ML18106A843

LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr

ML18106A843
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	08/24/1998
From:	Bakken A, Nagle J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
LER-98-009-01, LER-98-9-1, LR-N980418, NUDOCS 9809010154
Download: ML18106A843 (4)

Text

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• Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit AUG 24 1998 LR-N980418 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 Gentlemen:

SPECIAL REPORT 311/98-009-00

• SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO DPR 75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 This Special Report entitled "Failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Program" is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of License Condition 2.1 which requires that a 14 day report be submitted for cases where the provisions of the approved fire protection program are not maintained. Further, Technical Specification 6.9.3 states that "violations of the fire protection program ... which would have adversely affected the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire shall be submitted ...

via the Licensee Event Report System within 30 days." This report satisfies both of these requirements.

Sincerely, A. C. Bakken, Ill General Manager-Salem Operations Attachment

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c U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 9809010154 980824 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR Tht' ~~m' *t'r i~ in y( 1llr hands.

95-2168 REV 6194

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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA Y COMMISSION APPROVED B NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/3012001 (6-1998) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information

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collection request 50 hrs. Reported leSsOns learned are incorporated into LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33). U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the (See reverse for required number of Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget. Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display digits/characters for each block) a currently valid OMB control number. the NRC may not conduct or sponsor.

and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (l) PAGE (3)

SALEM UNIT 2 05000311 1 OF 3 TITU(4)

Failure.to Post Continuous Firewatch as required by Fire Protection Plan 08 10 98 OPERATING NAME John C.

• CAUSE SYSTEM REPORTABLE TO EPIX EXPECTED MONm DAY YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

ABSTRACJ (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

This Special Report is being made pursuant to the requirements of License Condition 2.I which requires that a 14 day report be submitted for cases where the provisions of the approved fire protection program are not maintained. Further, Tech Spec 6.9.3 states that "violations of the fire protection program -* which would have adversely affected the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire shall be submitted -*

via the Licensee Event Report System within 30 days." This report satisfies both of these requirements.

At 0945 hours0.0109 days <br />0.263 hours <br />0.00156 weeks <br />3.595725e-4 months <br /> on 8/9/98 the smoke detectors associated with the Salem Unit 2 chiller room were placed in bypass as a result of spurious alarms and an hourly fire watch was established. At approximately 0640 hours0.00741 days <br />0.178 hours <br />0.00106 weeks <br />2.4352e-4 months <br /> on 8/10/98 it was determined that the fire watch should have been provided on a continuous basis due to a pre-existing impairment affecting cable wrap in the same fire zone. This pre-existing condition was associated witn issues concerning qualification of fire barrier material that was used for the cable wrapping.

Upon discovery a continuous fire watch was posted. The cause of this event was failure to recognize the concurrent conditions. This even~ was reported to the NRC by telephone at approximately 14:40 on 8/10/98.

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J NRC FOR.'Yl 366A (6-1998)

• U,S, NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

• TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET(2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE(3)

NUMBER(2)

SALEM UNIT 2 05000311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 2 OF 3 98 0 0 9 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies ofNRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Fire Detection {IC/-}*

• Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as (SS/CCC)

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Salem Unit 2 was in the process of starting up following the completion of a maintenance shutdown.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On Friday 8/7/98 at 0650 hours0.00752 days <br />0.181 hours <br />0.00107 weeks <br />2.47325e-4 months <br /> a smoke detector in zone 122 (Salem Unit 2 Chiller area) alarmed for no apparent cause. The zone was reset and the alarm cleared. On Sunday 8/9/98 at 06~3 hrs, the same alarm came in and it was determined that there was no apparent cause for the alarm. As an immediate corrective action, all six detectors in this zone were accessed and cleaned. The zone was successfully reset, however, the alarm reflashed at 0945 hours0.0109 days <br />0.263 hours <br />0.00156 weeks <br />3.595725e-4 months <br />. Because power ascension was in progress the Control Room Supervisor requested that no further troubleshooting be performed at that time. When this detector zone was locked into an alarm condition no other smoke detectors in the zone would cause a reflash alarm condition. A fire protection impairment was established for the loss of detection in accordance with procedures as well as an hourly firewatch. An action request was written to document this condition for further troubleshooting and repair. On 8/10/98, at approximately 0640 hours0.00741 days <br />0.178 hours <br />0.00106 weeks <br />2.4352e-4 months <br />, during turnover from the off-going fire protection supervisor to the on-coming duty fire protection supervisor, a status review determined that a continuous firewatch should have been established because of the lack of smoke detection in the area combined with the previously existing impairment for potentially inoperable fire barriers in the area. An hourly firewatch was in place during the period of time the smoke detection zone was locked into the fire condition.

The lack of continuous f irewatch is a violation of the approved fire protection program.

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)

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NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)

• l'.S. SUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

• TEXT CONTINUATION

.FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET(2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE(J)

NUMBER(2)

SALEM UNIT 2 05000311 SEQUENTIAL IREVISION 3 OF 3 I NUMBER NUMBER 98 0 0 9 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fonn 366A) (17)

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE This was a human performance issue in which there was a failure to properly recognize the implications of the concurrent impairments and take the appropriate required compensatory actions.

Fire protection procedures clearly require the posting of a continuous firewatch in cases where there was a loss of a fire barrier and no detection was available.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES LERs for 1995 to 1998 were reviewed and no similar occurrences were identified.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS For approximately 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> the fire zone was subject to a one-hour fire watch rather than the continuous fire watch required by the Fire Protection Program. The need for a continuous firewatch was based upon loss of detection in conjunction with the degraded fire barrier. However, the fire barrier in question was not absent but is considered to be degraded and therefore impaired due to the concern regarding the ability of the insulating material to fully meet its design requirements. A review of the Fire-Safe Shutdown analysis has determined that the there is minimal significance associated with this event because there is very limited amount of combustible material in this fire area and it is expected to self extinguish in the worst case within approximately four minutes. In addition, the cables are run in conduit and the fire wrap, although considered to be degraded, was not missing. These reasons, when coupled with the fact that there was a one-hour fire watch in place, significantly minimize the safety significance of this event.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1. A continuous firewatch was posted immediately upon discovery of the error.

2. The smoke detectors were repaired and returned to service.

3. The individuals involved are being held accountable for their actions in accordance with company policy.