ML20049J187
| ML20049J187 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1981 |
| From: | Delgaizo T, Sargent I FRANKLIN INSTITUTE |
| To: | Huang Y NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20049J183 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-03-79-118, CON-NRC-3-79-118 TER-C5257-36, NUDOCS 8203120238 | |
| Download: ML20049J187 (25) | |
Text
TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTAINMENT+ LEAKAGE RATE TESTING -
l JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY j OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION .
NRC DOCKET NO. 50-219 -
N RC TAC NO. 08678 FAC PROJECT C5257 NRC CO.. TRACT NO. NRC-C3-73-118 FRC TASK 36 Prepared by . -w -
Franklin Research Center Author: I. E.,Sargene The Parkway at Twentieth Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: T. J. DelGaizo Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer:- Y, s. Euang P.ay 21, 1981 This report was prepared as an account of werk, spenscred by an agency cf the Umted States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereef, or any cf their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility fer any third ;any's use, or the results of such use, cf any information, apparatus, creduct or -precess disclosed in this report, or represents' that its use by such third party weeld not infringe privately owned rights.
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CONTENTS .
Secticn Title Page i 1 EACKGRCUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 EVALUATICN CRITERIA. . . . . . . . .
.. . 2 3 TECHNICAL EVALUATICN . . . . . . . ,. . . 3
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3.1 Request fcr Exemption from the Requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J. . . . - - . . . . . 3 3.1.1 Request for Exemption drem Draining and Venting -
Several Syste=u During Type A Testing . . . 3_ L 3.1.1.1 Systems with Reacter Vessel Pene-trations Below the Water Level Required While Puel is in the Vessel. . . . . . . . . 3 3.1.1.2 System with Reactot vessel Pene-tratiens Below the Water Level in the Vessel During the Test. .. . . . 4 3.1.1.3 Systems Required to be In Service to Maintain the Plant in a Safe Shut-down Cenditien During the Test. . . 6' 3.1.1.4 System Nerzally Filled with Water l
and Operating Under Post-Accident Conditiens. . . . . . . . 7
- 3.1.2 Request fer Exemptien frem Correcting Test-
- Leakage Rates fer Instrutent Errer . . . . 8
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l 3.1.3 Request for Exemptien with Respect te Type 3 Testing of Drywell Airlocks. . . . . . 9' t
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COh"I'ENTS ;
Secticn Title Pace ,
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3.1.4 Request for Exe=ptien from Type C Testing ;
- Requirements . . . . . . . . . 11
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3.1.4.1 Request for Exemptien frcm Type C l Testing of Shutdewn Cooling System f Valves V-17-19 and V-17-54. '. . . 11 ;
3.1.4.2 Request for Exemption frem Type C' Testing of E:rergency Condenser,5ys, tem ,
valves V-14-30 through V-14-37. . . 12 4 CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5 REFEPINCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1
t APPENDIX A - CONVERSICN CF FICCCED PPISSURE AIR LEAKAGE ."_.ASURE.v.ENTS TO EQUIVALENT FULI. PRESSUP2 AIR LEAKAGE l
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- 1. BACKGROUND .
On August 7, 1975 [1], the NRC requested Jersey Central Power and Light Ccepany (JCPL) to review the containhent leakage te's ting program for Oyster Creek, Nuclear Generating Station (Oyster Creek) and to provide a plan for !
achieving full ccepliance with the requirements cf 10CFR50, Appendix J, including appropriate design modifications, changes to technical specifi-cations, or t.equest for exemptien frem the requirements pursuant to 10CTR50.12, where necessary.
JCPL responded en December 24, 1975 [2] stating that the containment leakage testing program at Oyster Creek compared f avorably with the Types A and B testing of Appendix J but dif fered considerably with the r'equirements
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for Type C testing. In a subsequent letter da'ted AugDst i2, 1976 (3), JCPL requested certain exemptions frem the requirements of Appendix J and also forwarded Technical Specification Change Request No. 48 to incorporate the requested exemptions into the technical specifications.
Cn February 24, 1977, a meeting was held between NRC and. JCPL pe:sonnel in which the requested exemptions of Reference 3 were discuseed. Subse-quently, in a letter dated November 22, 1976 [4), JCPL submitted a modified set of requests for exemptien from the requirements of Appendix.J. JCPL l
stated that propcsed revisions to the technical specifications would be l withheld pending NRC acticn en the latest requested exemptiens.
The purpcse of this report is to conduct technical evaluaticns en all cutstanding issues regarding the implementation of ICCFR50, Appendix J, at Cyster C eek. Accc:dingly, technical evaluatiens are provided fer the requests for exemption f:ce the requirements of Appendix J submitted by Reference 4. The technical specification change request of Reference 3 has not teen evaluated since JCPL ir.tends to submit revised technical specifi-cation changes upon receipt of NRC action en the exemptien requests.
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- 2. EVALUATION CRITERIA .
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50 (10CFR50), Appendix J, Contain=ent Leakage Testing, provided the criteria used in conducting the technical evaluations. Where applied to the following evaluations, the criteria are either referenced or briefly, stated, where necessary, in suppert , , ,
of the results of the evaluatiens. Further:cre, in recognition of the plant-specific conditiens which could lead to requests for exemptien not explicitly covered by the regulations, the NRC directed that the technical reviews constantly emphasize the basic intent of 3.CCFR50, Appendix J, that pctential centainment at cspheric leakage paths be identified, monitored, and maintained below established limits.
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- 3. TECHNICAL EVALUATICN I I
3.1 REQUESTS FOR EXEMPTICN FROM TEE RIQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR50, APPENDIX J l
Requests for exemption from the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J were submitted by JCPL as Tables 1, 2, and 3 of Reference 4 for Type A, B, and C
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testing, respectively. A technical evaluation of each of these requests fcr~
exe=ptien is included in the following sections.
3 .1.1 Recuest fer Exemetien frem Draininc and Ventinc Several Svstems Durinc Tvoe A Testina Table 1, Item 1 of Reference 4, identifies several systems, portic.ns of
, which are part of the reacter coolant pres,sure boundary and may be open directly to the centair. ment atmosphere under post-accident conditions, which JCPL dees not intend to cpen or vent to atmosphere and drain during Type A testing. JCFL's bases fer not opening and draining these systems during the Type A test can be categcrired into four g cups, each cf which is evaluated separately below.
3.1.1.1 System with Reacter Vessel Penetraticns Below the Water Level
- Required While Fuel is in the vessel JCPL stated that three systems having reactor vessel penetratiens below the water level required while fuel is in the vessel wculd not be cpened er vented to at=csphere and drained. These systems are:
Emergency condenser system cendensate return Reacter sample line Reacter cleanup system.
JCPL stated that modifications wculd be made to the reacter sample line and the reacter cleanup system so that local leak rate testing ceuld be performed en the isolatien valves. The local leak results wculd be added.to the result cf the integrated leak r, ate test (ILRT) . JCPL requested exempticn frem the requirement to vent and drain the emergency cendenser system cenden-sate return lines because having these lines water-filled will not affect the test results.
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Evaluation.Section III.A.1. (d) of Appendix J does not require venting and draining of systems which are part of the reactor coolant pressure bound-ary and may be cpened to contain=ent atmosphere af ter an accident if the system is required to raintain the blant in a safe conditi.cn during the Type A test. Sectien' !!! . A.1. (d) further requires that the centainment isciatien valves cf these systems be local leak rate tested. The results of the local, _ ,,
leak rate tests are- then added to the results of the ILRT (Type A test) .
Vesting and draining of syste=s with reactor vessel penetratiens belew the water level required while fuel is in the vessel, therefore, is net required by Section III. A.1. (d) since to do so wculd place the plant in an unsafe condition. Furthermore, JCPL has cc==itted ltself to performing Type C tests of the centain=ent isolation valves of the reacter sa ple line and the reacter cleanup systems. In Secticn 3.1.4.2 cf this report, FRC has deter-mined that the isolation valves of the emergency ccndenser system condensate return lines do not require Type C testing because they are not relied upen to perfcrm a centainment isolatien functicn as defined in Secticn II.E cf Appendix J with regard to the leakage cf centainrent atscsphere. Therefere, the three systems of this categcry need not be vented and drained during the Type A test and no exemptiens f:cm the requirements cf Appendix J a:e neces-sary because all Appendix J requirements will be =et.
3.1.1.2 Syste=s with Reactc Vessel Penetrations selcw the Water Level in the Vessel turing the Test i
l JC7L stated that f.ive systems having reacter vessel penetratiens belcw the level in the vessel during the Type A test wculd net be'epened c: ve nter.
te atscrphere and drained. These systems are:
Feedwater system i
Centrol rod driveline (CRD) hydraulic return to reacter l Liquid poisen I
( Ccre spray to reacter .
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JCPL stated that modifications would be made 'to the 'feedwater system, CRD hydraulic return to reactor, and liquid poison system so that local leak rate testing of isolation valves could be performed. , Local leakage results would be added to the results of the ILRT. JCPL regjested exe:ptien frem the requirements of Appendix J to vent and drain the core spray to reactor lines and the reactor coolant instru=ents since these lines are not considered to .be . ..
scurces of post-accident containment atmospheric leakage.
Evaluatien. Section III. A.l(d) of Appendix J dces not require venting and draining of systems which are part of the reacter coolant pressure bound-ary and may be opened to containment atmesphere after an accident if the system is required to maintain the plant in a safe-cendition duri,ng the Type A test.Section III. A.l. (d) further requires,that ,ty.y centainment isolation valves of these systems be local leak rate tested. The results of the local leak rate tests are then added to the results of the ILRT (Type A test).
FRC infers frem JCPL's statement that the systems in this category have penetratiens belcw the water level in the vessel during the Type A test and that this level is the level necessary tc =aintain the plant in a safe ecndi-tien thrcug.E. cut the Type A test. If this were net the case, the water level wculd be icwered to that level necessary to expose the isolaticn valves of these systems to the differential pressure of the Type A test and there
[ wculd te ne need for an exe:ptien request.
Previded that the water level maintained in the vessel during the Type A test is the level which JCPL has determined to be required to aintain the plant in a safe ccnditien, these systems need net be vented and drained prier to and during the Type A test. In the case of the feedwater system, CRD hydraulic return, and liquid poisen system, JCPL's cet=itsent to perform local leakage rate tests en the centainment isolatien valves in these systems and to l
add to the measured leakage to the ILRT results meets all requirements cf i .
l Appendix J and no exe=ption is needed for these systems.
l l The ccre spray syste= is designed to functicn throughcut the pcst-accident period. It has sufficient redundancy to ensure that the syste=
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TER-CS257-36 will be pressurized to pressures greater than the pe'ak calculated containment accident pressure (Pa) regardless of a possible single active failure to the system. Consequently, the isolation valves of this system are not relied upon
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to perform an isolation function to prevent leakage of contair. ment atmosphere at any time throughout the post-accident period. Consequently, these valves are not containment isolation valves as defined by Section II.B of Appendix ,J , ,,
and therefere they need not be tested. The core spray system need not be
. vented and drained during the Type A test and the isolation valves need not be local leak rate tested because Appendix J does not require this testing. No exemptien from Appendix J is needed.
Reactor coolant instrument lines do not require, Type C testing unless they provide a direct connection between inside and outside containment atmcspheres as required by Section II.H.1 of Appendix.'J. ~ In the case of these lines, a passive f ailure of the instrument line cutside centain=ent is required in order for there to be a leakage path. In additien, since the lines' penetrate the reactor vessel below the mini um water line, there is no pessibility for leakage of centainment atmesphere even with a passive failure.
Consequently, these lines do not need to be vented and drained during the Type A test nor do they require Type C testing in acccrdance wi.th Appendix J. No exe ptien frc= Appendix J is necessary.
3.1.1.3 Svstem Recuired to be In Service to Maintain the Plant in a Safe Shutdewn Cenditice Curine the Test JC?L stated that tye systems required to be in service to r.aintain the plant in a safe shutdewn ccnditien'during the Type A test sculd net be cpened er vented' to at=osphere and drained. These systems are:
Shutdown ecoling system Feactor building closed cooling water system.
JCPL stated that modifications wculd be made to the reacter building closed cocling water system to permit 1ccal leakage rate testing of this system. The measured leakage frem these local leak tests wculd be added to 4__
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.i the results of the JaRT. JCPL requested exemption frcm the requirements 'of Appendix J with regard to venting and draining the shutdown cooling system during the Type A test since this system does not contribute to post-accident containment atmospheric leakage. ,
Evaluatien.Section III. A.1. (d) does not require venting and draining of syste=s which are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and/or may be opened to centainment atmosphere after an accident if the system is required to remain in cperatien during the test to maintain the plant in a safe condi-tien. This section, however, requires that the centainment isol tion valves in these systems be Type C tested.
Since the reactor building closed cooling water system i. solation valves will be local leak rate tested and the geasure(. leakage will be added to the ILRT results, this system need not be vented and drained price to and during the Type A test and no exemption frem the requirements of Appendix J is needed.
In Section 3.1.4.1 cf this report, FRC deter =ined that the isolation valves of the shutdewn ecoling system do not require Type C testing beca'use they are not relied upon to perform a centainment isclaticn function as defined in Section II.B of Appendix J with regard to leakage of centaincent at csphere. Therefore, FRC finds that the shutdown cocling system need not be vented and drained for the Type A test and that no exemptien f rom the require-ments of Appendix J is necessary.
3.1.1.4 System Scr: ally Filled with 'n'ater and Operating Under Pest-Accident Cenditiens JCPL stated that the CEO insert and withdraw lines are normally filled with water when operating af ter an accident and therefere wculd not be vented and drained for the Type A test. JCPL requested exemptien Cte: the require-ments of Appendix J to vent and drain these lines stating that they were small lines (3/4 to 1 inch), seismically designed, and protected frem damage due to pipe ruptures.
Evaluatien. Secticn III.A.l.(d) cf Appendix J requires venting and draining of syste=s which are part of the reacter coolant pressure beundary O. -
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TER-C5257-36 and may be open to containment atmosphere under post-accident conditions. The CRD insert and withdraw lines connect to the reactor coolant pressure bcundary but are not open to containment atmo, sphere under post-accident conditiens.
These lines connect to the reactor coolant system at the bottom of the reactor vessel, well below the minimum water level required to maintain the core covered. In addition, the lines are desrgned seismically anf protected -- ' ~~
against other secondary effects of the LOCA which could cause one or several lines to' upture. Since there is no potential centainment atmospheric leakage .
path frem these lines, Appendix J dces not require that they be vented and drained during the Type A test and no exe:ptien is necessary.
3.1.2 Recuest for Exemetien frem Correcting Test Leakage Rates fer Instrument Error * "-
Table 1, Item 2B of Eeference 4, identified the Licensee's intent not to add a statistically determined, roct-=ean-square allowance for instrument er:cr'to the " measured" leak rate. This request fer exemption was cc:bined with the requirerent of Section III.A./.3 (c) of Appendix J, implying that the licensee was cf the cpinien that this* infer:ation is relevant to the instru-ment er:cr cer:ection requirement cf that sectien.
Evaluatien. Secticn III. A.2 (c) cf Appendix J requires that calculated leakage rates (for both the Type A and supple: ental ILRT tests) be based en the absolute value of measured parameters (i.e., centainment pressure, cen-tainrent temperature, water vapor pressure, etc.) cc :ected for er:crs in these instru:ents used to evaluate these para..eters. This article creates no require ents pertaining to additien cf any er:c factc (inciudingastatisti-cally determined " instrument er:ce") to a calculated leakage rate. JC7L's request fc: exe ptien, therefore, is unnecessary since Appendix J dces not require the impcsitien of an instrument error to the measured leakage rate.
The requirements of Section III.A./ (c) with regard to instrument errors, as applied to the measurement of parameters, shculd be folicwed.
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TER-C5257-36 3.1.3 Recuest for Exeretion with Reseect to Type 'E Testino of Dryvell Airlocks Reference 4, Table 2, Items 2 and 3, requested exemptions with respect to both the frequency and pressure of dryvell airlock testing. JCPL proposed that airlocks at Oyster Creek be tested at 6-month intervals at a pressure of 35 psig using strongbacks to prevent the inner door frem becoming unseated. If
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the airicek is opened during the intervaf between the 6-menth tests, the air"-
lock wculd be tested within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of every first of a series of cpenings at a pressure of 10 psig, a pressure not requiring the use of stengbacks. The result of the test at 10 psig will be censervatively extrapolated to a leakage rate at 35 psig to determine the acceptability of each test.
Evaluation. Sections III.B.2 and III.D.2'of Appendix J require'that containment airlocks be tested at peak calcitlated accident pressure (Pa) at 6 menth intervals and after each cpening. This requirement of mere frequent testing of airlocks than other isolaticn barriers is based en the fact that these potentially large leakage paths are more subject to persennel error and degradation than ether containment penetratiens. A ccmpilation of airlock events f cm Licensee Event Reports submitted since 1969 shews that airicck testing in accordance with Appendix J has been effective in prcmpt identifi-catien cf airlock leakage, but that rigid adherence to the af ter-each-opening requirement may not be necessary.
i Since 1969, :here have been a;;ccximately 70 repcrted instances in which i
t airlock testing results htve exceeded allowable leakage limits. Of these l
events, 25% vere the result of leakage other than that frem impreper seating l a of airlock docr seals. These failures were generally caused'by leakage past decr-cperating mechanism handwheel packing, docr-cperating cylinder shaf t scals, equali:er valves, er test lines. These penetratiens are not unlike ctner Type B er Type C centainment penetratiens except that they may be cper-ated mere frequently. Since airlocks are tested at a pressure cf Pa every 6 months, these penetrations are tested, at a minimum, fcur times acre fre-quently than typical Type B er C penetraticns. The 6-menth test is therefere '
- censidered to be both justified and adequate fer the prempt identification of 1
this leakage.
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Improper seating of the airlock door seals, howeve'r, is not only the most frequent cause of airlock f ailures (the remaining 754), but also represents the largest potential leakage path. While testing at a pressure of Pa after
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each cpening will identify seal leaRage, seal leakage can also be identified by alternative methods such as pressuriting between double-gasketed door seals (for airlocks designed with this type of seal) er pressurizing the airlock to pressures other than Pa. Furthermore, experience gained in testing airlocks since the issuance of Appendix J indicates that the'use of one of these alter-native methods may be preferable to the full pressure test of the entire airleck.
Reactor plants designed before the issuance of Appendix J of t'en do not have the capability to test airlocks at Pa without the installation'of strong-backs er the performance of mechanical adjustk.ents I'C' the operating =echanisms of the inner doors. This is because the inner doors are designed to seat with accident pressure (i.e., accident pressure en the centainment side of the dec r ) ', and therefore the operating mechanisms were not designed to withstand accident pressure in the oppesite direction. When the airlock is pressuri:ed for a 1ccal airlock test (i.e., pressuri:ed between the doors), pressure is exerted en the airlock side of the inner decr, causing the decr to unseat and preventing the cenduct of a meaningful test. The strengback or mechanical adjustrents prevent the unseating of the inner door, allcwing the test to pecceed. The insta11atien of strengbacks or performance of mechanical adjust-ments is time censc=ing (cf ten taking several hours), =ay result in additienal radiatien expcsure to cperating persennel, and may also cause degradaticn to the cperating mechanism cf the inner door with censequentiAl icss of reli-ability of the airlock. In addition, when conditiens require frequent cpenings over a short period of time, testing at Pa after ea.ch cpening becemes i= practical (t'ests eften take frem 8 hcurs to several days) and accelerates the rate of exposure to persennel and degradation of mechanical equip ent.
Fcr these reasons, FRC concludes that the intent of Appendix J is satisfied and the undesirable effects cf testing after each cpening are reduced if a satisfactcry test of the airlock door seals is performed within 3 days of each cpening er every 72 hcurs during a period cf frequent cpenings.
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TER-CS257-36 Furtherncre, these tests, conducted betweenI 6-month full pressure (Pa)' tests, may be conducted at a pressure less than Pa which does not require the installation of strengbacks or performance of other mechanical adjustments.
However, leakage determined from such test's =ust be censervatively extrap-elated to an equivalent leakage rate at Pa to determine acceptability.
Acceptable methods for extrapolation of 1eakage rates are given in Appendix A to this report. As can he seen in Appendix A, a conservative correlation between the measured leakage rate at pressure Pt (dt) and the theoretical leakage rate at pressure Pa (sa) is given by (where Pat = atmospheric pressure):
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(Pat)
In summary, JCPL's prcpesed drywell airlock testing is acceptable, provided the results of testing at 10 psig are conservatively extrapelated to 35 psig. An exemptien frem the requirements of Appendix J is not required because the prepcsed testing is in ecnformance with'Section III.D,2, as revised en Octcber 22, 1980. The Licensee shculd ensure that it cceplies with
- all previsiens of the revised Secticn III.O.2.
3.1.4 Recuest fer Exemetien frem Tvre C Testine Fecuire ents l Table 3 cf Reference 4 identifies 10 isclatien valves fer which JCPL has requested exemptien f rem the Type C testing require:ents of Appendix J. These valves are asscciated with twc systems, the shutdcwn eccling syste: (2 valves) and the emergency condenser system (8 valves) . The request for exemption fer i
each system is evaluated separately belcw.
t f 3.1.4.1 Request fer Exe ption frcm Type C Testing of Shutdewn Cooling Systen valves V-17-19 and V-17-54 JCPL requested an exe:ptien frem the Type C testing reqcire ents for shut-dewn ecoling system valves V-17-19 and V-17-54 en the basis that the l
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TER-C5257-36 system is not expected to be a source f post-accident leakage. The valves are closed during power operation. The system is closed cutside centainment, is seismically designed, and is protected frcm the effect of pipe ruptute.
Evaluatien. Valves V-17-19 and V-17-54 are normally shut valves which remain shut in the post-accident condition. Since the shutdown cooling system eennects to the reactor coolant pressure-boundary through th& reactor recircu- . -
lation system, these valves will remain water-covered throughout the post-accident period by the water level in the reactor vessel (the recirculatien no:zles penetrate the reactor vessel well below the level necessary to main-tain the core cevered). Ccnsequently, there is no path for centainment at=o -
spheric leaksge to penetrate the contain=ent beundary through these two valves.
Section III . A.1. (d) requires that containment,. iso _latien valves in syste=s that are cpen to centainment atmosphere af ter an accident be tested by Type C testing procedures.Section II.B defines containment isolation valves as these valves relied upon to perform a containment isolation function. Since valves V-17-19 and V-17-54 are net relied upon to perfor: a centainment iso-latien functicn against potential leakage of contain=ent air, Appendix J does not require that they be tested. TEC finds that these valves need not be tested and that no exemptien f rem Type C testing require:ents of A' ppendix J is necessary.
3.1.4.2 Request fer Exemptien f rom Type C Testing of Energency Cendenser System Valves V-14-30 Thrcugh V-14-37 JCPL requested an exemptien frem the Type C testing requirements for erergency cendenser syste= valves V-14-30, V-14-31, V-14'32, and V-14-33 (10-inch motor-cperated stea: line isolatien gate valves) and V-14-34, V-14-35, V-14-36, and V-14 (10-inch meter-cperated cendensate return iso-lation gate valves). JC?L's basis for this reque:t is that the emergency cendenser system is designed to be operable follcwing an accident and acts as an extensien of the containment boundary. It is not a scurce of leakage during the post-accident period. It is isclated aute atically enly en high flew, er manually en high radiatien in the cendenser shell.
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TER-CS257-36 Evaluation.Section III.A.l.(d) requires Type C testi'ng of contairment ,
isolation valves which are connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
Section II.B, however, defines centainment isolation valves as those valves
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relied upon to perform a containment isolation function.
Steam supply isolation valves (V-14-30 through V-14-33) are normally cpen valves, and therefore the closed-locp emergency condenser pip'ing cutside -
centairment is constantly pressurized to reactor coolant system pressure.
JCPL has stated that this piping is an extensien of the centair ent boundary.
The isolatica valves are shut cnly en high ficw cr high radiatien in the cendenser shell, neither of which results f rem a LCCA inside centainment.
Consequently, it is clear that the emergency condenser system isolatien valves (V-14-30 through V-14-37) are not relied upon ,to perfgem a containeent isola-th
- function following a LOCA, and therefore Type C testing is not required.
No exemptien frem Appendix J is required.
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CONCLUSIONS Requests for exemption from the requirements of 10CTR50, Appendix J,
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submitted by JCPL in Reference 4 were technically evaluated. The following ~
conclusions are' submitted:
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o The following systems er portions of systems do not require venting -
and draining price to and during the Type A , test (section III. A.l. (d) of Appendix J). No exemptions from the requirements are needed.
Emergency cendenser system condensate return Reactor sample line Reactor cleanup system Teedwater system ~'
CED hydraulic return to reactor .
Liquid poisen
- ~~" '
Core spray to reactor Reacter coolant instruments Shutdown coeling Reactor building closed cooling water CRD insert and withdraw lines.
o The addition of a statistically deter =ined instrumens errer to the Type A or supplemental test is net required by Appendix J. The requirement of Secticn III.A.2?(c) to calculate leakage rates based upcn absciute values corrected for instruzent erre-s in the instru-ments used to measure the parameters shculd be fc11cwed, o JCPL's preposal to test drywell airlocks at 6-zenth intervals at a pressure of Pa (35 psig) and within 72 hcurs of every first cf a series of cpenings at 10 psig in the interim between 6-month tests is acceptable. No exemptien is required because of the revision to section III.D.2 cf Appendix J, effective Octcber 22, 1950, c Shutdcwn eccling system val'ves V-17-19 and V-17-54 do net require Type C testing and no exe:ptien is required tecause Appe.. dix J dces not require ,that these valves be tested.
c Emergency cendenser isolation valves V-14-30 thrcugh V-14-37 need not be Type C tested and no exemption is required because Appendix J dees not require that these valves be tested.
O_.__ ...J Frank!!n Research Center
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i-TER-C5257-36 l
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- 5. FIFERENCES -
- 1. NRC, Generic letter to JCPL regarding implementation of 10CFR50, Appendix J at Oyster Creek ..
i.
07-Aug-75 ,
- 2. V. R. Finfrock, Jr. (JCPL)
Letter to K. R. Gcller (NRC) - -
24-Dec-75 (GD-75-0 20 ) -
- 3. V. R. Finfrock, Jr. (JCPL)
Letter to Secretary, USNRC 12-Aug-76 (EA-76-781) -
-~
- 4. V. R. Finfrock, Jr. (JCPL)
- Letter to Director, NRR * "N -
22-Nov-78 e
43 ..G Franklin Research Center
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APPENDIX A .-
6
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, S 6 4
i i CONVERSION OF REDUCED PRESSURE AIR LF.EACE .".r ASUR.NENTS'
-~
TO EQUIVALENT FULL PRESSURE AIR LD_GGI .
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. .f > 't-l' A
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'4 l JUI.Y 17, 1980 s
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N s Dr. G. P . 'n'acht ell Franklin Research Center n
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' APPENDIX A. AIR TO AIR LEAXAGE CONVERSION In pneu=atic leakage testing in which application of Pa psig is cs ,ca lled for by Appendix J, it is so=eti=es necessary to request an ex-e=ption that permits pneu=atic testing at a lever pr, essure, Pt psig.
The leakage ~ rate, Lt, =easured under test conditions =ust then be cen-verted =a:he=atically to the leakage eate, La, that would- occur if the_ .
pressure were equal to Pa. It is essential that the conversien be con-y
'\,' servative. That is, the calculated value of La =ust t.o be lever than
~
s ~
the actual leakage rate at Pa vould be. On the other. hand, the conver-s s ion'. 8should not be = ore' conservative than necessary in the light of available data, because excessive conservatis= could frequently result
~'
~~
s in the interpretation that a given leak exceeds its =axi=== allevable li=it when in fact it would not exceed that IEnic if Pa vere actually s .-
i applied.
' The =eaning of the expression "if ?a were actually applied" should s be carefully censidered. The assu=ptien is =ade that the gec=etry and i h Pa applied as "k .' .'di=ensiens of :he leakage path would be the sa:e w t vith Pr' applied, or that any changes in gec=e:ry veuld not increase the (u. .
- . leakaga rate. In the case of airlock doors in which Pt is applied in
- h>e reverse direction, oppesite to the direction in which Pa veuld be applied under functica conditions, the use of the reverse direction cf ipplicatica of pressure is expected to tend to cpen the seal and increase
~
s the leaAag~e Yate. Under function ccnditiens, in which pressure is
- 2) plied in , he forward direction, the seal should be i=preved if it J
~
cnanges at all . The expressic: "if ?a were actually applied" in this
~
cad =eans "if Pa were actually applied in the forvard (ner=al for functien) direction." In the case of valves and ether penetratiens, l'
.. ._ s
,1
' it is essential that increasing the applied pressure frc= P: :o Pa not change the sec=etry so as te increase the leakage rate. For exa=ple, t
increasing the pressure on a closed valve shculd tend to i=preve 1:s b * -
sealing a: the surf aces that provide the seal, and also in any other 4 - ,
s {
~
' A_1
, y+ ,
s, s
~ g:.
\ r
\= i
. m .
,My I N
/
i potential leakage paths such as valve ste= or packing that =ay have a connection to the applied pressure. Such other potential leakage paths are of ecurse absent in vs1ve desi bus in which the ste=. and packing have a connection only to the downstream side of the valve.
Reference 1, which is ASME Code,Section II, paragraph IW7-3423 (e),
states the following rule for tests at less thah function differential
~
pressure:
" Leakage tests involving pressure differentials-lover --
than f:ncticn pressure differentials are per=itted in those types of valves in unich service" pressure vill tend :o diminish the overa'.1 leakage channel opening, as by pressing the disk into or ento the seat, with graater fcrce. Cate valves, check valves, and glebe-type valves having function pressure dif ferential applied over the f. eat, are examples of valve applica-tiens satisfying this require:ent. When leakage t,ests are ade in such cases using pressures lever than fune-tion =axi=u= pressure differentisl, thE-observed leak-age shall be adjusted to functica =axi=u= pressure differential value. This adjustment shall be =ade by calcula:1on appropriate to the test redia and the .
ratio berveen test and function pressure dif ferential, assu=ing leakage to be directly proportional to the pressure differential to the one-half pewer."
In the discussion belev, it 'is shcw= that if (a) the t e s t radiu=
is air, (b) Pa is appreciable compared to cne at:csphere, and (c) the leakage path is such as to prcduce la=inar viscous fiev (i.e., capilla;y-like rather than orifice-like), the calculatien apprcpriate to this :est ediu= yields a substantially higher calculated value cf Pa than veuld be obtained by assu=ing leakage to be directly proportienal to the pres-sure dif ferential to the one-half pcver.
l l yer air flew through an crifice, assu=ing unifer: ilev velocity over the orifice area, the = ass flow rate per uni: orifice area is ;v, where o is ,the density of air in the crifice and v is vel' ocity in the orifice. Assuning that the discharge pressure is Pat = 1 atmosp'here and the source pressure is Po, where ?o and Pat are both absolute pressures, Ov is given by 2vg Pz:2 -
Po 3
(sv)2 =
y-1 R. i Pat
-1 G. (A-1) 0 s s A-2
-. g -_____=_m -s
i
. . 1
-?
i 2
where y = 1.,4 is the specific heat ratio for air, g = 32.2 ft/sec is the acceleration of gravity, T is source (upstream, a; Po) tecperature .
(*R).Nisabsgiutep;gaura(psf),R = 53.26 fralb/lh*F is the gas constant for air and G is given by P 9 y-1 ; Y-1 .
- 3 y y x
Pe ' 2 x -l (A-2)
G' =. '
,P a t, po
-1 . _.
, Pat ,
?o x = r e-Pe = Pat for subsonic flow Pe = 0.5283 Po for choked flow . . ,. .
Choked flow occurs when Y
Pat , Yal Y-1 = 0.5253 Fo --
2
/li is proportional to Ov//Fo-Pat. Values of /li are lis:ed in Table A-1. < GI, the li=iting value of /GI for s=all (?c-Pat), is o
/ (y-1) /y = 0.5345.
In Table A-1, inspection of /G/ To shows the accuracy of the assu=ption that for an crifice-like leakage flow resistance, leakage
= ass ficw rate is proportienal to pressure difference to the ene-half pcuer. For exa:ple, if Fo = 60 psig (?c-Ps: = 60 in Table A-1),
v G// G = 1.210. Extrapola:1cn of = ass flev race =easured with P: =
o
. 15 psig to = ass flev rate predicted for Pa = 60 psig will underesti= ate the = ass flow rete by the factor 0.968/1.210 = 0.80, or 20%.
The foregoing argu=ent tacitly assu=es that the crifice coefficient is = 1.0. however, the sa=e conclusien concerning extrapolatien from low values of Pt to high values of Fo can be drawn if the orifice coef-ficient is assumed to be ccnstant, i.e., independent of Po. Ccasequently, A-3
- n -- a n
Table A-1. /li for Various Values of Po - Pat for Orifice. (Pat taken' = 15 psia.)
Po - Pat fg b (psi) G 0.01 _0.5345 . 1.000 1 0.5332 0.998 5 0.5282 0.988 0.970 - - -
13.3 0.5185 13.4* 0.5184 . 0.970 15
- 0.5176 0.968 20
- 0.5230 0.978 '
25
- 0.5346 1.000
- 30.
- 0.5490 __ 1.027 35
- 0.5648 1.057
' ~
40 *. 0.5811 1.587 45
- 0.5977 1.118 50
- 0.6143 1.149 55
- 0.6307 1.180 60
- 0.6470 1.210
' Choked ficw ,
for leakage paths that are kncun to be entirely orifice-like, the assu=p-i -d en that leakage mass flev rate is propertienal te pressure difference l to the one-half pcuer gives a reasonably accurate correla:1cn, underesti-
=ating the leakage cass flev rate by at =cs: 20~ for ?a < 60 psig. To correct the underes:1:ste, the factor ( d/r T )a/(4/v I o- ): has :o be applied, o
where a and : nean ?o = ?a and ?:, respectively. F.eferences 2, 3, and 4 discuss the conversien fer=ulas to be applied fer varicus. fluids (e.g. , air and water) 'for various types of leakage path. For visecus flev,of a gas, the = ass flow rate from a source at absciute inlet pressure Py to absolute 2 2 outle: pressure 2? is prcportional to (? The proportionality 1 -P2 ). '
facter is C/uT, where C is a function of gec=e:ry, T is absolute tenpera-ture, and u is viscosity (which is a functicn only of tenperature).
Assuming that test pressure P: psig is applied at the same te pera-ture as that at which function pressure Fa psig is applied, and assu=ing 1-4
further that the downstrea= pressure is one at=osphere, Pat psia, then the ratio of the = ass flow rates is
- ma (Pa + Pat)2 - (Pat)2 (A-3)
$t (Pt + Pat)2 - (Pat)2 If the te=peraturr.s are not the sate, the right side of' Equation (A-3) has to be =ultiplied by u(Tt) Tt u(Ta) Ta (A-4)
Assuming that It = Ta, Table A-2 shows the ratio Ea/Et for various -
values of Pa and Pt, along with values of (Pa psig/Pt psig) ,
. Pat is taken to be 15 psia in calculating Ea/=t.
- Table A-2. 5a/ht for Various Values of Pa and Pt.
(da/ht) ha/5: (Pa/Pt)l/2 (Pa/Pt)l/2
- Pt Pa=50 55 60 ~50. ~
55 ~
60 -
50 -
55 60 (osic) (psig) _
5 22.86 26.71 30.56 3.16 3.32 3.46 7.2 8.1 8.9 15 5.93 6.93 8.00 1.83 1.91 2.00 3.2 3.6 4.0 25 2.91 3.40 3.93 1.41 1.48 1.55 2.1 2.3 2.5 35 1.76 2.05 2.37 1.20 1.25 1.31 1.5 1.6 1.8 45 1.19 1.39 1.60 1.05 1.11 1.15 1.1 1.3 1.4 In all cases, the assu=ptica that nass flev rate is preperti nal to pressure dif ferential to the ene-half power is unconservative fer purely viscous flev. For Pa = 60 psig and Pt = 5 psig, it is uscenserva-I tive by a factor of 8.9.
RECOMFENDED PROCEDURE Any one of the follcuing procedures, A, E, or C shculd be adepted.
i i
A-5 f
9
- y. --
. __ ..-- _ , .-y . - . . - . ,_a. -, ,. ,
l l
A. Test Program An extensive test program, covering several,co=ponents of each type for which a correlatio'n fro = Pt to Pa is sought, should be per-formed, in which sufficient experi= ental data showing the relation between Pt and leakage mass flow rate are obtained to per=1t a con-servative empirical correlation ko be established. Care must be taken to ensure that experimental orifice-like leaks are not used to repre-sent actual, potentially capillary-like or viscous leaks._ _, _ ..
B. Conservative Theoretical Correlation Use Equation (A-3) as the correlatien for=ula, including the factor (A-4) if necessary.
C. Measure Leakage Characteristic For a given penetration, several values of Pt =ay be applied, so that an e=pirical correlatien can be established. A statistical analysis of the data would be required to ensure at a 95: confidence level, that the predicted value of $a is not exceeded by the actual value of =a.
REFIRENCES
- 1. ASMI Code,Section XI, paragraph r V-3423(e) .
- 2. A=ess, J. , " Conversion of Leak Flow-Rates for Various Fluids and Different Pressure Conditions," 1966, EUR 2982.e, CRGEL Progra=,
Ispra Establish =ent, Italy.
- 3. Maccary, R.R., DiNunno, J.J., Holt, A.E. , and Arlotto, G. A. , " Leakage l Characteristics of Steel Contain=ent Vessels and the Analysis of
, Leakage Rate Deter =inations,'" May,1964 Division of Safety Standards, AEC, T 3-20583.
4 Cottrell,' Wn. 3., and Savolainen, A.W., editors, "U.S. Reactor Con-j tain=ent Technology," CKNL-NSIC-5, Aug. 1965. Chapter 10, "?erfor=ance Tests," R.F. Griffin and G.H. Dyer. Sectiens 10.4.5 and 10.4.6 adapted fro: Reference 3.
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