05000361/FIN-2010002-05
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Procedure Results in an Inadequate operability Determination |
| Description | The inspectors identified two examples of a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instruction, Procedures, and Drawing, for the failure of operations personnel to follow procedures to approve and document operability determinations using adequate or technically correct information. Specifically, on January 15, and January 22, 2010, operations personnel failed to follow procedure SO123-XV-52, Functionality Assessments and Operability Determinations, Revision 14, in that, the documented bases for operability for degraded conditions did not adequately support the basis for an operability position taken by the licensee. Following the inspectors identification of the issues, operations personnel performed new operability determinations to provide adequate bases for operability. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Nuclear Notifications NNs 200765208 and 200753880. The finding is greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, inadequate operability determinations would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to recognize that risk significant equipment is in a potentially inoperable condition and as such, may not be able to perform its specified safety function would not be recognized and accounted for by operators. The finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding: (1) is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; (3) did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and (4) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions addressed causes and extent of conditions as necessar |
| Site: | San Onofre  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000361/2010002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Lantz P Elkmann D Allen J Reynoso J Josey G Warnick B Rice W Schaup |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - San Onofre - IR 05000361/2010002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (San Onofre) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (San Onofre)
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