05000456/FIN-2009007-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure of Containment Sump Suction Valve 1SI8811B to Stroke Open |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of substantial safety significance and an associated apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to prevent water from entering the motor operated valve actuator for valve 1SI8811B that resulted in corrosion of the torque switch. This resulted in the valve failing to stroke full open on June 24, 2009. The licensee determined that water entered the valve actuator through a flexible conduit penetration and pooled in the actuator limit switch box. This caused corrosion of the torque switch and minor corrosion of the limit switch. As part of the corrective actions for this event, the licensee sealed the susceptible conduit. Also, to address extent of condition, the licensee subsequently performed successful valve strokes of the 1SI8811A and 2SI8811A/B valves as part of previously scheduled maintenance windows. Additionally, the licensee performed a walkdown of the other SI8811 valves on both Units. Open conduit terminations were identified on all three remaining valves. The 2SI8811B valve was found to have the same susceptible conduit/cable tray configuration while the 1SI8811A and 2SI8811A valves had horizontal conduit terminations that were less susceptible to water intrusion. As a result, the licensee sealed the 2SI8811B valve open conduit termination. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor due to impacting the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems the respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding associated with this apparent violation was assessed using a Phase 3 analysis in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and is preliminary determined to have substantial significant safety significance (Yellow). The inspectors determined that this issue is associated with the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area. (P.1(a)) Specifically, licensee staff was aware for several years of water leakage from the overhead areas around the SI8811 valves. Several corrective action documents were generated previously but the licensee did not adequately evaluate the potential safety significance of the water leakage and did not correct the issue. (Section 1R22.1.b |
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2009007 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: White |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Dickson L Kozak N Valos R Skokowski A Garmoeg Gullag Shear M Satorius P Lougheed R Skokowski S Orth |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2009007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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