05000266/FIN-2008004-03
From kanterella
Revision as of 20:38, 28 October 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V NCV for the Failure to Have Adequate Maintenance Procedures for Service Water Pump Replacements |
Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed for the failure to properly rig and install the P-32E service water pump shaft on June 7, 2006. The bent pump shaft subsequently led to high pump vibrations and pump inoperability in excess of Technical Specification Action Condition completion time in February 2008. Specifically, the licensee determined that Routine Maintenance Procedure (RMP), RMP 9216-2, Service Water Pump Removal, Installation, and Maintenance, lacked adequate installation and rigging instructions to ensure excessive force was not applied to the shaft during installation. As part of its corrective actions, the licensee revised the RMP to include proper installation and rigging instructions. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Tables 3b and 4a for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not involve a design or qualification deficiency, there was no actual loss of safety function, no single train loss of safety function for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time, and no risk due to external events. The inspectors also determined that the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources component, because licensee procedures were not complete or adequate to ensure that the P-32E pump shaft was rigged and installed without damage to the shaft. H.2(c) (Section 4OA3.1) |
Site: | Point Beach |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000266/2008004 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2008 (2008Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Mcneil R Ruiz D Szwarc J Jacobson W Slawinski R Krsek L Kozak D Betancourt K Barclay |
CCA | H.7, Documentation |
INPO aspect | WP.3 |
' | |
Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2008004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2008Q3
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||