ML20079H606

Procedures Generation Package for Seabrook Station

ML20079H606
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	01/17/1984
From:	PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:
Shared Package
ML20079H582	List: ML20079H579 ML20079H606 ML20079H653
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 PROC-840117, NUDOCS 8401230500
Download: ML20079H606 (27)

Text

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PROCEDURES GENERATION PACKAGE FOR SEABROOK STATION 8401230500 840117 PDR ADOCK 05000443 PDR F

Table of Contents r

Section Page i

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1. _ Introduction ..................................................... 1 l 1.1 Purpose 1.2 Scope 1.3 Organisation

2. Plant-Specific Technical Guidelines .............................. 2

3. Writers Guide for EOPs ........................................... 3

, 3.1 General 3.2 Document Description

4. Users Guide ...................................................... 4

5. E0P Verification ................................................. 5

6. EO P Va li d a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

7. Training .......................................................... 7 4

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1.- Introduction 1.1 Purpose The purpose of this Procedures Generation Package (PGP) is to describe the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) development at Seabrook Station. Seabrook Station is a Westinghouse pressurized water reactor.

1.2 Scope This document was developed in response to Supplement 1 of NUREG-0737, Item 7.2(b).

1.3 Organization This document consists of the following parts:

• Plant-Specific Technical Guidelines

• Writers Guide for E0Ps

• Users Guide

• EOP Verifica. tion

• EOP Validation Program

• EOP Training Program i

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2. Plant-Specific' Technical Guidelines The Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS), Revision 1, were based on a " REFERENCE" plant design. To correct the ERGS to Seabrook-specific guidelines, differences between the REFERENCE plant and Seabrook Station were identified. The combination of the ERGS (generic guidelines) and the Seabrook Station / REFERENCE plant comparison satisfies the requirement for plant-specific technical guidelines.

Appendix F of Exhibit A contains the Seabrook Plant Description developed by comparing the Seabrook design to the REFERENCE plant systems description. Appendix F highlights the differences between Seabrook Station and the REFERENCE plant and was used to tailor the ERGS to Seabrook-specific E0Ps.

3. Writers Guide for E0Ps 3.1 General A Writers Guide for E0Ps is a plant-specific document that provides instructions on writing EOPs, using good writing principles. In addition to establishing sound writing principles, the guide helps to promote consistency among all E0Ps and their revisions, independent of the number of E0T 'ters.

The tab iabeled " Writers Guide' in Exhibit B describes the writers guide for the Emergency Response Procedures (ERPs) for Seabrook Station that were used in the Westinghouse Owners Group ERG Validation Program. As a result of lessons learned during the Validation Program, a revised writers guide was generated. This revised guide is contained in the tab labeled "Seabrook Writers Guide". The Seabrook Writers Guide will be revised, as necessary, based on feedback from operator training and experience.

3.2 Document Description Information on the following major items is included in the writers guide:

• Purpose and Scope

• ERP Designation and Numbering

• ERP Format

• Writing the Procedure

• Status Tree Format

• Mechanics of Style

• Printed Format

• Reproduction

4. Users Guide The Users Guide is a document which provides information on how to use the ERGS. The ERGS developed by the Westinghouse Owners Group contain the technical basis for the development of plant-specific EOPs. The two-column format used to present the ERGS contains implicit rules of usage which supplement the technical instructions. The Critical Safety Function Status Trees have their own format and rules of usage.

Priorities have been established between the Optional Recovery Guidelines (ORGs) and Functional Restoration Guidelines (FRGs) which are intended to direct operator action .to the most urgent operational or safety conditions. The background documents, which are presented separately from the guidelines, contain additional detail about each operator action step (and guidelines in general) which may affect the way the actual plant E0Ps are written or presented in training.

Each of these aspects of using the ERGS is presented in the Users Guide. The tab in Exhibit B labeled " Users Guide" contains this document. The Users Guide has been revised as indicated in the tab labeled "Seabrook Users Guide" as a result of tne lessons learned from the Validation Program.

. 5. E0P Verification EUP Verification is defined as the comparative evaluation between the final EOPs and their source documents. Detailed guidance for performing this evaluation is presented in the following documents:

1. DRAFT - Component Verification and System Validation Guideline, May 9,1983 (NUTAC) .

2. Emergency Operating Procedures Verification Guideline, INPO-83-004, March, 1983 Details of the E0P Verification process for Seabrook Station are contained in Section 3.1 of Exhibit A.

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6. EOP' Validation EOP Validation is the evaluation performed to determine that the actions i specified in the procedure can be performed by the operator to manage the emergency conditions effectively. The Seabrook Station Emergency Response Procedures (ERPs) were validated as part of the Wc tinghouse i Owners Group ERG Validation Program which was conducted at the site-specific Seabrook simulator the week of October 31, 1983.

A complete description of the Westinghouse Owners Group ERG Validstion

-Program is provided as Exhibit A. A preliminary report of the initial evaluation of the validation effort is provided as Exhibit C. The lessons learned from the validation effort have already resulted in a revised Writers Guide and Users Guide as discussed in Sections 3 and 4 of this package. Further revisions to both documents, as well as to the ERPs, may be necessary when the final report on the Validation Program f becomes available.

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7. Training Operators participating in the Validation Program underwent a comprehensive training program in the use of ERGS and Emergency Response Procedures (ERPs ) . The training program included both classroom and simulator instruction. The training program is fully described in Section 3.1 of Exhibit A and in the tab labeled '*Iraining" in Exhibit B. Also in Exhibit B is a tab labeled "TRN Comments" which summarizes recommendations made by participants in the training program to improve the provided training.

All participants in the licensed training program will receive training in the use of ERPs similar to that provided to the participants in the Validation Program. The licensed training program will utilize the same training materials and consist of bcth a classroom and a simulator phase.

Training on ERPs will also be included as a part of the requalification program.

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EXHIBIT C l

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EOG-83-294 l

I Water Reactor Nut:ev Tecnnc!cgy Omsen Westinghouse Electric Corporation Divisions g Pms:urgnPennsyIvan;a 15230 December 15, 1983 TO: Westinghouse Owners Group Representatives Westinghouse Owners Group Procedures Subccmmittee Plant Site Procedures Contacts -

WESTINGHCU':E OWNERS GROUP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES VALIDATION PROGRAM PRELIMINARY REPORT This letter presents a summary and an initial evaluation of the Emergency Response Guidelines Validation Test performed on the Seabrook Station training simulatcr during the week of October 31 to November 4, 1983.

The validation effort was authorized by the WCG in May, 1983 to demonstrate the effectivenss of the new, Revision 1 ERGS in responding to plant emergencies. At that time, ccmpletion of Revision 1 appeared imminent, so that scheduling of the test in Octeter was appropriate. Two possible sites of the test were considered: the Westinghouse SNUPPS II simulator near Pittsburgh, and the Seabrcok simulatcr at the plant site in Seabrock N,H. The latter was chosen based on consideration of relative program costs and available support.

The primary objectives defined in the original project authcrization were:

1. Tc validate Revision 1 of the ERGS (this was later clarified to mean validation as defined and described in INP0 documentation).

2. To evaluate the effectiveness of changes made to the BASIC ERGS in respense to the original validation program findings.

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3. To document the results of the validation in a manner to support maximum usage by individual utilities as described by the INPC ECPIA

" Reference" method of validation.

The objectives required the formaticn of a multi-disciplinary planning effort involving Westinghouse, the WCG Precedures Subcccmittee, and Seabrook. This effort culminated in a comprehensive Program Plan s.ich was transmitted to the WOG by letter WCG-83-267 (October 31, 1983). In that letter, a final repcrt en the test results was planned fcr February, 19E4; hcuever recent adjustments in schedules by the Prccedures Subccmmittee have moved the target date for a ,

final report into the April-May 1984 time frame.

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The actual test was preceded by one week of intensive training for the operating crews on the structure and usage of the ERGS. In fact, all training and testing was based on a set of Seabrook-specific E0Ps generated by Seabrook Operations personnel. These E0Ps were updated as last minute revisions were made~in the final review stages of Rev. 1. The similarity between the test E0Ps and the reference Rev. 1 ERGS in content, structure and format enable conclusions from the test observations to be applicable, generically, to the Rev. 1 ERG set.

Training was broken into classroom and simulator sessions; typically the ECP introduction and usage was presented in the classroom, and then actual hands-on practice took place on the simulator. A fairly detailed outline and set of lesson plans, including class handout material and a final quiz, were developed to support this training effort.

The actual testing was performed exactly as described in the detailed Program Plan. An average of six assigned observers tracked each test scenario as it was being run, noting any operational problems, confusion, hesitation, or resistance to E0P usage on the part of the operators. All cor. trol room operations were recorded on video tape using two cameras in a split-screen format which effectively covered the entire control board. All plant responses to operator action were recorded on magentic computer tape using a special program developed by Seabrook simulator support personnel.

Following each test scenario, the operating crew and observation team proceeded to a dedicated debriefing room to discuss that scenario. All recorded observations were clarified and a standard set of questions on procedure usage was asked. A videotape player was available in the rocm to replay the test scenario if necessary for clarification of any observation.

In addition to the written summaries from observation team members, this entire session was recorded on a cassette tape. As in the first validation test program at Callaway, the operator comments during these debriefing sessions were the most direct and valuable feedback on ERG effectiveness and useability.

In order to provide further details on the actual Validation test and to preview some of the final report contents, the following attachments are prosided:

Attachment 1 is a listing of the test scenarios as they were actually performed during the test week. On any particular day, a variety of transients was pre-selected and randomly scheduled. Similarly, each day the composition of the observation teams was randemly shuffled.

Attachment 2 is a separate listing of the test scenarios, including a brief description of the actual test run and any interesting observations nade.

Attachment 3 is a sampling of comments directly from the operatcrs in different debriefing sessions. These ccaments have been grouped into different categories to demonstrate the range of information obtained just from this feedback.

Attachment 4 is a proposed cutline for the Validation Program Final Report.

It will incorporate much of the information found in the Program Plan and present ccmprehensive documentation of a11' test results.

Attachment 5 providos a request sheet of several items developed for this Validation Test Program which may te of interest or use to individual WOG members, both for ECP writing and training. Copies of the actual test ECPs and the E0P training program / lesson plans / handouts, are available upon request at no cost. Copies of the video tapes or magnetic data tapes frcm the test will be made available - at cost. If a special format for the magnetic tape data is desired, that request is understood to involve time and cost, but can also be accommodated. All requests for Validation Test materials should be made by indicating the desired materials on the request sheet and returning it to Bruce King, WOG Project Manager.

Whfie the detailed compilation of all observations and ccceents is not yet complete, several summary conclusions can be made based on general agreement among all participants:

1. ERG Rev.1 guidelines are effective in mitigating a t, road range of cceplex plant transients.

2. The guidelines are not difficult to use in spite of the apparent size and cceplexity. -

3. The internal consistency of the guidelines, achieved through extensive review by the Procedures Subcommittee, facilitated useability and acted to

correct operator errors.

4. Based on a brief review of operator comments, Rev. I represents a major improvement over the BASIC version of the ERGS, as tested a year ago at Callaway. No major problem in E0P implementation was encountered in any of the thirty-five test scenarios ccmprising the test week.

5. The use of cceputer-based CRT-displayed Status Tree monitoring, as implemented on the Seabrook simulator, was found to be extremely effective and accurate.

4 If you have any questions concerning the Revisicn i Validation Program or the material provided herein, please contact Charlie 14 eyer, (412)374-5162, or Bruce King (412)256-7666.

Very truly yours, Roger Newton, Chairman WOG Procedures Subconnittee

! Attachments: 1) Test Scenario Summary (order of performance)

2) Test Scenario Summary

3) Operater Comments from Debriefing Sessions

4) Validation Program Final Report (proposed outline)

5) Program fiaterial Request Sheet i

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ATTACH!'ENT 1 ERG-Revision i Validation Program Test Scenario Summary (Order of Performance) i Friday, October 28, 1983 7 Small LOCA plus subsequent SGTR 17: Secondary break in 3 SGs plus SGTR fionday, October 31, 1983 1 Loss of offsite power, reactor trip, natural circulation cooldown 19 _SGTR plus cooldown using backfill 11 Secondary break - all fSIV's fail to close 8 Small LOCA, no ERJ 20 SGTR's in different SGs (sutsequent) 27 ATWS from full power 29 Lcss of all feedwater, offsite power lost 15 Secondary break inside containment, plus LOCA Tuesday, November 1, 1983 16 Secondary break plus SGTR in faulted SG 12 Secondary break plus subsequent secondary break 26 Loss of all ac power plus SGTR during recovery

. 6 ICC 14 Secondary break, itSIV failure, plus SGTR 31 LOCA while on RHR 30 Spurious SI at low pressure and temperature 35 Reactor trip Uecnesday, November 2, 1983 34 SGTR plus ccc!down using backfill 23 SG tube leak plus spurious SI 21 SGTR plus secondary break in non-ruptured SG 28 Loss of all feedwater, offsite power available 33 DBA LOCA with switchover 36 Loss of EFW (no SI) 10 Secondary break outside containment Thursday, November 3, 1983 (no SPDS) 9 Small LOCA, no HHSI, return-to-critical 22 SGTR, no HHSI, return-to-critical 4 Intermediate size LOCA, post-LOCA cooldown 38 LOCA outside containment 5 DBA LOCA, no RHR pumps 32 SGTR on RHR 24 SGTR plus loss of EFW 0571e:1d/121383

ATTACH!!EtiT 1 (Con't)

Friday, November 4, 1983 37 LOCA, no HHSI 39 tion-isolable LOCA outside containment 40 SGTR without PRZR pressure control 0571e:1d/121383

. l ATTACHl:ENT 2 ERG-Revision 1 Validation Program Scenario Summary Scenario Scenario Number Name Comments 1/1A Loss of offsite power - reactor Simulator problem resulted in SI trip followed by natural actuation. Also excessive circulation cooldown cooldown due to EFU. E0P diffi-culties with negative wording.

2 Spurious SI NOT DONE 3/3A Small LOCA - post LOCA cooldown NOT DONE 4/4A Intermediate LOCA - post LOCA Did not use adverse containment cooldown values. Most ECPs in one scenario (8). Problems in SI termination (criteria) and reinitiating SI.

Overall good usage.

5 DBA LOCA - no RHR pumps Identified potential conflict between ECA-1.1 and FR-P.1. Also not clear what to do with contain-ment spray pumps. Transition (s) to ECA-1.1 not clear enough.

(Also some simulator problems.)

6 Inadequate core cooling (ICC) Good use of procedures.

Interesting comments on steps catching prior operator errors.

Certain steps did not seem appropriate in this scenario.

7 Small LOCA plus subsequent SGTR Complicated procedure usage, but

. correct. Good comments on foldout.

Some confusion on wording. (CRESS REHEARSAL) 8 Small LOCA - no EFW Some difficulty with procedure usage.

i Users guide and format questions.

Not happy about being caught in FR-H.1 until feed can be established.

Need switchover CAUTION. Simulator -

problems.

9 Small LOCA, no HHSI - return to Conflict between allowed ORG.EFU flow critical and status tree requirement. EFW conflict in FR-S.I. Good recovery.

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ATTACHMENT 2 (Con't)

Scenario Scenario Number Name Comnents 10 Secondary break outside OK procedure usage. Problem with containment definiticn " uncontrolled".

11 Secondary break - all MSIVs Several procedure interaction fail to close deviations recorded. Missed some status tree transitions.

12 Secondary break plus subsequent Good comments on foldout page.

secondary break Problems with double-negative construction in steps.

13 Secondary break - MSIV failure NOT DONE plus LCCA 14 Secondary break - MSIV failure Conflicts between ECA-2.1, ECA-3.1.

plus SGTR Confusion about the work "feedlines" (ECA-2.1). Some internal conflicts in ECA-2.1 wording.

15 Secondary break inside containment Unexpected execution due to plus LOCA equilibrium model in SG (simulator problens).

16 Secondary break plus SCTR in Very good procedure usage. Unable faulted SG to use adverse containment numbers.

-17 Secondary breaks in 3 SCs plus Some trouble with procedure SCTr numbering, step wording, especially negative sense. Apparently some simulator problems too. (DRESS REHEARSAL) 18 Secondary breaks in 2 SGs plus NOT DONE~-

SGTR (one intact SG) 19/19A SGTR plus cooldown using backfill Interesting ccaments on foldout page.

Simulator problems caused interesting deviations.

20 SGTRs in different SGs Uncertainty atout looping (ECA-3.1)

(subsequent) Need SGTR isolation on E-3 foidout, no good way to do it in ECA-3.1.

21 SGTR plus secondary break in Procedure usage not clean. Some non-ruptured SG confusion in step execution.

0571e:1d/121383 t

ATTACHMENT 2-(Con't)

Scenario Scenario Number Name Comments 12 2 SGTR - Loss of HHSI - Return- EFW requirement in FR-S.1 (for to-critical ATWS) conflicts with need to stop cooldown. Some incorrect procedure usage without SI. Probiern with definitions of "(un) controlled" and " maximum rate".

23 SG Tube leak plus spurious SI Good procedure usage. Difficulty in E-3 steps with multiple options /

conditions. Nothing in ECA-3.1 to stop leak.

24 SGTR plus loss of EFU No entry into FR-H.1 due to high level in ruptured SG. No guidance on feeding in ECA-3.1 or ECA-3.2.

25 SGTR plus secondary overpressure NOT DONE 26/26A Loss of all ac power plus recovery Fairly good usage of procedures.

with SGTR Missing some plant-specific inputs; some confusion due to control power vs. instrument power.

27 ATWS from full power Recovery complicated by SG dryout (due to MFW pump trip). SI actuation not anticipated, tut occurred on PRZR safety valve operation.

28 Loss of all feedwater Inadvertent SI, but proper recovery from bleed and feed. Good status tree usage and FRG implementation.

29 Loss of all feedwater offsite Inadvertent SI. Good procedure power lost usage. Interesting findings on plant-specific FR-H.1.

30 Spurious SI at low pressure SI successfully terminated.

(1000 psi, 350 F) Anomalous RCS pressure decrease caused early termination of scenario.

31 LOCA while on RHR Entry conditions and applicability of steps are not clear. Significant operator judgement required.

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s ATTACHMENT 2 (Con't)

Scenario Scenario Number Name Comments 32 SGTR while on RHR Never needed SI. Applied the intent of E-3 without entering ERGS.

33 DBA LOCA with switchover Unexpected problem with SG depressurization due to reverse heat transfer in affected loop.

Caused transitions to E-2.

34 SGTR plus cooldown Very suc'_essful SGTR response and recovery. Unable to reset Phase A (switch problem). Good example of subsequent checks cffsetting operator errors.

35 Reactor trip Very clean trip response.

36 Loss of EFW Identified some problems with plant-specific wording (no SI).

37 LOCA without HHSI pumps Normal post-LOCA cooldown rate not fast enough to beat ICC symptoms. Further guidance would be helpful. Good use of Post-LOCA.

38 LOCA outside containment Good procedure usage. Some confusion over value sequence process and valve identification.

39 Non-isolable LOCA outside Experienced difficulty in determining containment if LOCA isolated or not (ECA-1.2)

Criteria can be improved. Excessive delay in getting to Loss of ECR (ECA-1.1).

40 SGTR without PRZR pressure control Procedure not covered in training, but correct usage anyway. Undue concern with PRZR level.

0571e:ld/121383

ATTACH!iENT 3 ,

Operator Comments From-Debriefing Sessions Comments related to wording, structure, and level'of detail. Most of

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these can probably be adequately addressed in plant-specific E0P writing and training:

Did not like statements worded in the negative sense (not faulted, not ruptured)

Did not like " uncontrolled manner" Red path summary on foldout page is not necesary; foldout page to

" wordy".

" Operate SI pumps as necessary" needs to be clarified flay need a note to monitor foldout page Some cautions appear to be buried in procedures and can easily be missed.

Certain plots were difficult to read; need better resolution on scales.

Numbering system is confusing; there is ES-3.1 and ECA-3.1.

Step wordings with triple options hard to follow (e.g., E-3).

The word ' evaluate" was not clear in E-1, Step 30.

Procedures do not mention that certain control toard indications will be lost when ALL ac power is lost.

Certain valves required to be stroked in the E0P needed pcuer restored; this was not mentiened in the step (ECA-1.2, Step 2) 0571e:1d/121383

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2. Comments relating to technical details on technical presentation in the ERGS. In some cases, these comments resulted from actual difficulty in using the procedures; in other cases, a potential problem was raised for discussion. These comments will require more detailed review by the Procedures Subcommittee, and could potentially result in modifications to individual guidelines. Another possible resolution for specific cases might be a " letter of instruction", stating specific concerns and recommended treatment in the plant-specific ECP writing process:

No transition to " Loss of ECR" (ECA-1.1) on loss of both RHR pumps Conflict between FR-P.1 (stop SI flow) and ECA-1.1 (add SI flow) i Conflict in FR-S.1 between need for maximum EFW flow (ATUS) and stopping cooldown (reactivity).

Conflict between ECA-2.1 (reduce EFW to 25 GPif/SG) and ECA-3.1, E-2 (isolate ruptured SG). ECA-3.1 is the preferred procedure for all SGs faulted plus one ruptured.

No provision for isolating a second rutpured SG once in ECA-3.1.

FR-S.1 only stops " uncontrolled cooldown," does not mention cor, trolled cooldown (reactivity addition).

FR-H.1 is the only procedure which allows feeding SGs with condensate pumps; but need to have low level on status tree to get to FR-H.1.

11ay need this capability at other times.

- Possible interactions between PORY instructions and Cold Overpressure 4 System functions.

Some steps / actions requir,e transition before stating condition (see foldout pages which state "go to" before giving criteria).

0571e:1d/121383

The " loop" in FR-H.1 (Steps 17 and 18) is confusing; required continued attempts to restore feedwater while on bleed and feed. What about other possible actions?

For incidents initiating while on RHR, certain considerations arc absent; fiPSH fcr RCPs, entry conditions to E-0, cooldown nechanisms, etc.

Cooldown rate in FR-C.2 should be increased until some low temperature is reached and then limited to 100*F/ hour (consistent with F-0.4, INTEGRITY status tree).

FR-Z.1 should have some concluding NOTE about future use of containment spray.

ECA-1.2, LOCA OUTSICE CCNTAlfif'ENT. The listing of valves to be sequentially closed and opened should be very detailed. Time for each cycle su;gested. A better/ additional symptom for flow being isolated is needed. /.fter break is isolated, RHR pump in that train should be stopped.

3. General ccaments on procedure usage and operator response:

"flaximum rate" for a cooldown can be achieved by a ccabination of condenser and atmospheric steam dumps.

Subsequent steps, NOTES, serve to catch operator errors.

Computer based SPDS is fast, clearly presented to operators; what about bid data? Manual SPDS is slow, misses changing conditions; but -

uses same methods as normal control room observations.

Rediaonosis was used several times; seen to be a positive feature.

Operator wanted more detail.

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1 During SI termination check in most cases PRZR 1evel was already recovered. Use of normal spray to recover level would be sufficient; PORY not necessary.

0571e:1d/121383

ATTACHi:ENT 4 Emergency Response Guidelines Validation Program Final Report (Proposed outline)

Introduction Objectives Validation Program Scope 11ethod Criteria ECP Writing Test Scenarios Simulator Capability Data Collection Observation Teams Test Crews Training Test Process Conclusion and Reconmendations from the Validation Test Program

' Technical Aspects Human Factors Aspects System Aspects Critical Safety Function Status Trees Training Application to Plant Specific Vaiidation Surnary References Appendices:

A. Definitions B. NUREG-0737, I.C.1 and Supplement 1 C. Acceptance Criteria D. Run Sheets E. E0Ps/ ERGS F. Lesson Plan G. Test Scenario Summaries H. Summary of Test Observations and Comments / Recommendations 0571e:1d/121383

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ATTACHMENT 5 Validation Program Material Request Sheet Bruce King WOG Project Manager Bay 203 R&D 701 Box-2728 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Please provide the materials indicated below:

ITEM NUMBER DESIRED Validation test E0Ps Validation Test E0P Training Package Video Tapes (Specify scenario numbers, tape format)

Magnetic Computer Tapes

-(Specify scenario numbers, tape format)

Send to: Phone:

Address:

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R ECFI vthj /UTC C9&L Carofma Power & Light Company none v M p~: .- ~ . . ,,A' WOG-83-283 November 22, 1983 Mr. George S. Thomas Vice President, Nuclear Production Public Service of New Hampshire 1000 Elm Street -

P. O. Box 330 Manchester, NH 03105

Dear Mr. Thomas:

On behalf of the Westinghouse Owners Group and Westinghouse Electric Corporation, we would like to thank you and your staff for the outstanding contribution made by Public Service of New Hampshire to the

< validation of the WOG Emergency Response Guidelines - Revision 1. The validation training and testing exercises held at the Seabrook site will undoubtably become the industry standard for excellence in the future.

The oui. standing success of the program is largely 'due to the excellent performance of the Seabrook personnel involved:

o Larry Walsh, Operations Manager arid Phil Swanson, Training Center Manager, for their outstanding cooperation and support.

o The operations personnel who generated a complete set of Seabrook-specific E0Ps without the benefit of detailed background information.

o The operating crews who performed admirably with only one week of prior training on the E0Ps.

o The simulator instructors who operated the systen, and the simulator support engineers, who made necessary software changes and additions on very short notice.

411 Faye:tene Street + P O Bos 155:

• Ra e ;9 N C 27632

WDG-83-283 Mr. George S. Thomas November 22, 1983 And certainly, the excellent simulator and other training facilities at the Seabrook site also played a major role in the program success.

Please forward our thanks for a job well done to all the Public Service of New Hampshire employees who participated.

Very truly yours, 2

J. J. Sheppard, Chairman Westinghouse Owners Grou'p 1

M Bruce King, Manager Westinghvuse Owners Group

/pab cc: WOG Representatives i

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OG-108 October 31, 1983 l

Mr. Dennis Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Dear Mr. Crutchfield-Westinghouse Owners Group I Emergency Response Guidelines, Rev. 1 Validation Program One of the majcr undertakings of the Westinghouse Owners Group has been the development of a comprehensive set of Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS) to respond to the requirements set forth initially in NUREG-0737, Item I.C.l. The ERGS contain both optimal recovery and function restoration strategies presented in a human-factored two-column format.

Both types of strategies are symptom-based. The Optimal Recovery Guidelines (0RGs) provide optimal strategies for recovering the plant based on plant parameter responses and the Function Restoration Guidelines (FRGs) respond to challenges to the integrity of the physical barriers against radiation release. ,

The BASIC version of the ERGS was issued substantially in September, 1981, for the reference High Pressure (HP) plant. Subsequently, additional guidelines were added to the set, until it reached its final form in mid-1982. In that same time frame, an analagous set of ERGS was developed for the reference Low Pressure (LP) plant. In June, 1982, the BASIC version of the HP-ERGS was subjected to a thorough validation test at the Union Electric Company Callaway training simulator.

As a result of that validation, a great deal was learned about the new ERG format and strategies. To incorporate the findings of that first validation test, and also a number of other utility, NRC and Westinghouse recomendations, the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) authorized the development of Revision 1 to the ERGS. Printed versions of the Revision 1 ERGS will be issued shortly, with their respective " Configuration Control and Approval" sheets certifying WOG and Westinghouse approval.

Vi3lH50aW' 411 Fayettevole Street

• P O Sox 1551

• Aaleign. N. O. 27602

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OG-108 Mr. Dennis Crutchfield October 31, 1983 In March, 1983, the WOG authorized a comprehensive validation test of the Revision 1 ERGS. The validation test has since been carefully planned, taking full advantage of the experience gained in the BASIC validation program and also the currently available INPO guidance on E0P validation. The test will take place at the Public Service of New Hampshire Seabrook training simulator during the week of October 31 to November 4, 1983.

Attached for your information is a copy of the Program Plan for the

> Revision 1 Validation Program. Following the test, a detailed review of all the test data will be performed, resulting in a Revision i Validation Program Final Report in early 1984. A copy of this report will be sent to the NRC following distribution to WOG utility members. The major objectives of this program are to demonstrate the useability and operational correctness of the ERGS, and to provide generic documentation which can be referenced by utilities in their plant specific E0P validation programs.

Your interest in our validation program is appraciated. If further information is desired, please contact Roger Newton (414-277-2002),

Chairman, WOG Procedures Subcosmiittee.

Sincerely, l )

. ~/ / = 4 J. J. Sheppard, Chairman Westinghouse Owners Group

/pab Attachments cc: Mr. Hugh L. Thompson, Jr.

i Director, Division of Human Factors safety f

0022c:12