ML072910227

Palo Verde, Units 1, 2, and 3, Technical Specification Bases Revision 46 Update

ML072910227
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	10/11/2007
From:	Weber T N Arizona Public Service Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
102-05756-TNW/CJS
Download: ML072910227 (29)

Text

Technical Specification 5.5.14 AMN Thomas N. Weber Mail Station 7636 Palo Verde Nuclear Department Leader Tel. 623-393-5764 PO Box 52034 Generating Station Regulatory Affairs Fax 623-393-5442 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 102-05756-TNW/CJS October 11, 2007 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)Units 1. 2 and 3 Docket Nos. STN 50-528/529/530 Technical Specifications Bases Revision 46 Update Pursuant to PVNGS Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications Bases Control Program," Arizona Public Service Company (APS) is submitting changes to the TS Bases incorporated into Revision 46, implemented on September 26, 2007.The revision insertion instructions and replacement pages are provided in the Enclosure.

No commitments are being made to the NRC by this letter. Should you have any questions, please contact Glenn Michael at (623) 393-5750.Sincerely, TNW/GAM/CJS/gat A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway 0 Comanche Peak 0 Diablo Canyon 0 Palo Verde

• South Texas Project

• Wolf Creek U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Technical Specifications Bases Revision 46 Update Page 2 Enclosure

-PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 46 Insertion Instructions and Replacement Pages cc: E. E. Collins Jr.M. T. Markley G. G. Warnick NRC Region IV Regional Administrator (enclosure)

NRC NRR Project Manager (enclosure)

NRC SeniorResident Inspector for PVNGS (enclosure)

A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway 0 Comanche Peak

• Diablo Canyon e Palo Verde 9 South Texas Project 0 Wolf Creek ENCLOSURE PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 46 Insertion Instructions and Replacement Pages Insertion Instructions for the Technical Specifications Bases Revision 46 REMOVE PAGES Cover page List of Effective Pages 1/2 through 7/8 B 3.1.5-7 / B 3.1.5-8 through B 3.1.5-11 / Blank B 3.1.6-1 lB 3.1.6-2 B 3.1.6-5 / Blank B 3.3.3-9 / B 3.3.3-10 B 3.3.3-13 / B 3.3.3-14 B 3.3.6-21 / B 3.3.6-22 INSERT PAGES Cover page List of Effective Pages 1/2 through 7/8 B 3.1.5-7 / B 3.1.5-8 through B 3.1.5-11 / Blank B 3.1.6-1 / B 3.1.6-2 B 3.1.6-5 / B 3.1.6-6 B 3.3.3-9 / B 3.3.3-10 B 3.3.3-13 / B 3.3.3-14 B 3.3.6-21 / B 3.3.6-22 I PVNGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specification Bases TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No.Page No.Rev.No.Rev No.2. 1 .1-1 2 .1 .1-2 2 .1 .1-3 2 .1 .1-4 2 .1 .1-5 2.1.2-1 2.1.2-2 2.1.2-3 2 .1.2-4 2.1.2-5 3 .0-1 3 .0-2 3 .0-3 3.0-4 3 .0-5 3.0-6 3 .0-7 3.0-8 3 .0-9 3 .0-10 3.0-11 3 .0-12 3 .0-13 3.0-14 3 .0-15 3 .0-16 3 .0-17 3 .0-18 3 .0-19 3.0-20 3 .1. 1-1 3 .1 .1-2 3 .1 .1-3 3 .1 .1-4 3 .1 .1-5 3.1.1-6 3.1.2-1 3.1.2-2 3.1.2-3 3.1.2-4 3.1.2-5 3.1.2-6 3.1.2-7 3.1.2-8 3.1.2-9 3.1.3-1 3.1.3-2 3.1.3-3 3.1.3-4 3.1.3-5 3.1.3-6 3 .1 .4-1 3.1.4-2 3 .1 .4-3 0 0 37 21 23 0 31 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 28 0, 43 43 27 31 28 0 43 28 0 43 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 0 3 .1 .4-4 3 .1.4-5 3 .1. 5-1 3.1.5-2 3 .1 .5-3 3 .1. 5-4 3 .1. 5-5 3.1.5-6 3 .1 .5-7 3 .1. 5-8 3 .1. 5-9 3 .1. 5-10 3 .1.5-11 3 .1 .6-1 3 .1. 6-2 3 .1. 6-3 3 .1 .6-4 3 .1. 6-5 3 .1. 6-6 3.1.7-1 3.1.7-2 3 .1.7-3 3.1.7-4 3.1.7-5 3.1.7-6 3.1.7-7 3.1.7-8 3.1.7-9 3 .1. 8-1 3 .1. 8-2 3 .1. 8-3 3 .1. 8-4 3.1.8-5 3 .1 .9-1 3.1.9-2 3 .1. 9-3 3 .1. 9-4 3.1.9-5 3.1.9-6 3 .1.10-1 3 .1. 10-2 3 .1 .10-3 3 .1 .10-4 3 .1. 10-5 3 .1. 10-6 3 .1 .11-1 3 .1 .11-2 3 .1.11-3 3 .1 .11-4 3 .1 .11-5 3 .2 .1-1 3.2.1-2 3 .2 .1-3 3 .2 .1-4 0 0 0 28 28 28 28 28 46 46 46 46 46 0 46 42 42 46 46 0 0 28 34 25 0 0 0 0 28 28 28 28 28 0 0 0 0 28 1 0 28 0 37 37 0 0 28 0 34 0 28 10 28 0 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 1 Revision 46 September 26, 2007

'TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES 1LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No.Rev.No.Page No.Rev No.3.2.1-5 3.2.1-6 3.2.1-7 3.2.1-8 3.2.2-1 3.2.2-2 3.2.2-3 3.2.2-4 3.2. 2-5 3.2.2-6 3.2.2-7 3.2.3-1 3.2.3-2 3.2.3-3 3.2.3-4 3.2.3-5 3.2.3-6 3.2.3-7 3.2.3-8 3.2.3-9 3.2.3-10 3.2.4-1 3.2.4-2 3.2.4-3 3.2.4-4 3.2.4-5 3.2.4-6 3.2.4-7 3.2.4-8 3.2.4-9.3 .2 .4-10 3.2.5-1 3.2.5-2 3.2.5-3 3.2.5-4 3.2.5-5 3.2.5-6 3.2.5-7 3.3.1-1 3.3.1-2 3.3.1-3 3.3.1-4 3.3.1-5 3.3.1-6 3.3.1-7 3.3.1-8 3.3.1-9 3.3.1-10 3 .3 .1-11 3 .3 .1-12 3 .3 .1-13 3.3.1-14 3.3.1-15 3.3.1-16 0 0* 0* 0* 28* 10 0* 28 1 0 0 28 10 0* 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 28* 10 0~28 25 25 27 31 31 31 28 10* 0 28 0 28 0 35 25 25 25 25 27 25 25 34 35 35 35 35 35 35 25 B 3.3.1-17 B 3.3.1-18 B 3.3.1-19 B 3.3.1-20 B 3.3.1-21 B 3.3.1-22 B 3.3.1-23 B 3.3.1-24 B 3.3.1-25 B 3.3.1-26 B 3.3.1-27 B 3.3.1-28 B 3.3.1-29 B 3.3.1-30 B 3.3.1-31 B 3.3.1-32 B 3.3.1-33 B 3.3.1-34 B 3.3.1-35 B 3.3.1-36 B 3.3.1-37 B 3.3.1-38 B 3.3.1-39 B 3.3.1-40 B 3.3.'1-41 B 3.3.1-42 B 3.3.1-43 B. 3 .3. 1-44 B.3 .3 .1-45 B.3 .3 1-46 B. 3 .3 .1-47 B.3 .3.1-48 B.3.3.1-49 B.3 .3.1-50 B.3 .3 1-51 B. 3.3.1-52 B.3 .3 .1-53 B.3 .3 1-54 B.3 .3 1-55 B.3.3.1-56 B. 3 .3 .1-57 B 3.3.1-58 B 3.3.1-59 B 3.3.1-60 B 3.3.2-1 B 3.3.2-2 B 3.3.2-3 B 3.3.2-4 B 3.3.2-5 B 3.3.2-6 B 3.3.2-7 B 3.3.2-8 B 3.3.2-9 B 3.3.2-10 35 35 35 35 35* 35 35*, 35* 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 38 42 35 42 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 0 1 35 35 35 35 35 35 38 Corrected Corrected Corrected Corrected PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 2 Revision 46 September 26, 2007 TECHNICAL:SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page .Rev No. No.Page No.Rev.No.B 3.3.2-11 B 3.3.2-12 B 3.3.2-13 B 3.3.2-14 B 3.3.2-15 B 3.3.2-16 B 3.3.2-17 B 3.3.2-18 B 3.3.3-1 B 3.3.3-2 B 3.3.3-3 B 3.3.3-4 B 3.3.3-5 B 3.3.3-6 B 3.3.3-7 B 3.3.3-8 B 3.3.3-9 B 3.3.3-10 B 3.3.3-11 B.3 3.33-12 B. 3.3.3-13 B. 3.3.3-14 B.3 3.33-15 B. 3.3.3-16 B.3.3.3-17 B. 3.3.3-18 B.3 3.3-19 B. 3.3.3-20 B.3 3.33-21 B 3.3.4-1 B 3.3.4-2 B 3.3.4-3 B 3.3.4-4 B 3.3.4-5 B 3.3.4-6 B 3.3.4-7 B 3.3.4-8 B 3.3.4-9 B 3.3.4-10 B 3.3.4-11 B 3.3.4-12 B 3.3.4-13 B 3.3.4-14 B 3.3.4-15 B 3.3.5-1 B 3.3.5-2 B 3.3.5-3 B 3.3.5-4 B 3.3.5-5 B 3.3.5-6 B 3.3.5-7 B 3.3.5-8 B 3.3.5-9 B 3.3.5-10 42 42 35 35 35 35 35 35 25 27 25 25 25 25 27 27 27 46 25 25 25 46 27 25 25 25 27 27 27 0 0 0.0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 31 0 0 3.3.5-11 3.3.5-12 3.3.5-13 3.3.5-14 3.3.5-15 3.3.5-16 3.3.5-17 3.3.5-18 3.3.5-19 3.3.5-20 3.3 .5-21 3.3 .5-22 3.3 .5-23 3 .3 .5-24 3.3 .5-25 3.3.5-26 3 .3 .5-27 3.3.5-28 3 .3 .5-29 3.3.5-30 3.3.6-1 3.3.6-2 3.3.6-3 3.3.6-4 3.3.6-5 3.3.6-6 3.3.6-7 3.3 .6-8 3.3.6-9 3.3.6-10 3.3.6-11 3.3.6-12 3.3.6-13 3.3.6-14 3.3.6-15 3.3.6-16 3.3.6-17 3.3.6-18 3 .3 .6-19 3 .3 .6-20 3 .3 .6-21 3.3 .6-22 3.3.7-1 3.3.7-2 3.3.7-3 3.3.7-4 3.3.7-5 3.3.7-6 3.3.7-7 3.3.7-8 3 .3.7-9 3.3.8-1 3 3 .38-2 3.3.38-3 0 1 0 0 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35* 38 38 42 35 35 35* 35 35* 0 0 0 0 31 0 27 527 0 0 0 0*0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 1 46* 2 , 32*0*0 0 42 0*0 2 0 44 0 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 3.Revision 46 September 26, 2007 TECHNICAL-SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No.Rev.No.Page No.Rev No.3.3.8-4 3 .3 .8-5 3.3 .8-6 3 .3 .8-7 3 .3 .8-8 3 .3 .9-1 3.3.9-2 3 .3 .9-3 3 .3 .9-4 3.3.9-5 3 .3 .9-6 3 .3 .9-7 3 .3 .10-1 3 .3 .10-2 3 .3 .10-3 3 .3 .10-4 3 .3 .10-5 3 .3 .10-6 3 .3 .10-7 3 .3 .10-8 3.3 .10-9 3 .3 .10-10 3 .3 .10-11 3 .3 .10-12 3 .3 .10-13 3 .3 .10-14 3 .3 .10-15 3 .3 .10-16 3 .3 .10-17 3 .3 .10-18 3 .3 .10-19 3.3.10-20 3.3.10-21.3-.3 .10-2 2 3 .3 .11-1 3 .3 .11-2 3 .3 .11-3 3 .3 .11-4 3 .3 .11-5 3.3.11-6 3 .3 .11-7 3 .3 .12-1 3 .3 .12-2 3 .3 .12-3 3 .3 .12-4 3.3.12-5 3.3.12-6 3 .4 .1-1 3 .4.1-2 3 .4 .1-3 3 .4. 1-4 3 .4. 1-5 3.4.2-1 3.4.2-2 0 0 1 0 44 0 2 21 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 14 14 14 14 14 14 32 32 32 42 32 32 32 33 32 0 2 2 42 42 2 2 15 15 37 37 6 6 10 28 0 0 0 7 1 3.4.3-1 3.4.3-2 3.4.3-3 3.4.3-4 3.4.3-5 3.4.3-6 3.4.3-7 3.4.3-8 3 .4.4-1 3 .4 .4-2 3 .4.4-3 3 .4.4-4 3 .4. 5-1 3 .4 .5-2 3 .4. 5-3 3 .4. 5-4 3 .4 .5-5 3 .4 .6-1 3 .4 .6-2 3 .4. 6-3 3 .4. 6-4 3 .4. 6-5 3.4.7-1 3.4.7-2 3.4.7-3 3.4.7-4 3.4.7-5 3.4.7-6 3.4.7-7 3 .4. 8-1 3 .4 .8-2 3 .4. 8-3 3.4.9-1 3 .4 .9-2 3 .4 .9-3 3.4.9-4 3 .4 .9-5 3.4.9-6 3 .4.10-1 3 .4. 10-2 3 .4. 10-3 3 .4 .10-4 3 .4.11-1 3 .4.11-2 3 .4. 11-3 3 .4 .11-4 3.4.11-5 3 .4.11-6 3 .4.12-1 3.4.12-2 3 .4 .12-3 3.4.12-4 3.4.12-5 3.4.13-1 0* 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 38 7 0 0 38 38 0 6 0 6 38 6 6 0 6 42 38 0 0 27 0 6 6 41* 31 41 41* 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 7 0 42 42 0 1 34 0 0 31 0 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 4 Revision 46 September 26, 2007 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Rev. Page Rev No. No. No. No.B 3.4.13-2 0 B 3.5.1-10 35 B 3.4.13-3 1 B 3.5.2-1 0 B 3.4.13-4 0 B 3.5.2-2 35 B 3.4.13-5 0 B 3.5.2-3 0 B 3.4.13-6 0 B 3.5.2-4 0 B 3.4.13-7 2 B 3.5.2-5 0 B 3.4.13-8 42 B 3.5.2-6 0 B 3.4.13-9 42 .B 3.5.2-7 1 B 3.4.13-10 42 B 3.5.2-8 22 B 3.4.13-11 42 B 3.5.2-9 1 B 3.4.14-1 0 B 3.5.2-10 35 B 3.4.14-2 34 B 3.5.3-1 0 B 3.4.14-3 34 B 3.5.3-2 0 B 3.4.14-4 38 B 3.5.3-3 0 B 3.4.14-5 38 B 3.5.3-4 0 B 3.4.14-6 38 B 3.5.3-5 0 B 3.4.14-7 38 B 3.5.3-6 2 B.3.4.14-8 38 B 3.5.3-7 2 B 3.4.15-1 0 B 3.5.3-8 1 B 3.4.15-2 0 B 3.5.3-9 0 B 3.4.15-3 0 B 3.5.3-10 2 B 3.4.15-4 0 B 3.5.4-1 15 B 3.4.15-5 0 B 3.5.4-2 0 B 3.4.15-6 35 B 3.5.4-3 42 B 3.4.15-7 35 B 3.5.5-1 0 B 3.4.16-1 2 B 3.5.5-2 7 B 3.4.16-2 10 B 3.5.5-3 4 B 3.4.16-3 0 B 3.5.5-4 4 B 3.4.16-4 42 B 3.5.5-5 0 B 3.4.16-5 0 B 3.5.5-6 0 B 3.4.16-6 0 B 3.5.5-7 0 B 3.4.17-1 0 B 3.5.6-1 0 B 3.4.17-2 .27 B 3.5.6-2 1 B 3.4.17-3 42 B 3.5.6-3 0 B 3.4.17-4 42 B 3.5.6-4 24 B 3.4.17-5 0 B 3.5.6-5 27 B 3.4.17-6 0 B 3.6.1-1 0 B.3.4.18-1 38 B 3.6.1-2 35 B.3.4.18-2 40 B 3.6.1-3 0 B.3.4.18-3 38 B 3.6.1-4 29 B.3.4.18-4 38 B 3.6.1-5 29 B.3.4.18-5 38 B 3.6.2-1 45 B.3.4.18-6 38 B 3.6.2-2 35 B.3.4.18-7 38 B 3.6.2-3 0 B.3.4.18-8 38 B 3.6.2-4 0 B 3.5.1-1 0 B 3.6.2-5 0 B 3.5.1-2 35 B 3.6.2-6 0 B 3.5.1-3 7 B 3.6.2-7 0 B 3.5.1-4 0 B 3.6.2-8 0 B 3.5.1-5 0 B 3.6.3-1 36 B 3.5.1-6 0 B 3.6.3-2 43 B 3.5.1-7 1 B 3.6.3-3 43 B 3.5.1-8 1 B 3.6.3-4 43 B 3.5.1-9 0 B 3.6.3-5 43 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 5 Revision 46 September 26, 2007 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF'EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No.Page No.Rev No.Rev No.B 3.6.3-6 B 3.6.3-7 B 3.6.3-8 B 3.6.3-9 B 3.6.3-10 B 3.6.3-11 B 3.6.3-12 B 3.6.3-13 B 3.6.3-14 B 3.6.3-15 B 3.6.3-16 B 3.6.3-17 B. 3.6.3-18 B. 3.6.3-19 B 3.6.4-1 B 3.6.4-2 B 3.6.4-3 B 3.6.5-1 B 3.6.5-2 B 3.6.5-3 B 3.6.5-4 B 3.6.6-1 B 3.6.6-2 B 3.6.6-3 B 3.6.6-4 B 3.6.6-5 B 3.6.6-6 B 3.6.6-7 B 3.6.6-8 B 3.6.6-9 B 3.6.7-1 B 3.6.7-2 B 3.6.7-3 B 3.6.7-4 B 3.6.7-5 B 3.7.1-1 B 3.7.1-2 B 3.7.1-3 B 3.7.1-4 B 3.7.1-5 B 3.7.1-6 B 3.7.2-1 B 3.7.2-2 B 3.7.2-3 B 3.7.2-4 B 3.7.2-5 B 3.7.2-6 B 3.7.2-7 B 3.7.2-8 B 3.7.2-9 B 3.7.3-1 B 3.7.3-2 B 3.7.3-3 B 3.7.3-4 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 27 43 43 35 38 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 38 7 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 42 0 0 28 34 34 34 34 28 40 42 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 1 37 0 B 3.7.3-5 B 3.7.4-1 B 3.7.4-2 B 3.7.4-3 B 3.7.4-4 B 3.7.5-1 B 3.7.5-2 B 3.7.5-3 B 3.7.5-4 B 3.7.5-5 B 3.7.5-6 B 3.7.5-7 B 3.7.5-8 B 3.7.5-9 B 3.7.5-10 B.3.7 .5-11 B 3.7.6-1 B 3.7.6-2 B 3.7.6-3 B 3.7.6-4 B 3.7.7-1 B 3.7.7-2 B 3.7.7-3 B 3.7.7-4 B 3.7.7-5 B 3.7.8-1 B 3.7.8-2 B 3.7.8-3 B 3.7.8-4 B 3.7.9-1 B 3.7.9-2 B 3.7.9-3 B 3.7.10-1 B 3.7.10-2 B 3.7.10-3 B 3.7.10-4 B 3.7.11-1 B 3.7.11-2 B 3.7.11-3 B 3.7.11-4 B 3.7.11-5 B 3.7.11-6 B 3.7.12-1 B 3.7.12-2 B 3.7.12-3 B 3.7.12-4 B 3.7.13-1 B 3.7.13-2 B 3.7.13-3 B 3.7.13-4 B 3.7.13-5 B 3.7.14-1 B 3.7.14-2 B 3.7.14-3 0 0 31 42 0' 0 0 40 27 42 42 9 9 9 9 9 0 28 28 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 44 44 10 1 1 0 0 21 10 10 10 1 21 21 10 0 0 0 0 0* 0 21 21 Corrected PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 6,-Revision 46 September 26, 2007 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No.Page No.Rev.No.Rev No.3 .7 .15-1 3 .7 .15-2 3 .7 .16-1 3 .7 .16-2 3 .7 .16-3 3 .7 .16-4 3 .7 .17-1 3.7.17-2 3 .7 .17-3 3.7.17-4 3.7.17-5 3 .7 .17-6 3.8.1-1 3.8.1-2 3.8.1-3 3.8.1-4 3.8.1-5 3.8.1-6 3.8.1-7 3.8.1-8 3.8.1-9 3 .8 .1-10 3 .8 .1-11 3 .8.1-12 3 .8 .1-13 3 .8 .1-14 3 .8 .1-15 3 .8 .1-16 3 .8 .1-17 3 .8 .1-18 3 .8 .1-19 3.8.1-20 3.8.1-21 3 .8. 1-22 3 .8 .1-23 3. 8 .1-24 3.8.1-25 3.8.1-26.3.8.1-27 3. 8. 1-28" 3.8.1-29 3.8.1-30 3 .8 .1-31 3 .8.1-32 3 .8.1-33 3. 8.1-34 3.8.1-35 3.8.1-36 3 .8.1-37 3.8.1-38 3.8.1-39 3 .8.1-40 3 8.1-41 3.8.1-42 3 3 7 0 0 0 23 3 3 3 3 3 35 2 34 34 20 27 42 42 42 43 43 43 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 45 45 41 41 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 B 3.8.1-43 B 3.8.1-44 B 3.8.1-45 B.3.8.1-46 B.3.8.1-47 B.3 .8.1-48 B 3.8.2-1 B 3.8.2-2 B 3.8.2-3 B 3.8.2-4 B 3.8.2-5 B 3.8.2-6 B 3.8.3-1 B 3.8.3-2 B 3.8.3-3 B 3.8.3-4 B 3.8.3-5 B 3.8.3-6 B 3.8.3-7 B 3.8.3-8 B 3.8.3-9 B 3.8.3-10 B 3.8.4-1 B 3.8.4-2 B 3.8.4-3 B 3.8.4-4 B 3.8.4-5 B 3.8.4-6 B 3.8.4-7 B 3.8.4-8 B 3.8.4-9 B 3.8.4-10 B 3.8.4-11 B 3.8.5-1 B 3.8.5-2 B 3.8.5-3 B 3.8.5-4 B 3.8.5-5 B 3.8.5-6 B 3.8.6-1 B3 .8.6-2 B 3.8.6-3 B 3.8.6-4 B 3.8.6-5 B 3.8.6-6 B 3.8.6-7 B 3.8.7-1 B 3.8.7-2 B 3.8.7-3 B 3.8.7-4 B 3.8.8-1 B 3.8.8-2 B 3.8.8-3 B 3.8.8-4 45 45 45 45 45 45 0 0 0 21 21 0 0 0 38 0 34 41 41 41 41 41 0 37 0 2 2 2 35 35 35 37 37 1 1 21 21 2 2 0 0 0 6 37 37 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 21 21 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3ý7 Revision 46 September 26, 2007 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No.Rev.No.Page No.Rev No.3.8.8-5 3.8.9-1 3. 8 .9-'2 3.8.9-3 3.8.9-4 3.8.9-5 3.8 ..S9-6 3.8.9-7 3.8.9-8 3.8.9-9.3.8.9-10 3. 8.9-11 3 .8 .10-1 3-8. 10-2 3.8.10-3 3.8.10-4 3.9.1-1 3.9.1-2 3.9.1-3 3.9.1-4 3.9.2-1 3.9.2-2 3.9.2-3 3.9.2-4 3.9.3-1 3.9.3-2 3.9.3-3 3.9.3-4, 3.9.3-5 3.9.3-6 3.9.4-1 3.9.4-2 3.9.4-3 3.9.4-4 3.9.95-1 3.9;5-2 3.9.5-3 3 .9.5 1 4 , 3 .9'.5 7ý5 3.9. 6-l" 3.9.6-2 3.9.6--3 3.9.7-1 3.9.7-2 3.9.7-31 1 34 0 0~0~0 0 0 0.*0 0 0 34 0 0 0 15 15 15 18 19 27 19 19'19 0 I 0 0 0 16*..27 16 16 0 01 0 0., 0 0 Corrected PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 8 Revision 46 September 26, 2007 CEA Alignment B 3.1.5 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

In both cases, a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> time period is sufficient to...a. Identify cause of a misaligned CEA;b. Take appropriate corrective action to realign the CEAs: and c. Minimize the effects of xenon redistribution.

The CEA must be returned to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.If a CEA misalignment results in the COLSS programs being declared INOPERABLE, refer to Section 3.2 Power Distribution Limits for applicable actions.B.1 and B.2 At least two of the following three CEA position indicator channels shall be OPERABLE for each CEA: a. CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter (RSPT 1)with the capability of determining the absolute CEA positions within 5.2 inches, b. CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter (RSPT 2)with the capability of determining the absolute CEA positions within 5.2 inches, and c. The CEA pulse counting position indicator channel.If only one CEA position indicator channel is OPERABLE, continued operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, at least two position-indicator channels are returned to OPERABLE status; or within6 hours and once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, verify that the CEA group with the inoperable position indicators are either fully withdrawn or fully inserted while maintaining the insertion limits of LCO 3.1.6, LCO3.1.7 and LCO 3.1.8. CEAs are fully withdrawn when the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 and 3.1.7 are met,.Additionally, the Upper Electrical Limit (UEL) CEA reed switches provide an acceptable indication of CEA position for a fully withdrawn condition.(conti nued)PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.1.5-7 REVISION 46 CEA Alignment B 3.1.5 BASES ACTIONS C.1 If a Required Action:.or..associated Completion Time of.Condition A'or Condition B is not-met' ior if one or more regulating or: shutdowniCEAs;,are untrippable (immovable as a result of excessive::friCtionor:mechanical interference or known to be untrippable), the unit is required to be brought to MODE 3. By being brought to MODE 3, the unit is brought outside its MODE of applicability.

When a Required Action cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, a controlled shutdown should be commenced.

The allowed-Completion Time'of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching*,MODE-3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant-systems.

if atfuil strength CEA is untrippable,, it is not available for reactivity insertion during a reactor trip. With an untrippable CEA, meeting the insertion limits of LCO 3.1.6,"Shutdown Control Element Assembly (CEA) Insertion Limits," and LCO 3.1.7, "Regulating Control Element Assembly (CEA)Insertion Limits," does not ensure that adequate SDM exists.Therefore, the plant.must be shut down"in order to evaluate the SDM required boron-concentration and power level for critical operation.

Continued operati~on is allowed with untrippable part length or part strength CEAs if the alignment and insertion limits are met.., Continued operation is not allowed with one or more full length CEAs untrippable.

This is because these cases are indicative of a loss of SDM and power ditstribution, and a loss of safety function, respectively., DL.1 ., ...Continued operation is not allowed in the case of more than one CEA misaligned from any other CEA.in its group by> 9.9 inches. For example, two CEAs i'n a group misaligned from any other CEAin that group by >19.9. inches, or more than one CEA group,:that has a .least oreCEA misaligned from any other CEA in that group'by.>.9.9 ilnches. This is indicative of a loss of powerdistribdtion and a loss of safety function; respectively.

Multi5le CEA misalignments should'result in automatic protective action. Therefore, with two or more CEAs misaligned moreithan 9.9 inches, this (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.1.5-8 REVISION 46

-1 CEA Alignment B 3.1.5 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued) could result in.a. situationr outside :,the design basis and immediate action would~be, -required to pnevent any potential.fuel damage.. !Immediately.

open~ijng,.thereactor trip breakers minimizes these-effects:,..

'SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.5.1 Verification that individual CEA positions are within 6.6 inches. (indicated reed switch.positions) of all other CEAs in the group at a.12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency allows the operator to detect a CEA that is beginning to deviate from its expected position., The, specified Frequency takes into account other CEA position information that is continuously available to the operator in the control room, so that during',actual CEA motion, deviations can immediately be detected.SR 3.1.5.2* .OPERABILITY of.at least two CEA position-indicator channels is required to determineCEA positions, and thereby ensure.compliance with:the.CEA alignment and insertion limits. The CEA. full *in and full out limits provide an additional independent means for determining the CEA positions when the CEAs are at either their fully inserted or fully withdrawn positions..

.SR 3.1.5.3 Verifying each full strength CEA is trippable would require that each-CEA be tripped. In MODES 1 and 2 tripping each full.strength CEA would result in radial or axial power tilts, or, oscillations.

Therefore individual full strength CEAs are exercised every 92 days,.to provide increased confidence that all full strength CEAs continue to be trippab~le, even if.they are not regularly tripped. A movement .of 5 inches is adequate to' demonstrate motion without exceeding the alignment limit-:when only one full strength, CEA i.s being moved. The 92 day Frequency takes into consideration other information available to the operator, in 'the control .room and other surveillances being performed more frequently,, which add to .the determination of OPERABILITY of the CEAs (Ref. 3),. Between required (conti nued)PALO.VERDE'UNITS 1,2,3 B 3. 1.5-9..REVISION 46 CEA Alignment B 3.1.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.5.3 (continued),.

REQUIREMENTS.performancesofSR 3.1.5..3, jf a CEA(s) is discovered to be immovable but remains trippable,,and.aligned, the CEA is cons~idered.to be OPERABLE..

At anytime., if a CEA(s) is immo'vable, a'determination of the trippability (OPERABILITY) of thlat CEA(s).'must be.made,"and appropriate action taken.Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST"of each reed switch position transmitter channel ensures the channel is OPERABLE-and.capable of indicating CEA.position.

Since this test must be performed when the reactor is shut down, an 18 month Frequency totbe coincident With refueling outage was selected.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at a Frequency of once every 18 months. Furthermore, the Frequency takes into account other factors, which determine the OPERABILITY of the CEA Reed Switch Indication System.These factors include: a. Other, more frequently performed surveillances that help to verify OPERABIL TY;., b. On-line diagnostics performed automatically by the CPCs, CEACs, and the Plant Computer which include CEA position comparisons and sensor validation:

and c. The CHANNEL CALIBRATIONs for the CPCs (SR 3.3.1.9) and CEACs (SR 3.3.3.4) input channels that are performed at 18 month intervals and is an overlapping test.SR 3.1.5.5 Verification of full strength CEA drop times determines that the maximum CEA drop time permitted is consistent with the assumed drop time used in the safety analysis (Ref. 3).Measuring drop times prior to reactor criticality, after reactor vessel head removal, ensures the reactor internals and CEDM will not interfere with CEA motion or drop time, and that no degradation in these systems has occurred that would adversely affect CEA motion or drop time. Individual CEAs whose drop times are greater than safety analysis assumptions are not OPERABLE.

This SR is performed prior to criticality due to the plant conditions needed to perform the SR and the potential for an unplanned plant transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.The 4 second CEA drop time is the maximum time it takes for a fully withdrawn individual full strength CEA to reach its 90% insertion position when electrical power is interrupted to the CEA drive mechanism with RCS T Id greater than or equal to 550°F and all reactor coolant pumps operating.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.1.5-10 REVISION 46 CEA Alignment B 3.1.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.5'.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS iThe CEA,drop ti me. of fu'll strengthiCEAs shall also be demonstrated through. measuremerit prior, to reactor criticalityfor specificiCallly affected, individual CEAs fo~llo~wing an5 maintenance on or modification to the CEA drive system which'could affect'the drop time of those specific CEAs.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50,, Ap 2. 10 CFR 50.46.pendix A, GDC 10 and GDC 26.3.4.5.UFSAR, UFSAR, UF.SAR, Secti on Section Section 15.4.7.7.1.3.2.3.

7.5.1.1.4.

PALO VERDE UNITS-1,2,3 B 3.1.5-11-REVISION 46 This page intentionally blank Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits B 3.1.6 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B 3.1.6 Shutdown Control Element Assembly (CEA) Insertion Limits BASES BACKGROUND The insertion limits of the shutdown CEAs are initial assumptions in all safety analyses that assume CEA insertion upon reactor trip. The insertion limits directly affect core power distributions and assumptions of available SDM, ejected CEA worth, and initial reactivity insertion rate.The applicable criteria for these reactivity and power distribution design requirements are 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10, "Reactor Design," and GDC 26, "Reactivity Limits" (Ref. 1), and 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors" (Ref. 2). Limits on shutdown CEA insertion have been established, and all CEA positions are monitored and controlled during power operation to ensure that the reactivity limits, ejected CEA worth, and SDM limits are preserved.

The shutdown CEAs are arranged into groups that are radially symmetric.

Therefore, movement of the shutdown CEAs does not introduce radial asymmetries in the core power distribution.

The shutdown and regulating CEAs provide the required reactivity worth for immediate reactor shutdown upon a reactor trip.The design calculations are performed with the assumption that the shutdown CEAs are withdrawn prior to the regulating CEAS. The shutdown CEAs must be capable of full withdrawal without the core going critical.

This provides available negative reactivity for SDM in the event of boration errors.The shutdown CEAs are controlled manually by the control room operator.

During.normal unit operation, the shutdown CEAs are fully withdrawn.

The shutdown CEAs must be completely withdrawn from the core prior to withdrawing regulating CEAs during an approach to criticality.

The shutdown CEAs are then left in this position until the reactor is shut down. They affect core power, burnup distribution, and add negative reactivity to shut down the reactor upon receipt of a reactor trip signal.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.1.6-1 REVISION 0 Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits B 3.1.6 BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE Accident analysis assumes that the shutdown CEAs are fully SAFETY ANALYSES withdrawn any time the reactor is critical.

This ensures that: .a. The minimum SDM is maintained:

and'b. The potential effects of a CEAýejection accident are limited to acceptable-limits.

With the Shutdown CEAs at a fully withdrawn position (as defined in SR 3.1.6.1 Bases section), the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 are met and the assumptions made in the safety analyses are maintained.

On a reactor trip, all CEAs (shutdown CEAs and regulating CEAs), except the most reactive CEA, are assumed to insert into the core. The shutdown and regulating CEAs shall be at or ,above their insertion:limits and available to insert the maximum amount of negative reactivity on a reactor trip signal.' The regulating CEAs may be partially inserted in the Core as'allowed by LCO 3.1*7, "Regulating Control Element Assembly (CEA) Insertion Limits:" The shutdown CEA insertion limit is established to ensure that a sufficient amount of negative reactivity is available to shut down the reactor and maintain the required SDM (see LCO 3.1.2,"SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM):- Reactor Trip Breakers Closed")following a reactor. trip from full power. The combination of regulating CEAs and shutdown CEAs (less the most reactive CEA, which is assumed to be fullywithdrawn) is sufficient to take the reactor from full powericonditions at rated temperature to'zero power, and to maintain the required SDM at. rated no load .temperature (Ref. 3). The shutdown CEA insertion limit also limitsthe reactivity worth of an ejected shutdown CEA.The acceptance criteria'for addressing shutdown CEA as well as regulating CEA insertion limits and inoperability or misalignment are that: *a There be no violation of: 1. specified acceptable fuel limits, or 2. Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary damage integrity; and (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.1.6-2 REVISION 46 Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits B 3.1.6 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.:1.6..1 (continued.):

REQUIREMENTS

-Shutdown CEAs are considered fully withdrawn when each shutdown CEA is positioned, to meet one of the following conditions:

k Condition 1:* Pulse-Counter

> 147.75 inches.and At least, one Reed Switch. Position -Transmitter (RSPT) 145.25 inches.OR Condition 2;*Upper Electrical Limit (UEL) position.Condition 1 necessitates that the Pulse Counter and at least one of the two Reed Switch Position Transmitters (RSPTs) be available to verify the position of each shutdown CEA. The Pulse Counter is.a very accurate position indication system but is not as reliable,(i.e., slip, rod) as the other position indicating systems. The RSPTs are very reliable but are not as accurate as the PulseCounter indicating system. Therefore; requiring these two systems together will accountfor ins~trument inaccuracies and reliability issues associated with these position indicators (instrument inaccuracies and the acceptability of these indicator limits are detailed in Reference 4)..Additionally,,a CEA at its.UEL (Upper Electrical Limit)position alone provides-an acceptable indication (accounting for inaccuracies) of CEA position to satisfy the condition for a CEA to be considered fully, withdrawn.

A CEA at its UEL position will be' : 147-.75 inches withdrawn Since the shutdown CEAs are positioned manually by the control room operator, verification of shutdown CEA position at a Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is adequate to ensure that the shutdown CEAs are within their insertion limits. Also, the Frequency takes'into account other information available to the operator in the control room for the purpose of monitoring the status of the shutdown CEAs.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3..1.6-5 REVISION 46 Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits B 3.1.6 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10 and GDC 26.2. 10CFR 50.46., 3,. -UFSAR, Section, 15.4.4. Calculation 113-JC-SF-0202:., PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.1.6-6.:REVISION

46.

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and Al.2 (continued)(Before CPC Upgrade) Verification every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.'that -each CEA is within (continued)

6.6 inches

of the other CEAs in its group provides a check on the position of all CEAs and provides verification of the proper operation of the remaining CEAC. An OPERABLE CEAC will not generatepenal.ty factors-until deviations of> 9.0 inches within a subgroup are encountered.

The Completion Time of once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is adequate based on operating experience, considering the low probability of an undetected CEA deviation coincident with an undetected failure in the remaining CEAC within this limited time frame.As long as Required Action A.1 is accomplished as specified, the inoperable CEAC can be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is adequate for most repairs, while minimizing risk, considering that dropped CEAs are detectable by the redundant CEAC, and other LCOs specify Required Actions necessary to maintain DNBR and LPD margin.B.I, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5 and B.6 Condition B applies if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Required Action A are not met, or if both CEACs are inoperable.

Actions associated with this Condition involve disabling the Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System (CEDMCS), while providing increased assurance that CEA deviations are not occurring and informing all OPERABLE CPC channels, via a software flag, that both CEACs are failed. This will ensure that the large penalty factor associated with two CEAC failures will be applied to CPC calculations.

The penalty factor for two failed CEACs is sufficiently large that power must be maintained significantly

< 100% RTP if CPC generated reactor trips are to be avoided. The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is adequate to accomplish these actions while minimizing risks.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 31.3.3-9 REVISION-.27 CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS (Before CPC Upgrade).(continued)

B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4,:.B.,5.and.B.6 (continued).The Required :Actions :are %ast follows'.:, B.1 Meeting the.DNBR margin reqijirements,.of.,L.CO 3.2.4, "DNBR" ensures that power level is within' adconservative region of operation ,based on actual..cor B.2 This Action requires that the CEAs are maintained fully withdrawn (all CEAs meet the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 and 3.1.7), except as required for specified testing or flux control via, group #5. This verification ensures that undesired perturbations in loc'al fuel burnup are prevented.

The Upper Electrical Limit (UEL) CEAreed switches provide an acceptable indication of CEA position.'

B.3*The "RSPT/CEAC Inoperable" addressable constant in each of the OPERABLE CPCs is set to indicate that both CEACs are inoperable.

This provides a conservative penalty factor to ,ensure that a conservative'effective margin is maintained by the: CPCs in the computation of DNBR and LPD trips.B.4 The CEDMCS is placed and maintained i.n "STANDBY MODE," except during CEA motion.permitted by Required Action B.2, to prevent inadvertent mo-tion and .possible misalignment of the.CEAs.

.B .5 I ..A comprehensive set of conmparison-checks on individual CEAs within groups must be made within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Verification that each CEA is within 6.'6 inches of other CEAs in its group provides a check that-no CEA-has deviated from its proper position within the group.B.6 The Reactor Power Cutback (RPCB) System must be disabled.This ensures that CEA position will not be affected by RPCB operation.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.3-10 REVISION 46 CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS (After CPC Upgrade)(continued)

A.2.1,and A:2:2. (continued)

The CEACs andCPPs-providing, CEA-position input to the .CEACs include complex diagnostic'software making it unlikely that a CEAC will fail without informing the CPC of its failed status. With one failed CEAC in one or more channels, the CPC inthe affectedchahnels..will

'reCeive'CEA.deviation penalty, factdrs'from the'remaining OPERABLE channel CEAC.If'the'secondCEAC"should faill(Condition B), the CPC will use large preassigned penalty factors. The specific Required Actions are as follows: With one CEAC inoperable in one or more channels, the second CEAC still provides a comprehensive set of comparison checks on individual CEAs within subgroups, as well as outputs to the affected CPCK, CEA dev'iation alarms, and position indication for display. Verification every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> that each CEA is within 6.6 inches of. the other CEAs in its group provides a check on the position of all CEAs and provides verification of the proper operation of the remaining CEAC.An OPERABLE CEAC will not generate penalty factors until deviations of > 9.0 inches within a subgroup are encountered..

The Completion Time of once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is adequate based on operating experience, considering the low probability of an undetected CEA deviation coincident with an undetected failure in the remaining CEAC within this limited time frame.As long, as *Required Action A.2.1 is accomplished as specified, the.inoper'able CEAC can be, restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days., The Completion Time of 7 days is adequate for most-repairs, while minimizing risk, considering that dropped CEAs are detectable by the redundant CEAC, and other LCOs specify Required Actions necessary to maintain DNBR and LPD margin.B.1,"B.'2.1, B.2.2, B.2.3, B'.2.4' B.2.5, and B.2.6 Condition B applies if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, or if both CEACs are inoperable in one or more CPC channels.

Actions associated with this Condition involve two choices:* Action B.1 immediately'renders the' affected CPC channels inoperable, thus requi'ring entry into the Required Actions associated with LCO 3.3.1.(continued)

PALO-VERDE' UNITS 1,2,3 B '3. 3. 3-13 REVISION 25 CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS (After..CPC Upgrade)'

.(conti-nued)

• Action B.2.1 through B'.2.6 disable the Control Element Dr'ive .Mechanism Control -System v(CEDMCS), while providing i.icreased assuranceý.that CEA deviations are* not occurring..nd; iniforming aIl'.'OPERABLE CPC channels, via a software flag;-that.bothCEACs are failed. This"will ensurethat the large penalaft.'factor associated with two' CEAC falilures ,wiTl be .-applied to the CPC'calcul ations:..

Th#'penaltty' fadtor.for two failed CEACs is sufficiently, la'rge that,'power must be maintained significantly

< 100% RTP if'CPC generated reactor trips are to be avoided. The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is adequate to accomplish these actions while minimizing risks.The Required Actions are as followsl'B.1 Required Action B.1 provides for immediate declaration of affected CPC channel inoperability, and entry into Required Actions associated with. LCO3.3.1 for the DNBR-Low and LPD-High trip functions..Th'is Required Action treats failureof both CEACs in one or more channels in a manner consistent with other RPS failures in one or more channels.

Similarly, this Required Action permits immediate declaration, of channel inoperability and entry in the Required Actions of LCO 3.3.1'if the Required Actions and associated Comp~letion Time's of Condition A are not met. Required Action B.l,might be the preferred action if only, one. CPC channel is affected.

If the failure affects more than two CPCdCha'nels, required Actions B.2.1 *through B2.6 would be preferable.

B.2.1 Meeting. the DNBR 'margin requirements.'of LCO 3.2.4, "DNBR" ensures that power level is within a conservative region of operation based. on actual core condi tions.B.2.2 This Action requires that'the CEAs are maintained fully withdrawn (all CEAs meet the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 and 3.1.7), except as required for specified testing or flux control via group #51 This yerification ensures that undesired perturbations in local fuel burnup (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.3-14 REVISION 46 ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE Trip Path (Initiation Logic) Tests (continued)

Dunilng -the Matrix. Logic :apnd .Ini ti-ation Logic test, power is appl.ied tothe,M atr~i~x-ýri.]ay.test coils. The test coils..prevent an:actuatiorn., dur~iong,:testing by preventing the Matrix-rel.,ay contacts in the Initiation Logic from changing state ..dulring the. test. ; -This does not affect the Oper.abi li ty .of the Initi ,at'ion Logic since only one of the six logic combinations that are. available to trip the Initi.ationLogit,'are affected~dunring the test because only one. Matrix Logic.combinati~on can be.tested at any time.The remaining five matrix .cOmbinations available ensure that a trip in any three'channels will de-energize all four Initiation paths.Manual Trip Tests, This test verifies capable of opening designed..

that the manual trip handswitches are contacts in the Actuation Logic as i-4 The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis presented in topical report.CEN-327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation"(Ref.

2).SR 3.3.6.2 Individual ESFAS subgroup relays must also be tested, one at a time, to verify the individual ESFAS components will actuate'when requi'red.

Proper operation of the individual subgroup relays-is verified by de-energizing these relays one-at a time using an ARC mounted test circuit. Proper operation of each componentiactuated by the individual relays is thus verified"Without.

the need to actuate the entire ESFAS function.The 9 months Staggered Test Frequency is based on operating experience and ensures individual relay problems can be detected within this time frame. Considering the large* number of similar relays'in the ARC, and the similarity in their-use, a large test sample can be assembled to verify the validity of this Frequency.

The actual justification is based on CEN-403, "ESFAS Subgroup Relay Test Interval Extension (Ref.' 3).If two ormore ESFAS subgroup relays,fail per Unit in a 12-month period, an evaluation should be performed to determine the adequacy of the surveillance interval.

The evaluation should consider the design, maintenance, and (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.6-21 REVISION 1 ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS testing of all ESFAS subgroup relays. If it is determined that the surveillance interval is inadequate for detecting a single relay failure, the surveillance interval should be decreased.

The revised surveillance interval should be such that an ESFAS subgroup relay failure can be detected prior to the occurrence of a second failure.Some components cannot be tested at power since their actuation might lead to a plant transient, equipment damage, unjustifiable exposure or an unnecessary burden on plant personnel relative to the safety significance of the surveillance.

Reference 1 lists similar criteria, from reference 4, for those relays and actuated equipment exempted from testing at power. Relays not tested at power must be tested in accordance with the Note to this SR.The above guidance for reevaluating ESFAS subgroup relay surveillance test intervals is based on the Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,"Review of CE Owners Group Topical Report CEN-403, Rev. 1,'ESFAS Subgroup Relay Test Interval Extension'" (Ref. 4).CEN-403, Rev. 1 was later replaced with Rev. 1-A which contains the NRC safety evaluation.

It should be noted that this report (CEN-403) identifies that Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 replaced the pre-1990 ESFAS subgroup relays with a newer prototype model. CEN-403 states that the failure rates for the new model relays will be comparable to the rates for the new style relays pioneered and installed at Palo Verde in late 1989 to resolve the'failure mode of the older style relays. Therefore, the ESFAS subgroup relays identified as being replaced at the end of 1989 are acceptable.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 7.3.2. CEN-327, May 1986, including Supplement 1, March 1989, and Calculation 13-JC-SB-200.

3. CEN-403, "ESFAS Subgroup Relay Test Interval Extension, Revision 1".4. Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Review of CE. Owners Group Topical Report CEN-403, Rev. 1, "ESFAS Subgroup Relay Test Interval Extension", February.27, 1996.PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.6-22 REVISION 46