ML22175A189
| ML22175A189 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/2022 |
| From: | Joseph Demarshall Operations Branch I |
| To: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| Shared Package | |
| ML21020A061 | List: |
| References | |
| EPID L-2022-OLL-0002 | |
| Download: ML22175A189 (36) | |
Text
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Exam Date: February 14 - 28, 2022 1
2 3
Attributes 4
Job Content 5
6 Admin JPMs ADMIN Topic and K/A LOD (1-5)
U/E/S Explanation I/C Cues Critical Scope Overlap Perf.
Key Minutia Job Link Focus Steps (N/B)
Std.
SRO-A1 Conduct of Operations 2.1.7 Determine which ECCS Pumps can be Stopped to Maintain Minimum Required Injection Flow Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Chilled Water Loads IAW S2.OP-SO.CH-0001, 2
X E
S NRC:
JPM Task Overlaps with Event 8 of Scenario ESG-1.
SALEM:
Replaced JPM with a task that requires the SRO to determine the non-essential heat load value and which heat loads should be isolated. JPM was validated during NRC Prep week SRO-A2 Conduct of Operations 2.1.20 Determine the Amount of Time to Borate for 3 Stuck Control Rods and Evaluate Final BAST Levels to Determine any Applicable TS LCO(s) and Action(s) 3 X
X X
E S
NRC:
What is the basis for the +/-2% for the Final BAST Levels?
Performance Standard for Critical Step 2, Determining Final BAST Levels requires the calculations and methodology necessary to arrive at the final values to be performed correctly. Accordingly, each of these items should be separately designated as Critical Steps, for example:
Total Volume Added Calculation.
Use of the Tank Curve to determine (a) Volume Change per Percent Level OR (b) Overall Change in Level for one Tank and Dividing by 2 Currently, the calculations and methodology used to Determine Final BAST Levels are provided without any Step assignment or Critical Step designation. Suggest a format similar to that utilized in
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Step 1 of the JPM for Determining the Total Boration Time.
Critical Step 3 Performance Standard should include an explanation of how the determination was made for TS 3.1.2.6.a.1 not met.
Critical Step 3 Performance Standard includes an item that states May also identify that 3.1.2.2 is not met. Appears that identification of the FLOW PATHS
- OPERATING TS would not be a Critical Step aspect of this JPM.
Accordingly, include clarifying information that although TS 3.1.2.2. may be identified, it is not required.
The first Cue on Page 5 of the JPM directs the Examiner to provide the applicants with TS 3.1.2.6 and Curve 3.1-2. This information should not be provided as an initial handout. Multiple copies of the TSs should be made available for use in the classroom.
SRO applicants are expected to be able to find/locate the necessary TS information on their own.
The last bullet of the first Cue on Page 1 states If requested, provide the following TS:
Technical Specification 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. Same comment as the previous regarding the use of TSs.
The first Cue on Page 5 of the JPM directs the Examiner to provide the applicants with S2.OP-ST.CVC-0009 and S2.OP-ST.CVC-0010. Why are these references/resources being provided? Does not appear that they are necessary to successfully complete the JPM Task. These procedures can be made available in the classroom, similar to the TS, if required.
Critical Step 1 of the JPM has both a # sign and asterisk (*) in the Left-most column. What is the reason for the # sign?
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 SALEM:
2% was chosen based on the readability error using the curve.
See explanation provided in Examiners Note in Step 2.3 of the JPM.
Revised format as suggested.
Revised Task Standard Item 2 to read, Determines final BAST tank levels for 21 tank at 43% +/- 2% and 22 tank at 43% +/- 2%.
Critical Step 3 explanation why TS was not met was added.
Determined that TS 3.1.2.2 is not applicable to the JPM Task.
Accordingly, the reference to TS 3.1.2.2 in Step 3 of the JPM has been removed.
Complete copy of Tech Specs will be provided in lieu of providing specific Tech Specs to the individual applicants.
Copies of S2.OP-ST.CVC-0009 and 0010 will be made available and not given to applicants unless asked for.
- removed from Step 1.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 SRO-A3 Equipment Control 2.2.12 Review and Approve a Completed Containment Ventilation Valve Surveillance X
X E
S NRC:
Delete the last two bullets of the Initiating Cue and revise the second bullet to state Review the completed surveillance for compliance with Acceptance Criteria and document results.
Original version was leading with respect to Tech Spec implications.
Ensure the Initiating Cue information is updated within the body of the JPM and on the sheet to be provided to the applicants.
Performance Standard for determining that 2VC5 exceeded its allowed stroke time should include the Stroke Time and Acceptable Range Value from S2.RA-ST.CBV-0001 that was exceeded.
Performance Standard for Step 5.4.3.B states Operator will determine all the valves except 2VC5 meet this step and initial no action since none were previously inoperable. What does initial no action since none were previously inoperable mean and where in Step 5.4.3.B of the ST is this guidance provided? Enhancement and clarification required.
The first Cue on Page 5 of the JPM directs the Examiner to provide the applicants with TS 3.6.3. This information should not be provided as an initial handout. Multiple copies of the TSs should be made available for use in the classroom.
SRO applicants are expected to be able to find/locate the necessary TS information on their own.
SALEM:
Last two bullets deleted and suggested statement was added.
Added the actual stroke time and the criteria that was exceeded.
Reworded Step 5.4.3.B to clarify that this step would be initialed for all the valves that were acceptable, except for the 2VC5.
Complete copy of TS will be provided. The cue was changed to
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 state Provide complete copy of U2 TS.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 SRO-A4 Radiation Control 2.3.4 Determine Personnel Exposure and Authorization for Containment Entry at Power (HRA) 2 X
E S
FREE LOOK NRC:
Delete the bulleted item in the Initiating Cue that states Use the 22 CFCU area dose rates for Gamma and Neutron dose in your calculations. This item is leading and not required to successfully complete the JPM Task. A minimally competent SRO Applicant should be able to make said determination without having to be provided this piece of information.
The last bulleted item in the Initiating Cue states Assuming the dose received from both gamma and neutron were added to their current totals, will the operators exceed the Admin annual dose limit? The highlighted portion of this statement is leading and not required to successfully complete the JPM Task. A minimally competent SRO Applicant should be able to make said determination without having to be provided this piece of information.
Delete the bulleted line item for recording the Total Dose.
Individual line items have already been provided for recording the both Gamma and Neutron dose values. Requiring the applicant to record the Total Dose value is leading and not necessary to successfully complete the JPM Task.
Ensure that the JPM Title matches what is on Form ES-301-1 for the SRO Examination Level.
JPM Step numbers have not been provided.
SALEM:
Bullet #1 - Use of 22 CFCU area dose removed from stem.
Bullet #2 - The assumption statement associated with the addition of both the gamma and neutron dose values, was
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 removed from the Initiating Cue.
Bullet #3 - Total dose line was deleted Bullet #4 - JPM title was changed to reflect the outline.
Bullet #5 - Step numbers have been provided.
Chief Examiner (CE)Supplemental Comment (12/21/2021):
Separate the Neutron Dose Stay Time calculation from the Gamma Dose Stay Time calculation so that they are individual Critical Steps.
Enhance the Task Standard by inserting the word Determines at the front end of each of the four line items Salem Both comments by the Chief Examiner were incorporated.
Note was added to JPM to enlarge survey map SRO-A5 Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.41 Classify an Event and Determine PARs (Time Critical) 3 X
X E
S NRC:
JPM Task overlaps with Q83 on the Written Exam. Specifically, the GE in Q83 is based on readings obtained from Containment High Range Radiation Monitors 2R44A and 2R44B (> 2000 R/hr) and a declaration that is based, in part, on Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Table EALS FB2.1 and potentially RB1.L. The GE in SRO Admin A5 is based on a reading obtained from Containment High Range Radiation Monitor 2R44A (> 2000 R/hr) and a declaration that is based, in part, on FPB Table EALS FB2.1 and RB1.L.
Task Standard is deficient. Part 2 of the Task Standard states Accurately completes Attachment 4 Sections I thru V of the ICMF and selects Default PAR (No RPSA) 15 minutes from event declaration. It is not clear what is meant by Accurately. Statement is vague and does not provide objective performance standards for evaluation. Note that an Answer Key
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 has been included as part of the JPM. Accordingly, revise Part 2 of the Task Standard to state Completes Attachment 4 Sections I thru V of the ICMF and selects Default PAR (No RPSA) 15 minutes from event declaration (see ICMF Answer Key).
SALEM:
Replaced ECG call using a GE for Loss of all AC Power. This will eliminate the overlap concern.
Chief Examiners Task Standard comments have been incorporated into the Task Standard for the replacement JPM.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 RO-A1 Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 Determine the Maximum Reactor Vessel Vent Time in Response to Head Voiding 3
X X
E S
NRC:
Steps 2.2 and 2.3 should be designated as Critical Steps because the calculation of Containment Air Volume must be performed correctly to properly determine the Maximum Reactor Vessel Vent Time.
Step 2.3 Performance Standard Calculated Value for Containment Air Volume is 2.1E06 Cubic Feet.
This value has been rounded up.
The actual value is 2.096E-06, using 0.8 versus 0.82 from previous Step 2.2.. Accordingly, the associated Examiners Note, which states This value will have rounding errors, is confusing because the rounding has already occurred. Clarification /
Enhancement required.
Where does the value of 15,000 Cubic Feet come from in Step 3.3 Performance Standard? Using a rounded value of 2.1E06 for Calculated Air Volume, the Calculated Maximum Vent Volume should be 14,700 Cubic Feet, not 15,000.
Step 4.3 Performance Standard Evaluators Note states that there is a +/- 133 cfm allowance for reading Figure 1, Hydrogen Flow Rate.
Calculations show that +/- 100 cfm is sufficient for the allowance.
Step 4.4 Performance Standard Range for the Maximum Vent Time is 4.2 - 4.8 minutes. Calculations show that 4.2 to 4.7 is of sufficient range. Note: JPM Task Standard Range will require update as well.
SALEM:
Critical Step designations added.
Step 2.2 and Step 2.3 Performance Standards revised to show Calculations without rounding.
Evaluator Note removed.
Step 3.3 Performance Standard revised to show Calculations without rounding. Evaluator Note removed.
Changed value to +/- 100 cfm in Step 4.3 Performance Standard
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Evaluators Note.
Range changed to 4.2 - 4.7 minutes. JPM Task Standard range updated.
RO-A2 Conduct of Operations 2.1.20 Determine the Amount of Time to Borate for 3 Stuck Control Rods and the Final BAST Level 3
X X
E S
NRC:
What is the basis for the +/-2% for the Final BAST Levels?
Performance Standard for Critical Step 2, Determining Final BAST Levels requires the calculations and methodology necessary to arrive at the final values to be performed correctly. Accordingly, each of these items should be separately designated as Critical Steps, for example:
Total Volume Added Calculation.
Use of the Tank Curve to determine (a) Volume Change per Percent Level OR (b) Overall Change in Level for one Tank and Dividing by 2 Currently, the calculations and methodology used to Determine Final BAST Levels are provided without any Step assignment or Critical Step designation. Suggest a format similar to that utilized in Step 1 of the JPM for Determining the Total Boration Time.
Separately, the parenthetical information in the Performance Standard Line Item that reads %
change=(94-54)/2 = 27% per tank is incorrect. Should be (94-40).
Critical Step 1 of the JPM has both a
- sign and asterisk (*) in the Left-most column. What is the reason for the # sign?
SALEM:
2% was chosen based on the readability error using the curve. See explanation provided in Examiners Note in Step 2.3 of the JPM.
Revised format as suggested.
Agree; re-performed Tank Level
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 calculations.
- sign removed.
RO-A3 Equipment Control 2.2.12 Perform Manual QTPR Calculation Surveillance 3
E S
NRC:
K/A referenced on ES-301-1 is G2.2.12. K/A referenced on JPM cover sheet is G2.1.25. Should be K/A G2.2.12. Correct this discrepancy.
Revise Part 1 of the Task Standard to state Manually calculates the highest QTPR as UNSAT (highest N42T AND N42B) with a value of 1.041 and 1.032 respectively (=/-
0.002). Avoid making references to procedures in the Task Standard.
Statements such as using, IAW, or per a procedure, regardless of whether the specific procedure reference is identified, can imply that every step in the procedure is intended to be critical.
SALEM:
K/A reference corrected.
Task Standard revised.
RO-A4 Radiation Control 2.3.13 Determine Radiation Dose and Stay Time Limits for a Containment Entry 2
X X
E S
FREE LOOK NRC:
Heat Stress Stay Time of 15 minutes is provided in the Initiating Cue. Applicants should be required to calculate the Heat Stress Stay Time.. The JPM Step to calculate Heat Stress Stay Time is only critical if a calculation is actually performed to determine the value.
Revise the Task Standard to appropriately reflect the Heat Stress Stay Time Calculation task.
Delete the bulleted item in the Initiating Cue that States Use the 22 CFCU area dose rates for Gamma and Neutron dose in your calculations. This item is leading based on the information provided and is not required to successfully complete the JPM Task.
Ensure that the JPM Title matches what is on Form ES-301-1 for the RO Examination Level.
JPM Step numbering is incorrect;
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 i.e., there are three Q1 Steps.
SALEM:
Bullet #1 - Determining heat stress stay times is a supervisor responsibility. The critical step to calculate heat stress was removed.
Bullet #2 - As discussed with NRC Chief, Task Standard as written is acceptable given that heat stress is not being calculated (see previous bullet).
Bullet #3 - Use of 22 CFCU area dose removed from stem.
Bullet #4 - JPM title was changed to reflect the outline.
Bullet #5 - Step numbering corrected.
Chief Examiner (CE)Supplemental Comment (12/21/2021):
Performance Standard for the Gamma Dose Stay Time calculation states Team limits are 0.002 REM or 2 mrem gamma. Revise this item to state Limit is 0.002 REM or 2 mrem gamma, to maintain consistency with Performance Standard for the Neutron Dose Stay Time calculation.
Separate the Neutron Dose Stay Time calculation from the Gamma Dose Stay Time calculation so that they are individual Critical Steps.
SALEM:
Both items identified in the Chief Examiners Supplemental Comment have been incorporated.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 1
Simulator/In-Plant Safety Function and K/A JPMs Sim A 1
001 A2.11 Control Rod Exercise Surveillance 3
X X
E S
NRC:
Task Standard is deficient. Task Standard, in part, states Correctly performs rod control surveillance using approved procedure. Statement is vague and does not clearly identify the predetermined outcome against which task performance will be measured. Task Standards should (a) provide a general description / overview of the task, (b) avoid using terminology like Correctly performs, and (c) avoid making references to procedures. Use of Correctly performs does not provide objective performance standards for evaluation. Separately, statements such as using, IAW, or per a procedure, regardless of whether the specific procedure reference is identified, can imply that every step in the procedure is intended to be critical.
Step 4.1.10.9 to RESTORE Control Bank D to the pre-test position should be designated as a Critical Step.
Editorial - Last part of the third bullet of the Initial Conditions reads awkwardly; i.e., with the only remaining rod bank to test is Control Bank D. Ensure correction made to Page 4 and the Cue Sheet at the back of the JPM.
SALEM:
Enhanced the Task Standard.
Designated Step 4.110.9 as a Critical Step.
Editorial corrections made to the Initial Conditions.
Sim B 2
004 A4.04 Manual Makeup to VCT 3
X X
E S
NRC:
Revise Task Standard to state Initiates manual makeup to VCT and stops the makeup when informed that VCT level is at 53%.
Why, in the Initiating Cue, is the applicant being told that P&Ls have NOT been reviewed. Clarification required.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Steps 5.2.12 B STOP Primary Water Pump, and 5.2.12.C, PLACE Boric Acid Pump selected in SLW Speed, should be designated as Critical Steps SALEM:
Task Standard revised.
Removed the P&L bullet item in the Initiating Cue.
Steps identified have been designated as Critical Steps.
Sim C 3
006 A3.01 Isolate ECCS Accumulators 3
S Sim D 4P 003 A1.10 Respond to RCP Standpipe Low Level Alarm 2
X E
S NRC:
Task Standard states Correctly performs standpipe fill to clear the low level alarm and terminates the fill when the high alarm is in IAW console alarm response procedure S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011. Task Standards should (a) provide a general description / overview of the task, (b) avoid using terminology like Correctly performs, and (c) avoid making references to procedures. Use of Correctly performs does not provide objective performance standards for evaluation. Separately, statements such as using, IAW, or per a procedure, regardless of whether the specific procedure reference is identified, can imply that every step in the procedure is intended to be critical. An example of how this Task Standard could read would be Primary Water is used to make up to the RCP standpipe to clear the low level alarm and the fill is terminated upon receipt of the high level alarm.
SALEM:
Task Standard appropriately revised to address the items identified.
Sim E 4S 059 A4.01 Immediate Actions for Loss of SGFP 2
X X
E S
NRC:
JPM OVERLAPS with Written Exam Q44; i.e., Immediate Actions for Loss of a SGFP. Accordingly, either the JPM or Q44 will need to be replaced.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 SEPARATELY:
Task Standard needs to include the Main Turbine Load Reduction target criteria specified in Step 2.3.1.B. Task Standard should also be Enhancement to state inserts control rods in MANUAL due to failure of the rods to insert in AUTO.
Suggest requiring the applicant to perform Step 2.3.1.B.1 of S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 for RAMP RATES not preset for SGFP Runback, to raise the Discrimination Validity of this JPM. As written, the JPM requires the applicant depress a single pushbutton (Select the DEHC SETTER to GO) and then commence Manual Rod Insertion.
SALEM:
RO Q44 was replaced to address overlap Task Standard revised as requested.
JPM revised to require the applicant to perform Step 2.3.1.B.1 of S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 for RAMP RATES not preset for SGFP Runback.
Sim F 5
026 A2.03 Manually Actuate Containment Spray 2
X E
S NRC:
JPM Task Standard, Items 2 and 3, both state OR, whereas the Individual Step Performance Standards for Placing the Valves in their Safeguards positions, uses AND. Which is correct? Reconcile this discrepancy.
K/A referenced on ES-301-2 is A2.03.
K/A referenced on JPM cover sheet is A4.01. Should be K/A A2.03. Correct this discrepancy.
SALEM:
Item changed to use OR Individual Step Performance Standards for Placing the Valves in their Safeguards positions has been changed to OR.
K/A changed to A2.03 on the JPM Cover Sheet.
Sim G 6
062 A2.04 Respond to Loss of 2A 4KV Vital Bus 2
E S
NRC:
Task Standard is deficient. Task Standard states Operator Enters S2.OP-AB-0001 and completes actions to start 22 Charging pump. Statement is vague and does not clearly identify the predetermined outcome against which task performance
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 will be measured. Task Standard should provide a general description / overview of the task, including the ALT Path actions necessary for successful completion.
SALEM:
Task Standard appropriately revised to address the identified deficiency.
Sim H 8
029 A3.01 Perform a Containment Pressure Relief 3
X E
S NRC:
System 103 is not SF 8; 103 is SF 5.
Also, same System and K/A combination (i.e., 103 & A3.01) are used on Q54 of the Written Exam & Q55 of the CERT Exam)
System Designator referenced on the ES-301-2 included with the 75-Day Submittal, is 029. System Designator referenced on JPM cover sheet is 103. Should be 029.
Correct this discrepancy.
SALEM:
Sim-h K/A was corrected to read 029 A3.01 (IR 3.8 / 4.0) to match Safety Function 8.
NRC Q54 uses same A3.01 however, the JPM is different requiring the candidate to demonstrate the ability to perform a containment pressure relief per procedure and the ability to use alarm response procedure(s) to respond to a plant vent radiation monitor high alarm. NRC Q54 is asking the candidate knowledge of Containment Ventilation Isolation signal and not procedural actions. In addition, the candidate is also being asked about the expected response on the containment sample isolation valves which do not close on CVI.
The CERT Exam Q55 is different than NRC Q54 and the NRC Sim-h JPM in that it is asking the candidate to choose which components close on a Phase A Isolation signal. The VC5 and VC6 is not mentioned in the question.
Chief Examiner (CE)Supplemental Comment (12/20/2021):
100% review of the Written Exam identified a SECOND overlap issue involving this JPM (separate from the previously identified overlap item associated with Q54), this time with the
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Q23, which similarly requires the applicant to assess / evaluate the response of Containment Isolation Valves *VC5 and *VC6 upon receipt of High Radiation Alarm conditions where 2R41D is the affected Rad Monitor.
Consequently, 2 of the following 3 test items will require significant revision /
replacement due to the nature of the overlap: Q 23, Q54, and Sim JPM h.
SALEM::
Replaced JPM with a SF 8 task that tests ability of the applicant to respond to a fire in the plant. Replacement JPM addresses the overlap concern.
IP-I 13 014 A2.02 Transfer Rod Position (IRPI) to Emergency Power Supply 1
2 U
S NRC:
LOD=1. JPM consists of two breaker manipulations, both located side by side within the same panel. JPM, as written, limits the ability of the Examiner to perform an effective and proper evaluation of the applicants.
Task Standard is deficient. Task Standard states Transfers IRPI to Emergency Power Supply IAW approved procedures.
Statement is vague and does not clearly identify the predetermined outcome against which task performance will be measured.
Task Standards should (a) provide a general description / overview of the task, and (b) avoid making references to procedures. Statements such as using, IAW, or per a procedure, regardless of whether the specific procedure reference is identified, can imply that every step in the procedure is intended to be critical.
SALEM:
Replaced JPM with a task that tests the ability of the applicant to locally transfer the PZR backup heater bus to the emergency power supply.
IP-J 7
012 A4.06 Locally Open Reactor Trip and M-G Set 2
E S
NRC:
- Revise Item 1 of the Task Standard to state Locally opens Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers.
SALEM:
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Breakers Revised Item 1 of the Task Standard as requested.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 IP-K 9
068 A4.03 Perform a Radioactive Liquid Release 3
X X
X U
S NRC:
Need to confirm assigned K/A A4.03, Stoppage of Release if limits exceeded.
K/A referenced on ES-301-2 is A4.03. K/A referenced on JPM cover sheet is A2.04.
Appears that the K/A should be K/A A4.03.
Resolve this discrepancy.
The Inoperable Flow Recorder approach upon which this JPM is based does not meet the intent of K/A A4.03. K/A A4.03 states Stoppage of release if limits exceeded. No limit has been exceeded in this JPM as written.
Critical Step associated with recording Discharge Flow Rate (Step 5.5.8) contains No Critical Action Step. Associated Performance Standard contains only Examiner Cue information. The Cues provided are confusing (e.g., why would the Fl and FR be reading differently?).
First Cue reads as follows:
CUE: 2FR1064 reads 0 gpm.
picture available of Flow indicator showing 50 and Flow recorder indicating ZERO.
Second Cue reads as follows:
Possible Cue: 2W51 is Open.
What is meant by Possible Cue? The applicant should only be provided with information sufficient to deduce the Flow Recorder failure, as in the FIRST Cue. The applicant should not be cued to perform the Critical Step Action of calling the Control Room to close 2W51.
Accordingly, the SECOND Cue should be eliminated and the FIRST Cue reworded/enhanced to more clearly communicate the information pertaining to the FR and FI instrument readings.
Regardless, Step 5.5.8 associated with the Discharge Flow Rate should not be designated as a Critical Step. Step 5.5.9 is the Critical Step Action required of the applicant once the Flow Recorder Failure has been deduced.
Task Standard Item 1 states Controls the discharge of 21 CVCS MT to less than the Maximum Release Rate of 75 gpm. The
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 two Examiner Cues associated with Step 5.5.6 appear to indicate that the Maximum attainable FR Recorder Flow is only 50 gpm after throttling 2WR59. If these cues are to be provided, then how is Item 1 of the Task Standard valid? Clarification required.
SALEM:
Agree that K/A A4.03 is the correct K/A.
Changed the K/A reference to A4.03 on the JPM Cover Sheet.
The JPM is a match because the JPM will provide a cue to the operator when recording readings that the flow monitor has failed to zero. Per procedure, the operator is required to take action and notify the control room to close the 2WL51 to terminate the release.
Removed the Second Cue (i.e., Possible Cue) in Step 5.5.8. Also removed the Critical Step designator from Step 5.5.8.
Maximum Release Rate changed from 75 gpm to 45 gpm in the Initial Conditions to ensure the validity of Task Standard Item 1.
Chief Examiner (CE) Supplemental Comment (12/20/2021):
Disagree with the Licensees response that the K/A is a match. JPM as written, is not a K/A Match. As previously noted, K/A A4.03 states Stoppage of release if limits exceeded. No limit has been exceeded in this JPM. Suggest revising the JPM to require Liquid Radwaste System to be isolated on 2R18 Monitor Alarms, instead of 2FR-1064 Inoperable.
SALEM:
Revised the JPM to cue the applicant on the 2R18 Radiation Monitor High Alarm, requiring the applicant to notify the Control Room to close the WL51.
ES-301 21 Form ES-301-7 Instructions for Completing This Table:
Check or mark any item(s) requiring a comment and explain the issue in the space provided using the guide below.
- 1.
Check each JPM for appropriate administrative topic requirements (COO, EC, Rad, and EP) or safety function requirements and corresponding K/A. Mark in column 1.
(ES-301, D.3 and D.4)
- 2.
Determine the level of difficulty (LOD) using an established 1-5 rating scale. Levels 1 and 5 represent an inappropriate (low or high) discriminatory level for the license that is being tested. Mark in column 2 (Appendix D, C.1.f)
- 3.
In column 3, Attributes, check the appropriate box when an attribute is not met:
The initial conditions and/or initiating cue is clear to ensure the operator understands the task and how to begin. (Appendix C, B.4)
The JPM contains appropriate cues that clearly indicate when they should be provided to the examinee. Cues are objective and not leading. (Appendix C, D.1)
All critical steps (elements) are properly identified.
The scope of the task is not too narrow (N) or too broad (B).
Excessive overlap does not occur with other parts of the operating test or written examination. (ES-301, D.1.a, and ES-301, D.2.a)
The task performance standard clearly describes the expected outcome (i.e., end state). Each performance step identifies a standard for successful completion of the step.
A valid marked up key was provided (e.g., graph interpretation, initialed steps for handouts).
- 4.
For column 4, Job Content, check the appropriate box if the job content flaw does not meet the following elements:
Topics are linked to the job content (e.g., not a disguised task, task required in real job).
The JPM has meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the applicant's understanding and ability to safely operate the plant. (ES-301, D.2.c)
- 5.
Based on the reviewers judgment, is the JPM as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 5.
- 6.
In column 6, provide a brief description of any (U)nacceptable or (E)nhancement rating from column 5.
Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.
ES-301 22 Form ES-301-7 Facility: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Scenario: 1 Exam Date: February 14 - 28, 2022 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 Event Realism
/Cred.
Required Actions Verifiable actions LOD TS CTs Scenario Overlap U/E/S Explanation 1 - Load Reduction to 89% at 10%
Per Hour IAW IOP-4 S
Reactivity Manipulation 2 - 24 Vacuum Pump Trips S
3 - 24 Loop Cold Leg RTD Fails High TS S
4 - RCS Leak Inside Containment (20 gpm)
TS S
5 - RCS Leak Worsens to 350 gpm
- Auto Safety Injection Fails to Actuate
- Large Break LOCA CT1 E
S Major Event NRC:
The Event 6 LOCA is an extension of the Event 5 Leak Degradation and should therefore be included with Major Event 5.
Failure of SI to Auto Actuate in Event 5 should be stand-alone Event 6. Note that CT1 will now be associated with Event 6 as a result of this change.
NOTE: The Event 6 SI Failure will qualify as a Post-EOP Entry Instrument Malfunction.
This change will require revision of the following items:
(a) Scenario D1 Event Descriptions, including CT1 identifier, (b) D1 Event Type Code for Event 6 (Component Instrument),
(c) D1 Event Type Code for Event 6 (ALL RO; per the D2),
(d) Target Quantitative Attributes Table, (e) Scenario Summary, (f) Associated D2 information SALEM:
LOCA added to Event 5.
Event 6 changed to Auto SI actuation failure.
All items in the D-1 were updated and applicable sections in the scenario guide.
6 - Large Break LOCA
- Auto Safety Injection Fails CT1 E
S NRC:
The Event 6 LOCA is an extension of the Event 5 Leak Degradation and should therefore be included with Major Event 5.
Failure of SI to Auto Actuate in Event 5 should be stand-alone Event 6. Note that
ES-301 23 Form ES-301-7 to Actuate CT1 will now be associated with Event 6 as a result of this change.
NOTE: The Event 6 SI Failure will qualify as a Post-EOP Entry Instrument Malfunction.
This change will require revision of the following items:
(a) Scenario D1 Event Descriptions, including CT1 identifier, (b) D1 Event Type Code for Event 6 (Component Instrument),
(c) D1 Event Type Code for Event 6 (ALL RO; per the D2),
(d) Target Quantitative Attributes Table, (e) Scenario Summary, (f) Associated D2 information SALEM:
These items are enveloped by and addressed in Event 5 7 - 22 RHR Pump Fails to Start on SEC Signal CT2 S
8 - 22 RHR Pump Trips CT3 CT4 E
S NRC:
A fourth Conditional Critical Task, CT-4, Stop all ECCS Pumps taking suction from the RWST when RWST Lo-Lo Level Alarm actuates, was added after the 150-Day Outline Submittal. Event 8 D1 Event Description specifies CT-3 or CT-4.
Insufficient Bounding Criteria specified for CT-3 and no Bounding Criteria specified for CT-4. There should not be a Conditional stand-alone fourth CT in addition to previously specified CT-3 for the 22 RHR Pump Trip.
SALEM:
CT-4 was deleted and combined with CT-3. CT-3 modified to read Make up to the RWST, minimize RWST outflow, and if RWST Lo-Lo level alarm received stops ECCS pumps prior to cavitation.
8 2
4(four) 3 8
E S
ES-301 24 Form ES-301-7 Facility: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Scenario: 2 (SPARE)
Exam Date: February 14 - 28, 2022 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 Event Realism/
Cred.
Required Actions Verifiable actions LOD TS CTs Scenario Overlap U/E/S Explanation
ES-301 25 Form ES-301-7 Designated Spare Scenario - Information Redacted
ES-301 26 Form ES-301-7 Facility: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Scenario: 3 (Free Look)
Exam Date: February 14 - 28, 2022 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 Event Realism/
Cred.
Required Actions Verifiable actions LOD TS CTs Scenario Overlap U/E/S Explanation 1 - Power Ascension to 98% IAW IOP-4 E
S Reactivity Manipulation NRC:
Initial power level per the D1 Initial Conditions (IC) is 93%. D1 Turnover guidance and the D1 Event 1 Description state that power is to be raised to 98%. The Event 1 Summary Description states that the crew will raise power to 100%. Reconcile this discrepancy.
SALEM:
Corrected to 98%.
2 - 21 CRDM Vent Fan Damper Fails Closed E
S NRC:
The D1 credits the Reactor Operator (RO) with the Component Failure in Event 2.
The mitigative actions to stop 21 CRDM Fan and start 23 CRDM Fan are scripted for the Plant Operator (PO). Reconcile this discrepancy and appropriately revise Forms ES-301-5 and ES-301-6.
SALEM:
Corrected D-1 to credit PO.
3 - PZR Level Controlling Channel Fails High TS E
S NRC:
D2 has a step for the PO to remove the failed PZR Channel from service IAW S2.OP-RPS-0003. These steps have not been scripted in the D2.
The D1 only credits the RO with the Instrument Failure. If substantive/verifiable actions are being taken by the PO to remove the failed PZR Channel from service using S2.OP-RPS-0003, then the PO should also receive credit for performing these actions.
SALEM:
No substantive actions taken by the PO to credit. The CRS will direct this action but all control actions would have already been performed by the Abnormal procedure.
D-2 item for directing the PO to remove the failed PZR Channel from service has been updated with parenthetical information stating (No action by PO).
4 - 21CN22 Low Pressure FWH Inlet Valve Fails Closed E
S NRC:
Editorial: The D1 does not specify the Event Type. The Event Type Column credits ALL positions for this Event, but does not indicate that the Event Type is a Component Failure.
SALEM:
Corrected D-1 to read ALL (C).
ES-301 27 Form ES-301-7 Chief Examiner (CE)Supplemental Comment (12/22/2021):
Scenario Summary for Event 4 states that actions will be taken to bypass the condensate polisher. These actions have not been scripted in the D2.
SALEM:
Bypassing the polisher is not expected for this condition. The step appears in the scenario summary to provide awareness in the event unexpected conditions occur that would require bypassing of the polishers.
5 - 2A EDG Emergency Trip TS E
S NRC:
Regarding TS: Questioning whether TS 3.8.1.1, Action b.2, should be entered.
Doesnt appear that any redundant equipment is Inoperable based on the Initial Conditions and scenario events preceding the 2A EDG Emergency Trip.
Clarification required.
SALEM:
TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.2 would not be active at this point due to no redundant equipment out of service up to this point in the scenario. Removed b.2 from D-2.
6 - 22 23 RCP Motor Oil Level Low E
S NRC:
D1 credits ALL positions with the performance of verifiable actions. The D2 for this event has no actions scripted for the PO other than to initiate the Attachment 1 CAS for S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 and to report that the limits have been exceeded for 22 RCP Motor Bearing temperatures and vibrations. Is the PO performing any substantive and verifiable actions under the Attachment 1 CAS? If so, then these actions need to be scripted. If not, then Forms ES-301-5 and ES-301-6 need to be appropriately revised.
SALEM:
Agree; D-1 corrected to read RO (C) and CRS (C). Updated the 301-5 and 301-6 Forms.
Chief Examiner (CE)Supplemental Comment (1/18/2022):
Event 6 changed from 22 RCP to 23 RCP following the Onsite Validation to obtain the desired pressure dynamic in the S/Gs prioritized for steaming (22 & 24) per 2-EOP-FRHS-1.
7 - Main Turbine Fails to Trip from the MCR
- MSL Isolation Fails to Auto Actuate CT1 X
E S
2020 NRC Exam; Scenario 5, Event 5 (Previous 2 NRC Exams)
Major Event NRC:
Provide the noun name/title of EOP-LOSC-2 in the CT1 Critical Task (CT) information section of Event 7 (Page 19 of 36).
CT1Critical Task Sheet on Page 34 of 36 includes a CT Element for Performance Indicator. The CT Element should be relabeled Measurable Performance Standard, IAW Appendix D, and specify the bounding criteria for the CT (i.e., the agreed upon limits for what is acceptable for task completion and what constitutes
ES-301 28 Form ES-301-7 (Expect Auto Safety Injection -
No SGFPs Available and No Steam Dumps Available)
- 23 AFW Pump Fails to Auto Start failure). Objective criteria for failure needs to be specified. The information currently provided under Performance Indicator, states Manipulation of controls as required to manually actuate steamline isolation. This is not objective criteria for failure.
SALEM:
Bullet #1 - Added procedure title to CT-1 Bullet #2 - The CT element was relabeled to read Measurable Performance Standard and the objective criteria was added..
Chief Examiner (CE)Supplemental Comment (12/23/2021):
Consolidate Events 8 and 9, making the Total Number of Events 8.
Move 23 AFW Pump Failure to Auto Start from Event 8 to Event 7.
Change Major Event designation from Event 6 to Event 7.
SALEM:
Events 8 and 9 consolidated. Moved 23 AFW Pump Failure to Auto Start from Event 8 to Event 7. Event 8 is Loss of all AFW flow and Red Path to Heat Sink.
Event 8 is CT-2.
Designated Event 7 as the Major Event.
8 - 22 AFW Pump Trips
- 23 AFW Pump Fails to Auto Start
- 23 AFW Pump Trips During EOP-TRIP-1 (Loss of ALL AFW Flow; CFST Heat Sink Red Path)
CT2 XX E
S 2020 NRC Exam; Scenario 5 Event 7 (Previous 2 NRC Exams) 2020 NRC Exam; Scenario 5, Event 8 (Previous 2 NRC Exams)
NRC:
Event incorrectly labeled as Event 7 in the D2 (Free Look Scenario, Page 19 of 36).
RO action on Page 21 of 36 (Free Look Scenario) states RO reports MSLI not required, but Fast Closure was performed to isolate turbine. This statement is confusing. MSLI isolation is required due to failure of the Auto actuation and has been appropriately designated as a CT. The CT mitigative action for this failure is to manually initiate a MSLI using the Fast Close pushbuttons on 2CC2. Clarification required.
SALEM:
Bullet #1 - this event is now part of Event #8 on revised D2.
Bullet #2 - Step not required; removed to eliminate confusion.
Chief Examiner (CE)Supplemental Comment (12/23/2021):
Consolidate Events 8 and 9, making the Total Number of Events 8.
Move 23 AFW Pump Failure to Auto Start from Event 8 to Event 7.
SALEM:
Events 8 and 9 consolidated. Moved 23 AFW Pump Failure to Auto Start from Event 8 to Event 7. Event 8 is Loss of all AFW flow and Red Path to Heat Sink.
Event 8 is CT-2.
ES-301 29 Form ES-301-7 9 - 23 AFW Pump Trips During EOP-TRIP-1 (Loss of ALL AFW Flow; CFST Heat Sink Red Path)
CT2 X
E 2020 NRC Exam; Scenario 5, Event 8 (Previous 2 NRC Exams) (Moved to Event 8)
NRC:
Event incorrectly labeled as Event 8 in the D2 (Free Look Scenario, Page 21 of 36); should be Event 9.
Direction for the RO to stop all RCPs is duplicated on Page 23 of 36 (Free Look Scenario).
Examiners Note on Page 26 of 36 (Free Look Scenario) states 21BF13 valve position indication will be lost due to loss of 2B 460/230 VAC bus. The 2B bus is not lost in this scenario. Appears to be a carryover item from the previous NRC Exam (19-01). Need to scrub this scenario for carryover items from the 19-01 Exam.
CT2 Critical Task information section on Page 26 of 36 states Steps that are bolded and shaded are necessary to complete the Critical Task. CT2 steps are specified on Pages 25, 26, and 27 of the D2. Note that this statement has not been provided in the CT1 Critical Task information section on Page 19 of 36. As an alternative to this convention, recommend identifying all CT1 and CT2 Critical Task action statements in the D2 by either highlighting and/or using a different color so that they more clearly stand out from the other action items. Ensure that the Critical Task identifier (i.e., CT1, CT2) is annotated as well, to further distinguish the Critical Task action statements.
CT2 Critical Task Sheet on Page 35 of 36 includes a CT Element for Performance Indicator. The CT Element should be relabeled Measurable Performance Standard, IAW Appendix D, and specify the bounding criteria for the CT (i.e., the agreed upon limits for what is acceptable for task completion and what constitutes failure). Objective criteria for failure needs to be specified. The information currently provided under Performance Indicator, states Manipulation of controls as required to establish feedwater flow into at least on SG. This is not objective criteria for failure.
SALEM:
Bullet #1 - Events consolidated and appropriately relabeled based on CE feedback.
Previous Event 9 (23 AFW Pump Trip and Loss of All AFW Flow) is now Event 8.
Bullet #2 - Duplicate step deleted.
Bullet #3 - Note was removed.
Bullet #4 - Added title Critical Task -# and double borders to each step that supports the CT.
Bullet #5 - The CT element was relabeled to read Measurable Performance Standard and the objective criteria was added.
Chief Examiner (CE)Supplemental Comment (12/23/2021):
Bullet #3 comment not addressed.
Consolidate Events 8 and 9.
SALEM:
Bullet #3 - Verified that the note regarding loss of 2B 230/460V bus has been removed.
Events 8 and 9 consolidated.
8 2
2 6
E S
ES-301 31 Form ES-301-7 Facility: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Scenario: 4 (Low Power)
Exam Date: February 14 - 28, 2022 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 Event Realism
/Cred.
Required Actions Verifiable actions LOD TS CTs Scenario Overlap U/E/S Explanation 1 - Continue Power Ascension to 10% IAW IOP-3 and Enter Mode 1 E
S Reactivity Manipulation NRC:
All applicant positions (i.e., ATC, BOP, CRS) are credited with a Reactivity Manipulation for the designated Reactivity Event Type in each of the scenarios.
Only the ATC position should be credited with the Reactivity Manipulation. The BOP and CRS positions should be credited with Normal Evolutions for the planned power changes scripted in Event #1 for each scenario.
SALEM:
Event Type designations corrected for each position. Only the ATC is credited with the Reactivity Manipulation. The BOP and CRS were each credited with Normal Evolutions.
2 - 2PR2 PZR PORV Leakage TS S
3 - High DP Across 23A CW Traveling Screen S
4 - 23 SG Tube Leak (35 gpm)
TS S
5 - 23 SG Tube Rupture (650 gpm)
CT1 CT2 X
E S
2020 NRC Exam; Scenario 4 Event 6 (Previous 2 NRC Exams)
Major Event NRC:
Confirm that this SGTR Event is not being used on the CERT Exam. This Event was used on the 2020 NRC Exam (previous Exam). Licensee intends to use the previous NRC Exam Op Test for their CERT. No duplication of test items is permitted between the NRC and CERT Exams.
Quantitative Attributes Table, Line Item 5, on Page 4 of the Scenario incorrectly lists TRIP-1 and does not specify the associated Event Number, as is done consistently in the other 3 scenarios. Should be SGTR-1 and Event 5.
SALEM:
Confirmed that the SGTR Event is not being used on the CERT Exam.
Agree; correction made to Line Item 5 of the Quantitative Attributes Table.
6 - 21 CFCU Fails to Start S
ES-301 32 Form ES-301-7 in Low Speed 7 - PZR Spray Valve 2PS3 Fails to Close During Depressurizat-ion S
7 2
2 6
E S
ES-301 33 Form ES-301-7 Instructions for Completing This Table:
Use this table for each scenario for evaluation.
2 Check this box if the events are not related (e.g., seismic event followed by a pipe rupture) OR if the events do not obey the laws of physics and thermodynamics.
3, 4 In columns 3 and 4, check the box if there is no verifiable or required action, as applicable. Examples of required actions are as follows: (ES-301, D.5f) opening, closing, and throttling valves starting and stopping equipment raising and lowering level, flow, and pressure making decisions and giving directions acknowledging or verifying key alarms and automatic actions (Uncomplicated events that require no operator action beyond this should not be included on the operating test unless they are necessary to set the stage for subsequent events. (Appendix D, B.3))
5 Check this box if the level of difficulty is not appropriate.
6 Check this box if the event has a TS.
7 Check this box if the event has a critical task (CT). If the same CT covers more than one event, check the event where the CT started only.
8 Check this box if the event overlaps with another event on any of the last two NRC examinations. (Appendix D, C.1.f) 9 Based on the reviewers judgment, is the event as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 9.
10 Record any explanations of the events here.
In the shaded boxes, sum the number of check marks in each column.
In column 1, sum the number of events.
In columns 2-4, record the total number of check marks for each column.
In column 5, based on the reviewer's judgement, place a checkmark only if the scenario's LOD is not appropriate.
In column 6, TS are required to be 2 for each scenario. (ES-301, D.5.d)
In column 7, preidentified CTs should be 2 for each scenario. (Appendix D; ES-301, D.5.d; ES-301-4)
In column 8, record the number of events not used on the two previous NRC initial licensing exams. A scenario is considered unsatisfactory if there is < 2 new events. (ES-301, D.5.b; Appendix D, C.1.f)
In column 9, record whether the scenario as written (U)nacceptable, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory from column 11 of the simulator scenario table.
ES-301 34 Form ES-301-7 Facility: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Exam Date: February 14 - 28, 2022 Scenario 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 11 Event Totals Events Unsat.
TS Total TS Unsat.
% Unsat.
Scenario Elements U/E/S Explanation 1
8 0
2 0
3 0
0 E S 2
8 0
2 0
2 0
0 E S 3
8 0
2 0
2 0
0 E S 4
7 0
2 0
2 0
0 E S Instructions for Completing This Table:
Check or mark any item(s) requiring comment and explain the issue in the space provided.
1, 3, 5 For each simulator scenario, enter the total number of events (column 1), TS entries/actions (column 3), and CTs (column 5).
This number should match the respective scenario from the event-based scenario tables (the sum from columns 1, 6, and 7, respectively).
2, 4, 6 For each simulator scenario, evaluate each event, TS, and CT as (S)atisfactory, (E)nhance, or (U)nsatisfactory based on the following criteria:
- a.
Events. Each event is described on a Form ES-D-2, including all switch manipulations, pertinent alarms, and verifiable actions. Event actions are balanced between at-the-controls and balance-of-plant applicants during the scenario. All event-related attributes on Form ES-301-4 are met. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory events in column 2.
- b.
TS. A scenario includes at least two TS entries/actions across at least two different events. TS entries and actions are detailed on Form ES-D-2. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory TS entries/actions in column 4. (ES-301, D.5d)
- c.
CT. Check that a scenario includes at least two preidentified CTs. This criterion is a target quantitative attribute, not an absolute minimum requirement. Check that each CT is explicitly bounded on Form ES-D-2 with measurable performance standards (see Appendix D). Enter the total number of unsatisfactory CTs in column 6.
7 In column 7, calculate the percentage of unsatisfactory scenario elements:
8 If the value in column 7 is > 20%, mark the scenario as (U)nsatisfactory in column 8. If column 7 is 20%, annotate with (E)nhancement or (S)atisfactory.
9 In column 11, explain each unsatisfactory event, TS, and CT. Editorial comments can also be added here.
Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.
2 + 4 + 6 1 + 3 + 5100%
ES-301 35 Form ES-301-7 Facility: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Exam Date: February 14 - 28, 2022 OPERATING TEST TOTALS Total Total Unsat.
Total Total Unsat.
Explanation Edits Sat.
Admin.
JPMs 9
0 9
0 Sim/In-Plant JPMs 11 2
8 1
In-Plant JPMs I and K Unsat.
Scenarios 4
0 4
0 Scenario 2 is the designated SPARE.
Op. Test Totals:
24 2
21 1
8.3 Convention utilized by the Chief Examiner to indicate Final Review and Acceptance of those Operating Test Items (JPMs & Scenario Events) requiring Enhancement (E) OR determined to be Unsatisfactory (U), consists of lining out the E (E) or U (U) in the associated U/E/S Column, and assigning the letter S for Satisfactory, to indicate the necessary corrections were made.
Instructions for Completing This Table:
Update data for this table from quality reviews and totals in the previous tables and then calculate the percentage of total items that are unsatisfactory and give an explanation in the space provided.
- 1.
Enter the total number of items submitted for the operating test in the Total column. For example, if nine administrative JPMs were submitted, enter 9 in the Total items column for administrative JPMs.
For scenarios, enter the total number of simulator scenarios.
- 2.
Enter the total number of (U)nsatisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the two JPMs column 5 and simulator scenarios column 8 in the previous tables. Provide an explanation in the space provided.
- 3.
Enter totals for (E)nhancements needed and (S)atisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the previous tables. This task is for tracking only.
- 4.
Total each column and enter the amounts in the Op. Test Totals row.
- 5.
Calculate the percentage of the operating test that is (U)nsatisfactory (Op. Test Total Unsat.)/(Op. Test Total) and place this value in the bolded % Unsat. cell.
Refer to ES-501, E.3.a, to rate the overall operating test as follows:
satisfactory, if the Op. Test Total % Unsat. is 20%
unsatisfactory, if Op. Test Total % Unsat. is > 20%
- 6.
Update this table and the tables above with post-exam changes if the as-administered operating test required content changes, including the following:
The JPM performance standards were incorrect.
The administrative JPM tasks/keys were incorrect.
ES-301 36 Form ES-301-7 CTs were incorrect in the scenarios (not including post scenario critical tasks defined in Appendix D).
The EOP strategy was incorrect in a scenario(s).
TS entries/actions were determined to be incorrect in a scenario(s).