05000361/FIN-2010002-14
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Operations Procedure to Monitor Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Pressure |
| Description | A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.1.1 was identified for the failure of operations personnel to follow procedures for operating the component cooling water system. Specifically, on January 27, 2010, operations personnel failed to follow the requirements of procedure SO123-2-17, Component Cooling Water System Operation, Revision 31, while performing a planned drain down of the component cooling water surge tanks. Operations personnel failed to maintain the surge tank pressure, in accordance with procedure SO23-2-17, such that, component cooling water surge tank pressure was permitted to go low out of the expected operating range. As a result of this low surge tank pressure, operators declared the component cooling water and shutdown cooling train A systems inoperable. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Nuclear Notification NN 200771367. The finding is greater than minor because the continued failure to follow procedures when operating safety-related plant equipment, if left uncorrected, would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 guidance, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not result in an increase in the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system inventory, degrade the ability to add reactor coolant system inventory, or degrade the ability to recover decay heat removal. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work practices because operations personnel failed to use proper human error prevention techniques and proceeded in the face of unexpected circumstances when operating the component cooling water syste |
| Site: | San Onofre  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000361/2010002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Lantz P Elkmann D Allen J Reynoso J Josey G Warnick B Rice W Schaup |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - San Onofre - IR 05000361/2010002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (San Onofre) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (San Onofre)
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