ML043280467

Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Plant Request for Amendment to Provide a one-time Integrated Leak Rate Test Interval Extension

ML043280467
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	11/10/2004
From:	Balduzzi M Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
2.04.110, TAC MC2706
Download: ML043280467 (21)

Text

v-Entergy Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360 Michael A. Balduzzi November 10, 2004 Site Vice President U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Pilgrim Request for amendment to provide a one-time integrated leak rate test interval extension (TAC NO. MC2706)

REFERENCE:

1. Entergy Letter No. 2.04.027, Request for amendment to the Technical Specifications to provide a one-time integrated leak rate test interval extension, dated April 14, 2004.

LETTER NUMBER: 2.04.110

Dear Sir or Madam:

Attachment 1 to this letter provides Pilgrim response to the NRC Request for Additional Information in support of Pilgrim's request contained in Reference 1.

There are no commitments contained in this letter.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Bryan Ford, Licensing Manager, at (508) 830-8403.

I deqlare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the

/V day of November 2004.

Sincerely, Michael Bald ES/dm Attachment 1: Pilgrim Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (10 pages)

Attachment 2: Table 3, Pilgrim IWE Containment First Interval Inspections and Findings To Date (9 pages) 2.04.110 D47

l1 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Letter Number: 2.04.110 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Page 2 cc: Mr. Robert Fretz, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Region 1 Mail Stop: 0-8B-1 475 Allendale Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission King of Prussia, PA 19406 1 White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Senior Resident Inspector Rockville, MD 20852 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 2.04.110

ATTACHMENT 1 Pilgrim Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Request for Amendment to the Technical Specifications to Provide a One-time Integrated Leak Rate Test Interval Extension NRC QUESTION NO. 1 In the last paragraph of page 7 of reference 1, Entergy stated that augmented examinations documented corrosion in the drywell-to-torus main vent low points, which were below minimum wall thickness but were found acceptable by evaluation.

a. Describe the basis for Entergy's determination that the below minimum wall thickness is acceptable. The following information is needed: location and size of the areas in question, their nominal design thickness and the actual measured thickness.

b. Discuss the potential impact of the proposed one-time ILRT interval extension upon Entergy's continued ability to timely identify and evaluate containment degradation to reasonably assure the leak-tightness and structural integrity of Pilgrim's containment.

PILGRIM RESPONSE

a. Prior to inspecting the containment structure, calculations were performed to determine minimum acceptable thickness for general area and localized areas. The statement in reference 1 was with respect to general area thickness. Inspection of the drywell to torus vent line low point bowl regions identified areas of localized pitting. The individual pits were sized and compared to both general area and local area minimum wall thickness requirements. The results of this comparison are shown on Table 1 where t vent is the measured wall thickness in the general area of the pit, t loca is the local area wall thickness at the location of the pit, t min area is the minimum allowable thickness for the entire vent pipe system, and t min local is the calculated minimum allowable thickness at the pit and accounts for pit size and depth. In some cases t local is slightly less than t minawea, but in all cases t local is greater than t min local. The nominal design wall thickness in the bowl region is 0.25 inches for the vent pipe and 0.44 inches for the end cap.

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TABLE 1

• .PittingVent Pipes A, B, E, F and G I-Pit No. Dia. Depth t vent t local t min area t min local (in) (in) (in) (in )Ii (in)

Vent Pipe B @ 292.5 Azimuth 1 .125 to .049 .258 .209 .210 .189OK

.25 2 .125to .043 .258 .215 .210 .189OK

.25 9 .125to .055 .260 .205 .210 .189 OK

.25 7 .25 .057 .261 .204 .210 .189 OK Vent Pipe G @ 337.5!Azimuth 1 .25 .052 .246 .194 .210 .189 OK 2 .25 .067 .249 .182 .210 .046OK 3 .125 .053 .249 .196 .210 .189 OK 6 Not .066 .401 .335 .210 .210 OK Recorded 7eNot .047 .365 .318 .210 .210 OK Recorded _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I__ __ _ _ _ _ _

Vent Pipe A @ 247.50Azimuth A .25 .035 .250 .215 .210 .189 OK B .25 .056 1.265 .209 .210 .189OK C .19 .060 1.266 .206 .210 .189OK Vent Pipe E @67.5uAzimuth A Not ] 039 .265 .226 l .210 J.210 OK Vent Pipe F @ 112.5"Azimuth A .75 1.047 1.251 1.204 1.210 1.189 OK B .25 .033 .251 .218 .210 .189 OK C .75 .033 .251 .218 .210 .189 OK Table 1 Notes 1. Vent pipe required thickness determined using MK 1 Loads (NUREG 0661) by Calculation M899.

2. A more detailed local pitting evaluation was performed as outlined in Calculation M899.

b. Pilgrim Station is requesting a one-time extension of the ILRT containment pressurization test only. In order to allow for early uncovering of evidence of structural deterioration, Pilgrim Station is planning to perform the visual examination of accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment system during RFO 15 in 2005. The visual examination will also be performed again prior to the ILRT currently planned for the RFO in 2009. Current plans call for the vent system locations where coating repairs were made in 1999 to be re-inspected to VT-3 visual standards during the Detailed Visual Walkdown scheduled for RFO16 in 2007.

Additionally, augmented ultrasonic examinations of containment wall thickness will continue to be performed at selected upper drywell locations in RFO1 7 (2009) and of the torus shell in RFO1 6 (2007).

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Pilgrim Station will continue to perform the Type B and Type C Local Leak Rate Testing during the interval extension period. In addition, the primary containment nitrogen makeup usage will continue to be monitored for any trend that may be indicative of a potential degradation of containment leak-tightness.

NRC QUESTION NO. 2 Section 5.1.3 of attachment 5 to reference 1, Entergy's First Ten-Year Interval IWE Containment Inspection Program, also describes Code Category E-C augmented examinations for Pilgrim's containment. Please discuss the containment's key augmented examination results beyond those reported in Section 5.1.3 that would provide additional performance based justifications for the staff's acceptance of the proposed one-time ILRT interval extension.

PILGRIM RESPONSE:

In addition to the Section 5.1.3 inspections, augmented ultrasonic (UT) examinations were conducted in 1999 and 2001 at the 9, 72 and 83-foot elevations of the drywell shell and detected no wall loss or evidence of degradation after approximately 28 years of service. Augmented UT examinations at two locations on the 72-foot elevation adjacent to the spent fuel pool will continue to be performed once every 10 years in accordance with the Pilgrim IWE program.

The drywell wall thickness measurements are supported by the lack of any leakage detected from the annulus drain lines. Leakage from the refueling bellows when the refueling cavity is flooded or leakage due to spent fuel pool leaks would eventually be directed into the annulus drains. Leak checks of the annulus drain lines are performed during each refueling outage shortly after flooding up to the maximum elevation (116 ft) and prior to draining down at the end of each outage. No leakage has ever been found coming from an annulus drain.

Torus (suppression pool) wall thickness was measured ultrasonically in 1999 and 2003 in four locations near the water line and at an additional four submerged locations.

Torus wall thickness was determined to be at nominal wall thickness values.

Entergy Engineering chose these augmented examination locations discussed above as the areas most likely to experience degradation due to external corrosion considering the containment design and fabrication methods used during construction at Pilgrim Station.

The fact that no degradation of the containment was discovered in the approximately 28 years since commencing commercial power operations in 1972 provides performance based justification for the premise that Pilgrim's containment structure has not degraded significantly over time and for NRC acceptance of the one-time ILRT interval extension.

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NRC QUESTION NO. 3 In attachment 5 to reference 1, Table 5.3.2, uPilgrim Nuclear Power Station IWE Components Scheduled for Examination During 1st IWE Interval" only addresses the first 10-year interval.

a. Please document Entergy's ISI methods and plans for the additional 5-year extended period that would provide assurance that in the absence of an ILRT for fifteen years, the containment structural and leak tight integrity will be maintained.

b. Additionally, many plant specific inspection activities listed in this table must have been completed to date. Provide a detailed summary of ISI and related containment testing activities listed in the table that have been completed to date including inspection/testing dates, findings, corrective actions, and maintenance/repair as well as containment modifications.

c. Based on the above plant specific ISI results, discuss Entergy's performance based justifications for staff's acceptance of the proposed one-time ILRT interval extension from ten to fifteen years.

d. Table 5.3.2 also lists projected examination schedules covering the first IWE interval for the listed plant components. Discuss how these component examination schedules would be impacted or revised during the proposed extended period after September 2008.

PILGRIM RESPONSE

a. The first ten-year IWE inspection interval ends in September 2008. The second IWE ten-year program examinations will be performed in accordance with code requirements as determined by the code accepted by reference in 10CFR50 twelve months prior to the start of the interval. Augmented examination areas will be selected in accordance with code requirements in effect at that time. The performance of code required examinations during the second ten year interval beginning September 2008 and Appendix J Type B and C tests performed during each refueling outage will provide sufficient assurance that containment structural and leak tight integrity will be maintained for the two-year period from September 2008 to 2010.

b. Please refer to Attachment 2, "Table 3, Pilgrim IWE Containment First Interval Inspections and Findings To Date" for the requested information.

c. Pilgrim Station is planning to perform the visual examination of accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment system during RFO 15 in 2005. The visual examination will also be performed again prior to the ILRT currently planned for the RFO in 2009. Current plans call for the vent system locations where coating repairs were made in 1999 to be re-inspected to VT-3 visual standards during the Detailed Visual Walkdown scheduled for RFO16 in 2007. Additionally, augmented ultrasonic examinations of containment wall thickness will continue to be performed at Page 4

selected upper drywell locations in RFO17 (2009) and of the torus shell in RFO16 (2007). The fact that no degradation of the containment was discovered in the approximately 28 years since commencing commercial power operations in 1972 provides performance based justification for the premise that Pilgrim's containment structure has not degraded significantly over time and for NRC acceptance of the one-time ILRT interval extension.

d. Inspections scheduled for the second ten year IWE inspection interval beginning September 2008 will be scheduled in accordance with requirements of the code accepted by reference in 10CFR50 twelve months prior to the start of the interval as required by ASME Xl.

NRC QUESTION NO. 4 Inspections of some reinforced concrete and steel containment structures have found degradation on the non-inspectable (embedded) side of the drywell steel shell and steel liner of the primary containment. These degradations cannot be found by visual (i.e.,

VT-1 or VT-3) examinations unless the degradation is through the thickness of the shell or liner, or 100% of the non-inspectable surfaces are periodically examined by ultrasonic testing.

a. Document how potential leakage under high pressure during core damage accidents is factored into the risk assessment implemented for justifying the proposed one-time ILRT interval extension.

b. Discuss the potential impact of the proposed ILRT interval extension upon the Entergy's continued ability to reasonably assure the leak tightness and structural integrity of Pilgrim's containment.

PILGRIM RESPONSE

a. The Pilgrim containment liner corrosion analysis utilized the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant assessment to estimate the risk impact from containment liner corrosion during an extension of the ILRT interval.

The following are a list of key assumptions used in the Calvert Cliffs assessment applicable to the Pilgrim liner corrosion risk analysis:

1. A half failure is assumed for basemat concealed liner corrosion due to the lack of identified failures.

2. The exposure period of 5.5 years reflects the period (for Calvert Cliffs) since 1OCR 50.55a required visual inspections (September 1996).

3. The steel shell flaw likelihood is assumed to double every five years.

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4. The likelihood of the containment atmosphere reaching the outside atmosphere given a liner flaw exists was estimated as a function of the pressure inside Containment.

5. The likelihood of leakage escape (due to crack formation) in the basemat region is considered to be less likely than the containment cylinder and dome region.

6. A 5% visual inspection detection failure likelihood given the flaw is visible and a total detection failure likelihood of 10% is used.

7. A 100% visual inspection detection failure likelihood given the flaw is located in an inaccessible area of either the drywell or torus.

8. All non-detectable containment failures are assumed to result in early releases.

9. The probability of a concurrent containment breach given a flaw in the containment liner is depicted as an exponential function.

These assumptions are iustified and validated as follows:

1. The assumption of a half failure is a typical statistical technique for cases wherein no failures have occurred.

2. The containment liner corrosion exposure period is bounding as no additional failures have been identified in the nuclear industry since March 2002 and no failures were identified prior to September 1996 (the date when 1OCUR 50.55a was implemented). Therefore, the actual exposure time period is greater than 5.5 years. However, by using the lower exposure time of 5.5 years, the results are considered bounded.

3. Similar to the Calvert Cliffs assumption, this is based solely on judgment and is included in this analysis to address the increase likelihood of corrosion as the steel shell ages. Sensitivity studies are included that addresses doubling this rate every 10 years and every two years.

4. The Pilgrim containment will exhibit a similar behavior as the Calvert Cliffs Containment liner. Namely, as Containment pressure increases, cracks will form. Subsequently, if a crack occurs in the same region as a liner flaw, then the Containment atmosphere can communicate with the outside atmosphere. At low pressures, this crack formation is extremely, unlikely. However, near the point of Containment failure, crack formation is virtually guaranteed. Therefore, the analysis uses anchored points of 0.1% at 20 psia and 100% at 113 psia (Pilgrim's plant specific ultimate Containment failure pressure). Sensitivity studies are included that decrease and increase the 20-psia anchor point by of factor of 10.

5. The leakage potential via the Drywell floor was assumed to be ten times less likely than via other sections of the Containment structure. The bottom of the liner lies between a layer of concrete comprising the Drywell floor and the Page 6

concrete basemat. This arrangement provides an additional barrier to leakage from undetected liner corrosion through the floor, since any liner corrosion would need to coincide with crack formation on both sides.

6. This assumption is applicable to Pilgrim because to date, all liner corrosion events have been detected through visual inspection. Sensitivity studies are included that evaluates total detection failure likelihood's of 5% and 15%.

7. This assumption is applicable because the Pilgrim containment structure does have some inaccessible areas.

8. Containment liner corrosion, as a phenomenon does not contribute to core damage frequency (CDF), but is part of the sequence of events leading to accident releases. Thus, CDF is unchanged for a Type A ILRT extension. CDF may be divided into the various PRA Accident Classes and further sub-divided into the release categories that comprise Large Early Release Frequency (LERF). The High/Early portions of EPRI Accident Classes 2, 3b, 6, 7 and 8 comprise the base LERF. The impact of a Type A ILRT extension is postulated to cause an increase in LERF, and is categorized as EPRI Accident Class 3b.

Assuming a Type A ILRT extension, LERF is the base LERF plus the change in LERF due to the extension. The extension of the Type A ILRT is also postulated to allow previously undetected corrosion to progress such that accident sequences previously not contributing to LERF would contribute to LERF.

Accident classes comprising LERF are unaffected by the Type A ILRT extension because these classes are already "Large" and "Early". Therefore, the non-LERF accident classes form the source for additional large early releases due to the Type A ILRT extension.

9. The probability of Containment breach is typically developed as an exponential function. Calvert Cliffs used the upper and lower Containment failure pressure points (from the PRA) to estimate Containment failure probability versus Containment pressure. The Pilgrim Containment failure probability profile is developed similarly.

b. Please refer to the response to question 1.b.

NRC QUESTION NO. 5 Per Information Notice 92-20, stainless steel bellows have been found to be susceptible to trans-granular stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and the leakage through them is not readily detectable by Type B testing. If applicable, document the inspection and testing of Pilgrim's bellows, and discuss how such potential SCC behavior has been factored into the risk assessment implemented for justifying the proposed one-time ILRT interval extension.

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PILGRIM RESPONSE IN 92-20 documented that Type B testing performed on two ply expansion bellows with one pressurization test connection did not detect a through wall defect that existed downstream of a crimp in the bellows. Due to the crimp in the bellows, the area with the defect did not communicate with the test connection area. Pilgrim Station expansion bellows configuration has two test connections, one on each end of the bellows. As a result of IN 92-20, Pilgrim Station performs a flow test across the bellows to verify that the test connections communicate across the bellows (i.e. the bellows is not crimped), followed by a flow makeup leakage test.

Since Pilgrim Station's configuration has the two test connections, the potential for undetected potential SCC behavior did not need to be factored into the risk assessment.

NRC QUESTION NO. 6 For the examination of seals and gaskets, and examination and testing of bolted connections associated with the primary containment pressure boundary (Examination Categories E-D and E-G), reference 2 granted relief from the code's requirements. As an alternative, it was proposed to examine these items during the leak rate testing of the primary containment. However, Option B of Appendix J for Type B and Type C testing (as per Nuclear Energy Institute 94-01 and Regulatory Guide 1.163) and the ILRT interval extension requested in this amendment request for Type A testing, provides flexibility in the scheduling of these inspections. Please document your schedule for examination and testing of seals, gaskets, and bolts beyond the first ten-year period that would provide assurance regarding the integrity of the containment pressure boundary.

PILGRIM RESPONSE The current ten-year ILRT interval ends in May 2005. Table 2 below lists the currently planned testing for the Type B testing of seals, gaskets, and O-Rings.

TABLE 2 Planned Testing for Typ B testing of seals, gaskets, and O-Rings Component ID Component Description Year Gibbs Manway 0Q2 Gibbs Manway O-Rings 2005 Gibbs Manway @ 452 Gibbs Manway O-Rings 2005 Gibbs Manway © 902 Gibbs Manway O-Rings 2005 Gibbs Manway @ 1352 Gibbs Manway O-Rings 2005 Gibbs Manway @ 1802 Gibbs Manway O-Rings 2005 Gibbs Manway © 2252 Gibbs Manway O-Rings 2005 Gibbs Manway © 2702 Gibbs Manway O-Rings 2005 Gibbs Manway @ 3152 Gibbs Manway O-Rings 2005 Drywell Head Drywell Head O-Rings Each RFO Drywell Head Access Hatch Hatch O-Rings 2013 Equipment Hatch Hatch O-Rings Each RFO Page 8

Component ID Component Description Year Personnel Airlock Personnel Airlock Gaskets Each RFO

._ And Seals CRD Removal Hatch Hatch O-Rings Each RFO North Torus Hatch Hatch O-Rings Each RFO East Torus Hatch Hatch O-Rings Each RFO Torus Test Connection Flange Flange O-Rings 2007 Inboard Flange of AO-5044A Flange O-Rings 2005 Inboard Flange of AO-5044B Flange O-Rings 2005 Outboard Flange of AO-5044B Flange O-Rings 2005 Inboard Flange of AO-5035B Flange O-Rings 2013 Inboard Flange of AO-5035A Flange O-Rings 2013 Outboard Flange of AO-5035A Flange O-Rings 2013 TIP Drive Flange X35A (Inner) Flange O-Rings 2005 TIP Drive Flange X35A (Outer) Flange O-Rings 2005 TIP Drive Flange X35B (Inner) Flange O-Rings 2005 TIP Drive Flange X35B (Outer) Flange O-Rings 2005 TIP Drive Flange X35C (Inner) Flange O-Rings 2005 TIP Drive Flange X35C (Outer) Flange O-Rings 2005 TIP Drive Flange X35D (Inner) Flange O-Rings 2005 TIP Drive Flange X35D (Outer) Flange O-Rings 2005 TIP Purge Flange X35E (Inner) Flange O-Rings 2005 TIP Purge Flange X35E (Outer) Flange O-Rings 2005 Drywell Test Connection Flange Flange O-Rings 2013 ILRT Supplemental Conn. Flange Flange O-Rings 2013 Inboard Flange of AO-5036B Flange O-Rings 2009 Inboard Flange of AO-5036A Flange O-Rings 2009 Outboard Flange of AO-5036A Flange O-Rings 2009 HPCI Steam to Torus (Inbd Flange) Flange O-Rings 2005 HPCI Steam to Torus (Outbd Flange) Flange O-Rings 2005 Inboard Flange of 2301-74 Flange O-Rings 2013 Outboard Flange of 2301-74 Flange O-Rings 2013 Inboard Flange of 1301-64 Flange O-Rings 2005 Outboard Flange of 1301-64 Flange O-Rings 2005 RCIC Steam to Torus (Inbd Flange) Flange O-Rings 2013 RCIC Steam to Torus (Outbd Flange) Flange O-Rings 2013 Inboard Flange of AO-5040A Flange O-Rings 2007 Outboard Flange of AO-5040A Flange O-Rings 2007 Inboard Flange of AO-5040B Flange O-Rings 2007 Outboard Flange of AO-5040B Flange O-Rings 2007 Inboard Flange of AO-5042A Flange O-Rings 2007 Inboard Flange of AO-5042B Flange O-Rings 2007 Outboard Flange of AO-5042B Flange O-Rings 2007 Inboard Flange of AO-5025 Flange O-Rings 2007 Flange of X-212A Seat Flange Gasket 2007 Flange of X-212B Seat Flange Gasket 2007 Page 9

Component ID Component Description Year Electrical Penetration X100A Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X100B Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X100C Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X100D Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X100E Seal 2005 Electrical Penetration X101A Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X101 B Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X101C Seal 2005 Electrical Penetration Xl 02A Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration Xl 02B Seal 2005 Electrical Penetration X103A Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration Xl 03B Seal 2005 Electrical Penetration Xl 04A Seal 2005 Electrical Penetration Xl 04B Seal 2005 Electrical Penetration X104C Seal 2005 Electrical Penetration X104D Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X104E Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X104F Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration Xl 04G Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration Xl 04H Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X104J Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X105A Seal 2005 Electrical Penetration X105B Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X106B Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X202A Seal 2013 Electrical Penetration X202B Seal 2013 Page 10

Attachment 2: Table 3, Pilgrim IWE Containment First Interval Inspections and Findings to Date

__ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ D s crip io n . _________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _on__

Cosont Y:-n L Completed InsHtion Date FindIngs l: .- Dis D"Hr l CiCrcive Adcions .. lCo ment hH-50-1-270GIBS H1-50-1-TORUSBAY13 iDRYWELLSTABILIZER TORUS SUPPORTS DRYWELL TORUS ROOM I_. I. _ ._

I 1999 1999 None Torus saddle suppon found with loose anchor bolt B

n/a Bolting rework-n/a IUPPER DRYWELLSTABILIZER BEHIND GIBS MANWAY AT 270 AZ Bolts rtorued t0 COrrct TORUS SUPPORTS (ONE SADDLE AND ONE pecifications; baseplateU E A N N I R extensions and baseplate Baseplate corrosion- corrosion determned EARTHQUAKE TIE) BAY 13 ON DRAWINGS ac e t-si ior s A7 S l

.CI- 6 a1e-a0i1ioradacetbe US SUPPORTS (ONE SADDLE AND ONE H-50-1-TORUSIIAY5 SUPPORTS TORUS ROOM 2003 None n/a n/a EARThfQUAKE TIE) BAY 5 ON DRAWINGS IA175SHI &CIA-624 TORUS SUPPORTS (ONE SADDLE AND ONE 11-50-1-TORUSBAY9 TORUS SUPPORTS I

ORUS ROOM

___ ___ _ [___ 2001 None n/a nta EARTHQUAKE TIE) BAY 9 ON DRAWINGS C IA 175SIII & C IA 4 IWE-ANNDRN-080 IANNULUS DRAINS(2) AT 80 AZ TORUS ROOM

[_________AT80 1999 None n/a n/a AUGMENTED VT-2 OF ANNULUS DRAINS(2) degree AZIMUTHI. BAY 3 IWE-ANNDRN-080 'ANNULUS DRAINS(2) AT 80 AZ TORUS ROOM 2001 None n/a n/a AUGMENTED VT-2 OF ANNULUS DRAINS(2)

I AT 80 degree AZIMUTH. BAY 3 WE-ANNDRN-080  !ANNULUS DRAINS(2) AT 80 AZ TORUS ROOM 2003 None n/a n/a AT 80 degree AZiMUTf2. BAY 3 IIWE.ANNDRN.170 IANNULUS DRA'NS(2) AT 170 AZ TORUS ROOM I 1999 None n/a n/a AUGMENTED VT-2 01 ANNULUS DRAINS(2)

AT 170 degree AZIMUTH. BAY 7 IWEANNDRN-170  !ANNULUS DRAINS(2) AT 170 AZ ORUS ROOM 2001 None n/a n/a AUGMENTED VT2 o ANNULUS DRAINS(2)

IWE-ANNDRN-170 IANNULUSDRAINS(2) AT 170 AZ TORUSROOM 2003 None n/a n/a ATU170Ndegree AZIMUTH. BAY 7 IWE-ANNDRN-260 lANNULUS DRAINS(2) AT 260 AZ. ORUS ROOM 1999 None nta n/a AUGMENTED VT-2 OF ANNULUS DRAINS(2)

___________AT 260 degree AZIMUTH. BAY I I fWE-ANNDRN-260 IANNULUS DRAINS(2) AT 260 AZ. TORUS ROOM 2001 None n/a n/a AUGMENTED VT-2 oF ANNULUS DRAINS(2)

AT 260 degree AZIMUTH. BAY I I

,WANIR26 ANUSDAN2)AT 260 AZ TRUS ROOM 2003 None n/a n/a AUGMENTED VT-2 0OFANNULUS DRAINS(2)

WEANNDRN260 ANNULUS DRAINS(2) AT2AT 260 degree AZIMUTH. BAY II IWF,ANNDRN-350  !ANNULUS DRAINS(2) AT 350 AZ TORUS ROOM 1999 None n/a n/a AUGMENTED VT-2 01 ANNULUS DRAINS(2)

I AT 350 degree AZIMUTH. BAY 15 IWE-ANNDRN-350 ANNULUS DRAINS(2) AT 350 AZ TORUS ROOM 2001 None n/a n/a AUGMENTED VT.2 OF ANNULUS DRAINS(2)

I AAT 350 degree AZIMUTH. BAY 15 IVANDN30 'ANNULUS DRAINS(2) AT 350 AZ. TORUS ROOM I2003 None n/a n/a AGETDV- 1 NUU RIS2

_ ____ ____ _____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ ___ TA 350__de___ T H.ZIM Z IM U T Y1 B A YA Page 1

Attachment 2: Table 3, Pilgrim IWE Containment First Interval Inspections and Findings to Date

______________________________________________I section Date' i jiic~tAciriCnmrf n______s_______ fli.

Component D escription -.!::K, 5 C m ltd_ i.,t( _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. . _ __ Drywlioun eadboling . reork Chased threads of sorre Drwitlhdeaod (otigallend) Bolting, eor- bolting as required duringDRWL ADLNGBOTG.CE

'(DRYWHAD COTANENT BOLTIGB11AD) ihdfore (ald Protective coating. accept. reassembtly. Protective DRWEQUIREDONLY NCEPERTINTERCOA E IWECBDWWEAECNT INMENT BOTN BI1 9threads and loss of as-is coating not'required by RQI EDOLONEPRITVA

_______________________________ protective coating. Specxfication.___________________

CONTAINMENT BOLTING RDRYWELL HEAD RLANGE BOLTING. CODE

_E-C-DWIIEAD (DRYWELLHEAD) B 117 2001 None n/a 111a UIRED ONLY ONCE PER INTERVAL Access cover plate bolting CNINETOLNGfound with damaged threads CONTAINMENT BOLTING AT GIBS IWE-CB GBS3 ONTAINMENT OLNG DRYWELL 1999 due to use ofchannel-lock Accept-as-is None taken. MANWAY AT135 AZ, pliers on threads during construction.,

IWE-CB-GIBS135 CONTAINMENT BOLTING DRYWELL 2003 cosi None CONTAINMENT BOLTING AT GIBS nta nPa MANWAYATI35AZ.

Access cover plate bolting found with damaged threads CONTAINMENT BOLTING AT GIBS IWE-CB-GIBS180 CONTAINMENT BOLTING 1999 due to use of channel-lock Accept-as-is None taken. MANWAY AT 180 AZ.

pliers on threads during construction.

IWE CB IBS1 G ICONTAINMENT BOLTING RYWELL iE l2003 CONTAINMENT BOLTING AT GIBS NonentNnean. MAWYT8Z Access cover plate bolting found with damnaged threads CONTAINMENT BOLTING AT GIBS WE-CB-GIBS225 CONTAINMENT BOLTING DRYWELL 1999 due to use of channel-lock Accept-as-is None taken. MANWAY AT 225 AZ.

pliers on threads during construction.

Access cover plate bolting found with damaged threads Dmgdsuswr WE-CB-GIBS273 CONTAINMENT BOLTING DRYWELL 1999 due to use of channel-lock Replace replaced aserl CONTAINMENT BOLTING AT GIBS plirson threads during assemhlbasared MANWAY AT 270 AZ.

I l l . 1 construction. .l_

Access cover plate bolting found with damaged threads CONTAINMENT BOLTING AT GIBS IWE-CB-G1BS315 CONTAINMENT BOLTING DRYWE1999 due to use of channel-lock Accept-as-is None taken. MANWAY AT 315 AZ.

pliers on threads during construction.

I found with damanged threads IVE-CB-GIB1S360 'CNTIMETBOLTING RYEL1999 dueto :se of channel-lock Accept-at-is None taken. MANWAYNT 360 NA ATZ.B I ~pliers"on threads during j __ ___ ___ ___ ____ ___ ___ ___ constructton.

lAcei I cover plate bolting TWE-CB-GIBS45 CONTAINMENT BOLTING 1 DRYWELL und weitohsemofahnrel-la due o usAccept-as-is of hannl-lok CNTAINMENT BOLTING AT GIBS None taken.

I pliers on threads during

- ___ ___ ____ _ ____ ___ ___ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ ons ruct on.____

nstructio n.__ ___ ____ ___ ____ __ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ _co ___

Page 2

Attachment 2: Table 3, Pilgrim IWE Containment First Interval Inspections and Findings to Date r  :

C nt Completed Insm on Date As 'iition Coctive Actions _ '

Access cover plate bolting found wish daaeCtrasNTAINMENT OTN TGB IWE-CB-GIBS90 CONTAINMENT BOLTING DRYWELL 1999 due to use of channel-lock Accept-as-is None taken. CNTAt AT CIBS pliers on threads duning fNA T9 Z I _ construction.

None taken. Galling was in ltWE-CB-X200B CONTAINMENT BOLTING TORUS ROOM 1999 Torus hatch cover Accept-as-is te center section of each TORUS HATCH X200B BOLTING threads. engagerent is not required.

Us ~_ re___

IWE-CB-X203A TORUS BOLTING FOR TORUS-DRYWELL VACUUM CONTAINMENT BOLTING INTERIOR I999 None n/a nla BREAKER PENETRATION X-203A.

I TORUS . BOLTING FOR TORUS-DRYWELL VACUUM IWECB-X203B CONTAINMENT BOLTING NTERIOR99 None n/a n/a BREAKER PENETRATION X-203B.

IWE-CB-X203C CONTAINMENT BOLTING TORUS 1999 None n/a n/1a BREAKER PENETRATION X-203C.

INTERIORBRAEPEERTOX-0C IWE-CB-X203D CONTAINMENT BOLTING TORUS 2003 None n/a n/a OLTING FOR TORUS-DRYWELL VACUUM II - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __._ _ _ _ _ _

INTERIOR IBREAKER PENETRATION X-203E.

TBOLTING FOR TORUS-DRYWELL VACUUM IWE-CB-X203E CONTAINMENT BOLTING EOR 2003 None n/a n/a BREAKER PENETRATION X-203E.

lWVE>CI-X203F CONTAINMENT BOLTING jINTERIOR 12003 None n/a n/a BREAKER PENETRAUTIODNRxE X-203F.

2CB-X213A CONTAINMENT BOLTING TORUS ROOM l 2001 None n/a n/a TORUS DRAIN X213A BOLTING BWE-Cl-X35A CONTAINMENT BOLTING _TIP ROOM 2001 None n/a n/a TIP PENETRATION X35A BOLTING IWE-CB-X4 CONTAINMENT BOLTING RB 117' DRYWELL HEAD MANWAY BOLTING AT 2001 None n/a n/a PENETRATION X-4.

.INVE-CB-X6 CONTAINMENT BOLTING RB 23' 2001 None n/a n/a CRD HATCH X6 BOLTING

!GENERAL VISUAL WALKDOWN TO BE DONE ONCE PER PERIOD IN CONJUNCTION WITH APPENDIX I SCHEDULE HISTORY.

IWE-GVWD-01 GENERAL VISUAL WALKDOWN VARIOUS 1999 None n/a n/a RFO16 WALKDOWN WILL BE TIJE DETAILED VISUAL (VT-3). USE ENN ENGINEERING STANDARD ENN-EP-S-00I, Rev.0 FOR GVWD.

GENERAL VISUAL WALKDOWN TO BE IDONE ONCE PER PERIOD IN CONJUNCTION l i l WITH APPENDIX J SCIJEDUU IJISTORY.

IWE.GVWD-01 GENERALVISUALWALKDOWN VARIOUS 2003 None n/a n/a RFO16WALKDOWN WILL BE THE DETAILED VISUAL (VT-3). USE ENN ENGINEERING STANDARD ENN-EP-S-001, I __ i l'Rev.0 FOR GVWD.

Page 3

Attachment 2: Table 3, Pilgrim IWE Containment First Interval Inspections and Findings to Date

_______Actions_______

~~II. _men___ Corcirect______

,. ,,, ,,.,.d. *. , *. , - --:'-":

':I

-Cmponent __crption hC*o_________ ,oan Completed Inspection Date l.: .dInis  : - D D tt..on Corec ive Acto° :Comments ** o!:

AUMENTED VT'-2 OF 5 SPENT FUEL(EQUIP. POOL RB 74 LINER DRAINS.

IWE-LINERDRAINS LtNER DRAINS RB 74 1999 None nta PERFORMED ONCE PER PERIOD WHILE nta FLOODED UP (for Equiprment Pool leakage).

Related to potential corrosion of drywell exterior from leakage into the annulus air gap.

AUGMENTED VT-2 OF 5 SPENT FUELtEQUIP. POOL RB 74 LINER DRAINS.

i PERFORMED IWE.LINERDRAINS LINER DRAINS RB74 2003 None nta nta tFLOODED UP ONCE PER PERIOD (for Equipment Pool leakage). WHILE

. I .Related to potential corrosion of drywell exterior from leakage into the annulus air gap.

None taken. Moisture barrier at this location riot Drywell floor seal between required by construction MOISTURE BARRIER AT DRYWELL 9 FT concrete floor and specification Corrosion of INTERIOR AT CONCRETE-SHELL IWE-MB-DW-9 MOISTURE BARRIER AT DRYWEL DRYWELL 1999 ontminsent shell appears to contains-ent shell interior INTERFACE RF012 EXAM FOUND NO EM-W0 9 FT DRWL 99be misting: corrosion of Accept-as-is surface and concrete INSTALLED MOISTURE BARRIER AT drywell shell and spalled dasnage determined to be DRYWELL 9 ft elev. THEREFORE NO concrete. typical service and age FURTHER EXAMS REQUIRED POST-RFO 12.

related minor surface

-__ _corrosion and chipping. l AUGMENTED DRYWELL UT AT 9 FT /DELETED FROM PROGRAM 812002 PER IR tWE-SNDCUSH-035 05AUGENE DRWUU T9F RYWELL 1999 None nta nta 0240.AUGMENTED Ur OF SAND 03i A_. ._ CUSHION AREA AT 9 FT 035 AZ.

AUGMENDCTED IUDELETED FROM PROGRAMOF 812002 PER IR IWE>SNDCUSIB.125 125 AZ DRYWELL 1999 . -0400-AUGMENTEDUr None n/a n/a 024)400. AUGMENTEDUTOFSAND SAN CUSHION AREA AT 9 FT 125 AZ

.UMNE .RWL UTA.9I DELETED FROM PROGRAM 8t2002 PER IR IWE-SNDCUSH-215 AUGI NTED DRYWEU UT AT 9 FT DRYWELL 1999 None n/a n/a 02-0400. AUGMENTED UT OF SAND I21 AZ. CUSHION AREA AT 9 FT 215 AZ 1AUGMENTED DRYWELL UT AT 9 FT 1 IWE.SNDCUSH.3305 305 D DRYWELL 2001 None DELETED FROM PROGRAM 812002 PER IR n/a n/a 02-0400. AUGMENTED UT OF SAND 1305 AZ. ICUSHION AREA AT 9 FT 305 AZ None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings were marginally less than those specified on the inspection IWE-TORUS-LOWER-lI 1

AUGMENTED TORUS UT clv.I lIft

'6i BAY I el.- TORUS ROOM IWall 1999 thickness of torus shell foundlt be less than Accept-as-is drawing but greater than designrin. wall thickness. AUGMENTED TORUS UT elev.- Ift 6in BAY I in I nominal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.010') and UT instruimenterror(l%)

I . i iallowed condition to be I  ! I . I }acceptable as is. l Page 4

Attachment 2: Table 3, Pilgrim IWE Containment First Interval Inspections and Findings to Date

< I 110 :L-Comoo nt . Desci tion,, Complete rnspctlon Date Fidins D6spoit!o

-'-i:ll Co*.tvAsif~55C- o;§m.:ntsK None takent. Ultrasonic thickness readings were mnarginally less than those specified on the inspection AUGMENTED TORUS UT ekv.-l IR T Wall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than tWE-TORUS-LOWER-B IU TORUS ROOM 203 found to be less than Accept-as-is design mrin. wall thickness. AUGMENTED TORUS UT clev.- Ift 6in BAY I nominal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.010') and Ur instird ent error (1%)

allowed condition to be acceptable as is. . . . . . . . . . . . __ ___ _ ........ ___

None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings marginally less than were those specified on the inspection 5AUGMENTEDTORUS Urekv.lTR RO l 1Wall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than AUGMENTED TORUS UT elev.-lI ft 6in BAY FETRSLWRB36in DAY 13 TORUS ROOM 1999 found to be less than Accept-as-is design Inin. wall thickness. 13 nominal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.010 ) and UT tnstrusment error (I%)

allowed condition to be accetbea s None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings were marginally less than those specified on the inspection AGETDTRSU lvIIftWall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than AGMENTED TORUS UT elev,-I ftR 6in BAY nV6OU-,WRB3 in BAY 13 TORUS ROOM 2003 found to be less than Accept-as-is design snin. wall thickness. 13 nominal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.010") and UT instrument error (I%)

allowed condition to be None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings were marginally less than those specified on the inspection AUGMENTED TORUS UT elev.-.1I ft: Wall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than IEORUS-LOWER.B5 6in BAY5 ORUS ROOM 1999 found to be less than Accept-as-is design mm. wall thickness. AUGMIENTED TORUS UT elev.-Il ft 6inBhAY5S I

nominal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.010") and UT instrument error (I%)

_________________ __________________________________________allowed____condition ____

__________ to__be Page 5

Attachment 2: Table 3, Pilgrim IWE Containment First Interval Inspections and Findings to Date Component___

_.___.___Inspec-v c in -ni Date,., ;__

sDisposition "dn Cor cieActions c

C None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings were marginally less than those specified on the inspection AGMNETRS rev-ftWall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than

,IWE-TORUS-LOWER-B5 6AnBAY U TORUS ROOM 2003 found to be less than Accept-as-is design ruin, wall thickness. AUGMENTED TORUS UTelev.-l 1ft 6in BAY s nominal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.010") and UT instrunrnt error (I %)

allowed condition to be l _ ac~cptable as is.

None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings were marginally less thun those specified on the inspection TORUS UT eev.l Ift Wall thickness of torus shell WAUGMENTED drawing but greater than IWE-TORUS-LOWER-B9 6n BAY 9 TORUS ROOM 1999 found to be less than Accept-as-is design min. wall thickness. AUGMENTED TORUS UT elev.-l InA6in BAY 9 nomninal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.0 10") and Ur instrument error (1%)

allowed condition to be None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings were marginally less than those specified on the inspection AUGMENTED TORUSUTelev.lft Wall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than IWE-TORUS-LOWER-.T9 TORUS ROOM 2003 found to be less than Accept-as-is design rnin. wall thickness. AUGMENTED TORUS UT elev.- I I0 6in BAY 9 inBY9nomrinal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.0 10') and UT instrunent etror (I%)

allowed condition to be

_ _. ____________ ____ ____________ -_acceptable as is. _____________

None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings were marginally less than those specified on the inspection Wall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than IWE-TORS-WI AT US UT AT MWL TORUS ROOM 1999 found to be less than Accept-as-is design rin, wall thickness. AUGMENTED TORUS UT AT MWL BAY I nominal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.010") and UT instrument error (1%)

allowed condition to be

___lacceptable as is.

Page 6

Attachment 2: Table 3, Pilgrim IWE Containment First Interval Inspections and Findings to Date l - Cijent D6§6 iow, *3 l , l on i *c ve Xclm Commentsf6

~

ConxnnS f~if ILocation Compneted lnspectdon Mat F'lidslng Dir~spaiIo  : Cwnde______________

None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings were marginally less than those specified on the inspection AGETDTRSUATM LWall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than IWE-TORUS-MWL-Bl AUGMENTED YITORUS TORUS UT AT ROOM 2003 found to b less than Accept-as-is design nin. wall thickness. AUGMENTED TORUS UT AT MWL BAY I BA rninal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.01 Or) and UT instrument error (I %)

allowed condition to be acceptable as is.

None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings Were marginally less than those specified on the inspection AUGMENTED TORUS Ur AT MWL Wall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than WE.TORUS-MWL-B13 AUMNE OU TTM L TRUSOM1999 found to be less than Accept-as-is design rnin. wallithickness. AUGMENTED TORUS UT AT MWL BAY 13 nominal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.010") and UT instrument error (1%)

allowed condition to be I

C. as. ______i____ _____._______ablea_.______ ___.____

None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings were marginally less than those AUGMENTED TORUS UT AT MWL Wall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than

'WE-TORUS-MWL-B3 ABAY 13 ORUS UT 2003 found to be less than Accept-as-is design rnin. wall thickness. AUGMENTED TORUS UT AT MWL BAY 13 nominal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.010") and UT instrurnent error (1 %)

l specified allowed on the inspection condition to be

__ _ _ - ----- _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ ___ _acceptable as is.

None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings were marginally less than those specified on the inspection AGETDTRSUATM LWall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than IWE-TORUS-MWlB5 AUMNEITRSU A W OUS ROOM 1999 found so be less than Accept-as-is design mnin. wall thickness. AUGMENTED TORUS UT AT MWVL BAYS5 iBY5nomninal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.010") and UT instrumnent error (1%)

allowed condition to be

__ _ __ ____ _ _ ________ __ _ __ ___ _ _ __ ____ __ _ _ _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ __ _ __ __ __ _ ___ ___ acc pta le sais Page 7

Attachment 2: Table 3, Pilgrim IWE Containment First Interval Inspections and Findings to Date Co-pnn

_ _ _o__

a

{ __ _

pl dnspe l

i

__l_

-oa n

. Fns t

_ sC _ __t_

i::;

t

_ __d r e t ve clg None taken. Ultrasonic

__v_ _cI m~ n ~ .

thickness readings were marginally less than those specified on the inspection TORUS UT AT MWL lAUGMENTED Wall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than IWE-TORUS-MWL-BS TORUS ROOM l 2003 found to be less than Accept-as-is design mintwall thickness. AUGMENTED TORUS UT AT MWL DAY 5 lAY l nominal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.010") and UT instrument error (I%)

allowed condition to be

.. _acceptable

_ _ as is.

None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings were marginally less than those specified on the inspection

-AGETDTOU TA MWL TRSWall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than A U TRUS-MWB9 RUSROOM 1999 found tobe less than Accept-as-is design nin. wall thickness. AUGMENTEDTORUS UT AT MWL BAY 9 EAY nominal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.010") and UT instrument error(l%)

allowed condition to be

. ac eptable as is.

None taken. Ultrasonic thickness readings were marginally less than those specified on the inspection AUGMENTED TORUS Ur AT WL ROMWall thickness of torus shell drawing but greater than E-OU-W,9 ;BAY 9 TORU RO2003 found to be lest than Accept-as-is design mmn. wall thickness. AUGMENTED TORUS UT AT MWL DAY 9 nominal value. Consideration of fabrication tolerances (0.0 10") and UT instrument error (I %)

allowed condition to be

__ __ __ _ _..__ .__acceptable as is. l ___

REDUCED FREQUENCY IN 812002 TO ONCE 1

IWE-UPDW.72-252 AUGMENTED DRYWELL UT AT 72 DRYWEVER None 1999n0anER

FT 252 AZ.

__ IIa l72 FT IGYRS PER IR 02-040.

AUGMENTED UT OF UPPER DRYWELL AT 252 AZ. ADJACENT TO c MS LINE AI l N nREDUCED FREQUENCY IN 812002 TO ONCE

,IVE-UPDW-72-288 AUGMENTED DRYWELL UT AT 72 DRYWELLI.n/A 2001 None EVERY 10 YRS PER IR 02-040.A

FT 288 AZ. AUGMENTED Ur OF UPPER DRYWELL AT I i72 FT 288 AZ. ADJACENT TO D MS LINE lII _DELETED FROM PROGRAM 812002 PER IR I[WE-UPDW-83-072 'FT 72 A7. UrAT83 ATDWE RYWELL 1 2001 None n/a n/a 02-0400. AUGMENTED UT OF UPPER TO DRYWELL AT 83 FlT 72 A7. ADJACENT Iii _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ [ _ _ _ _ _ _ _I MS W__ UINE Page 8

Attachment 2: Table 3, Pilgrim IWE Containment First Interval Inspections and Findings to Date l -ICImint DId.t~n, l l l l l -

4..ft C.r.

' 1 l .DELETED FROM PROGRAM 812002 PER IR VWE-UPDW-83-108 1AUGMENTED DRYWELL UT_AT_83_ AUMNEUTFPE DRYWELL _ _ _ , _ _ _

2001 None _ _ _ _ _ _ _ CoDE LETi E D ActO ns PW Y.- Co mUTJOC n tsER UPPE

FT 108 AZ. n/a_ _ _

na 02.0400. AUGMENTED DRYWELL AT 83FT 108AZ. ADJACENT TO lB

,IWE-UPIDW-83-252 i

DRYWELL UT AT 83 AUGMENED D2RY0 1

l 1999 None n/an/a D MS LINE DELETFED FROM PROGRAM 812002 PER IR AUGMENTED UT OF UPPER ITr 252 AZ. DRWL 99NoenaRaDRYWELL AT 83 FT' 252 AZ. ADJACENT TO j J _ ____ ____ ~MS LNE IWEUPW8328 A 83D AUGMNTED RYWELDUT FROM PROGRAM 8/002 PER IR JW-PW8-8 Fl 288 AZ. DRRWELL 1999 199Noen/a NoRUS njaDRYWELL 02Y0rA3AUGMENTEDAT 83 FTF288UT AZ.OFADJACENT UPPER TO

.1- _ ____ ____ ____ ____D' M S LINE PNE-VENT-022 ,AGEN. VENT PIPE AT 22 AZ.NERO 1999 None n/a rn/a UGMENTED VT-I OF VENT PIPE AT 22 1 1 RAZIMUTH.

IWE-VENT-067 AUGMENTED VENT PIPE AT 67 AZ INTERIOR 1999 None n/a n/a Adgree AZIMUTH.

l Surfaces were cleaned and l Drywell-to-torus vent piping re-coated to prevent IWr-VENT-1 12 AGMENTED VENT PIPE AT 112 AZ TORUS thickness found to be less Thickness- accept; additional corrosion. Wall AUGMENTED VT-I OF VENT PIPE AT 112 INTERIOR 1999 than general area rnin. wall Coating- rework thickness was accepted due degree AZIMUTH.

and degraded coating. to localized pitting-type

_____ ______ _ ______ _______ ______corrosion. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

VENT PIPE AT 157

____ ___ AGETDVN IW-ET17 _ _ _ IEA __ 5 AZ ZINTERIORRSE-VENT RUS

__ .__i 199NnI AUGMENTED None

__reZI~l i rtanta

/ / I57ereAZIMUTH.

GNIENTED VT-I OF OF. VENT VEN PIPEPIP AT AT__157 WE-VENT-202 AUGMENTED VENT PIPE AT 202 AZ TORUS 1999 None n/aa AUGMENTED VT4 OF VENT PIPE AT 202

________-INTERIOR n/ I99AZNone l_ __Surfaces were cleaned and l Drywell-to-torus vent piping re-coated to prevent IE-VENT-247 AUGMENTED VENT PIPE AT 247 AZ T199S9 thickness found to be less Thickness- accept; additional corrosion. Wall AUMENTED VT-1 OF VENT PIPE AT 247 NTERIOR than general area rnan. wall Coating- rework thickness was accepted due deGrEe AZIMUTH.

and degraded coating. to localized pitting-type 1999 Surfaces were cleaned and ywell-to-torus vent piping re-coated to prevent L MNEVETPPAT22ATORUS 199thickness found to be less Thickness- accept; additional corrosion. Wall AUGMENTED VT-I OF VENT PIPE AT 292 IWE-VENT-292 AUGMENTED VENT PIPE AT 292 AZ NTERIOR 1999 than general area nin, wall Coating. rework thickness was accepted due degree AZIMUTH.

l and degraded coating. to localized pitsing-type I

_ _ _ __ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ ___ __ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ ___ _ __ _ _ __ __ _ _ __ _ _ c rros on._ ___ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ _

piin Surfaces were cleaned and 3 A L Drywell-to-torus vent piping re-coated to prevent A TIORUS i thickness found to be less Thickness- accept. additional corrosion. Wall AUGMENTED VT-I OF VENT PIPE AT 337 INTERIOR I than general rHin. wall and Coating- rework thickness was accepted due degree AZIMUTH.

_ l - degraded coating. to localized pitting-type

_ I__ I_ I_ corrosion.

Page 9