-to-the-eneegy-specteum-given-off-by-cadieiedine-to-insure accurate-detection-of-cadiefedine-thyreid-contaminatien in the presence of background readings which are likely to elevated above the 50 cpm maximum 1,10-15 cpm nominal) assumed by LILCO.

(OPIP 3.9.2 and Plan, at 3.9-4). In addition, the Plan provides no information or instruction on how to make a mea-surement if the background reading exceeds 50 cpm. According-ly, the LILCO plan fails to comply with NUREG 0654 Section II.J.12.

Contentions 78-83: Food, Milk, Water and Livestock Control Further Preamble to Contentions 78-83. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) requires that protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ " appropriate to the locale" be in place.

The ingestion exposure pathway generally covers an area approx-imately 50 miles in radius. 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2). Plans for the ingestion pathway are required to " focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion path-way." Id. The purpose of these requirements is to protect the

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public from consumption of contaminated foodsteffs. NUREC 0654,Section II.J.ll.

Contention 78. Withdrawn. The LILCO Plan does not ade-quately identify the LIICO or LERO personnel who will be re-sponsible for making or implementing protective action recom-mendations or decisions with respect to the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. The Plan states that the Director of Local Re-sponse is responsible for the protective action function (Plan, Figure 3.6.1), while the Health Services Coordinator will provide " coordination for local resources involved in control-ling food, milk, water and livestock feed supplies" (Plan, at 3.6-8), and the Coordinator of Public Information will " advise farmers on the recommended practices with respect to livestock and agricultural products" (Plan at 3.6-8). However, the re-sponsibility for implementation of the Ingestion Pathway Pro-tective Action Procedure is assigned to the Dose Assessment

- Staff under the guidance of the Environmental Assessment Coordinator. (OPIP 3.6.6, section 2.0). The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), and 50.47(b)(3).

Contention 79. Withdrawn. The Plan fails to provide for protective actions for the portion of the ingestion exposure pathway in the State of Connecticut. The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1),

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1 l

l t

50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2), and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.ll.

Contention _80. Withdrawn. OPIP 3.6.6 - " Ingestion Path-way Protective Actions" -- requires dose projections to be made as a prerequisite to implementing the procedure. The projections are to be made according to OPIP 3.5.2. Such projections are inadequate for use in determining ingestion ex-posure pathway protective actions, however, because those dose projections are limited to the area only 10 miles from the plant (OPIP 3.5.2 Section 5.2.7 and Attachment 3). Thus, they cannot be relied upon to provide the dose projections necessary for protective action recommendations for the 50 mile ingestion pathway EPZ. The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(9), 50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2),

and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.ll.

Contention 81. The Plan contains ne insufficient proce-dures or other means of implementing the protective actions set forth in Attachments-7-and-8-of OPIP 3.6.6. Thus, LILCO has not developed adequate plans for the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway, and there is no compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(10),

50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.ll. Specifically:

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- _ _ -__ __-___ _____________-_____ _ l

i Contention 81.A. The Plan does not statet---fit-hew-the cemeval-ef-taccating-dairy-animals-feem-eentaminated-pasturage and/ee-the-previsien-of-substitute 7-uneentaminated-stered-feed 7 will-be-eehievedt-f2t-hew-eneentaminated-watee-seurees-ace-te be-ebtained-ee-previded-fee-leetating-dairy-animalst-f3f-hew and-under-what-ceiteria-reats7-meat-peeducts-and-animal-feeds are-to-be-eensidered-en-a-ease-by-case-basist-ee-f43-hew-all livesteek-ean-be-iselated:--En-additten7-the-Plan provide adecuate has-ne procedures or guidance governing the disposi-tion of contaminated lactating dairy animals, or the treatment of uncontaminated lactating dairy animals should uncontaminated stored feed not be available. Thus, there is no assurance that the milk or meat products of these animals will be kept from public consumption.

Contention 81.B. The Plan calls for withholding contami-nated milk from the market to allow radioactive decay of short-lived radionuclides but does not call for its disposal or l continued withholding after the decay period. (OPIP 3.6.6, At-l tachment 7, at 1). The Plan provides no standards for determining what constitutes an adequate " decay period" or for identifying short-lived radioisotopes, nor does it contain any l provisions for dealing with long-lived isotopes which would l

I pose a serious health consequence to the public. In addition, l

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l l

the Plan does not state: (1) how the withholding of-contaminated milk would be achieved; (2) how the prolonged storage and special pasteurization of milk would be achieved; (3) how the diversion of the production of fluid milk would be achieved; or (4) how the introduction of milk supplies into commerce would be prevented.

Contention 81.C. The Plan calls for removing contamina-tion from washing-contaminated fruit and vegetables by washing, brushing, scrubbing or peeling and-milling-and-pelishing-een-taminated-gesins (OPIP 3.6.6, Attachment 7, at la). However, the Plan contains no procedures for disposing of the wash water or miiling residue, which could pose a serious potential for adverse health consequences. In addition, the Plan does not state: ~(1) how the removal of surface contamination from fruits and vegetables by washing, milling 7 brushing, etc. would be achieved; (2) what the criteria are for a contaminated operations area and how to measure it; hew-the-milling-and-pel-ishing-ef-centaminated-graine-would-be-achievedt or (3) how the many informal local farm stands can be found and controlled.

Contention 81.D. The Plan contains no maps showing key land use data, watersheds, water supply intakes and treatment plants and reservoirs. Nor does it state: (1) how and from where-alternative drinking water supplies would be made l

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l

available; or (2) how affected wells would be identified and isolated and reservoirs secured.

Contention 81.E. The Plan does not state: (1) how the diet of all residents and visitors is to be restricted; (2) who will pay for condemnation and under what procedures condemna-tion will be executed; or (3) how exports of agricultural products and ducks from Suffolk County or Connecticut to other parts of the country can be controlled or prevented.

Contention 81.F. The Plan does not provide for personnel, facilities, equipment or even a communications network to im-plement any of the actions listed in subparts A through E.

Contention 82. Withdrawn. The Plan does not provide for the confiscation of fish or other sea life from the Long Island Sound which may be contaminated, and thus does not consider the necessary range of foodstuffs. Since about one-half of the possible plume trajectories are over the Long Island Sound where there is much commercial and recreational fishing, there must be procedures for monitoring and controlling this path to the food chain. Without incorporating these considerations in Section 3.6.6 and the related OPIPs, the Plan does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10),

50.47(c)(2), and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.11.

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1 l

Contention 83. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The Long Island duck' industry must be included for special consideration in the Plan. There must be procedures for putting commercially grown ducks on special feed and for restraining the movement of con-taminated ducks into the commercial market and the food chain.

LILCO's mere listing of the duck growers in OPIP 3.6.6 does not constitute the proper consideration. The dietary factor from OPIP 3.6.6, Attachment 6, which should be applied to commer-cially grown ducks should also be defined. Without the further development of duck procedures, the Plan does not comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.4?(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.ll.

Contentions 84,-91: Recovery and Reentry Preamble to Contentions 84-91. The.LILCO Plan proposes that short-term and long-term recovery and reentry operations will be performed by LILCO personnel following a radiological emergency at Shoreham (Plan, at 3.10-1 and 3.10-2; OPIP 3.10.1). For the reasons specified in Contentions 84-91, In-tervenors contend that contrary to the emergency planning standards of 10 CPR Section-50.47(b)(13) and NUREG 0654,Section II.M, the LILCO Plan fails to include general plans for recovery and reentry, including the development of necessary procedures and methods that are capable of being implemented.

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Contention 84. [Not admitted by ASLBl. LILCO states that "the initiation of Recovery and implementation of Reentry is a P

non-utility decision-making process" (OPIP 3.10.1, at 1). Con-trary to 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1) and 50.47(b)(3), LILCO identifies no non-utility entity, with necessary authority, which has agreed to undertake the initiation of the recovery and reentry processes. Accordingly, under the LILCO Plan re-covery and reentry cannot be initiated or implemented, and there is no compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(13), and NUREG 0654 Section II.M.

Contention 85. The-LILGO-Plan-states-fat-Brie-ite LERG-personnet-will-eentinue-te-meni-tee-the-effected-areas-and-when-eadiatsen levels-are-such-that-it-is-safe-te-entee the-seea7-witt-inform-the-Birectee-ef-Leest Response-fa-LILEG-employeetv--The-Biceetee ef-becal-Respense-will-then-appoint-a-Re-eevery-Aetien-Gemmittee-te-develep-a recevery-elan-for-the-resteretten-ef-the aree-te-its-pre-emergency-eenditsent fEmphasis-addedtv--The-LILEG-Plan-thus-meeely-states-that-e plan-fee-recevery-and-reentey-will-be-developedy The LILCO Plan at 3.10-1 states that after site conditions are controlled the Director of Local Response will appoint a Recovery Action l Committee which "will plan and implement actions for the resto-i l ration of the affected areas to their pre-emergency conditions." (Id.) The LILCO Plan thus provides merely that

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. ,_ _ , ,,s- y

planning for recovery and reentry will commence after the appointment of the Recovery Action Committee; at this time, no such plan exists. This is contrary to the requirement of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(13) that "[g]eneral plans for recovery and reentry are developed," (emphasis added), and NUREG 0654 Section II.M.

Contention 86. [Not admitted by ASLB}. Although the Plan asserts several general types of " Recovery and Reentry operations" (Plan, at 3.10-1 and 3.10-2), the Plan fails to identify the persons or organizations who will: determine when such operations are necessary or appropriate; determine if they are adequate; have the capability of performing the operations; provide the necessary equipment; or determine if they are performed properly. There is no provision in the Plan which identifies when, under what circumstances, how, or according to what criteria, the listed operations are to be performed. In-deed, the Plan does not state that any of the operations ever would or could actually be performed. The list of operations contained in the Plan does not constitute a " plan" at all; it is merely a compilation of hypothetical actions. The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1),

50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(13), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.M.1 and II.M.2.

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l Contention 87. [Not admitted by ASLB] The Plan fails to identify, by name, title or qualification, the individuals from FEMA and DOE who are to be appointed to the Recovery Action Committee by the LILCO Director of LERO. (See OPIP 3.10.1, at Section 3.0.) It thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3), and NUREG 0654, Sections A.1, A.2, and C.l.

In addition, the LILCO and BNL employees who will be appointed to the Recovery Action Committee (see OPIP 3.10.1, at Section 5.1) are not qualified or capable of exercising the responsibilities which LILCO apparently exracts them to fulfill (see OPIP 3.10.1, at Sections 5.2 and 5.3). Similarly, the LILCO employee who will serve as Health Services Coordinator (i.e., a Department or Division manager of LILCO's Environ-mental Engineering Department (OPIP 2.1.1 at 7)), is not quali-fied or capable of " recommending . . ., modifying, talaxing and discontinuing protective actions" as stated in the Plan.

(Plan, at 3.11-1). Accordingly, the purported recovery and re-entry activities could not and would not be implemented.

Finally, the Plan fails to assign specific recovery and reentry responsibilities to particular members of the proposed Recovery Action Committee. Further, the Plan fails to document that any of the personnel or equipment required for recovery

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- ' * * = - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

.s and reentry activities, designated in Sections 5.3.2, 5.3.3, -

and 5.3.4 of OPIP 3.10.1, will be available to LILCO. The Plan thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654, Sections II.M.2, A, and 2

C, as well as with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1),

50.47(b)(3), and 50.47(b)(13).

Contention 88. OPIP 3.10.1 sets forth " Acceptable Surface Contamination Levels" in units of disintegrations per minute.

The Plan does not include a method for converting such informa-tion into radiation doses to the public (e.g., persons-rems.

I The Plan also fails to state the dose criteria that will ,

provide the basis for a determination that it is safe for the public to reenter previously evacuated areas. The Plan calls for cost benefit analysis based on a $1,000/ person-rem during temporary reentry (OPIP 3.10.1 at 5), but provides no guidance on how to analyze a situation in order to be able to apply this criterion. Thus the Plan end-thus fails to comply with 10 CFR E n

,g, Section 50.47(b)(13) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.I.10, and .

e II.M.l.

Contention 89. [Not admitted by ASLB] The Plan fails to ' -

~

include a radiological cleanup plan and procedures to provide Ih@,S

.Jg;*.-

for the physical removal of radionuclides, stabilization of the radionuclides in place, and environment management which covers e.

. (( ...

the following factors: 6 7:

L.7'.

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A. The type of surface contaminated; B. The external environment to which the surface is exposed; C. The applicability of weapons fallout data (particles from weapons fallout are typically 100 microns or more in diam-eter);

D. The possible radiological hazards to the decontamination operators:

E. The level of decontamination required; F. The consequences of the decontamination operation;

and, G. The costs involved.

In addition, the Plan fails to identify the anticipated decontamination factors ("DF"), and fails to cite or develop a technical basis for a DF. (The DF is a measure of decontamination effectiveness and is defined as the amount of contaminant per unit surface area before contamination, divided by the amount of contamination after decontamination.) The Plan also faile, to address the following external factors that affect the efficiency of decontamination operations:

H. Wet and dry deposition; I. Major weather changes after deposition;

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l J. Aging physical and chemical actions; K. Particulate matter size (aerosols expected to be released from a reactor core meltdown would be less than 10 microns in diameter);

L. Contsminated surface characteristics; and M. Operator or team skill, training and incentive.

Finally, the Plan fails to set forth the criteria or methods for decontamination of the various types of surfaces, (structures, paved areas, vehicles and equipment, land areas and soil, water, vegetation, animals, and humans), which could become contaminated. The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(13).

Contention 90. [Not admitted by ASLB). The Plan fails to address the means for handling and disposing of the volumes and forms of radioactive waste that may result from decontamination operations. The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(13).

Contention 91. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The Plan fails to demonstrate that LILCO has the required financial resources to provide for the direct costs associated with the necessary re-covery and reentry activities, including decontamination during the period until restoration of community life has been com-pleted. Intervenors contend that LILCO lacks such necessary

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-u b

E ETA

_l?

financial resources and thus the Plan cannot be implemented.

g" The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) 5$[

Fa and 50.47(b)(13). r --

C Contention 92: State Emergency Plan -12T "w-Contention 92. There is nc N'w e York State or State of 3RC-Connecticut emergency plan to deal with an emergency at the Shoreham plant before this Board. (See Plan, at Attachment

-}

[

1.4.2). In addition, the LILCO Plan fails to provide for 1[=

2-ccordination of LILCO's emergency response with that of the W

State of New York or the State of Connecticut (assuming, as arquendo, such a response would be forthcoming). (See FEMA ,J[

Report at 1.) In the absence of a State emergency plan for Shoreham, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Id' Sections 50.47(a)(2), 50.47(b), or NUREG 0654,Section I.E, ^{

zw-I.F, I.H or II..l2/ W

!E!W Contentions 93-96: Loss of Offsite Power ik Tb Preamble to Contentions 93-96. The LILCO Plan must 25b am In LBP-83-22, at 60, the ASLB mentioned that contentions F

17/ -

would be appropriate concerning lack of coordination 'r between the LILCO plsa and the State plan. As noted in -ZQ this contention, however, there is no State Plar before J-the Board. Thus, there is in fact noncompliance with all pg.

the NUREG-0654 planning requirements which pertain to the _f State. The County has not alleged separate contentions as er to each of these, it being considered sufficient to note IE merely the lack of any State plan.

7[

e

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?.-_

C'l kW

provide an adequate response for even "the worst possible accident, regardless of its extremely low likelihood." NUREG 0654,Section I.D. at 7. This includes a loss of offsite power, which would not be unlikely in conjunction with a severe accident at Shoreham. The LILCO Plan, however, contains no measures for dealing with such a circumstance, and thus does not provide for the protection of the public health and safety, for the reasons set forth in contentions 93-96 below.

Contention 93. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(8) requires the emergency response organization to establish " adequate facilities" to maintain the emergency response. See also NUREG 0654,Section II.H. The LILCO Plan fails to satisfy this re-quirement by failing to allow for the possibility of a loss of offsite power. Specifically:

A. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that the EOC has a backup power supply nor does it provide for the management of the emergency response from another location. In the event of a loss of offsite power the EOC would become inoperable and LERO would become unable to implement an emergency response.

B. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that backup power supplies have been established for staging areas, bus transfer points, receiving hospitals, or relocation centers. In the event of a losa of offsite power, these facilities would become inoperable.

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Contention 94. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) and NUREG 0654,Section II.E.2 require that emergency plans provide for the prompt notification of response personnel. See also 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E, Sections 4C and D. Notification channels must remain open on a 24-hour basis. NUREG 0654, Sections II.F.1.a. The LILCO Plan violates this requirement by not al-lowing for the possibility of a loss of offsite power. Specif-ically:

A. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that the LILCO Cus-tomer Service Office has a backup power supply. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the LILCO Customer Service Office will become inoperable. Thus, the SNPS Contol Room will be un-able to notify LERO and initiate the emergency response process. See LILCO Plan at Section 3.3.

B. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that the EOC has a backup power supply. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the EOC will become inoperable, and LERO will be unable to no-tify emergency personnel in the field.

Contention 95. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) requires every emergency plan to provide for early notification and clear instruction to those within the plume EPZ. These requirements are distinct: the public must be given an early alert signal and a follow-up instructional message. See NUREG 0654,

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Appendix 3, Section B(2)(a). The LILCO Plan violates these requirements by failing to take account of the possibility of a loss of offsite power. Specifically:

Contention 95.A. LILCO relies on a system of sirens for providing an immediate alert to the public. See LILCO Plan at 3.3-4; OPIP 3.3.4. However, the LILCO Plan does not indicate that the sirens have a backup power supply. Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, the sirenc will not function.

Contention 95.B. Withdrawn. LILCO relies on the trans-mission of emergency broadcast messages by radio station WALK as the " primary direct communications link to the public after activation of the sirens." LILCO Plan at 3.3-6. But the LILCO Plan does not indicate that WALK has a backup power supply.

Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, WALK would cease transmissions. The LILCO Plan suggests that there is a

" backup" system involving CBS radio in New York City. See LILCO Plan at 3.3-7. But this system evidently depends on the transmission capabilities of Long Island radio stations which, like WALK, will become inoperable in the event of a loss of offsite power.

Contention 95.C. Withdrawn. The LILCO Plan does not in-dicate that radio station WALK has a backup power supply, or

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that any other broadcasting facility has the capability to transmit the emergency broadcast signal used to activate the tone alert radios which will allegedly be provided to hundreds of facilities within the plume EPZ. See LILCO Plan at 3.3 pp.

6-7. In the event of a loss of offsite power, WALK would cease transmissions and would be unable to activate the tone alert radios.

Contention 95.D. LILCO relies on tone alert radios to provide the extra evacuation time required by large facilities such as factories and schools. See LILCO Plan at 3.3-4,5. The tone alert radios will evidently operate on AC power rather than on batteries. Therefore, in the event of a lots of offsite power, the tone alert radios would not function.

Contention 95.E. Emergency plans must provide formal means for dissemination of information to the public through the news media. See NUREG 0654,Section II.G.3 and 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(7). LILCO relies on the establishment of an Emergency News Center to satisfy this requirement. See OPIP 3.8.1. However, the LILCO Plan does not indicate that the Emergency News Center has a backup power supply or that a back-up news facility has been established. Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, the Emergency News Center will be-come inoperable and LILCO's public notification duties will not be satisfied.

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Contention 96. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) requires each emergency plan to provide for protective actions which protect the public health and safety in the event of an accident.

NUREG 0654,Section II.J.9 requires a demonstration that the protective actions within a plan are capable of being imple-mented. The LILCO Plan does not satisfy these requirements be-cause it fails to take account of the possibility of a losc of offsite power. Specifically:

Contention 96.A. Assuning that an evacuation of the plume EPZ were determined to be the appropriate protective action, the LILCO Plan relies heavily on the services of private firms such as ambulance services, LILCO Plan at 3.7-1, and bus companies, OPIP 3.6.4. et-27-end-lumhee-eempansee7-Appendix-A at-IV-186v However, in the event of a loss of offsite power these firms and facilities would become inoperable and close.

LERO would thus become unable to utilize those services.

Contention 96.B. Assuming that an evacuation of the plume EPZ were determined to be the appropriate protective action, LERO would be responsible for evacuating scores of hospitals, nursing homes, and facilities for the handicapp2d. However, the LILCO Plan does not indicate that these facilities have backup power supplies. In the event of a loss of offsite power, evacuation of these facilities would be either 204 -

l.

impossible or far more difficult and time-consuming than indicated in the LILCO Plan.

Without functioning elevators, non-ambulatory persons could be moved only with extreme difficulty, if at all. With-out lighting, nighttime evacuation of these facilities would be all but impossible. Without functioning medical equipment, management would attempt some form of limited evacuation on its own. In any case, this potential circumstance is not taken into account in the LIICO Plan.

Contention 96.C. Assuming that evacuation of the plume EPZ were determined to be the appropriate protective action, the successful implementation of such an action would depend on the functioning of systems and facilities that would in fact be inoperable in the absence of offsite power. These include:

residential lighting, public streetlights, traffic signals, and service stations. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that any of these facilities and systems have backup power supplies.

Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, the Plan would not provide for the protection of the public health and safety.

SOC Contention 97: Bad Weather SOC Contention 97. The LILCO Plan is inadequate because it fails to take account of the possibility that a severe

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accident at Shoreham might occur in tandem with severe adverse weather, i.e., heavy snow. This deficiency violates the appli-cable standards in several respects.

C; tention 97.A. [Not admitted by ALSB] Prompt notifica-tion of the public is mandated by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b;'6) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.6 and II.J.10. The means specified by the LILCO Plan for immediate public notification are the siren system and, as a backup, route alerting. In the event of a heavy snowfall, however, neither of these means will work. Heavy snow may damage commercial telephone lines and prevent communications, via pagers, with those LERO personnel responsible for activating the siren and emergency broadcast systems. Even if these persons were contacted, they would be unable to travel to the EOC, and from there to initiate the siren and emergency broadcast systems. Moreover, during a heavy snowfall, the route alerting system would not constitute a reliable backup to the siren system because route alert driv-ers would not receive notification of the emergency (due to the inoperability of the EOC), would not be able to reach the staging areas (because of impassable roads), or (for the same reason) would not be able to travel from the staging areas along the designated alert rottes.

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l l

Contention 97.B. Pursuant to 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) the LILCO Plan must designate a range of protective actions appropriate to a variety of circumstances. See also NUREG 0654,Section II.J.9. This includes unfavorable weather. Yet the LILCO Plan's procedures for evacuation completely disregard the possibility of the existence of deep snow. SOC contends that the evacuation procedures outlined in the LILCO Plan would not work during a heavy snowfall, for the following reasons:

1. Key LERO personnel would be unable to travel to the EOC, as required by the LILCO Plan at 3.3;

2. Neither traffic guides, road crews, evacuation route spotters, ambulance drivers nor staging area coordinators would be able to travel to the staging areas, as required by OPIP 3.3.3 at-2 and 3.6.3 at-57-6;

3. Even if the persons listed in (2) above were to reach the staging areas, they would be unabla to travel to their assigned posts / routes, as required by OPIP 3.6.3;

4. Bus drivers and shuttle operators would be un-able to travel to staging areas, as required by OPIP 3.6.4 at-4 and, in any case, would be unable to complete their assigned trips;

5. Relocation center staff would be unable to travel to the relocation centers; and

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6.  !! ambers of the public would be unable to evacu-ate their homes or places of work.

Dated: January 12, 1984 Washington, D.C.

b

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