ML070120513

Draft - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 2)

ML070120513
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	10/09/2006
From:	Kafantaris M Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	D'Antonio J Operations Branch I
Sykes, Marvin D.
References
50-272/06-301, 50-311/06-301 50-272/06-301, 50-311/06-301
Download: ML070120513 (91)

Text

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SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SCENARIO TITLE: SGTR SCENARIO NUMBER. I ILT NRC ESG-001 EFFECTIVE DATE: 121416 EXPECTED DURATION: 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE STA OTHER Revision Summary:

Rev 0: New Issue for I ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY: Paul Williams (INSTRUCTOR)

APPROVED BY:

(OPERATIONS TRAINNG MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)

APPROVED BY:

(OPERATIONS MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)

I ILT NRC-ESG-001 Enabling Objectives A. Given the unit at power the crew will reduce power to remove a Heater Drain Pump from sewice, IAW approved station procedures.

B. Given the unit at power with a failure of a Pressurizer Pressure control channel, the crew will take action to stabilize RCS pressure and swap to a non-failed channel, IAW approved station procedures.

C. Given the unit with a leak in a SW bay, the crew will take action to isolate the leak, IAW approved station procedures.

D. Given a SGTL, the crew will identify and isolate the leaking SG, IAW approved station procedures.

E. Given the unit with a SGTR and loss of off-site power, take actions to minimize off site dose and RCS leakage, IAW approved station procedures.

A. Power Reduction to 90%

B. Pressurizer Pressure Channel 1 Fails High C. #2 SW Bay Leak D. SGTL E. SGTR on 21 SG with Loss of Off-Site Power and B Vital Bus 2 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001 A. The crew will receive the unit at 100% power with all system in automatic. One major piece of equipment will be C/Ted, 2B DIG.

B. Once the crew takes the watch they will reduce reactor power to 90% at 30% per hour to remove 22 Heater Drain pump fkom service due to an emergent mechanical seal leak.

C. Once the power reduction to 90% is underway Channel 1 Pressurizer Pressure will fail high.

The RO will take manual control of the Master Pressure Controller and adjust demand to stabilize RCS pressure. The CRS will enter AB.PZR-0001 and direct crew actions to remove the channel from service.

D. After AB.PZR-0001 has been completed to the point of determining channel operability a leak will begin in #2 SW Bay. The CRS will enter AELSW-0003 and direct crew actions to isolate and remove #2 bay fiom service.

E. When the bay isolated a SGTL will occur on 21 SG. The CRS will enter AE3.SG-0001 and direct the crew to perform actions to address the SGTL. During the SGTL, the SG tube will rupture. The CRS will direct a manual SI initiation.

F. The RO will manually initiate SI and commence the Immediate Actions of EOP-TRIP-1. The CRS will enter EOP-TRIP-1. During the performance of EOP-TRIP-1 a loss of off-site power will occur coincident with the loss of B Vital Bus. This will necessitate the crew manually isolating service water to the turbine building.

G. The crew wilI perform actions of EOP-TRIP-l and then transition to EOP-SGTR-1 3 of24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001 Presnapped IC-191 from portable exam drive SELF-CHECK Description Delay I Ramp I Trigger I Severity -

1. VL0055 23SW20 Fails to Position NA NA NA 100

2. VL0053 2SW26 Fails to Position NA NA NA 100

3. PR0016A Ch 1 Prz Press Fails High NA NA ET- 1 2500

4. SW0216A 2 SW Bay Leaks NA 1 min ET-2 10000

5. SG0078A SG Rupture NA 3:OO ET-3 25

6. EL0134 Loss of Off-Site Power :30 NA ET-4 NA

• SELF-CHECK I Description I Delay Ramp I Trigger I Condition

1. DGl9D 2B D/G Locked Out NA NA NA Yes

2. DG2 1D 2B DG BKR Rack Out NA NA NA Tagged

3. DG20D 2B DG BKR Control Power NA NA NA Off

4. PR34D PORV Stop Valve 2PR6 Tagged NA NA RT-10 Tagged

5. SW23D - 21 SW Pump Control Power NA NA RT-11 Off

6. SW27D - 22 SW Pump Control Power :30 NA RT-11 Off 7 SW32D - 23 SW Pump Control Power :60 NA RT-11 Off SELF-CHECK I Description Delay Ramp Action

1. AI06 OVA0 BIT Flow meter failed NA NA NA 0 SELF-CHECK I ET#n I Discription Command

1. ET-4 MOW 25440

2. ET-5 KA915TC4 DMF VL0055 4 of24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001 I Description

- 1. RHlandRH2

2. VC 1-4

3. RH 18s

4. RCPs (SELF CHECK)

5. RT (SELF CHECK)

- 6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)

- 7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).

8. 22 AJ3V Supply Fan

- 9. 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)

10. 2B D/G ( C R )

Description

1. Ensure Channel 1 Pressurizer Pressure selected for control 5 of24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001

. -L .- .

EVal Expected Plan#&udent 0 CRS implements S2.OP-I0.ZZ-0004 0 CRS directs ROPO to commence a power reduction to 90% at 30% per hour 0 PO sets-up DEHC for correct reduction and rate IAW S2.OP-S0.TRB-0002 0 CRS directs RO to commence a boration at rate and gallon amount as determined during brief IAW S2.0P-S0.CVC-0006 0 RO monitors reactor parameters to maintain Tavg within programmed value 0 PO monitors main turbine response 0 PO monitors SGFP suction pressure to ensure it remains greater than 320 psig 0 PO monitors condenser Delta Ts 0 RO commences boration IAW S2.0P-S0.CVC-0006 PO informs CRS when CRS when power has reduced to 90%

0 RO informs CRS when boration has been completed and returns boration control to automatic 0 CREW reviews S2.OP-SO.TD-0001 to remove 22 Heater Drain Pump from service 7 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001 ator/instr;;ctor Expeged Plant-/

service

2. Pressurizer Pressure Channel 1 0 RO reports that Pressurizer Pressure Channel 1 has failed high and requests permission to take master pressure controller to manual 0 CRS concurs with RO assessment and directs master pressure controller placed in manual 0 CRS enters S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001 0 CRS directs PO to implement CAS 0 RO reports POPS is not in service 0 RO reports that controlling pressurizer pressure channel is failed RO adjust master pressure controller to be consistent with attachment 2 0 RO selects channel 3 for controlling channel RO returns master pressure controller to Auto CRS conducts brief and discusses contingent actions. Also during brief informs crew that TSAS 3.3.2.1 b 19, 3.3.1.1. act 6 and 3.4.5b are applicable.

0 CRS directs RO to close 2PR6 to comply with technical specifications 8 of24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001 0 RO closes 2PR6 0 CRS directs WCC to have breaker opened IAW SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0103 0 CRS directs PO to implement S2.0P-S0.RPS-0003 0 PO initiates S2.OP-S0.RPS-0003 9 of 24

"I" ILT NRC-ESG-001 0 CREW responds to OHA alarms o B-13 and 14: 21 and 22 SW HDR Press LO o B-29: 21-23 SW Pmp Sump Area Lvl HI.

0 RO acknowledges standby SW Pump start.

0 CRS enters AB.SW-0001 or goes directly to AB.SW-0003.

0 Crew monitors AB.SW-0003 CAS.

0 CREW dispatches operator to investigate.

0 RO opens 21 & 22SW23, Nuc Hdr X-over MOVs.

0 RO closes 21 & 22SW17, Pump Disch X-over MOVs.

0 Crew isolates 2 SW Bay:

o RO starts 24 SW Pump.

o RO stops 21&23 SW Pumps.

o CRS directs NE0 to open 125 VDC Control Power to 2 Bay sw Pumps.

o RO closes 21SW22, NucHdr Inlet.

o RO closes 21SW20, TurbHdr Supply.

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I ILT NRC-ESG-001 Crew initiates actions to remove 1 CCHX from service IAW S2.0P-S0.CC-0002 IAW CAS 4.0.

SM contacts maintenance services to assist with dewatering CRS enters AB-ZZ-0002 for flooding CRS refers to Tech Specs and determines that TS 3.8.1.l.b, action b.2 and 3.7.4 for 1 SW header inoperable

4. Tube Leak on 21 SG RO reports OHA A-8 verifies on CRT 2R53A in alarm CRS directs monitoring of 2R19A to confirm status of SGTL PO informs CRS that 2R19A is rising as expected for tube leak CRS enters S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 CRS directs RO to implement Attachment 1 CAS CRS directs NE0 to de-energize turbine and polisher area sumps RO reports PZR level lowering slowly CRS directs a swap to centrifugal charging pump RO places a centrifugal charging pump in service by performing the following:

o Closing CV55 11 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001 o Starts 21 or 22 CV Pump o Places 23 CV pump in manual and lowers speed o Adjust CV55 to maintain stable charging flow and seal injection flow o Stops 23 CV Pump o Places CV55 in automatic 0 CRS directs letdown flow to minimum 0 RO reduces letdown to minimum 0 RO adjusts charging to stabilize Pressurizer level and estimate leak rate 0 SM/CRS/STA determine that Action level 3 is met and Unit must be in Mode 3 in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 0 RO informs CRS that leak rate has increased and PZR level is lowering rapidly 0 CRS briefs crew that leak is beyond capacity of makeup system and directs a Rx trip and SI

5. SGTR 0 RO trips reactor, confirms Rx trip and initiates SI 0 RO performs VAS of EOP-TRIP-1 0 CRS enters EOP-TRIP-1 0 CRS confirms immediate actions 0 RO announces reactor trip and request 12 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001

-wv.., -. WP -

---i Comm Y

CtiVi Expesed Plan Respon s, SM and STA report to control room 0 When Immediate Actions are complete within 10 min on identification of PO requests permission to throttle fault and complete isolation of AFW and isolate 21 SG by closing Ruptured Steam Generator 21AF11 and 21 Time of Isolation:

SAT UNSAT 0 CRS directs action as requested 0 CREW continues with EOP-TRIP-I 0 PO evaluates AFW status and SEC Loading and reports that 22 AFW Pump is unavailable and that all equipment is loaded as expected except that 2B Vital Bus de-energized due to 2B EDG tag-out 0 PO determines that valves 2SW26 and 23SW20 have not closed as required and SW header pressure is <3Opsig CT#2 (E-0 -L): Manually start and 0 CRS directs 23SW20 closed since align the minimum ESW pumps in 2SW26 has no power an operating safeguard train prior to transition from EOP-TRIP-1 RO determines containment pressure has remained less than 15 psig 0 CRS conducts brief to discuss plant status and minimizes length due to time critical nature of SGTR 0 CRS directs RO/PO to start one CCW pump IAW EOP-APPX-1 13 of24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001 RO starts 23 CCW Pump by blocking 2C SEC Verifying 22CS Pump is stopped and 22CS2 is closed Sends and operator to place 21 CCHX in service Closes 22CC3 RO evaluates SI status as within limits, however, BIT flow is zero.

CREW validates that charging pumps have correct amps and valve lineup is correct PO maintains AFW flow >22E4 l b m h until 1 SG is greater than 9% and then throttles to maintain 9-33%

RO informs CRS that RCS temperature is stable at 547F RO reports Reactor Trip Breakers are open RO reports both Pressurizer PORVs are closed, however, only 2PR7 is open PO evaluates all steam generator pressure are stable or rising and no faulted steam generator exist CREW transitions to SGTR-1 based on 21 SG Level rising in an uncontrolled manner CREW identifies 21 SG as ruptured SG PO adjusts 21MS10 setpoint to 1045 Psig PO closes 21MS7,18,167 and GB4 PO determines 23 AFW pump is not required to maintain feed flow since 2 1 14 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-00 1 Q tor/Instruct ~ Expeded Plant/S ons AFW pump feeds 23/24 SGs and can provide sufficient AFW flow for cooldown PO trips and stops 23 AFW pump CRS dispatches and NE0 to close 2 1MS45 CRS dispatches an operator to close 2SS321 PO determines 21 SG is isolated from intact SGs and feed flow should remain isolated RO determines 2PR6 is closed with power removed CRS directs power restored to 2PR6 PO determines no SG is faulted CREW resets safeguards RO stops both RHR pumps PO evaluates 21 SG as greater than 375 and not faulted CRS dispatches operator to shift Gland seal supply to U1 CREW determines target temperature is 503F CREW commences rapid cooldown to target temperature PO cools down at max rate using an RCS temperature so that a available MS 1Os transition from SGTR-1 does not 15 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001 1 SAT UNSAT e PO stops cooldown when target temperature is reached and dumps steam to stabilize temp CT# 4 (E-3 -C): Depressurize RCS Crew determines normal spray is not until Ruptured SG and RCS pressure available and depressurizes using 2PR2 are equal and PZR level is L11%

with Subcooling >O, before water RO terminates depressurization when release from ruptured SGPORV or criteria of table F is met Safety valve SAT UNSAT CREW terminates SI 16 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG)

D. SC.OP-AP.ZZ-O102(Q), Use of Procedures E. S2.OP-SO.TD-0001 - Bleed Steam Coil Drain Tank And Heater Drain Pump Operation F. S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006 - Boron Concentration Control G. S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 - Power Operation H. S2.OP-AELPZR-0001 - Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction I. S2.OP-S0.RPS-0003 - Removing a Pressurizer Channel from Service J. S2.OP-AB.SW-0001 - Loss of Service Water Header Pressure K. S2.OP-Al3.SW-0003 - Service Water Bay Leak L. S2.OP-AB.SG-0001- Steam Generator Tube Leak M. 2-EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip or Safety Injection N. 2-EOP-SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture 17 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001 CT#1 (E-3 --A): Close 21AFll and 21 within 10 min on identification of fault and complete isolation of Ruptured Steam Generator Basis Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and intact SGs. Upon loss of differential pressure the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that necessitates the crew taking compensating action that complicates the event mitigation strategy.. .

For feedwater, isolation must occur after ruptured SG level exceeds minimum indication (9%). ..Any delay in the AFW isolation allows the ruptured SG level to increase as the AFW adds additional inventory along with the primary to secondary leakage. Too long a delay (>lo min) prevents the crew fi-om depressurizing and terminating SI before excessive inventory seriously damages the SG as a fission product barrier.

CT#2 (E-0 --L): Manually start and align the minimum ESW pumps in an operating safeguard train Basis Failure to manually start and align the minimum required number of ESW pumps in an operating safeguards train represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to:

Recognize a failurehcorrect auto actuation of and ESF system or component 0 Effectively direcumanipulate ESF controls.

CT#3 (E-3 --B) EstablisWmaintain an RCS temperature so that a transition from SGTR-1 does not occur Basis Failure to establish and maintain correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from SGTR-1 to a contingency procedure, which constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action that complicates the event mitigation strategy.. .

CT# 4 (E-3 --C) Depressurize RCS until Ruptured SG and RCS pressure are equal and PZR level is ?11% with Subcooling >O, before water release from ruptured SG PORV or Safety valve Basis Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario 18 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-00 1 S-ILT-2006 NRC ESG1

-

SALEM ESG PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT y/N EVENT N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water Y Steam Generator Tube Rupture N LossofCCW Y Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN y/N TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N GasTurbine Y SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area Y Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves fiom Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation N Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation Y Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Y Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Y Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures Y Early depressurize RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

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I ILT NRC-ESG-00 1 BORON:

SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5,6& DEFUELED):

NIA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burn-up 10,500 MWDIMTU, reactivity plan provided by reactor engineering MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

3.8.1.1.b action b. 2B diesel CIT EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCESIN PROGRESS:

Shutdown to 90% at 30% per hour to support removal of 22 heater drain pump fkom service ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

CONTROL ROOM:

Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.

No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.

PRIMARY:

NONE SECONDARY:

Heating steam is aligned to unit 1.

RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATEWSERVICE WATER:

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I ILT NRC-ESG-001 Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.

EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note: This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.

SELF- E S G I ILT NRC-ESG-001 - REVIEWER: Ed Gallagher CHECK

1. THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.

2. The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.

3. Each event description consists of:

0 The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated, 0 The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event, 0 The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew, The expected operator actions (by shift position), and The event termination point.

4. The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.

5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

6. Sequencingtiming of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time fiame and implements procedures and/or corrective actions).

7. Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

8. If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.

9. The simulator modeling is not altered.

-10. All crew competencies can be evaluated.

11. Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).

12. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

13. Proper critical task methodology is used IAW NRC procedures.

14. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.

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I ILT NRC-ESG-001

1. Verify simulator is in correct load for training

2. All required computer terminals in operation

3. Simulator clocks synchronized

4. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

5. Rod step counters correct (channel check)

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)

7. DL- 10 log up-to-date

8. Required procedures clean

9. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)

10. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

11. Procedure pens available

12. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

13. Shift manning sheet available

14. SPDS reset

15. Reference verification performed with required documents available

16. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out

17. Required keys available

18. Video Tape (if applicable)

19. Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03

20. Reset P-250 Rod Counters 22 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-001 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.

The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...

e degradation of any barrier to fission product release e degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity e a violation of a safety limit e a violation of the facility license condition e incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) e a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...

e effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.

e recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

e take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

e prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

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I ILT NRC-ESG-001 EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) Pre-Job Brief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:

Lead ESG: I ILT NRC-ESG-001 Examiner:

1.ESG overview and sequence of major events.

2.Determine which optional events will be performed, if any.

3 .ESG summary of Critical Tasks.

4.Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.

5.Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performanceof Critical Tasks.

6.Review alternate path(s) identified by the ESG.

7.Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.

&Determineswhat parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.

Ensure SOE recorder is recording.

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SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SCENARIO TITLE: LOCA SCENARIO NUMBER: I ILT NRC ESG-002 EFFECTIVE DATE: 12/4/6 EXPECTED DURATION: 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE STA OTHER Revision Summary:

Rev 0: New Issue for I ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY: Paul Williams (INSTRUCTOR)

APPROVED BY:

(OPERATIONS TRAINNG MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)

APPROVED BY:

(OPERATIONS MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 Enabling Objectives A. Given the unit in a start-up condition and the need to raise power, raise power to 18-20%,

IAW approved station procedures.

B. Given the unit at power with a loss of tripping capability on a reactor trip breaker, the crew will validate the alarm, IAW approved station procedures.

C. Given the unit with a trip of the running charging pump, the crew will place another pump in service, IAW approved station procedures.

D. Given the unit at power with a partial loss of off-site power, the crew will take actions to stabilize the unit, IAW approved station procedures.

E. Given the unit with a LOCA in progress, the crew will take corrective actions to mitigate the accident, IAW approved station procedures.

F. Given the unit with a total loss of off-site power and a LOCA in progress, the crew will take actions to restore safeguards equipment, IAW approved station procedures.

A. Raise power to place Turbine on Line B. Loss of Tripping Capability on RTB B C. 23 CV Pump Trip D. Loss of 3 SPT E. Small Break LOCA F. Loss of Off-Site Power 2 of21

I230 E

'd

-2

• a

'3

'8

'V

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 Presnapped IC-192 fi-om Exam Drive

1. CV0034 23 Charging Pump Trip NA NA ET-2

2. VL0245 2CV4 Fails to Position NA NA ET-2 50

3. EL0102 Loss of 3 SPT-Diff NA NA ET-3

4. RC0002 RCS Leak into Containment NA NA ET-4 10000

5. EL0134 Loss of Off-Site Power NA NA ET-5

6. RP0108 Failure of Automatic SI NA NA NA NA 7* RP0342 2SJ12 Fails to Open on SEC act NA NA NA NA

• • RP0343 2SJ13 Fails to Open on SEC act NA NA NA NA 9 AN0183 E37 Ch C Shutdown Margin NA NA NA 1 lo* AN0191 E45 Ch D Shutdown Margin NA NA NA 1

. MC12D Loss of Tripping Capability RTB N

NA NA ET- 1 Alarm 2 CV42A Minimum Flow Stop for 2CV55 NA NA ET- 10 0

3. MT03D Main Turb Turning Gear PB NA NA NA Dep PB 4 DA033D DC breaker #14 A Rx Trip Brkr NA NA ET- 1 Off SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Trigger Action 4 of21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 SELF-CHECK ET#n Discription Command Description

1. RH1 andRH2

2. VC 1-4

3. RH 18s

4. RCPs (SELF CHECK)

5. RT (SELF CHECK)

6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)

7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).

8. 22 ABV Supply Fan

9. 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)

I I Descriution 1 IOP-3 signed off thru step 5.4.14 5 of21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002

• -,-r*

.T J E dent Comments_

1. Power Increase 0 CRS briefs crew on power increase 0 RO withdraws rods to raise reactor power 0 PO adjusts steam dumps to increase steam load and maintain Tavg on Program

1. Loss of Tripping Capability on A RTB 0 RO reports alarm to CRS 0 CRS directs ROs to hold power increase 0 PO reviews ARP and informs CRS 0 CRS directs NE0 to check 125VDC breaker 0 CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 act 14 7 of 21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 2.23 CV Pumr, Trir, 1

e RO responds to loss of seal injection flow console alarms, identifies 23 Charging Pump t i p e CRS enters AB-CVC-1 e Crew determines pump did not trip due to cavitation e RO closes 2CV2 and 2CV277 e RO informs CRS that CV4 did not close fully e CRS directs RO to attempt to close CV4 and RO reports that CV4 did not close e CRS directs letdown isolated using the 2CV2 and 2CV277 to prevent flashing the Letdown Line e Crew determines 23 CV pump not available e CRS directs start of 21 or 22 Charging Pump IAW AB.CVC-1 e RO shifts CV55 to Manual CLOSED, starts a CCP e CRS directs NE0 to investigate cause of 23 Charging pump trip e CRS directs Excess Letdown reestablished IAW S0.CVC-0003 e RO establishes excess letdown e CRS directs CV7 to be closed to isolate 8 of21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 penetration e CRS enters TSAS 3.6.3 and contacts WCC to prepare a tagout for CV7

3. 3 SPT Trip, SB LOCA Crew acknowledges multiple OH and console alarms PO informs CRS that 21 CN pump and 2 1 SGFP have tripped and AFW has started and is feeding the SGs CRS enters Al3.LOOP-0003 CRS initiates CAS of LOOP-3 PO informs CRS that all vital buses are energized by off-site power e CRS directs WCC to coordinate opening 500KV disconnects e Crew initiates Attach 2, Part A of LOOP-3 for loss of 2E and 2H group busses CRS directs a Reactor trip, enters Trip-1 requests assistance form WCC to continue with AB-LOOP-3 RO initiates a MANUAL Rx trip e RO performs TRIP-1 Immediate Actions, fkom memory:

1. Trip reactor,

2. Confirm reactor trip,

3. Trip turbine,

4. All 4 KV Vital Bus energized

5. SI Actuation not required e CRS enters TRIP-I and reads Irnmed 9 of 21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002

~ -1 .,.

Evaluator ctor ted. Commen Actions 0 PO throttles AFW at completion of Immed actions 0 CRS transitions to TRIP-2 0 RO announces Reactor Trip 0 POthrottlesAFW 0 RO reports rapidly lowering PZR pressure and level 0 RO initiates Safety Injection due to lowering Pressurizer Pressure 0 CRS returns to Trip-1 0 RO announces Rx Trip and Safety Injection and informs CRS that Auto SI failed to actuate 0 RO/PO performs SEC loading verification 0 PO ensures 21 and 22 AFW pumps are running and throttles AFW flow to maintain Steam Generator level >9% or

>22E4 lbm/hr feed flow.

0 PO checks SafeguardsValve Alignment and identifies 2SJ12 and 2SJ13 not open 0 CRS directs RO to open 2SJ12 and 13 0 RO opens valves and informs CRS BIT flow now established 0 RO closes 21/22CA330.

10 of 21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002

..*

C RO reports Containment Spray not required RO determines MSLI isolation is not required CREW closes CV139 and CV140 when RCS pressure is below 1500 psig with BIT Flow established CREW secures remaining RCPs when RCS pressure is < 1350 with ECCS flow established PO verifies all 4KV vital busses energized RO reports Control Room Ventilation in Pressurized Mode RO reports proper Switchgear Room Ventilation lineup.

RO reports 2 CCW pumps running RO evaluates ECCS flow alignment.

ROPO verifies AFW flow >22E04 lbm/hr or SG level >9%.

Crew verifies RCS temperature control.

ROPO verifies reactor trip breakers open.

RO verifies PORVs closed and stop 11 of21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 Evaluatorflhstructor Ac PlantfSt&dentRis valves open e CREW identifies PZR Sprays not available and RCPs secured.

e PO verifies no faulted SGs.

e PO verifies no SGTRs exist.

e ROPO perform LOCA evaluation e CREW transitions to LOCA- 1.

e Crew performs verifications of FRCE- 1 and return to LOCA-1 (Only of Purple path is met) e PO verifies no faulted SGs.

e PO maintains SG levels e PO verifies no ruptured SGs.

e RO/PO resets Safeguards:

Resets SI; e Resets Phase A; e Resets Phase B; e Opens 21 & 22CA330; 0 Resets each SEC; and e Resets 230V Control Centers.

e Crew evaluates SI flow reduction criteria e CRS determines spray pumps and RHR pumps should not be stopped e PO stops unloaded diesels e CRS refers to Step 5 Continuous Action IF Blackout occurs. ..

12 of 21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 e Crew performs actions of Table B of LOCA- 1 e ROPO verifies SEC loading complete e PO resets all SECs.

CRS directs restart of available Safeguards loads:

o 21 and 22 Charging Pump 0 21/22 SI Pump; o 2 1-25 CFCU in slow speed; o SwitchgearRoom Exhaust Fans o Containment Spray pumps (If required)

CT #3 (E-0-4 Start at least one Safety Injection Pump (Intermediate Head) prior to step 14 of LOCA-1 or prior to step 6 of FRCC-2.

SAT UNSAT 13 of21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

B. Technical Specifications C. SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0102(4), Use of Procedures D. S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001- Charging System Malfunction E. S2.OP-AB.LOOP-0003- Partial Loss of Off-Site Power F. EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip or Safety Injection G. EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip Response H. EOP-LOCA LOSSof Coolant I. EOP-FRCE-1 -Response to Excessive Containment Pressure 14 of 21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 CT-1 (E-0 -D): Manually actuate at least 1 train of Safety Injection before transition to any LOCA, or FR procedure or completion of step 9 of Trip-2.

BASIS: Failure to manually actuate SI under postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity Additionally, failure to manually actuate SI (when it is possible to do so) results in a significant reduction in safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Finally, failure to manually actuate SI is a violation of the facility license condition CT #2 (E-1-C): Trip all RCPs prior to RCS inventory becoming depleted to critical inventory. (within 5 mins of RCS pressure < 1350 with ECCS flow)

BASIS: Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to the degradation of a barrier to fission product release.

WOG sponsored analysis to demonstrate that the operating crew would have sufficient time (fiom the point at which the criteria was met) to recognize the indications that the criteria are met and trip RCPs before the window for adverse consequence begins.. .The minimum response time for the operating crew is 5 minutes.. . if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT remains below 2200 CT#3: Re-establish plant design basis conditions by starting at least one train of ECCS equipment after a loss of off-site power occurs with SI Reset.

BASIS: FSAR assumption of minimum ECCS flow per section 15.3.1.2.

15 of21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 I ILT NRC #2 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE

~

y/N EVENT y/N EVENT N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture N LossofCCW Y Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out Y LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEMUNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N GasTurbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves fiom Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Y Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N Early depressurizeRCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

16 of 21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 BORON:

SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS ( 5 , 6 & DEFUELED):

NIA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burn-up 17,500 MWDiMTU, reactivity plan provided by reactor engineering is for initial power increase to 20% to be performed with control rods. Detailed plan for continued power ascension will be provide after Turbine is on line.

MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCESIN PROGRESS :

Increase power to 18% in preparation for placing the main turbine on line. IOP-3 is complete thru step 5.4.14 and all approvals and surveillances for transition to Mode 1 are complete.

ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

CONTROL ROOM:

Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.

No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.

PRIMARY:

NONE SECONDARY:

Heating steam is aligned to unit 1.

RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATEWSERVICE WATER:

17 of 21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.

EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note: This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.

E S G I ILT NRC-ESG-002 REVIEWER: Ed Gallagrher CHECK

1. THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES J N THE SCENARIO.

2. The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.

3. Each event description consists of The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated, The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event, 0 The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew, 0 The expected operator actions (by shift position), and The event termination point.

4. The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.

5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

6. Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures and/or corrective actions).

7. Sequencingkiming of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

8. If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.

9. The simulator modeling is not altered.

10. All crew competencies can be evaluated.

11. Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).

12. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

13. Proper critical task methodology is used IAW NRC procedures.

14. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.

18 of 21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002

1. Verify simulator is in correct load for training

2. All required computer terminals in operation

3. Simulator clocks synchronized

4. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

5. Rod step counters correct (channel check)

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)

7. DL- 10 log up-to-date

8. Required procedures clean

9. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)

10. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

11. Procedure pens available

12. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

13. ShiR manning sheet available

14. SPDS reset

15. Reference verification performed with required documents available

16. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out

17. Required keys available

18. Video Tape (if applicable)

19. Ensure ECG Classificationis correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03

20. Reset P-250 Rod Counters 19 of 21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.

The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...

e degradation of any barrier to fission product release e degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity e a violation of a safety limit e a violation of the facility license condition e incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) e a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...

e effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.

e recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

e take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

e prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (WS) or ESF actuation.

20 of 21

I ILT NRC-ESG-002 EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) Pre-Job Brief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:

Lead ESG: I ILT NRC-ESG-001 Examiner:

1.ESG overview and sequence of major events.

2.Determine which optional events will be performed, if any.

3.ESG summary of Critical Tasks.

4.Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.

5.Assign examiner ownership for observing and documentingperformance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.

-6.Review alternate path(s) identified by the ESG.

7.Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.

8.Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.

Ensure SOE recorder is recording.

21 of 21

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SCENARIO TITLE: Loss of Heat Sink SCENARIO NUMBER: I ILT NRC ESG-003 EFFECTIVE DATE: 121416 EXPECTED DURATION: 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE STA OTHER Revision Summary:

Rev 0: New Issue for I ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY: Paul Williams (INSTRUCTOR)

APPROVED BY:

(OPERATIONS TRAINNG MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)

APPROVED BY:

(OPERATIONS MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 Enabling Objectives A. Given the unit at power, with a sustained excessive U2 Main Power Transformer DC Ground Current, the crew will reduce power as required, IAW approved station procedures.

B. Given the unit at power with a Thot Failure, the crew will place rods in manual and stabilize the plant, IAW approved station procedures.

C. Given the unit at power with a leak in the CCW system, the crew will identify and isolate the leak, IAW approved station procedures.

D. Given a situation with an OHA alarm, perform action(s) to investigate and correct the cause of the alarm, L4W approved station procedures.

E. Given the unit with a loss of heat sink condition, the crew will restore feedwater, IAW approved station procedures.

A. AbnormalGrid B. 22 Loop Tavg fails as is C. CCWLeak D. Main Power Transformer Failure E. Loss of Heat Sink 2 of 22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 A. The crew takes the watch at 100% power. 21 AFW Pump is tagged for bearing replacement.

B. Once the crew assumes the watch the DC neutral ground current will rise to 25 amps. The crew will enter AB.GRID-0001 and reduce power to 942 MWe. During the power reduction 22 Loop Tavg will fail as is resulting in excessive rod motion. The crew will enter AB.ROD-0003 and remove the channel fi-om service.

C. After the channel is removed from service, a leak develops in the CCW system. The crew should implement AB.CC-0001 to establish makeup flow and isolate the leak.

D. Following isolation of the CCW leak, an OHA alarm comes in on MPT Phase 1. The N E 0 will report a major oil leak on the MPT and a desire to leave the area because of electrical arcing noises.

The CRS should order a manual reactor trip.

E. The Turbine fails to trip on the reactor trip and MSLI fails to auto initiate. The crew should initiate a MSLI as part of immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1. Safety Injection will occur based on the high steam flow.

F. 23 AFWP trips when it auto starts and is not able to be reset. After AFW flow is throttled to 22e4, 22 AFWP breaker trips open. The crew should transition to FRHS-1 when the RED PATH conditions are met. In FRHS-1, the crew should stop the RCPs; select 1 SG for depressurization to allow feed using a Condensate pump.

G. The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario any time after S/G WR level is observed rising.

H. NOTE: Depending on timing of the MSLI and progress through the procedures, RCS Bleed and Feed criteria may be met before the Condensate pump is feeding the S/G. In that case, the crew will initiate RCS Bleed and Feed then feed the S/Gs via a Condensate Pump.

3 of22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 Pre-snapped IC-193 from portable exam drive SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Trigger Severity

1. AF20D, 21 AFW Pump Bkr Control Power N/A NIA N/A Off 2* AFZlD, 21 AF Pump Rack Out NIA NIA NIA Tagged

3. EL12A DC Neutral Ground Current NA 2:oo ET- 1 25 SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Trigger Action

3. OVDI MSLI CH A Loop 3 NA NA NA Off

4. OVDI MSLI CH A Loop 4 NA NA NA Off

5. OVDI MSLI CH B Loop 1 NA NA NA Off

- OVDI MSLI CH B Loop 2 NA NA NA Off 4 of 22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003

7. NA NA NA Off OVDI MSLI CH B Loop 3

8. OVDI MSLI CH B Loop 4 NA NA NA Off SELF-CHECK ET#n Description Command I Description

1. RHlandRH2

2. VC 1-4

3. RH 18s

4. RCPs (SELF CHECK)

5. RT (SELF CHECK)

6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)

7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).

8. 22 AI3V Supply Fan

9. 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)

- 10. 21 AFW Pump (C/T)

R I

Description 5 of 22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 A. State shift job assignments:

B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide CREW members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)

C. Inform the crew The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift.

D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.

E. Do not review objectives with crew 6 of 22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 I --

nskctor Activity den{ Respon c

1. Abnormal Grid PO acknowledges OHA H-23, MPT 0 2 TRBL 0 PO determines CRT point 545 is in alarm and refers to alarm response 0 CREW dispatches NE0 to MPT Phase 2 to investigate and correct alarm 0 CREW monitors Computer point Y2 107A and determines that MPT DC Ground Current is 21 5 amps PO informs CRS that MPT DC Ground Current is rising rapidly 0 CREW determines that MPT DC Ground Current has been ? 17 amps for

> 5 minutes.

0 CRS enters S2.OP-AELGRID-0001 0 CREW initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Statements (CAS) 0 CREW initiates Attachment 2, Solar Magnetic Disturbance.

0 CREW holds brief discussing actions of AB.GRID-1 including reactivity and contingency actions 0 CREW initiates a Generator Load reduction to <942 M W by:

o PO selecting SMD #1 Runback of DEHC panel o PO selecting GO on DEHC panel CREW initiates S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001 CREW performs Continuous Actions 7 of22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003

--

I Evaluatorfiistc? Expected Plan$S&denr se Summary (Attachment 1) of S2.0P-AB.LOAD-0001.

0 ROPO maintain TAVGon program with rods, boration, or turbine load 0 RO energizes Pressurizer heaters 0 ROPO initiates boration or Rapid Boration to maintain rods above RIL 0 CREW determines AFD is outside the target band and begins accumulation of penalty minutes.

0 RO informs CRS that rods are inserting in Auto, with Tave lowering further than expected also 21 Tavg channel is higher than the others RO reports OHA for Rod insertion limit Lo and LO LO.

CRS directs RO to place rods in mimual 0 CRS enters S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 0 RO withdraws rods as required to control Tavg IAW Attachment 1 of S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 0 Crew identifies 21 loop Thot as failed 0 RO adjusts charging flow as required to restore PZR level to program 0 CRS directs RO to defeat failed channel 8 of22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 RO returns PZR level and Rod control to Automatic CRS enters TSAS for 21 Loop Thot and requests assistance fkom I&C to remove channel from service TSAS 3.3.1.1 act 6, 3.3.2.1.b act 19

3. CCW Leak RO/PO report lowering level in CCW surge tank PO refers to console ARP and initiates makeup to CCW surge tank CREW enters AB.CC-001.

PO opens 2DR107 to makeup to the system and determines level can be maintained RO directs N E 0 to verity CC 145 or CC146 open.

0 CRS directs NEOs to walkdown the system.

Crew monitors sumps and WHUTs 0 RO reports RHR sump pump run CRS initiates attachment 4 for locating leak.

RO informs CRS 22CV pump not in service PO places 2CC3 1 in manual and starts 23 CC pump then stops 21 CC pump CRS returns to step 3.28 and refers to Attachment 3 for isolation of leak CRS directs NE0 to isolate pump by closing 2 1CC2 and 2 1CC 19 9 of 22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 CRS directs the WCC to have NE0 de-energize control power for 21 CC pump to prevent auto start of isolated pump and requests tagging request for 21 CC Pump.

CRS refers to Tech Specs and enter TSAS 3.7.3

3. MPT PHASE I Failure 0 CREW responds to OHA H-15 CREW implements OHA ARP and sends an NE0 to investigate.

4. Reactor Trip, Failure of Auto CRS orders a MANUAL Reactor trip Turbine Trip, MSLI and based on MPT problem.

0 3 performs IAs for TRIP-1:

Trip Reactor.

Confirm Reactor trip.

Reports Turbine NOT Tripped.

Attempts Manual Turbine Trip Attempts MSLI fi-om safeguards bezel Fast closes MS 167s from CC3 Verifies 4kV Vital Bus energized.

Reports SI actuated.

CT#l(E-0 -P): Manually accomplish PO reports 23 AFW pump tripped MSLI before a severe challenge develops to either subcriticality or integrity CSF or transition to LOSC SAT UNSAT PO report generator breakers did not open with turbine failing to trip 10 of 22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003

..

-, Evaluatdrfl om 0 CRS directs generator breakers open 0 PO throttles 21/22AF21 to 22e4 to minimize cooldown.

PO reports t i p of 22 AFW Pump and loss of all AFW capability 0 CREW dispatches N E 0 to investigate loss of 22 and 23 AFW pumps 0 CRS briefs crew on status and plan CREW transitions to FRHS-1 at step 20.1 of TRIP-1 CRS reviews Bleed and Feed criteria 0 Crew determines Aux Feed Pumps are not available 0 RO stops all RCPs.

PO reports Condensate system is in operation Crew determines that SGFPs are not available due to SI actuation.

Crew verifies SI valve alignment.

0 RO resets safeguards 11 of22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 0 Crew selects SG for depressurization 0 CRS reviews depressurization termination criteria 0 PO reports Steam Dumps are NOT available (MSLI)

CT#2A (FR-H.1-E): Establish PO fully opens selected MS 10 minimum required feedwater flow rate to the S/Gs before S/G dryout. CRS dispatches an NE0 to hlly open SAT UNSAT selected BF40 PO opens selected BF13 PO releases selected BF22 PO opens 2 1 and 22 CN48s and closes 2 1 and 22 CN32s 12 of 22

~~

"I" ILT NRC-ESG-003

_-

. Expected Pfant/S&den "Comm CREW goes to Step 23 of FRHS-1.

RO stops RCPs.

Crew may validate that Sl 'isin RO initiates SI.

service without re-initiating RO verifies Charging pumps running and BIT flow established RO opens both PZR PORVs and PORV Bleed and Feed before PZR PORVs Stop Valves.

open due to loss of heat sink.

CREW performs EOP-APPX-3.

ROPO resets SI, Phase A, Phase B, opens 21 & 22CA330, resets each SEC and 230V Control Center.

At Step 35, CRS returns to Step 20 to align a Condensate Pump to feed at least one S/G.

13 of22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003

- t Evaluat *ExpectedPlaut/Student R CRS selects a S/G to be steamed.

RO depressurizes and maintains selected S/G < 575 psig using steam dumps or MS 10.

0 PO positions selected S/G valves:

BF13 open, BF 19 or BF40 (local by NEO) open, BF22open, 21 & 22 CN48 open, and closes 21 & 22 CN32.

CREW establishes condensate flow to the selected S/G as evidenced by rising S/G WR level indication or lowering CETs.

14 of 22

• a 3

8

• V

.a

-a 3

8 V

E O O - 9 S B - 3 W JL?I177

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 CT#l(E-0 -P) Manually initiate MSLI before a severe challenge develops to either subcriticality or Integrity CSF or transition to LOSC BASIS: Failure to close the MSIVs under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the auto actuation of an ESF system or component and to take action that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

CT#2A (FR-H.l-A)Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before RCS Bleed and Feed is required.

BASIS: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the crews having to rely upon the lower priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release.

NOTE: This Critical Task will be considered NOT satisfied if in the opinion of the Evaluators the bleed and feed criteria is reached due to mis-operation, inaction or delay by the crew. If the bleed and feed criteria is reached as a direct result of the failure of the automatic MSLI then the action of the crew will be based on CT-2B. Thus, when the crew fails to simply establish available feedwater flow (as it could, given postulated conditions) before SG dryout occurs, it necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy.

CT#2B (FR-H.l --B) Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before PZR PORVs open due to loss of heat sink.

BASIS: Failure to establish RCS bleed and feed before automatic opening of the PORVs reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a significant reduction of the safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario NOTE: The PORV opening as stated in the critical task means opening caused by the RCS heatup from loss of heat sink. If the PORV opens for any other cause, it does not constitute a misoperation of the critical task.

16 of22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 I ILT NRC-ESG003 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT

- -

Y/N EVENT N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture Y LossofCCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENTITRAINISYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR y/N TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N GasTurbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation N Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N Early depressurize RCS Y Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

17 of 22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 MODE: 1 POWER: 100 RCS 1192 MWe: 1200 BORON:

SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS ( 5 , 6 & DEFUELED):

NIA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burn-up 4000 MWDMTU, reactivity plan provided by reactor engineering MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

3.7.1.2a. (21 AFW Pump) entered last shift, 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> remaining EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCESI N PROGRESS:

21 AFW Pump C/Ted for Pump Inboard bearing Repair ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

Currently K-3 in effect CONTROL ROOM:

Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.

No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.

PRIMARY:

NONE SECONDARY:

Heating steam is aligned to unit 1.

RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATEWSERVICE WATER:

River grass loading very high,high tide in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 18 of 22

f I ILT NRC-ESG-003 Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.

EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note: This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.

SELF- E S G I ILT NRC-ESG-003 - REVIEWER: Ed Gallagher CHECK

1. THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.

2. The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.

3. Each event description consists of:

0 The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated, 0 The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event, 0 The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew, 0 The expected operator actions (by shift position), and 0 The event termination point.

4. The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.

5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

6. Sequencingltimingof events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures and/or corrective actions).

7. Sequencingltimingof events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

8. If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.

9. The simulator modeling is not altered.

10. All crew competencies can be evaluated.

11. Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).

12. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

13. Proper critical task methodology is used IAW NRC procedures.

14. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is comdeted for the scenario at the audicable facilitv.

19 of 22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 1

-FOR-TRAINING

1. Verify simulator is in correct load for training

2. All required computer terminals in operation

3. Simulator clocks synchronized

4. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

5. Rod step counters correct (channel check)

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)

7. DL- 10 log up-to-date

8. Required procedures clean

9. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)

10. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

11. Procedure pens available

12. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

13. Shift manning sheet available

14. SPDS reset

15. Reference verification performed with required documents available

16. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Trpewriter with Baseline Data filled out

17. Required keys available

18. Video Tape (if applicable)

19. Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03

20. Reset P-250 Rod Counters 20 of 22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.

The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents..

e degradation of any barrier to fission product release e degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity a violation of a safety limit e a violation of the facility license condition e incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) e a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...

e effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.

a recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

e take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

e prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

21 of22

I ILT NRC-ESG-003 EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) Pre-Job Brief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:

Lead ESG: I ILT NRC-ESG-003 Examiner:

1.ESG overview and sequence of major events.

2.Determine which optional events will be performed, if any 3.ESG summary of Critical Tasks.

4.Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.

5.Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.

6.Review alternate path(s) identified by the ESG.

7.Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.

8.Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.

Ensure SOE recorder is recording.

22 of 22

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SCENARIO TITLE: LOPA SCENARIO NUMBER: I ILT NRC ESG-004 EFFECTIVE DATE: 12/4/6 EXPECTED DURATION: 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE STA OTHER Revision Summary:

Rev 0: New Issue for I ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY: Paul Williams (INSTRUCTOR)

APPROVED BY:

(OPERATIONS TRAINNG MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)

APPROVED BY:

(OPERATIONS MANAGER OR @ATE)

DESIGNEE)

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 A. Given the unit at power and a failure of a Power Range Nuclear Instruments, the crew will take corrective actions to stabilize the plant, IAW approved station procedures.

B. Given a situation with an OHA alarm, perform action(s) to investigate and correct the cause of the alarm, IAW approved station procedures.

C. Given the unit at power with a failed closed stop or governor valve, the crew will reduce load to <75% at 5%/min, AW approved station procedures.

D. Given RCPs with a malfunction, the crew will take action to remove the RCPs from service, IAW approved station procedures.

E. Given the unit with a loss of all vital busses, the crew will perform actions to attempt to recover vital busses and maintain RCP seal integrity, IAW approved station procedures.

A. PR NIS Fails High B. 23 SW Pump Strainer Clogs C. Main Turbine Governor Valve Fails Closed D. Inadvertent Phase B E. LOPA 2 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 A. The crew will receive the unit at 100% power with all systems in automatic. 2B D/G will be C/Ted. 2PR1 will be isolated due to a leak.

B. Once the crew assumes the watch, 2N44 will fail high. The RO will place rods in manual and the CRS will enter AB.NIS-0001 to remove the channel fiom service.

C. Before the channel is removed fiom service a high DP will occur on 23 SW strainer, header pressure will lower and the stand-by pump will fail to auto start. The crew will refer to the alarm response procedure stop the pump and start a stand-by pump.

D. Once the service water issue is addressed, a main turbine governor valve will fail closed. The crew will reduce power at S%/min to 75% power. When boration is started for the power reduction the auto boron setpoint will fail to 5 gpm, the RO will initiate a manual boration E. During the power reduction, an inadvertent Phase B will occur and the crew will trip the reactor and stop all RCPs IAW AB.RCP-0001.

F. During the reactor trip response all vital busses will be deenergized. The crew will transition to EOP-LOPA-1 and perform a rapid RCS cooldown. Once the cooldown is established the only source of AFW will trip and all feedflow capability will be lost. The crew will stop the cooldown on all but one SG.

G. Once the steaming strategy is established, the crew will be informed 2B D/G has been released and then they will start and load 2B Bus.

H. The scenario will terminate once the vital bus is energized or at the lead evaluators discretion.

3 of24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 Pre-snapped IC-194 fiom portable exam drive SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Severity =

1

1. EL0273A 2A D/G breaker fails to close NA NA NA NA

2. RP318Q1 2A D/G fails to start on SEC

3. SW0339E 25 SW Pump fails to auto start NA NA NA NA

4. NlOl93D 2N44 Fails High NA NA RT- 1 200

5. SWO222C 23 SW Strainer Plugs NA 1:30 RT-2 100

6. TU0081H 24 Governor Valve Fails Closed NA NA RT-3 NA

7. CV0032 Boric Acid Flow Cntrlr Fails NA NA RT-4 10

- 8. VL0049 2CC117 Fails to Position NIA :10 RT-5 0

9. VL0050 2CC118 Fails to Position NIA :10 RT-5 0

10. VL0056 2CC190 Fails to Position NIA :10 RT-5 0

11. VL0051 2CC187 Fails to Position NIA :08 RT-5 0

12. VL0087 2CC131 Fails to Position NIA :09 RT-5 0

13. n o 0 5 2 2CC136 Fails to Position NIA :10 RT-5 0

14. AN0137 SER 137 :C16 Phase B N/A NIA RT-5 2

15. EL0134 Loss of Off-Site Power 1:oo NA ET-6* NA

16. EL0146 2C Bus Fault 1:Ol NA ET-6* NA

17. VL0083 2SJ1 Fails to Position NA NA RT-10 100

18. VL0085 2CV40 Fails to Position NA NA RT-10 0

- 19. VL0053 2SW26 Fails to Position NA NA RT- 10 0

20. VL0045 2CV116 Fails to Position NA NA RT- 10 0

21. AF0183,23 Aux FW Pmp Overspeed Trip NIA NIA RT-7 False 4 of 24

"I" ILT NRC-ESG-004

1. DG21D 2B DIG BKR RACK OUT NIA N/A NIA Tagged

2. DGl9D 2B DIESEL GEN LOCKED OUT NIA N/A NIA Yes

3. DG20D 2B DG BKR CONTROL POWER NIA NIA NIA Off

4. DGOlD DEENERGIZE "A" SEC NIA N/A RT-11 Off CABINET

5. DG02D DEENERGIZE "BI' SEC :20 NIA RT-11 Off CABINET

6. DG03D DEENERGIZE "C" SEC :45 NIA RT-11 Off CABINET 7' AF20D 21 AFW Pump Control Power NA NA RT- 12 Off

8. AF25D 22 AFW Pump Control Power 30 secs NA RT- 12 Off

9. CV28A-31A 22-24CV98~ NA NA RT-13 0.0 SELF-CHECK Description Delay Ramp Action

1. A503 OVLO TRAIN 'A' - SPRY ACT1 PH- NIA N/A RT-5 On B ISL

2. A503 OVLO TRAIN 'A' - SPRY ACT1 PH- NIA NIA RT-5 On B ISL

3. A503 OVLO Train A Cont Is0 Ph B Reset N/A NIA RT-5 Off

4. 4813 OVLO PHASE B ISOL - 2CC117 NIA NIA RT-5 Off

5. 4813 OVLO PHASE B ISOL - 2CC117 :08 NIA RT-5 On

6. 4816 OVLO PHASE B ISOL - 2CC118 :09 NIA RT-5 On

7. 4818 OVLO PHASE B ISOL - 2CC190 :10 N/A RT-5 On

8. 4815 OVLO PHASE B ISOL - 2CC187 :06 N/A RT-5 On

9. 4814 OVLO PHASE B ISOL - 2CC131 :08 N/A RT-5 On

10. 4817 OVLO PHASE B ISOL - 2CC136 :09 NIA RT-5 On

11. 4451 OVLO PERMISSIVE NIA NIA RT-5 On CONTAINMENT PHASE B

12. CB05 O W 1 2A DIESEL GEN-BREAKER N/A N/A NIA Off CLOSE 5 of24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 SELF-CHECK ET* Description Command 6 of 24

~~ ~ ~~~

I ILT NRC-ESG-004

1. RHl andRH2

2. VC 1-4

3. RH 18s

4. RCPs (SELF CHECK)

5. RT (SELF CHECK)

6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)

7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).

8. 22 ABV Supply Fan

9. 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)

- 10.1 2B D/G (C/T)

DescriDtion

1. Close2PR6 7 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 RO responds to the following:

E PR Flux Hi; E PR OVRPWR Rod Stop; E PR Ch Dev; and E PR Neutron Flux Rate Hi 0 RO verifies no runback in progress and places Rods in Manual with concurrence from the CRS 0 CRS enters S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001 0 PO verifies no load change.

0 Crew identifies that N-44 failed high.

0 CRS notifies I&C of failed channel and requests assistance.

0 ROPO reviews OHAs in alarm and refers to AFV.

0 CRS initiates S2.OP-SO.RPS-0001.

0 CRS briefs crew on inability to withdraw control rods and determines contingent actions based on this inability 0 SRO reviews Tech Specs and enters 3.3.1.1, Action 2 9 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 x .. e

.-

.

Eva1 , Expectid Pfan>S&deG omments-0 Crew acknowledges OHA B-8,21-23 SW Strain Trbl followed by B 13 and 14 for SW header Pressure LO 0 PO verifies SW header pressure lowering and notes that 25 SW pump did not Auto Start 0 CRS directs standby SW pump started 0 PO informs CRS of lowering amps on 23 SW pump Crew dispatches NE0 to investigate strainer trouble Crew directs NE0 to collect data IAW Observation Data Sheet 0 CRS directs 23 SW pump stopped 0 CRS directs control power removed from 23 SW pump 0 CRUSTA refer to TS and enter tracker for 3.7.4 10 of 24

---

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 E;al PlantiS6xdent Res

3. Main Turbine Governor Valve 24MS29 (GV-41Fails Closed 0 Crew identifies loss of turbine load by:

o Lowering Mwe, o Rising Tavg/ PZR pressure, o OHA E-28, PZR HTR ON PRESS LO o Tave-Tref console alarm.

I InsertRT-4 after boration isstarted I 0 RO controls Tavg with rods in manual PO identifies 24MS29 Closed using DEHC HMI indications.

0 CRS dispatches NE0 to investigate cause of valve closure.

0 CRS reviews S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001 precautions and limitations and determines load limitation of < 75%

with failed governor valve.

0 CRS orders a turbine load reduction at S%/minute IAW S2.0P-SO.TRB-001.

0 RO/PO coordinate actions to reduce turbine load to < 75% power.

0 CRS directs entry into S2.0P-AELLOAD-1.

0 CRS initiates Attachment 1 (CAS).

0 RO initiates boration for Tavg and AI control 0 RO informs CRS boric acid flow controller has failed 0 CRS directs RO to perform manual 11 of24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004

&etorActi% Expected PIanaSGden coin 8 boration 0 RO starts manual boration IAW S0.CVC-0006 0 RO energizes PZR heaters.

4/5. Inadvertent Phase B Actuation and Loss of All AC Power 0 RO identifies Phase B Actuation 0 RO identifies loss of CCW to RCPs 0 CRS implements ARP for OHAs CT#1: Manually trip the reactor and 0 CRS implements AB.RCP-0001 stop RCPs from the control room within 5 minutes of OHA C-16 0 RO reports Phase B is invalid based on Containment pressure TIME:  :  : of C-16 TIME:  :  : ofRCPstop 0 CRS directs RO to reset Phase B SAT UNSAT 0 RO attempts to reset Phase B and reports it cannot be reset 0 CRS directs RO to manually trip the reactor and stop all RCPs 0 RO trips the reactor and stops all RCPs 0 RO completes IAs of TRIP -1 o VerifiesRxTrip o Tripsturbine o Verifies NO Vital Bus energized o CRS directs entry into TRIP-1 12 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 Evaluator/Ins omments 0 CRS transitions to EOP-LOPA-1 0 CRS verifies IAs of LOPA-1 complete 0 RO verifies both PZR PORVs closed 0 RO Isolates Letdown 0 PO verifies AFW >22E04 lb&

0 RO makes page announcement 0 CRS directs operators to perform Attachment 2, Part A of AB.LOOP-1 0 CRS dispatches NE0 to deenergize all SECs 0 CRS briefs crew and SM contacts Maintenance Groups 0 CREW performs manual Vital Bus stripping IAW LOPA-1, Table A 0 CRS directs PO to attempt to start 2A EDG PO reports 2A EDG has started 0 PO reports 2A EDG output breaker will not close 0 SWCRS request assistance fkom maintenance with 2A EDG breaker 0 PO secures 2A and 2B EDGs since they has no SW 0 CRS dispatches NE0 to OPEN 2SJ1 or 2 and CLOSE 2CV40 and 41 13 of24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 w- --

rfinshctor A c t i v i ~ .Expected PlanGSkdGt %espons e CRS dispatches NE0 to isolate SW to Turbine Area by closing 2SW26 e CRS directs initiation of Safety Injection e CRS directs closure of Phase A valves and CVI valves e ROPO close valves as directed CT#2: Stop any EDG running w/o RO resets Safeguards and opens SW prior to engine overheating. 21/22CA330 CRS directs NE0 to remove 125VDC Control Power from 21 and 22 AFW PPS CRS directs CREW to take actions to restore power IAW AB.LOOP-1 concurrent with continuing with LOPA- 1 CRS directs RCP Seal Cooling isolation CT#3: (ECA-0.0-H) Isolate RCP seal PO initiates MSLI, MFW isolation, and injection before a Charging Pp starts SG Blowdown isolatiodsampling or is started PO evaluates for a faulted SG Unsat PO evaluates for a ruptured SG PO maintains maximum AFW flow 14 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004

, t .( n19 dPIangStudent R Comments until at least one SG is >9%

0 CRS assigns a NCO Checkoff sheet 3 0 PO commences SG depressurization once one SG is >9% to 235 psig 0 CRS reviews Cautions, Notes and Termination Criteria for SG depressurization CT#4: (ECA-0.0-G) Depressurize 0 PO identifies loss of 23 AFW Pp intact SGs at max rate as long as one intact SG can be maintained >9% 0 CRS briefs crew on strategy for continuing SG depressurization and Sat Unsat maintaining at least 1 SG greater than 9%

0 PO adjusts steaming rates to maintain 1 SG>9%

0 PO terminates SG depressurization if all SG NR levels go <9%

0 CRS directs an NEOMaintenance to investigate the loss of 23 AFW Pp CRS directs PO to start 2B EDG and close the output breaker CRS direct the RO to start 23 or 24 SW pump and verify/close 2SW26 CRS directs control power restored to 22AFW pump and directs pump started 15 of24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 PO recommences depressurization of all SGs when SG levels in one intact 16 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

B. Technical Specifications C. SC.OP-AP.ZZ-O102(Q), Use of Procedures D. S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001- NIS Malfunction E. S2.0P-AE3.ROD- 0003 - Continuous Rod Motion F. S2.OP-S0.RPS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Trip/Restoration G. S2.OP-AELSW-0001 - Loss of SW Header Pressure H. S2.OP-S0.SW-0001- Service Water System operation I. S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality J. S2.OP-AB.LOOP-0001, Loss of Off Site Power K. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection L. 2-EOP-LOPA-I - Loss of All AC Power 17 of 24

~~~ ~~

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 CT# 1: Manually trip the reactor from the control room within 5 minutes of OHA C- 16 BASIS: Conditions requiring immediate attention for operation of the RCPs. These recommendations are incorporated from Westinghouse Tech Bulletin ESBU-TB-93-01-R1 CT# 2: (LOPA-1 CAS) Stop any EDG running w/o SW BASIS: Running the EDG without ESW cooling leads to a high temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. F O G ERG Based Critical tasks)

IF a Diesel is started and can not be promptly supplied with SW cooling, it is tripped to prevent damage until SW cooling is available (LOPA-1 Basis Document)

CT# 3: (ECA-0.0-H ) Isolate RCP seal injection before a Charging Pp starts or is started BASIS: Failure to isolate RCP seal injection before starting a charging pump, under the postulated plant conditions, can result in unnecessary and avoidable degradation of the RCS fission-product barrier. (WOG ERG Based Critical tasks)

CT# 4: (ECA-0.0-G ) Depressurize intact SGs at max rate such that of the following limiting conditions are met:

0 SG depressurization is initiated until narrow range level in at least one intact SG is

>9%

0 If narrow range level cannot be maintained >9% in at least one intact SG, then depressurization is stopped until narrow range is restored to >9% in at least one intact SG a SG pressure does not lower to 4 3 5 psig a RCS cold leg temperature does not lower to <3 10°F 0 If positive SUR is indicated on either the source range or intermediate range, then the depressurization is stopped and the RCS is allowed to heat up BASIS: Failure to depressurize the secondary and cool down the RCS, under the postulated plant conditions, results in a greater possibility for core damage. The intact SGs should be depressurized as quickly as possible to minimize RCS inventory loss, but within the constraint of controllability.. .. The PORVs on all intact SGs should be wide open, provided that none of the limiting conditions associated with this critical task are violated. (WOG ERG Based Critical tasks) 18 of24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 I ILT NRC-ESG004 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE y/N EVENT y/N EVENT N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture Y LossofCCW Y Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation Y Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEMUNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN y/N TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N GasTurbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area Y Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation N Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE y/N OPERATOR ACTION Y Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine Y Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Y Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N Early depressurize RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

19 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 MODE: 1 POWER: 100 RCS 840 MWe: 1 190 BORON:

SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS ( 5 , 6 & DEFUELED):

N/A REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burn-up 10,500 MWDMTU MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

3.8.1.lb - 2B D/G C/Ted for generator brush inspection EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCESIN PROGRESS :

ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

Currently K-3 in effect CONTROL ROOM:

Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.

No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.

Winter Storm Alert for next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> PRIMARY:

NONE SECONDARY:

Heating steam is aligned to unit 1.

RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATEWSERVICE WATER:

20 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.

EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note: This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.

CHECK E S G I ILT NRC-ESG-004 REVIEWER: Paul Williams

1. THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.

2. The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.

3. Each event description consists of:

0 The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated, The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event, The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew, 0 The expected operator actions (by shift position), and The event termination point.

4. The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.

5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

6. Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time fiame and implements procedures and/or corrective actions).

7. Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

8. If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.

9. The simulator modeling is not altered.

10. All crew competencies can be evaluated.

11. Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).

12. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

13. Proper critical task methodology is used IAW NRC procedures.

14. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.

21 of24

1. Verify simulator is in correct load for training

2. All required computer terminals in operation

3. Simulator clocks synchronized

4. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

5. Rod step counters correct (channel check)

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)

7. DL-10 log up-to-date

8. Required procedures clean

9. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)

10. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

11. Procedure pens available

12. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

13. Shift manning sheet available

14. SPDS reset

15. Reference verification performed with required documents available

16. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out

17. Required keys available

18. Video Tape (if applicable)

19. Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03

20. Reset P-250 Rod Counters 22 of 24

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.

The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...

e degradation of any barrier to fission product release e degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity e a violation of a safety limit e a violation of the facility license condition e incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) e a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...

e effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.

e recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

e prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

23 of24

- -

--

- ~

I ILT NRC-ESG-004 EXAMhATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) Pre-Job Brief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:

Lead ESG: I ILT NRC-ESG-004 Examiner:

1.ESG overview and sequence of major events.

2.Detemine which optional events will be performed, if any.

3.ESG summary of Critical Tasks.

4.Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.

5.Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.

6.Review alternate path(s) identified by the ESG.

7.Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.

8.Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.

Ensure SOE recorder is recording, 24 of 24