05000361/FIN-2009004-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Submit Complete Revisions to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for Penetration Seal Changes |
Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) for the failure of licensing personnel to submit revisions to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report reflecting changes to the Unit 2 safety equipment building emergency core cooling pump room piping penetration that were in place for more than 24 months. Specifically, for the reporting periods between (1) July 2005 and June 2007; and (2) July 2007 and June 2009, licensing personnel failed to submit complete revisions to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report reflecting the removal of the boot seal from the Unit 2 emergency core cooling system train B pump room penetration. This seal was removed in July 2005 and was left in this condition as discovered by the inspectors in August 2009. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Nuclear Notification NN 200550985. The failure of licensing personnel to submit revisions to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to describe changes to the Unit 2 safety equipment building emergency core cooling pump room piping penetration that were in place for more than 24 months was a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be applicable to traditional enforcement because the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function was potentially impacted by the licensees failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report in a timely manner. The finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with Section D.6 of Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding is more than minor because the degraded flood barrier is associated with the external events attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance and complexity P.1(d)(Section 1R01) |
Site: | San Onofre ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000361/2009004 Section 1R01 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
Inspectors (proximate) | M Haire N O'Keefe R Kellar A Allen G Warnick J Reynoso |
CCA | P.3, Resolution |
INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - San Onofre - IR 05000361/2009004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (San Onofre) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (San Onofre)
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