05000361/FIN-2010002-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Enter Operating Experience into Corrective Action Program for Timely Evaluation |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to properly implement procedure requirements to ensure that applicable risk significant operating experience was entered into the corrective action program for timely evaluation. Specifically, on December 17, 2009, the operating experience review committee failed to properly implement the requirements of procedure SO23-XV-40, Sharing Industry Information, Revision 1. An industry operating experience report review determined the operating experience was not applicable and was distributed as information only; not requiring any action. The same industry operating experience was later determined to be applicable by the probabilistic risk assessment group, and interim compensatory measures were initiated on February 10, 2010, to address the issues. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Nuclear Notifications NN 200805879. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding: (1) is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; (3) did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and (4) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision-making because the operating experience review committee did not use a systematic process when making a safety significant decision, to ensure safety is maintained and obtaining interdisciplinary inputs and reviews on risk-significant decisions |
| Site: | San Onofre  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000361/2010002 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Lantz P Elkmann D Allen J Reynoso J Josey G Warnick B Rice W Schaup |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - San Onofre - IR 05000361/2010002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (San Onofre) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (San Onofre)
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