ML20092N650

Technical Evaluation of Integrity of Oyster Creek Reactor Coolant Boundary Piping Sys

ML20092N650
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	08/31/1983
From:	Nagata P EG&G, INC.
To:	Donohew J, Koo W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20092N642	List: ML20092N650
References
CON-FIN-A-6429, RTR-NUREG-0313, RTR-NUREG-313 EGG-FM-6255, GL-81-04, GL-81-4, TAC-46668, NUDOCS 8407030388
Download: ML20092N650 (38)

Text

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EGG-FM-6255 August 1983 i

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF INTEGRITY 0F THE OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION l

REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY PIPING SYSTEM l

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EGG-FM-6255 TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF INTEGRITY OF I

THE OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY PIPING SYSTEM Published August 1983 Peter K. Nagata Materials Engineering Branch Materials Sciences Division EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Responsible NRC Individual and Division:

W. H. Koo/ Division of Engineering J. N. Donohew, Jr./ Division of Licensing Docket No.:

50-219 TAC No.: 46668 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under 00E Contract No. DE-AC07-761001570 FIN No. A6429

ABSTRACT NUREG-0313, Rev.1, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for SWR coolant Pressure Soundary PiDing, is the NRC staff's revised acceptable methods to reduce intergranular stress corrosion cracking in boiling water reactors. The responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 of Jersey Central Power and Light Company (JCPLC) concerning whether its Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station meets NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 are evaluated by EG&G Idaho, Inc. in this report. Particular attention was given the leak detection systems described in Regulatory Guide 1.45, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection Systems, referenced by Parts IV.B.l.a.(1) and (2) found on pages 7 and 8 of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

FOREWORD This report is supplied as part of the Selected Operating Reactor Issues Program being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing, by EG&G Idaho, Inc., Materials Engineering Branch.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under the authorization, B&R 20 19 10 11.

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SUMMARY

NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Pioing, is the NRC staff's revised acceptacle metnocs to recuce intergranular stress corrosion cracking in boiling water reactors. The responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 of Jersey Central Power and Light Company (JCPLC) concerning whether its Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station meets NUREG-0313, Rev. I are evaluated by EG&G Idaho, Inc. in this report.

Particular attention was given the leak detection systems described in Regulatory Guide 1.45, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection Systems, referenced by Parts IV.S.I.a.(1) ano (2) found on pages 7 and 8 of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

As may be observed in the following table, Jersey Central Power and Light Company (JCPLC) does not meet any of the parts of NUREG-0313, Rev.1 evaluated in this document.

The following table is a synopsis of the EG&G Idaho, Inc. evaluation of JCPLC's response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04.

Additional Data Part of NUREG-0313, a

D Rev. 1 Evaluated Evaluation Recuired Discrepancy Section II.

II.C.

Does not meet NUREG-0313, No Major Rev. 1 l

Section III.

Section IV.

1 IV.B.I.a.(1)

Provides alternative to No Major NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 IV.B.l.a.(2)

Does not rneet NUREG-0313, No Major Rev. 1 l

IV.B.I.b.

Does not meet NUREG-0313, No Minor Rev. 1 IV.B.I.b.(3)

Did not provide data in Yes Minor response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 tii

Additional Data Part of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 Evaluated Evaluation' Recuirea Discrecancy e

i IV.B.l.b.(4)

Did not provice cata in Yes Minor l

response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 IV.8.2.a.

The comments for Parts IV.B.1.a.(1) and IV.B.I.a.(2) apply here.

IV.B.2.b.

Does not meet NUREG-0313, No Minor Rev. 1 IV.B.2.b.(6)-

Did not provide data in Yes Minor response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 j<

Section V.

aSee Tables 1 and 3 for additional information.

bSee Tables 1 and 4 for additional information.

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s CONTENTS A B S TR AC T..............................................................

11

SUMMARY

iii 1.

I N TRO D UC T I O N.....................................................

1 2.

EVALUATION.......................................................

4 2.1 NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 Guidelines..............................

4 i

2.2 Discussion of Tables.......................................

4 2.3 Discrepancies..............................................

5 3.

C O NC L U S I O N S......................................................

6 4.

R E F E R E NC E S.......................................................

32 TABLES 1.

Review of Licensee's Response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04........

7

~

2.

Summaries of Evaluation of Licensee's Responses..................

23 3.

Differences between NUREG-0313, Rev. I and Licensee's Responses........................................................

25 4.

Additional Data Required of Licensee.............................

30 l

V

a TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF INTEGRITY OF THE OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION REACTOR COOLANT B0UNDARY PIPING SYSTEM i

1.

INTRODUCTION i

Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of austenitic stainless steel (SS) piping has been observed in boiling water reactors l

(BWRs) since December 1965.I The NRC established a Pipe Crack Study Group (PCSG) in January 1975 to study the problem.2 The PCSG issued two documents, NUREG-75/067 Technical Report, Investigation and Evaluation of 3

L Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactors and an implementation document, NUREG-0313, Rev. 0.2 After cracking in large-diameter piping was discovered for the first time in the Duane Arnold BWR in 1978, a new PCSG was formed. The new PCSG in turn issueo two reports, NUREG-0531, Investigation and Evaluation of Stress-Corrosion 4

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Cracking in Piping of Light Water Reactor Plants and NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping.' NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 is the implementing document of NUREG-0531 and discusses the augmented inservice inspection (ISI) and leak detection requirements "for plants that cannot comply with the material selection, testing, and processing guidelines" of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.5 NRC Generic Letter 81-04 requested each licensee "to review all ASME Code Class 1 and 2 pressure boundary piping, safe ends, and fitting material, including weld metal to determine if (they) meet the material selection, testing and processing guidelines in" NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.6 The generic letter offered tt:e option of providing a description, schedule, and justification for alternative actions that would reduce the susceptibility of pressure boundary piping and safe ends to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) or increase the probability of early detection of leakage from pipe cracks.

1

2.

EVALUATION 2.1 nUREG-0313, Rev. 1 Guioelines The guidelines and requirements outlined in NUREG-0313, Rev. I form the basis of this evaluation. The NUREG-0313, Rev. I guidelines are found in Parts III and V and the requirements in Parts II and IV of that document. Part II discusses implementation of material selection, testing, and processing guidelines. Part III summarizes acceptable methods to minimize IGSCC susceptibility with respect to the material selection, testing, and processing guidelines.

Part IV deals with leak detection and inservice inspection requirements of nonconforming (i.e., not meeting the guidelines of Part III of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1) piping. Part V discusses general recommendations.

2.2 Discussion of Tables Table 1 has the complete text Parts II through V of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 on the left side so that the reader may be able to refer to it as the topics are discussed. The right side summarizes the licensee's responses, lists tne differences between the licensee's proposed implementation program and NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, and identifies the additional data required to evaluate the licensee's response.

Many sections in Parts II through IV of NUREG-0313, Rev. I are not discussed in the right hand column.

In these cases, one of the comments below will be used.

o Not applicable because the construction permit for this plant has been issued.

o Not applicable because the operating license for this plant has been issued.

o Not applicable because the plant has been constructed.

4

3.

_ Credit for past operating experience and inspection results.

4 The acceptability of inouction neating stress improvement (IhSI), heat

. sink welding (HSW), and weld overlay a: alternates to augmented ISI.

a 4

3 I

3.

CONCLUSIONS JCPLC's Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station has the following major discrepancies:

Part IV.B.l.a.(1) Leak Detection and Monitoring System JCPLC's description of Oyster Creek's leak detection methods is not detailed enough to determine whether they meet Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45.

Part IV.B.I.a.(2) Leak Detection Requirements JCPLC has not proposed a requirement for snutdown after a 2-gpa increase in unidentified leakage in 24 h into the Technical Specifications for Oyster Creek.

JCPLC has not proposed a requirement for monitoring the sump level at 4-h intervals (or less).

JCPLC does not meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 in this matter.

There are minor discrepancies as well as the major ones listed above.

These minor discrepancies are not listed here. However, while the licensee's alternate proposals that havs been classified as minor discrepancies might be acceptable under the anticipated revision of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, it should not be inferred that approval of those alternate proposals has been given.

The licensae has not supplied sufficient information to evaluate his responses to topics IV.B.l.b.(3), IV.B.I.b.(4) and IV.B.2.b.(6).

Table 4 lists the required information for each topic.

Table 4 lists the required information for each topic.

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i The licensee has not furnished data on this topic in his o

responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04.

o No comment made because alternative plan: were not evaluated.

Table 2 lists the summaries of the licensee's responses to NRC questions on implementation of NUREG-0313, Rev. I guidelines. Therefore, in Table 2 the reader is able to read all the summaries in one table without having to search Table 1 for all the summaries.

The same compilation applies to Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3 lists the differences between the licensee's proposed. implementation program and that recommended in NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

Table 4 lists the areas where additional information is required to properly evaluate the licensee's proposed implementation program. All the items in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are listed in their respective table.s in the order' they appear in Table 1.

2.3 Discrepancies Any alternate proposal that did not meet a specific guideline or requirement of NUREG-0313, Rev. I was considered a discrepancy.

Evaluation of alternate proposals was outside the scope of this task, as indicated in Section 1 of this report. Licensees have submitted definitions of "nonservice sensitive" and augmented ISI proposals that differ from NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

These differences are considered minor because the NRC staff is considering major modifications to those requirements. An example i

of a minor discrepancy is the use of the stress rule index (SRI) to choose which welds would be subjected to augmented ISI.

If the alternate proposal to leak detection does not meet the requirements in NUREG-0313, Rev.1, it was considered a major discrepancy because NRC is not considering major modifications to those requirements.

An example of a major discrepancy is a licensee's not proposing Technical Specifications to implement leak detection requirements in NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

Only major discrepancies are listed in the Conclusions section.

5

I II. A.

' Selection of Materials A.~

The licensee has not furnished data on this paragraph in his responses to 8WIC Generic Letter 81-04.. See only those materials described in Paragraphs I connent on Part II.C. above.

and 2 below are acceptable to the IRC for installation in IMt A5ME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 piping systems. Other materials may be used when evaluated and accepted by the IWIC.

Ill.A.I. Corrosion-Resistant Materials 1.

The connents on III.A. also apply here.

All pipe and fitting material including safe ends, thermal sleeves, and teeld metal should be of a type and grade that has been

-demonstrated to be highly resistant to oxygen-assisted stress corrosion in the as-installed condition. Materials that have been so demonstrated include ferritic steals, "fluclear Grade" austenttic stainless steels,*

Iypes 304L and 316L austentLic stainless steels Type CF-3 cast stainless steel, Types CF-8 and CF-8M cast austenttic stainless steel with at least 51 ferrite, Type 308L stainless steel weld metal, and other austenit1C stainless steel weld metal with at least 51 ferrite content. lanstabilized wrought austenitic stainless steel without controlled low carbon has not been so demonstrated except when the piping is in the solution-annealed condition. The use of such material (i.e., regular grades of' Types 304 and 316 stainless steels) should be avoided.

If such material is used, the as-installed piping including welds should be in she solution-annealed condition. Ifhere segular grades of lypes 304 and 316 are used and welding or heat treatment is required, special measures, such as those described in Part lit.C. Processing of Materials, should be taken to ensure that IGSCC will not occur.

Such measures may include (a) solution 43Hleasing suuseiluent to the weiding or heat treatment, and (b) weld cladding of materials to be welded using procedures that have been demonstrated to reduce residual stresses and sensittration of surf ace materials.

alhese materlaIs have controlled low Carbon (0.021 max) and nitrngen (0.11 max)" contents and meet all requirements, including me(nanical prope. ty requirements, of ASME specif itation f or regular grades of Type 304 or 3;6 sta6nless steel pipe.

IABLE I.

REVl[W OF LICEIISEE'S RESP 0stSE TO IIRC GENERIC IEIIER 81-04 Excerpts from INREG-0313, Rev.1 EG4G Idaho Evaluation--0YSIER CREEK leUCLEAR II.

IMPLEMENTATI0ft OF MATERIAL SELECTICII TESTlHG, AIID PiiGCf5TileG GU!DELIIES II.A.

For plants unJer review, but for which a A.

Not applicable because the construction permit for tiels construction permit has not been issued, all ASK plant has tieen issued.

Code Class I, 2, and 3 lines shogld Conform to the guidelines stated in Part III.

11.8.

For plants that have been issued a construction 8.

Ilot appilcable because the operating IlCense for this permit but not an operating license, all ASME Code plant has been issued.

Class I, 2, and 3 lines should conform to the i

guidelines stated in Part III unless it can be demonstrated to the staff that implementing the guidelines of Part III would result in undue hardship. For Cases in whlCh the guidelines of Part III are not complied with additional measures should be taken for Chess 1 and 2 Ifnes in accordance with the guidelines stated in Part IV of this document.

II.C.

For plants that have been issued an operating C,

SIMIARV license, IIRC designated " Service Sensitive" lines u

j (Part IV. 8) should be modified to confom to the Jersey Central Power and Light Company JCPLC) does not guidelines stated in Part III, to the extent consider material replacement necessary because AISI practicable. When " Service Sensitive" and other Type 316 stainless steel is considered by JCPLC to be imune 4

Class I and 2 lines do nct meet the guidelines of to IGSCC.

Part III, additional measures should be taken in accordance with the guidelines stated in Part IV JCPLC does not meet MUREG-0313, Rev. I in this matter.

of this document. Lines that experience cracking l

during service and require replacement should be DIFFEREleCES replaced with piping that conforms to the guidelines stated in Part Ill.

ImmEG-03I3, Rev. I requires th.t IIRC-designated nonconforming " service sensitive" lines be replaced with corrosion-resistant materials.

JCPLC considers replacement of AISI Type 316 stainless replacementisunnecessary,jherefore,JCPLCbelievesthat steel as Immane to IGSCC.

s ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED

leone, III. SHHMARY UF ACCEPTABLE METHODS TO MllIIMIZE CRACK luMEPIIBItTIV--MA!ERlR TELECT1011. TESTilIG, AIID Fi6Risliid 60I6ftTiiE5' l

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Ill.C. Processing of Materials C.

The licensee has' not furnished data on this paragraph.

In his responses to NRC Generic tetter 81-04. See ferrosion-resistant cladding with a duplex comment on Part II.C. above, snicrostructure (51 minimum ferrite) may be applied to the ends of Type 304 or 316 stainless stees l

pipe f or the purpose of avoiding IGSCC at weldments. Such cladding, which is latended to (a) minimite the HAZ on the pipe inner surf ace, (b) move the HAZ away f rom the highly stressed region next to the attachment weld, and (c) isolate the welement from the envirosument, may be applied under the following conditions:

a III.C.I. For initial construction, provided that my of 1.

The comments on III.C. also apply here.

the piping is solution annealed af ter cladding.

l III.C.2. For repair welding and modification to 2.

The comments on III.C. also apply herq.

in-place systt:ss in operating plants and plants under construction. When the repair f

welding or modification requires replacement of pipe, the replacement pipe should be j

solution-annealed af ter cladding.

i Corrosion-resistant cladding applied in the l

"fleld" (i.e., without subsequent solution annealing of the pipe) is acceptable only on that purtion of the pipe that has not been 4

removed from the piping system. Other "fleld" applications of corrosion-resistant cladding are not acceptable.

-o Other processes that have been found by I

laboratory tests to minimize stresses and i

IG500 in austenttic stainless steel weldsents 4

include induction heating stress improvement (11151) and heat sink welding (HSW). Although 4

the use of these processes as an alternate to autyNented inservice inspection is not yet accepted by the NRC, these processes may be

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per:missible and will be considered on a case-by-case basis provided acceptable a

supportive data are subeeltted to the NRC.

IV.

IN5ERVICE INSPECTION AND LEAK DEIECTION REQUIREMENTS f5fBWiis Wlill VARYING DEGRf ES OF CONIORMANCE 10 MAlfRIAC TEiFCTIDC TE5TTiiG-AillFPAULT55TliGTJITDELINES 4

IV.A.

For plants whose ASME b.de Class 1, 2, and 3 A.

The llCensee has not furnished data on this paragraph pressure boundary piping meets the guidelines of

- in his responses to NRC Generic tetter 81-04.

Part III, no augmented inservice inspection or leak detection requirements beyond those specified in the 10 CFR 50.55a(g), " Inservice Inspection Requirements" and plant Technical Specifications 1

for leakage detection are necessary.

4 i

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1

Ill. A.2.

Corrosion-Resistant Safe Ends and Themal 2.

The cos,ments on Ill. A. also apply here.

Sleeves

' All unstabillied wrought austenttic stainless steel materials used for safe ends and thermal sleeves without controlled low carbon contents (L-grades and Nuclear Grade) should be in the solution-annealed condition. If as a consequence of f abrication, welds joining these materials are not solution annealed, they should be made between cast (or weld overlald) austenttic stainless steel surfaces (51 minimum ferrite) or other materials having high resistance to oxygen-assisted stress corrosion. the joint design must be suca that any high-stress areas in unstabillled wrought austenttic stainless steel without controlled low carbon content, wnich may become sensttlied as a result of the welding process, is not exposed to the reactor coolant.

Thermal sleeve attachments that are welded to the pressure boundary and form crevices where impurities may accumulate should not be exposed to a BWR coolant environment.

III.B. Testing of Materials 8.

The licensee has not furnished data on this paragraph in his responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04.

For new installation, tests should be made on all regular grade stainless steels to be used in the ASME Code Class I 2, and 3 piping systems to demonstrate that the material was properly annealed and is not susceptible to IG$CC. Tests that have been used to determine the susceptibility of IGSCC include Practices A*

and E** of ASIM A-262, " Recommended Practices for Detecting Susceptlallity to Intergranular Attack in Stainless Steels" and the electrocheelCal pctentlokinetic reactivation (EPR) test. The EPR test is not yet accepted by the NRC. If the EPR test is used, the acceptance criteria applied must be evaluated and accepted by the NRC on a case-by-case basis.

• Practice A--Oxalic acid etch test for classification of etch structures of stainless steels.

" Practice E--Copper-copper sulf ate-sulfuric acid test for detecting susceptibility to intergranular attack in stainlass steels.

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Lc.st IAetection: Ine reactor coolant leakage def ection systems should be operated under the lecewitcal Specification requirements to enhance the discovery of unidentifled leakage that may include through-wall cracks developed in austenitic stainless steel piping.

IV.B.I.a.(I)

The leatage detection system provided (1)' StsMARY should include sufficiently diverse leak detection methods with adequate JCPLC's description of Oyster Creek's leak detection sensitivity to detect and measure small methods is not detailed enough to determine whether they leans in a timely marwier and to identify meet Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45.

the leakage sources within the practical limits. Acceptable leakage detection and DiffERE81CES somitoring systems are described in Section C. Regulatory Position of The nine subsections of Section C os ;gulatory Negulatory Guide 1.45, " Reactor Coolant Guide 1.45 are discussed below.

Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems."

C.1 JCPLC has stated that leakage to the primary reactor contaisument from identified sources is Particular attention should be given to collected such that upgrading and calibratin9 those leak detection systems that well provide prompt 4.

the flow rates are tored separately from is.dication of asi increase in leakage rate, unidentified leakage, and uther equivalent leakage detection and b.

the total ow rate can be established and monitored.gI N

collection systems will be reviewed on a Case-by-Case Desis.

rates of I gpm in about 4 h. gens can detect leak C.2 The existing Oyster Creek sy C.3 The primary containment leak detection systems consist of the following:

1.

Primary Contalrument Sump level Monitoring System 2.

Airborne Particulate Radioactivity mmituring System AirbornyUGaseous Radioactivity Honitoring 3.

,: tem.

Because of condensation problems, th latter two haveneverbeenplacedinoperation.yO Iherefore. Oyster Creek's leak detection systinus do not meet the rectummendations in Regulatory Guide 1.45.

C.4 "Intersystem leakage would nut contribute significantly to overall risk."l0 C.5, The existing systg at Oyster Creek can detect 4 1-gene leak in 4 h.

r-IV.S.

ASML Code Class I and 2 pressure bonsadary piping 8.

The licensee has not furnished data on this paragraph Enat does not meet guidelines of l' art Ill is in his response to W C Generic Letter 81-04 destgensted *hosef orming" ased mest leave additional inservice inspection and more stringent leak detection registrements. The degree of augmented Inservice inspection of such piping depends on weiether the specific "Itoseconforming" piping ruses are classified as " Service Sensitive." Ine " Service Sensitive" lines were and will be designated by the MC and are defined as those anat have experiessced cracting of a generic nature, or that are considered to be particularly susceptible to cracking because of a cumuination of high local stress, material conditiosi, ana nign oxygen content in the relatively stagnant, intermittent, or low-flow coolant. Currently, for the nonconforming A5fE Code Class 3 piping, no additional inservice inspection beyond the Section XI visual esamination is required.

Examples of piping considered to be " Service Sensitive" include but are not limited to: core spray lines, recirculation riser lines.*

recirculation bypass lines (or pipe extensions / stub tubes osi plants weiere the bypass

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lines nave been removed), control rod drive (0t0) nydraulic return lines, isolation condenser lines, recirculation inlet lines at safe ends where crevices are formed by tese welded thermal sleeve attacraments, and shutdown heat eachanger lines.

It cracutrig snould later be found in a particular piping rure and considered to be generlo, it will ue oesignated by the feltC as " Service Sensitive."

• $1nce no IG5LL; nas Deese observed in the domestic plants and in view of the possible nign radiation exposure to the 6nspection personnel, surveillance and monitoring means other than those specified In Section IV of tnis report for recinulation riser lines will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

teatage afetection aval augmenteJ Inservice inspection requirements for "flonconforming" lines ark! "fitMIConforming, ServjCe Sensitive" lines are specified below:

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+.

C.7 Control room indications do not meet the-recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45.10 C.8 It is not known whether the systems enumerated in during operatton.gan be tested or calibrated Section C.3 above C.9 The Oyster Creek Technical Specifications include Ilmiting conditions for identified and unidentifled leakage.

JCPLC has not identified the availability of the leak detecting and monitoring systems.

The Oyster Creek leak detection systems do not meet the recommendations of Regislatory Guide 1.4h.

"Ihe licensee has committed to (1) identify the system modifications necessary to make the airborne particulate and gaseous radioactivity monitors operational (2) evaluate the reliability and sensitivity of the existing leakage detection systems, m

and (3) propose a schedule for any necessary systese w

modifications or procedural changes by June 1983. the licensee intends to provide procedures to address seismic events, rattier than upgrade the seismic qualification of the existing equipment, finds the licensee's proposed action accept the NRC ADDill0NAL DATA REQlilRED None.

(2) SistMARY JCPLC has not proposed a requirement f or shutdown af ter iv.11.8.a.(t) Plasit snutdows should be initiated for a 2-gpa increase in unidentified leakage in 24 h into the inspection and corrective action wnen any

-Tecluitcal Specifications for Oyster Creek.

i leakage detection system indicates, wittiin a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or less, an increase JCPLC has not proposed a requirement for monitoring the in rate of unidentified leakage in excess sump level at 4-h intervals (or less).

or t gallons per minute or its equivalent, or when tne total unidentified le4Kage JCPLC does not meet NtREG-0313. Rev. I in this matter.

attains a rate of 5 gallons per minute or its equivalent, whichever occurs first.

DIFFEstENCES for sump level monitoring systems with

!imed-measurement interval method, the NilRtG-0313. Rev. I requires that reaa. tor shutilown be level should be monitored at 4-hour initiated when there is a 2-gpa increase in unidentified intervals or less.

leakage in 24 h.

For sump level monitoring systems with the fixed-measurement interval method, the level should be monitored every 4 h or less. MRC Generic Letter 81-04 requires that the above resluirements be incorporated in the plant Technical Specifications.

I L

JCFLC has submitted the augmented ISI program for nonconfoming "nonservice sensitive

• piping, but has not distingelshed between the ASME Code Class I and Class 2 piping, and between the ASE Code Class 2 pipes which are to be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b (3) and IV.8.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313. Rev.1. Therefore, JCPLC's program for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated.

AD0lll0hAL DATA REQUIRED 1.

Identify which ASME Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.B.I.b.(3).

2.

Identify the inspection procedures for " service sensitive" ASMC Code Class 2 pipe.

IV.B.I.b.(3)(a) All welds of the terminal ends of (a) The consients on IV.8.1.b.(3) also apply here.

pipe at vessel no221es, and IV.B.I.b.(3)(b) At least 101 of the welds selected (b) The Coseents on IV.8.1.b.(3) also apply here.

proportionately from the following categories:

I V.B. I.b. ( 3)(b)( l)

Circumferential welds at (1) The comments on IV.8.1.b.(3) also apply here.

locations where the stresses under the loadings resulting from aun plant conditions as calculated by the sum of Equations (9) and (10) in NC-3652 exceed 0.8 (1.2Sh + S );

A N

IV.B.I.b.(3)(b)(ll)

Welds at terminal ends of (11) The comments on IV.8.1.b.(3) also apply here.

piping, including branch runs; IV.B.I.h.(3)(h)(lli) Dissiellar metal welds;

- (ill)The comments on IV.8.1.b (3) also apply here.

IV.B.1,b.(3)(b)(lv)

Welds at structure' (iv) The comments on IV.B.I.b.(3) also apply here.

discontinuitles; and IV.B.I.b.(3)(b)(v)

Welds that cannot be pressure (v) The comments on IV.8.1.b.(3) also apply here.

tested in accordance with

-IWC-5000.

The welds to be examined shall be distributed appronlaately I

equally among runs (or portions of runs) that are essentially siellar in design, slie, systee function, and service conditions.

I V.B. I.b. ( 4 )

The following ASME Code Class 2 pipe (4) SteMARY welds in systems other than residual heat reeuval systems, emergency core JCPLC has not identified those nonconforming cooling systems, and containment heat "nonservice sensitive

• pipes which are to be inspected per renoval systems, which are subject to Part IV.8.1.b (4) of ht1 REG-0313 Rev.1. Data are needed to w

e

P should include all internal attachment welds that are not through-wall welds but are welded to or fore part of the pressure boundary.

I V.B. I.b. (2) The following ASME Code Class I pipe welds (2).The comments on IV.B.I.b. also apply here.

subject to inservice inspection requirements of Section Il should be examined at least once in no more than 80 months:

I V.B. I.b. (2)( a) All welds at terminal ends

• of olpe (a) The cossments on IV.B.I b. also apply here, at vessel nozzles;

• lerminal ends are the entrenttles of piping runs that comwct to structures, components (such as vessels, pumps, valves) or pipe anchors, each of which acts as rigid i

restraints or provides at least two degrees of restraint to piping thermal expansion.

IV.B.I.b.(2)(b) All welds having a design combined (b) The consments on IV.B.I.b. also apply here.

primary plus secondary stress range of 2.45, or more; m

IV.8.1.b.(2)(c) All welds having a design Cumulative (c) The comments on IV.B.I.b. also apply here, f atigue usage f actor of 0.4 or more; and I V.B. I.b. (2)(d) Suf ficient additional welds with high (d) The Comments on IV.B.I.b. also apply here.

potential for cracking to make the total equal to 25% of the welds in each piping system.

I V.B. I.b. ( 3 ) The following ASME Code Class 2 pipe (3)

SUMMARY

welds, subject to inservice inspection requirements of Section II, in residual JCPLC has not identified those nonconforming heat removal systems, emergency core "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per cooling systems, and containment heat Part IV.B.I.b.(3) of NUREG-0313. Rev.1. Data are needed to removal systems 5%uld be examined at determine which "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 least once in no more than 80 months:

pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.

DIFFERENCES NUREG-0313. Rev. I requires that nonconforming ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program. The augmented 151 prugram for ASME Code Class 1 piping differs from that required on Class 2 piping. Also, augmented ISI requirements dif fer for ASME Code Class 2 pipes to be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b.(3) and IV.B.I.b.(4) of NUREG-0313. Rev.1.

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i esamination equal to 255 of the

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, c!rcumferential welds la eacW piping '- 4 j,

system.

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• 5tructural discontinuities include pipe weld joints' to #

i veyel nozzles.,yalve bo. lies, pump casings, pipe fittimp f

f.oce as elbumsg tees, reducers, f langes, etc., confors to WI Standard B 16.9) end pipe branch connections andq

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IV.8.1.b.(5)

If emasination of (1), (2), (3), and

, (5) The comments on IV.p.1.b.(1), (2), (3), and (4) also j

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- 80 monte.s reveal no incleance of

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IV.B.I.b.(6)

Sampling plans other theejhose (6) No comment me,de because alternattse.chns were not

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described in (2), (3), any (4)'above

, evaluated.

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2 i,,eak Detection: The laAage deteCilM a.

P 1liequirements, desr-I in IV.8.1.a.

IV.IL.! a.(2) apply' tere.

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above, should be implenwnted.

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I V.B.2.b.

Augmented Inservice laspection

b.

e

,K,ttVocr r:ct consider augmented ISI of ASME Code

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CIAas I nus.onforming " service sensitive" necessary, and does not me'at huREG-0313, Rev. I h this matter.

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DEFFERENCES

/ '

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i huREG-0313, Rev. I requires that A5ME Code Class I nonconfonsing " service sensitive

• pipes be subject ta an aw;eented 151 program.

• JCPLC does not consider augmented 15l necessary because JCILC belgeves that AISI Type 316 stainless steel is lanume to IG5CC.

ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED None.

t e ~

a-.

Inservice inspection requirements of deteratine which "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Section II, should be inspected at least pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will once in no more than 80 months; he used.

DIFFERfnCES NelREG-0313. Rev. I requires that nonconforming ASME Code Class I and Class 2 piping be subjected to an aesgaented ISI program. The augmented ISI program for AS8E Code Class I piping ditfers from that required on Class 2 piping. Also, augmented ISI requirements differ for AS8f Code Class 2 pipes to be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b.(3) -

and IV.B.I.b.(4) of NUREG-0313. Rev.1.

JCptC has submitted the augmented ISI program for nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" piping, but has not distinguished between the ASME Code Class I and Class 2 piping, and between the ASME Code Class 2 pipes which are to be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b.(3) and IV.B.I b.(4) of stIREG-0313. Rev.1. Therefore, JCptC's program for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated.

ADDITIONAL DATA REqulRED 1.

Identify which ASME Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.B.I.b.(4).

2.

Identify the inspection procedures for " service sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipe.

IV.8.1.b.(4)(a) All welds at locations where the (a) The comments on IV.8.1.b.(4) also apply here, stresses under the loadings resulting from "Isormal" and " Upset" plant conditions including the operating basis earthquake (OBE) as calculated by the sum of Equations (g) and (10) in NC-3652 eaceed 0.8 (1.25,+ S Is A

I V.B. I.b. (4 )(t:) All walds at terminal ends of piping, (b) The comments on IV.B.1.b.(4) also apply here.

lucluding branch runs; I V.8.1.b. (4)(c) All dissiellar metal welds; (c) The comments on IV.B.I b.(4) also apply here.

IV.S.I.b.(4)(d) Additional welds with high potential (d) The comments on IV.B.1.b.(4) also apply here, for cracking at structural

~s b

lY.B.2.b.(3)

Ine welds and adjoining s'eas of (3) The comments on IV.B.2.h.' also apply here.

w other ASME Code Class 1 -Service s

s Sensitive

• piping should be examined using the sampling plan described in IV.B.I.b(2) except that the frequency of such examinations should be at each reactor refueling outage or at v

x other scheduled plant outages.

Successive examinations need not be x T closer than 6 months, if outages

\\ ~

s occur more f requently than 6 months.

IV.D.2.b.(4)

The adjoining areas of internal (4) The comments on IV.B.2.b.'also apply here.

attachment welds in recirculation inlet lines at safe ends where

. I

~~-

crevices are formed by the welded thermal sleeve attachment should be examined at each reactor refueling outage or at other scheduled plant outages. Successive examinations need not De closer than 6 months, if outages occur more frequently than

~

s 6 months.

t I V. D.2.b. ( S)

In the event the examinations (5) The comments on IV.E.2.b.' also apply here.

described in (2), (3) and (4) above find the piping f ree of unacceptable indicatto.:s for three successive c) inspections, the examination may be extended to each 36-month period (plus or sluus by as much as s

12 months) coinciding with a refueling outage.

In the event these 36-month period exaninations reveal no unacceptable indications for three successiw7 inspections, the frequency of examination may revert to 80-month periods (two-thirds the time prescribed in the ASHE Code

$cctirn XI).

I V.S.2.h. (6) the area, extent, and frequency of (6) SilHMARY examination of the augmented inservice inspection for ASHE Code JCPLC has not identified those nonconforming Class 2 " Service Sensitive" lines "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per will be determined on a case-by-case Part IV.B.2.b.(6) of NilREG-0313 Rev.1. Data are needed to basis.

determine whice "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.

i - -..-. _ _ _

=

a A

IV.B.2.b.(1%

the welds and adjoining areas of (1)' The comuments on IV.B.2.b. also apply here.

hypass piping of the discharge valves in the min recirculation loops, and of the austenttic stainless steel reactor core spray piping up to and including the second isolation valve s should be examined at each reactor refueling out.ge or at other scheduled plant outages. Successive examinatloa need not be closer than 6 months. If outages occur more f requently than 6 months. This requiremment applies to all welds in all bypass lines whether the 4-loch valve is kept open or closed during operation.

In the event these examinations find the piping free of untcceptable indications for three successive inspectlons, the exassination may be extended to each 36-month period (plus or minus by as much as 12 months) coincident with a refueling outage. In these cases, the successive examination may be llalted to all welds in one bypass pipe run and one reactor core spray ge piping run. If unacceptable flaw indications are detected, the remaining piping runs in each group l

should be examined, in the event these 36-month period examinations reveal no unacceptable Indications for three successive

. inspections, the welds and adjoining areas of these piping runs should be examined as described in IV.8.1.b(1) f or dissimilar metal welds and in IV.B.I b(2) for other welds.

I V. B. 2.0. (2)

The dissiellar metal welds and (2) The licensee has not furnished data on this paragraph adjoining areas of other ASME Code in his responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04.

Class 1 " Service Sensitive' piping should be examined at each reactor refueling outage or at other scheduled plant outages. Successive examinations need not be closer than 6 months, if outages occur more f requently than 6 months. Such esamination should include all internal attachmeats that are nJL through-wall welds but are welded to or form part of the pressure boundary.

1

~

V.' CfhtRAL RELOPHLhlsAll0NS V.

The licensee has not furnished data on this paragraph in his responses to NRC Generic letter 81-04.

The measures outlined in Part 111 of this document provide f or positive actions that are consistent with curient technohujy. lhe implementation of these actions should markedly reduce the susceptibility of stainless steel piping to stress corrosion cracking in llWRs. It is recognized that additional means could be used to limit the extent of stress corrosion cracking of BWR pressure nunndary piping materials and to improve the '

uverall system integrity. These ' include plant design ano operational procedure Considerations to reduce system exg.usure to potentially aggressive enviros. ment, improveu material selection, special fabrication and welding techniques, and provisions for volumetric inspection capauslity in the desigst of weld joints. The use of_sucn means to limit 10500 or to improve plant system integrity will be reviewed on a case-by-case hasis.

1 N

N t

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m y

v

,yry

DlIFLNEIKES leastEG-0313 Rev. I requires that nonconfonning ASME Code Class I and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program. The augmented 151 program for ASME Code Class I piping dif fers from that regstred on Class 2 piping.

l IE has submitted the augmented 151 program for nonconforming " service sensitive" piping, bot has not distinguished between LI:e ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping. Therefore, IE's program for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated without more data.

ADolil0IIAL DATA REQUIREi!

1.

Identify which ASME Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per'Part IV.8.2.b.(6).

l 2.

Identif> the inspection procedures for " service sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipe.

IV.B.a.

teondestructive Examination (leuE) Requirements 3.

The licensee has not furnished data on this paragraph

. In his responses to IIRC Generic Letter 81-04.

lhe method of examinallon and volume of material to be examinea, the allowable inalcation N

standards, and examination procedures should

~

comply with the requirements set forth in the applicaule Ldition and Addenda of the ASME Code,Section XI, specified in Part (g), " Inservice inspection Nequirements " of 10 CFR 50.55a, "Loues and Standards."

in some cases, the code examination procedures may not be ef feClive Ior detecting or evaluating 16500 and other ultrasonic (Ui) procedures or advanced nondestructive examination LeChniques may be required to detect and evaluate stress corrosion cracking in austenitic stainless steel piping. Improved UI procedures have been developed by certain organizations. These improved UT detection and evaluation procedures that have been or can be demonstrated to the NHC tu be ef fective in detecting IGSCC should be used in the inservice inspection.

4 Recawenendations for the development and eventual smplementation ni these leproved techniques are in<.luded in Part V.

i

IV.B.l.b.(3) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe JCPLC has not identified those nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per Part IV.B.1.b.(3) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

Data are needed to determine which "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.

IV.B.l.b.(4) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe JCPLC has not identified those nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per Part IV.B.l.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

Data are needed to determine which "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.

IV.B.2.b.

Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" Pipe JCPLC does not consider augmented ISI of ASME Code Class 1 nonconforming " service sensitive" necessary, and does not meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 in this matter.

IV.B.2.b.(6) Augmented ISI of Nonconfprming " Service Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe r

JCPLC har not identified those nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per Part IV.B.2.b.(6) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

Data are needed to determine which "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be useo.

l I

l 24 1

i

i 1

IV.B.l.b.(3) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME I

Code Class 2 Pipe l

JCPLC has not identified those nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per Part IV.B.l.b.(3) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

Data are needed to determine which "nonservice sensitive"

[

ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.

4 IV.B.I.b.(4) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe JCPLC has not identified those nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per Part IV.B.l.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

Data are needed to determine which "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used, i

IV.B.2.b.

Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" Pipe JCPLC does not consider augmented ISI of ASME Code Class 1 nonconforming " service sensitive" necessary, and does not meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 in this matter.

IV.B.2.b.(6) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" ASME Code

' Class 2 Pipe JCPLC has not identified those nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per Part IV.B.2.b.(6) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

Data are needed to determine which "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.

l l

24

I C.3 The primary containment leak detection systems consist of the following:

1.

Primary Containment Sump Level Monitoring System 2.

Airborne Particulate Radioactivity Monitoring System

~

3.

Airborne Gaseous' Radioactivity Monitoring System.10 Because of condensat' ion problems, the latter two have never been placed in operation.10 Therefore, Oyster Creek's f

leak detection systems do not meet the recommendations in Regulatory Guide 1.45.

C.4 "Intersystem leakage would not contribute significi.ntly to overall risk".10 C.5 The existing systems at Oyster Creek can detect a 1-gpm leak in 4 h.10 C.6 It is not known whether the airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system remains functional after SSE.10 C.7 Control room indications do not meet the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45.10 C.8 It is not known whether the systems enumerated in Section C.3 above can be tested or calibrated during operation.10 C.9 The Oyster Creek Technical Specifications include limiting conditions for identified and unidentified leakage.

JCPLC has not identified the availability of the leak detecting and monitoring systems.

26

C.3 The primary containment leak detection systems consist of the following:

1.

Primary Containment Sump Level Monitoring System 2.

Airborne Particulate Radioactivity Monitoring System 3.

Airborne Gaseous Radioactivity Monitoring System.10 Because of condensation problems, the latter two have never been placed in operation.10 Therefore, Oyster Creek's leak detection systems do not meet the recommendations in Regulatory Guide 1.45.

C.4 "Intersystem leakage would not contribute significantly to overall risk".10 C.5 The existing systems at Oyster Creek can detect a 1-gpm leak in 4 h.10 C.6 It is not known whether the airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system remains functional after SSE.10 C.7 Control room indications do not meet the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45.10 C.8 It is not known whether the systems enumerated in Section C.3 above can be tested or calibrated during operation.10 C.9 The Oyster Creek Technical Specifications include limiting conditions for identified and unidentified leakage.

IPLC has not identified the availability of the leak detecting and monitoring systems.

j 26

NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires thct nonconforming ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program. The augmented ISI program for ASME Code Class 1 piping differs from that required on Class 2 piping. Also, augmented ISI requiremenic differ for ASME Code Class 2 pipes to be inspected per Parts IV.B.l.b.(3) and IV.B.l.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

9 JCPLC has submitted the augmented ISI program for nonconfccming "nonservice sensitive" piping, but has not distinguished between the ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping, and between the ASME Code Class 2 pipes which are to be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b.(3) and IV.B.l.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

Therefore, JCPLC's pragram for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated.

IV.B.1.b.(4) Augmented ISI for ASME Code Class 1 Pipe Welds with High Potential for Cracking NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that nonconforming ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program. The augmented ISI program for ASME Code Class 1 piping differs from that required on Class 2 piping. Also, augmented ISI requirements differ for ASME Ccde Class 2 pipes to be inspected per Parts IV.B.l.b.(3) and IV.B.I.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

JCPLC nas submitted the augmented ISI program for nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" piping, but has not distinguished between tne ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping, and between the ASME Code Class 2 pipes which are to be inspected per Parts IV.B. I.b. (3) and IV.B. l.b. (4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

Therefore, JCPLC's program for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated.

IV.B.2.b.

Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" Pipe NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that ASME Code Class 1 noncor.f arining

" service sensitive" pipes be subject to an augmented ISI program.

28

l The Oyster Creek leak detection systems do not meet the i

recommendations of Regulatory Guiae 1.45.

"The licensee has committed to (1) identify the system modifications necessary to make the airborne particulat. and i

gaseous radioactivity monitors operational, (2) evaluate the reliability and sensitivity of the existing leakage detection systems, and (3) propose a schedule for any necessary system modifications or procedural changes by June 1983.

The licensee intends to provide procedures to address seismic events, rather than upgrade the seismic qualification of the existing equipment.

The NRC staff finds the licensee's proposed action acceptable."10 l

IV.B.l.a.(2) Leak Detection Requirements NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 requires that reactor shutdown be initiated when there is a 2-gpm increase in unidentified leakage in 24 h.

For sump level monitoring systems with the fixed-measurement interval method, the level should be monitored every 4 h or less.

NRC Generic Letter 81-04 requires that the above requirements be-incorporated in the plant Technical Specifications.

JCPLC has not incorporated this provision into the Oyster Creek l

Technical Specifications because AISI Type 316 stainless: steel is considered immune to IGSCC by JCPLC.7 IV.8.1.b.

Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" Pipe NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 requires that ASME Code Class 1 nonconforming "nonservica sensitive" pipes be subject to an augmented ISI program. Selection methods for pipes to be examined are found in Part IV.B.l.b. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

JCPLC does not consider augmented ISI necessary because JCPLC believes that AISI Type 316 stainless steel is immune tc IGSCC.7 IV.B.l.b.(3) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe

~

27

TABLE 4 ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED OF LICENSEE

~

II.C Material Selection, Testing, and Processing Guidelines for BWRs with an Operating License None.

IV.B.I.a.(1) Leak Detection and Monitoring Systems E

None.

IV.B.1.a.(2) Leak Detection Requirements None.

IV.B.l.b.

Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" Pipe r

None.

IV.B.I.b.(3) Augmented ISI for ASME Code Class 1 Pipe Welds Having a Design Cumulative Fatigue Usage Factor of 0.4 or More 1.

Identify which ASME Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.B.l.b.(3).

2.

Identify the inspection procedures for " service sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipe.

i IV.B.l.b.(4) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe 1.

Identify which ASME Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.B.I.b.(4).

30

JCPLC does not consider augmented ISI necessary because JCPLC believes that AISI Type 316 stainless steel is immune to IGSCC.7

-IV.8.2.b.(6)

Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that nonconforming ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program.

The augmenteo ISI program for ASME Code Class 1 piping differs from that required on Class 2 piping.

IE has submitted the augmented ISI program for nonconforming

" service sensitive" piping, but has not distinguisned between the ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping. Therefore, IE's program for ASME Ccde Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated without more data.

29

~

4.

REFERENCES 1.

E. D. Eason et al., The Cost Effectiveness of Countar=easures to Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking in BWR Piping, EPRI NP-1703, February 1381, p. A-04.

2.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for 8WR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping, USNRG Report NUREG-0313, July 19//.

3.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Technical Report, Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactor Plants, UShRG Report NUREG-75/067, October 1975.

i 4.

U.S.; Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Investigation and Evaluation of Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Piping of Light Water Reactor Plants, USNRC Report NUREG-0531, February 1979.

5.

.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping, USNRG Report NUREG-0313, Rev.

1, Ju ly 1980.

6.

D. G. Eisenhut letter to all BWR licensees (except Humboldt Bay and La Crosse), " Implementation of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Gu'idelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping (Generic Task A-42)," Generic Letter 81-04, February 26, 1981.

7.

J. R. Finfrock, Jr. to Director, Division of Licensing, June 30, 1981 (NRC Accession No.: 8107080530).

8.

P. B. Fiedler to R. C. Haynes letter, Decemoer 21, 1982 (NRC Accession No.: 8212080556).

9.

P. B. Fiedler to F. J. Mirag'ia letter, February 4,1983 (NRC Accession No.:

8302040380).

10.

Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Docket No.:

50-219, January 1983.

11. Oyster Creek FSAR, Section 3.3.

h 32

2.

Icentify tne inspection procedures for " service sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipe.

IV.S.2.b.

Augmented ISI of.':enconf rming " Service Sensitive" Pipe None.

IV.8.2.b.(6) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe 1.

Identify which ASME Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.B.2.b.(6).

2.

Identify the inspection procedures for " service sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipe.

a 31

r i

f,2;faem33s u.s. muCLEAa r.E:utATOnv Commiss Ou BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET EGG-FM-6255 4 TITLE AND SUBTITLE

2. / Leave o/a>*/

TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF INTEGRITY OF THE OYSTER CREEK REACTOR COOLANT B0UNDARY PIPING SYSTEM

s. RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.

I l-

7. AUTHORISI S. DATE REPORT COMPLETED P. K. Nagata August I ^" 1983 M ON "

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADORESS tractuor 2,0 Code)

OATE REPORT ISSUED August I"

1983 EG8G Idaho, Inc.

g ft,,,,,,,,,

Idaho Falls, ID 83415

8. (Leave manal

12. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADORESS Ilactude tea Coorf

10. PROJECT / TASK / WORK UNIT NO.

Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Reaulation ii. piu so, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 A6429

13. TYPE OF REPORT PE RiOO COVE RE D //actusive dates /

b

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. (te,ve oisins

16. ASSTR ACT (200 words or sesst f

e e

17 KEY WCROS AND DOCUMENT AN ALY$lS 17a OESCRiPTORS 17e ICENTIFiERS'OPEN ENCE O TE AMS 18 AV AILABILITY STATEVENT 19 SE CU AITY CLASS e ra.: coorri 21 NO OFPAGES Unclassified Unlimited zo sECuaiTY CtyS ira.s o,*,

122 aaiCE Unclas si fied I

s weC come ass m e,'

-