Information Notice 1996-63, Potential Safety Issue Regarding the Shipment of Fissile Material

Potential Safety Issue Regarding the Shipment of Fissile Material

ML031050508
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	12/06/1996
From:	Haughney C NRC/NMSS/SFPO
To:
References
IN-96-063, NUDOCS 9612040215
Download: ML031050508 (9)

K) JIM MCKNIGHT UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 December 5, 1996 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 96-63: POTENTIAL

SAFETY ISSUE REGARDING

THE SHIPMENT OF FISSILE MATERIAL

Addressees

All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

licensees

authorized

to possess special nuclear material in unsealed quantities

greater than a critical mass.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees

to an issue with potential

safety significance

regarding

shipments

using the fissile material exemption

provisions

and general licenses.

It is expected that recipients

will review this information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.Description

of Circumstances

An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential

situation

where one of the fissile material exemptions

in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality

safety if large amounts of an exempt concentration

of fissile material were to be transported

in the presence of a special moderating

material (i.e., beryllium).

A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to process weapons-usable

enriched uranium materials.

The waste product, a uranium-beryllium

filtercake, met the fissile exemption

provisions

in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence of beryllium

in significant

quantities

in NRC-regulated

fissile exempt shipments

is extraordinary, and was not considered

in the development

of the fissile exemptions

in the regulations.

NRC has reviewed and verified the licensee's

calculations, and has concluded

that the current regulations

need to be revised to preclude criticality

in fissile exempt shipments

made under 10 CFR 71.53, and fissile shipments

made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. This information

notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of this potential

safety issue, while the regulatory

revisions

are made.Discussion

The licensee proposed to employ the provision

in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision

in the U.S. Department

of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).

J//1 961204021 on jl4Pqt PDR ETE OO~tc 99 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements

in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e., the additional

requirements

placed on fissile packages and shipments

to preclude criticality), provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material in any 10-liter (610-cubic-inch)

volume. The fissile exemptions

appearing

in 10 CFR 71.53 are assumed to provide inherent criticality

control for all practical

cases in which fissile materials exist at or below the applicable

regulatory

limits (i.e., independent

calculations

would generally not be expected nor required).

Consequently, the fissile exemptions

generally

do not place limits on the types of moderating

or reflecting

material present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport

index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality

control.Further, the fissile material exemptions

and general license provisions

allow any licensee to make shipments

without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic

computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium

oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be demonstrated

to provide adequate nuclear criticality

safety. Because the current regulations

would allow the possibility

of criticality

in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no assurance

that such shipments

will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address exclusion

of beryllium

and other special moderating

material (e.g., deuterium

and graphite)

in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be transported

in a single consignment.

NRC has contacted

the U.S. Department

of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating

materials

in question.NRC and DOT are coordinating

the revisions

to their respective

regulations.

NRC notes that very few licensees

are involved in the shipment of fissile materials

with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium.

However, for those licensees

that are involved in such shipments, it is important

that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality

safety is provided where fissile materials

are transported

with materials

known or expected to have moderating

properties

greater than water. As demonstrated

by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions

cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality

in all cases.

I):K,)IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 This information

notice requires no specific action nor written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the individual

listed below, or the appropriate

NRC regional office.Charles J. Haighney, Actirt Dire Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Technical

contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information

Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information

Notices o k')~ Gu A 7- Attachment

I IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Page 1 of I LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NMSS INFORMATION

NOTICES Info rmation Notice No.Date of Issuance Subject Issued to 96-57 96-54 96-53 Incident-Reporting

Require-ments Involving

Intakes, During a 24-Hour Period that May Cause a Total Effective

Dose Equivalent

in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)Vulnerability

of Stainless Steel to Corrosion

When Sensitized

Retrofit to Amersham 660 Posilock Radiography

Camera to Correct Incon-sistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility

Cracked Insertion

Rods on Troxler Model 3400 Series Portable Moisture Density Gauges Residual Contamination

Remaining

in Krypton-85 Handling System After Venting Recordkeeping, Decommis-sioning Notifications

for Disposals

of Radioactive

Waste by Land Burial Authorized

Under Former 10 CFR 20.304, 20.302, and Current 20.2002 10/30/96 10117/96 10/15/96 09/26/96 09/11/96 08/19196 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

licensees All material licensees All industrial

radiography

licensees All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

portable gauge licensees

and vendors All material licensees All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

licensees 96-52 96-51 96-47 v>Attachment

2 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 96-62 96-61 96-60 96-59 96-58 Potential

Failure of the Instantaneous

Trip Function of General Electric RMS-9 Programmers

Failure of a Main Steam Safety Valve to Reseat Caused by an Improperly

Installed

Release Nut Potential

Common-Mode

Post-Accident Failure of Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers

Potential

Degradation

of Post Loss-of-Coolant

Recirculation

Capability

as a Result of Debris RCP Seal Replacement

with Pump on Backseat Incident-Reporting

Require-ments Involving

Intakes, During a 24-Hour Period That May Cause a Total Effective

Dose Equivalent

in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rems)11/20/96 11/20/96 11/14/96 10/30/96 10/30/96 10/29/96 All holders of OLs and CPs for nuclear power plants All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized-water

reactors All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

licensees 96-57 OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit

K>IN 96-63 v2 December 5, 1996 This information

notice requires no specific action nor written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the individual

listed below, or the appropriate

NRC regional office.ChaSes J. Haugfey Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Technical

contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exeenrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information

Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information

Notices 96-63.IN*See Previous Concurrence.

OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* l c SFPO* I c NRR/OECB*

I c OGC* lc TEditor I NAME RLewis:LMG

EEaston SShankman

AEChaffee

ENJenson EKraus*DATE 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 11/25/96 11/25/96 OFC lIMOB l I SFP t I I l- I NAME KRamsey CJH_ ney DATE 1/27/96 W215196 Ia; v4 i _ _C_ CO E E CO E N L S R O C C =COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NE) CQPT

IN 96-##KJ i2 October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport

index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality

control. Further, the fissile material exemptions

and general license provisions

allow any licensee to make shipments

without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic

computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium

oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be demonstrated

to provide adequate nuclear criticality

safety. Because the current regulations

would allow the possibility

of criticality

in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no assurance

that such shipments

will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address exclusion

of beryllium

and other special moderating

material (e.g., deuterium

and graphite)

in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be transported

in a single consignment.

NRC has contacted

the U.S. Department

of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating

materials

in question.

NRC and DOT are coordinating

the revisions

to their respective

regulations.

NRC notes that very few licensees

are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-with

beryllium, graphite, or deuterium.

However, for those licensees

that are involved in such shipments, it is important

that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality

safety is provided where fissile materials

are transported

with materials

known or expected to have moderating

properties

greater than water. As demonstrated

by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions

cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality

in all cases.This information

notice requires no specific action nor written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the individual

listed below, or the appropriate

NRC regional office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information

Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information

Notices Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

S:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN

See Previous Concurrence.

OFC SFPON* c SFPO l c SFPO

• c NRR/OECBh*

I c OGCN lc TEditor I NAME RLewis:LMG

EEaston SShankman

AEChaffee

ENJenson EKraus *DATE I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 1 11/25/96 1 11/25/96 I--OFC IMOB I SFP lL,/ I l _NAME KRamseyeK

CJHa_ _ _DATE 1I9 196 12- ?79 _6 _,,___. __ _ ________C -COVER E = COVER & LNULUbUKIt

N = Nu iurO

>-considerations

and shipping experience

indicate that the criticality

of fissile exempt packages is not an immediate

threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibility

of criticality

in fissile exempt shipments

has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to address the possible inclusion

of beryllium

and other special moderating

material (e.g., deuterium

and graphite)

in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material which can be transported

in a single consignment.

NRC staff has also contacted

the Department

of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, as DOT regulations

contain a parallel provision

to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).NRC and DOT are coordinating

the revisions

to their respective

regulations.

In practice, operating

and administrative

limits and procedures

should prevent the collection

of fissile materials

in amounts or geometries

which could achieve criticality

as a result of any single change in the conditions

necessary

for criticality

safety. Nevertheless, NRC notes that until the expedited

regulatory

revisions

are made, good practice would be for licensees

to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials

with materials

known or expected to have moderating

properties

greater than water; or (2)single consignments

of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or 180 grams of other fissile radionuclides.

As demonstrated

by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions

cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality

in all cases.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below, or the appropriate

NRC Regional Office.William D. Travers, Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information

Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information

Notices Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8527 S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN

See Previous Concurrence.

OFC lSFPO l -SFPO l f-0 e-O NRR/OECB l OGC l TEDITOR I NAME RLeg -sAG EEas aman b affee WReamer EKraus lATVS I J.JIIAIg -I -&.10 & I 0 I la;: I a lIda I I , -I I /on LO#% IV. I(V U l TO'I 1J1_IU 1 v IU Iva % I I I Ef %I OFC DWM I IMOB l SFPO I SFP NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney

WDTravers DATE I/ /96 / /96 / /96 I /96 l C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE

N = NO COPY 2 IN 96-##/ H October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport

index (see §71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality

control. Further, the fissile material exemptions

and general license provisions

allow any licensee to make shipments

without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic

computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium

oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be demonstrated

to provide adequate nuclear criticality

safety. Because the current regulations

would allow the possibility

of criticality

in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no assurance

that such shipments

will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion

of beryllium

and other special moderating

material (e.g., deuterium

and graphite)

in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material which can be transported

in a single consignment.

NRC staff has contacted

the U.S. Department

of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating

materials

in question.

NRC and DOT are coordinating

the revisions

to their respective

regulations.

NRC notes very few licensees

are involved in the shipment of fissile materials

with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium.

However, for those licensees

that are involved in such shipments, it is important

that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality

safety is provided where fissile materials

are transported

with materials

known or expected to have moderating

properties

greater than water. As demonstrated

by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions

cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality

in all cases.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the individual

listed below, or the appropriate

NRC Regional Office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information

Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information

Notices Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

S:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN

• See Previous Concurrence.

OPP3 OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* lc SFPO* I c NRR/OECB*

I c OG TE TOR I NAME RLewis:LMG

EEaston SShankman

AEChaffee

_____enson

EKraus DATE I /196 / /96 1 1/96 I /196 1 196 I /196 OFC DWM I IMOB l FlO I Sl FPO I jI NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney

WDTravers DATE I/ /96 I /96 1 /196 / /96 J .I.. ==_C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NU COPlY