ML16337A127

From kanterella
Revision as of 21:49, 4 February 2020 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
2016 Dresden Nuclear Station Initial License Examination Outline Files - Form ES-D-1
ML16337A127
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/01/2016
From: Palagi B
NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
To:
Exelon Generation Co
Shared Package
ML16257A678 List:
References
SVPLTR 16-0019
Download: ML16337A127 (15)
v • d • e


Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: ILT-N-1 Op-Test No.: 15-1 (2016-301)

Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 180 MWe. Shutdown in progress per DGP 02-01. NoLC0 1 actions are in effect. 2/3 RBCCW pump and Reactor Feed Pump Standby Selector Switch are OOS.

Turnover: Transfer Buses 21 and 23 to TR-22 . Continue shutdown via control rod insertion per DGP 02-01. Insert control rods until< 140 MWe and remove turbine from service.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 N (BOP) Transfer Aux Power NONE 2 NONE R (ATC) Insert Control Rods to lower power LP32117BU 3 1/T (ATC)(T/S) APRM Fails upscale- RPS failure B12 4 T45 C (BOP) Generator fails to trip on reverse power 5 011 C (BOP) TBCCW - Pump Trip ILT-N-1 6 l/T (ATC) (T/S) RECIRC - 2A Recirculation Flow Controller Fails Upscale Recir.cae 7 F41 M (ALL) Manual Scram - LOCA in drywell H32 H33 Loss of RFPs - Use HPCI to restore level 8 H34 M (ALL)

HPCI - Auto-start failure HP2A1F1 HP2B1F1

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
  • Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-1 SWAP AUX POWER INSERT CONTROL RODS TO LOWER POWER APRM FAILS UPSCALE (RPS FAILURE)

GENERATOR FAILS TO TRIP ON REVERSE POWER TBCCW PUMP TRIP 2A RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROLLER FAILS UPSCALE LOCA IN OW-MANUAL SCRAM

  • LOSS OF RFPS - USE HPCI TO RESTORE LEVEL Rev.00 02/16 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Objective Evaluate the Team's ability to operate the plant with a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and a subsequent loss of Reactor Feed System .

Scenario Summary

1. Unit is at -25%.
2. The following equipment is OOS:
a. 2/3 RBCCW Pump
b. Reactor Feed Pump Standby Selector Switch
3. LCOs:
a. None Scenario Sequence
  • After completing shift turnover, the ATC will insert control rods to allow removing the Main Generator from Service.
  • During the power reduction, APRM Channel 5 will fail upscale. RPS will fail to actuate. The team will respond by manually inserting a B channel RPS half scram. The Unit Supervisor will reference Tech Specs and declare Technical Specification3.3.1.1 Condition A applies. *
  • After power is reduced to 100 MWe, the BOP will reduce load on the Main Generator in preparation for tripping the Main Turbine .

When Main Generator load has been reduced to approximately 1O MWe, the BOP will attempt to trip the Main Turbine. The turbine will fail to trip and the BOP will be required to open GCB 1-2 and 1-7 from the 923-2 panel.

The 2A TBCCW pump will trip on overcurrent. The BOP will respond and start the 2B TBCCW pump per DOA 3800-01. The BOP will execute DOP 6700-20 to address the 480V breaker trip.

  • After the actions of DOA 0202-03 and Technical Specifications have been addressed, a small leak from the Recirc System will develop. The team will respond to indications and enter DOA 0040-01 k, Slow leak and take actions in preparation for a reactor scram per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram. The team will insert a manual scram when RPS actuation thresholds are challenged .
  • After the team has stabilized the plant following the scram a loss of Reactor Feed pumps will occur. The team will transition to the middle leg of DEOP 100, RPV Control and restore RPV level with High Pressure Coolant Injection.
  • Completion criteria: When the RPV level is restored to level band directed by the Unit Supervisor and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, Place the simulator in FREEZE.
  • SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 3 of 28 Rev. 00 {02/16)

Event One - Transfer Aux Power

  • The BOP will transfer power supplies for Buses 21 and 23 from TR-21 to TR-22 in preparation for Unit Shutdown .
  • Malfunctions required : 0
  • (None)

Success Path:

  • Transfers Bus 21 feed from TR-21 to TR-22 IAW DOP 6500-01 , Transfer of 4160 Volt Bus Power Supply
  • Transfers Bus 23 feed from TR-21 to TR-22 IAW DOP 6500-01 , Transfer of 4160 Volt Bus Power Supply Event Two - Insert Control Rods to Lower Reactor Power
  • The ATC operator will insert control rods per DGP 02-1 , Reactor Shutdown .

Malfunctions required : 0

  • (None)

Success Path:

  • Inserts to control rods per DGP 02-1, Reactor Shutdown until Generator Output is 100 MWe.
  • Performs DOP 0400-01 , Reactor Manual Control System Operation Event Three - APRM fails upscale (RPS fails to actuate)
  • Malfunctions required: 2 (APRM fails upscale)

(Failure of RPS)

Success Path:

  • Determines Technical Specifications requirements.

Event Four - Main Generator Fails to trip on reverse power

  • Generator Field Breaker fails to open .

Malfunctions required: 1

  • (Reverse Power Trip Failure)

Success Path:

  • Opens GCB 1-2 and 1-7 from the 923-2 panel.
  • SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 4 of 28 Rev. 00 (02/16)

Event Five - TBCCW Pump Trip

  • The running (2A) TBCCW pump trips on overcurrent and TBCCW temperatures begin to rise.

Malfunctions required: 1

  • * (2A TBCCW Pump Trip)

Success Path:

  • Performs DOA 3800-01, TBCCW System Failure.
  • Starts standby (28) TBCCW pump and executes DOP 6800-20 for 480V Breaker Failure.

Event Six - 2A Recirculation Flow Controller Fails Upscale

  • The 2A Recirculation Flow Controller fails upscale.

Malfunctions required: 1 (CAEP)

  • (2A Recirculation Flow Controller fails upscale)

Success Path:

  • DOA 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation System Flow Control Failure.

Event Seven - Earthquake Causes Plant Damage I Torus Leak I Manual Scram

  • A LOCA in the Drywell occurs, causing DW pressure to rise, and requiring a manual scram .

Malfunctions required: 1

  • (Recirc loop leak)

Success Path:

Performs DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

Performs DEOP 0100, RPV Control Performs DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control.

Event Eight- Small Steam Leak I Emergency Depressurize Due Low Torus Level

  • A loss of RFPs results in RPV level dropping.

Malfunctions required: 4

  • (HPCI failure to Autostart)

Success Path:

  • Performs DOA 2300-02, HPCI Fast Startup .
  • SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 5 of 28 Rev. 00 (02/16)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: ILT-N-20p-Test No.: 15-1 (2016-301)

Examiners : Operators:

Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 680 MWe for maintenance on 2C RFP. 2C RFP returned to service late last shift.

Turnover: Place 2C RFP in service on Bus 21. Raise Power to 750 MWe.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event

' No. Description 1 None N (BOP) Place 2C RFP in service

  • 2 3

4 5

None HPGP4RLY AT46 RDFAILF5 FWSACBV R (ATC) l!T (BOP)

(T/S) l!T (ATC) (T/S)

C (ATC)

Raise power with flow HPCI spurious isolation - Incomplete CRD- RPIS, Loss of Control Rod Indication RFP vent fan trip with failure of standby to auto-start 6 U11 C (BOP) RWCU pump trip on overcurrentwith incomplete isolation 7 Manual Scram - Earthquake Causes Plant CSBRKSEV M (ALL)

Damaqe!Torus Leak 8 Small Steam Leak/Emergency Depressurize Due Low F41 M (ALL)

Torus Level

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l}nstrument, (C)om ponent, (M)ajor
  • Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-2 PLACE 2C RFP IN SERVICE RAISE POWER USING RECIRC FLOW HPCI SPURIOUS ISOLATION- INCOMPLETE LOSS OF CONTROL ROD INDICATION RFP VENT FAN TRIP WITH FAILURE OF STANDBY TO AUTO-START RWCU PUMP TRIP - INCOMPLETE ISOLATION EARTHQUAKE I MANUAL SCRAM STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL I EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZE DUE TO LOW TORUS LEVEL Rev.00 02/16 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Objective Evaluate the Team 's ability to operate the plant with a Torus leak that requires an Emergency Depressurization .

  • Scenario Summary 1.

2.

Unit is at -70%.

The following equipment is OOS:

a. None.
3. LCOs:
a. None Scenario Sequence
  • After completing shift turnover, the crew will place the 2C RFP in service per DOP 3200-03, Startup of Second or Third Reactor Feed Pump or Shifting to Alternate Reactor Feed Pump.
  • After completing DOP 3200-03, the Team will raise power using Recirc Flow per DGP 03-01, Power Changes and DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation
  • After the change in power has been observed, a HPCI isolation signal is received, and the HPCI isolation valves fail to close. The BOP must take manual action to complete the isolation per DAN 902(3)-3 C-7, HPCI AUTO ISOL INITIATED.
  • After the HPCI system isolation is completed, the US will review TS and determine TS 3.5.1 Action F.1 and TS 3.3.6.1 Action A.1 are applicable .
  • After the HPCI failure and TS have been addressed, CRD F-05 RPIS indication fails. The operating team will take action per DOA 0300-06, RPIS FAILURE. The ATC operator will enter a substitute position for CRD F-05 an attempt to restore RPIS indication. Ultimately, the ATC operator will select and fully insert CDR F-05.
  • The US will review TS and determine TS 3.1.3 condition C.1 and C.2 apply and directs fully inserting and disarming CRD F-05.
  • After TS declaration, the running RFP vent fan will trip and the standby will fail to auto-start. The ATC operator will manually start the standby RFP vent fan.
  • Once the standby RFP vent fan has been started, the RWCU Recirc pump will trip. RWCU Sys After Non-Regen HX Press Hi alarm will be received and required valve closures will fail to occur. The BOP operator will take manual action per the DAN to close the MO 2-1201-1 and MO 2-1201-2 valves.
  • After the Master Recirc failure is addressed, an earthquake causes plant damage, including a torus leak, which will require the Team to implement DOA 0010-03, Earthquakes, and manually scram the reactor.
  • After the scram, a small steam leak occurs. Emergency Depressurization will ultimately be required due to torus level.
  • Completion criteria: When the RPV is depressurized and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, Place the simulator in FREEZE.
  • SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 3 of 28 Rev. 00 (02/16)

Event One - Place 2C RFP in service

  • The BOP will start and place in service the 2C Reactor Feed Pump.

Malfunctions required : 0

  • (None)

Success Path:

  • Performs DOP 3200-03, Startup of Second or Third Reactor Feed Pump or Shifting to Alternate Reactor Feed Pump.

Event Two - Raise Power Using Recirc Flow

  • The Team will raise power by increasing Recirc Flow.

Malfunctions required : 0

  • (None)

Success Path:

  • Performs DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation Event Three - Incomplete HPCI isolation
  • 902-3 C-12, HPCI STM LINE FLOW HI is received and HPCI fails to isolate. The team will isolate HPCI per DAN 902(3)-3 C-7, HPCI AUTO ISOL INITIATED Malfunctions required: 2
  • (HPCI spurious isolation)
  • (PCIS Group IV relay failure)

Success Path:

  • Take actions of DAN 902(3)-3 C-7 and isolate HPCI.
  • Verifies Isolation Condenser administratively operable
  • Determines Technical Specifications requirements.

Event Four - Loss of RPIS indication

Malfunctions required: 1

Success Path:

  • Performs DOA 0300-06, RPIS Failure. Full insertion of CRD F-05 is required .
  • SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 4 of 28 Rev. 00 (02/16)

Event Five - RFP Vent Fan trip with failure of standby to auto-start

  • Running RFP Vent Fan trips, standby fails to auto-start Malfunctions required: 1
  • (RFP Vent Fan Trip)

Success Path:

  • Performs actions of DOA 5750-01, Ventilation System Failure
  • Starts standby RFP Vent Fan Event Six - RWCU pump trip on overcurrent with incomplete isolation
  • RWCU pump trip Malfunctions required : 2
  • (Overcurrent trip of RWCU pump)
  • (RWCU Isolation Failure)

Success Path:

  • .Perform actions of DAN 902(3)-4 F-12, RWCU SYS AFTER NON-REGEN HX PRESS HI Event Seven - Earthquake Causes Plant Damage I Torus Leak I Manual Scram
  • An earthquake causes plant damage, including a torus leak.

Malfunctions required : 1

Success Path:

  • Performs DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.
  • Performs DEOP 0100, RPV Control

Event Eight-Small Steam Leak I Emergency Depressurize Due Low Torus Level

  • A small steam leak occurs. Emergency Depressurization will ultimately be required due to torus level Malfunctions required: 1
  • (Small Steam Leak)

Success Path:

  • Performs DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization .
  • SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 5 of 28 Rev. 00 (02/16)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: ILT-N-30p-Test No.: ILT 15-1 (2016-301)

Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 980 MWe. No equipment OOS and no LCO actions in effect.

Turnover: Perform DOP 4400-08. EO and field supervisor have been briefed and are in the field awaiting direction. Maintain load per TSO direction Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event

' No. Description 1 None N (BOP) Circ Water Flow Reveral

  • 2 3

4 5

FW3502AU FWHDR018 ICTUBLK K50 HP5 C(ATC)

CIT (BOP) (T/S)

C (BOP)

C (BOP)

Loss of a Feedwater Heater Isolation Condenser Tube Leak Loss of all turbine seal oil - ESOP failure to auto-start Circulating Water Pump Trip 6 B02 CIT (ATC) (T/S) RPS - MG Set, Trips I Re-energize from reserve power 7 NP2 M (ALL) Manual Scram - Loss of Instrument Air - Unisolable 8 RDHLVFPA M (ALL) ATWS - Hydraulic - Repeated Scram/Resets RDHLDEGA RDHLVFPB RDHLDEGB SCPMPOCA SCPMPOCB

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C}omponent, (M)ajor
  • Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-3 CIRC WATER FLOW REVERSAL LOSS OF A FEEDWATER HEATER ISOLATION CONDENSER TUBE LEAK LOSS OF TURBINE SEAL OIL PUMP -WITH ESOP FAILURE TO AUTO-START CIRCULATING WATER PUMP TRIP RPS MG SET TRIP I RE-ENERGIZE FROM RESERVE POWER UNISOLABLE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR I MANUAL SCRAM HYDRAULIC ATWS - REPEATED SCRAM/RESETS Rev.00 02/16 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Objective Evaluate the Team's ability to operate the plant with a loss of Instrument Air and a Failure to Scram .

  • Scenario Summary 1.

2.

Unit is at -100% .

The following equipment is OOS:

a. None.
3. LCOs:
a. None Scenario Sequence
  • When Circulating Water System Flow Reversal is complete, 2B1 HTR Normal Drain unlatches due to mechanical failure of the latch. 2B1 HTR level rises and the Emergency drain opens. However level continues to slowly rise until a 2B1 HTR trip occurs. The operator places the 2B1 HTR Extraction valve in PTS to prevent it from closing or re-opens it after it closes. This results in the 2B1 HTR level dropping with the Emergency drain controlling.
  • The Isolation Condenser develops a tube leak and must be isolated . The Unit Supervisor will review TS and determine TS 3.5.3 Condition A1. and A.2 are applicable
  • The Main Hydrogen Seal Oil pump trips with a failure of the Emergency Hydrogen Seal Oil pump to start. The team starts the Emergency Hydrogen Seal Oil pump and verifies the generator load does not exceed the capacity limit curves for possibly reduced generator hydrogen pressure.
  • Circulating water pump 2A then trips on overload and the BOP manually starts circulating water pump 2B to maintain condenser vacuum.
  • The Team receives a report that the Engineering department determined that EPAs 2B-1 and 2B-2 are inoperable. The CRS determines Tech Spec requirements and then a trip of RPS EPA 2B-1 causes a loss of RPS Bus A. The Team will reenergize RPS Bus A from reserve power and begin restoration of affected systems to a normal condition.
  • When Power restoration is in progress, a large leak develops in the Instrument Air system. The Team will scram the reactor prior to the MSIVs failing closed.
  • A hydraulic ATWS occurs when the Reactor scrams. The SBLC system fails to inject when started. The Team inserts control rods by manually driving them in and performing repeated scrams .
  • Completion criteria: When all rods are fully inserted and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, Place the simulator in FREEZE .
  • SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 3 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)

Event One - Circulating Water System Flow Reversal

  • (None)

Success Path:

  • 281 HTR Normal Drain unlatches due to mechanical failure of the latch. 281 HTR level rises and the Emergency drain opens. However level continues to slowly rise until a 281 HTR trip occurs.

Malfunctions required: 1

  • (281 HTR trip)

Success Path:

  • Places the 281 HTR Extraction valve in PTS to prevent it from closing or re-opens it after it closes.

Event Three - Isolation Condenser Tube Leak

  • Isolation condenser develops a tube leak.

Malfunctions required: 1

  • (Isolation Condenser Tube Leak)

Success Path:

  • Team isolates the Isolation Condenser
  • References Tech Specs Event Four - Main Seal Oil Pump Trip I Failure of Emergency Seal Oil Pump to Auto Start
  • The Main Hydrogen Seal Oil pump trips with a failure of the Emergency Hydrogen Seal Oil pump to start Malfunctions required : 2
  • (Failure of Standby pump to auto start)

Success Path:

  • Team starts the Emergency Hydrogen Seal Oil Pump
  • SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 4 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)

Event Five - Circulating Water Pump Trip

  • The team will recognize and respond to a trip of the 2A Circulating Water Pump Malfunctions required : 1

Success Path:

  • Start 2B Circulating Water Pump Event Six - RPS MG Set Trip I Re-energize from Reserve power

Malfunctions required: 1

Success Path:

  • The CRS determines Tech Spec requirements.
  • Re-energize RPS Bus A from Reserve Power.

Event Seven - Loss of Instrument Air I Manual Scram

  • A large leak develops in the Instrument Air System Malfunctions required: 1
  • (Instrument Air Leak)

Success Path:

  • Performs manual reactor scram.

Event Eight - Hydraulic ATWS/ARI Unsuccessful

  • A Hydraulic ATWS occurs when the reactor is scrammed. ARI is unsuccessful Malfunctions required: 2
  • (SBLC Failure to inject)

Success Path:

  • SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 5 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML16337A127&oldid=2441991"