ML12222A350

Unit 2 - Issuance of Emergency Amendment Removal of License Condition, Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Change and Fasr Change for Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Measurement

ML12222A350
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	08/10/2012
From:	James Kim Plant Licensing Branch 1
To:	Heacock D Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
Kim J
References
TAC ME9108, FOIA/PA-2013-0045
Download: ML12222A350 (14)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 August 10, 2012 Mr. David A. Heacock President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Nuclear Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT:

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 - ISSUANCE OF EMERGENCY AMENDMENT RE: REMOVAL OF LICENSE CONDITION, PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES CHANGE AND FSAR CHANGE FOR ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT (TAC NO. ME9108)

Dear Mr. Heacock:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 311 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for Millstone Power Station Unit 2, in response to your application dated July 17, 2012, as supplemented by two letters dated August 9, 2012. In your submittals, you requested that the proposed change be considered on an emergency basis.

The amendment revises Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 9.7.2.1.2, "Design Criteria, Service Water System," and Appendix B, "Additional Conditions, Facility Operating License No. DPR-65." The proposed FSAR changes would provide additional operating margin for measurement of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) temperature. The proposed change to Appendix B is to remove a license condition that is no longer needed.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely, James Kim, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 1-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 311 to DPR-65

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-336 MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNIT NO.2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 311 Renewed License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by the applicant dated July 17, 2012, as supplemented by two letters dated August 9, 2012, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment Will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

-2

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 311, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. Accordingly, by Amendment No. 311, the license is amended to authorize revision to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), and Appendix B as set forth in the application dated July 12, 2012. The licensee shall update UFSAR, and Appendix B to incorporate the changes as described in the licensee's application dated July 12, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated August 9,2012 and the NRC staffs safety evaluation attached to this amendment, and shall submit the revised description authorized by this amendment with the next update of the UFSAR.

4. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance. The FSAR changes shall be implemented in the next periodic update to the FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71 (e).

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

~Cvl4-George A. Wilson, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 1-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the License and Appendix B Date of Issuance: August 10, 2012

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 311 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 DOCKET NO. 50-336 Replace the following page of the Renewed Facility Operating License with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert Page 3 Page 3 Appendix B Appendix B

- 3 Connecticut, in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this renewed operating license; (2) Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended; (3) Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30,40, and 70, to receive, possess and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (4) Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form for sample analysis or instrument and equipment calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; (5) Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

C. This renewed operating license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter 1: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Section 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level The licensee is authorized to operate the facility at steady-state reactor core power levels not in excess of 2700 megawatts thermal.

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 311, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

Renewed License No. DPR-65 Amendment NO.311

APPENDIX B ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 The licensee shall comply with the following conditions on the schedules noted below:

Amendment Implementation Number Additional Condition Date 212 This amendment authorizes the licensee to 30 days from the incorporate in the Updated Final Safety Analysis date of issuance Report certain changes to the description of the facility.

Implementation of this amendment is the incorporation of these changes as described in Attachment 3 of the licensee's application dated September 3, 1997, and evaluated in the staff's Safety Evaluation dated January 23, 1998.

222 This amendment authorizes the licensee to include in Next UFSAR the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) update changes to the description of the facility.

Implementation of this amendment is the updating of the UFSAR to reflect the changes in Attachment 3 of the licensee's application dated July 2, 1998, and evaluated in the staff's Safety Evaluation dated December 18,1998 AB-l Amendment No.~, 311 (Page Number Added for Administrative Control)

"~,,,p. RE.GUt _ UNITED STATES

~v -."

.,ii!'c~ 0"ll NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

!! ("> WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

.. °3:

'" it

~ ~

~ tJ 1-", ...0

• • • • "'" SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 311 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-336

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated July 12, 2012 (Accession No. ML12202A040), as supplemented by two letters dated August 9,2012, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC or the licensee), submitted an amendment to revise Technical Specification Bases (TSB) 3/4.7.11, "Ultimate Heat Sink," Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 9.7.2.1.2, "Design Criteria, Service Water System," and Appendix B, "Additional Conditions, Facility Operating license No. DPR-65." The proposed FSAR changes would provide additional operating margin for measurement of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) temperature. The proposed change to Appendix B is to remove a license condition that is no longer needed. In it's July 17, 2012, and August 9, 2012 (2 supplements) letters, the licensee requested that this change be considered on an emergency basis in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.91 (a)(5).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The UHS for Millstone Unit No.2 is the Long Island Sound, which receives heat from safety related systems during normal and accident conditions. The service water cooling system functions to supply a dependable continuous flow of cooling water to the reactor building closed cooling system, and the emergency diesel generators. The temperature of the service water system is monitored as its suction is taken from the UHS.

The present method for measuring the UHS temperature has been based on a single highest valid indication of the service water system. The licensee has proposed a change in a methodology documented in the FSAR for determining the UHS temperature. The proposed change consists of using an average of several valid indications (when homogeneous conditions exist) and using the highest valid indication (when non-homogeneous conditions exist). The change in methodology for determining the ultimate heat sink temperature and associated uncertainty were evaluated against standard engineering practice for such calculations. The change in the methodology will be documented in FSAR Section 9.7.2.1.2, "Design Criteria," pages 9.7-5 and 9.7-6. In addition, the licensee will remove a condition from amendment number 213 in Appendix B, Additional Conditions Facility Operating license No. DPR-65. .

-2

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The licensee's current Technical Specification 3/4.7.11 states that UHS remains operable when the water temperature is equal to or below 75°F, and the maximum allowable UHS temperature is 77°F. The licensee is not requesting to change these values. The licensee is requesting to change the acceptable methods it uses in order to measure the temperature of the ultimate heat sink.

Currently (no change proposed) once the highest valid main control room UHS temperature indication exceeds 70°F, the licensee is required to measure the UHS temperature using local indications on the service water header. Operations may continue as long as these local readings remain at 75°F or below.

Currently, plant procedures direct the licensee to obtain local temperature indications as follows:

Normally, local SWS header temperature will be taken at the inlet to the vital AC switchgear room cooling coils. If the local SWS header temperature cannot be taken at the inlet to the vital AC switchgear room cooling coils, the inlet to the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water heater exchangers, or other acceptable instrumentation should be used to determine SWS header temperature."

The licensee is proposing to change the method (as documented in FSAR Section 9.7.2.1.2) used to determine the service water header temperature as follows:

When homogeneous intake structure operating temperatures are assessed to exist (e.g., no condenser backwash evolutions), the UHS temperature shall be determined by computing the average of multiple SWS inlet header/branch temperature measurements. Normally, three vital switchgear room cooler SW inlet line local digital temperature measurements are available and these three instruments are averaged to determine the UHS temperature. Alternatively, the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water heat exchanger SW inlet or other acceptable instrument/location can be employed to obtain other measurements, if the normal vital switchgear room cooler SW inlet instruments are unavailable.

When the Intake Structure bay operating temperatures are assessed to be potentially non-homogeneous (such as would be expected during condenser backwash evolutions), SWS supply temperature measurements shall be obtained for each operable SWS loop and the highest valid SWS supply loop temperature shall be used to determine the UHS temperature. In the implementing surveillance procedure, the < 75 of limiting condition of operation and the 77 of maximum allowable operating temperature criterion defined in TS 3/4.7.11 Action Statements

a. and b. shall be reduced by an applicable UHS temperature measurement uncertainty allowance.

The licensee will continue to use the same primary means and alternate means to measure the local service water header temperature.

The staff finds that the proposed methodology to determine the local temperature of the ultimate heat sink via instruments on the service header follows generally accepted engineering practices and provides an accurate determination of the temperature of the ultimate heat sink. The Staff's analysis of the licensee's proposal to change from using the highest local temperature indication to

- 3 using an averaging methodology of multiple instruments to calculate the UHS temperature, in order to reduce uncertainty and regain margin, shows the practice to be acceptable, as described below.

The service water system has three half capacity pumps that take suction from the same intake structure. The pumps supply two independent service water headers. The service water headers are not cross tied during normal operation. During normal operation two pumps are operating and provide water to the reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) and the turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) heat exchangers and vital switchgear ventilation system cooling coils. It is reasonable to assume that since both service water pumps are the same size and have the same suction source, that the service water in the two headers that are normally flowing will be close to the same temperature. Using an average of multiple instrument readings of the same parameter is a reasonable industry practice that has been accepted by the NRC staff. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's change to use an average of the service water header temperature instruments verses using the highest reading will provides reasonable assurance that the UHS temperature is monitored not to exceed the plant's operating limit.

The licensee submitted its uncertainty calculations and a summary of the averaging calculations for the SWS instrumentation. The NRC Staff reviewed the calculations and noted that the Square Root-of-the-Sum-of-Squares (SRSS) did not include the uncertainty of the RTD transmitter because this uncertainty was addressed as part of the "string calibration accuracy" of the digital indicators (M2). The licensee uses a full loop calibration as a way to embed the RTD transmitter's uncertainty. The inclusion of the actual RTD transmitter's accuracy did not raise a significant value of uncertainty, thus the Staff found this to be acceptable.

The other item under question is the calculation package description of the RTD being a 200 ohm based device and the provide model of the temperature transmitter stated that its inputs were only 100 ohm Pt, 120 ohm Ni, 10 ohm Cu and thermocouples. The NRC Staff did not see reference to 200 ohm pt. The license subsequently amended the application to explain that the transmitter was special ordered to be usable with a 200 ohm platinum RTD; therefore the apparent incompatibility of the transmitter (based on the standard documentation) with the RTD has been resolved and is acceptable.

In the event the licensee determines the intake structure bay operating temperatures are assessed to be potentially non-homogeneous, the licensee proposes not to use averaging methodology. The licensee proposes to use the highest local service water header indication as a representation of the UHS temperature. In addition, the licensee will apply an appropriate measurement uncertainty to that reading. The staff finds the use of the highest service water header temperature reading is conservative will reasonably represent the temperature of the UHS.

The change to the FSAR is approved. as discussed above. In addition to the changes to the FSAR, the LAR included changes to the TS Bases. The NRC reviewed the Bases and determined that the Bases provide a summary statement of the reason for the TS, as described in 10 C.F.R. 50.36(a). As described in Technical Specification 6.23, the licensee maintains a Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program. TS Section 6.23.c states that the Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the FSAR. Accordingly, the NRC expects to the licensee to update its TS Bases in a manner consistent with the information provided in the LAR.

-4 The license condition amendment number 213 were met. The documentation for the selection of instruments and the consideration of their accuracies for measuring the ultimate heat sink temperatures> 70°F greater were fulfilled in the FSAR; therefore, the removal of this condition amendment number 213 in Appendix B, Additional Conditions Facility Operating License No.

OPR-65 is acceptable.

4.0 EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES In it's July 17, 2012, and August 9,2012 (2 supplements) letters, the licensee requested that this amendment be treated as an emergency amendment. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(5),

the licensee provided the information regarding why this emergency situation occurred and how it could not be avoided.

The NRC's regulations in 10 CFR 50.91 contain provisions for issuance of an amendment where the Commission finds that an emergency situation exists in that failure to act in a timely manner would result in shutdown of a nuclear power plant. In such a situation, the NRC may issue a license amendment involving no significant hazards consideration without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing or for public comment. In such a situation, the Commission will not publish a notice of proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration, but will publish a notice of issuance under 10 CFR 2.106.

Regulation 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(5) states that where the NRC finds that an emergency situation exists, in that failure to act in a timely manner would result in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plant's licensed power level, it may issue a license amendment involving no significant hazards consideration without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing or for public comment. The regulation also states that the NRC will decline to dispense with notice and comment on the determination of no significant hazards if it determines that the licensee has abused the emergency provision by failing to make timely application for the amendment and thus itself creating the emergency. The regulation requires that a licensee requesting an emergency amendment explain why the emergency situation occurred and why the licensee could not avoid the situation.

In its supplement dated August 9, 2012, the licensee stated that a prolonged hot weather in the long Island Sound, in conjunction with high humidity during the day and minimal cooling at night, has resulted in sustained elevated cooling water temperature supplied to the plant from long Island Sound. Ambient air temperature in July were the hottest on record in the contiguous United States since record keeping began in 1895 according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and temperature continue to remain high in August. Water temperatures in long Island Sound have been averaging 1.7 of higher than normal. Current trending projections of the water, wind direction, and tidal conditions indicate the maximum allowed Technical Specification (TS) UHS temperature limit will be exceeded on August 10,2012 at approximately five o'clock in the evening. However, the TS UHS temperature limit may be reached earlier of later as weather conditions change. Without approval of the proposed change, TS 3/4.7.11 would require the unit to shutdown in the TS UHS temperature limit of 75 of is exceeded.

This emergency situation results from prolonged adverse environmental conditions in the area.

Under these conditions, ONC could not have reasonably applied for this emergency license amendment in advance of the event or in a more timely manner following the event.

-S The current situation at MPS2 satisfies the criteria for an emergency situation in that MPS2 TSs require shutdown of the unit in the event that the temperature of the UHS exceeds the 7S of temperature limit in TSs. This emergency situation is caused by environmental factors beyond the control of DNC. Approval of the subject license amendment request would allow continued operation of the unit by providing additional operational margin for measurement of UHS temperature.

In this instance, an emergency situation exists in that failure to act in a timely way would result in derating or shutdown or a nuclear power plant. Based on the above, the requirements for an emergency situation as stipulated in 10 CFR SO.91 (a)(S) have been satisfied.

S.O FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION The Commission's regulations at 10 CFR SO.92(c) states that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or, (3) result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The following analysis was provided by the licensee in its letters of July 17, 2012, and August 9,2012 (2 supplements):

1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change continues to reasonably ensure that the plant is operated within its design basis and Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.11 UHS temperature < 7S0F limiting condition of operation because temperature is determined at representative locations and measurement uncertainty continues to be accommodated within the surveillance process when UHS temperature exceeds 700F. Thus, the proposed change has no significant impact upon previously evaluated accident probability or accident consequences because the UHS temperature used within various design and safety analyses is not impacted. Structures, system, and components (SSCs) not significantly impacted include the safety-related and non-safety related SWS [Service Water System]

heat exchangers and the main condensers which are cooled by the Circulating Water (CW) System.

Based on the above, DNC concludes that the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident or transient previously evaluated in the safety analysis report.

-6

2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change continues to reasonably ensure that the plant is operated within its design basis and the TS 3/4.7.11 UHS temperature < 75 of limiting condition of operation because UHS temperature is determined at representative locations and temperature measurement uncertainty continues to be accommodated within the surveillance method when UHS temperature exceeds 70 of. Thus, the proposed change doesn't create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident from accident previously evaluated because design functions and SSCs remain unaffected. The proposed change doesn't create a new failure mode, mechanism, or accident initiators not considered in the design and licensing basis because there is no new reliance upon credited equipment.

Based on the above, ONC concludes that the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident or transient from any previously evaluated.

3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

UHS temperature is determined at representative locations and measurement uncertainty continues to be accommodated within the surveillance method when UHS temperature exceeds 70 of. This change involves recovering uncertainty allowance associated with instrument accuracy. Thus, the proposed change continues to reasonably ensure that the plant is operated within the TS 3/4.7.11 UHS temperature <

75°F limiting condition of operation. This change has no impact upon a design limit, safety limit, or safety margin. Safety margin is maintained by assurance that the UHS temperature remains < 75 of limiting condition of operation.

If the TS 3/4.7.11 UHS temperature < 75 of limiting condition of operation is exceeded, UHS temperature measurement uncertainty is addressed in the proposed method relative to the Action Statements a. and b. regarding the 77 of maximum operating UHS temperature criterion. Thus, there is no significant impact upon engineering analyses that support Action Statements a. and b. technical bases because reasonable assurance is provided that Action Statement b. will be entered prior to a maximum 77 of UHS temperature being exceeded.

Based on the above, ONC concludes that the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC Staff finds that the licensee's analysis is satisfactory and has determined that there is no significant hazards consideration for the proposed amendment. Therefore, the Commission is making a final determination that no significant hazards consideration is involved.

-7 The NRC Staff finds that the licensee's analysis is satisfactory and has determined that there is no significant hazards consideration for the proposed amendment. Therefore, the Commission is making a final determination that no significant hazards consideration is involved.

6.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in amounts, and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has made a finding in this document that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

8.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: N. Carte K. Sturzebecher S. Gardocki Date: August 10, 2012

August 10, 2012 Mr. David A. Heacock President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Nuclear Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711 SUB~IECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 -ISSUANCE OF EMERGENCY AMENDMENT RE: REMOVAL OF LICENSE CONDITION, PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES CHANGE AND FSAR CHANGE FOR ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT (TAC NO. ME9108)

Dear Mr. Heacock:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 311 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for Millstone Power Station Unit 2, in response to your application dated July 17, 2012, as supplemented by two letters dated August 9, 2012. In your submittals, you requested that the proposed change be considered on an emergency basis.

The amendment revises Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 9.7.2.1.2, "Design Criteria, Service Water System," and Appendix B, "Additional Conditions, Facility Operating License No. DPR-65." The proposed FSAR changes would provide additional operating margin for measurement of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) temperature. The proposed change to Appendix B is to remove a license condition that is no longer needed.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely, lraJ James Kim, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 1-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 311 to DPR-65

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC RidsRgn1 MailCenter RidsNrrDorllpl1-1 Resource RidsNrrlAKGoldstein RidsNrrDeEicb Resource RidsNrrDorlDpr Resource RidsNrrPMMillstone RidsNrrDssSbpb Resource R. Bellamy, RI RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCenter Resource RidsOgcMailCenter Resource