05000456/FIN-2010006-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow the Operability Determination Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when licensee personnel failed to adhere to Operability Determination Procedure OP-AA-108-115 after identifying a potential auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system design vulnerability. Specifically, since May 15, 2007, the licensee had questioned the motor-driven AFW systems capability to effectively transfer its water source from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to the essential service water system during a hypothetical catastrophic failure of the non-seismic CST. The lack of involvement in bringing this issue to the attention of the operating crew, lack of quality in evaluating the issue, and length of time the questions had been unanswered were not consistent with the Operability Determination process. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as Issue Report (IR) 1114604. Corrective actions planned included performing an Operability Evaluation and a corrective action assignment to ensure a rigorous evaluation was performed on the motordriven AFW pumps motor and breaker. The inspectors determined that this issue was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because the issue was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the AFW pump operability was not fully evaluated by the licensee. The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue was not a confirmed loss of operability and did not represent a risk significant issue based on the plants design backup capability to remove decay heat via the primary feed and bleed method. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance for Decision-Making (H.1(a)). Specifically, the licensee did not make a safety-significant or risk-significant decision using the Operability Evaluation systematic process, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions involving a potential design vulnerability to the plant to ensure safety was maintained. (Section 4OA2.1.b.2.c) |
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2010006 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Scarbeary E Duncan J Benjamin J Gilliam L Jones M Perry |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2010006 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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