Text

Ginna - Final Operating Exam (Sections a, B, and C) (Folder 3)
	ML12332A110
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	10/01/2012
From:	Geckle M; Constellation Energy Nuclear Group
To:	Presby P A; Operations Branch I
	Jackson D E
Shared Package
ML12137A368	List: IR 05000244/2012301; ML12143A262; ML12272A026; ML12291A019; ML12332A097; ML12332A107; ML12332A110; ML12339A253; ML12339A257; ML12356A332; ML12356A346; ML12356A352; ML12356A369; ML12356A376;
References
	TAC U01857
	Download: ML12332A110 (433)
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{{#Wiki_filter:--Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 344-001-03-01 Perform Calculations To Determine The Plant Status (e. g., Fluid Flow And Heat Balance, Quadrant Power Tilts, Shutdown Margin, Etc.) Task Title: Perform OPG-REACTIVITY -CALC JPM 2012 ILT NRC JPM RA-1 KIA

Reference:

2.1.37 Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% RTP, steady state, equilibrium xenon.

Current "BURNUP" is 13764 MWD/MTU
Current RCS Boron Concentration is 517 ppm
Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg) is 16,100 ppm
Current BAST temperature is 165°F
Current RWST Boron Concentration is 2910 ppm
Current RWST temperature is 65°F
Control Rods in Auto at 215 steps on Control Bank D Task Standard: Perform the weekly reactivity calculation for a 50% power change (assuming Rods are operable) from 100% power at 1 % per minute. Required Materials: Computer with PCNDR and PPCS
OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001
Calculator
Pencil General

References:

OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 Handouts: OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Initiating Cue:

Using the data from the Initial Conditions, perform the weekly reactivity calculation for a 50% power change (assuming Rods are operable) from 100% power at 1% per minute. Validation Time: 30 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have a clean copy of OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 ready to provide to the Examinee.

20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 3 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ...J) Start Time: ____ Procedure Note: Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 2 Standard: EXAMINER Note: Comment: Step 3.1 Plant should be approximately 100% RTP, steady state, equilibrium Xenon to perform this guideline. Determine burnup from PPCS point ID "8URNUP". Examinee enters 13764 MWD/MTU, based on Initial Conditions. Provide the Examinee with a clean copy of REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 Step 3.2 Use the following burnup values to determine appropriate curve for time in Core life: 80L-6139 MWD/MTU ---* Use 80L curves 6140 -12279 MWD/MTU ---* Use MOL curves 12280 -EOL MWD/MTU ---* Use EOL curves None This step impacts the performance of the procedure if the operator will be using the Cycle Book to perform the calculation (different sets of curves). In this case the operator will be using PCNDR, so the result of this determination has no impact on the calculation. 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 3 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 4 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 4 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 3.2.1 Use PCNDR (or Cycle Book) and appropriate time in core life to determine values for Differential Boron Worth, Power Defect, and Integral Rod Worth. Uses PCNDR and appropriate time in core life to determine values for Differential Boron Worth, Power Defect, and Integral Rod Worth. The Cycle 36 PCNDR program is initialized by: Clicking on PCNDR Cycle 36 Beta icon on desktop In response to "Security Warning -Macros Have Been Disabled" message, click on "Options" When Security Alert Menu popup appears, click on the 2 nd bullet "Enable This Content" and "OK" to start program The examinee must determine the correct values at this point; however, the values aren't documented until Attachment 3 is filled out. Step 3.2.2 Use Xenon Predict report from PPCS, if available, to determine values for initial and final Xenon and Samarium. Uses Xenon Predict report from PPCS, to determine values for initial and final Xenon and Samarium. The examinee must determine the correct values at this point; however, the values aren't documented until Attachment 3 is filled out. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 5 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 3.3 --J Performance Step: 5 Record the following: Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 6 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 7 Standard: Comment: 20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-1

Current RCS Boron Concentration
Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg)
Current RWST Boron Concentration
Current Core Burnup
Differential Boron Worth
Records values from Initial Conditions, and step 3.2.1: o Current RCS Boron Concentration;:;

517 ppm o Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg);:; 16,100 ppm o Current RWST Boron Concentration;:; 2910 ppm o Current Core Burnup;:; 13,764 o Steps 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 Perform Attachment 1, 2, and 4

Recognizes these are not required for this task.
N/A's these three steps Step 3.6 Perform Attachment 3, 50% PWR CHANGE AT 1 % PER MINUTE
Goes to Attachment 3 (Page 6) NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Procedure Note: Procedure Note: Performance Step: 8 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 9 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 6 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Delta Power Defect (El: Values obtained for items B, C, 0, F, G, G1, G2 and I are always negative. Delta Xe and Sm is calculated from the time power decrease starts until completed. 100% Total Power Defect 50% Total Power Defect ____PCM (D) -_-___PCM (C) = See Exam Key for acceptable answers. Delta Rod Reactivity (Fl: (Use 170 steps on Bk D for Final Rod Position) Initial Integral Rod worth on Bk 0 Final Integral Rod worth on Bk D ____PCM (F1) -___PCM (F2) = See Exam Key for acceptable answers. 20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 10 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 11 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 7 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Delta Xe and Sm (G): Initial Xe and Sm Xe and Sm 50 minutes into power change ____ PCM (G2) -_-___ PCM (G1) = See Exam Key for acceptable answers. Total Reactivity (H): Delta Power Defect + Delta Rod Reactivity + Delta Xe and 8m = Total Reactivity Change ___ (E) + _-___ (F) + _-___ (G) = See Exam Key for acceptable answers. 20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 12 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 13 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 14 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 8 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION RCS Boron Offset Value (I): __----'-P.=C=..:..:.M (H)/_-__PCM/PPM (B) = -PPM (I) See Exam Key for acceptable answers. Required RCS Boron Concentration Current RCS Boron Conc (A) -PPM change (I) =Required Boron Conc ___---'-P..:...P=..:..:.M (A) -_-___ (I) = _+___ PPM See Exam Key for acceptable answers. Gallons of Boric Acid needed: (Use PPCS or VBD Book to calculate the number of gallons required from BASTs and the RWST). See Exam Key for acceptable answers. 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Performance Step: 15 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Terminating Cue: Stop time: ___, Page 9 of 11 VERIFICATION OF Initial Boration Rate for Rapid shutdown 1 %/min gals BAST (K)_/ 50 minutes = _ GPM BA flow 3%/min gals BAST (K)_/16.67 minutes = _ GPM BA flow 5%/min gals BAST (K)_/1 0 minutes = _ GPM BA flow Divides the gallons of boric acid required from the BASTs by the time required to result in the desired shutdown rate to determine the boric acid flow rate required for that particular load reduction rate.(6.2 gpm, 18.7 gpm, 31.2 gpm) See Exam Key for acceptable answers. When Examinee returns the JPM to the Examiner, or at the Examiner's discretion: Evaluation on this JPM is complete. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 10 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC N-RA-1 Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 INITIAL INITIATING JPM CUE The plant is at 100% RTP, steady state, equilibrium xenon. Current "BURNUP" is 13,764 MWD/MTU Current RCS Boron Concentration is 517 ppm Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg) is 16,100 ppm Current BAST temperature is 165°F Current RWST Boron Concentration is 2910 ppm Current RWST temperature is 65°F Control Rods in Auto at 215 steps on Control Bank D Using the data from the Initial Conditions, perform the weekly reactivity calculation for a 50% power change (assuming Rods are operable) from 100% power at 1% per minute. 20121LT NRC "IPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 ---Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Facility: Task No.: 344-001-04-02 Perform Calculations To Determine The Plant Status (e. g., Fluid Flow And Heat Balance, Quadrant Power Tilts, Shutdown Margin, Etc.) Task Determine Maximum Allowable RV JPM No.: 2012 IL T NRC JPM Head Venting Time RA-2 KIA 2.1.25 (3.9/4.2) Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions:

The crew is performing FR-1.3, Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel
CN MT Hydrogen concentration is stable at 1.1 %
RCS pressure is stable at 650 psig
Containment temperature is stable at 180°F Task Standard:
Correctly calculate the maximum allowable venting time. Required Materials:
Calculator
Clear ruler General

References:

FR-I.3. Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel, Revision02400
ATT-20.0, Attachment Vent Time. Revision 4
FIG-12.0.

Figure CNMT Hydrogen. Revision 0 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021. Revision 9. Supplement 1 Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Handouts:

FR-1.3, Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel, Revision02400
ATT-20.0, Attachment Vent Time, Revision 4
FIG-12.0, Figure CNMT Hydrogen, Revision 0 Initiating Cue:
The Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform FR-1.3, Step 21 -Determine Maximum Allowable Venting Time. Validation Time: 10 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have a clean copy of the following available to provide to the Examinee:
FR-1.3, Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel, Revision 02400
ATT-20.0, Attachment Vent Time, Revision 4
FIG-12.0, Figure CNMT Hydrogen, Revision 0 20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 3 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J) Start Time: ___. Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 2 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: FR-1.3, Step 21 Determine Maximum Allowable Venting Time: CNMT hydrogen concentration -LESS THAN 3% Determine maximum venting time (Refer to ATT-20.0, ATTACHMENT VENT TIME) Determines that CNMT hydrogen concentration is less than 3%, based on Initial Conditions Refers to ATT-20.0, ATTACHMENT VENT TIME Provide the Examinee with a clean copy of: FR-I.3, Response to Voids in Reactor A TT-20.0, Attachment Vent Time, Revision 4 A TT 20, Step 1 Record H2 Concentration and RCS pressure. Records 1.1 % and 650 psig, respectively. This information would have been recorded in FR-1.3, step 18, but, for the purpose of this JPM, the information has been provided in the Initial Conditions. 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 3 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 4 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 4 of7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION A TT -20.0, Step 2 Determine Containment Volume at standard conditions (V). Uses 180 OF in the equation 2a Determines that V (step 2b) =796,875 cu ft. Since all students are provided the same calculator, there is no defined tolerance needed for step 2b. Any minor rounding or scientific notation differences will be reflected within the readability margins of Fig. 12.0 (Performance Step 5). ATT -20.0, Step 3 Determine the maximum H2 volume that can be vented (H). Uses 1.1 % in equation 3a

The tolerance allows for minor variation in rounding calculated value up or down to the nearest whole number. Critical step since an error has the potential to affect containment integrity.

2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 5 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 6 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Terminating Cue: Stop time: ___ 2012 IL T NRC ..IPM N-RA-2 Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION ATT-20.0, Step 4 Determine H2 flow rate (F) from curve on Figure CNMT HYDROGEN and RCS pressure recorded in step 1 b. (When requested by Examinee) Provide a clean copy of Figure-12.0. The tolerance allows for a minor variation in graph reading since the graph divisions are small. Critical step since an error has the potential to affect containment integrity. ATT -20.0, Step 5 Calculate the maximum venting time (T). Divides H, from step 3, by F, from step 4 Lower end of tolerance allows for using low end of Fig 12.0 readability (1125 SCFM). Upper end of tolerance allows for using upper end of Fig 12.0 readability (1175 SCFM). Critical step since an error has the potential to affect containment integrity. When Examinee returns A IT-20.0 and Fig 12.0 to the Examiner, or at the Examiner's discretion: "Evaluation on this JPM is complete." NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 6 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 IL T NRC JPM N-RA-2 Examinee's Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question: Response: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date: 20121LT NRC ..IPM N-RA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Form JPM CUE INITIAL INITIATING The crew is performing FR-1.3, Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel CNMT Hydrogen concentration is stable at 1.1 % RCS pressure is stable at 650 psig Containment temperature is stable at 180°F The Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform FR-1.3, Step 21 -Determine Maximum Allowable Venting Time. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 ---Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form Worksheet qFacility: Task No.: 351-012-01-05 Perform 11M Plots And Calculations Task Title: Perform 11M Plot per 0-1.2.1 JPM 20121LT NRC JPM RA-3 KIA

Reference:

(4.5/4.4)

Alternate Path Yes No.]S Time Critical Yes No.]S Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The crew is performing a Reactor Startup per 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, step 6.2.14. 0-1.2.2, CRITICAL ROD POSITION CALCULATION, has been performed: The Estimated Critical Rod Position has been determined to be 105 steps on Control Bank D. The + 500 PCM bank position is _Bk D @ 52 steps The -500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 186 steps The Shutdown bank is already withdrawn. 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, has been completed up to step 6.0. Task Perform a 11M plot and correctly interpret the plot. Determine if criticality is projected within the next pull, or if the projected critical position falls outside either the +1-500 pcm position or below the 0% power RIL. Required Materials:

0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Section 6.2 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits Calculator Clear ruler 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet General

References:

Handouts: Initiating Cue: QUESTIONS: 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Revision 19602 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, Revision 01900 Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Section 6.2 A copy of 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, Revision 01900 completed up to step 6.0, Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits A copy of the JPM Data Sheet Calculator Clear ruler The Control Room Supervisor directs you to use the provided materials to perform a 11M plot per 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, steps 6.0 through 6.4.8. Disregard any Independent Verification requirements. On the JPM CUE SHEET, answer the following questions based on the 11M plot that you have constructed: Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height greater than the 0% RIL? Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height within the + and -500 pcm bank positions? Hand in the JPM CUE SHEET and Attachment 1 pages 2 and 3 when you have completed the JPM. Based on the 11M plot that you have just completed: Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height greater than the 0% RIL? DYES 0 NO Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height within the + and -500 pcm bank positions? DYES 0 NO Validation Time: 30 Minutes 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job Performance Measure Form Worksheet SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have the following available to provide to the Examinee:

0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Section 6.2,
A copy of 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, Revision 01900 completed up to step 6.0,
Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits,
A copy of the JPM Data Sheet,
Calculator, and
Clear ruler 2012 IL T NRC JPM N-RA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Form ES-C-1 JPM CLIE SHEET (Denote Critical Steps with a .,j) Start Time: ___ Step 6.1 Procedure Notes: Per 0-1.2, 11M is determined at 50 step intervals OR as specified by SM.

Data is recorded on Attachment

1. A 11M plot is completed each time an approach to criticality is desired. '. Performance Step: 1

MARK the following rod bank positions on 11M graph: * + 500 PCM bank position as determined in 0-1.2.2, Critical Rod Position Calculation * -500 PCM bank position as determined in 0-1.2.2, Critical Rod Position Calculation Bank B Rod Insertion Limit for 0% power as determined from TS 3.1.6 (using Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits) Standard: Identifies the +500 PCM bank position and -500 PCM bank position from the Initial Conditions Determines that the Bank B Rod Insertion Limit for 0% power using Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits is 181 steps -1M'

..", ... .. EXAMINER Provide the Examinee with: A marked up copy of 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits A copy of the JPM Data Sheet A calculator A ruler EXAMINER +500 pcm position = 0 @ 52 -500 pcm position = 0 @ 186 Bank B RIL for 0% = B @ 181 Comment: 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 Procedure Note: Performance Step: 2 Standard: Comment: .JPM CUE SHEET Step 6.2 and 6.3 DO NOT obtain base counts for control banks until shutdown bank is fully withdrawn and counts have stabilized. RECORD initial baseline counts from the following:

NI-31 Source Range meter
NI-32 Source Range meter RECORD initial 11M Baseline value as 1.0 on Attachment 1, 11M Plot. Identifies baseline counts on the JPM Data Sheet Records initial 11M Baseline value as 1.0 on Attachment 1, 11M Plot (Control Bank). 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

C Procedure Notes: Procedure Cautions: Performance Step: 3 Standard: Comment: Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 6.4.1 through 6.4.4 Control Rod withdrawal is performed as directed per 0-1.2, Reactor Startup Section. 11M =CR base I CR final WHEN either Source Range reaches 1 x 10 4 cps, THEN rate of rise should be adjusted so it is rising very slowly. IF either Source Range reaches 5 x 10 4 cps AND IR Power is NOT above the P-6 defeat permissive, THEN the HCO should be directed tom stabilize OR reduce power. DO NOT exceed 10 5 cps Source Range to prevent a Reactor Trip (1/2 10 5 cps). 6.4 AFTER Control Rods are withdrawn AND count rate has stabilized, THEN CREATE 11M plot as follows: RECORD time AND rod position. RECORD RCS loop average temperatures. RECORD count rate. CALCULATE 11M values AND RECORD Attachment 1, 11M Transfers time, rod position, RCS loop average temperatures, and count rate data from the JPM Data Sheet to the appropriate position on Attachment 1, 11M Plot (Control Bank) [See Answer Key]

2012 ILT NRC NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Performance Step: 4 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 5 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 6.4.5 through 6.4.7 INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY calculations. MARK 11M values on graph. DRAW a line connecting last pOint to current point AND EXTRAPOLATE to X-axis to determine a projected critical position. Disregards Independent Verification Requirement per Initiating Cue. ..J Marks 11M ..J Draws a line connecting fast point to current point AND EXTRAPOLATE to X-axis to cteterminesjprojected critical position. Step 6.4.8 WHILE REVIEWING SUBSEQUENT STEPS CONCERNING CRITICALITY, repeat Steps 6.4.1 thru 6.4.7 for each rod pull. Disregards Independent Verification Requirement per Initiating Cue. After the examinee completes marking 11M values and drawing lines for all data provided, he should answer the two questions asked in the Initiating Cue: 1. Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height greater than the 0% Rll? Answer: Yes Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height within the + and -500 pcm bank positions? Answer: No Comment: 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET When Examinee returns the JPM to the Examiner, or at the Examiners discretion: Evaluation on this JPM is complete. Terminating Cue: Stop time: ____ 20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC JPM N-RA-3 Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 JPM CUE INITIAL CONDITIONS: The crew is performing a Reactor Startup per 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, step 6.2.14. 0-1.2.2, CRITICAL ROD POSITION CALCULATION, has been performed: The Estimated Critical Rod Position has been determined to be 105 steps on Control Bank D. The + 500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 52 steps The -500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 186 steps The Shutdown bank is already withdrawn. 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, has been completed up to step 6.0. INITIATING CUE: The Control Room Supervisor directs you to use the provided materials to perform a 11M plot per 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, steps 6.0 through 6.4.8. Disregard any Independent Verification requirements. Hand in the JPM CUE SHEET and Attachment 1 pages 2 and 3 when you have completed the JPM. QUESTIONS: Based on the 11M plot that you have just completed: Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height greater than the 0% RIL? DYES D NO Does it appear that the reactor will go critical at a rod height within the + and -500 pcm bank positions? DYES D NO 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 ---Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 119-011-03-03 Determine stay time and exit requirements for working in a High Radiation Area. Task Determine stay time for local valve JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM operation in the RCA. RA-4 KIA 2.3.4 (3.2/3.7) Alternate Path Yes No X Time Critical Yes No Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% steady state power and a trouble shooting plan has been developed and approved to investigate possible leakage through V-358. This plan potentially requires multiple local valve operations. The first step in the plan is that V-358, (RWST Makeup AOV Bypass Valve to Charging Pump Suction) must be checked fully closed. Task Standard: Determine stay time for local valve operation in the RCA. Required Materials: A-1, RADIATION CONTROL MANUAL, Revision 08200 Charging Pump Room Survey Map (modified) Examinee's Radiation Exposure Record Calculator Procedures Cart General

References:

A-1, RADIATION CONTROL MANUAL, Revision 08200 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Handouts:

Charging Pump Room Survey Map Examinee's Radiation Exposure Record Calculator Access to procedures cart Initiating Cue: Determine the maximum stay time for local valve operation of V-358 without requiring higher authorization for exceeding any limits. Stay time = _______ Assume that no dose will be received in transit to or from the area of V-358. Validation Time: 17 Minutes (1 RO) SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have the following available to provide to the Examinee:
Charging Pump Room Survey Map
Examinee's Radiation Exposure Record
Calculator
Access to procedures cart containing A-procedures book (for A-1) 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 3 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J) Start Time: ___ Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 2 Standard: Comment: A*1 Step 3.5 Examinee determines Regulatory Occupational Dose Limits for Adults Determines A-1 Procedure should be referenced, locates same on procedures cart Determines applicable annual dose limits from Table (Regulatory! Station Admin/Site): 5 rem 14 rem /1 rem (TEDE) Provide the Examinee with:

Charging Pump Room Survey Map
Examinee's Radiation Exposure Record
Calculator
Access to procedures cart Determine expected dose rate Examinee refers to the Charging Pump Room Survey Map and determines his expected dose rate while operating V-358. \t.;35eiS (80 mRlhr general area dose) * '" Determines that the radiation Will be 80mRthr 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Performance Step: 3 Standard: Instructor NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 4 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 5 Terminating Cue: Page 4 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Determine current exposure Examinee reviews his exposure record and determines Admin mrem .(Girinca) --J TEpE (Site Lioiit) = Site DOE + Site CeDe = . mrem = 505 mrem . . *.* , Ii* Ginna ADMIN limit applies to ALL dose received at nuclear facilities (A-1, section 3.5.5.a NOTE) =4 Ginna SITE limit is only dose received at Ginna this =1 rem/yr He is closest to the ADMIN limit as most limiting 140 mRem remain to limit of 4 Determine remaining exposure available and most Subtracts current exposure from applicable limit .--J AClffiintimitTEDE mrem -3860 mrem::' ,,,,,' i':,,' ' ' ,<,": 0 --JSi,eJ.iroi.t1I;Di:=190P fllre'U 505 = --JDetermines ADM 1f;Jlirrl.iUs 1mrent .... Determines Stay Time Stay time =Remaining exposure available I Expected --JStaYTime = 1..75hror( 1 05 minutes When Examinee returns the JPM to the Examiner, or at the Examiner's discretion: "Evaluation on this JPM is complete." 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Stop time: ___, Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE INITIAL INITIATING *

The plant is at 100% steady state power and a trouble shooting plan has been developed and approved to investigate possible leakage through V-358. This plan potentially requires multiple local valve operations.

The first step in the plan is that V-358, (RWST Makeup AOV Bypass Valve to Charging Pump Suction) must be checked fully closed.

Determine the maximum stay time for local valve operation of V-358 without requiring higher authorization for exceeding any limits. Stay time =_______
Assume that no dose will be received in transit to or from the area of V-358. 2012 IL T NRC JPM N-RA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET N-RA-4 Your Exposure for the Current Year Ginna Calvert Cliffs 375 mrem 2825 mrem 35 mrem 25 mrem 130 mrem 530 mrem 45 mrem 10 mrem 25 mrem 15 mrem 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-RA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 --Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 344-001-03-03 Direct Calculations To Determine The Plant Status (e. g., Fluid Flow And Heat Balance, Quadrant Power Tilts, Shutdown Margin, Etc.) Task Title: Verify OPG-REACTIVITY -CALC ..IPM 2012 ILT NRC ..IPM SA-1 KIA

Reference:

2.1.37 Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% RTP, steady state, equilibrium xenon.

Current "BURNUP" is 13764 MWD/MTU
Current RCS Boron Concentration is 517 ppm
Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg) is 16,100 ppm
Current RWST Boron Concentration is 2910 ppm
Control Rods in Auto at 215 steps on Control Bank D Task Standard: Using PCNDR, PPCS, and the data from the Initial Conditions, perform an independent verification of the weekly reactivity calculation for a 50% power change (assuming Rods are operable) from 100% power at 1% per minute, performed by an RO, and identify any errors. Required Materials: Computer with PCNDR and PPCS
OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001
Calculator
Pencil General

References:

OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 Handouts: OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Initiating Cue: Using PCNDR, PPCS, and the data from the Initial Conditions, perform an independent verification of the weekly reactivity calculation for a 50% power change (assuming Rods are operable) from 100% power at 1% per minute, performed by an RO .

List any errors identified on the JPM CUE SHEET. Validation Time: 34 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP Reset to IC-24, 100% steady state. EOl Override BURNUP value in PPCS to those in Initial Conditions of this JPM INSTRUCTOR AC"nONS Have a clean copy of OPG-REACTIVITY-CAlC, Revision 01001 ready to provide to the Examinee.

20121lT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 3 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J) Start Time: ___ Procedure Note: Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 2 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Step 3.1 Plant should be approximately 100% RTP, steady state, equilibrium Xenon to perform this guideline. Determine burnup from PPCS point ID "BURNUP". Verifies that the RO entered 13764 MWD/MTU, based on Initial Conditions. Provide the Examinee with a marked up copy of REACTIVITY-CALC, Revision 01001 Step 3.2 Use the following burnup values to determine appropriate curve for time in Core life: BOl -6139 MWD/MTU ----7 Use BOl curves 6140 -12279 MWD/MTU ----7 Use MOL curves 12280 -EOl MWD/MTU ----7 Use EOl curves None This step impacts the performance of the procedure if the operator will be using the Cycle Book to perform the calculation (different curve sets). In this case the operator will be using PCNDR, so the result of this determination has no impact on the calculation. 2012 IlT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 3 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 4 Standard: Comment: Page 4 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 3.2.1 Use PCNDR (or Cycle Book) and appropriate time in core life to determine values for Differential Boron Worth, Power Defect, and Integral Rod Worth. Uses PCNDR and appropriate time in core life to determine values for Differential Boron Worth, Power Defect, and Integral Rod Worth. The Cycle 36 PCNDR program is initialized by: Clicking on PCNDR Cycle 36 Beta icon on desktop In response to "Security Warning -Macros Have Been Disabled" message, click on "Options" When Security Alert Menu popup appears, click on the 2 nd bullet "Enable This Content" and "OK" to start program Step 3.2.2 Use Xenon Predict report from PPCS, if available, to determine values for initial and final Xenon and Samarium. Uses Xenon Predict report from PPCS, to determine values for initial and final Xenon and Samarium. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 5 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 3.3 :" Performance Step: 5 Record the following: Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 6 Standard: Comment: 2012 IL T NRC JPM Current RCS Boron Concentration Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg) Current RWST Boron Concentration Current Core Burnup Differential Boron Worth Verifies that the RO recorded the correct values from Initial Conditions, and step 3.2.1 .tnat the wrong value for'Oifferential .... recorded. See Exam Key for acceptable answers. Incorrect values were obtained using Startup Parameters tab in PCNDR. This produces values for Hot Zero Power. Examinee would obtain the values in the marked up copy of OPG-REACTIVITY -CALC if this mistake were made. Steps 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 Perform Attachment 1, 2, and 4 Recognizes these are not required for this task. NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Performance Step: 7 Standard: Comment: Procedure Note: Procedure Note: Performance Step: 8 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 6 of 12 VERIFICATION OF Step 3.6 Perform Attachment 3, 50% PWR CHANGE AT 1 % PER MINUTE Goes to Attachment 3 (Page 6) Delta Power Defect (E): Values obtained for items S, C, D, F, G, G1, G2 and I are always negative. Delta Xe and Sm is calculated from the time power decrease starts until completed. 100% Total Power Defect 50% Total Power Defect ____PCM (D) -_-___PCM (C) = Uses PCNDR to verify that the RO determined the values for 100% and 50% values for Total Power Verifies that the RO subtracted the 100% value from the 50% value correctly See Exam Key for acceptable answers. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C V Performance Step: 9 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 10 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 7 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Delta Rod Reactivity (F): (Use 170 steps on Bk D for Final Rod Position) Initial Integral Rod worth on Bk D Final Integral Rod worth on Bk D ____ PCM (F1) -___PCM (F2) = Uses PCNDR to verify that the RO correctly values for initial and final Integral Rod worth on Bk

V Verifies that the RO subtracted the Final value from the Initial value correctly.

See Exam Key for acceptable answers. Delta Xe and Sm (G): Initial Xe and Sm Xe and Sm 50 minutes into power change ____ PCM (G2) -_-___ PCM (G1) = Uses Xenon Predict report from PPCS to verify that the RO correctly determined values for "Initial Xe and Sm", and "Xe and Sm 50 minutes into power change" Verifies that the RO subtracted the "Initial Xe and Sm" value from the "Xe and Sm 50 minutes into power change" value correctly See Exam Key for acceptable answers. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix ...J Performance Step: 11 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 12 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 8 of 12 VERIFICATION OF Total Reactivity (H): Delta Power Defect + Delta Rod Reactivity + Delta Xe and Sm= Total Reactivity Change ___ (E) + _-___ (F) + _-___ (G) = Verifies that the RO added Delta Power Defect, Delta Reactivity, and Delta Xe and Sm to obtain Total Change ...J R_.._litb See Exam Key for acceptable answers. RCS Boron Offset Value (I): __(H)/_-__PCM/PPM (B) = -PPM (I) Verifies that the RO correctly divided Total Reactivity Change by Differential Boron Worth to obtain the RCS Boron Offset Value *:=rllnd See Exam Key for acceptable answers. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Performance Step: 13 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: ..:'J Performance Step: 14 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 9 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Required RCS Boron Concentration (J): Current RCS Boron Conc (A) -PPM change (I) =Required RCS Boron Conc (J) ___--'-P-'-P.:.:.:,M (A) -_-___(I) = _+___ PPM (J) Verifies that the RO correctly subtracted the RCS Offset Value from the Current RCS Boron Concentration obtain the required RCS Boron ...J . for fl,".taemg and .* afto See Exam Key for acceptable answers. Gallons of Boric Acid needed: (Use PPCS or VBD Book to calculate the number of gallons required from BASTs and the RWSn. Verifies that the RO correctly used PPCS to calculate number of gallons required from BASTs and the ..J.. .... '.these values are (Baiit".iRe taUftyvakie' See Exam Key for acceptable answers. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 15 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Terminating Cue: Stop time: ____ Page 10 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Initial Boration Rate for Rapid shutdown 1 %/min gals BAST (K)_I 50 minutes =_ GPM BA flow 3%/min gals BAST (K)_/16.67 minutes = _ GPM BA flow 5%/min gals BAST (K)_I 10 minutes = _ GPM BA flow Verifies that the RO correctly divided the gallons of boric acid required from the BASTs by the time required to result in the desired shutdown rate to determine the boric acid flow rate required for that particular load reduction rate. See Exam Key for acceptable answers. When Examinee returns the JPM to the Examiner, or at the Examiner's discretion: Evaluation on this JPM is complete. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC JPM N-SA-1 Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-1 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 INITIAL INITIATING JPM CUE The plant is at 100% RTP, steady state, equilibrium xenon. Current "BURNUP" is 13764 MWD/MTU Current RCS Boron Concentration is 517 ppm Current BASTs Boron Concentration (avg) is 16,100 ppm Current RWST Boron Concentration is 2910 ppm Control Rods in Auto at 215 steps on Control Bank D Using PCNDR, PPCS, and the data from the Initial Conditions, perform an independent verification of the weekly reactivity calculation for a 50% power change (assuming Rods are operable) from 100% power at 1% per minute, performed by an RO. List any errors identified on this JPM CUE SHEET. 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 ---Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 119-006-03-01A Determine the Allowable Hours an Operator Can Work TasklJPM Determine The Allowable Hours An JPM No.: 2012 IL T NRC JPM Operator Can Work SA-2 KIA

Reference:

2.1.5 Alternate

Path Yes Time Critical Yes Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial

The plant is at full power at MOL You are the SM It is Sunday of your Day shift tour (0600 Sunday -1800 Sunday) The oncoming HCO has called in sick for the next shift (1800 Sunday -0600 Monday) You must find a replacement HCO Task Correctly determine if either, neither, or both of two possible replacements for the HCO satisfy the work hour limits of 1002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS.

Required Calculator General

References:

CNG-SE-1.01-1002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS, Rev 00600 Handouts: CNG-SE-1.01-1002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS, Rev 00600

JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet 2012 IL T Audit JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Initiating Cue: Determine if either, neither, or both of two possible replacements for the HCO satisfy the work hour limits of CNG-SE-1.01-1002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS.

For each possible replacement, explain on the JPM CUE SHEET: 1. If he can or cannot work as HCO What work hour limit prevents him from working, if applicable?

Validation Time: 16 Minutes EXAMINER NOTE: Ensure the following materials are available: CNG-SE-1.01-1002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS, Revision 00600, the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet Calculator 2012 IL T Audit JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C START TIME: ..J =CRITICAL STEP Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 2 Standard: Comment: Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Step The following limits apply to all Covered Workers regardless plant a. No more than 16 work hours in any 24-hour period Reviews the procedure and locates the work hours limits Reviews the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet to determine if the 16 work hours in any 24-hour period limit will be exceeded for Operator #1 and/or Operator #2 Determines that the limit will not be exceeded by either Operator Hand the examinee a copy of CNG-SE-1.01-1002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS, Revision 00600, the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet, and a calculator. Step S.2.A.1.b The following limits apply to all Covered Workers regardless of plant status: b. No more than 26 work hours in any 48-hour period Reviews the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet to determine if the 26 work hours in any 48-hour period limit will be exceeded for Operator #1 and/or Operator #2 Determines that the limit will not be exceeded by either Operator 2012 IL T Audit JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 3 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 4 Standard: Comment: Page 4 of Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Step 5.2.A.1.c The following limits apply to all Covered Workers regardless of plant status: No more than 72 work hours in any 7 -day period Reviews the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet to determine if the 72 work hours in any 7 -day period limit will be exceeded for Operator #1 and/or era tor #2 -V.* Determines Operator #2 will NOT exceed the limit Operator #1 will exceed the 72-hour limit Step 5.2.A.2.a The following work hour breaks apply to all Covered Workers regardless of plant status: At least a 1 O-hour break between successive work periods or an 8-hour break when a break of less than 10 hours is necessary to accommodate a crew's scheduled transition between work schedules or shifts. Reviews the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet to determine if the hour or 8-hour break between successive work periods limit will be exceeded for Operator #1 and/or Operator #2 Determines that the limit will not be exceeded by either Operator 2012 ILT Audit JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 5 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 6 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 7 Standard: Comment: Page Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Step 5.2.A.2.b The following work hour breaks apply to all Covered Workers regardless of plant status: b. A 34-hour break in any 9-day period. Reviews the ...IPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet to determine if the hour break in any 9-day period limit will be exceeded #1 and/or

Determines Operator #1 will NOT exceed the limit Operator #2 will exceed the 34-hour break limit Step 5.2.6.1. Table 5.2-1 In addition to the above work hour limits, individual workers shall meet the Minimum Days Off (MDO) requirements in the tables: Table 5.2-1 Outage Minimum Days Off Requirements Recognizes that the outage MDO requirements are not applicable.

Step 5.2.C The averaging period is the duration over which the 54-hour per week average is calculated and may be consistent with standard shift schedules but not be greater than 6 weeks. Reviews the JPM N-SA-3 Data Sheet to determine if the Hour Week Average will be exceeded for Operator #1 and/or Operator #2 Determines that the limit will not be exceeded by either Operator 2012 ILT Audit JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Terminating Cue: STOP TIME: When Examinee returns the JPM CUE SHEET and the his copy of CNG*SE-1.01*1002 to the EXAMINER: Evaluation on this JPM is complete. 2012 ILT Audit JPM N-SA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 IL T NRC JPM N-SA-2 Examinee's Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question: Response: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date: 2012 IL T Audit JPM N-SA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE Initial Conditions: The plant is at full power at MOL You are the SM It is Sunday of your Day shift tour (0600 Sunday -1800 Sunday) The oncoming HCO has called in sick for the next shift (1800 Sunday -0600 Monday) You must find a replacement HCO Initiating Cue: Determine if either, neither, or both of two possible replacements for the HCO satisfy the work hour limits of CNG-SE-1.01-1 002, FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR CONTROLS. For each possible replacement, explain on the JPM CUE SHEET: 1. If he can or cannot work as HCO 2. What work hour limit prevents him from working, if applicable? (Circle ONE for each operator) Justification for Decision Operator #1 : CAN or CANNOT work as HCO Operator #2: CAN or CANNOT work as HCO 2012 ILT Audit JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 2012 ILT JPM N-SA-2 Data Sheet SHIFT HOURS WORKED M-26 N 12 ,.:':27T . T-29'--F:*jO 28 D D 12 12 ***5-315-1 0 0 12 12 OPERATOR #1 fIiI:':2 .... t-3TW-4 T-5 T9 T9 T9 9 9 9 F-6 T9 9 5-7 S-8 M-9 T N 12 11 N 12 T*12 N 12 F-13 N 12 S-15 M-16 0 12 T-17 D 12 W-18 F-20 D 0 0 12 , 12 12 0 12 5-22 M-23 N ? T:':24 W-25 T-26 F-27 S-28 N 12 S-29 N 12 M-30 N ..... SHIFT HOURS WORKED M-26 0 12 T-27 0 12 28 D 12 T-29 F-30 ..._ S-31 OPERATOR #2 ............ _ ... ... S-1 M-2 T-3 W-4 T-5 F-6 N 12 S-7 N 12 S-8 N 12 M-9 N 12 T-10 11 T-12 D 12 .. T-*;': F-13 0 0 12 12 S-15 D 12 M-16 T-17 T9 9 W-18 T9 9 T-19 T9 9 F-20 T9 9 S-21 0 1L S-22 M-23 N ? , . T-24 N 12 W-25 N 12 T-26 N 12 F-27 N 12 S-28 S-29 M-30 D 12 2012 IL T Audit JPM N-SA-2 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 ---Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 351-012-01-05 Perform 11M Plots And Calculations Task Evaluate 11M Plot per 0-1.2.1and JPM No.: 20121LT NRC JPM 0-1.2 SA-3 KIA 2.2.1 (4.5/4.4) Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The crew is performing a Reactor Startup per 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, step 6.2.14. 0-1.2.2, CRITICAL ROD POSITION CALCULATION, has been performed: The Estimated Critical Rod Position has been determined to be 105 steps on Control Bank D. The + 500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 52 steps The -500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 186 steps The Shutdown bank is already withdrawn. 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, has been completed up to step 6.0. Task Perform a 11M plot and correctly evaluate the plot. Determine the procedure and step number for any required action(s), based on the results of the 11M plot. Required Materials:

0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Section 6.2 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits Calculator Clear ruler 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet General

References:

0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Revision 19602 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, Revision 01900 Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits Handouts: 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Section 6.2 A copy of 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, Revision 01900 completed up to step 6.0, Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits A copy of the JPM Data Sheet Calculator, A ruler Initiating Cue: The Control Room Supervisor directs you to use the provided materials to perform a 11M plot per 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, starting at step 6.0. Disregard any Independent Verification requirements. Determine the procedure and step number for any required action(s), based on the results of the 11M plot, if applicable. Document any required actions on this JPM CUE SHEET. Hand in the JPM CUE SHEET and Attachment 1 pages 2 and 3 when you have completed the JPM. Validation Time: 35 Minutes 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIMULATOR SETUP NIA INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have the following available to provide to the Examinee: 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Section 6.2, marked up to Step 6.2.20 A copy of 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, Revision 01900 completed up to step 6.0, Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits, A copy of the JPM Data Sheet, Calculator Clear-ruler 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 4 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J) Start Time: 0-1.2.1, Step 6.1 Procedure Notes: Per 0-1.2, 11M is determined at 50 step intervals OR as specified by SM.

Data is recorded on Attachment

1. A 11M plot is completed each time an approach to criticality is desired. "". Performance Step: 1

MARK the following rod bank positions on 11M graph: * + 500 PCM bank position as determined in 0-1.2.2, Critical Rod Position Calculation * -500 PCM bank position as determined in 0-1.2.2, Critical Rod Position Calculation Bank B Rod Insertion Limit for 0% power as determined from TS 3.1.6 (using Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits) Standard: Identifies the +500 PCM bank position and -500 PCM bank position from the Initial Conditions
...Determines that the Bank B Rod Insertion Limit for 0% power using Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits is 181 steps ...j Marks theBaAkB*Rodln$artionl-imit on tt.11M graph EXAMINER Provide the Examinee with: A marked up copy of 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES Figure COLR-3, Control Bank Insertion Limits A copy of the JPM Data Sheet A calculator A ruler EXAMINER +500 pcm position = D @ 52 -500 pcm position = D @ 186 Bank B RIL for 0% =B @ 181 Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Page 5 12 Form ES-C-1 Procedure Note: Performance Step: 2 Standard: Comment: VERIFICATION OF Step 6.2 and 6.3 DO NOT obtain base counts for control banks until shutdown bank is fully withdrawn and counts have stabilized. RECORD initial baseline counts from the following:

NI-31 Source Range meter
NI-32 Source Range meter RECORD initial 11M Baseline value as 1.0 on Attachment 1, 11M Plot. Identifies baseline counts on the JPM Data Sheet Records initial 11M Baseline value as 1.0 on Attachment 1, 11M Plot (Control Bank). 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Procedure Notes: Procedure Cautions: Performance Step: 3 Standard: Comment: Page 6 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.4.1 through 6.4.4 Control Rod withdrawal is performed as directed per 0-1.2, Reactor Startup Section. 11M =CR base I CR final WHEN either Source Range reaches 1 x 10 4 cps, THEN rate of rise should be adjusted so it is rising very slowly. IF either Source Range reaches 5 x 10 4 cps AND IR Power is NOT above the P-6 defeat permissive, THEN the HCO should be directed tom stabilize OR reduce power. DO NOT exceed 10 5 cps Source Range to prevent a Reactor Trip (1/2 10 5 cps). 6.4 AFTER Control Rods are withdrawn AND count rate has stabilized, THEN CREATE 11M plot as follows: RECORD time AND rod position. RECORD RCS loop average temperatures. RECORD count rate. CALCULATE 11M values AND RECORD Attachment 1, 11M Transfers time, rod position, RCS loop average temperatures, and count rate data from the JPM Data Sheet to the appropriate position on Attachment 1, 11M Plot (Control Bank) [See Answer Key] -J ..* loCatIm 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Performance Step: 4 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 5 Standard: Comment: Page 7 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.4.5 through 6.4.7 INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY calculations. MARK 11M values on graph. DRAW a line connecting last point to current point AND EXTRAPOLATE to X-axis to determine a projected critical position. Disregards Independent Verification Requirement per Initiating Cue .

graph,: Draws a line connecting last point to current point AND EXTRAPOLATE to X-axis to determine a projected critical position.

Step 6.4.8 WHILE REVIEWING SUBSEQUENT STEPS CONCERNING CRITICALITY, repeat Steps 6.4.1 thru 6.4.7 for each rod pull. Disregards Independent Verification Requirement per Initiating Cue.*"'Ma_ '" OraWttand extrapolates to X-axis to determine a projected critical position for each rod pull. 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.4.9 Performance Step: 6 6.4.9 PRIOR to de-energizing Source Range Detectors, RECORD baseline counts from the following:

NI-35 Intermediate Range meter
NI-36 Intermediate Range meter Standard:
Determines step is not applicable.

Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Steps 6.5 through 6.7 Performance Step: 7 6.5 IF criticality is projected by all of the following conditions being met, THEN DO NOT PULL Control Rods the full interval, PULL Control Rods to criticality: OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. Projected critical position falls within the +1-500 pcm bank position Projected critical position falls above RIL Projected critical position indicates criticality within the next desired interval IF criticality is NOT projected within the next rod pull interval, THEN CONTINUE withdrawal sequence AND 11M evaluation. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. IF either of the following conditions are met (MARK conditions met) THEN STOP pulling Control Rods AND REFER to 0-1.2 for further guidance: OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. Projected critical position falls outside the +1-500 pcm bank position Projected critical position falls below the 0% power RIL Standard: Comment: 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 8 Standard: Comment: Terminating Cue: Stop time: ____ Page 10 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION 0-1.2, Step 6.2.31 IF during the final approach to criticality, there are indications that ACTUAL critical rod position will differ from ESTIMATED critical rod position by an amount equal to 0.5% DELTA KlK (500 pcm) reactivity OR Reactor will go CRITICAL below Rod Insertion Limits, then perform the following: Stop Control Rod withdrawal Perform the following under the supervision of the SM and with Reactor Engineer assistance: Check ECP calculation for errors Check curves for errors in interpolation Request Chemistry perform another [8] sample ...

Documents the determination on the ..IPM CUE SHEET. When Examinee returns the JPM to the Examiner, or at the Examiner's discretion:

Evaluation on this JPM is complete. 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC N-SA-3 Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-3 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 INITIAL INITIATING ,JPM CUE The crew is performing a Reactor Startup per 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, step 6.2.14. 0-1.2.2, CRITICAL ROD POSITION CALCULATION, has been performed: The Estimated Critical Rod Position has been determined to be 105 steps on Control Bank D. The + 500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 52 steps The -500 PCM bank position is Bk D @ 186 steps The Shutdown bank is already withdrawn. 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, has been completed up to step 6.0. The Control Room Supervisor directs you to use the provided materials to perform a 11M plot per 0-1.2.1, 11M CURVES, starting at step 6.0. Disregard any Independent Verification requirements. Determine the procedure and step number for any required action(s), based on the results of the 11M plot, if applicable. Document any required actions on this CUE SHEET. Hand in the CUE SHEET and Attachment 1 pages 2 and 3 when you have completed the JPM. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 ---Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 119-011-03-03 Determine stay time and exit requirements for working in a High Radiation Area. Task Determine Worker Availability No.: 2012 ILT NRC Based on Radiation Exposure SA-4 Limits. KIA 2.3.4 (3.2/3.7) Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% steady state power and a trouble shooting plan has been developed and approved to investigate possible leakage through V-358. This plan potentially requires multiple local valve operations.

The repair job is expected to take 3 hours. Task Standard:

Determine stay time for local valve operation in the RCA. Required Materials: A-1, RADIATION CONTROL MANUAL, Revision 08200

Charging Pump Room Survey Map
Worker Radiation Exposure Record
Calculator
Procedures Cart General

References:

A-1, RADIATION CONTROL MANUAL, Revision 08200 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job .... Form Handouts: Charging Pump Room Survey Map Worker's Radiation Exposure Record Calculator Access to procedures cart Initiating Cue: Determine the maximum stay time for local valve operation of V-358 without requiring higher authorization for exceeding any limits. Stay time =_______ Determine which dose limit(s) will be most limiting for this work: Determine any permission that will be required for the worker to perform the job, if applicable. Assume that no dose will be received in transit to or from the area of V-358 Validation Time: 19 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

Have the following available to provide to the Examinee:

o Charging Pump Room Survey Map o Examinee's Radiation Exposure Record o Calculator o Access to procedures cart containing A-procedures book (for A-1) 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J) Start Time: ____' Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: '" Performance Step: 2 Standard: Comment: Step 3.5 Examinee determines Regulatory Occupational Dose Limits for Adults Determines A-1 Procedure should be referenced, locates same on procedures cart Determines applicable annual dose limits from Table (Regulatory/ Station Admin/Site): ..J Provide the Examinee with:

Charging Pump Room Survey Map
Worker's Radiation Exposure Record
Calculator
Access to procedures cart Determine expected radiation dose rate Examinee refers to the Charging Pump Room Survey Map and determines the worker's expected dose rate while working on 286.
area dose) v Determines'thatthe , * .fiatiOlr"',...d.c.mRlhr 20121LT NRC .JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C "'. Performance Step: 3 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 4 Standard: Comment: '" Performance Step: 5 Standard: Comment: Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Determines the worker's Expected Dose for the job Expected Dose::: Expected radiation rate x 3 hours Determine current exposure Examinee reviews the worker's exposure record and determines his limit(s) of concern. *

Determines Stay Time to nearest limit Stay time =Remaining exposure available I Expected radiation rate 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Performance Step: 5 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 6 Standard: Comment: Page 5 9 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Determine the worker's expected post job exposure Add the expected dose for the job to the worker's current exposure Determines the worker's availability Compare the worker's expected post job exposure to the Dose Limits for Adults 20121LT NRC JPM N-SA4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 , . .,1 Performance Step: 7 Standard: Comment: Terminating Cue: Stop time: ____ VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Determines any permission that will be required for the worker to perform the job. Refers to A-1, step 3.5.5 a.1. Ginna Administrative (Admin) Limits Control Limits for Occupational Radiation Exposure 2. Ginna Admin limit SHALL be 4.0 rem per year TEDE. b) If an individual's Annual TEDE is expected to exceed 4.0 rem, they may submit a request to increase the limit to greater than 4.0 rem. An individual may be authorized up to 4.5 rem TEDE with complete record dose for the current year and approvals by the Radiation Protection, Plant GM and Vice President, or their designees. When Examinee returns the JPM to the Examiner, or at the Examiners discretion: Evaluation on this JPM is complete. 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-4 Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 20121LT NRC N-SA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE INITIAL CONDITIONS: INITIATING CUE: The plant is at 100% steady state power and a trouble shooting plan has been developed and approved to investigate possible leakage through V-358. This plan potentially requires multiple local valve operations. The repair job is expected to take 3 hours. Determine the maximum stay time for local valve operation of V-358 without requiring higher authorization for exceeding any limits. Stay time = _______ Determine which dose limit(s) will be most limiting for this work: Determine any permission that will be required for the worker to perform the job, if applicable. Assume that no dose will be received in transit to or from the area of V-358 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Form JPM CUE N-SA-4 Worker Exposure for the Current Year Ginna Calvert Cliffs Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE) 375 mrem 2825 mrem Lens Dose Equivalent (LDE) 35 mrem 25 mrem Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) 130 mrem 530 mrem Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE) 45 mrem 10 mrem Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) 25 mrem 15 mrem 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-4 NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 ---Appendix Page 1 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Facility: Task No.: 340-001-05-02 Perform Site Emergency Plan Duties TasklJPM Determine PAR and complete EPIP JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM 1-5, Attachment 3a SA-5 KIA

Reference:

2.4.44 Alternate Path Yes No X Time Critical Yes No Knowledge of Emergency Plan protective action recommendations. Examinee must complete the JPM in < 15 minutes. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: X Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: 30 minutes ago, the plant was operating at full power when a cold leg LOCA occurred. Reactor Coolant System activity is high, and R-29/30 read -1060 Rlhr The SM/EC has just declared a General Emergency based on EAL 2.3.3 of EPIP 1-0 (Containment Radiation Monitor R-29/30 reading> 1000 R/HR). Skies are partly cloudy with a light breeze and zero precipitation. Wind speed is 5 mph at elevation 33' Wind direction is from 285° at elevation 33' Meteorological temperatures are 71°F at elevation 250' and 69°F at elevation 33' Task Using the information provided, complete Attachment 3a, New York State Radiological Emergency Data Form Part 1, of EPIP 1-5 NOTIFICATIONS within 15 minutes. Required Pencil or pen General

EPIP 1-5, NOTIFICATIONS, Revision 09200 EPIP 2-1, PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMMENDATIONS, Revision 02800 2012 IL T NRC JPM N-SA-5, Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key Appendix Page 2 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Handouts:

Initiating Cue: Validation Time: PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 1-5, NOTIFICATIONS, Rev 09200 EPIP 1-5 Attachment 3a (with Step 2 circled as an "Exercise") EPIP 2-1, PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMMENDATIONS, Revision 02800 P-9, Radiation Monitoring System, Rev 09810 Using the information provided, complete Attachment 3a, New York State Radiological Emergency Data Form Part 1, of EPI P 1-5 NOTIFICATIONS, beginning at Step 3 The electronic version of Attachment 3a is not available This is a time-critical JPM. Z Minutes (when only Step 6 was being performed, PAR) 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key Appendix C Page 3 of 11 Form ES-C-1 START -.J =CRITICAL -.J Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: -.J Performance Step: 2 Standard: Comment: PERFORMANCE EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a, Block 3 3. Classification: A. UNUSUAL EVENT B. ALERT C. SITE AREA EMERGENCY D. GENERAL EMERGENCY E. EMERGENCY TERMINATED F. RECOVERY _" ," '. --.,"" .Y5,__ . _ , _

Does NOT check the "information changed" box Provide student with the 3 EPIP handouts as soon as he has read the Initiating Cue. EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a, Block Classification Emergency Classification declared at: Date __Time __..*......,.." ,"'" l1li
Does NOT check the "information changed" box 2012 IL T NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key Appendix Page 4 of 11 Form ES-C-1 " Performance Step: 3 Standard:

EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a, Block Release of Radioactive Materials due to the Classification A. No release B. Release BELOW federal limits 0 to atmosphere 0 to water C. Release BELOW federal limits 0 to atmosphere 0 to water D. Unmonitored release Reads Instructions (Att.3) for Block 5 on p22 Reviews Tables in Block 5 for ntial release Does NOT check the "information changed" box With no cues to indicate otherwise, all CI and CVI actions have occurred as expected (must be assumed). P9 is referenced in Block 5, but provides only the warning and high alarm setpoints (have on hand if asked to provide) If asked about the status of CNMT radiation monitors, respond:

R2, R5, R7, R11, and R12 are in alarm
R11 and R12 read 1E6 cpm 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key Appendix Page 5 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Procedure Note: Performance Step: 4 Standard:

EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 5 Standard: Comment: PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 1-5 Attachment 3, Block 6 Instructions PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS ARE ONLY REQUIRED AT A GENERAL EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION. Check the appropriate PAR. The Shift Manager, TSC Director, or the EOF Recovery Manager will use EPIP 2-1, Protective Action Recommendations. PARs only reflect Ginna's recommendations, NOT THE ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED BY OFFSITE COUNTY OFFICIALS.

Locates block 6 of EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a
References Instructions for Block 6 in Att.3
Goes to EPIP 2-1 Hand the examinee copies of: EPIP 2-1, PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMMENDATIONS, Revision 02800 EPIP 2-1 Steps 5.3 A & B Protective Action Recommendations shall be issued with the initial declaration of a General Emergency. Any changes to the initial PAR shall be communicated within 15 minutes of the decision by the Emergency Coordinator, to change the PARs using EPIP 1-5.
Reads steps 5.3 A and B 2012 IL T NRC JPM N-SA-5, Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key Appendix Page 6 of 11 Form ES-C-1
Performance Step: 6 Standard:

Comment: Performance Step: 7 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 8 Standard: Comment: PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 2-1 Steps 5.3 C Use the flowchart below to determine Protective Action Recommendations EPIP 2-1 Flowchart General Emergency Declared *

Continues to the next box EPIP 2-1 Has procedure ER-SC.1 "Adverse Weather Plan" been
Follows the NO arrow 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key Appendix C Page 7 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 2-1 Flowchart t Performance Step: 9 Standard:

Comment: , Performance Step: 10 Standard: Comment: ',.., . -< Performance Step: 11 Standard: Comment: Is a procedurally controlled, short duration (less than 1 hour total) release in progress or anticipated within the next 15 minutes? *

Follows the NO arrow EPIP 2-1 Flowchart Is an unanticipated release isolable from the main control board in less than 15 minutes? *
Follows the NO arrow EPIP 2-1 Recommend Protective Actions using Attachment 1

and the current wind

Goes to Attachment 1, EVACUATION AREAS BY ERPA *
2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key Appendix C Page 8 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a, Block Protective Actions RECOMMENDATIONS: (Refer to EPIP " Performance Step: 12 check box if information has changed Standard:
Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment: EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a, Block 7 " Performance Step: 13 EAL Number Standard:
Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment: EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a, Block 8 " Performance Step: 14 Reactor Status Standard:
Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment: 2012 IL T NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key Appendix C Page 9 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3A Block 9 '" Performance Step: 15 Wind Speed: Standard:
Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment: EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3A Block 10 '" Performance Step: 16 Wind Direction:

Standard:

Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment: EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3A Block 11 '" Performance Step: 17 Stability Class: Standard:
Does NOT check the "information changed" box Comment: Terminating Cue: When Examinee returns the EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a to the EXAMINER:

Evaluation on this JPM is complete. STOP TIME: 2012 IL T NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5 Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 2012 IL T NRC JPM N-SA-5, REV.1 Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key Appendix Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Initiating Cue: JPM CUE 30 minutes ago, the plant was operating at full power when a cold leg LOCA occurred. Reactor Coolant System activity is high, and R-29/30 read -1060 Rlhr The SM/EC has just declared a General Emergency based on EAL 2.3.3 of EPIP 1-0 (Containment Radiation Monitor R-29/30 reading> 1000 RlHR). Skies are partly cloudy with a light breeze and zero precipitation. Wind speed is 5 mph at elevation 33' Wind direction is from 285 0 at elevation 33' Meteorological temperatures are 71°F at elevation 250' and 69°F at elevation 33' Using the information provided, complete Attachment 3a, New York State Radiological Emergency Data Form Part 1, of EPIP 1-5 NOTIFICATIONS, beginning at Step 3 The electronic version of Attachment 3a is not available This is a time-critical JPM. 2012 ILT NRC JPM N-SA-5, Post-Exam Corrected Answer Key Protective Action Recommendations EPlP-2-1 Revision 02800 Page 6 of 18 C. Use the flowchart below to detennine Protective Action Recommendations General Emeroencv Declared + Has procedure "Adverse Weather been I NO I YES I.. Due to the adverse weather, have Ginna Emergency I I Response Facilities have been I YES I staffed as a precaution? I I Recommend Protective Actions using+ Attachment 2 Is a procedurally controlled, short duration (less than 1 hour total) -1 YES and the current wind direction. release in progress or within the next 15 I I + Is an unanticipated release .. isolable from the main control 1board in less than 15 I I .. Recommend Protective Actions using: J Attachment 1 (Evacuation) Continually reassess PARs*1 I and the rurrent wind direction. Record in EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a (RECS form), Item 6, the Protective Actions Recommended and conmunicatewithin 15 minutes of the PAR decision. Protective Action Reconvnendations EPlP-2-1 Revision 02800 Pase9of18 ATTACHMENT

1. EVACUATION AREAS BY ERPA Page 1 of2 Wind From N (Degrees)

Initial Protective Action Recommendations (Evacuation based on 2 mile radius & 5 miles downwind) 349 to 11 I W (1,2,3) and implement KI ptan I'lIII'Ilaining ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System} NNE 12 to 33 Evacuate: W (1,2) M (1) and imptementKI plan (all remaimna ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System) NE 34 to 56 Evacuate: W (1,2) M (1) and imptement KI plan (alll'lIII'Ilaimna ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System) ENE 57 to 78 Evacuate: W (1,2) M (1) and implement KI plan (all remainina ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System) E 19 to 101 Evacuate: W (1,2) M (1) and imptement KI plan {all remainina ERPA's to manitor me emergencY Alert System} ESE 102 to 124 Evacuate: W (1) M (1) and implement KI plan (all remaimng ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System) SE 125 to 146 Evacuate: W (1) and implement KI ptan (all remaimng ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System) SSE 147 to 1El8 Evacuate: W (1) and implement KI plan (all remaimna ERPA'sto manitorme Emergency Alert System) S 16910 191 Evacuate: W (1) and implement KI plan (all remaining ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System) SSW 192 to 213 Evacuate: W (1) and implement KI plan (all remaimna ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System) SW 21410 236 Evacuate: W (1,3) and implement KI plan (all remaimna ERPA's to manitor me emergencY Alert System} WSW 237 to 258 Evacuate: W (1,3) and implement KI plan (all remaining ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System) W 25910281 Evacuate: W (1,3) and implement KI plan (all remaining ERPA's to manitor me Emergency Alert System) WNW 26210 303 Evacuate: W (1,2,3) and implement KI plan (all remainina ERPA's to manitor the Emergency Alert System) NW 30410 326 Evacuate: W (1,2,3) and implement KI plan {all remaining ERPA's to monitor me Emergency Alert System} NNW 32710 348 Evacuate: W (1,2,3) and implement KI plan (all remaimllg ERPA's to manitor the Emergency Alert Svsteml NOTIFICATIONS EPIP-1-5:28 Rev. 09200 Attachment 3a Page 1 of 1 NEW YORK STATE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY DATA FORM (PART I) RECS message number ____ "This is Ginn.a Station. PleBe sbnd by for roll call. "N_ York Sfatlt" D "Monroe County" D "Wayne County'" D 1. IIIsAge lRmMilfild ill:: 2. This is: Dabt Time Via: A. An Actual E'II!IIt B. An Elcere1H A. Ii. 0Iher 3. CIas5iIicIiItiD: [J check box if infarmation bas changad A. UNUSUAL EVENT C. SITE AREA EMERGENCY E. EMERGENCY ELALERT D. GENERAl. EMERGENCY F. ... CIiIssitiNtiDn T_: [J check box if infarmation bas changad Current This CIauification dedInId at 0_ TODAY nme 5. IWHse ofRadioaative IIatI!riIIs due.tIIe Clanified Event: (RefertoP.g.) [J check box if infarmation bas changed A. No Release EL Release BB.OW iIder.IIlimilf. [J to acmosph_ [J to waller C. ReIe_ ABOVE fecI9qIlimits [J III atmosphent [J ID wa1I!r' D. Unmoniknd release A!quiring -'uation 6. PfOtectiwAationsREeOMMEtmATJONS: (Refer to EPlP-2*1) [J check box if infarmation bas changad A. No need for Pratecti_ AcIions oul5ide the sitJll! EL EVA.CUAlE and impIemert_KI plan for lie(aIIl1I!imaining ERP A's to rnoniIar \he Emergency AIen ) W1 W2 W3 WI W5 WtI W1 Ml M2 M3 1M M5 Me M7 Me MO C. SI£l TER-IN-PLACE and inPement the KI plan for the folawing ERPA.'s Call nemaining ERPA's to rnoniIar \he Emergency Alert WI W2 W3 WI W5 WtI W1 Ml M2 M3 1M M5 Me M7 Me Brief Event DHcripticII1 and O1hersignificant i'II'orm.l&ion [J check box if infarmation bas changed I EAL Number I 2.3.3

__wf a. RHctDr Sbdus: T-30 A. B. ShuIidarIm Dale TO DA. Y Tme {subcrilicall

9. Wind SPHd: [J check box if inbmation bas changed A. 5 MiIesIhoII'

elevalion 33 feel to. Wind Dftctian:

[J check box if . bascNnaed From 285 .*eIevation 33 . feel 11. Stlblity Clan: UNST NEUTRAl. STMLE [J check box if AT 69 Wormation 71 I Bravo 1 Charlie 1 Delta 1 Echo I Foadrut tGolf----'" --1--1--1 I 1 bas Chanaea 2S1 t II!mp 33ftll!mp -2.11 -1.15 -1.7' ..a15 +1.74 +2.0 +4.77 by.: Name: Area Code N1nber "PIe_ stIInd by for roll CIII: "-York S .... copy?"C '"Mo_ County copy?"C "Wayne County copy?"C FOR GlNNA USE Time Prepared: Time Approved: Comp.....d form sent flo EP Prepared By: AppI'CMld WAYNE COUNTY USE Routing: _ALL _Dose Assess Calculator _ROO _Ginna Tech Rep _FltIld Team Coord. _Plclt<<NYS Rlid Health Cps Ofticer NYS HeaIIt1 (Cps 1'OCIfII) DiR!!CIDr MONROE COUNTY USE Distribution:

1. Command Room (OEP Administrator}

2. EOC (Op!ratjons 3. Assessment Area (Rad Ofticer. HHIth. Fi!l!ld Tum ComRIlter Oaerationl!.

Tech Reo) 4. EvaluatlDr

5. FH

--Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 001-004-04-01 Respond to an immovable and/or stuck control rod. Task Borate for one rod not fully inserted JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM A per ES-0.1 and ER-CVCS.1 KIA 004 A4.07 (3.9/3.7) Alternate Path Yes No Time Critical Yes No Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Boration/dilution. Use ER-CVCS.1 because normal boration flow can't be established. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The plant has experienced a reactor trip. The crew is currently at ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 4. Task Standard: RCS boration flow established. Required Materials: None General

References:

ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE ER-CVCS.1, REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL MALFUNCTION, Revision 00801 Handouts: Control Room copy of ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, kept up to Step 4. Initiating Cue: The CRS directs you to perform Step 4 of ES-0.1. Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with assigned task. Validation Time: 8 Minutes 2012 IL T NRC NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following: From protected IC-19 (100% MOL) The following fails the Makeup Mode Select Switch Insert OVR-D.I-CVCOBA, [False], Borate Signal Makeup Mode Select Switch Insert OVR-D.I-CVCOBB, [False], Auto Signal Makeup Mode Select Switch Insert OVR-D.I-CVCOBC, [False], Dilute Signal Makeup Mode Select Switch Insert OVR-D.I-CVCOBD, [False], Alt Dilute Signal Makeup Mode Select Switch Insert MALF ROD03-D4, Untrippable (Stuck Rod D4-Control Bank C), only one rod to use step 4 RNO procedure flowpath to clearly go to ER-CVCS.1 Insert OVR-D.I.-CVC34D, [False], MOV-350 fails to open-prevents 4 RNO being a success path if procedure use is incorrect. Trip the reactor Perform E-O to transition to ES-0.1, and then perform ES-0.1 up to (but NOT including) step 4. FREEZE If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 170 . INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Ensure PPCS Variable Boration Dilution screen is clear. Placekeep the Control Room copy of ES-0.1 up to (but NOT including) step 4, and place it on the HCO's desk. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 3 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J> Start Time: ____' " Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 2 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 3 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: ES-O.1 Step 4 Verify MRPI Indicates -ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM Point out marked up copy of ES-O.1 at HCO's desk. Chooses correct RNO with only ONE rod not fully inserted. Step 4 RNOa I F one Control Rod is NOT fully inserted, THEN perform the following: Place RMW mode selector switch to BORATE. Place RMW mode selector switch to BORATE. Step 4 RNO b Adjust boric acid integrator flow control valve, FCV-110A, for desired flowrate. Adjusts boric acid integrator flow control valve, FCV-11 OA to desired flowrate. If questioned "What is the desired flowrate?" respond with "SM has directed you to borate at the maximum rate." (a setting of ">9 gpm" on the FCV-110A controller) 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 4 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Performance Step: 4 Standard: Comment: VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4 RNO c Set boric acid integrator to desired amount (650 gallons for each control rod not fully inserted). Sets boric acid integrator to 650 gallons. To set the BA COUNTER: Push 'SEL' Button to move the number column to be adjusted. Raise or Lower the column vaule by depressing the U+" or " " Depress the 'ENT' Button to enter (Lock-in) the selected amount to be added. NOTE: -'C' Line is a running total for BA -There is a decimal point between the last two (2) 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 5 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION I EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP EXAMINER CUE: (After the Examinee determines the need for ER-CVCS.1) Provide the Examinee a clean copy of ER-CVCS.1. Performance Step: 5 Step 4 RNO d d. Place RMW control to start and verify flow. IF flow can NOT be established, THEN refer to ER-CVCS.1, REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL MALFUNCTION. Standard:

Places RMW control to start (Red light lit, Green light off) o No flow indicated on the BA FLOW chart recorder o Boric Acid Counter, YI C-11 0 not counting o Boric Acid Audible Device not "clicking"
It"'*IW_, Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Procedure PRECAUTION: Procedure PRECAUTION: Procedure

PRECAUTION: Performance Step: 6 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 7 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 6 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION ER-CVCS.1 PRECAUTIONS The charging pump suction automatically switches to the RWST (LCV 112B Open, LCV 112C Closed) when VCT level lowers to 5%. The use of MOV-350 for normal boration at power should be avoided as the valve must stroke fully open before it may be reclosed, making it difficult to control the amount of boric acid being added. IF boric acid filter DIP exceeds 20 psid, THEN the filter should be bypassed and a MWRlTR should be submitted. Examinee reviews PRECAUTIONS. Reviews PRECAUTIONS. IF field operator is asked for boric acid filter DIP reading in response to the PRECAUTION above, respond that "Local boric acid filter DIP is _ psid." (8 if 1 BA pump running or 12 psid If 2 BA pumps are running) ER-CVCS.1 Step 4.1.1.1 INITIATE Normal Boration as follows: 4.1.1.1 PLACE RMW Mode selector switch to BORATE Places RMW mode selector switch to BORATE. Examinee may recognize that step 4.1.1, Normal Boration, was already attempted unsuccessfully in ES-O.1, and continue with the next alternative -step 4.1.2. Instructor silence MCB alarms not associated with task. 20121LT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 8 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 9 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 10 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 7 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4.1.1.2 ADJUST boric acid flow control valve, HCV-110A to desired flowrate in AUTO. Adjusts HCV-110A to desired flowrate. Should have been done previously. Step Set boric acid integrator to desired Sets boric acid integrator to 650 Should have been set to 650 gallons Step PLACE RMW Control switch to Places RMW Control switch to START Should have been done previously. 2012 ILT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Performance Step: 11 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 12 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 13 Standard: Comment: Page VERIFICATION OF Step 4.1.1.5 Verify RMW control -ARMED. (Red light lit above RMW Control switch) Identifies Red light lit and Green light off.

Should have been verified previously
May go behind the MCB to read BA Pump pressure on Step 4.1.2.1 4.1.2 IF makeup system does NOT operate properly in BORATE, THEN perform the following:

4.1.2.1 OPEN blender outlet to charging pump suction AOV-110B. Recognizes that the makeup system does NOT properly in

Step 4.1.2.2 Start at least one boric acid pump. Red light lit, Green light off 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 9 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4.1.2.3 Performance Step: 14 PLACE boric acid flow control valve, HCV-110A, to MANUAL and open to establish desired flow. Standard: Checks indicated on the SA FLOW chart recorder Boric Acid Counter, YIC-110 counting Boric Acid Audible Device "clicking" Continues to monitor flow rate and amount added till required amount added. Comment: Terminating After BA flow is verified: "Evaluation on this JPM is complete. " Stop time: ____ 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 10 of 11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC JPM A Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 2012 ILT NRC JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 11 of 11 Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: INITIATING CUE: JPM CUE SHEET The plant has experienced a reactor trip. The crew is currently at ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 4. The CRS directs you to perform Step 4 of ES-0.1. Another operator will handle all other MCB operations and alarms not associated with assigned task. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 --Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 344-002-05-01 Perform Emergency Operations Task Secure SI Pumps as part of JPM No.: 20121LT NRC JPM B Terminating RCS Bleed and Feed KIA 006 A2.02 (3.9/4.3) Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Ability to (a) predict the impact of the following operations on the RCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to control the consequences of those operations: Loss of flow path. Requires multiple RNO actions. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the Objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The plant experienced a loss of secondary heat sink. 'A' SI pump is unavailable. The crew established RCS Bleed and Feed per FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK. AFW has been restored, and the adequacy of the Secondary Heat Sink has been verified per Step 29 of FR-H.1 The crew is in the process of terminating ReS Bleed and Feed. All three charging pumps are available. Task Standard: Secure the running SI pump per FR-H.1, beginning at Step 33 Required Materials: None General

References:

FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, Revision 04000 FIG-1.0, Min Subcooling, Rev 00100 Handouts: FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, placekept per Simulator Setup instructions up to Step 33 FIG-1.0, Min Subcooling, Rev 00100 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Initiating The CRS directs you to secure the running SI pumps per FR-H.1, beginning at Step 33. Validation Time: Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following: From protected 1C-19 (100% MOL) Pull-Stop both MDAFW pumps, and the TDAFW pump (initially) Pull-Stop 'A' SI pump and hang CAUTION tag Insert MALF STM09A, [100, on Trigger 1] (Main Steam Safety Failure: Vlv 3508) Insert MALF STM09B, [100, on Trigger 1] (Main Steam Safety Failure: Vlv 3509) Stop both MFPs and all Condensate pumps Insert Trigger 1 Perform E-O with transition to FR-H.1. Perform I placekeep FR-H.1 assuming that no feed sources are available. As soon as both SG WR levels are < 120 inches, clear the STM09A &B malfunctions, return to step 2 and continue to establish Bleed &Feed. At step 27, start both MDAFW pumps and restore level in at least one SG to >25%; and then continue FR-H.1 with step 28. Ensure PRZR level> 20% Ensure AFW flow is secured to any SG >25% Run simulator until RCS pressure is stable (-520 psig) and CETs are -300°F (this will ensure 120°F subcooling exists) When step 32 is reached, placekeep the step and stop. FREEZE If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 171 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have a place-kept copy of FR-H.1 and FIG-1.0, RCS Subcooling, ready to provide to the examinee. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 3 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET (Denote Critical Steps with a ") Start Time: ____ EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER NOTE: Performance Step: 1 Standard: Comment: EXAMINER NOTE: Performance Step: 2 Standard: Comment: Provide Examinee a marked copy of FR-H.1 and FIG-1.0 Currently two SI pumps running and both PORVs open Step Check If One Of Three SI Pumps Should Be

a. Three SI pumps -RUNNING b. Per RNa: If NOT, Go to Step 34 Confirms that only two SI pumps are running per o Band C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off

Goes to Step 34 Step 34 Currently two 51 pumps running and both PORVs open Check If One Of Two SI Pumps Should Be Stopped: a. Two SI pumps -RUNNING b. Determine required RCS subcooling from table: Observes that two SI pumps are running o Band C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off o SI flow indicated on FI-924 and FI-925
Determines (from the table) that 120°F of subcooling required 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Performance Step: 3 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 4 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 4 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 34 c RCS subcooling based on CETs GREATER THAN VALUE FROM TABLE ABOVE USING FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING

Obtains a copy of FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING
Determines that subcooling IS > 120°F
Goes to step 34d Subcooling

-130°F, required is [120°F] Step 34 d d. PRZR level-GREATER THAN 20% [40%] Refers to MCB PRZR level indicators (LI-426 -428), or Refers to PPCS PRZR level indication Determines that PZR level is >100% Goes to step 34e PRZR level will be offscale HI due to BOTH PORV's open for bleed and feed. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C EXAMINER NOTE: ...; Performance Step: 5 Standard: Comment: EXAMINER NOTE: Performance Step: 6 Standard: Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM B Page 5 of 20 Form E8-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 34e Currently two SI pumps running and both PORVs are open Stop one 81 pump Observes that two SI pumps are running Band C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off 81 flow indicated on FI-924 and FI-925 Goes to Step 35 Step 35 Currently one SI pump running and both PORVs are open Check If Last SI Pump Should Be Stopped: One SI pump -RUNNING Check the following: oRCS subcooling based on core exit TICs greater than OOF using FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING oRCS pressure greater than 1650 psig [1650 psig adverse CNMT] Observes that one 81 pump is running Running SIP Red light lit and Green light off SI flow indicated on the associated flow indicator 924 or FI-925) Using FIG-1.0, CETs and RCS pressure, determines that greater than OOF subcooling exists, Using RCS pressure indicators (PI-420-2 and/or 420A), or PPC8 RCS pressure indication, determines that RCS pressure is < 1650 psig Does NOT stop the running SI pump Goes to Step 35b RNO (Go to Step 36) NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C EXAMINER NOTE: Procedure Note: Performance Step: 7 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: EXAMINER NOTE: Procedure CAUTION: Performance Step: 8 Standard: Comment: Page 6 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 36 Currently one SI pump running and both PORVs open NOTE: After closing a PORV, it may be necessary to wait for RCS pressure to rise to permit stopping SI pumps in SI reduction steps. Check PRZR PORVs And Associated Block Valves -ANY BLEED PATH OPEN

Checks PRZR PORV indication (MCB center section)
Identifies that PORV-430 and PORV-431C are open
Goes to step 37 Per the WOG ERG Background document, the criteria for stopping the next SI pump is based upon steady-state conditions, and RCS pressure should be stable or rising Step 37 Currently one SI pump running and both PORVs open IF RCS is solid, closure of PORVs will result in rapid RCS pressure rise unless RCS temperature and RCS inflow carefully Isolate PRZR Bleed PRZR PORVs -BOTH OPEN Identifies that PORV-430 and PORV-431 C are open and goes to step 37b. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 7 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 37b EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI pump running and both PORV's open Performance Step: 9 b. Close one open PRZR PORV and place in AUTO: Standard:

Once PORV is closed, Goes to Step 37c. Comment: Step 37c. EXAMINER NOTE: Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open Performance Step: 10 c. Returns to Step 33. Standard:
Returns back to step 33 Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C EXAMINER NOTE: Performance Step: 11 Standard: Comment: EXAMINER NOTE: Performance Step: 12 Standard: Comment: Page 8 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 33 Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open Check If One Of Three SI Pumps Should Be Stopped: a. Three SI pumps -RUNNING o Per RNO: If NOT, Go to Step 34 Confirms that only one SI pumps are running per o B or C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off

Goes to Step 34 Step 34 Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open Check If One Of Two SI Pumps Should Be Stopped: a. Two SI pumps -RUNNING Per RNO: If NOT, Go to Step 35 Observes that one SI pump is running o B or C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off o SI flow indicated on FI-924 and FI-925 Goes to Step 35 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 9 of 20 Form ES-C-1 EXAMINER NOTE: Performance Step: 13 Standard: Comment: JPM CUE Step 35 Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open Check If Last SI Pump Should Be Stopped: One SI pump -RUNNING Check the following: oRCS subcooling based on core exit TICs greater than OOF using FIG-1.D, FIGURE MIN SUBCOOLING oRCS pressure greater than 1650 psig [1650 psig adverse CNMT] b. RNO Goes to Step 36 Observes that one SI pump is running Running SIP Red light lit and Green light off SI flow indicated on the associated flow indicator 924 or FI-925) Using FIG-1.0, CETs and RCS pressure, determines that greater than O°F subcooling exists Using RCS pressure indicators (PI-420-2 and/or 420A), or PPCS RCS pressure indication, determines that RCS pressure is< 1650 psig. Per 35b RNO goes to step 36 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C EXAMINER NOTE: Procedure Note: Performance Step: 14 Standard: Comment: EXAMINER NOTE: Procedure CAUTION: Performance Step: 15 Standard: Comment: Page 10 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 36 Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open NOTE: After closing a PORV, it may be necessary to wait for RCS pressure to rise to permit stopping SI pumps in SI reduction steps. Check PRZR PORVs And Associated Block Valves -ANY BLEED PATH OPEN

Checks PRZR PORV indication (MCB center section)
Identifies that PORV-430 or PORV-431C is open
Goes to step 37 Step 37a Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open IF RCS is solid, closure of PORVs will result in rapid RCS pressure rise unless RCS temperature and RCS inflow are carefully controlled.

Isolate PRZR Bleed Paths: a. PRZR PORVs -BOTH OPEN Identifies that PORV-430 or PORV-431C is open and goes to step 37a RNO 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 16 EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 17 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 11 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 37a RNO a. Perform the

1) Stop all but one charging Step 25 has previously established maximum charging flow Step 37a RNO a.2 Control charging flow to maintain RCS pressure and PRZR level. Observes RCS pressure and PRZR level Refers to MCB RCS pressure indicators (PI-420-2 and/or PI-420A), or PPCS RCS pressure indication Refers to MCB PRZR level indicators (LI-426, LI-427 , and LI-428), or PPCS PRZR level indication If pressure and level are lowering, raises charging pump speed If pressure and level are rising, reduces charging pump speed If pressure and level are stable, makes no adjustment to charging pump speed With a PORV open and one SI pump running it is likely that the PRZR will indicate full, and therefore, the examinee will likely reduce charging pump speed. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Performance Step: 18 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 19 Standard: EXAMINERS NOTE: Comment: Page 12 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 37a RNO a.3 3) Establish excess letdown as a) Place AOV-312 to

Ensures AOV-312 in NORMAL AOV-312 should already be in NORMAL at this time. Step 37 RNO a.3 b -d b) Reset both trains of XY relays for AOV-310 and 745. c) Manually open CCW from excess letdown Hx 745). Ensure excess letdown flow control valve, HCV-123 is closed, demand at o.
Ensures HCV-123 demand at zero o Controller (MCB left section) -0 is fully to the left AOV-745 switch will already be in the open position and AOV-745 will open as soon as the XY relays are reset. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 13 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 37 RNa a.3 e & f Performance Step: 20 e) Reset both trains of XY relays for MOV-313. f) Open MOV-313. Standard: Comment: Step 37 RNa a.3 9 & h Performance Step: 21 g) Open excess letdown isolation valve AOV-310. h) Slowly open HCV-123. Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: For current plant conditions, the response on TI-122 and 121 will be minimal. Comment: 20121LT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 22 Standard: Comment: EXAMINER NOTE: '" Performance Step: 23 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM B Page 14 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 37 RNO a.3 i i) Adjust Charging Pump speed as necessary Observes RCS pressure and PRZR level Refers to MCB RCS pressure indicators (PI-420-2 and/or PI-420A), or PPCS RCS pressure indication Refers to MCB PRZR level indicators (LI-426, LI-427, and LI-428), or PPCS PRZR level indication If pressure and level are lowering, raises charging pump speed If pressure and level are rising, reduces charging pump speed If pressure and level are stable, makes no adjustment to charging pump speed Step 37 b &c Currently one SI Pump running and one PORV open Close one open PRZR PORV and place in AUTO Return to step 33 itto '. Turns the PORV switch to the CLOSE position and then returns it to the AUTO position Verifies green light lit and red light off Returns back to Step 33 With both PORVs closed, injection flow from the SI pump and charging pumps will cause RCS pressure to rise. The only removal of RCS mass at this time is excess letdown flow, which ranges from a few gpm at low pressure to -20 gpm at NOP. When RCS pressure rises to SI pump shutoff head, RCS pressure will continue to rise due to the mismatch between charging flow and excess letdown flow. NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C EXAMINER NOTE: Performance Step: 24 Standard: Comment: EXAMINER NOTE: Performance Step: 25 Standard: Comment: Page 15 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 33 Currently one SI pump running and both PORVs Closed Check If One Of Three SI Pumps Should Be Stopped: c. Three SI pumps -RUNNING d. Per RNO: If NOT, Go to Step 34 Confirms that only two SI pumps are running per o Band C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off

Goes to Step 34 Step 34 Currently one SI pump running and both PORVs Closed Check If One Of Two SI Pumps Should Be Stopped: c. Two SI pumps -RUNNING d. Determine required RCS subcooling from table: Observes that two SI pumps are running o Band C SI Pump Red lights lit and Green lights off o SI flow indicated on FI-924 and FI-925
Determines (from the table) that 120°F of subcooling required 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 16 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE EXAMINER NOTE: Performance Step: 26 Standard: Comment: Step 35 Currently one SI pump running and both PORVs are closed. Check If Last SI Pump Should Be Stopped: One 51 pump -RUNNING Check the following: oRCS subcooling based on core exit TICs greater than OOF using FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN 5UBCOOLING oRCS pressure greater than 1650 pSig [1650 psig adverse CNMT] Observes that one SI pump is running Running SIP Red light lit and Green light off SI flow indicated on the associated flow indicator 924 or FI-925) Using FIG-1.0, CETs and RCS pressure, determines that greater than O°F subcooling exists, HOWEVER Using RCS pressure indicators (PI-420-2 and/or 420A), or PPCS RCS pressure indication, determines that RCS pressure is < 1650 psig Does NOT stop the running SI pump Goes to Step 35b RNO When directed to go to step 36 observes Note prior to step 36. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C EXAMINER NOTE: Performance Step: 27 Procedure Note: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER NOTE: Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Page 17 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Step 35b (RNO) Currently one 51 pump running and both PORVs are closed. NOTE: After closing a PORV, it may be necessary to wait for RCS pressure to rise to permit stopping SI pumps in SI reduction steps. PORV's are closed, one 51 pump is running and RCS pressure is rising slowly. During validations it takes 8-10 minutes for RCS pressure >1650 psig. The examinee should recognize per the Note that it will take some time for RCS pressure to rise >1650 psig and wait to meet the 51 termination criteria of FR-H.1 o The following are acceptable choices to complete task: 1. Waits for RCS pressure to rise above 1650 psig and secures the last 51 pump per step 35. 2. Candidate may vocalize that they understand and the need to wait for RCS pressure to rise> 1650 psig to allow securing of the last 51 pump. 2012 ILT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 18 of 20 Form ES-C-1 Terminating Cue: Stop time: ____ JPM CUE SHEET Secures the last SI pump after RCS pressure rises to greater than 1650 pSig OR Candidate may vocalize that they understand and the need to wait for RCS pressure to rise> 1650 psig to allow securing the last SI pump. 20121LT NRC JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 19 of 20 Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM B Examinee's Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date: 2012 ILT NRC B NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE INITIAL INITIATING The plant experienced a loss of secondary heat sink. 'A' SI pump is unavailable. The crew established RCS Bleed and Feed per FR-H.1 , RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK. AFW has been restored, and the adequacy of the Secondary Heat Sink has been verified per Step 29 of FR-H.1 The crew is in the process of terminating RCS Bleed and Feed. All three charging pumps are available. The CRS directs you to secure the running SI pumps per FR-H.1, beginning at Step 33. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 --Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 006-018-05-01 Transfer SI to High Head Recirc Task Align SI and RHR Systems For High JPM No.: 20121LT NRC JPM C Head Recirculation KIA 002 A2.04 (4.3/4.6) Alternate Path Yes No Time Critical Yes No Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCS; and (b) based Per A-601.1 0, Event 6 (LOCAs), on those predictions use procedures to correct, control RHR pump swap to CNMT Sump or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or alignment required to be completed operations: Loss of heat sinks. in 10 minutes NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial

The plant was at 100% power when a LOCA occurred. The Crew has transitioned to ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION. RHR has been aligned to take suction from CNMT Sump B. Task Complete the alignment of SI pump suction to the RHR pump discharge, and initiate SI flow within 10 minutes of stopping the last SI pump taking suction from the RWST. Required None General

References:

ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, Revision 04600 A-601.10 , Time Critical Action Management Program, Rev 00003 Handouts: Control Room copy of ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, place-kept up to step 9.

FIG-19.0, High Head SI Required, Rev 002 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Initiating Cue: As the HCO, you have been tasked to continue with ES-1.3 starting at step 9. This is a time-critical JPM. An Examiner will act as a second board operator and respond to all alarms and conditions NOT related to your task. Validation Time: 10 Minutes (for the entire JPM)(5-9 min for time critical actions) Time Critical Basis: Per A-601.1 0, TIME CRITICAL ACTION MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, If RCS pressure is above RHR pump shutoff head, High head alignment and SI pump restart must be completed within 10 minutes. Completion within this time limit will maintain core inventory. 2012 IL T NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following: From protected IC-19 (100% MOL) Insert MALF RCS02D, [10,000 gpm] (RCS Leak Into CNMT: Loop B Cold Leg) until RWST level <28%, then reduce leak size to 4000 gpm Perform E-O, E-1, and ES-1.2 Do NOT initiate cooldown in ES-1.2 Ensure both spray pumps are running to deplete RWST When 28% is reached in the RWST perform ES-1.3 up to step 9. FREEZE when the RWST level reaches 15%. If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to Ie __ INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Placekeep the Control Room copy of ES-1.3 up to (but NOT including) step 9, and place it and FIG-19.0 on the HCO's desk. Ensure MCB key is present and clearly visible in the Simulator key drawer. Due to being a time critical ..IPM, do not pre-brief the student (e.g., in classroom) with task or procedure prior to the start of the Go to RUN when Operator takes watch. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 4 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J) Start Time: ____ EXAMINER NOTE: Procedure Caution: Procedure Note: Performance Step: 1 Standard: Comment: Point out marked up copy of ES-1.3 on HCO's desk. ES-1.3, Step 9 Sump recirculation flow to RCS must be maintained at all times, except during alignment for high head recirculation. The TSC should be requested to establish periodic monitoring of the Aux Bldg sub-basement, as radiological conditions permit, to monitor RHR pump operation. Check RWST Level -LESS THAN 15% Reads the Caution and Note Observes MCB RWST level indicators -LI-920 and 921 less than 15% Recognizes that annunciator B-16, RWST LO-LO LEVEL 15%, is lit 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 5 of 15 Form ES-C-1 Procedure Note: Standard: Comment: VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 10 a Cold leg injection should be reinitiated within 4 hours -5.5 hours after stopping SI pumps. Stop All Pumps Supplied From RWST: Stop operating CNMT spray pump and place in PULL STOP Identifies the running spray pump Red light lit and green light off Turns pistol-grip switch counter clockwise and withdraws the switch to the PULL Stop position Verifies green light and red light off Observes that Spray Additive flow, FI-930, (MCB left section) lowers to zero gpm 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 6 of 15 Form ES-C-1 Performance Step: 3 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 10 b & c b. Check CNMT pressure -LESS THAN 28 PSIG c. Reset CNMT spray if necessary

Determines that CNMT pressure is < 28 psig PI-945, PI-947, and PI-949 indicate < 28 psig Annunciator A-28, CONTAINMENT SPRAY CHANNEL ALERT 2/3 >28 PSI, extinguished
Depresses the CNMT Spray Reset pushbutton Verifies annunciator A-27, CONTAINMENT SPRAY 2/3 + 2/3 > 28 PSI, extinguished Annunciator A-28 alarms when either 213 front MCB left section (PI-945, 947, or 949) OR 213 back MCB left section (PI-946, 948, or 950) are> 28 psig (43 psia for back of MCB). Annunciator A-27 alarms when both 2/3 front MCB left section (PI-945, 947, or 949) AND 2/3 back MCB left section (PI-946, 948, or 950) are> 28 psig (43 psia for back of MCB). The back of the MCB indication can also be utilized for indication, but because it is out of the way and reads out in PSIA rather than psig, it is usually not utilized for this task. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Performance Step: 4 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 7 of 15 VERIFICATION OF Step 10 d Close CNMT spray pump discharge Closes any open CNMT spray pump discharge valves Turns switch counter clockwise to CLOSE and allows the switch to spring return to the AUTO position Verifies green light lit and red light off At this point in the procedure one spray pump should already have been secured and its associated discharge valves closed. Step 10 e Stop all charging pumps. -Reduces charging pump speed to minimum using the controller -Verifies green flag showing -Verifies green light lit and red light off -Verifies Charging Line Flow indication (FI-128C) lowers to zero GPM (MCB center section), after last pump stopped Charging Line Flow indication, FI-1288 (MCB left section) also provides the same indication. However, due to its location, normally FI-128C is utilized rather than FI-1288. A and C Charging pump are running. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 8 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Step 10 f Stop all SI pumps and place in PULL STOP Standard:

Verifies green flag showing Verifies red light and green light off Verifies SI Line Flow indication (FI-924 and FI-925) lowers to zero GPM (MCB left section), after last pump stopped. Comment: Start 10 Min Time Critical Clock: ____ (Starts when the last SI pump is stopped.)

20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Procedure Caution: " Performance Step: 7 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 9 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 11 a Cooldown and depressurization will raise cold leg injection flow which may result in an adverse condition in the F-OA, INTEGRITY status tree. If RCS subcooling based on CETs is less than OaF using Fig-1.0, FIGURE MIN SU8COOLlNG, then cooldown to initiate RHR injection should be completed before transition to either FR-P INTEGRITY procedure. Align SI And CNMT Spray For Sump Recirculation: Close RWST outlet valves to SI and CNMT spray pumps (turn on DC power key switches) MOV-896A MOV-8968 Retrieves MC8 key from Simulator Key Drawer Observes MOV-896A stroking closed -both red and green lights lit Observes MOV-8968 stroking closed -both red and green lights lit Observes both MOV-896 A and 8 closed -green light lit and red light off MOV-896A and MOV*896B each have a stroke time of -15 seconds. Once action is initiated to close the first valve, it is NOT necessary to wait for that valve to fully close before continuing with the next action {the next valve}. The valves may be done in any order. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Page 10 of 15 Form Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 11 b Close 81 pump RECIRC Observes MOV-898 stroking closed -both red and green lights lit Observes MOV-897 stroking closed -both red and green lights lit Observes both MOV-898 and MOV-897 closed -green light lit and red light off MOV-898 and MOV-897 each have a stroke time of -10 seconds. Once action is initiated to close the first valve, it is NOT necessary to wait for that valve to fully close before continuing with the next action (the next valve). The valves may be done in any order. After the second valve has started closing it is acceptable to continue with the next step of the procedure (step 12). 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Standard: Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM Page 11 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 12 a Verify Adequate RCS Makeup Flow: RCS pressure -LESS THAN 250 psjg [300 psig adverse CNMT]

Observes RCS pressure on: RX CLNT LOOP LO RNG PRESS, PI-420 (MCB left section), or oRCS PRESSURE indicators, PI-420-2, and PI-420A (MCB center section), or PPCS
To use PI-420, the Examinee will have to place ReS RNG PRESS DEFEAT PI-420 switch to ON, if it is already in the ON Step 12 b RHR injection flow adequate: CETs -LESS THAN requirements of FIG-19.0, High Head SI Required Check RVLlS level (no RCPs) -GREATER THAN 52% [55%

IF either condition NOT met, THEN go to Step

Obtains Core exit TICs from PPCS
Uses the RCS pressure just observed in step 12a NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 12 of 15 Form ES-C-1 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 12 d Align operating RHR pump flow path(s) to SI and CNMT spray IF RHR Pump A operating, THEN open MOV-857A and MOV-857C IF RHR Pump 8 operating, THEN open MOV-8578 Determines which RHR pump is running Red flag visible Red light lit and green light off V (For MOV-8578) Turns switch clock-wise to the OPEN position and then allows it to spring return to the center position Verifies red light lit and green light off RHR Pump 'B' was started previously in Step S.d 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 13 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 12 e e. Start 2 SI Pumps Standard: o Observes that the red flag is visible o Observes that the red light is lit and green light is off o Observes flow on FI-924 and FI-925 Comment: Stop 10 Min Time Critical Clock: ____ (Stopped when the first SI pump is started.) Terminating When Examinee starts SI pumps: "Evaluation on this JPM is complete." Stop time: ____ Time Critical Duration (TC Stop Time -TC Start Time): ______ 2012 IL T NRC NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 14 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC C Examinee's Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question: Response: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date: 2012 ILT NRC JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 INITIAL INITIATING VERIFICATION OF The plant was at 100% power when a LOCA occurred. The Crew has transitioned to ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION. RHR has been aligned to take suction from CNMT Sump B. As the HCO, you have been tasked to continue with ES-1.3 starting at step 9. This is a time-critical ...IPM. An Examiner will act as a second board operator and respond to all alarms and conditions NOT related to your task. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 --Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 45-016-01-01 Synchronize the turbine generator with grid. Task Synchronize Generator On-Line with No.: 2012 ILT NRC D improper load pickup KIA 045 A2.17 (2.7*/2.9*) Alternate Path Yes No Time Critical Yes No Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operation on the MTIG system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Malfunction of electrohydraulic control. Generator load pickup is inadequate. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The generator is being started following a refueling outage. The generator is at 1800 rpm and the turbine is fully warmed up. The generator output voltage is 19 KV. Task Standard: Generator synchronized on-line with gross load between 40 to 60 MW. Required Materials: None General

References:

0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, Rev 19602 Handouts: 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, placekept up to step 6.13. (Pages 1-11,55, and 66-74) 0-1.2, ATT-2, No Load Excitation Limits for #1 and #11 Transformers, Rev 19602 FIG-13.0, Back Pressure, Rev 0 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Initiating Cue:

The SM directs you to synchronize the generator on-line per 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, steps 6.13.1 through 6.13.10.
The HCO will control the primary plant. Validation Time: 15 Minutes 20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following: Reset to IC-8 (Turbine 1800 rpm) Withdraw control rods to ensure reactor power> 15% but < 20%. Ensure FRVs in Auto. Ensure generator output voltage at 19 KV. Insert MALF TUR18 [0] (Failure of Turbine Auto Load Pickup) Ensure Grid voltage [E-MIS10] is low enough to allow the examinee to adjust incoming voltage to slightly greater than system voltage, while maintaining generator voltage < 19.5 KV (Step 6.13.4) Set REM EDS017 to Closed (Sta 13A Man Disconnect 1G13A73) Set REM EDS016 to Closed (Sta 13A Man Disconnect 9X13A71) FREEZE If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 173 . INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Placekeep a copy of 0-1.2 up to (but NOT including) step 6.13. Ensure page 55 is included (CAUTION at beginning of Subsection 6.9). Ensure Attachment 2, No Load Excitation Limits for #1 and #11 Transformers, is included with handout materials. Ensure FIG-13.0, Figure Back Pressure, is available. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 4 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ..J) Start Time: ____ Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Procedure Note: Performance Step: 2 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Step 6.13.1 PLACE synchroscope switch handle in CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE. Places synchroscope switch handle in CIRCUIT BKR 1 G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE. There is a single switch handle that may be placed in either CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE, or CIRCUIT BKR 9X 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE. Provide marked up copy of 0-1.2 to Examinee. Step 6.13.2 WHEN next step is performed, THEN MCB Alarm J-5, #11 OR #12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH, will cycle in and out of alarm as the Generator phases in and out of sync with the grid. PLACE CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to ON. Rotates CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch clockwise to the ON position. Alarm J-5 may cycle in and out of alarm per the note. (If Alarm J-5 is cycling in and out of alarm): "The CRS gives you permission to allow alarm J-5 to flash." 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Procedure Note: Performance Step: 3 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 5 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.3 Synchroscope should be rotating slowly in the FAST (clockwise) direction in the next step. IF Turbine Generator frequency is slightly higher than system frequency, THEN synchroscope should be rotating in the FAST (clockwise) direction. IF rotating counter clockwise, THEN a raise in speed will be required. IF Turbine Generator speed adjustment must be made, THEN PERFORM the following: OTHERWISE, MARK this Step NfA. ADJUST SETTER up OR down 1 rpm. (Turbine EH Control Panel) DEPRESS GO pushbutton. (Turbine EH Control Panel) REPEAT Steps 6.13.3.1 AND 6.13.3.2 UNTIL synchroscope is rotating slow in the FAST (clockwise) direction. Observes the SYNCHROSCOPE (MCB right section) ., Up or down arrow push buttons depressed to raise flower the setter GO pushbutton depressed to cause the turbine speed to change until the REFERENCE matches the SETTER Up, down, and GO push buttons are located on EH control panel Digital REFERENCE and SETTER indication is located above the EH control panel 2012 IL T NRC ..IPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 6 of 16 Form ES-C-1 Performance Step: 4 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.4.1 WHEN Turbine is at synchronous speed, THEN REPEAT the following as necessary to ensure generator INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage is slightly higher than system RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage: 1. CHECK voltage on all three phases. Rotates the GENERATOR VOLTMETER switch to each phase position and compares:

INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage to the
RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage o A-8 phase o 8-C phase o C-A phase INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) is located to the left of the SYNCHROSCOPE. RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) is located to the right of the SYNCHROSCOPE.

20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 5 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 6 Standard: Comment: Page 7 of 16 VERIFICATION OF Step 6.13.4.2 WHILE maintaining voltage within the acceptable operating region of Attachment 2, No Load Excitation Limits for #1 and #11 Transformers, TRY to adjust BASE ADJUSTER to make INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage slightly higher than RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage. Refers to Attachment 2 Adjusts BASE ADJUSTER (IF necessary) to make INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage slightly higher than RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage. Does NOT allow GENERATOR voltage to exceed 19.5 KV (per Attachment

2) Initial IC setup may make the performance of this step unnecessary (removed previous CT status) Voltage will remain within the acceptable operating region of Attachment 2 as long as the Examinee keeps the GENERATOR voltage < 19.5 KV. Step 6.13.4.3 IF INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage CANNOT be made slightly higher than RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage, THEN PERFORM the following:

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. REQUEST RG&E Energy Control Center to adjust system voltage. REPEAT Steps 6.13.4.1 through 6.13.4.3 as necessary. Marks step N/A 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 7 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 8 Performance Step: 9 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: (as HCO) Comment: Page 8 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.5 PLACE CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to OFF. Rotates CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch counter clockwise to OFF. Step 6.13.6 WHEN disconnects are closed at 13A, THEN OBSERVE the following (red) CLOSED lights ILLUMINATED: GENERATOR DISCONNECT 1 G13A71 GENERATOR DISCONNECT 9X13A73 Observes that the disconnects are closed: red lights lit Step ENSURE Reactor power is between 15% to Observes Power Range channels NI-41C, NI-42C, 43C, and NI-44C between 15% and 20%, or Observes Reactor power indication on PPCS between 15% and 20%, or Directs the HCO to report power level (If asked to report power level): "Power level is _ {current power level)". 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 9 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.8 Performance Step: 10 REVIEW CAUTION at beginning of Subsection

6.9. Standard

Reviews CAUTION. Comment: Step 6.13.9 Performance Step: 11 PLACE CIRCUIT BKR 1 G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to ON. Standard: Rotates CIRCUIT BKR 1 G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch clockwise to ON. EXAMINER CUE: (If Alarm J-5 is cycling in and out of alarm): "The CRS gives you permission to allow alarm J-5 to flash." Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Procedure CAUTION: Performance Step: 12 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 10 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.10.1 At low MWe output, Turbine loading requirements SHALL be observed PER EOP, FIG-13.0, Figure Back Pressure Operation in the Avoid Region SHOULD be minimized. Operation in the DO NOT OPERATE region SHALL be limited to 5 minutes. PERFORM the following to CLOSE CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 BUS 1 115KV: WITH RG&E Energy Control Center concurrence, TRY to adjust BASE ADJUSTER so generator INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage is slightly higher than system RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage as indicated on all three phases. Contacts RG&E ECC by direct telephone line as necessary Rotates the GENERATOR VOLTMETER switch to phase position and INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage to the RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage A-B phase B-C phase C-A phase Adjusts BASE ADJUSTER as necessary so INCOMING voltage is slightly higher than SYSTEM voltage on all phases Completed previously. Further adjustment should not be required. 2012 IL T NRC ..IPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 11 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.10.2 Performance Step: 13 IF INCOMING VOLTMETER (GENERATOR) voltage CANNOT __ be adjusted slightly higher than system RUNNING VOLTMETER (SYSTEM) voltage, THEN PERFORM the following: OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. Marks 6.13.10.2. a and b N/A. Comment: Step 6.13.10.3 Performance Step: REVIEW Steps 6.13.10.4 thru 6.13.10.6 prior to closing CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 BUS 1 115KV to ensure timely actions are taken for automatic load pickup to preclude a generator trip from reverse power. Reviews Steps 6.13.10.4 thru 6.13.10.6 Comment: 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 1 of 16 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.10.4 Procedure MCB Alarm J-S, #11 or #12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH, will stay EXTINGUISHED during performance of next step . .y; Performance Step: WHEN synchroscope rotating slow in the FAST (clockwise) direction AND approaching 12 o'clock position, THEN CLOSE CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 BUS 1 11SKV so breaker closes at the approximate point of synchronism (12 o'clock).

a. RECORD time of closure

Observes synchroscope
Observes 1 G 13A72 red lights lit
Records time of closure EXAMINER Examinee may not record breaker closure time until after automatic load pickup is verified.

This is acceptable to ensure timely actions are taken for automatic load pickup to preclude a generator trip from reverse power. Comment: I EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP Step 6.13.10.5 Procedure Load is to be maintained between 40 to 60 MW UNTIL hold time in Step 6.14.S.2 is completed. -.J Performance Step: VERIFY Automatic load pickup occurs within approximately 1 0 ";i"{"* seconds. Standard: Comment: 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 13 of 16 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.13.10.6 Performance Step: IF automatic load pickup does NOT occur within approximately 10 seconds, THEN PERFORM the following: OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. DEPRESS TURB. MANUAL pushbutton. (Turbine EH Control Panel) INTERMITTENTLY DEPRESS the following push buttons as necessary to adjust generator gross load between 40 to 60 MW: MANUAL CONTROL VALVE LOWER MANUAL CONTROL VALVE RAISE Standard: Observes OPER PAN light off and TURB MANUAL light lit Observes digital Generator Gross MW indication

Comment: Step 6.13.10.7 Performance Step: PLACE CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch to OFF.

Rotates CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE control switch counter clockwise to the OFF position. Comment: 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 14 of 16 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Form ES-C-1 Performance Step: 19 Step 6.13.10.8 REMOVE synchroscope switch handle from CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE. Standard: Removes synchroscope switch handle from CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE. Comment: Terminating Cue: After synchroscope switch handle is removed from CIRCUIT BKR 1G 13A72 SYNCHROSCOPE: Evaluation on this JPM is complete. Stop time: ____ 20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 15 of 16 VERIFICATION OF Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 IL T NRC D Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 20121LT NRC JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Form INITIAL INITIATING JPM CUE The generator is being started following a refueling outage. The generator is at 1800 rpm and the turbine is fully warmed up. The generator output voltage is 19 KV. The SM directs you to synchronize the generator on-line per 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD, steps 6.13.1 through 6.13.10. The HCO will control the primary plant. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 --Page 1 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 015-001-01-01 Verify proper operation of the Nuclear Instrumentation System. Task Perform STP-O-6.1 on Source JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM E Range N-31 KIA 015 A4.02 (3.9/3.9) Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: NIS indicators. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The plant is shutdown. Both Source Range Channels are operable. The HCO has declared N-31 I NOPERABLE for performance of surveillance testing per A-52.4, Attachment IV. Containment is locked. Core Alterations are NOT in progress. STP-O-6.1 Prerequisites, step 5.0, has been completed. Task Standard: STP-O-6.1 performed correctly for N-31 up to step 6.1.9. Required Materials: None General

References:

STP-O-6.1, SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM CHANNELS N-31 AND N-32, Revision 00102 Handouts: STP-O-6.1, SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM CHANNELS N-31 AND N-32, Revision 00102 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 2 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Initiating Cue: The CRS directs you to perform STP-O-6.1, SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM CHANNELS N-31 AND N-32, for N-31, steps 6.1 through (and including)

6.1.8. Wherever

verification is required, place a check mark in the initial block and assume that the verification has been completed. Validation Time: 25 Minutes 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Job Performance Form ES-C-1 Worksheet SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following: Reset to IC-21 (HSD -1 hour trip from IC-12) Set REM N I S098 to 400 Set REM N I S099 to 400 If using an I C developed for this exam, reset to I C 174 . INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Mark-up STP-O-6.1 up to step 6.1. Have a marked-up copy of STP-O-6.1 ready to provide to the Examinee. Ensure START UP RATE CHANNEL SELECTOR selected to N-31 , on COMPARATOR AND RATE DRAWER. Ensure AUDIO COUNT RATE can be heard in Main Control Room: Depress the STOP, then RESET, then START pushbuttons Adjust the Level Adjust threshold slowly CCW until the display reads a value (divided by the number of seconds being counted) and the audio CR signal can be heard. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Page 4 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet (Denote Critical Steps with a Start Time: _____' EXAMINER NOTE: Procedure Note: Performance Step: 1 Standard: Comment: Provide marked-up copy of STP-O-6.1 to Examinee. AUDIO COUNT RATE CHANNEL is on the column of panels all the way to the right. Step 6.1.1.1 to 6.1.1.3 Due to electrical interlock between TRIP BYPASS switch and OPERATION SELECTOR switch the Main Control Board SR High Flux level trip annunciator cannot be checked with the test signal. PERFORM the following to prepare for Surveillance Testing of N-31: ENSURE N-32 is OPERABLE, prior to removing N-31 from service. (N/A this Step if N-32 is not required to be OPERABLE) REQUEST HCO to declare N-31 INOPERABLE for performance of surveillance testing PER A-52.4, Attachment IV. PLACE CHANNEL SELECTOR to N-32, on AUDIO COUNT Rate Channel. Reads the note. Initials step 6.1.1.1 based on Initial Conditions. Initials step 6.1.1.2 based on Initial Conditions. Ensures CHANNEL SELECTOR switch is selected to N-32, on AUDIO COUNT Rate Channel.

2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 5 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.1.4 to 6.1.1.7 Performance Step: 2 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: IF AUDIO COUNT RATE cannot be heard in Main Control Room, CHECK AUDIO COUNT RATE panel. PLACE START UP RATE CHANNEL SELECTOR to 32, on COMPARATOR AND RATE DRAWER. VERIFY HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN switch for N-31 is in BLOCK position on Source Range N-31. VERIFY annunciator E-5, HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN CNMT AUDIBLE BLOCKED, is ILLUMINATED. Recognizes that the AUDIO COUNT RATE can be heard Main Places START UP RATE CHANNEL SELECTOR to N-32, on COMPARATOR AND RATE DRAWER. Verifies HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN switch for N-31 is BLOCK position on Source Range Verifies annunciator E-5, HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN AUDIBLE BLOCKED, is COMPARATOR AND RATE DRAWER is on the column of panels all the way to the right. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Page 14 Procedure Note: Procedure Note: Performance Step: 3 Standard: Comment: Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.2 The PPCS SHOULD be used to monitor N-31 response, utilizing PPCS Point N31, during the performance of surveillance testing, if available. The following step will cause MCB Annunciator E-7, NIS TRIP BYPASS, to annunciate. PERFORM the following to defeat the Reactor Trip input from N-31: PLACE LEVEL TRIP switch for N-31 to BYPASS position. VERIFY local light, LEVEL TRIP BYPASS, VERIFY bypass status panel light, SOURCE RANGE-1 TRIP BYPASS, ILLUMINATED. VERIFY annunciator E-7, NIS TRIP BYPASS, annunciates. (N/A if already in alarm from another NIS channel) Rotates the N-31 LEVEL TRIP switch clockwise to the BYPASS position Verifies local light, LEVEL TRIP BYPASS, is ILLUMINATED. Verifies bypass status panel light, SOURCE RANGE-1 TRIP BYPASS, ILLUMINATED. Silences and acknowledges E-7 alarm. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Performance Step: 4 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 5 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: 20121LT NRC JPM E Page 7 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.3 PERFORM the following to record initial data for N-31: RECORD N-31 CPS on local indicator. RECORD N-31 CPS to the Background Reading blank below the table on Attachment 1, for N-31. Records local value for N-31 in step 6.1.3.1 . Records local value for N-31 in the Background Reading blank below the table on Attachment 1, for N-31. Background value will be between 1S0-200 CPS Step 6.1.4 PERFORM Attachment 1, for N-31 to verify N-31 indications respond to test signals. CHANGE the OPERATION SELECTOR switch sequentially through the various CPS positions and VERIFY correct response from channel indicators and recorder. The indicators and recorder will show injected test signal level plus background reading. For 60CPS position: 240-250 CPS (50-75 > BKGD) For 10 3 position: SOO -1200 CPS For 10 5 position: Sx10 4 -1.2x10 5 CPS NOTE: Reference values from Attachment 1 (After values have been verified and recorded for the 60CPS, 10 3 CPS, and 10 5 CPS SEL Switch Settings): "Assume the rest of the table is completed with all values satisfactory, and continue with the procedure." NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 6 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 7 Standard: Comment: Page 8 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.5 to 6.1.7 RETURN Operation Selector Switch to 60 CPS position. VERIFY local light, CHANNEL ON TEST, ILLUMINATED. VERIFY Annunciator E-1, NIS CHANNEL TEST, annunciates. Returns Operation Selector Switch to 60 CPS position. Verifies local light, CHANNEL ON TEST, illuminated. Verifies Annunciator E-1, NIS CHANNEL TEST, annunciates. Acknowledges the E-1 alarm. E-1 will already be in alarm and acknowledged from the previous step. Step 6.1.8.1 PERFORM the following, to test High Flux at Shutdown Alarm. TURN LEVEL ADJUST potentiometer fully CLOCKWISE. Turns LEVEL ADJUST potentiometer fully COUNTER CLOCKWISE. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Procedure Note: Performance Step: 8 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 9 Performance Step: 10 Standard: Comment: Page 9 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.8.2 The following step will cause MCB Annunciator, E-1, NIS CHANNEL TEST, to annunciate. PLACE OPERATION SELECTOR switch to LEVEL ADJUST position.

Verifies Annunciator E-1, NIS CHANNEL TEST, annunciates.
Acknowledges the E-1 alarm. Step 6.1.8.3 NOTIFY personnel in containment that Source Range High Flux at Shutdown Alarm will be tested by making announcement over plant page. (N/A this step if containment is locked)
Marks step N/A Step 6.1.8.4 PLACE HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN switch for N-31 to NORMAL position.

20121LT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 10 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.8.5 Procedure The following step will cause MCB Annunciator, E-29, SOURCE RANGE HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN, to annunciate. Performance Step: ADJUST Level Adjust Potentiometer slowly CLOCKWISE until HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN local light is ILLUMINATED. Standard: Comment: Step 6.1.8.6 Procedure Note: Bistable trip point should be approximately 2 X counts at shutdown. Performance Step: PERFORM the following: RECORD local meter indication at which bistable tripped. VERIFY Annunciator E-29, SOURCE RANGE HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN, annunciates.

Reads the note .
Records local value for N-31 in step 6.1.8.6a
Silences and acknowledges E-29 alarm. EXAMINER NOTE: E-29 should alarm at -400 CPS Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.8.7 Performance Step: ADJUST LEVEL ADJUST potentiometer slowly CLOCKWISE until HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN local light is NOT ILLUMINATED. Standard: EXAMINER Bistable RESET setpoint should be -200 CPS Comment: Step 6.1.8.6 Performance Step: PERFORM the following: RECORD local meter indication at which bistable tripped. VERIFY Annunciator E-29, SOURCE RANGE HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN, is NOT ILLUMINATED. VERIFY local light, HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN, is NOT ILLUMINATED.

Records local value for N-31 in step 6.1.8.8a Verifies E-29 is not illuminated. Verifies local light, HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN, is NOT illuminated.

Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Procedure Note: Performance Step: 15 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 16 Standard: Comment: Terminating Cue: Stop time: ____' 2012 ILT NRC JPM E Page 12 of 14 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.1.8.9 Bistable width should be 45% to 55%. PERFORM the following to determine bistable loop width: %LW =CPS at Bistable Reset ( CPS) CPS at Bistable Trip ( CPS) X 100 = % Calculates %LW Determines that %LW is between 45% and 55% Calculated loop width value should be -50% Step 6.1.8.10 -6.1.8.12 PLACE HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN switch for N-31 to BLOCK position. VERIFY Annunciator E-5, HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN CNMT AUDIBLE BLOCKED, is ILLUMINATED. NOTIFY personnel in containment that Source Range High Flux at Shutdown Alarm test is complete by making announcement over plant page. (N/A this step if containment is locked) Places HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN switch for N-31 to the BLOCK position. Silences and acknowledges annunciator E-5 N/As step 6.1.8.12 After step 6.1.8.12 is marked N/A: "Evaluation on this JPM is complete." NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 4 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM E Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 2012 ILT NRC JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 INITIAL INITIATING CUE SHEET The plant is shutdown. Both Source Range Channels are operable. The HCO has declared N-31 INOPERABLE for performance of surveillance testing per A-52.4, Attachment IV. Containment is locked. Core Alterations are NOT in progress. STP-O-6.1 Prerequisites, step 5.0, has been completed. The CRS directs you to perform STP-O-6.1, SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM CHANNELS N-31 AND N-32, for N-31, steps 6.1 through (and including)

6.1.8. Wherever

verification is required, place a check mark in the initial block and assume that the verification has been completed. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 --Appendix C Page 1 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 064-007-01-01 Unload the Diesel Generator. Task Shutdown the "A" Emergency Diesel JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM F Generator KIA

Reference:

064 A4.06 (3.9/3.9) Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Manual start, loading, and stopping of the ED/G. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: You are an extra RO. A plant startup is in progress with the turbine being synchronized to the grid. The "A" EDG is running for the monthly surveillance per STP-O-12.1 through Step 6.2.46. The Diesel has run for 65 minutes. All readings have been taken and evaluated as satisfactory. There is an AO available at the A DIG. The AO has the data sheets. Bi-annual selected Service Water Pump starts are NOT required. Task Standard: "An D/G shutdown per STP-O-12.1 steps 6.3 through 6.3.21. Required Materials: None General

References:

STP-O-12.1, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A, Rev 01301 Handouts: Marked up copy of STP-O-12.1, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A, Rev 01301 Blank copies of ATT-3, As Found/As Left Voltage and Frequency, and ATT-14, Auto Voltage Control Rheostat After Start -As Left Initiating Cue: The CRS directs you to shutdown the "An D/G per STP-O-12.1, steps 6.3 through 6.3.21. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 2 of 15 Job Performance Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Validation Time: 18 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following: Reset to IC-19 (100% MOL or operating at power) "A" DIG running at between 2025 and 2050 KW per STP-O-12.1, Rev. 01301 step 6.2.42 Ensure "A" SWP running and "C" SWP stopped. Ensure "A" SWP selected on Safeguard Selector Switch. Complete and mark up STP-O-12.1 through Step 6.2.48. Insert Manual Triggers 1 and 2 to reset DG1A ELCP Annunciator Panel, when requested in performance step 24. Trigger 1: REM-GEN11 (Reset) Trigger 2: REM-GEN23 (Acknowledge) If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 175 . INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

Have a marked up copy of STP-O-12.1 ready to provide to the Examinee. Have clean copies of ATT-3 and ATT-14 ready to provide to the Examinee.

2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 3 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet (Denote Critical Steps with a ") Start Time: ____ EXAMINER NOTE: Procedure Note: Performance Step: 1 Standard: Comment: Provide the Examinee a marked-up copy of STP-O-12.1. Step 6.3.1 & 6.3.1.1 IF performing Vendor Engine Analysis OR full load firing pressures, the acquisition of data may have to be aborted IF 115 minute run time limit is approached. This will prevent exceeding the two hour limit of operation with the DIG vital bus supply breaker closed. WHEN Emergency Diesel Generator A has operated between 2025 and 2050 KW for a period of greater than 60 minutes, but less than or equal to 115 minutes, THEN UNLOAD Emergency Diesel Generator A as follows: 1. RECORD time unloading begins.

Records time unloading begins ___ 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Performance Step: 2 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Procedure Note: Performance Step: 3 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Page 4 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.1.2 If the DIG A LOAD LIMIT on mechanical governor is NOT in the MAX FUEL position, THEN PERFORM the following: OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. Calls the AO to determine if LOAD LIMIT setting is at MAX FUEL. Marks step NIA "Load Limit setting is at MAX FUEL position." Candidate should N/A this step based upon MAX FUEL position Step 6.3.1.3 Step 6.3.1.3 will verify normal response for Emergency Diesel Generator A electronic governor following manipulation of LOAD LIMIT (max fuel) dial. IF 2016 KW is obtained, Emergency Diesel Generator A remains operable. IF the Mechanical Governor was adjusted to lock the load, THEN ADJUST Emergency Diesel Generator A load to between 2150 and 2175 KW using A DIG GOVERNOR SPEED CONTROL switch AND MAINTAIN Power Factor at approximately 0.9 (lag) using DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT as necessary. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. Calls the AO to determine if Mechanical Governor was NOT adjusted to lock the load. Marks step NIA "Mechanical Governor was NOT adjusted to lock the load." 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Procedure Note: Performance Step: 4 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 5 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Page 5 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.1.4 Emergency Diesel Generator A, unloading rate is approximately 500KW every 30 seconds. UNLOAD Emergency Diesel Generator A, to 400KW by intermittently turning A DIG GOVERNOR SPEED CONTROL switch in the lower direction, AND MAINTAIN Power Factor at approximately 0.9 (lag) using DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT as necessary.

Reads note.
This has been an approved "two-handed operation."
If unloading unnecessary slow, ask operator why. Step 6.3.2 IF Bi-Annual selected Service Water Pump starts are required, THEN PERFORM Attachment 13, Bi-Annual Service Water Pump Starts. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step AND Attachment 13 N/A. Marks Step 6.3.2 AND Attachment 13 N/A. "Bi-Annual selected SW pump starts" are NOT required." 2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Performance Step: 6 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: ;I Performance Step: 7 Standard: Comment: Page 6 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.3 WHEN Emergency Diesel Generator A load has been reduced to 400 twV, THEN TRIP one Emergency Diesel Generator A supply breaker. KW, . . breake:rfor bU$>1S. '.

Verifies associated green light lit and red light off If the DIG trips on Reverse Power due to operator error, the step will be evaluated as UNSAT. Step 6.3.4 UNLOAD Emergency Diesel Generator A, to 200 twV by intermittently turning A DIG GOVERNOR SPEED CONTROL switch in the lower direction, AND MAINTAIN Power Factor at approximately 0.9 (lag) using DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT as necessary.

20121LT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C --J Performance Step: 8 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 9 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 10 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 7 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.5 WHEN Emergency Diesel Generator A load has been reduced to approximately 200 KW AND Power Factor is 0.9 (lag), THEN TRIP the remaining closed Emergency Diesel Generator A supply breaker. *

Verifies associated green light lit and red light off If the DIG trips on Reverse Power due to operator error, the step will be evaluated as Unsat. Step 6.3.6 RECORD time breaker was opened.
Records time breaker was opened. Step 6.3.7 IF Attachment 13, Bi-Annual Service Water Pump Starts, was performed, THEN ENSURE Service Water Pumps AND Selector Switches are aligned to the desired configuration.

OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.

Marks step N/A Be-annual SW Pump starts was NOT performed.

2012 IL T NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 11 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 12 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 13 Page 8 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.8 PLACE D/G A UNIT/PARALLEL OPERATION SELECTOR switch to UNIT position. Places D/G A UNIT/PARALLEL OPERATION SELECTOR switch to UNIT position. Step 6.3.9 PLACE D/G A SYNCHROSCOPE switch in the BUS 14 or BUS 18 position. Places D/G A SYNCHROSCOPE switch in the BUS 14 or BUS 18 position. Step 6.3.10 If Emergency Diesel Generator A frequency is high, THEN OPERATE D/G A GOVERNOR switch to return to a setting of between 60 and 60.1 Hertz (revolving slowly in the clockwise direction) AND TRANSFER frequency setting data to Attachment 3, As Found/As Left Voltage and Frequency. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. Marks step N/A 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 14 Performance Step: 15 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 16 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 9 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.11 PLACE DIG A SYNCHROSCOPE switch to the OFF position. Places DIG A SYNCHROSCOPE switch to OFF. Step 6.3.12 MEASURE the Emergency Diesel Generator A speed using a photo-tachometer, AND RECORD speed data on Attachment 3, As FoundlAs Left Voltage and Frequency. Directs AO to measure the DIG speed using a photo-tachometer. Records the speed data on Attachment

3. "DIG speed has been measured and recorded." Step 6.3.13 ADJUST DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT to establish Emergency Diesel Generator A output voltage between 480 and 490 volts. Adjusts DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT to establish DIG A output voltage between 480 and 490 volts. During preparation and validation, no adjustment was required.

2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 17 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 18 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 19 Standard: Comment: Page 10 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.14 IF this procedure is being performed for monthly surveillance in June or December, THEN PERFORM the following: OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. Marks 6.3.14.1 through 6.3.14.20 N/A. If asked, the current month is today's date {October 2012} Step 6.3.15 ADJUST DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT to establish Emergency Diesel Generator A output voltage between 480 and 490 Volts (adjust as close to 480 volts as possible) AND RECORD voltage data on Attachment 3, As FoundlAs Left Voltage and Frequency. Adjusts DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT to establish DIG A output voltage between 480 and 490 volts, but as close to 480 volts as possible. Records voltage data on Attachment

3. Step 6.3.16 RECORD the as left DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT position on Attachment 14, Auto Voltage Control Rheostat After Start -As Left, by sketching in the dial setting. Sketches in the DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL RHEOSTAT dial setting on Attachment

14. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 11 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.17 Performance Step: PERFORM the following to SECURE DIG A: 1. REMOVE plastic cover from DIG A Control Switch. 2. TURN DIG A CONTROL switch to the STOP position.

Removes plastic cover from DIG A control switch
Comment: Step 6.3.18 ...J Performance Step: PUSH AND HOLD the DIG A VOLTAGE SHUTDOWN button (Black button) for a few seconds immediately after stopping DIG A. Standard button after stopping DIG A. EXAMINER This action will result in J-24, Emergency Diesel Gen 1A Panel, alarm EXAMINER Failure to push and hold the Voltage Shutdown button in a timely manner could damage the voltage control circuitry as it tries to maintain voltage while the diesel's speed lowers. Comment: Step Performance Step: 22 REPLACE plastic cover on DIG A control
Replaces plastic cover on DIG A control switch. Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 12 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.20 Performance Step: 23 PERFORM the following to RESET Emergency Diesel Generator A: VERIFY Emergency Diesel Generator A has stopped rolling. PUSH the following buttons: DIG A RESET DIG A FIELD RESET

Asks AO to verify that DIG A has stopped rolling .
EXAMINER (Ensure the Start Relay blue lights have been lit for -5 seconds and then report as AO): "A DIG has stopped rolling." EXAMINER Failure to push the reset pushbuttons would subsequent automatic Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Performance Step: 24 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Terminating Cue: Stop time: ____ Page 13 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Step 6.3.21 WHEN the Emergency Diesel Generator A is reset, THEN VERIFY the following indicating lamps are illuminated (MCB Rear):

AIR START SOLENOID VALVE 1 POWER AVAILABLE
AIR START SOLENOID VALVE 2 POWER AVAILABLE
START RELAY 1 POWER AVAILABLE
START RELAY 2 POWER AVAILABLE
VERIFY the following indicating lamps are illuminated:

o AIR START SOLENOID VALVE 1 POWER AVAILABLE o AIR START SOLENOID VALVE 2 POWER AVAILABLE o START RELAY 1 POWER AVAILABLE o START RELAY 2 POWER AVAILABLE The four (4) blue indicating lamps should be illuminated After step 6.3.21 is completed: "Evaluation on this ..IPM is complete. " 2012 IL T NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 14 of 15 Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC JPM F Examinee's Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question: Response: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date: 2012 ILT NRC JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 INITIAL INITIATING JPM CUE You are an extra RO. A plant startup is in progress with the turbine being synchronized to the grid. The "A" EDG is running for the monthly surveillance per 0-12.1 through Step 6.2.46. The Diesel has run for 65 minutes. All readings have been taken and evaluated as satisfactory. There is an AO available at the A DIG. The AO has the data sheets. Bi-annual selected Service Water Pump starts are NOT required. The CRS directs you to shutdown the "A" DIG per 12.1, steps 6.3 through 6.3.21. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 --Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 029-006-04-01 Recover From Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) Signal. Task Respond to a Spurious CVI While at JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM G Full Power KIA

Reference:

012 A2.01 Alternate Path Yes No Time Critical Yes No Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operation on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Faulty bistable operation. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The plant is at steady state full power at Middle of Task Standard: Respond to a spurious CVI while at full Required Materials: General

References:

AR-A-25, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION, Rev
E-20, CNMT or PLANT VENT RAD MON PUMP TRIP, Rev 00500 Handouts:

None Initiating Cue: You are the HCO assigned the Control Room Monitoring function. Validation Time: Minutes 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following:

Reset to IC-19 (100% MOL)
Insert MALF RPS09 [Both], Trigger 1 (Inadvertent CVI) If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 176 . INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS
Approximately 15 seconds after the begins, initiate Trigger 1
Approximately 15 seconds after Trigger 1 was initiated, clear MALF RPS09 20121LT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Page 3 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ") Start Time: ____ Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Alarm A-25, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION received Responds to alarm A-25 Silences audible alarm by depressing SILENCE pushbutton Acknowledges flashing alarm by ACKNOWLEDGE Refers to appropriate Alarm Response procedure: AR-A-25, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION The Examinee should also acknowledge alarm E-20. However, based on the indications available, he should recognize that CVI caused trip of the R-1 OAl11112 CNMT Vent Sample Pump, and should give AR-A-25 a higher priority than AR-E-20. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 4 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION AR-A-25 Step 4.1 V Performance Step: 2 4.1 ENSURE CVI has occurred. Verifies CVI has occurred properly by verifying the automatic actions of step 3.0:

The following valves CLOSE: o R10A R11 R12 SUCTION, o R10A R11 R12 DISCHARGE, o R10A R11 R12 DISCHARGE, o MINI PURGE EXH, o MINI PURGE EXH, o CNMT MINI PURGE SPLY VLV OUTSIDE, o CNMT MINI PURGE SUPPLY, o CNMT PURGE EXH, o CNMT PURGE SUPPLY, Standard:

EXAMINER AOV-1597, 1598 AND 1599 located on MCB left section front. All of the rest are located on MCB left section back. Comment: 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement Appendix Page 5 of 10 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4.1 (continued) Performance Step: 3 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 4 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: 20121LT NRC JPM G The following fans TRIP: o CNMT PURGE SUPPLY FAN A o CNMT PURGE SUPPLY FAN B o CNMT PURGE EXHAUST FAN A o CNMT PURGE EXHAUST FAN B R10NR11/R12 Pump TRIPS Verifies the above fans tripped by green light lit and red light off. ___CNMT Purge Supply and Exhaust Fans are not in service when the plant is at power. Fans located on MCB left section back. R10AlR11/R12 Pump indication on Radiation Monitoring panel. The pump trip will be annunciated by E-20, CNMT or PLANT VENT RAD MaN PUMP TRIP Step 4.2 IF performing Core Alterations OR movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, THEN ENSURE requirements of LCO 3.9.3 are met. Determines that the step is not applicable. (If Examinee asks if core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment is in progress): "The plant is at steady state full power at Middle of Life. You are the HCO assigned the Control Room Monitoring function." NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 6 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Performance Step: 5 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 6 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 7 Standard: Step 4.3 MONITOR the following Area Radiation Monitors:

R-2, CONTAINMENT
R-7, INCORE DETECTOR AREA Observes that both R-2 and R-7 have normal readings. Observes that there has been no variation of R-2 or R-7 values on the Yokogawa Recorder.

Step 4.4 RESET CVI when conditions warrant. Determines that conditions warrant resetting CVI. Observes that annunciator A-25 clears. (After Examinee reads step 4.4): "Troubleshooting has been completed. The cause of the CVI has been determined and repaired. Continue with the procedure." Step 4.5 & PURGE R-11 and R-12 as RESET X-V Relays for the following on CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL TRAIN A:

RAD MON AOV1597
RAD MON AOV1598 Verifies associated back-lit white light energizes.

Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 8 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 9 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 10 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 7 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4.5.2 RESET X-Y Relays for the following on CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL TRAIN B: RAD MON AOV1597 RAD MON AOV1599

Verifies associated back-lit white light energizes.

Step 4.5.3 VERIFY on MCB the following valves OPEN: R10A R11 R12 SUCTION, AOV-1597 R10A R11 R12 DISCHARGE, AOV-1598 R10A R11 R12 DISCHARGE, AOV-1599 Verifies AOV-1597, 1598 and 1599 bright-dim status lights -dim, and/or Verifies lights associated with AOV-1597, 1598, and 1599 2-position switches -red light lit and green light off Step PLACE R10AlR11/R12 PUMP control switch to

Verifies the "on" light is lit E-20 alarm will CLEAR after pump is started 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 8 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 4.5.5 Performance Step: 11 DEPRESS PURGE pushbutton above R10AlR11/R12 PUMP control switch. Standard:

Depresses the PURGE pushbutton above R10AlR11/R12 PUMP control switch. EXAMINER NOTE: There is no change in indications available in the Control Room when the PURGE pushbutton is pushed. Comment: Terminating Cue: After step 4.5.5 is completed:

Evaluation on this JPM is complete. Stop time: ____' 2012 ILT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 9 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM G Examinee's Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question: Response: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date: 20121LT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS: The plant is at steady state full power at Middle of Life. INITIATING CUE: You are the HCO assigned the Control Room Monitoring function. 2012 ILT NRC JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Facility: Task No.: 008-002-04-01 Respond To A Loss Of Component Cooling Water. Task Respond to a Rapidly Lowering JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM H CCW Surge Tank Level KIA 008 A2.02 (3.2/3.5) Alternate Path Yes No Time Critical Yes No Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operation on the CCWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: High/low surge tank level. Alternate path because RNO directed E-O immediate actions will be required in addition to AP-CCW.2 actions. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial The plant is at steady state full power at Middle of Life. Task Respond to a rapidly lowering CCW Surge Tank level during power operation. Required None General

AR-A-13, CCW SURGE TANK LO LEVEL 41.2%, Revision 11 AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION, Revision 02201 ATT-1.0, AT-POWER CCWALIGNMENT, Rev 3 None Initiating You are the HCO assigned the Control Room Monitoring function.

Validation I Minutes 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP If NOT using an IC snapshot developed for this exam, perform the following: Reset to IC-19 (100% MOL) Insert MALF CLG05 [100], Trigger 1 (CCW Supply Line Break) until A-13 alarm Insert MALF CLG05 [10], Trigger 2 (CCW Supply Line Break) until directed by Lead Examiner at step 6b. Insert MALF CLG05 [300], Trigger 3 (CCW Supply Line Break) If using an IC developed for this exam, reset to IC 177 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Approximately 15 seconds after the JPM begins, initiate Trigger 1 NOTE that the leak rate has 3 different values during this scenario, with the intent that: -The initial value prompts the occurrence of A-13 alarm and entry into AP-CCW.2 -The initial value is reduced (to -100 gpm) immediately after A-13 is received to allow the candidate to take actions to recover surge tank level After A-13 clears due to makeup flow, at Step 6 of AP-CCW.2, the value is again modified to drive the candidate back to Step 2 RNO column and the AP actions required (300 gpm) When the A-13 alarm is received, reduce MALF CLG05 to [10 gpm] When the candidate has begun the actions of Step 6 of AP-CCW.2 AND annunciator 13 is clear, raise MALF CLG05 to [300 gpm] Ensure clean copies of ATT-1.0 are available to provide candidate 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Page 5 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a Start Time: ____ Sim Driver: Trigger 1 Performance Step: 1 Standard: Sim Driver: Trigger 2 EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 2 Standard: Comment: As soon as the candidate takes the watch, insert Trigger 1 (100 ADm leak) Alarm A-13, CCW SURGE TANK LO LEVEL 41.2% received Responds to alarm A-13 Silences audible alarm by depressing SILENCE pushbutton Acknowledges flashing alarm by ACKNOWLEDGE Refers to appropriate Alarm Response procedure: AR-A-13, CCW SURGE TANK LO LEVEL 41.2% As soon as the candidate picks up the AR procedure for 13, insert Trigger 2, reduce the leak rate ( 10 Apm) Leak rate reduction at this point will allow the candidate to take the RNO actions of Step 2 in AP-CCW.2 and begin to recover CCW surge tank level while continuing in the procedure AR-A-13 Step 1 For an UNEXPECTED alarm perform the following: GO TO the applicable AP-CCW procedure: AP-CCW.2 (LOSS OF CCW DURING AP-CCW.3 (LOSS OF CCW -PLANT SHUTDOWN) Goes to AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Procedure Caution: Procedure Caution: Performance Step: 3 Standard: Comment: Page 4 of 15 VERIFICATION OF AP-CCW.2 Step 1 If CCW flow to a RCP is interrupted for greater than 2 minutes or if either RCP motor bearing temperature exceeds 200°F. Then trip the affected RCP. If CCW is lost, then seal injection should be maintained to the RCP(s) until RCS temperature I less than 150°F, or until CCW is restored. Check CCW Pump Status: Both CCW pump breakers white lights -EXTINGUISHED Annunciator A-17, MOTOR OFF RCP

Verifies Both CCW pump breakers white lights extinguished
Verifies A-17, MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP extinguished 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Procedure Note: Procedure Note: Performance Step: 4 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 5 Standard: Comment: Page 5 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 2 MCB CCW surge tank level indication should be verified locally in the AUX BLDG, if possible. If it is suspected that CCW Fluid will enter the WHUT, Notify the Chemistry Technician.

2 Monitor CCW Surge Tank Level -APPROXIMATELY 50% AND STABLE (PPCS Point L0618) Directs the Primary AO to report local CCW surge tank level indication .

Step 2 is a CAS and will drive subsequent AP actions If called for local surge tank level, "Local level indication corresponds to MCB indications. II Step 2 RNa a Perform the following:

a. Open RMW to CCW surge tank, MOV-823. Verifies associated red light lit and green light off 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Performance Step: 6 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 7 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 8 Page 6 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 2 RNa b Start RMW pump(s). Verifies associated red flag visible. Verifies associated red light lit and green light off Given the initial rate of surge tank level drop, the Examinee may start both RMW pumps. Step 2 RNa c 1 IF surge tank level stable or rising, THEN control level at approximately 50% while continuing with step 3. Determines that CCW surge tank level is now rising in response to initiation of RMW flow. The reduction in leak severity will allow RMW flow to begin raising CCW surge tank level Step

3 Monitor CCW Hx Outlet Temperature (MCB rear or PPCS point ID T0621) CCW Hx Outlet temperature

-LESS THAN 120°F CCW Hx Outlet temperature is <120°F 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 9 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 10 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 11 Standard: Comment: Page 7 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step

4 Monitor RCP Indications: Annunciator A-7 (A-15), RCP 1A (1B) CCW Return HI temp or low flow -EXTINGUISHED RCP motor bearings temperature (PPCS Group Displays RCPS or RCP temperature monitor RK-30A recorder) 200°F Determines that no indications of high temperature CCW conditions exist Step
5 Monitor If Letdown Should Be Isolated: Check annunciator A-12, NRHX Letdown Out HI Temp 145°F -EXTINGUISHED Confirms A-12 is NOT lit Step
5 Monitor If Letdown Should Be Isolated: Check excess letdown temperature

-LESS THAN 195°F Determines Excess Letdown is NOT in service 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 8 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step Performance Step: 12 Check CCW Valve Alignment Check MCB CCW valves (Refer to A TT -1.0, At-Power CCW Alignment) Standard:

Begins using ATT-1.0 to confirm proper CCW valve alignment Sim Driver: When the candidate begins implementing A TT -1.0 , insert Trigger 3, to, raise the leak rate (300 apm) EXAMINER NOTE: Examinee should return to Step 2, RNO Step c.1 (CAS) when alarm A-13 EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT ST Step 2 RNO c Performance Step: 13 c. IF CCW surge tank level can NOT be maintained than 10%, THEN perform the

1) Close letdown isol, Standard:

Verifies associated green light lit and red light EXAMINER NOTE: AOV-427 is located on MCB center section (left 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 9 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 2 RNa c 2 Performance Step: 14 2) Close excess letdown, HCV-123.

Verifies HCV-123 closed -OUTPUT at 0% demand (If HCV-123 is NOT closed) Rotates controller knob clockwise to the 0% demand position and verifies OUTPUT at 0% demand EXAMINER Normally excess letdown is NOT in service and therefore, HCV-123 is already closed. Comment: Step 2 RNa c 3 Performance Step: 15 3) Trip the reactor. Standard:

EXAMINER There are two reactor trip push buttons -one on the MCB left section, and one on the MCB center section. The Examinee may depress either pushbutton. Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 16 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER NOTE: Page 10 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 2 RNO c 4 I E-O Step 1 WHEN all E-O Immediate Actions done, THEN trip BOTH RCPs. E-O, Step 1 Verify Reactor Trip: At least one train of reactor trip breakers -OPEN Neutron flux -LOWERING MRPI indicates -ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM Announces "Reactor is tripped" (If Examinee attempts to refer to E-O to perform immediate actions) "Perform the immediate actions from memory." Normally by the time the operator gets to verifying that neutron flux is lowering, the Power Ranges are already pegged low, therefore the operator will utilize the Intermediate Ranges. The Examinee may verify all control and shutdown rods on bottom by reading the message at the bottom of the ROD POSITION page, or he may look at the individual rod indications and swap pages to verify the status of the shutdown rods. Per A-50l.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE, initial verification of EOP immediate actions from memory requires only communication of the high level action being verified. Broadcasting of these high level actions is acceptable. However, in a JPM setting, the Examinee may choose to verbalize more than the high level actions in order to better demonstrate his knowledge of the immediate actions. Comment: 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 11 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Performance Step: 17 E-O Step 2 E-O, Step 2 Verify Turbine Stop Valves -CLOSED Standard:

Announces "turbine is tripped" or equivalent wording EXAMINER NOTE: Indication is on the EHC Panel right side under EH VALVE STATUS. Comment: Performance Step: 18 E-O Step 3 E-O, Step 3 Verify Both Trains Of AC Emergency buses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS: o Bus 14 and Bus 18 o Bus 16 and Bus 17 Standard:
Announces "Safeguard Buses are energized to at least 440 volts" or equivalent wording EXAMINER NOTE: 480V Bus meters are on the vertical section of the MCB, right section Comment: 2012 IL T NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix Performance Step: 19 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 20 Standard: Comment: Page 12 15 Form VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION E-O Step 4 E-O 4 Check if SI is

a. Any SI Annunciator

-LIT Goes to Step 4 a RNO E-O Step 4 a RNO E-O 4 RNO IF any of the following conditions are met, THEN manually actuate SI and CI: o PRZR pressure less than 1750 psig, OR o Steamline pressure less than 514 psig, OR o CNMT pressure greater than 4 psig, OR o SI sequencing started, OR o Operator determines SI required IF SI is NOT required, THEN go to ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1. Announces "SI is not actuated and not required, and E-O immediate actions are complete", or equivalent wording. Returns to AP-CCW.2 2012 IL T NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 21 Standard: Comment: Performance Step: 22 Standard: Comment: Terminating Cue: Stop time: ____ Page 13 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION AP-CCW.2 Step 2 RNO c 4 (continued) WHEN all E-O Immediate Actions done, THEN trip BOTH RCPs.

Verifies associated green flag visible
Verifies associated green light lit and red light off AP-CCW.2 Step 2 RNO c 4 (continued) PLACE both CCW pumps in pull stop.
Verifies associated green flag visible.
Verifies associated red and green lights off. After CCW pumps are in pull stop: "Evaluation on this JPM is complete." 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 14 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC ..IPM H Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 2012 ILT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS: The plant is at steady state full power at Middle of Life. INITIATING CUE: You are the HCO assigned the Control Room Monitoring function. 20121LT NRC JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 ---Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Facility: Task No.: 006-003-01-04 Perform Lineups For Filling The SI Accumulators. Task Makeup to "A" SI Accumulator Using JPM No.: 20121LT NRC JPM 1 the SI Accumulator Makeup Pump KIA 006 A 1.13 (3.5/3.7) Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ECCS controls including: Accumulator pressure (level, boron concentration). NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: Classroom Simulator Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial

The plant is at 100% power, MOL conditions The CRS has determined that it is necessary to fill "A" SI Accumulator using the SI Accumulator Makeup Pump. The Pre-Job Brief is complete, and S-16.13, RWST Makeup To The Accumulators, has been completed up to Step 6.1.7 The! CRS has submitted an A-52.4 for tracking on Penetration 101 Task Makeup to "AU SI Accumulator Using the SI Accumulator Makeup Pump. Required Hard Hat, Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection, Safety Shoes, Gloves, and Dosimetry.

General S-16.13, RWSTWATER MAKEUP TO ACCUMULATORS, Revision 03600 S-16.13 (Marked up to Step 6.1. 7) S-16.13 Attachment 1, SI ACCUMULATOR MAKEUP PUMP OPERATION S-16.13 Attachment 2, RESTORATION ACTIONS FOR SI OR CI S-16.13 Attachment 3, SI ACCUMULATOR MAKEUP PUMP CONFIGURATION DRAWING 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Initiating Cue:

The plant is at 100% power, MOL conditions The CRS has determined that it is necessary to fill "An SI Accumulator using the SI Accumulator Makeup Pump. The Pre-Job Brief is complete, and S-16.13, RWST Makeup To The Accumulators, has been completed up to Step 6.1.7 The CRS has submitted an A-52.4 for tracking on Penetration 101 Validation Time: 19 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have a marked-up copy (to step 6.1.7) of S-16.3 Have a clean copy of S-16.13, Attachments 1, 2, and 3 ready to provide to the Examinee.

20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 3 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF (Denote Critical Steps with a ,J) Start Time: ____ Procedure Note: Procedure Caution: Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 2 Standard: Comment: Step 1.0 Attachment 3 is a drawing of the SI Accumulator Makeup Pump configuration that is provided for informational purposes. Containment Isolation Boundary SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE ISOLATION VALVE, V-2817C, AND SI Accumulator Makeup Pump suction and discharge valves are opened during this Attachment. A dedicated Operator SHALL be stationed in the vicinity of these valves, in direct communication with Control Room, to ensure prompt closure should it be required. Discharge pressure of the SI Accumulator Makeup Pump SHALL NOT exceed 1000 psig as indicated on calibrated test gauge, PI-928B. SI Accumulator level of 75% SHALL NOT be exceeded during filling. ENSURE a dedicated Operator in direct communication with the Control Room, is stationed in the vicinity of SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE ISOLATION VALVE, V-2817C, AND SI Accumulator Makeup Pump suction and discharge valves, to ensure prompt closure should it be required. Reads step and recognizes that he is the dedicated Operator. Provide Examinee a clean copy of S-16.13, Attachments 1,2, and 3. Step 2.0 PERFORM Attachment 2, Restoration Actions for SI OR CI, if SI OR CI signal occurs while performing this attachment. Reads step. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 3 Standard: Comment: Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Page 4 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 3.0 SUBMIT A-52.4, Control of Limiting Conditions for Operating Equipment, for tracking on Penetration 101. Reads step, and recognizes that the CRS has already done this (based on Initial Conditions). Step 4.0 OPEN SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE, V-2817.

Locates V-2817 * (As Examinee simulates opening V-2817) "Valve no longer moves in that direction." Step 5.0 OPEN SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP SUCTION ISOL VALVE, 2817A.
Locates V-2817A * (As Examinee simulates opening V-2817A) "Valve no longer moves in that direction." 20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Standard: Examiner NOTE: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Standard: Examiner NOTE: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Page 5 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.0 OPEN SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE ISOL VALVE, V-2810. V-2810 is inboard of SI Pump 'B' (As Examinee simulates opening V-2810) "Valve no longer moves in that direction." Step 7.0 OPEN SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE ISOLATION VALVE, V-2817C.

Locates V-2817C .

V-2817C is inboard of SI Pump 'B' (As Examinee simulates opening V-2817C) "Valve no longer moves in that direction." 20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Procedure Note: Performance Step: 8 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Page 6 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 8.0 The following steps will add water to the Aux Bldg Sump. NOTIFY Control Room of possible A. B. Sump Pump actuation. Simulates notifying Control Room of possible A. B. Sump Pump actuation. (When Examinee simulates calling the Control Room) "Control Room Supervisor" (After message) Repeat back message [Expected to be similar to "Possibility of an Aux Bldg sump pump actuation."] Step 9.0 OPEN SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE DUMP VALVE, V-2817E. (On Pump Skid) (As Examinee simulates opening V-2817E) "Valve no longer moves in that direction." 20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Standard: Examiner NOTE: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Page 7 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 10.0 OPEN SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE, 2817F. (On Pump Skid)

Locates V-2817F *

"""0'"" :", ..' '",' open. (As Examinee simulates opening V-2817F) "Valve no longer moves in that direction." Step 11.0 START SI ACCUMULATOR MAKEUP PUMP, PSI01D.

The label for the pump start controller is NOT labeled -only the skid itself has a label (PSI010) for the pump When Examinee simulates calling the Control Room: "Control Room Supervisor" (After message) Repeat back message [Expected to be similar to "I'm starting SI Accumulator Makeup pump".] (After Examinee simulates starting pump) "Normal noises associated with the pump start." 20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Standard: Examiner NOTE: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Terminating Cue: Stop time: ____ Page 8 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 12.0 THROTTLE SI ACCUM. MAKEUP PUMP DISCHARGE DUMP VALVE, V-2817E, as necessary to maintain pump discharge pressure greater than 800 psig and less than 1000 psig as indicated on PI-928B AND RECORD indicated pressure.

Locates PI-928B
Records final PI-928B indicated pressure Examinee should stop throttling when he is provided a pressure reading> 800 psig and < 1000 psig (see CUES) (After examinee locates PI-928B) "Indicates 400 psig" As examinee throttles V-2817E closed, provide higher pressure readings such as: "Indicates 500 psig", "Indicates 700 psig", "Indicates 900 pSig". If examinee attempts to OPEN V-2817E further (it was opened fully in Step 9.0), "No change in pressure indication." After PI-928B pressure is recorded:

Evaluation on this JPM is complete. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Page 9 of 10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC JPM I Examinee's Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question: Response: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Signature: Date: 20121LT NRC JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 JPM CUE INITIAL INITIATING The plant is at 100% power, MOL conditions The CRS has determined that it is necessary to fill "A" SI Accumulator using the SI Accumulator Makeup Pump. The Pre-Job Brief is complete, and S-16.13, RWST Makeup To The Accumulators, has been completed up to Step 6.1.7 The CRS has submitted an A-52.4 for tracking on Penetration 101 You will be the dedicated operator in direct communication with the Control Room, stationed in the vicinity of the SI accumulator Makeup Pump discharge isolation valve V-2817C, and the Accumulator Makeup Pump suction and discharge valves. Perform S-16.13 Attachment 1, SI ACCUMULATOR MAKEUP PUMP OPERATION. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 ---Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Facility: Task No.: 071-007-01-04 Conduct Gas Decay Tank Release Task Title: Release the "Au Gas Decay JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM J KIA

Reference:

071 A4.2"7 Alternate Path Yes 1 No Time Critical Yes No 1 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Opening and closing of the decay tank discharge control valve. Alternate path because R-14 alarms during release and the release must be manually secured. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: Classroom Simulator Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial

The "Au GDT is full and approved for release. The previous crew has started S-4.2.5. All radiation monitors are operable. Gaseous Tank Release Form (CH-703) has been completed and authorized by the SM. The GDT does NOT contain VCT gas. There is an eSOMS CAUTION tag hanging on PCV-1036A, Inlet to 'A' GDT. The Extra Auxiliary Operator has removed the eSOMS DANGER tag from V-1617, GDT 'A' manual outlet valve. The Pre-Job Brief has been completed Task Lineup and release the "Au GDT in accordance with the procedure and secure the release. Required Hard Hat, Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection, Safety Shoes, and Dosimetry.

General S-4.2.5, Release of Gas Decay Tank, Revision 01901 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet Handouts: S-4.2.5, Release of Gas Decay Tank, Revision 01901 Marked up copy of CH-703 Attachment 1, Gaseous Waste Release Form Initiating Cue: You are the Primary AO and the Control Room Supervisor has directed you to release the "Au GDT per S-4.2.5, Release of Gas Decay Tank, starting at step 4.8. Validation Time: 26 Minutes SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have a copy of S-4.2.5 completed up to (but not including) step 4.8. Ensure S-4.2.5 steps 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 are marked N/A (based on step 2.1). Have a marked up copy of CH-703 Attachment 1, Gaseous Waste Release Form ready to provide to the Examinee. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 3 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a .J) Start Time: ____' Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 2 Standard: Examiner NOTE: Comment: Step 4.8 VERIFY one Auxiliary Building Main Exhaust Fan is in service. Verifies one Auxiliary Building Main Exhaust Fan is in service at the Aux Bldg Ventilation Panel. Provide Examinee: A copy of S-4.2.5 completed up to step 4.8, A marked up copy of CH-703 Attachment 1, Waste Release The Aux Bldg Ventilation Panel is located in the Intermediate Bldg Hot side (to the right just after entering the RCA). Step 4.9 VERIFY Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation is OPERABLE per ODCM Table 3.2-1. R-14A CANNOT be used for release if R-13 and R-14 are INOPERABLE. Initials step based on Initial conditions. Candidate may base operability decision on the circled monitors on the CH-703 form. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 3 Procedure Caution: Performance Step: 4 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Page 4 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Steps 5.1 through 5.5 Precautions and Limitations Reviews precautions and limitations. Step 6.1.1 Only one gas decay tank may be released at one IF GDT A contains VCT gas, THEN REQUEST Shift authorize removal of Operator Aid OTHERWISE, MARK this step Observes that there is no Operator Aid Tag and marks step (If asked if GOT A contains VCT gas, or if there is an Operator Aid "GOT A does not contain VCT gas. There is no Operator Tag for GOT 2012 ILT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 5 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Performance Step: 6 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 5 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.1.2 CLOSE INLET AOV TO GAS DECAY TANK A, PCV-1036A.

Locates PCV-1036A switch.
Ensures PCV-1036A is closed. o Associated green light lit and red light off "A Caution Tag is installed on the switch." (After the switch is "Green light is lit and red light is (If Examinee calls the Control Room and permission to operate Caution Tagged "You have permission to operate Caution Tagged associated with the PCV-1036A Switch is on the Waste Disposal Step CLOSE GAS DECAY TANK A REUSE CONTROL AOV, 1629.
Locates AOV-1629 switch.
Ensures AOV-1629 is closed. o Associated green light lit and red light off (After the switch is "Green light is lit and red light is AOV-1629 Switch is on the Waste Disposal 2012 ILT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Performance Step: 7 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 6 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.1.4 CLOSE GAS DECAY TANK A OUTLET AOV TO GAS ANALYZER, PCV-1036B.

Locates PCV-1036B switch.
Ensures PCV-1036B is closed.
Associated green light lit and red light off (After the switch is "Green light is lit and red light is PCV-1036B Switch is on the Waste Disposal 2012 ILT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Performance Step: 8 Standard: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Page 7 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.1.5 LOCK CLOSED GDT manual outlet valves on all tanks.

GAS DECAY TANKA MANUAL OUTLETVLV, V-1617
GAS DECAY TANK B MANUAL OUTLETVLV, V-1618
GAS DECAY TANK C MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-1619
GAS DECAY TANK D MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-1620
Locates and ensures locked closed: o GAS DECAY TANKA MANUAL OUTLETVLV, V-1617 o GAS DECAY TANK B MANUAL OUTLETVLV, V-1618 o GAS DECAY TANK C MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-1619 o GAS DECAY TANK D MANUAL OUTLETVLV, V-1620 To ensure a valve is locked closed, the Examinee attempt to rotate the valve in the clockwise direction, check that the locking device is (For each "The valve does not move in that direction.

The lock (If the Examinee contacts the Control Room to determine eSOMS location for the "These valves are located in the Aux Bldg Intermediate GOT alley 5ft elevation (Y-1617 and Y-1618) and 1 elevation (Y-1619 and 2012 IL T NRC ..IPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Performance Step: 9 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 10 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Page 8 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.1.6 CLOSE GAS DECAY TANK RELEASE AOV TO PLANT VENT VIA CHARCOAL FILTER, RCV-014. Locates RCV-014 Simulates rotating the RCV-014 controller knob clockwise until it won't turn any Observes associated green light lit and red light off Observes that air pressure reads 0 psig on the RCV-014 air pressure gauge. (IF examinee simulates rotating RCV-014 "Knob no longer moves in that (If Examinee "green light is lit and red light is (If Examinee "Air pressure reads 0 psig on the RCV-014 air Step REMOVE eSOMS Tag from Verifies the Tag on V-1617 is "The Extra AO has removed the Tag and completed necessary paperwork. 2012 IL T NRC ..IPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix C Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Performance Step: 12 Procedure Caution: Procedure Caution: Procedure Caution: Standard: Comment: Page 9 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 6.1.8 UNLOCK AND OPEN GAS DECAY TANK A MANUAL OUTLET VLV, V-1617. (After Examinee simulates lock "The lock is (After Examinee simulates rotating "The valve no longer moves in that Step WHEN moving water or gas in the Waste Handling Systems with elevated activity present, THEN COORDINATE with RP to monitor local radiation levels. [G0168] WHEN releasing gas from tanks with elevated activity, THEN INITIATE the release slowly and allow time for the Rad monitor to stabilize. Increase the release rate, if necessary, in small increments, realizing that it may take several minutes for Rad Monitor to react to the increased activity level being released. [G0168] SECURE gas decay tank from release when approximately 5 psig, to prevent vacuum on the NSA Gas Analyzed (when the GDT is placed in service). Reads procedural CAUTIONS prior to performing

6.1.9 20121LT

NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Page 10 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT

Performance Step: 13 Standard:

EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER ClIE: ALT PATH starts here ---* 6.1.9 PERFORM the following to begin release: RECORD the following:

GOT A Initial Pressure
Time GOT A release initiated THROTTLE OPEN (may be full open) GAS DECAY TANK RELEASE AOV TO PLANT VENT VIA CHARCOAL FILTER, RCV-014, to desired release rate. NOTIFY Control Room of time GOT A release was initiated and the initial pressure. Records GOT "A" initial pressure from PI-1036 located Waste Disposal Records current time for GOT "An release initiation. Observes red and green lights lit Observes air pressure rising on RCV-014 air pressure gauge. Calls control room to confirm R-14 counts rising Notifies Control Room of the time GOT "A" release initiated and the initial "Initial GOT 'A' pressure is 90 As Examinee simulates opening "Air pressure is rising. Both the red and green lights are (When RCV-014I fully "Red light is lit and green light is off. R-14 indicates "Control room confirms that R-14 counts are (Should be some delay between this report and CUE (When Examinee notifies Control Repeat back the GOT A release initiation time and the (After the initial Control Room communication is "Control Room reports that R-14 indicates 2x10 5 counts ONLY if asked "is R-14 in alarm?: "YES, R-14 in 20121LT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement Appendix C Standard:

EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Terminating Cue: Stop time: ____ Page 11 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Step 5.2 ENSURE RCV-014 closes if high alarm occurs on R-14 Reviews step 5.2, Precautions and Limitations; or recalls from the Gaseous Waste Release Form that R-14 alarm is set at 1.2 x 10 5 or R-14 reading is much> the estimated 13 reading on CH-703 sheet. Observes green light lit and red light off Observes air pressure lowering on the RCV-014 air pressure gauge (If Examinee asks for position of "Red light lit, green light (As Examinee simulates rotating RCV-014 knob) "Knob no longer moves in that "Associated green light is lit and red light is "Air pressure is After reporting that the release has been Control room reports that "R-14 indicates lowering If asked, final GOT pressure after closing RCV-014 is Normally RCV-014 would close automatically when reaches the high alarm After RCV-014 is closed: "Evaluation on this JPM complete. 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 12 of 13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Job Performance Measure No.: 20121LT NRC ..IPM J Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 20121LT NRC JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE INITIAL INITIATING The "A" GOT is full and approved for release. The previous crew has started S-4.2.5. All radiation monitors are operable. Gaseous Tank Release Form (CH-703) has been completed and authorized by the SM. The GOT does NOT contain VCT gas. There is an eSOMS CAUTION tag hanging on PCV-1036A, Inlet to 'A' GOT. The Extra Auxiliary Operator has removed the eSOMS DANGER tag from V-1617, GOT 'A' manual outlet valve. The Pre-Job Brief has been completed You are the Primary AO and the Control Room Supervisor has directed you to release the "A" GOT per S-4.2.5, Release of Gas Decay Tank, starting at step 4.8. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 ---Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Facility: Task No.: 103-007-05-04 Perform Attachment CI/CVI. Task Perform Attachment CI/CVI for JPM No.: 2012 ILT NRC JPM K Valves in the Intermediate Building Clean Side KIA 103 A2.03 (3.5*/3.8*) Alternate Path Yes Time Critical Yes Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Phase A and B isolation. NRC Examiner: Facility Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: Classroom Simulator Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The plant has experienced a Safety Injection . While performing E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, it was found that some Containment Isolation Valves were not properly aligned. Task Standard: Given ATT-3.0, Attachment CIICVI, isolate AOV-5392, AOV-1597, AOV-5738, and AOV-5737 using the alternate isolation valves. Required Hard Hat, Safety Glasses, (Double) Hearing Protection, Safety Shoes, Gloves, Locked valve key. General ATT-3,,0, Attachment CI/CVI, Revision 01100 ATT-3.0, Attachment CI/CVI, Revision 01100 Initiating Cue: You are in the field and have been directed by the Control Room to isolate AOV-5392, AOV-1597, AOV-5738, and AOV-5737 in accordance with ATT-3.0, Attachment CIICVI, using the alternate isolation valves Validation 17 Minutes (average of 7 + 26) 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP N/A INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS Have a clean copy of ATT-3.0, Attachment CI/CVI, Revision 01100 ready to provide to the Examinee. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Page VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION (Denote Critical Steps with a ") Start Time: ____ Performance Step: 1 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: Examiner CUE: EXAMINER NOTE: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Isolate AOV-5392 Close the following valves: (lB BASEMENT CLEAN SIDE)

V-5397
V-541 0 Locates V-5397 and V-541 0 . fiadt When Applicant demonstrates how to obtain an approved copy of the current procedure (preferred method is to log on to FCMS and print one out; if FCMS is down, obtain a hard copy from the Control Room): Provide the Examinee with a clean copy of ATT -3.0, Attachment CI/CVI, Revision 01100 If examinee pOints to the "Double Hearing Protection" warning sign upon entering, "Assume you have double hearing protection available." All valves that are to be isolated may be isolated in any order. (As the Examinee simulates rotating the valve) "The valve no longer turns in that direction." If the Examinee attempts to contact the Control Room to determine the eSOMS locations for valves 5397 and 5410f, inform him that he must demonstrate the ability to locate this information himself. eSOMS location for V-5397 is IB COLD BASEMENT RC PENETRATION AREA, ELEVATION 4 FT. eSOMS location for V-541 0 is IB COLD BASEMENT RC PENETRATION AREA, ELEVATION 3 FT. 20121LT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Performance Step: 2 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: .4 Performance Step: 3 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER NOTE: Comment: Page 4 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Isolate Close V-1S96 (IB BASEMENT CLEAN

Locates V-1S96 *

.. is. ....... (As the Examinee simulates rotating the valve) "The valve no longer turns in that direction." eSOMS location for V-1596 is IB COLD BASEMENT RC PENETRATION AREA, ELEVATION 6 FT Isolate AOV-5738 Close V-S701 (IB BASEMENT CLEAN SIDE)

Locates V-S701 * (As the Examinee simulates rotating the valve) "The valve no longer turns in that direction." eSOMS location for V-5701 is IB COLD BASEMENT RC PENETRATION AREA, ELEVATION 1 FT 20121LT NRC JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Performance Step: 4 Standard: EXAMINER CUE: EXAMINER CUE: Comment: Terminating Cue: Stop time: ____ Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Isolate AOV-5737 Close V-5702 (IB BASEMENT CLEAN SIDE)

Locates V-5702 * (As the Examinee simulates rotating the valve) "The valve no longer turns in that direction." eSOMS location for V-5702 is IB COLD BASEMENT RC PENETRATION AREA, ELEVATION 1 FT After all valves have been isolated: "Evaluation on this ..IPM is complete. " 20121LT NRC JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1

Appendix C Page 6 of7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF Job Performance Measure No.: 2012 IL T NRC JPM K Examinee's Date Facility Number of Time to Question Result: SAT Examiner's Signature: 2012 IL T NRC JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1 Appendix Form ES-C-1 CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS: INITIATING CUE: The plant has experienced a Safety Injection. While performing E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, it was found that some Containment Isolation Valves were not properly aligned. You are in the field and have been directed by the Control Room to isolate AOV-5392, AOV-1597, AOV-5738. and 5737 in accordance with AIT-3.0, Attachment CI/CVI, using the alternate isolation valves 2012 ILT NRC JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 9. Supplement 1 Appendix Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Robert E. Ginna Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2012-N-1 Examiners: Initial Conditions: Turnover: Event Malf. No. No. 1 N/A SIS02A, [Off] RCS20 (630) ROD12 (A+M) ROD02-D4 (STA) RCSOSA ROD03-K7 ROD03-K9 ROD03-LB (Untrippable) EDS01A EDS01B GEN04A (All conditions) RPS07M RPS07N (SRO) (RO) (BOP) The plant is at 7S% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to SO% due to a failure of the B MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant is returning to full power per 0-S.2, Load Ascension, Step 6.2.32, and Placing Condensate Booster Pumps In Service. The trim valves are closed and MFP suction pressure is approaching 200 psig. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG has been OOS due to mechanical issue which prevents resetting of the fuel racks. This was found yesterday at OBOO. Expected return to service is tomorrow. A-S2.4 submitted for ITS 3.B.1. B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.B.1.1 and 3.B.1.2 completed successfully; SR-3.B.1.1 due again in 6 hrs. Continue load ascension. Event Type* Event Description N-BOP Start Condensate Booster Pump per 0-S.2, Step 6.2.32. N-SRO Green indicating light for 'A'CS pump deenergized and the (TS)-SRO Primary AO reports that there is an acrid smell, no fire, from breaker cubicle on 'A' CS Pump. Racking out breaker to investigate renders pump inoperable. ITS-3.6.6.A impacts EDG ITS-3.B.1.B.2 C-RO Average-Tavg fails high C-SRO Rod Stop Failure C-BOP R*HO Dropped rod D-4 and power load reduction R-BOP R (TS)-SRO 'A' RCP trip results in reactor trip, multiple (3) rods not fully inserted and FRV's remain open C-80P C-SRO M-BOP Loss of Offsite Circuit 7T M*RO Loss of Offsite Circuit 767 M-SRO 'A' EDG fails to start 3S04A fails to open in Auto C-BOP 3S0SA fails to open in Auto C-SRO -1 8 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 'A' SW pump Auto failure to start RPS070 C-BOP 'C' SW pump Auto failure to start RPS07Q C-SRO * (N)ormal, {R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor -2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Ginna 2012 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant is returning to full power per 0-5.2, Load Ascension, Step 6.2.32, Placing Condensate Booster Pumps In Service. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG is out of service B EDG has been OOS due to mechanical issue which prevents resetting of the fuel racks. ITS entry for 3.8.1.B, a 7-day LCO, has been entered, and all required surveillances are current. Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will meet the conditions for starting the Condensate Booster Pumps (trim valves are closed and MFP suction pressure is approaching 200 psig), and will start the Condensate Booster Pumps per Step 6.32 of 1.2. After the Condensate Booster Pumps are started, the green indicating light for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump will go out and the Primary AO will report a strong acrid electrical odor with no fire, coming from the breaker cubicle for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump. Maintenance will request breaker be racked out to troubleshoot, rendering the 'A' CS pump inoperable. ITS-3.6.6.A for one spray train inoperable is a 72 hour action, BUT with the 'B' EDG OOS, ITS-3.8.1.B.2 requires that the SRO "Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable." This B.2 Action is a 4-hr completion time, after which LCO 3.0.3 applies. ER-FIRE.O should NOT be entered for the report of an acrid smell. After the field operator reports all conditions normal after the CBP start, the Tavg signal will fail high, resulting in auto rod motion inward. The crew should respond per AR-F-15, RCS TAVG DEV and AP-RCC.1, Continuous Rod Withdrawal/Insertion. After the actions of AR-F-15 are complete, Control Rod D-4 (Control Bank 'C') will drop. Crew should respond per AR-C-14, ROD BOTTOM, and AP-RCC.3, Dropped Rod Recovery. The CRS will address ITS 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment) and 3.2.4 (QPTR). When the crew has commenced the load reduction and the RO has commenced the boration, the 'A' RCP will trip. The RCP trip results in a reactor trip and the crew will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Both FRVs will fail to close due to the earlier Average-Tavg failure. Depending upon the timing of Immediate Action completion and the crew response to recognize/close the FRVs, the crew may remain in E-O (SI due to excessive feed water cooling) or transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. If the crew remains in E-O, the LOAAC event will occur when the HCO is directed to perform Att.27.0, Automatic Action Verification. If the crew successfully isolated MFW and transitioned to ES-0.1, the LOAAC event will occur at Step 4, after the crew has initiated emergency boration in response to the 3 control rods not inserted. In either path, transition to ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power will be required when the 'A' EDG failed to start following the loss of offsite power. TDAFW AFW Pump Steam Supply Valves MOV-3505A and MOV-3504A fail to automatically open. - Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 At Step 20 of ECA-O.O (after depressurization of S/Gs and RCS cooldown has been initiated), the AO will report the 'A' EDG is now available for start. The crew should manually start the 'A' EDG from the main control board and start 1 SW pump per step 7, then, go to Step 28 (per the CAUTION prior to Step 8), recognize that only one SW pump is required, and manually perform SW isolation per Step 29. The scenario will end after SW lineup has been verified in Step 29 or when the correct transition to ECA-0.2 is determined in Step 31 (examiner's discretion). -4 Appendix Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks: ECA-0.0--8 Establish greater than 200 GPM AFW flow before both S/G levels decrease to < 120"wide range level [160" Adverse CNMT] . Safety Significance: Failure to establish the minimum required AFW flow rate, under the postulated accident conditions, is a violation of the basic objective of ECA-O.O and of the assumptions of the analyses upon which ECA-O.O is based. Both intend to mitigate deterioration of RCS conditions while AC emergency power is not available. Without AFW flow, the S/Gs could not support any significant plant cooldown. Thus, the crew would lose the ability to delay the adverse consequences of core uncover. Also, without AFW flow, decay heat would still open the safety valves and would rapidly deplete the S/G inventory, leading to a loss of secondary heat sink or S/G dryout. Decay heat would then increase RCS temperature and pressure until the pressurizer PORVs open, imposing a larger LOCA than RCP seal leakage. Both of these examples violate the basic assumptions of the analyses on which ECA-O.O is based, complicating the mitigation actions. Required Plant Conditions: A loss of all AC condition exists Less than 200 GPM of AFW flow The TDAFW pump is available, but must be manually started S/G NR levels are less than 5% Scenario Conditions: A loss of all AC condition exists (no offsite power, '8' EDG OOS, 'A' EDG fails) 80th MDAFW pumps have no power, TDAFW pump steam admission valves have not auto opened Manual opening of TDAFW pump steam admission valves is available Normal post-trip S/G level shrink in conjunction with no AFW availability will result in NR levels <5%. - Appendix Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ECA-O.O--F Manually start the SW pump such that the EDG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating. Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded emergency power capacity." Required Plant Conditions: Loss of all AC initial condition with subsequent restoration of AC power from one EDG. SW pump(s) fail to start automatically when the associated emergency bus is energized by the EDG. A SW pump aligned to provide cooling for the running EDG can be manually started from the MCR. The other EDG is inoperable. Scenario Conditions: AC power will be restored by 'A' EDG. Auto start of lA' and 'C' SWPs is failed. Start of either 'A' or 'C' SW pump will provide cooling for the 'A' EDG 'B' EDG is OOS. Appendix Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ECA-O.O--H Isolate RCP seal injection before a charging pump is started and isolate RCP thermal barriers before a CCW pump is started. Safety Significance: Failure to isolate RCP seal injection before starting a charging pump or the thermal barrier before starting a CCW pump, under the postulated conditions can result in unnecessary and avoidable degradation of the RCS fission product barrier specifically at the point of the RCP seals, especially if the RCPs are subsequently started. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in "significant degradation in their mitigative capability of the plant" in that the RCPs are not available for subsequent recovery actions (except for the red-path condition on the Core Cooling CSF that persists despite secondary depressurization). Required Plant Conditions: Station Blackout with subsequent restoration of power to at least one AC emergency bus. Blackout condition persists long enough for the crew to reach Step 8 of ECA-O.O, and RCP #1 seal outlet temperature is >235°F. Scenario Conditions: Loss of all AC existed. 'A' EDG has started and is providing power to one emergency train (buses 14 and 18). The 'A' EDG will not be reported as available until Step 20 of ECA-O.O (after SIG depressurization and RCS cooldown has been initiated). RCP seal injection and thermal barriers are isolated, if the crew correctly applies the procedure}. With no seal injection flow, RCP #1 seal outlet temperatures will rise to >235°F. Appendix Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) Facility: Robert E. Ginna Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2012-N-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial The plant is at -2% power (BOL). Plant startup is in progress per 0-1.2, Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown To Full Load. The team is currently at step 6.7 (page 39). The "A" Main Feed Pump has just been placed in-service. Based upon the current plant risk assessment, the crew is waiting for completion of B EDG repair before entering Mode 1. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG has been OOS due repairs on the governor. Expected return to service is 1 hour. A-S2.4 submitted for ITS 3.8.1.B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.8.1.1 was completed successfully 1 hour ago; all other EDG surveillances are current. Until B EDG is returned to service, hold power and do not go above S % Reactor Power till notified. Event Malt. Event Type* Event Description FDW14C N-BOP Transition from AFW to MFW per 0-1.2 steps 6.7.1 through 6.7.S. N (TS)-SRO MD AFW Pump 1B Discharge VLV (MOV-4008) will not re-open during the realignment. 2 RCS11F I-RO Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high (6S0) I-BOP I(TS)-SRO "B" RCP Thermal Barrier leak RCS01B C-RO C-SRO Spurious SI ("N Train), Concurrent w/LOOP and LOCA Outside 4 SIS01 M-BOP CNMT EDS1A M-RO EDS1B M-SRO Fire alarms in Aux Bldg Basement RHR pump area (1S00) FCP01BQ, [on, 30 delay] Reactor Trip Breakers fail to open automatically (manual available) RPSOSA C-RO RPSOSB C-SRO (man avail) "A" DG fails to start automatically (manual start available) GENOa C-RO (ADG) C-SRO -1 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) 7 RPS11-A-2 C-RO AOV-371 (LID Isolation to NRHX) fails to close automatically (Isolation C-SRO signal only) 8 RPS07K C-80P "AI! MDAFW Pump fails to start automatically C-SRO # =will be initiated by the Spurious SI event * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) Ginna 2010 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at -2% power (BOL). Plant startup is in progress per 0-1.2, Plant Startup from Hot Shutdown to Full Load. The team is currently at step 6.7 (page 39). The "A" Main Feed Pump has just been placed in-service. The plant is in a normal 50/50 electric plant lineup. Per Chemistry direction, the 60 gpm letdown orifice is in service. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG is out of service B EDG has been OOS due to mechanical linkage issue with the governor. ITS entry for 3.8.1.B, a 7-day LCO, has been entered, and all required surveillances are current. Work is in progress and expected return to service is 1 hour. 52.4 submitted for ITS 3.8.1.B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.8.1.1 (offsite power availability and breaker alignment) was completed 1 hour ago. Until B EDG is returned to service, hold power and do not go above 5 % Reactor Power till notified. After taking the watch, the team will transition from Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) to Main Feed Water (MFW) per 0-1.2 steps 6.7.1 through 6.7.5. This will involve the BOP verifying operation of the Feed Regulating Valves (FRVs) and the FRV Bypass valves, placing the FRV Bypass Valves in Auto, securing the AFW pumps, and placing the AFW pumps in safeguards alignment. During this normal alignment, AFW discharge valve on 'B' MDAFW pump will not reopen, rendering AFW Train B inoperable and entry into ITS 3.7.5, Action B.1, with a 7-day completion time. Next a channel four Thot RTD will fail high. The team will respond per:

AR-F-15, RCS Tavg Dev 4°F
AR-F-16, Avg Tavg -Tref Dev +1-5°F
AR-F-24, RCS AVG I:1T DEV 3°F ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure. The RO will transfer the charging pump that is in automatic to manual and manually adjust its speed to control Pressurizer (PRZR) level. The BOP will defeat the failed channel per ER-INST.1.

The SRO will refer to ITS 3.1.6, the COLR, and ITS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 Next, a thermal barrier leak will occur on the "B" RCP. The team will respond per:

AR-B-10, RCP 1B LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20, or
F-14, CHARGING PUMP SPEED, or
A-5, CCW SURGE TANK HI LEVEL 58.8% The crew may first enter AP-RCP .. 1, RCP SEAL MALFUNCTION, due to the AR procedural direction, but will end up in AP-CCW.1, LEAKAGE INTO THE CCW LOOP due to multiple indications of RCS leakage into the CCW system. Per AP-CCW.1, the RO will isolate the leak by closing AOV-754B.

Note that later in the scenario, when SI occurs, instrument air to containment will be isolated and AOV-754B will fail open. The CCW leak will need to be re-isolated when the team restores Instrument Air to containment per EOP direction. (Due to electrical power availability, power will not be available to close MOV-749B and MOV-759B -the alternate isolation method.) Next, a spurious "A" train SI signal will occur. At the same time there will be a loss of offsite power, the "A" DG will fail to start automatically, and a LOCA outside containment will be initiated. The team will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. At immediate action step 1, the RO will recognize that the reactor failed to trip automatically and will trip the reactor manually. At immediate action step 3 the BOP will inform the team of the status of Safeguard busses (no safeguard busses energized), and the RO will depress the "A" DG start pushbutton (front left section of the MCB) which will restore the "A" - Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) train of safeguard buses (busses 14 and 18). When the RO performs Attachment 27.0, Attachment Automatic Action Verification, (step 6 of E-O) he will discover that AOV-371, UD Isolation to NRHX and MOV-814, CCW From RX SUPP CLRS (loss of power), failed to isolate automatically. With the concurrent LOCA outside CNMT, the RHR-to-UD f10wpath established by AOV-371 will provide an additional pathway for RCS activity from RHR into the UD system through the open AOV-371, thru PCV-135 (which will open further to reduce UD system pressure), and lift UD relief valve 209 (setpoint 200 psig) to the VCT. Closing AOV-371 manually per the guidance in ATT-27.0 will isolate this flowpath. Attachment-3.0 will be used to isolate MOV-814. At step 7 of E-O, no MDAFW pumps will be running. The BOP will manually start the UN MDAFW pump and align the TDAFW pump as necessary. The LOCA outside containment will be due to failure of check valve 853A. When the SI occurs RCS will flow backwards through MOV-852A (Core Deluge Valve) and cause an RHR system piping break inside the Auxiliary building (RHR system piping is designed for a maximum of 600 psi -not RCS pressure). RCS will also flow from the RHR system to the CVCS system (via a check valve around HCV-133), lift relief valve 203, and flow to the PRT. Within a few minutes (depending on the size of the RHR piping break) the PRT rupture disc will blow and cause a LOCA inside containment. Because of this, the team is expected to transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, at E-O step 17, rather than transitioning to ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, at E-O step 26. (Transition from E-O step 26 is possible depending on break size and how fast the team progresses through E-O, but is unlikely.) Instrument air to containment will be re-established at step 9 of E-1. This will be the team's earliest opportunity to re-isolate the CCW system leak. (Unable to close MOV-749B and 759B due to bus 16 de-energized.) The team will transition to ECA-1.2 at E-1 step 17. At ECA-1.2 step 3 the RO will close MOV-852A and the team will check for an RCS pressure rise. With the leakpath isolated, RCS pressure will rise, indicating isolation of the LOCA outside containment. (The pressure rise may be delayed or slow depending on RCS inventory. If a sizable bubble exists in the reactor vessel head, injection flow has to refill the head to some extent before RCS pressure will rise significantly. The team should realize this.) Terminate the scenario upon transition back to E-1. Additional Information: When the Aux Bldg sump reaches 15,000 gallons the RHR pumps, Aux Bldg sump pumps, and RCDT pumps will fail due to submergence (2 to 4 minute time delay after submergence). E-O--C Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) Critical Tasks: Energize at least one emergency bus before transition out of E-O. Safety Significance: Failure to re-energize an emergency train leads to degraded emergency power capacity, needless degradation of a fission release barrier (RCS through RCP Seals), and results in a continuing loss of RCS inventory. Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip. 2. No emergency bus energized.

3. At least one EDG can be connected to an emergency bus. Scenario Conditions:

1. Spurious SI will require reactor trip. 2. Offsite power is lost, "B" DG is OOS, and "A" DG fails to start automatically.

3. "A" DG can be started manually.

Isolate LOCA outside containment prior to transition out of Safety Failure to isolate this leak degrades containment integrity resulting in continuing radioactive Required Plant

1. Isolable LOCA outside containment.

Scenario Conditions:

1. The LOCA outside containment may be isolated by closing MOV-852A.

- Appendix Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) Facility: Robert E. Ginna Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2012-N-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial The plant is at 70% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the "B" MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant was raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the "B" MFP operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. RG&E Energy Control Center has requested transfer to 100 -0 lineup in preparation for circuit 7T inspection next shift. The WCC is standing by to place protected equipment signs per OPG-PROTECTEO-EQUIPMENT. The SM has directed that you complete the transfer when you have the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: "B" Containment Spray Pump has been out of service for bearing replacement since late yesterday. Expected return to service is tomorrow. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.6.6, 72 Hour Action. Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No. FOW1'IB 'B' MOAFW trip on overcurrent on start FOW15B SAFW Pump "0" fails to start 1 NA Swap to 100/0 electrical lineup on Circuit 767 per 0-6.9.2, Establishing And/Or Transferring Offsite Power To Bus 12A / 12B N-SRO 2 PZR020 Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails HIGH (ITS 3.3.1: Trip channel within 6 hrs, TRM: TR 3.4.3 Immediately declare ATWS (2500) I-RO mitigating capability inoperable -was applicable until channel 429 INO-I(ITS)-SRO was selected as the controlling channel in the PLP) RPS07BK (off) TC408C Bistable status light failed 3 PZR05B Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage> "PORV INOPERABLE" condition (-21 gpm) [7.4] C(TS)-SRO PZR03B (OFF) Loss of condenser vacuum will occur. (The loss of vacuum will be REM-R-BOP ramped over 12 minutes so that the crew will trip the turbine when CN050 R-RO meeting the 5 minute backpressure DO NOT OPERATE region (0.04) R-SRO criteria or a turbine trip will occur on low vacuum.) Turbine Trip causes a Reactor Trip. EH "Go" pushbutton does not work OVR-OI-C-SRO -1 5 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) 6 STM09A (100) STM09C (100) STM11A (2E06) M-BOP M-RO M-SRO "B" SG Safety Valve 3508 and 3510 failed open (close when Bleed and Feed criteria met) Steam break on "A" SG inside CNMT EDS08 (Both) EDS04A FDW12 4KV Auto Bus Transfer fails to occur automatically Loss of Bus 14 (conditional on reactor trip) TDAFW Pump speed control failed to 0 (0) 7 SIS02A C-RO SI fails to actuate automatically SIS02B C-CRS (man avail) .. (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M}ajor -2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) Ginna 2012 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 70% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the uB" MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant was raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the uB" MFP operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. RG&E Energy Control Center has requested transfer to 100 -0 lineup in preparation for circuit 7T inspection next shift. The WCC is standing by to place protected equipment signs per Protected Equipment. The SM has directed that you complete the transfer when you have the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: "B" Containment Spray Pump has been out of service for bearing replacement since late yesterday. Expected return to service is tomorrow. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.6.6, 72 Hour Action. Shortly after taking the watch the team will swap to 10010 electrical lineup per 0-6.9.2. Following the electrical lineup swap, the Pressurizer (PRZR) controlling pressure channel 449 will fail high, causing PRZR spray valves to open and disabling the PRZR heaters. Channel IV indication will show a high indication, whereas actual pressure is lowering due to spray. Prompt RO action is required to place the Master PRZR controller in Manual to close the spray valves and stabilize pressure. With no operator action, a reactor trip and SI will occur on low pressure. The team will respond per:

AR-F-2, Pressurizer Hi Press 2310 psi, or
AR-F-10, Pressurizer Lo Press 2205 psi;
AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure and
ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrument Loop Failure When the BOP defeats the failed channel, bistable status light TC408C will fail to light, which indicates that the channel may not be in the tripped condition.

The SRO will notify the WCC, Operations Management, and possibly IIC to investigate further to ensure ITS requirements are met. (Sometimes the SRO will contact IIC directly, and sometimes he will request that the wce contact I/C. Either communication is acceptable.) The SRO will refer to ITS 3.3.1 and TRM TR 3.4.3 (he will determine ITS 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 are not applicable). While the PT -449 defeat is in progress, a 21 gpm leak will occur on PORV 431 C. The PORV will indicate in the throttled open position. The team will respond per:

AR-F-19, PRZR PORV Outlet Hi Temp 145°F
AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) The crew will attempt to close PORV-431C, but fails to close and will isolate the leak by closing associated block valve MOV-515, SRO will refer to ITS section 3.4.11 (Pressurizer PORVs) and 3.4.13 (RCS Operational Leakage).

Per 3.4.11, "A PORV with a leakage rate >10gpm must also be declared inoperable per this LCO." (Restriction based on the possible need to use this PORV during accident mitigation, and if the block valve then failed to close with greater than 10gpm leakage, the PORV leakage would be outside the accident analysis assumptions." After the SRO has had an opportunity to identify the ITS 1 TRM requirements associated with the PT-449 failure and the PORV leakage, a loss of condenser vacuum will occur. (The loss of vacuum will be ramped over 12 minutes so that the crew will trip the turbine when meeting the 5 minute backpressure DO NOT OPERATE region criteria or a turbine trip will occur on low vacuum.) The team will respond per:

AR-H-7, Condenser Hi Pressure 25.5" HG,
AR-K-30, Turbine Plant Sampling Rack Trouble
AP-TURB.4, Loss Of Condenser Vacuum, and refer to
AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction They will reduce turbine load in an attempt to stabilize condenser vacuum, and to get out of the "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure.

When the BOP initiates load reduction he will discover the EH control panel will not respond in OPER PAN, and will reduce turbine load manually. The team will be unable to stabilize condenser vacuum. Once the 5 minute "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure limit is met, the crew will trip the turbine or a trip on low vacuum will occur. If the crew reduced power to less than 50% to get less than P-9 (Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip interlock), when the turbine is tripped manually a reactor trip will occur due to the failure of the P9 interlock. Upon reactor trip, a failure of the 4KV Auto Bus Transfer and a loss of Bus 14 will occur. Additionally, the TDAFW Pump speed control is failed to zero and the 'B' MDAFW pump will trip on start. The team will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. With steam dump unavailable, SG pressure will rise rapidly causing SG ARVs and SG Safeties to open. Two SG safeties associated with 'B' SG will fail full open in conjunction with a MSLB on the 'A' SG inside containment. These events will cause a significant cooldown, RCS depressurization, and SI signal. The team will recognize that SI failed to actuate automatically and will manually actuate SI. At step 9 the team will transition to FR-H.1, Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are unavailable. "C" SBAFP has no power. Depending on SG level, the team will either go to step 13 for Bleed & Feed, or attempt to align and start "D" SBAFP. If there is time for the SBAFP start, the SRO will determine feed requirements per Attachment 22.0, Attachment Restoring Feed Flow (attempt to feed at max rate [225 gpm]). "D" SBAFP will trip when they try to start it. When less than or equal t0120 [160J inches wide range SG level is reached in both SGs, the team will go to step 13 for Bleed & Feed. The team will perform Attachment 12.0, Attachment N2 PORVs to operate the PORVs. Subsequently, Bus 15 will be energized by cross-tie to Bus 16, and instrument air will be aligned to the PORVs. Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) After Bleed and Feed is established (PORVs open and SI flow verified), at the Lead Examiner's discretion, the SRO will be notified from the wee that the "B" MDAFP is available. The team will establish AFW flow per the guidance of step 3. Terminate the scenario when auxiliary feed flow is established. Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) Critical Tasks: E-O--O Manually actuate at least one train of SI before transition to FR-H.1. Safety Significance: The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analyses are predicated on the assumption that, at the very least, one train of safeguards actuates. If SI is not actuated, the FSAR assumptions and results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to manually actuate at least one train of SI (when it is possible to do so) constitutes a violation of the license condition. Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip with valid SI required but not automatically actuated.

2. SI can be manually actuated from the control room. Scenario Conditions:

1. Loss of Condenser vacuum causes a forced crew trip of the turbine, once the 5 minute "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure limit is met or a trip on low vacuum will occur. crew to trip the turbine trip which causes a reactor trip (P-9 present).

Upon reactor trip, steam flow through the SG safeties will be sufficient to cause a valid SI signal prior to the team completing E-O step 4. 2. Manual SI is available. FR-H.1--F Initiate RCS Bleed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for RCS Feed injection) to Safety Failure to initiate RCS Bleed & Feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above shutoff head of the SI pumps results in significant and sustained core Required Plant

1. Reactor trip. 2. No AFW available.

3. Secondary heat sink required.

4. RCS pressure below PRZR PORV setpoint.

- Appendix Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Revised 9/19/12) Scenario Conditions: Loss of Condenser vacuum will require a manual trip when meeting the 5 minute DO NOT OPERATE region trip requirement. Failure of 4KV Auto Bus Transfer de-energizes the condensate pumps and MFPs. "B" Containment Spray Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. Loss of Bus 14 de-energizes "An MDAFP. The TDAFP speed controller is failed to zero. SBAFW is not available eC' SBAFW pump has no power, '0' SBAFW pump will trip on start.) Decay heat is adequate to require a heat sink. The team must follow the guidance of FR-H.1 to initiate RCS Bleed & Feed while RCS pressure is below PRZR PORV setpoint. -7 PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: 2012 Initial License Operator Training TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N12-1

REFERENCES:

1. 0-S.2, Load Ascension

2. CNG-OP-S.01 , Water Hammer Prevention and Mitigation Program, (Section 6.2.C) 3. Tech Spec LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray (CS), Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler (CRFC), and NaOH Systems 4. AR-F-1S, RCS TAVG DEV 4* F, or S. AR-F-16, TAVG-TREF DEVIATION

+/- S"F 6. AP-RCC.1, Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal/Insertion

7. AR-C-14, Rod Bottom B. AP-RCC.3, Dropped Rod Recovery 9. ER-RCC.1 ,Retrieval of a Dropped RCC 10. Tech Spec LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation

11. TRM 3.4.3, ATWS Mitigation

12. E-O, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection

13. ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response 14. ATT-27.0, Automatic Action Verification 1S. ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power 16. ATT-11.2, Attachment Diesel Air Compressor

17. ATT-B.3, Attachment Nonvital 1B. ATT-21.0, Attachment RCS Isolation

19. ATT-S.2, Attachment Alternate Cooling to TDAFW Pump 20. ATT-B.2, Attachment Gen Degas 21. ATT-B.O, Attachment DC Loads 22. ECA-O.2, Loss of All AC Power Recovery with SI Required 23. ECA-O.1, Loss of All AC Power Recovery without SI Required Author: Norm Meaker, Exam Writer Contractor Facility Review: Pat Landers, Lead Exam Author Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Facility:

Robert E. Ginna Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2012-N-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial The plant is at 75% power {MOL}. Several days ago, the plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant is returning to full power per 0-5.2, Load Ascension, Step 6.2.32, Place Condensate Booster Pumps In Service. The trim valves are closed and MFP suction pressure is approaching 200 psig. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG has been OOS due to mechanical issue which prevents resetting of the fuel racks. This was found yesterday at OBOO. Expected return to service is tomorrow. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.8.1.B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.B.1.1 and 3.8.1.2 completed successfully; SR-3.8.1.1 due again in 6 hrs. Continue load ascension. Event Malt. No. Event Event Description No. Type* 1 Coodensate Booster Pump per 0-5.2, Step 6.2.32. N-SR Green indicating light for 'A' CS pump deenergized and the 2 OVR-D.O.-{TS)-SRO Primary AO reports that there is an acrid smell, no fire, from SIS02A, [Off] breaker cubicle on 'A' CS Pump. Racking out breaker to investigate renders pump inoperable. ITS-3.6.6.A impacts EDG ITS-3.8.1.B.2 RCS20 (630) C-RO Average-Tavg fails high ROD12 C-SRO Rod Stop Failure (A+M) C-BOP ROD02-D4 R-RO Dropped rod D-4 and power load reduction (STA) R-BOP R SRO 5 RCS05A 'A' RCP trip results in reactor trip, multiple (3) rods not fully inserted and FRV's remain open ROD03-K7 C-BOP ROD03-K9 C-SRO ROD03-L8 (Untrippable) EDS01A M-BOP Loss of Offsite Circuit 7T EDS01B M-RO Loss of Offsite Circuit 767 GEN04A M-SRO (All 'A' EDG fails to start conditions) 3504A fails to open in Auto 7 RPS07M C-BOP 3505A fails to open in Auto RPS07N C-SRO 8 Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 'A' SW pump Auto failure to start RPS070 C-BOP 'C' SW pump Auto failure to start RPS07Q C-SRO * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, ( I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Overview of Scenario #1 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant is returning to full power per 0-5.2, Load Ascension, Step 6.2.32, Placing Condensate Booster Pumps In Service. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG is out of service B EDG has been OOS due to mechanical issue which prevents resetting of the fuel racks. ITS entry for 3.8.1.B, a 7-day LCO, has been entered, and all required surveillances are current. Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will meet the conditions for starting the Condensate Booster Pumps (trim valves are closed and MFP suction pressure is approaching 200 psig), and will start the Condensate Booster Pumps per Step 6.32 of 0-1.2. After the Condensate Booster Pumps are started, the green indicating light for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump will go out and the Primary AO will report a strong acrid electrical odor with no fire, coming from the breaker cubicle for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump. Maintenance will request breaker be racked out to troubleshoot, rendering the 'A' CS pump inoperable. ITS-3.6.6.A for one spray train inoperable is a 72 hour action, BUT with the 'B' EDG OOS, ITS-3.8.1.B.2 requires that the SRO "Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable." This B.2 Action is a 4-hr completion time, after which LCO 3.0.3 applies. ER-FIREO should NOT be entered for the report of an acrid smell. After the field operator reports all conditions normal after the CBP start, the Average-Tavg signal will fail high, resulting in auto rod motion inward. The crew should respond per AR-F-15, RCS TAVG DEV and AP-RCC.1, Continuous Rod Withdrawal/Insertion. After the actions of AR-F-15 are complete, Control Rod D-4 (Control Bank 'C') will drop. Crew should respond per AR-C-14, ROD BOTTOM, and AP-RCC.3, Dropped Rod Recovery. The CRS will address ITS 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment) and 3.2.4 (QPTR). When the crew has commenced the load reduction and the RO has commenced the boration, the 'A' RCP will trip. The RCP trip results in a reactor trip and the crew will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Both FRVs will fail to close due to the earlier Average-Tavg failure. Depending upon the timing of Immediate Action completion and the crew response to recognize/close the FRVs, the crew may remain in E-O (SI due to excessive feed water cooling) or transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. If the crew remains in E-O, the LOAAC event will occur when the HCO is directed to perform Att.27.0, Automatic Action Verification. If the crew successfully isolated MFW and transitioned to ES-0.1, the LOAAC event will occur at Step 4, after the crew has initiated emergency boration in response to the 3 control rods not inserted. In either path, transition to ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power will be required when the 'A' EDG failed to start following the loss of offsite power. TDAFW AFW Pump Steam Supply Valves MOV-3505A and MOV-3504A fail to automatically open. Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 At Step 20 of ECA-O.O (after depressurization of SIGs and RCS cooldown has been initiated), the AD will report the 'A' EDG is now available for start. The crew should manually start the 'A' EDG from the main control board and start 1 SW pump per step 7, then, go to Step 28 (per the CAUTION prior to Step 8), recognize that only one SW pump is required, and manually perform SW isolation per Step 29. The scenario will end after SW lineup has been verified in Step 29 or when the correct transition to either ECA-0.2 is determined in Step 31 (examiner's discretion). Scenario Event Description 2D12 NRC Scenario 1 Critical Tasks: ECA-O.O--B Establish greater than 200 GPM AFW flow before both S/G levels decrease to < 120"wide range level [160" Adverse CNMl1. Safety Significance: Failure to establish the minimum required AFW flow rate, under the postulated accident conditions, is a violation of the basic objective of ECA-D.D and of the assumptions of the analyses upon which ECA-D.D is based. Both intend to mitigate deterioration of RCS conditions while AC emergency power is not available. Without AFW flow, the S/Gs could not support any significant plant cooldown. Thus, the crew would lose the ability to delay the adverse consequences of core uncover. Also, without AFW flow, decay heat would still open the safety valves and would rapidly deplete the S/G inventory, leading to a loss of secondary heat sink or S/G dryout. Decay heat would then increase RCS temperature and pressure until the pressurizer PORVs open, imposing a larger LOCA than RCP seal leakage. Both of these examples violate the basic assumptions of the analyses on which ECA-D.D is based, complicating the mitigation actions. Required Plant Conditions: A loss of all AC condition exists Less than 2DD GPM of AFW flow The TDAFW pump is available, but must be manually started S/G NR levels are less than 5% Scenario Conditions: A loss of all AC condition exists (no offsite power, 'B' EDG OOS, 'A' EDG fails) Both MDAFW pumps have no power, TDAFW pump steam admission valves have not auto opened Manual opening of TDAFW pump steam admission valves is available Normal post-trip S/G level shrink in conjunction with no AFW availability will result in NR levels <5%. Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Manually start the SW pump such that the EDG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating. Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded emergency power capacity." Required Plant Conditions: Loss of all AC initial condition with subsequent restoration of AC power from one EDG. SW pump(s) fail to start automatically when the associated emergency bus is energized by the EDG. A SW pump aligned to provide cooling for the running EDG can be manually started from the MCR. The other EDG is inoperable. Scenario Conditions: AC power will be restored by 'A' EDG. Auto start of 'A' and 'C' SWPs is failed. Start of either 'A' or 'C' SW pump will provide cooling for the 'A' EDG '8' EDG is OOS. Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Isolate RCP seal injection before a charging pump is started and isolate RCP thermal barriers before a CCW pump is started. Safety Significance: Failure to isolate RCP seal injection before starting a charging pump or the thermal barrier before starting a CCW pump, under the postulated conditions can result in unnecessary and avoidable degradation of the RCS fission product barrier -specifically at the point of the RCP seals, especially if the RCPs are subsequently started. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in "significant degradation in their mitigative capability of the plant" in that the RCPs are not available for subsequent recovery actions (except for the path condition on the Core Cooling CSF that persists despite secondary depressurization). Required Plant Conditions: Station Blackout with subsequent restoration of power to at least one AC emergency bus. Blackout condition persists long enough for the crew to reach Step 8 of ECA-O.O, and RCP #1 seal outlet temperature is >235°F. Scenario Conditions: Loss of all AC existed. 'A' EDG has started and is providing power to one emergency train (buses 14 and 18). The 'A' EDG will not be reported as available until Step 20 of ECA-O.O (after SIG depressurization and RCS cooldown has been initiated). RCP seal injection and thermal barriers are isolated, if the crew correctly applies the procedure). With no seal injection flow, RCP #1 seal outlet temperatures will rise to >235°F. Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR DRIVER INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-27 o (Temp I/C-NRC-) o Prior to Crew RUN Briefing 75% power MOL Note: If only a 70% MOL IC available, must raise power and stabilize, to be closer to starting a CBP per 0-5.2. At T=O, insert: MALF ROD03-K7, [Untrippable], Stuck rod K7 MALF ROD03-K9, [Untrippable], Stuck rod Kg MALF ROD03-L8, [Untrippable], Stuck rod La MALF RPS07M, Auto Fail: TDAFW S1M SUP MOV-3504A MALF RPS07N, Auto Fail: TDAFW STM SUP MOV-3S0SA MALF RPS070, Auto Fail: A SW Pump MALF RPS07Q, Auto Fait: C SW Pump To take 'B' EDG OOS: Pull stop the 'B' EDG Control Stop/Start Switch and place CAUTION tag on switch Pull stop the D/G'B' Bus 16 Supply Breaker and place CAUTION tag on switch Pull stop the D/G'B' Bus 17 Supply Breaker and place CAUTION tag on switch Place CAUTION tag on DIG 'B' start pushbutton Place PROTECT tags per OPG-Protected Equipment and black dot J-32. Insert the following: OVR-D.0.-SIS02A, [Off], on T-2, 'A' CS Pump red light indication MALF RCS20 [630], on T-3 (Faiture of Average Tavg Channel) MALF ROD12 [Auto & Manual], on T-3 (Rod Stop Failure) ROD02D-D4, [Stationary],on T -4 (Dropped rod D-4) MALF RCS05A on T-5, (A RCP Trip) MALF EDS01A, on T-7 (Loss of Offsite Circuit 7T) MALF EDS01 B, on T-7 (Loss of Offsite Circuit 767) MALF GEN04A, [All Conditions], on T-7 (A DIG fails to start) Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protected Equipment Place Black Dot on MCB Annunciator J-32 and 25 Ensure Rods are in AUTO. Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1

Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
Conduct Pre-job Brief using marked up copy of 0-6.9.2, Section 6.4 marked up as follows: o All steps in Sections 6.4.1 are marked NA o All steps in Sections 6.4.3 are marked NA Begin At direction of Event 1 Start Condensate Booster At direction of Event reen indicating light for 'A' CS pump deenergized and 0 the Primary AO reports that there is an acrid smell, no OVR-D.O-SIS02A, [Off] fire, from breaker cubicle on 'A' CS Pump. Racking out breaker to investigate renders pump inoperable.

ITS-3.6.6.A impacts EDG ITS-3.8.1.B.2 At direction of Event fails high 0 Rod Stop Failure Trigger#3 RCS20 [630] ROD12 [Auto At direction of Event Dropped Rod D-4 0 examiner Trigger#4 ROD02-D4 [Stationary] Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 1 o examiner 0 Continued from Event 5 0 0 Continued from Event 5 Continued from Event 5 o Trigger #5 RCS05A MALF ROD03-K7, [Untrippable], MALF ROD03-K9, [Untrippable], MALF ROD03-L8, [Untrippable], Event 6 MALF EDS01A MALF EDS01B MALF GEN04A, [All Conditions] Event 7 MALF RPS07M MALF RPS07N Event 8 MALF RPS070 MALF RPS07Q 'A' RCP trip results in reactor trip, multiple (3) rods not fully inserted and FRY's remain open Multiple (3) rods not fully NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T =Loss of Offsite Circuit Loss of Offsite Circuit "A" EDG fails fails to TDAFW Steam Supply Auto NOTE: *rhis Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T ='A' SW pump failure to 'C' SW pump failure to NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T = O. Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _____ Page 13 of 56 Event

Description:

Start a condensate booster pump Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will meet the conditions for starting the Condensate Booster Pumps (trim valves are closed and MFP suction pressure is approaching 200 psig), and will start the Condensate Booster Pumps per Step 6.32 of 1.2 Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA 0-5.2, Load Ascension NOTE: EHC adjustments are being made per Step 6.2.24. Steps 6.2.26 thru 6.2.32 are completed. (Step 6.2.32) WHEN trim valves are closed AND MFW Pump suction pressure approaches 200 PSIG, THEN PLACE Condensate Booster Pumps in service as follows: (Step 6.2.32.1) ADJUST TRIM VLV CONTROL, AOV-950BD AOV-950BG, controller output in AUTO UNTIL the first Trim Valve starts to open. BOP 6.2.32.2) PLACE HOTWELL LEVEL 07, Controller in the MAN position. (Step 6.2.32.3) PLACE the standby NOTE: The CO will place one Condensate Pump control switch in the Condensate Pump in Pull PULL STOP position AND INDICATE which Stop. AR-J-17, pump was placed in PULL STOP. Safeguards Equipment Locked Off, will be received. Note: Refer to CNG-OP-S.01 , Water Note: Plant announcement of Hammer Prevention and Mitigation starting CBP and turbine Program, (Section 6.2.C) building evacuation should be made. Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N12-1 Scenario # _1.;...... ____ Page Op Test No.: Event # 14 of _5;:;,;6;..... ..1 Event

Description:

Start a condensate booster pump (Step 6.2.32.4) PLACE one Condensate Booster Pump switch to the RUN position AND INDICATE which pump was placed in RUN. BOP (Step 6.2.32.5) IF the Condensate Booster Pump low suction pressure trip in NOT reset, THEN DEPRESS CNST BSTR PMPS START/RESET green RESET pushbutton. BOP (Step 6.2.32.6) VERIFY CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP selected to RUN started. BOP (Step 6.2.32.7) IF the CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP selected to RUN in the previous step did NOT start automatically start, THEN DEPRESS CNDST BSTR PMPS START/RESET yellow START pushbutton. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. NOTE: The CO will place a Condensate Booster Pump to run. NOTE: The CO will depress the RESET pushbutton if required. NOTE: The Condensate Booster Pump will start in AUTO. Note: CRS marks this step N/A on normal start. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # Event # ....;2=--____ Page 15 of Event

Description:

Acrid order with no fire in "A' CNMT Spray Pump Breaker After the Condensate Booster Pumps are started, the green indicating light for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump will go out and the Primary AO will report a strong acrid electrical odor with no fire, coming from the breaker cubicle for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump. Maintenance will request breaker be racked out to troubleshoot, rendering the 'A' CS pump inoperable. ITS-3.B.B.A for one spray train inoperable is a 72 hour action, BUT with the 'B' EDG OOS, ITS-3.B.1.B.2 requires that the SRO "Declare required feature(s} supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s} is inoperable." This B.2 Action is a 4-hr completion time, after which LCO 3.0.3 applies. ER-FIRE.O should NOT be entered for the report of an acrid smell. Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 2 Primary AO will report a strong acrid electrical odor with no fire, coming from the breaker cubicle for rA' CNMT Spray Pump. Maintenance will request breaker be racked out to troubleshoot. Indications Available: None SIM Driver: Trigger 2 and then make report as Primary A 0 that a strong acrid electrical odor with no fire, coming from the breaker cubicle for 'A' CNMT Spray Pump. Maintenance will request breaker be racked out to troubleshoot. Notes that the green indication light for CS Pump is Direct the HCO to pull stop the 'N CS Pump Pull stops 'A' CS Pump Declares A CS Pump inoperable and to ITS 3.6.6.A and Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario ____ Page Event # 16 of i Event

Description:

Acrid order with no fire in 'A' CNMT Spray Pump Breaker CRS Notify the NOTE: The CRS may notify the WCC or request STAISM SM perform notifications. I&C Booth Instructor: as WCCS, o WCC acknowledge. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

3.6.6 Containment

Spray (CS), Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler and NaOH _'"A Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _2;;.....____ Page 17 of 56 Event

Description:

Acrid order with no fire in 'A' CNMT Spray Pump Breaker Containment Spray (CS). Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler (CRFC). and NaOH Systems LCO Two CS trains, four CRFC units, and the NaOH system shall be OPERABLE. -NOTE-In MODE 4, both CS pumps may be in pull-stop for up to 2 hours for the performance of Inter10ck and valve testing of motor operated valVes (MOVs) 857A, 857B. and 857C. Power may also be restored to MOVs 896A and 896B. and the valves placed in the closed position. for up to 2 hours for the purpose of each test. MODES 1. 2. 3, and 4. ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION One CS train inoperable. A.1 Restore CS train to 72 hours OPERABLE status. NaOH system Inoperable. B.1 Restore NaOH System to 72 hours OPERABLE status. Required Action and C.1 Be In MODE 3. 6 aSSociated Time of Condition A or B C.2 Be In MODE 5. 84 hOurs One or two CRFC units 0.1 Restore CRFC unites) to 7 inoperable. OPERABLE Required Action and E.1 Be In MODE 3. 6 associated Time of Condition D not E.2 Be In MODE 5. 36 hOurs TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1 AC-Sources-Modes 1, 2. 3 and 4 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 1 Event # ____ Page 18 of -Event

Description:

Acrid order with no fire in 'A' CNMT Spray Pump Breaker 3.8.1 AC Sources << MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 lCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE: One qualifted independent offsHe power circuit connected between the offsite transmission network and each of the onsite 480 V safeguards buses required by LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Subsystems << MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4"; and Two emergency diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying their respective onsite 480 V safeguards buses required by LCO 3.8.9. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS <<NOTE lCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Offsite power to one or A.1 Declare required feature(s) 12 hours from more 480 V safeguards inoperable When its discovery of bus(es) inoperable. redundant required Condition A feature(s) is conculTent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) AND Restore offsite circuit to 72 hours OPERABLE status. One DG Inoperable. B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the 1 hour offsite circuit. flli.ll Once per 8 hours thereafter AND

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Page Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 19 of _5;;,;6;"""-11 Event

Description:

Acrid order with no fire in 'A' CNMT Spray Pump Breaker AC Sources -MODES 1. 2. 3, and 4 CONDITION B.2 AND B.3.1 B.3.2 .ANQ B.4 C. Offsite power to one or more 480 V safeguards bus(es) inoperable. .ANQ One DG Inoperable. C.1 QR C.2 REQUIRED ACTION Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable. Determine OPERABLE DG Is not inoperable due to common cause failure . .QR Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG. Restore DG to OPERABLE status. -NOTE-Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems -MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4," when Condition C Is entered with no AC power source to one distribution train. Restore required circuit to Restore DG to OPERABLE status. 3.8.1 COMPLETION TIME 4 hours from discovery of Condition B concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 24 hours 24 hours 7 days 12 hours 12 hours At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # ____ Page Event

Description:

Average-Tavg fails high After the field operator reports all conditions normal after the CBP start, the Average-Tavg signal will fail high, resulting in auto rod motion inward. The crew should respond per AR-F-15, RCS TAVG DEV and AP-RCC.1, Continuous Rod Withdrawal/Insertion. Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 3 Indications Available:

F-15, RCS TAVG DEV AR-F-15, ReS TAVG DEV 1. Place Rods in manual (Auto rod motion HCO will be blocked).

2. Check RCS Tavg channels and Tavg chart recorder.

3. IF a turbine runback is occurring, THEN go to AP-TURB.2. 4. IF a Tavg channel has failed, THEN go to ER-INST.1.

5. IF average Tavg has failed, THEN perform the following:

a. Place steam dump mode selector to MANUAL. b. Place charging in MANUAL and control PRZR level at ram. Directs HCO to take Steam Dump Mode select Switch to manual HCO Directs taking charging to manual CRSt assigns a PRZR level control band. HCO Enter ER-INST.1.

NOTE: The HCO will place the Rods in MANUAL. May enter AP-RCC.1 directly. Note: Determines no channel failed and AVG-Tavg failed NOTE: a turbine run back is NOT occurring. Note: No channel failure and should not enter ER-INST.1 at this paint. Note: Places Steam dump mode selector switch to manual. Note: Will receive MCB alarm, G-1S. Should discuss this as a expected alarm prior to taking to manual. Note: NtA Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 _3______ Page Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # Event 21 of 56"';;';;""--11 Event

Description:

Average-Tavg fails high AP-RCC.1, Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal/Insertion (Step 1) Evaluate Rod Control

a. Check turbine load -STABLE. b. Place Rods in manual. c. Verify control rod motion CRS Ensures valid indications are used to Tavg and HCO (Step 2*) Monitor

Tavg-GREATER THAN 545 F
Tavg-LESS THAN 579 F H P 3) Check Tavg-TRENDING to Tref (Step 4) Check RCS Tavg All 4 channels indicate approximately the same value All 4 channels are responding to the power change (Step 4 RNO) IF any of the Tavg channel Note: No Tavg Channel failure malfunction is indicated, THEN refer to and should not enter INST.1. INST.1 Note: May refer to AP-RCS.1 indication of RCS leak. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # _4.;.....-

____ Page 22 of Event

Description:

Dropped Rod After the actions of AR-F-15 are complete, Control Rod D-4 (Control Bank 'C') will Crew should respond per AR-C-14, ROD BOTTOM, and AP-RCC.3, Dropped Recovery. The CRS will address ITS 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment) and 3.2.4 Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 4 Indications Available:

C-14, ROD BOTTOM
Control Rod D-4 on MRPI screen, indicates dropped HCO Acknowledges MCB alarm HCOI Note change RCS pressures BOP BOP Notes turbine load AR-C-14, Rod Bottom HCO (Step 4.1) If Reactor is critical, PERFORM the followin (Step 4.1.1) Verify Rod on the 4.1.2) GO TO AP-RCC.3 Dropped CRS Enters AP-RCC.3, Dropped Rod Recovery AP-RCC.3, Dropped Rod Recovery HCO (Step 1) Verify only one rod has dropped. Note: Rod D-4 , Bank C dropped. HCO (Step 2) Places rods in manual. Note: Rods in manual per alarm response.

1 Operator Form ES-O-2 _4_____ Page N12-1 Scenario # Event 23 of ...,;5;.;;.6--1 Appendix 0 Op Test No.: Event

Description:

CRSI HCO CRS! HCO BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP HCO BOP HCOI CRS Dropped Rod (Step 3*) Check Tavg -STABLE AT PROGRAM (Step 3 RNO) If Tavg is low, THEN perform the following:

a. Place EH control in manual b. Manually lower turbine load to match Tavg and Tref (Step 4) Verify Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED -EXTINGUISHED (Step 4 RNO) IF steam dump required but not operating THEN perform the following (Step 5) Check Main Generator Load GREATER THAN 15 MW (Step 6) Establish Stable Plant Conditions: Tavg -TRENDING TO TREF PRZR pressure -TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO PZRZ level -TRENDING TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL MFW Regulating Valves -RESTORING SIG LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO (Step 7) Check QPTR LESS THAN 1.02 NOTE: Tavg will be lowering due to the dropped rod. Note: Coordinates with HCO. Informs RG&E ECC of changing output to grid. Note: Not required Note: Match Tavg to Tref Note: Charging in manual and adjusting speed to restore PRZR level due to failed AVG-Tavg Failure. NOTE: QPTR will be > 1.02 [-1.09 during validations).

Obtain from PPCS. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # ____ Page 24 of Event

Description:

Dropped Rod CRS (Step 7 RNO) Refer to ITS section NOTE: The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications. ITS 3.2.4, QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR) Appendix Operator Action Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # _4.;....____-Event

Description:

Dropped Rod 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR) I LCO 3.2.4 APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER> 50% RTP. ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION I A. QPTR not within limit A.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 3% from RTP for each 1 % of QPTR > 1.00. AND Determine QPTR I ANI.l Perform SR 3.2. ,.1, SR 3.2.1.2 and SR 3.2.2.1. AND Reevaluate safety analyses and confirm resultS remain valid for the duration of operation under this condition. ANI.l Form ES-O-2 Page 25 _5;;..;6::"'--11 COMPLETION TIME 2 hours after each QPTR determination Once per 12 hours 24 hours after achieving equilibrium conditions from a THERMAL POWER reduction per Required Action A.1 Mill Once per 7 days thereafter Prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # Page 26 of _5;;,;6;""-'-11 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod QPTR 3.2.4 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.5 -Perform Required Action A.5 only after ReqUired Action A.4 is completed. Required Action A.6 shall be completed whenever Required Action A.5 is performed I Normalize excore detectors Prior to increasing to restore QPTR to within THERMAL POWER limit. above the limit of Required Action A.1 AND A.6 I -NOTE-Perform Required Action A.6 only after Required Action A.5 is completed . . Perform SR 3.2.1.1, Within 24 hours 3.2.1.2, and SR after achieving equilibtium conditions at RTP not to exceed 48 hours after increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1 B. Required Action and B.l Reduce THERMAL POWER 4 hours I aSSOCiated completion to S; 50% RTP. Time of Condition A not met. Appendix Operator Action Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 4 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod (Step 8) Evaluate Control Rod Operability: Verify MRPI indicates rod on bottom Direct I&C to locally investigate rod failure Refer to ER-RCC.1, RETRIEVAL OF A DROPPED RCC CRS Rod failure identified and corrected DROPPED ROD REPAIRED (Step 8d RNO) Perform the following: (Step 8d.1 RNO) Consult Reactor Engineer and ITS section 3.1.4 for operational concerns. Will refer to ITS 3.4.1 due to AR-F-1 0, PRZR LO PRESS 2205 PSI earlier during the plant transient. Form ES-D-2 Page 27 of 56 NOTE: The CRS may notify the WCC/I&C. Booth Instructor: as WCCS/I&C, acknowledge. NOTE: The cause of the dropped rod is still being investigated. NOTE: The CRS may notify the RE. Booth Instructor: as RE, acknowledge. Note: ITS 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # Event # ____ Page 28 of Event

Description:

Dropped Rod Note: Per Lead Examiner direction, call from OPS Management and Reactor Engineer, directs the crew to perform a load reduction to less than 50% at 1%/min per AP-TURB.5, in anticipation of retrieving the dropped rod. AP-TURB.5 Rapid Load CRS Perform a load reduction brief per HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load rify rods in OP b. Reduce turbine load in Auto as follows: Place Turbine EH Control in OPER PAN., IMP PRESS IN, if desired. Select desired rate on thumbwheel Note: 1 %/min Reduce the setter to the desired load Depress the GO button HCO c. Initiate boration at the rate determined in Note: Determines amount of OPG-REACTIVITY boration required to reduce power to <50%, discussed at PJB. d. Place PRZR backup heaters switch to ON HCO (*Step 2) Monitor ReS Tavg Tavg -GREATER THAN 545°F Tavg -LESS THAN 579°F Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # ____ Page 29 of _5;;,;6;......., Event

Description:

Dropped Rod (Step 3) Adjust Boric Acid Addition Rate As Note: Determines amount of Necessary To (refer to boration required to reduce CALC): power to <50%, discussed at PJB. e Maintain rods above the insertion limit Sets boric acid integrator to c----t----t------------------j desired amount. (-125 gal) r--__+-__+-e_M_at_c_h_T_a_vg_an_d_T_r_e_f

1 To set the BA COUNTER: e Compensate for Xenon Push 'SEL' Button to move the number column to be adjusted. Raise or Lower the column value by depressing the "+" or Depress the 'ENT' Button to enter in) the selected amount to be added. (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level-TO PROGRAM IN AUTO (Step 7) Check IA available to CNMT IA pressure-GREATER THAN 60 PSIG Instr Air to CNMT Isol Valve, 5392-0PEN Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # Event # _4-=--____ Page of _56=---i1 1 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod (*Step 8) Check Steam Dump Status: Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED-LIT Steam dump operating properly in AUTO (Step 9) Check Hotwell Level: Hotwell level controller in AUTO Controller demand LESS THAN 60% Hotwell level at setpoint (Step 9 RNO) If controller demand approaching 70% (Large Reject Valve Opens). THEN place controller in manual and control level (Step 10) Check if Condensate pumps can be

a. Condensate booster pumps-2 PUMPS Running b. Verify the following: Trim valve controller set at 400 PSIG Trim valve, AOV-9508G-GREATER THAN 80% open PI-4017 greater than 410 PSIG b. (RNO) Go to Step 18 c. Place the auto condensate booster pump to the trip position d. Stop one condensate booster pump.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # Page 31 of 56 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod ITS 3.4.1, ReS Pressure, Temperature, and Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS (RCS) RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits LCO RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified in the COLR. -NOTE-Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during pressure transients due to: a. THERMAL POWER ramp> 5% RTP per minute; or b. THERMAL POWER step> 10% RTP. MODE 1. ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME One or more RCS DNB A.1 Restore RCS DNB 2 parameters not within parameter(s) to within Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 associated Time not Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # ____ Page 32 of 56 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod I I ITS 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits LCO All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE, with all individual indicated rod positions within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position. MODE MODE 2 with Kelf ;:: ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME One or more rod(s) A.1.1 Verify SOM is within the 1 untrippable. limits specified in the Initiate boration to restore 1 hour SDM to within limit. AND Be in MODE 2 with Kelf 6 hours < 1.0. One rod not within B.l.1 Verify SDM is within the 1 alignment limits. limits specified in the OR Initiate boration to restore 1 hour SDM to within limit. ANP Reduce THERMAL POWER 2 hours to :s:75%RTP. AND At the discretion of the Lead Examiner during the down power, proceed to Event #5 I I

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 5 Page 33 of 56 Event

Description:

'A' RCP trip and reactor trip with 3 rods not tripped When the crew has commenced the load reduction and the RO has commenced the boration, the 'A' RCP will trip. The RCP trip results in a reactor trip and the crew will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Both FRVs will fail to close due to the earlier Average-Tavg failure. Depending upon the timing of Immediate Action completion and the crew response to recognize/close the FRVs, the crew may remain in E-O (SI due to excessive feed water cooling) or transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response. If the crew remains in E-O, the LOAAC event will occur when the HCO is directed to perform Att.27.0, Automatic Action Verification. If the crew successfully isolated MFW and transitioned to ES-O.1, the LOAAC event will occur at Step 4, after the crew has initiated emergency boration in response to the 3 control rods not inserted. In either path, transition to ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power will be required when the 'A' EDG failed to start following the loss of offsite power. TDAFW AFW Pump Steam Supply Valves MOV-3505A and MOV-3504A fail to automatically open. Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 5 Indications Available: Delta Panel alarms Directs HCO and CO to perform Actions of HCOI Perform Immediate Actions Note: 3 rods did not trip. HCO BOP should inform CRS. Enters E-O E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Upon report from the HCO that actions are completed, starts Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 5 Page 34 of 56 Event

Description:

'A' RCP trip and reactor trip with 3 rods not tripped (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: At least one train of reactor trip breakers -OPEN Neutron flux -LOWERING IVIRPI indicates -ALL CONTROL AND Note: 3 rods did not trip. HCO SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM should inform CRS. (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves (Step 3) Verify Both trains of AC Bus 14 and Bus 18 Bus 16 and Bus 17 HCOI (Step 4) Check if SI is a) Any SI Annunciator -Note: None are lit and HCO/CRS verify SI not required with step RNO. Depending upon the timing of Immediate Action completion and the response to recognize/close the FRVs, the crew may remain in E-O (51 due excessive feed water cooling) or transition to E5-0.1, Reactor Trip Note to Examiner: If 51, continue with E-O on page 38.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 35 of Event

Description:

'A' Rep trip and reactor trip with 3 rods not tripped PRZR pressure less than 1750 psig 5teamline pressure leass than 514 psig CNMT pressure greater than 4 psig SI sequencing started Operator determines SI required Transition to ES-O.1 ES-O.1 Reactor Trip Response Directs ST Al5M to monitor Critical Safety Function Status Trees. Reviews foldout pages with HCO/CO. H tep 1*) Monitor RCS Tavg-STABLE AT OR ENDING TO 54TF. (Step1 RNO) BOP a. Stop dumping steam b. Ensure S/G blowdown and sample valves BOP are closed c. Ensure reheater steam supply valves are sed. d. IF MDAFW pumps are supplying greater than 200 gpm, THEN ensure TDAFW pump supply valves in Pli LL STOP e. If cooldown continues, THEN control total feed flow greater than 200 gpm until narrow range level greater than 5% in at least one BOP S/G. WHEN S/G level h=greater than 5% in one S/G, THEN limit feed flow to that required to maintain S/G level. Note: 51 not required. Note: May request a peer check with STAISM. Note: RCS temp is lowering due to AFW/FW Note: CO pull stop steam supply valves Note: CO secures all AFW flow if >5%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 5 Page 36 of 56 Event

Description:

'A' Rep trip and reactor trip with 3 rods not tripped BOP (Step1 RNO) f. IF cooldown continues below 540°F, perform the 1 )Close both 2) Adjust SIG ARV controller in auto control temperature at HCO e. Check PRZR heaters-ENERGIZED o PRZR proportional heaters o PRZR heater backup group BOP (STEP 3) Check SIG Feed Flow Status a. Check RCS Tavg -LESS THAN 554°F b. Verify MFW flow control valves-CLOSED Note: COfCRS may have shut them earlier on reactor trip. o MFW regulating valves o MFW bypass valves b. (RNO) Depress MANUAL pushbuttons A and B MFW regulating valves and valve controllers AND adjust to 0% c. Verify total AFW flow-GREATER THAN Note: Controlling AFW if 200 GPM greater than 5% in at least 1 S/G. d. Close MFW pump discharge valves o MOV-3977, A MFW pump o MOV-3976, B MFW pump e. Stop MFW pumps and place in

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 5 Page 37 of 56 Event

Description:

'A' RCP trip and reactor trip with 3 rods not tripped BOP f. WHEN both MFP pumps are stopped. Note: COfCRS may have shut Depress MANUAL pushbuttons for A and B them earlier on reactor trip. MFW regulating valves and bypass valve controllers AND adjust to 0% demand (Step 4) Verify MRPllndicates -ALL Note: 3 rods are untrippable. CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM (STEP 4 IF two or more Control Rods are NOT inserted, THEN perform the

a. Start both BA Transfer Pumps. b. Open Emergency Boration Valve MOV-350 c. Borate a minimum of 650 gallons for Note: 1950 gallons required.

control rod not fully HCO and CRS should calculate time required at obtained flowrate. (-52 minutes) If the crew successfully isolated MFW and transitioned to ES-O.1, the Loss of AC event will occur at Step 4, after the crew has initiated emergency boration response to the 3 control rods not inserted. In either path, transition to Loss of All AC Power will be required when the 'A' EDG failed to start the loss of offsite Note to If Loss of ALL AC Power occurred during ES-O.1 then go to ECA-O.O on page Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Event

Description:

N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page"A' RCP trip and reactor trip with 3 rods not tripped 38 of 56 E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCOI BOP (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated: a) Any SI Annunciator -LIT b) SI sequencing-BOTH TRAI NS CRS Foldout pages given to MCB operators HCO (Step 5*) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required: o Annunciator A-27 , CNMT EXTINGUSHED o CNMT pressure-LESS THAN 28 PSIG CRS Direct HCO to perform ATT-27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION Note: If in E-O, initiate Loss of ALL AC Power Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # ...,;6;...;a;;;,;.n;.;;;.d...;.,7___ Page 39 of ....;5;,,;.6--/ Event Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start The Loss of ALL AC event will occur at Step 4 of ES-O.1, after the crew has emergency boration in response to the 3 control rods not inserted OR at step 7 of In either path, transition to ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power will be required when the EDG failed to start following the loss of offsite Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger # 6, Event 7 entered at Indications Numerous MCB Alarms Loss of Bus 14 and Bus 16 ECA-O.O Loss of ALL AC Power HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Note: The crew will attempt t start A DIG. At least one train of reactor trip breakers -OPEN Neutron flux -LOWERING MRPI indicates -ALL CONTROL AND Note: 3 rods are untrippable. SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM (Step 2) Verify turbine Stop Valves (*Step 3) Adjust SIG ARVs to Control Tavg Approximately HCO (Step 4) Stop Both Note: Tripped on LOPP. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # __ Page 40 of _5;;.,;6;""--11 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start HCO (Step 5) Check If RCS Is Isolated: PRZR PORVs -CLOSED Verify RCS isolation valves closed: PRZR PORVs -CLOSED Verify RCS isolation valves closed: Place letdown orifice valve to AOV-200A AOV-200B AOV-202 Place letdown isolation switches to AOV-371 AOV-427 Place excess letdown isolation switch to CLOSE (AOV-31 BOP (Step 6) Verify Adequate TDAFW Flow: Verify TDAFW pump -RUNNING NOTE: Fails to Auto start (Step 6a RNO) Perform the following: Note: S/G water levels are high due to failure of FRV's to close on trip. Verify governor valve, Manually or locally open at least TDAFW pump steam supply MOV-3505A MOV-3504A Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # ..,;6;.,;a;;;.;,n;.;;,d..;,.7___ Page 41 of ...,;:5;.:.6 __1 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start ECA-0.0--8 Establish greater than 200 GPM AFW flow before both S/G levels decrease to < 120"wide range level [160" Adverse CNMT] . Safety Significance: Failure to establish the minimum required AFW flow rate, under the postulated accident conditions, is a violation of the basic objective of ECA-O.O and of the assumptions of the analyses upon which ECA-O.O is based. Both intend to mitigate deterioration of RCS conditions while AC emergency power is not available. Without AFW flow, the SIGs could not support any significant plant cooldown. Thus, the crew would lose the ability to delay the adverse consequences of core uncover. Also, without AFW flow, decay heat would still open the safety valves and would rapidly deplete the SIG inventory, leading to a loss of secondary heat sink or SIG dryout. Decay heat would then increase RCS temperature and pressure until the pressurizer PORVs open, imposing a larger LOCA than RCP seal leakage. Both of these examples violate the basic assumptions of the analyses on which ECA-O.O is based, complicating the mitigation actions. Required Plant Conditions:

1. A loss of all AC condition exists 2. Less than 200 GPM of AFW flow 3. The TDAFW pump is available, but must be manually started 4. SIG NR levels are less than 5% Scenario Conditions:

1. A loss of all AC condition exists (no offsite power, 'B' EDG OOS, 'A' EDG fails) 2. Both MDAFW pumps have no power, TDAFW pump steam admission valves have not auto opened 3. Manual opening of TDAFW pump steam admission valves is available

4. Normal post-trip SIG level shrink in conjunction with no AFW availability will result in NR levels <5%.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No,: Scenario # 1 Event # _6;,.;8:;;,n.;,;;d...;.7 ___ Page 42 of _5;;.,;6;"""-11 Event Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start BOP (Step 6 Continued) Verify TDAFW pump flow -GREATER THAN 200 GPM (Step 6 Continued) flow -GREATER THAN 200 HCOI (Step 7) Try To Restore Power to any Train BOP of AC Emergency Busses: Verify emergency DIG aligned for Mode switch in UNIT Voltage control selector in AUTO Check emergency DIGs -BOTH DIG NOTE: Neither DIG is running, RUNNING (Step 7 RNa) WHEN non-running DIG NOTE: This step will be available for starting, THEN perform the performed later when the B following: DIG is restored, IF no emergency DIG available, perform the Direct AO to attempt to restore NOTE: The CRS will dispatch emergency DIG (Refer to ER-D/G,1, anAO, RESTORING SIM DRIVER: as AO, acknowledge,

Go to Step 8, HCOI (Step 8) Establish the Following Equipment BOP Alignment: Pull stop AC emergency bus loads RHR pumps Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event #

___ Page 43 of ...,;5;.;;,6---"1 Event Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start CNMT RECIRC fans CNMT spray pumps SI pumps CCWpumps Charging CREATS Fans Evaluate non-vital loads (Refer ATI-S.3, ATTACHMENT NOTE: The CRS will hand this off to the HCO or the CO. Examiner following operator performing ATT-S.3 continue below. Examiners following other operators continue on next page. ATT-B.3, ATTACHMENT NONVITAL HCOI (Step 1) Lockout the following equipment BOP from the control board by placing the respective switches in PULL STOP or OFF as necessary: EH pumps Turning gear oil pump Hi Press seal oil backup pump Condensate pumps RCDT pumps MFP AC oil pumps PRZR heaters Boric acid transfer pumps Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 6 and 7 Page 44 of 56 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start RMW pumps AUX BLDG sump pumps Air compressors Containment sump pumps (Step 2) Consideration should be given locking out the following loads ECA-O.O, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-8.3 continue HERE HCOI * (Step 8.Continued) Place non-running BOP SW pump switches to STOP, then return to AUTO Momentarily place switch for RCP seal return isolation valve, Momentarily place to CLOSE for RCP CCW return MOV-749A MOV-749B MOV-759A MOV-759B HCOI (Step 9) Try To Restore Offsite Power: BOP Consult RG&E Energy Control Center to NOTE: The CO will notify the determine if either normal offsite power RG&E ECC. supply - SIM DRIVER: as RG&E ECC, acknowledge, and report that offsite power is NOT readily available. 12B transformer via breaker 76702 OR Appendix D Op Test No.: Event

Description:

HCOI BOP CRS Operator Form ES-D-2 Scenario # Event # _6.;;...;;;an;.;,;d;;,.7;.... __ Page 45 of Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start 12A transformer via breaker 7T1352 (Step 9a RNO) IF normal offsite power supply NOT readily available, THEN perform the following: Restore IA system using the Diesel Air Compressor (Refer to A TT-11.2, ATTACHMENT DIESEL AIR COMPRESSOR). Evaluate Main transformer backfeed for long term concerns (Refer to ER-ELEC.3, EMERGENCY OFFSITE BACKFEED VIA MAIN & UNIT TRANSFORMER). Go to Step 10. (Step 10) Initiate Local Action to Isolate RCS And To Provide Cooling To Vital Areas And Equipment Open all Reactor Protection and Control System rack doors in the Control Room. Direct Security personnel to open the following vital area doors to enhance cooling: Control Room Door S51 F Intermediate Bldg Door S37F (AFW pump area) Intermediate Bldg Door F36F (Automatic fire door, Rod Drive MG set area) Intermediate Bldg Door S44F (Steam Header area) Intermediate Bldg Top Floor Overhead Door S55 SIM DRIVER: Set MIS42, OPEN, to establish using diesel air NOTE: The CRS will SIM DRIVER: as Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 6 and 7 Page 46 of 56 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start Dispatch AO To Locally Isolate RCP Seals (Refer to ATT-21.0, ATTACHMENT RCS ISOLATION) Critical Task: ECA-O.O--H Isolate RCP seal injection before a charging pump is started and isolate RCP thermal barriers before a CCW pump is started. Safety Significance: Failure to isolate RCP seal injection before starting a charging pump or the thermal barrier before starting a CCW pump, under the postulated conditions can result in unnecessary and avoidable degradation of the RCS fission product barrier -specifically at the point of the RCP seals, especially if the RCPs are subsequently started. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in "significant degradation in their mitigative capability of the plant" in that the RCPs are not available for subsequent recovery actions (except for the red-path condition on the Core Cooling CSF that persists despite secondary depressurization). Required Plant Conditions: Station Blackout with subsequent restoration of power to at least one AC emergency bus. Blackout condition persists long enough for the crew to reach Step 8 of ECA-O.O, and RCP #1 seal outlet temperature is >235°F. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # ___ Page 47 of ...,;5;.;;,6 __1 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start Dispatch AO to align backup cooling water to TDAFW Pump (Refer to A TT -5.2, ATTACHMENT ALTERNATE COOLING TO TDAFW PUMP) (Step 11) Isolate Makeup And Reject From Hotwell To CST By Placing Hotwell Level Controller (LC-107) In Manual AT 50% (Step 12) Isolate S/G: Manually close both MSIVs BOP Depress MANUAL pushbuttons for the A and B S/G MFW regulating and bypass valve controllers AND adjust to 0% demand

S/G A, HCV-466 and HCV-480
S/G B, HCV-476 and HCV-481 Place MCB master switch for S/G blowdown and sample valves to CLOSE (Step 13) Check if S/G Secondary Side is intact: Pressure in both S/Gs -STABLE OR RISING Pressure in both S/Gs-GREATER THAN 110 PSIG (Step 14) Control PRZR Level: a. Charging pumps-ANY RUNNING (a. RNO) Go to Step 15. NOTE: The CRS will dispatch SIM DRIVER: as acknowledge, and use FDW66, ON to backup cooling to CRS (Step 15) Check if S/G Tubes are intact:

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # Event # _6;;..,a;;;;,n,;.;;;d..:.,7___ Page 48 of Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start r Intact S/G Levels: a. Narrow range level-GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse CNMT] b. Control AFW flow by throttling flow control valves:

S/G A, AOV-4297
S/G B, AOV-4298 c. Control AFW flow to maintain narror range level between 17% [25% adverse CNMT] and 50%. (Step 17) Check DC Loads: a. Place control witches foe MFW pump AC oil pumps to OFF (allows timer to stop DC oil pumps) b. Stop all large non-essential DC loads. 1)Evaluate DC loads (Refere to ATT-8.0, ATTACHMENT DC LOADS) 2)WHEN turbine is stopped, THEN perform the following:

a) Locally close Turbine backup seal oil reg outlet valve V-5475J. b) Pull Stop Turbine DC lube oil pump (within 1 hour) c. Direct electricians to locally monitor DC power supply. A TT-8.0, ATTACHMENT DC LOADS. A) The A and MFP DC oil pumps should be automatically shed with 12 minutes to reduce battery load Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # Event # 6 and 7 Page 49 of 56 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start B) The following DC loads could be shed Note: BOP will direct AO's. from A and B DC busses, if necessary (obtain DC panel key from SS): MAIN DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL (DCPDPCB03A) (A Battery Rod drive MG set control panel, Iso phase control, position 5 Exciter equipment panel, position 6 MAIN DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL (DCPDPCB03B) (B Battery Rod drive MG set control panel, AUX BLDG DC DIST PANEL 1B (DCPDPAB01 B) (south end bus 16 on column near SI pump recuirc valves): Aux Bldg Heat & Vent cont position ATT-8.0, ATTACHMENT DC LOADS (conti) SCREEN HOUSE DC PANEL B (DCPDSH01 B) (screenhouse Traveling screen control, position 1 TURB BLDG DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL (DCPDTB01 B) (TURB BLDG basement fire water storage Hydrogen panel, position 3 degas ificatio MCC F, position 5 Water treatment panel, position 6 ECA-O.O, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER (Step 18) Verify Source Range ENERGIZED Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 and 7 Page 50 of 56 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start (Step 18 RNO) Dispatch personnel with relay Note: AO or STA performs rack key to turn off 125 VDC power switches task. in REACTOR PROTECTION racks RLTR-1 and RL TR-2 to deenergize source range SIM DRIVER: REM NIS 097, block relays. [Switch Off]. (Step 19) Monitor CST THAN 5 (Step 20) Initiate Depressurization of SIGs to 260 a. Check SIG narrow range GREATER THAN 17% [25%adverse CNMT] IN AT LEAST ONE SIG b. lVIanually dump steam from intact SIGs Note: Opens ARVs and using SIG ARVs to maintain cooldown rate in controls cooldown rates. RCS Cold Legs LESS THAN 100The. At Step 20 of ECA-O.O (after depressurization of SIGs and RCS cooldown has initiated), the AO will report the 'A' EDG is now available for start. The should manually start the 'A' EDG from the main control board and start 1 pump per step HCOI * (Step 7.b RNO) WHEN non-running DIG 81M DRIVER: Delete MALF BOP available for starting, THEN perform the GEN04A. following: Depress DIG FIELD RESET pushbutton Depress DIG RESET pushbutton Start DIG IF DIG starts, THEN go to Step 7c. NOTE: The A DIG will start. HCOI * (Step 7c) Check DIG voltage and BOP frequency Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # __ Page 51 of _5;,;6;""'-11 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start Frequency -APPROXIMATELY 60 Hz Verify adequate DIG cooling Bus 17 andlor Bus One SW Pump running for each NOTE: The A SW Pump will running DIG fail to start automatically, and the CO will need to start the A SW Pump manually. (Step 7.d.RNO) Manually busses and start SW IF adequate cooling can NOT be NOTE: Once the A SW Pump supplied to a running DIG is started, adequate cooling for the DIG will exist. BOP (Step 7.e ) Verify at least one train emergency busses -ENERGIZED Bus 14 and Bus 18 Bus 16 and Bus 17 (Step 7e RNO) Manually energize Emergency Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: Scenario # 1 Event # _6;;,.a;;.;,n;,;;d..;,.7 ___ Page 52 of ...,;5....6---11 Event Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start ECA-O.O--F Manually start the SW pump such that the EDG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating. Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded emergency power capacity." Required Plant Conditions: Loss of all AC initial condition with subsequent restoration of AC power from one EDG. SW pump(s) fail to start automatically when the associated emergency bus is energized by the EDG. A SW pump aligned to provide cooling for the running EDG can be manually started from the 8 The other EDG is Scenario Conditions: AC power will be restored by 'A' EDG. Auto start of 'A' and 'c' SWPs is failed. 7. Start of either 'A' or 'c' SW pump will provide cooling for the 'A' EDG 'B' EDG is OOS Note: Once AC Emergency busses are energized, eRS should go directly to Step 28. (Step 28) Manually Control S/G ARVs Stabilize S/G (Step 29) Verify SW System Operation: Check Bus 17 and Bus 18 -AT ONE Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 OpTest No.: N12*1 Scenario # 1 Event # ...,;6;;..,;a;;;,n;.;;;,d..;.,7 ___ Page 53 of Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start (Step 29b RNO) IF normal power THEN establish to SW pumps IF normal power NOT available, THEN establish one SW pump running for each operating DIG. IF only one SW pump running, perform the

1. Manually perform SW isolation

2. Refer to AP-SW.2, Loss of Service Water (Step 30) Verify Following Equipment Loaded On Available AC Emergency Busses: 480 volt MCCs -ENERGIZED MCC D from Bus 16 Verify Instrument busses -ENERGIZED Bus A from MCC C Bus B from MCC C Bus C from MCC D Dispatch personnel to verify proper NOTE: The CRS will dispatch operation of battery chargers anAO. SIM DRIVER: as AO, acknowledge. (Step 31) Select Recovery Procedure: Check RCS subcooling based on exit TICs -GREATER THAN OaF FIG-1.0, FIGURE MIN Check PRZR level -GREATER 10% [30% adverse Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # _6...a-.n_d....7___ Page 54 of _56_____ 1 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC Power with TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Failure to AUTO Start Check SI and RHR Pumps -CRS Go to ECA-O.2, LOSS OF ALL AC NOTE: The CRS should go to POWER RECOVERY WITHOUT SI ECA-O.2. REQUIRED, Step 1.

Crew Turnover Sheet for 2012 NRC Scenario #1 UNIT STATUS: Power Level: 75% RCS [B] 1075 ppm BAST [B]: 14000 ppm Power The Plant is at 70% power (MOL), Core Burnup: 10000 MWD/MTU for four days. INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT: The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The plant power was reduced to 50% several days ago due to a malfunction on the B Main Feedwater Pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant is returning to full power per 0-5.2, Load Ascension, Step 6.2.32, Placing Condensate Booster Pumps In Service. Per Chemistry direction, Normal Letdown is at 40 gpm. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 'B' EDG has been DOS due to mechanical issue which prevents resetting of the fuel racks. This was found yesterday at OSOO. Expected return to service is tomorrow.

A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.S.1.B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.S.1.1 and 3.S.1.2 completed successfully; SR-3.S.1.1 due again in 6 hrs. Continue load ascension. The crew has been directed to continue in 0-5.2, step 6.2.32 and start Condensate Booster Pumps. A-52.4 Equipment Date Time Reason Required Actions Required Required Action not met Completion DatefTime BEDG J..!12 0800 Fuel racks will ITS 3.8.1 0800 yesterday. ITS 3.8.1 Enter Condition B Enter Condition G not reset Required Action: Required Action C.1: Be in Mode 3 B.1: Perform SR 3.8.11 for the in 6 hours offsite circuit.-Perform every 8 AND hours, [Due in 6 hours] Required Action C.2: Be in Mode 5 AND in 84 hours B.2. Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable. AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG is not inoperable due to common cause failure. OR 8.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG. AND B.4 Restore DG to OPERABLE status. [7 days] PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: 2012 Initial license Operator Training TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N 12-2

REFERENCES:

1. 0-1.2, Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown to Full Load 2. AR-F-15, RCS TAVG DEV 4' F, or 3. AR-F-16, TAVG-TREF DEVIATION

+/- 5'F 4. ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure 5. Tech Spec LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation

6. Tech Spec LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation

7. T -14F.1, SIG Blowdown System Operation

8. OPG-BRIEF, Operations Briefing Guidance 9. AR-RMS-17, R-17 Component Cooling 10. AP-RCP.1, RCP Seal Malfunction

11. AP-CCW.1, Leakage Into the Component Cooling Loop 12. E-O, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection

13. ATT-27.0, Automatic Action Verification

14. ATT-3.0, Attachment CIICVI 15. E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 16. ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment Author: Norm Meaker, Exam Writer Contractor F acUity Review: Pat Landers, Lead Exam Author Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Facility:

Robert E. Ginna Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2012-N-1 Operators: (SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial The plant is at -2% power (BOL). Plant startup is in progress per 0-1.2, Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown To Full Load. The team is currently at step 6.7 (page 39). The "AI! Main Feed Pump has just been placed in-service. Based upon the current plant risk assessment, the crew is waiting for completion of B EDG repair before entering Mode 1. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG has been OOS due repairs on the governor. Expected return to service is 1 hour. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.8.1.B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.B.1.1 was completed successfully 1 hour ago; all other EDG surveillances are current. Until B EDG is returned to service, hold power and do not go above 5 % Reactor Power till notified. Event Malt. No. Event Event Description No. Type* 1 FDW14C N-BOP Transition from AFW to MFW per 0-1.2 steps 6.7.1 through 6.7.5. (O) N (TS)-SRO MD AFW Pump 1 B Discharge VLV (MOV-400B) will not re-open during the realignment. 2 RCS11F I-RO Th RTD {Channel 4) fails high (650) I-BOP I{TS)-SRO 3 RCS01B C-RO "B" RCP Thermal Barrier leak (5 ramp for C-SRO 120 sec) 4 SIS01 M-BOP Spurious SI ("A" Train), Concurrent w/LOOP and LOCA Outside EDS1A M-RO CNMT EDS1B M-SRO RCS19C Fire alarms in Aux Bldg Basement RHR pump area (1500) FCP01BQ, [on, 30 delay] 5 RPS05A C-RO Reactor Trip Breakers fail to open automatically (manual available)

RPS05B C-SRO (man avail) I 6 GENOa C-RO "AU DG fails to start automatically (manual start available) (A DG) C-SRO 7 RPS11-A-2 C-RO AOV-371 (LID Isolation to NRHX) fails to close automatically (Isolation C-SRO signal only) 8 Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 uA" MDAFW Pump fails to start automatically * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, ( I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Overview of Scenario # 2 The plant is at -2% power (BOL). Plant startup is in progress per 0-1.2, Plant Startup from Hot Shutdown to Full Load. The team is currently at step 6.7 (page 39). The "A" Main Feed Pump has just been placed in-service.

The plant is in a normal 50/50 electric plant lineup. Per Chemistry direction, the 60 gpm letdown orifice is in service. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B EDG is out of service B EDG has been OOS due to mechanical linkage issue with the governor. ITS entry for 3.8.1. B, a 7 -day LCO, has been entered, and all required surveillances are current. Work is in progress and expected return to service is 1 hour. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.8.1.B, 7 Day Action. SR-3.8.1.1 (offsite power availability and breaker alignment) was completed 1 hour ago. Until B EDG is returned to service, hold power and do not go above 5 % Reactor Power till notified. After taking the watch, the team will transition from Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) to Main Feed Water (MFW) per 0-1.2 steps 6.7.1 through 6.7.5. This will involve the BOP verifying operation of the Feed Regulating Valves (FRVs) and the FRV Bypass valves, placing the FRV Bypass Valves in Auto, securing the AFW pumps, and placing the AFW pumps in safeguards alignment. During this normal alignment, AFW discharge valve on 'B' MDAFW pump will not reopen, rendering AFW Train B inoperable and entry into ITS 3.7.5, Action B.1, with a 7-day completion time. Next a channel four Thot RTD will fail high. The team will respond per:

AR-F-15, RCS Tavg Dev 4°F
AR-F-16, Avg Tavg -Tref Dev +/-5°F
AR-F-24, RCS AVG DEV 3°F ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure. The RO will transfer the charging pump that is in automatic to manual and manually adjust its speed to control Pressurizer (PRZR) level. The BOP will defeat the failed channel per INST.1. The SRO will refer to ITS 3.1.6, the COLR, and ITS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 Next, a thermal barrier leak will occur on the "B" RCP. The team will respond per:
AR-B-10, RCP 1B LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20, or
F-14, CHARGING PUMP SPEED, or
A-5, CCW SURGE TANK HI LEVEL 58.8% The crew may first enter AP-RCP.1, RCP SEAL MALFUNCTION, due to the AR procedural direction, but will end up in AP-CCW.1, LEAKAGE INTO THE CCW LOOP due to multiple indications of RCS in-leakage into the CCW system. Per AP-CCW.1, the RO will isolate the leak by closing AOV-754B.

Note that later in the scenario, when SI occurs, instrument air to containment will be isolated and AOV-754B will fail open. The CCW leak will be re-isolated when the team restores Instrument Air to containment per EOP direction. (Due to electrical power availability, power will not be available to close MOV-749B and MOV-759B -the alternate isolation method.) Next, a spurious "A" train SI signal will occur. At the same time there will be a loss of offsite power, the "A" DG will fail to start automatically, and a LOCA outside containment will be initiated. The team will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. At immediate action step 1, the RO will recognize that the reactor failed to trip automatically and will trip the reactor manually. At immediate action step 3 the BOP will inform the team of the status of Safeguard busses (no safeguard busses energized), and the RO will depress the "A" DG start pushbutton Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 (front left section of the MCB) which will restore the "A" train of safeguard buses (busses 14 and 18). When the RO performs Attachment 27.0, Attachment Automatic Action Verification, (step 6 of E-O) he will discover that AOV-371, UD Isolation to NRHX and MOV-814, CCW From RX SUPP CLRS (loss of power), failed to isolate automatically. With the concurrent LOCA outside CNMT, the RHR-to-UD flowpath established by AOV-371 will provide an additional pathway for RCS activity from RHR into the UD system through the open AOV-371, thru PCV-135 (which will open further to reduce UD system pressure), and lift UD relief valve 209 (setpoint 200 psig) to the VCT. Closing AOV-371 manually per the guidance in ATT-27.0 will isolate this flowpath. Attachment-3.0 will be used to isolate MOV-814. At step 7 of E-O, no MDAFW pumps will be running. The BOP will manually start the "An MDAFW pump and align the TDAFW pump as necessary. The LOCA outside containment will be due to failure of check valve 853A. When the SI occurs RCS will flow backwards through MOV-852A (Core Deluge Valve) and cause an RHR system piping break inside the Auxiliary building (RHR system piping is designed for a maximum of 600 psi -not RCS pressure). RCS will also flow from the RHR system to the CVCS system (via a check valve around HCV-133), lift relief valve 203, and flow to the PRT. Within a few minutes (depending on the size of the RHR piping break) the PRT rupture disc will blow and cause a LOCA inside containment. Because of this, the team is expected to transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, at E-O step 17, rather than transitioning to ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, at E-O step 26. (Transition from E-O step 26 is possible depending on break size and how fast the team progresses through E-O, but is unlikely.) Instrument air to containment will be re-established at step 9 of E-1. This will re-isolate the CCW system leak. (Unable to close MOV-749B and 759B due to bus 16 de-energized.) The team will transition to ECA-1.2 at E-1 step 17. At ECA-1.2 step 3 the RO will close MOV-852A and the team will check for an RCS pressure rise. With the leakpath isolated, RCS pressure will rise, indicating isolation of the LOCA outside containment. (The pressure rise may be delayed or slow depending on RCS inventory. If a sizable bubble exists in the reactor vessel head, injection flow has to refill the head to some extent before RCS pressure will rise significantly. The team should realize this.) Terminate the scenario upon transition back to E-1. Additional Information: When the Aux Bldg sump reaches 15,000 gallons the RHR pumps, Aux Bldg sump pumps, and RCDT pumps will fail due to submergence (2 to 4 minute time delay after submergence). Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Critical Energize at least one emergency bus before transition out of Safety Failure to re-energize an emergency train leads to degraded emergency power needless degradation of a fission release barrier (RCS through RCP Seals), and results in a continuing loss of RCS inventory. Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip. 2. No emergency bus energized.

3. At least one EDG can be connected to an emergency bus. Scenario Conditions:

1. Spurious SI will require reactor trip. 2. Offsite power is lost, "8" DG is OOS, and "A" DG fails to start automatically.

3. "An DG can be started manually.

ECA-1.2--A Isolate LOCA outside containment prior to transition out of ECA-1.2. Safety Failure to isolate this leak degrades containment integrity resulting in continuing Required Plant

1. Isolable LOCA outside containment.

Scenario Conditions:

1. The LOCA outside containment may be isolated by closing MOV-852A.

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Reset to IC-41 o (Temp I/C-NRC-) -2% power BOL Note: If only a IC-41 IC available, must start A MFP and stabilize main condenser vacuum. Simulator support can generate an IC with secondary plant stable. IC should have controlling S/G water levels using A and B MDAFW pump bypass valves, V-4480 and V-4481 (MOV-4007 and MOV-4008 closed). Ensure: EHC valve limiter set 10% higher than setter. Ensure 60 GPM orifice is on service At T=O, insert: MALF FDW14C, [0], AFW Feed Control Valves Failure: 4008 MALF RPS05A, [Manual Available], Reactor Trip BKR A Failure MALF RPS05B, [Manual Available], Reactor Trip BKR B Failure MALF GEN08, [A DIG], Diesel Generator Auto Start Failure MALF RPS11-A2. [Isolation signal Only1. CI Failure -AOV-371 MALF RPS07K, Auto Failure: A MDAFW Pump To take 'B' EDG OOS:

Pull stop the 'B' EDG Control Stop/Start SWitch and place CAUTION tag on switch
Pull stop the D/G'B' Bus 16 Supply Breaker and place CAUTION tag on switch
Pull stop the D/G'B' Bus 17 Supply Breaker and place CAUTION tag on switch
Place CAUTION tag on DIG 'B' start pushbutton
Place PROTECT tags per OPG-Protected Equipment and black dot J-32. Insert the following: MALF RCS11F [650], on T-2 (RTD FAILURE: LP B HOT TE-404A (IT-404) MALF RCS01B [5 gpm ramp 120sec], on T-3 (B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak) MALF SIS01, [Train A),on T -4 (Spurious SI 'A' Train) MALF EDS1A, on T -4, (Loss of Off-Site Power: CKT 7T) MALF EDS1 B, on T -4, (Loss of Off-Site Power: CKT 767) MALF RCS19C, [1900], on T -4 (RHR Header Leak, Valve 853A)

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 o Prior to Crew RUN

Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protected Briefing Equipment
Place Black Dot on MCB Annunciator J-32 Crew Briefing o
Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
Conduct Pre-job Brief using marked up copy of 0-1.2, marked up to section 6.7. 0 T-O At direction of 0 At direction 0 examiner At direction of 0 examiner o At direction of examiner Event 1 Event 2 Trigger#2 MALF RCS11 F [650], on T-2 Event 3 Trigger#3 MALF RCS01 B [5 gpm ramp for 120 sec] Event 4 MALF SIS01, [Train A] MALF EOS1A MALF EDS1B MALF RCS19C, [1900] Shift from AFW to MFP per 0-1.2, section 6.7 RTD Thot failure B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak Spurious SI (liN' Train), Concurrent w/LOOP and LOCA Outside CNMT Loss of Off-Site Power' CKT 7T Loss of Off-Site Power; CKT 767 RHR Header Leak, Valve 853A Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 2 D D D D D At direction of examiner Continued from Event 5 Continued from Event 5 Continued from Event 5 Event 5 MALF RPS05A, [Manual Available]

MALF RPS05B, [Manual Available] MALF GEN08, [A Event 7 MALF RPS11-A2, [Isolation Signal Only] Event 8 MALF RPS07K Reactor Trip Breakers fail to open automatically (manual available) NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the Ie at T = o. "A" DG fails to start automatically (manual start available) NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the Ie at T = O. AOV-371 (UD Isolation to NRHX) fails to close automatically NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the Ie at T = O. "A" MDAFW Pump fails to start automatically NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the Ie at T = O. Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # -......;... ____ Page Event

Description:

Shifting from AFW to MFW during startup per 0-1.2 After taking the watch, the team will transition from Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) to Main Feed Water (MFW) per 0-1.2 steps 6.7.1 through 6.7.5. This will involve the BOP verifying operation of the Feed Regulating Valves (FRVs) and the FRV Bypass valves, placing the FRV Bypass Valves in Auto, securing the AFW pumps, and placing the AFW pumps in safeguards alignment. During this normal alignment, AFW discharge valve on 'B' MDAFW pump will not reopen, rendering AFW Train B inoperable and entry into ITS 3.7.5, Action B.1, with a 7-day completion time. Booth Operator Instructions: NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T = 0 Indications Available: NA 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD Reviews note at step 6.7.1 and ADFCS System Trouble may AR-G-22, ADFCS SYSTEM TROUBLE Rev 01100 ADFCS SYSTEM Page 1 of 3 Approval Authority-Manager -Operations Continuous Use/Safety Related I JALARM SETPOINTS

Numerous alarms generated by ADFCS (check printer or EMMI monitor>> SOURCE(S)
ADFCS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS None 4.0 PERFORMANCE CHECK ADFACS EMMI monitor (Relay Room) for the cause of the failure performing the Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ......;...

____ Page 11 of 55....;..;..----t Event

Description:

Shifting from AFW to MFW during startup per 0-1.2 (Step 6.7.1) VERIFY operation of MFW regulating AND bypass valves by cycling each of the following valves SLOWLY OPEN UNTIL flow indication is observed AND THEN returning the valve to CLOSED: S/G A FW REG VLV, HCV-466 S/G B FW REG VLV, HCV-476 FW FLOW LOOP A BYPASS VLV, HCV-480 FW FLOW LOOP B BYPASS VLV, HCV-481 (Step 6.7.2) ALIGN Feedwater Control as follows: 1. PLACE FW FLOW LOOP A VLV HCV-480 controller in 2. PLACE FW FLOW LOOP B VLV HCV-481 controller in 3. IF THEN PLACE S/G A FW REG controller in OTHERWISE, MARK this Step 4. IF THEN PLACE S/G B FW REG controller in OTHERWISE, MARK this Step Note: BOP will ask CRS. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # -.;...____ Page 12 of ....,;5;..;;;,5-1 Event

Description:

Shifting from AFW to MFW during startup per 0-1.2 (Step 6.7.3) REMOVE running AFW Pumps from service as follows: 1. IF AFW Pump A is RUNNING, THEN PERFORM the following: OTHERWIS MARK this N/A. a. CLOSE MD AFW PUMP 1A DISCHARGE VLV, MOV-4007 b. CLOSE AFW BYPASS VLV A, AOV-4480 c. STOP AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPA d. ENSURE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP control switch is in AUTO (Step 6.7.3) REMOVE running AFW Pumps from service as follows: 2. IF AFW Pump B is RUNNING, THEN PERFORM the following: OTH MARK this N/A. a. CLOSE MD AFW PUMP 1 B DISCHARGE VLV, MOV-4008 b. CLOSE AFW BYPASS VLV A, AOV-4481 c. STOP AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPB d. ENSURE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP B control switch is in AUTO (Step 6.7.4) IF Blowdown is desired, THEN THROTTLE OPEN Blowdown Flow Control valves to desired flow rate PER applicable sections of T -14F .1, S/G Blowdown System Operation. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. Note: Both AFW pumps are running Note: Not desired. SIM DRIVER: If CRS ask Chem Tech, Blowdown permit being currently being generated by Chemistry and then will inform Control when completed. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # -.:...____ Page 13 of ...,:5::.:::,5--11 Event

Description:

Shifting from AFW to MFW during startup per 0-1.2 connect valves: AFW CROSSOVERVLV, AFW CROSSOVER VLV, 2. ENSURE OPEN the following Auxiliary Note: MOV-4008 will not Feedwater Pump Discharge valves: open. BOP should inform TURB DRVN AFW PUMP DISCHARGE VLV, MD AFW PUMP 1A DISCHARGE Note: CRS may dispatch VLV, MOV-4007 Primary AO to look at breaker MD AFW PUMP 1 B DISCHARGE for MOV-4008. VLV, MOV-4008 Note: Taking out MOV-4007 would complicate both trains out with 'B' EDG OOS (72 hr LCO now) 3. OPEN both Turbine Driven Auxiliary Note: Valves currently open. Feedwater Pump flow control valves: AFWTO S/G 1A VLV, AFW TO S/G 1 B VL V Should refer to ITS requirement, Aux Feedwater System, 3.7.5. and have BOP continue with 0-1.2. (Step 6.7.5) 4. PLACE both AFW Bypass switches to AFW BYPASS PUMP 1A AFW BYPASS PUMP 18 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # --:;...____ Page 14 of Event

Description:

Shifting from AFW to MFW during startup per 0-1.2 5. VERIFY CLOSED MD AFW PUMP 1A RECIRC VLV AOV-4304.

6. VERIFY CLOSED MO AFW PUMP 1 B RECIRC VLV AOV-4310. (Step 6.7.6) ADJUST manual loader to Note: Dispatches AO to provide CLOSE signal for MAIN FW PUMP perform step 6.7.6 CLEANUP RECIRC AND RECIRC DUMP AOV TO MAIN CONDENSER, AOV-4262 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event #

Page 15 of 55""";";'---11 Event

Description:

Shifting from AFW to MFW during startup per 0-1.2 3I5 Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) System LCO Two motor driven AFW (MDAFW) trains, one turbine driven AFW (TDAFW) train, and two standby AFW (SAFW) trains shall be OPERABlE_ APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A-One TDAFW train f10wpath inoperable. A-1 Restore IDAFW train flowpath to OPERABLE status. 7 days B-One MDAFW train inoperable. B-1 Restore MDAFW train to OPERABLE status. Jdays C. TDAFW train inoperable. C.1 OR LCO 3.0A.b is not Two MDAFW trains inoperable. OR One TDAFW train f10wpath and one MDAFW train inoperable to opposite steam generators (SGs). applicable. Restore one MDAFW train or TDAFW train f10wpath to OPERABLE status. 72 hours At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ____ Page 16 of "' Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high I Next a Channel four Thot RTD will fail high. The team will respond per.

AR-F-15, RCS Tavg Dev 4°F
AR-F-16, Avg Tavg -Tref Dev +/-5°F I
AR-F-24, RCS AVG llT DEV 3"F I ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure. I The RO will transfer the charging pump that is in automatic to manual and manually adjust its speed to control Pressurizer (PRZR) level. The BOP will defeat the channel per ER-INST.1.

The SRO will refer to ITS 3.1.6, the COLR, and ITS 3.3.1 3.3.2 Booth Operator Instructions:

Trigger#2
Acknowledge as WCC and OPS Indications
AR-F-16, Avg Tavg -Tref Dev +/-5°F
AR-F-15, RCS Tavg Dev 4°F
AR-F-24, RCS AVG llT DEVIATION 3"F
TI-404, Loop B Tavg
TI-408B, Loop B 1 B-2 DT Temp
AR-F-15, ReS TAVG DEV 4°F HCO (Step 1) Place Rods in Manual (Auto rod NOTE: The rods are already in motion will be blocked) manual due to power less than P-12. (Step 2) Check RCS Tavg channels Tavg chart BOP turbine runback is NOTE: a turbine run back is NOT occurring. (Step 4) IF a Tavg channel has failed, go to CRS (Step 5) IF average Tavg has failed, NOTE: average Tavg has NOT failed. NOTE: The CRS will go to INST.1.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # Page 17 of 55 Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high Places charging in manual AR-F-24, ReS AVG flT DEVIATION 3°F (Step 1) Perform a channel check. (Step 2) Go to the appropriate procedure:

ER-INST.1 for Failed Instrument Channel NOTE: The CRS will go to INST.1. ER-INST.1, RPS BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENT LOOP FAILURE (Step 6.1.1) Identify the failed instrument channel by observation of the bistable light board, MCB annunciators, and the metering (Step 6.1.2) WHEN a failed instrument loop NOTE: The CRS will identify andlor channel has been identified, THEN an RCS Tavg or t.T Failure, refer to the appropriate section of this and go to Section 6.2. procedure listed below: (Step 6.2.1) IF annunciator F-15, RCS DEV 4°F, is lit, THEN AUTOMATIC control will be blocked and MANUAL control will be (Step 6.2.2) An RTD failure will affect Steam NOTE: unwarranted Steam Dump response if in AUTOMATIC TAVG Dump is NOT occurring.

control. IF unwarranted Steam Dump is occurring, THEN .... Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 N12-1 Scenario # 2 ....;2=--____ Page Op Test Event # 18 of ...,;;5;,;;.5--1! Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high (Step 6.2.3) An RTD (Tavg) failure will affect NOTE: The HCO will place the PRZR level setpoint. Place charging in Charging Pump Speed in MANUAL to stabilize PRZR level. MANUAL (if not done previously) (Step 6.2.4) Since Rod Insertion Limits (RIL) Note: Power <50% are generated from average t::.T, and RTD failure may result in unwarranted RIL alarms. Refer to ITS LCOs 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 to determine actual insertion limits. CRS (Step 6.2.5) IF hot leg streaming has been causing single channel t::.T runback signals, THEN .... CRS (Step 6.2.6) Refer to the appropriate attachment for defeat of the associated control functions:

T AVG 404/DEL TAT 408 YELLOW CHANNEL NOTE: Power level too low for hot leg streaming to be a concern NOTE: The CRS will determine that the Yellow Channel Attachment Tavg 404/Delta T 408 applies. NOTE: The CRS will hand this off to the CO, to coordinate with the HCO. ER-INST.1, RPS BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENT LOOP YELLOW CHANNEL ATTACHMENT TAVG 404lDELTA T Note: Operator will obtain data per step 5.0 to prepare for the instrument defeat brief to determine expected status of proving lights during the BOP Hold brief for instrument defeat per BRIEF Note: Attachment 1 of BRIEF used HCO (Step 1.0) Verify Rod Control selector switch in MANUAL. HCO (Step 2.0) Verify Charging Pump speed controllers in MANUAL.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # Page 19 of _5;;;,;5:"--i Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high (Step 3.0) In the RIL INSERTION LIMIT rack, PLACE T/405 DELTA T DEFEAT switch to LOOP B UNIT2 (Step 4.0) In the STEAM DUMP rack, PLACE the TAVG DEFEAT switch T/401B to LOOP B UNIT2 (Note Before Step 5.0)

lOOP a: to lAVG TC404A
OPAl L.OOP e-TC400A
OHT 1.001' e TC4O$C *
F-e. RCS LOQP 81..0 TA'VG 545 " F-3ZJ(CS OP DELTA T CHANNeL
F*2l,RCSOT8ElTATCHANNE.LALEl=rT BOP (Step 5.0) Determine the expected Bistable Examiner NOTE: Initiate Proving light status for the post defeat Event 3 while the CO/HCO is conditions as flows: behind the MCB tripping bistablas. (Step 5.1) Record the following NOTE: Data may have been obtained for the instrument lOOP B-2 T AVG TI-404 __OF defeat brief earlier. lOOP 18*2l1 TEMP TI-4088 __OTliT SP1l00P 18-2 TEMP TI-408A __OPt.T SP2 LOOP 1 B-2 TEMP TI-408C __

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event #

Page 20 of 55 Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high (Step 5.2) DETERMINE the expected post defeat Bistable proving light status and circle the expected status in table below; 404 LOOP B*2 HIGHT'AVG Light OFF IF TI-404 579"F LOWrAVG Light OFF IF TI-404 " 545°F 408 LOOP B-2 OVERTEMP TRIP Light OFF IF T -408B '" TI-408A OVERPOWER TRIP Light OFF IF TI-4086 ? TI-408C Expected Proving Post Def.at Light Bistable ! Light status (Circle) Status Verified 41J4LooP B-2 ON OFF HIGHT'AVG 404 LOOP B-2 ON OFF LOWTAVG 40SLooPB*2 ON OFF OVERTEMP TRIP 40BLooP8-2 ON OFF OVERPOWER TRIP (Step 6.0) Place the affected channel Bistables in the Trip condition by PERFORMING the following: (Step 6.1) In 1M: {YELLOW) 1 PROTECTfON CHANNEl 4 PlACE the IOOowIng bistable provtng w11ches to O£FEA T (UP) AND VERiFY the PfOVWigltght status -Is cmect per tne table above. 404 bOOP!}i1 HtGHTAVG lOWrAVG 40HOOPIl-2 OVERTEMP TRIP OVERPOWER TRIP (Step 6.2) Verify Correct Bistable Status Light And Annunicator status. (Step 7.0-7.5) Delete 404/408 from the PPCS by performing the following:

Select "Group Update" display
Select "List Server Groups"
Select 404_408 from the pick list NOTE: Expected Proving light stats may have been obtained for the instrument defeat brief earlier. Note: ON ON ON ON NOTE: All Bistable lights are LIT. Note: ON ON ON ON Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event #

____ Page 21 of ....5....5----4 Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high Turn "OFF" scan processing, then the "Set Scan Processing" Answer prompts CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 6.2.7 INST.1, RPS BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENT LOOP FAILURE (Step 6.2.7) Restore following systems to automatic operation as necessary: HCO HCO BOP BOP o o 0 0 PRZR level control Rod control Steam Dump Turbine EH control NOTE: The HCO will place Charging Pump Speed Control back in AUTO. NOTE: The HCO will place Rods back in AUTO. (Step 6.2.8) Check the following ITS Sections for LCO's: NOTE: The CRS will evaluate the Technical Specifications. CRS (Step 6.2.8a) Section 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Functions 5 and 6 CRS (Step 6.2.8b) Section 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4d CRS (Step 6.2.9) GO TO Step 6.15 HCO (Step 6.15.1) IF necessary, verify an operable channel is selected for the affected recorder. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _2"'--____ Page 22 of ..,;5;,;5;"'--11 Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high (Step 6.15.2) Verify the following systems AUTO if HCO Rod control BOP Turbine EH control HCO PRZR Pressure control

HC43'IK
PRZR spray valves
PRZR heaters
PRZR level control BOP Steam Dump (Unless 1 st pressure BOP MFW control BOP S/G Atmos Relief Vlv Control (Step 6.15.3) Notifications to the following NOTE: The CRS may notify people will be made by the Shift the SM/STA. Booth Instructor:

as SM/STA, acknowledge.

Operations Supervision
STA (Step 6.15.4) During normal working hours, NOTE: The CRS may notify Maintenance personnel shall be notified theWCC. immediately of the problem. Booth Instructor:

as WCCS, acknowledge. (Step 6.15.5) During back shifts personnel will be called in. HOWEVER, Shift Manager may defer calling people in, repairs may be deferred to the next NOTE: The CRS will evaluate the Technical Specifications. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 2 Event # ....:2=--____ Page 23 of _5:;,;5:"'--1 Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS) LCO The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3."1-1 shall According to Table 3.3.1-1. ACTIONS Separate Condition entry is allowed for each REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition with one channel referenced in Table inoperable. for the OR Two source channels B-As required by Required B.1 Restore channel to 48 Action A.1 and referenced OPERABLE by Table Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 associated Time of Condition B not met Initiate action to fuUy insert 6 hours all rods. AND Place Control Rod Drive 7 hours System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal. Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 24 of Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high Table 3.3.1-1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPUCABlE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFlfD CONOITlONS REQUIRED CHANNElS CONDITIONS SURVEIllANCE REQUIREMENTS LIMITiNG SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGStOf

1. Manual R.acto.rTlip 1.2. 3(1)), 4(1)). 5(1)) 2 e,c SR 3.3.1.11 NA 2.

Neutron Flux a. High 1.2 D.G SR3.3.1.1 SR3.3.1.2 SR3.3.1.7 SR3.a.1.m S 109.27% RTP b. Low ,(Ci, 2 D.G SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 SR3.3.UD .s 29.2B% RTP 3. Intermeciiate Range Nevtron Flux 1 (e). 2 2 E.G SR3.3.1.1 SR3.3.1.8 SR3.3.UD (0) 4. Souroe Range Neuiron Flux ,2le) 2 F.G SR3.a.l.1 SRll.a.l.S SR3.3.1.1O jel) 4{ll),5 11l) 2 H.I SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 (tI) 4ill.5 ill J SR 3.3.1.1 SR3.3.UD 5. Overtemperarure: L!.T 1.2 4 D.G SR3.3.1.1 SR3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 SR3.3.1.m Referio Note I 6. Overpo'M:rJ.T 1.2 D.G SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR3.3.1.m Referio Hotel Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 2 Event # ..;2;;;..... ____. Page 25 of 55 .....I Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION (ESFAS) The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.32-1 shall be OPERABLE. According to Table 3.32-1. ACTIONS Separate Condition entry is allowed for each REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition with one channel or train referenced in Table inoperable. for the channel or B-As required by Required B.l Restore channel to 48 Action A. 1 and referenced OPERABLE by Table Required Action and C.1 Be in MOOE2. 6 associated Time of Condition B As required by Required 0.1 Restore channel to 48 Action A. 1 and referenced OPERABLE by Table As required by Required E.1 Restore train to OPERABLE 6 Action A. 1 and referenced statusby Table Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni2-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 26 of Event

Description:

Th RTD (Channel 4) fails high Table 3.3.2-1 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Ins1rumentation FUNCTION APPUCA81E MODES OR OTHE.t! SPECIF!ED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS CONDITIONS SURVEILlANCE REQUIREMENTS LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETIINGSlai

4. Steam Une Isolation ii. Manual [nillation 1 per loop D.G SR 3.3.2.4 NA b. Automa1ic Actua!ion Logic and Actuation Relays ZlTsins E.G SR 3.3.2.7 NA c. Containment Pressure-High High 1.21 d).3 Id) 3 F.G SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.5 ::; 18.0 psig d. High Steam Flow 2 per steam 1m" F.G SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.5 :::130Efl IbmJhr C 1 OO5 psig Coincident wi!h Safety tnjeclion Refer to Function 1 (Safety Iniecfu>fl) for allll1rtialion ful'!ctIoris and requirements.

and Coincident wi!h T"og-Low .2 per loop F.G SR 3.32.1 SR 3.3.22 SR 3.3.2.5 c: 544J}"F e. High-High S!eamRow 2 per steam line F.G SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.32.5 54.53E6 IbmJhr @785psig Coincident with Safety Injectioo Refer to Function 1 (Safety Inj.ecOOo) for aU initiation functions and requirements. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ____ Page 27 of ....,;5=5---1 Event

Description:

'B' RCP Thermal Barrier Leak Next, a thermal barrier leak will occur on the "B" RCP. The team will respond per: AR-B-10, RCP 1B LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20, or F-14, CHARGING PUMP SPEED, or

A-5, CCW SURGE TANK HI LEVEL 58.8% The crew may first enter AP-RCP.1, RCP SEAL MALFUNCTION, due to the AR procedural direction, but will end up in AP-CCW.1, LEAKAGE INTO THE CCW LOOP due to multiple indications of RCS in-leakage into the CCW system. Per AP-CCW.1, the RO will isolate the leak by closing AOV-754B.

Note that later in the scenario, when SI occurs, instrument air to containment will be isolated and AOV-754B will fail open. The CCW leak will need to be re-isolated when the team restores Instrument Air to containment per EOP direction. (Due to electrical power availability, power will not be available to close MOV-749B and MOV-759B -the alternate isolation method.) Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 3 Indications Available: AR-B-1O, RCP 1B LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20 AR-A-5, CCW Surge Tank Hi-Level AR-RMS-17, R-17 Component Cooling AR-B-10, RCP 1B LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20 P 1) Check AOV-142 position correct for (Step 2) GO TO applicable procedure: AP-RCP.1, RCP AP-CVCS_1, CVCS LEAK AP-CVCS_3, LOSS OF CHARGING AR-RMS-17, R-17 Component Cooling HCO 1. Verify RCV-017 closed 2. GO TO AP-CCW.1 3. Direct RP to perform CH-PRI-CCW Note: CRS enters AP-CCW.1 leakage. when CCW surge level rising Appendix Operator Action Form Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ...,;3:..- ____ Page 28 of _5;..;.5--1 Event

Description:

'8' Rep Thermal Barrier Leak AP-CCW.1, Leakage Into the Component Cooling Loop HCO (Step 1) Check CCW Indications

a. Check CCW surge tank level -RISING (PPCS Point L0618) b. Direct RP tech to perform LEAK, DETERMINATION OF CCW SYSTEM LEAKAGE c. CCW radiation monitor, R-17, RISING HCO * (Step 2) Check RCP Thermal Barrier Indications: Labyrinth seal DIPs -GREATER THAN 15 INCHES OF WATER AND APPROXIMATELY EQUAL RCP #1 seal leak off flows-WITHIN THE NORMAL OPERATING RANGE OF FIG-4.0, FIGURE RCP SEALLEAKOFF Annunciator A-7 (15), RCP A (B) CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LO FLOW 165 GPM 12S QF EXTINGUSHED Note: Due to the cylindrical shape of CCW surge tank, using level indication to determine leak rate would be inaccurate.

For a more accurate leak rate determination, use of Charging/Letdown mismatch should be used. NOTE: The CRS/CO will contact RP. SIM DRIVER: as RP, acknowledge. Note: May declare a Local Radiation Emergency per EPIP 1-13 Note: RCPs may be safely operated without CCW to the thermal barrier if seal injection flow is maintained. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 29 of 55 Event

Description:

'B' Rep Thermal Barrier Leak (Step 2 IF either pump has indication of a barrier leak, THEN perform the

a. Verify seal injection flow to affected RCP. b. Close CCW return from affected RCP Note: HCO closes AOV-754B thermal barrier (labyrinth seal DIP should rise) RCP B, AOV-754A RCP B, AOV-754B c. Evaluate CCW surge tank level trend. If leakage has stopped, THEN go to step 17. (PPCS Point L0618) (Step 17) Evaluate Plant Conditions: CCW in leakage -IDENTIFIED AND NOTE: The leakage into the CCW System has been isolated. Determine if operation can continue SIM DRIVER: If asked, OPS (Consult Plant staff if necessary) -

management has determined OPERATION CAN CONTINUE that operation should continue. (Step 18) Check CCW Surge Tank APPROXIMATELY Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _3.:;...... ____ Page 30 of Event

Description:

'B' Rep Thermal Barrier Leak HCO (Step 19) Establish Control Systems In Auto Verify rods in AUTO Verify 431 K in AUTO Verify PRZR spray valves in AUTO Verify PRZR heaters restored: PRZR proportional heaters breaker-CLOSED PRZR backup heaters breaker RESET, IN AUTO Verify one charging pump in AUTO HCOI (Step 20) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status BOP (Refer to AR Procedures) At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event #4. Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4..:..-____ Page Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with lOOP and lOCA Outside Containment Next, a spurious "A" train SI signal will occur. At the same time there will be a loss of offsite power, the "A" DG will fail to start automatically, and a LOCA outside containment will be initiated. The team will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. At immediate action step 1, the RO will recognize that the reactor failed to trip automatically and will trip the reactor manually. At immediate action step 3 the BOP will inform the team of the status of Safeguard busses (no safeguard busses energized), and the RO will depress the "A" DG start pushbutton (front left section of the MCB) which will restore the "A" train of safeguard buses (busses 14 and 18). When the RO performs Attachment 27.0, Attachment Automatic Action Verification, (step 6 of E-O) he will discover that AOV-371, UD Isolation to NRHX and MOV-814, CCW From RX SUPP CLRS (loss of power), failed to isolate automatically. With the concurrent LOCA outside CNMT, the RHR-to-UD flowpath established by AOV-371 will provide an additional pathway for RCS activity from RHR into the UD system through the open AOV-371, thru PCV-135 (which will open further to reduce UD system pressure), and lift UD relief valve 209 (setpoint 200 psig) to the VCT. Closing AOV-371 manually per the guidance in ATT-27.0 will isolate this flowpath. Attachment-3.0 will be used to isolate MOV-814. At step 7 of E-O, no MDAFW pumps will be running. The BOP will manually start the "A" MDAFW pump and align the TDAFW pump as necessary. The LOCA outside containment will be due to failure of check valve 853A. When the SI occurs RCS will flow backwards through MOV-852A (Core Deluge Valve) and cause an RHR system piping break inside the Auxiliary building (RHR system piping is designed for a maximum of 600 psi -not RCS pressure). RCS will also flow from the RHR system to the CVCS system (via a check valve around HCV-133), lift relief valve 203, and flow to the PRT. Within a few minutes (depending on the size of the RHR piping break) the PRT rupture disc will blow and cause a LOCA inside containment. Because of this, the team is expected to transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, at E-O step 17, rather than transitioning to ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, at E-O step 26. (Transition from E-O step 26 is possible depending on break size and how fast the team progresses through E-O, but is unlikely.) At ECA-1.2 step 3 the RO will close MOV-852A and the team will check for an RCS pressure rise. With the leakpath isolated, RCS pressure will rise, indicating isolation of the LOCA outside containment. (The pressure rise may be delayed or slow depending on RCS inventory. If a sizable bubble exists in the reactor vessel head, injection flow* has to refill the head to some extent before RCS pressure will rise significantly. The I team should realize this.) Operator Trigger 4, all other faults were entered at T=O Indications Available:

Numerous MCB alarms Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ____ Page 32 of Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment Directs HCO and CO to perform Immediate Note: D-Panel alarm with Rx Actions of E-O Trip Breakers still closed HCOI Perform Immediate Actions Note: HCO manually trips Rx. BOP Manual start of 'A' EDG Upon report from the HCO that actions are completed, starts E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: At least one train of reactor trip breakers -OPEN Neutron flux -LOWERING MRPI indicates -ALL CONTROL SHUTDOWN RODS ON (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves BOP (Step 3) Verify Both trains of AC Emergency Buses Bus 14 and Bus 18 Note: HCO will start 'A' DG Bus 16 and Bus 17 Attempt to start any failed emergency DIG restore power to ALL AC emergency E-O--C Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4__________ Page 33 of 55 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment Critical Tasks: Energize at least one emergency bus before transition out of E-O. Safety Significance: Failure to re-energize an emergency train leads to degraded emergency power capacity, needless degradation of a fission release barrier (RCS through RCP Seals), and results in a continuing loss of RCS inventory_ Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip. 2. No emergency bus energized.

3. At least one EDG can be connected to an emergency bus. Scenario Conditions:

1. Spurious SI will require reactor trip. 2. Offsite power is lost, "B" DG is OOS, and "A" DG fails to start automatically.

3. "A" DG can be started manually.

HCOI (Step 4) Check if SI is a) Any SI Annunciator -Note: 0-19, Pressurizer LO Press Trip may be lit but only 'A' Train sequencing (RNO) a. IF any of the following conditions are MET. THEN manually actuate SI and CI: PRZR pressure less than 1750 psig OR Steamline pressure less than 514 psig OR CNMT pressure greater than 4 psig OR Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ____ Page 34 of Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment (Step SI Sequencing -BOTH TRAINS HCO (Steb 4b RNO) Manually actuate SI and Note: HCO Manually actuate SI and CI (Step 5*) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required: Annunciator A-27 , CNMT EXTINGUSHED CNMT pressure-LESS THAN 28 PSIG (Step 6) Direct HCO to perform ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC NOTE: The CRS will hand off ATT-27.0 to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in E-O. Examiner following operator performing ATT-27.0 continue below. Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue at page 38. ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION I and RHR Pumps Running: s-RUNNING pumps -RUNNING Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 35 of Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment (Step 2) Verify CNMT RECIRC All fans -RUNNING Charcoal filter dampers green lights -(Step 3) Check If Main Steamlines Should Any MSIV -OPEN (Step 3a RNO) Go to Step 4. (Step 4) Verify MFW Isolation: MFW pumps -TRIPPED MFW Isolation valves -CLOSED S/G A, AOV-3995 S/G B, AOV-3994 S/G Blowdown and sample (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps HCO ep 6) Verify CI and Note: HCO notes CCW valve reopened CI and CVI annunciators -LIT Annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION Annunciator A-25, CNMT VENTILATION ISOLATION Verify CI and CVI valve status Note: AOV-371 (Auto Isolation failed) and MOV-814 (Loss of Power) failed to close. Refers to ATT-3.0. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ____ Page 36 of Event

Description:

Spurious 51 Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside ATT..J.O, ATTACHMENT Cl/eVI HCO AOV-371: Takes MCB switch to Note: Uses ATT -3.0 for 371 and MOV-814 HCO

Dispatches AO to locally close Note: Local isolation for 814 Note: HCO/CO continues with ATT-27.0 ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC AC"nON VERIFICATION HCO CNMT RECIRC fan coolers SW valve status lights -FCV-4561 FCV-4562 Letdown orifice valves -CLOSED AOV-200A AOV-200B AOV-202 (Step 7) Check CCW System Status: Verify CCW pump -AT LEAST (Step 8) Verify SI and RHR Pump Flow: SI flow indicators

-CHECK FOR FLOW RHR flow indicator -CHECK (Step 7b RNO) IF RCS pressure less 150 psig manually start pumps and valves. IF NOT, THEN go to Step Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4"""'-____ Page 37 of 55"";;"';'---1 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment (Step 9) Verify SI Pump and RHR Emergency

a. RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge -OPEN MOV-852A MOV-852B b. Verify SI pump C RUNNING c. Verify SI pump A -RUNNING d. Verify SI pump B -RUNNING d. (RNO) (1) Ensure SI Pumps A and C running. If

either pump NOT running, THEN go to (2) Ensure SI pump C aligned to discharge line B: MOV-871 B open MOV-871A closed (3) Go to Step 10. (Step 10) Verify CREATS Actuation: At least one damper in each flowpath CLOSED Normal Supply Air Normal Return Air CREATS fans -BOTH RUNNING HCO Reports completion of ATT-27.0 and status SIM DRIVER: To reset update. TDAFW trip throttle valve, REM-FDW32, [1] Reports status of completing A TT-27.0 to crew.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4..;...-____ Page Event

Description:

Spurious 81 Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue at HERE. Note: Within a few minutes (depending on the size of the RHR piping break) the PRT rupture disc will blow and cause a LOCA inside containment. Because of this, the team is expected to transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, at E-O step 17, rather than transitioning to ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, at E-O step 26. (Transition from E-O step 26 is possible depending on break size and how fast the team progresses through E-O, but is unlikely HCOI (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW BOP (RNO Step 7) Manually start both IVIDAFW Note: Only power available for pumps. A MDAFW pump. HCOI (Step 8) Verify AFW Valve AFWflow-INDICATED TO AFW flow from each MDAFW pump LESS THAN 230 GPM (Step 8 RNO) align valves as necessary HCOI (*Step 9) Monitor Heat Check S/G narrow range level -NOTE: Adverse Containment GREATER THAN 7% [25% ADVERSE Numbers should be used, until CNMT] in any S/G Containment Pressure is less than 4 psig. Check S/G narrow range level BOTH S/G LESS THAN 50% Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4..:.-____ Page 39 of Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment BOP Control feed flow to maintain SIG narrow range level between 7% [25% adverse CNMT] and 50%. (Step 11) Check CCW Flow to RCP Thermal Barriers: Annunciator A-7, RCP 1A CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LO FLOW EXTINGUISHED Annunciator A-15, RCOP 1 B CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW EXTINGUISHED (Step 11 RNO) a. Stop affected RCPs. (Step 11 RNO) b. Reset SI. (Step 11 RNO) c. Check adequate power available to run one charging pump. 1. NIA 2. If Bus 14/16 DIG breakers are closed THEN verify adequate emergency DIG capacity to run one charging pump. (75 kw)., d. IF seal outlet temperatures are greater than 235°F, THEN go to step 12. (*Step 12) Monitor RCS Tavg -STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F (Step 12 RNO) If temperature less than 547°F and lowering, THEN perform the following: Stop dumping steam. Ensure reheater steam supply valves are closed. NOTE: The CO may stop feeding the A SG based on the indications. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ____ Page 40 of _5;:;.;5:"--1 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment IF cooldown continues, THEN control total feed flow between 20 gpm to 230 gpm until narrow range level greater than 7% [25% adverse CNMT] in at least one S/G. WHEN S/G level greater than 7% [25% adverse CNMT] in one S/G, THEN limit feed flow to that required to maintain level in at least one S/G. IF cooldown continues, THEN close both NOTE: Both MSIVs are MSIVs. closed. HCOI (Step 13 ) Check PRZR PORVs and CO PORVs -CLOSED Auxiliary Spray valves (AOV-296) Check PRZR pressure -LESS 2260 Normal PRZR spray valves -CLOSED PCV-431A PCV-431B HCOI (Step 14) Monitor RCP Trip

RCP status -ANY RCP (RNO)-GO to step HCOI (Step 15) Check I S/G Secondary Side CO Pressure in both S/G's-ST ABLE OR Rising Presssure in both S/G's -GREATER THAN 110 PSIG Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4__________

Page 41 of 55-----II Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment HCO (Step 16) Check if S/G Tubes are intact: Air Ejector radiation monitors (R-15, R-47, R-48) -NORMAL S/G blowdown radiation monitors (R-19) -NORMAL Steam line radiation monitors (R-31 , R-32) -NORMAL CRS (Step 17) Check if RCS is intact: a. CNMT area radiation monitors -NORMAL R-2 R-7 R-29 R-30 b. CNMT pressure -LESS than 0.5 psig c. CNMT sump B level-LESS THAN 8 inches. d. CNMT sump A level Level-STABLE Annunciator C-19-CONTAINMENT SUMP A HI LEVEL EXTINGUISHED Note: R47 and R48 only detectors with power (PPCS). Note: May go to E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT OR SECONDARY COOLANT if conditions met. Note to examiner: Go to page 45 for E-1, IF not continue in E-O. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No .. N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ____ Page 42 of _5,;;.;5;;""--i\ Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment (step 18) Check if SI should be terminated:

a. RCS Pressure: Pressure-GREATER THAN 1650 PSIG Pressure -STABLE OR RISING a. (RNO) Do NOT stop SI pumps. Go to Step 19. (Step 19) Initiate Monitoring of Critical Function Status (Step 20*) Monitor SIG Levels: a. Narrow range level-GREATER THAN 7% b. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 17% and 50% (step 21) Check Secondary Steamline radiation monitor (R-31 and R-32) Dispatch AO to locally check steam line radiation Request Chem Tech sample SIGs for activity (Step 22) Reset SI (step 23) Rest CI: a. Depress CI reset pushbutton

b. Verify annunciator A-26 ,

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4.;...-____ Page 43 of Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment (Step 24) Verify adequate SW flow" a. At least three SW pumps running a. (RNO) Manually start SW pumps as power supply permits (257 kweach) IF less than three pumps running, THEN ensure SW isolation b. Dispatch AO to establish normal shutdown alignment (refer to ATT-17.0, ATTACHMENT SD-1) (step 25) Establish IA to CNMT: a. Verify non-safeguards buses energized from off-site power Bus 13 normal feed CLOSED OR Bus 15 normal feed breaker CLOSED a. (RNO) Perform the

1) Close non-safeguards bus tie Bus 13 to Bus 14 tie

Bus 15 to Bus 16 tie 2) Reset Control Room Lighting b. Verify SW isolation valves to turbine building -OPEN
MOV-4613 and MOV-46'70
MOV-4614 and MOV-4664 b. (RNO) Restore IA using Service Air Compressor per step 25c. c. Verify adequate air RUNNING Note: Only power available for twoSW pumps Note: Manually performs SW isolation by manually closing SW valves on MCB. Note: Since only 'A ' EDG is running with -1875 KW, they may direct starting DIG Air Comp per ATT-11.2 and not tie to non-safeguards buses in step 25c. Note: Closed earlier due to less than 3 SW pumps running.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 ...:.,4_____ Page Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event 44 of 55 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment

c. (RNO) Manually start electric Note: Since only 'A ' EDG is compressors as power supply running with -1875 KW, they may direct starting DIG AirBuses 13/15 normal feed breakers Comp per A TT -11.2 and not closed-no restrictions tie to non-safeguards buses. Buses 14/16 normal feed breakers CLOSED 6 amps per air compressor Buses 14/16 DIG breaker CLOSED 75 kw per air compressor IF eclectic air compressors CAN NOT be started, THEN start the diesel air compressor and tie to Instrument Air (refer to ATT-11.2, ATTACHMENT DIESEL AIR COMPRESSOR) (Step 25d) Check IA supply: Pressure -GREATER THAN 60 PSIG Pressure-STABLE OR RISING (Step 25d RNO) d. Perform the following:

1. Continue attempts to restore IA (refer to AP-IA.1, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR) 2. Continue with Step 26. WHEN IA restored, THEN do Steps 25e and f. HCO tep 25e) Reset both trains of XV relays to CNMT (Step 25t) Verify IA to CNMT Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4.;....-____ Page 45 of ....,;5;..;;.5-1 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment (Step 26) Check Auxiliary Building Plant vent iodine (R-10B) Plant vent particulate (R-13) Plant vent gas (R-14) CCW Monitor (R-17) Letdown Line monitor (R-9) Charging pump room (R4) (step 26 RNO) Evaluate cause of abnormal Note to examiner: Go to conditions. page 51 for ECA-1.2 IF the cause is a loss of RCS inventory outside CNMT. THEN go to ECA-1.2, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, Step 1) E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT (Step 1) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria: RCP status -ANY RCP RUNNING SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING RCS pressure minus maximum S/G pressure -LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT] Stop both RCPs NOTE: If the RCPs have NOT been stopped prior to this step, they will be stopped here. (Step 2) Check If S/G Secondary Side Pressure in both SIGs -STABLE Pressure in both SIGs -THAN 110 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # Page 46 of 55 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment BOP (*Step 3) Monitor Intact S/G Levels: Narrow range level -GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse CNMn Control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 17% [25% adverse CNMT] and 50% (Step 4) Monitor If Secondary Levels Are Steamline radiation monitor (R-31 Request Chem Tech sample S/Gs for NOTE: The CRS may contact Chemistry. SIM DRIVER: As Chemistry, acknowledge. HCO (*Step 5) Monitor PRZR PORV Status: a. Power to PORV block valves

b. PORVs -CLOSED (Step 5b RNO) IF PRZR pressure than 2335 pSig, THEN manually IF any PORV can NOT be closed, THEN NOTE: The CRS will manually close its block valve. IF block recognize that the Block Valve valve can NOT be closed, THEN has failed, and that this step is dispatch AO to locally check breaker. NOT applicable. MOV-515, MCC D position 6C MOV-516, MCC C position 6C c. Block valves -AT LEAST ONE OPEN. HCO (Step 6) Reset SI.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # ____ Page 47 of Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment Depress CI reset pushbutton Verify annunciator A-26, ISOLATION BOP (Step 8) Verify Adequate SW Flow: Check at least two SW pumps Note: Manually start SW RUNNING pumps as power permits Dispatch AO to establish normal NOTE: The CRS will dispatch shutdown alignment (Refer to ATT-17.0, anAO. ATTACHMENT SD-1) SIM DRIVER: as AO, acknowledge. HCO (Step 9) Establish fA to CNMT: a. Verify non-safeguards busses from offsite a. (RNO Perform the

1) Close the non-safeguards bus tie Bus 13 to Bus 14 tie

Bus 15 to Bus 19 2) reset Control Room

b. Verify turbine building SW isolation MOV-4613 and MOV-4670 MOV-4614 and MOV-4664 C. Verify adequate air d. Check IA supply: Pressure -GREATER THAN Pressure STABLE OR RISING Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event #

Page 48 of .....:;.;55::""'--1 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment

e. Reset both trains of XY relays for 11 CNMT

f. Verify IA to CNMT AOV-5392 -OPEN (Step 10) Check Normal Power Available Charging Bus 14 normal feed breaker -* Bus 16 normal feed breaker -(Step 10a. Verify adequate emergency DIG capacity run charging pumps (75 If sufficient power is available GO to Step (Step 11) Check If Charging Flow Has Charging pumps -ANY RUNNING NOTE: There are NO Charging Pumps running. (Step 11a RNO) Perform the following: IF CCW flow is lost to any RCP thermal NOTE: CCW flow to the RCP barrier OR any RCP #1 seal outlet has NOT been lost, nor is any temperature greater than 235°F, RCP #1 seal outlet THEN ...... . temperature greater than 235°F. Ensure HCV-142 open, demand at 0%. (Step 11 Continued)

Charging suction aligned to LCV-112B -OPEN LCV-1112C -CLOSED (Step 11 b RNO) manually align valves Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # .....;.4_____ Page Event

Description:

Spurious 51 Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment HCO (Step 11 NOTE: The HCO will start one Charging Pump even though Start charging pumps and adjust charging Pzr Level is off-scale high. flow as necessary to restore PRZR level (Step 12) Check If SI Should Be Terminated: RCS pressure: Pressure -GREATER THAN 1650 psig [1650 psig adverse CNMT] (Step 12a RNO) Do NOT stop SI pumps. to Step (*Step 13) Monitor If CNMT Spray Should CNMT spray pumps -ANY RUNNING NOTE: No CS pumps running (Step 13a RNO) Go to Step 14. (*Step 14) Monitor IF RHR Pumps Should Check RCS pressure: Pressure -GREATER THAN 300 psig [350 psig adverse CNMT] RCS pressure -STABLE OR RISING RHR pumps -ANY RUNNING IN.IECTIOI\I Stop RHR pumps and place in AUTO NOTE: The HCO will STOP the RHR Pumps. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # Page 50 of 55""";";"---1 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment CRS Dispatch AO to perform ATT-14.6, ATTACHMENT RHR PRESS REDUCTION, Part A. (Step 15) Che.ck RCS And SIG Pressures Check pressures in both S/Gs STABLE OR RISING Check pressures in both S/Gs GREATER THAN 110 PSIG Check RCS pressure -STABLE OR LOWERING (Step 16) CHECK IF EMERGENCY DIGs Should Be Stopped: Verify Safeguards busses 14,16,17, and 18 voltage -GREATER THAN 440 VOLTS Verify Safeguards busses 14, 16, 17, and 18 voltage energized by offsite power: Emergency DIG output breakers OPEN AC emergency bus normal feed breakers -CLOSED Stop any unloaded emergency DIG and place in standby (Refer to ATT-S.1, ATTACHMENT DIG STOP) NOTE: The CRS will dispatch anAO. SIM DRIVER: as AO, acknowledge. Use INSIGHT point t_p682a to provide RHR pump suction pressure. If asked, report RHR discharge pressure -100 PSIG, and pressure reduction is not necessary per this Att. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: 2 Event # Page 51 of _5;;.,;5;;""--11 Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment (Step 17) Evaluate Plant Status: a. Check auxiliary building radiation NORMAL

Plant vent iodine (R-1 08)
Plant vent particulate (R-*13)
Plant vent gas (R-14)
CCW liquid monitor (R-17)
L TDN line monitor (R-9)
CHG pump room (R-4) b. WHEN TSC is manned, THEN request evaluation of sampling requirements. RCS boron RCS activity CNMT hydrogen CNMT sump boron CNMT Sump pH (Step 17 ) RNO If cause is a loss of RCS inventory outside CNMT, THEN go to ECA-1.2 LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, step 1. NOTE: The TSC will NOT be manned. Note: The team will transition to ECA-1.2 at E-1 step 17. ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment (Step 1) Verify Proper RHR Normal Cooling Valves Alignment:

a. Verify the following valves CLOSED MOV-700 and MOV-701 RHR suction valves from A hot CLOSED MOV-720 and MOV-721 RHR discharge valves from B cold CLOSED Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4.;.....____ Page 52 of Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Critical Isolate LOCA outside containment prior to transition out of Safety Failure to isolate this leak degrades containment integrity resulting in continuing radioactive release. Required Plant Conditions:

1. Isolable LOCA outside containment.

Scenario Conditions:

1. The LOCA outside containment may be isolated by closing MOV-852A.

HCO (Step 2) Check CVCS Valves Alignment:

b. Verify the following valves CLOSED AOV-310 Excess letdown isolation AOV-296, auxiliary spray valve AOV-392A, Charging line isolation valve to loop B hot leg b. Verify the following CI valves CLOSED MOV-313 seal return isolation AOV-371, letdown isolation valve Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # _4..;.....

____ Page 53 of Event

Description:

Spurious SI Signal Concurrent with LOOP and LOCA Outside Containment (Step 3) Check Safeguards Valves (Step 3 conti) a. Ensure SI reset. b. Close RHR pump discharge to Rx deluge MOV-852A (turn DC

c. Check for RCS pressure rise. Note: The leak will be isolated and RCS pressure will rise. d. Go to Step 7. (Step 7) Check if Break is isolated:

a. RCS pressure is rising. (Step 8) Check if Leakage to the Building has

a. Monitor Leakage to the Auxiliary has

Auxiliary Building sump
WHUT Levels b. Go to E-1, LOSS OF Note: Terminate the scenario upon transition back to E-1, per Lead Examiner

Crew Turnover Sheet for 2012 NRC Scenario #2 UNIT STATUS: Power level: -2% RCS [B] 2160pm BAST [B]: 14000 ppm Power The Plant is at 2% power (BOl), Core Burnup: 150 MWD/MTU with 0-1.2 Startup in progress.. INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT: The plant is at -2% power (BOL) with a plant startup in progress per 0-1.2. Fuel pre-conditioning limits are no longer in effect The plant tripped several days ago due to a malfunction on the A Main Feedwater Pump. Corrective Maintenance has been completed, all post-maintenance testing was completed satisfactorily, and the A MFW pump is currently running. Per Chemistry direction, Normal Letdown is at 60 gpm. The electric plant is in a normal 50/50 lineup, and no electrical declarations are in effect. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B Diesel Generator is OOS for repairs to the governor.

Work is in progress and expected return to service is 1 hour. LCO 3.B.1 was entered 24 hours ago, and an 52.4 has been submitted. SR-3.B.1.1 (offsite circuit availability and breaker alignment) was performed 1 hr ago, and all other required surveillances are current. The crew has been directed to continue the plant startup at Step 6.7, Transition from AFW to MFW. Until B EDG is returned to service, hold power and do not go above 5 % Reactor Power till notified. As part of this major action sequence: S/G Blowdown will not be placed in service at this time. P-15.36, 'A' MFW Pump Seal Drain Tank Water Diversion and Restoration, has been completed A-52.4 Equipment Date Time Reason Required Actions Required Required Action not met Completion OatefTime B EDG Governor ITS 3.8.1 0800 yesterday. ITS 3.8.1 linkage will not Enter Condition B Enter Condition G reset Required Required Action C.1: Be in Mode 3 B.1: Perform SR 3.8.11 for the in 6 hours oftsite circuit.-Perform every 8 AND hours, [Due in 6 hours] Required Action C.2: Be in Mode 5 AND in 84 hours B.2. Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable. AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG is not inoperable due to common cause failure. OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG. AND B.4 Restore DG to OPERABLE status. [7 days] PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: 2012 Initial License Operator Training TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N12-3

REFERENCES:

1. 0-6.9.2, Establishing and/or Transferring Offsite Power to Bus 12A112B 2. AR-F-2, Pressurizer Hi Press 2310 psi, or 3. AR-F-10, Pressurizer Lo Press 220S psi; 4. A-S03.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide S. AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure 6. ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrument Loop Failure 7. Tech Spec LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation

8. TRM 3.4.3, ATWS Mitigation

9. AR-F-19, PRZR PORV Outlet Hi Temp 14soF 10. AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure 11. Tech Spec LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer PORVs 12. Tech Spec LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage 13. AR-H-7, Condenser High Pressure 2S.S" Hg 14. AR-K-30, Turbine Sampling Rack Trouble 1S. AP-FW.1, Abnormal MFW Pump or NPSH 16. AP-TURB.4, Loss of Condenser Vacuum 17. AP-TURB.S, Rapid Load Reduction

18. E-O, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection

19. FR-H.1, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 20. ATT-12.0, N2 PORVs 21. ATT-S.1, SAFW 22. ATT-22.0, Restoring Feed Flow Author: Norm Meaker, Exam Writer Contractor Facility Review: Pat Landers, Lead Exam Author Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Facility:

Robert E. Ginna Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2012-N-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial The plant is at 70% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the "B" MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant was raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the "B" MFP operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. RG&E Energy Control Center has requested transfer to 100 -0 lineup in preparation for circuit 7T inspection next shift. The WCC is standing by to place protected equipment signs per OPG-PROTECTED-EQUIPMENT, The SM has directed that you complete the transfer when you have the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: "B" Containment Spray Pump has been out of service for bearing replacement since yesterday. Expected return to service is tomorrow at 0800 .. A-52.4 submitted for ITS 3.6.6, 72 hour Action. Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No. FDW1'IB 'B' MDAFW trip on overcurrent on start FDW15B SAFW Pump "D" fails to start 1 NA Swap to 100/0 electrical lineup on Circuit 767 per 0-6.9.2, Establishing And/Or Transferring Offsite Power To Bus 12A / 12B N-SRO 2 PZR02D Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails high (ITS 3.3.1: Trip channel within 6 hrs, TRM: TR 3.4.3 Immediately declare ATWS (2500) I-RO mitigating capability inoperable -was applicable until channel 429 IND-I(ITS)-SRO was selected as the controlling channel in the PLP) RPS07BK (off) TC408C Bistable status light failed 3 PZR05B Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage> "PORV INOPERABLE" condition (-21 gpm) [7.4] C(TS)-SRO PZR03B (OFF) Loss of condenser vacuum will occur. (The loss of vacuum will be REM-R-BOP ramped over 12 minutes so that the crew will trip the turbine when CND50 R-RO meeting the 5 minute backpressure DO NOT OPERATE region (0.04) R-SRO criteria or a turbine trip will occur on low vacuum.) Turbine Trip causes a Reactor Trip. EH "Go" pushbutton does not work OVR-DI-C-BOP TUR05BD C-SRO 6 Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 STM09A M-BOP "B" SG Safety Valve 3508 and 3510 failed open (close when Bleed (100) M-RO and Feed criteria STM09C STM11A Steam break on "A" SG inside (1 EDS08 4KV Auto Bus Transfer fails to occur Loss of Bus 14 (conditional on reactor FDW12 TDAFW Pump speed control failed to (0) ? SIS02A C-RO SI fails to actuate automatically SIS02B * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Overview of Scenario #3: PORV Leakage, Loss of Vacuum, Reactor Trip, SI, FR-H.1 The plant is at 70% power (MOL). Several days ago, the plant was taken to SO% due to a failure of the "B" MFW pump. Corrective maintenance was performed, and the plant was raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the "B" MFP operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. RG&E Energy Control Center has requested transfer to 100 -0 lineup in preparation for circuit 7T inspection next shift. The WCC is standing by to place protected equipment signs per OPG-Protected Equipment. The SM has directed that you complete the transfer when you have the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: "B" Containment Spray Pump has been out of service for bearing replacement since late yesterday. Expected return to service is tomorrow at 0800. A-S2.4 submitted for ITS 3.6.6, 72 Hour Action. Shortly after taking the watch the team will swap to 10010 electrical lineup per 0-6.9.2. Following the electrical lineup swap, the Pressurizer (PRZR) controlling pressure channel 449 will fail high, causing PRZR spray valves to open and disabling the PRZR heaters. Channel IV indication will show a high indication, whereas actual pressure is lowering due to spray. Prompt RO action is required to place the Master PRZR controller in Manual to close the spray valves and stabilize pressure. With no operator action, a reactor trip and SI will occur on low pressure. The team will respond per:

AR-F-2, Pressurizer Hi Press 2310 psi, or
AR-F-10, Pressurizer Lo Press 220S psi;
AP-PZR.1 , Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure and
ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrument Loop Failure When the BOP defeats the failed channel, bistable status light TC408C will fail to light, which indicates that the channel may not be in the tripped condition.

The SRO will notify the WCC, Operations Management, and possibly I/C to investigate further to ensure ITS requirements are met. (Sometimes the SRO will contact I/C directly, and sometimes he will request that the WCC contact I/C. Either communication is acceptable.) The SRO will refer to ITS 3.3.1 and TRM TR 3.4.3 (he will determine ITS 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 are not applicable). While the PT -449 defeat is in progress, approximately a 20 gpm leak will occur on PORV 431 C. The PORV will indicate in the throttled open position. The team will respond per:

AR-F-19, PRZR PORV Outlet Hi Temp 145°F
AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure The crew will attempt to close PORV-431 C, but fails to close and will isolate the leak by closing associated block valve MOV-S1S, SRO will refer to ITS section 3.4.11 (Pressurizer PORVs) and 3.4.13 (RCS Operational Leakage).

Per 3.4.11, "A PORV with a leakage rate >1 Ogpm must also be declared inoperable (Block valve closed and power removed) per this LCO." (Restriction based on the possible need to use this PORV during accident mitigation, and if the block valve then failed to close with greater than 10gpm leakage, the PORV leakage would be outside the accident analysis assumptions." Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 After the SRO has had an opportunity to identify the ITS I TRM requirements associated with the PT -449 failure and the PORV leakage, a loss of condenser vacuum will occur. (The loss of vacuum will be ramped over 12 minutes so that the crew will trip the turbine when meeting the 5 minute backpressure DO NOT OPERATE region criteria or a turbine trip will occur on low vacuum.) The team will respond per:

AR-H-7, Condenser Hi Pressure 25.5" HG,
AR-K-30, Turbine Plant Sampling Rack Trouble
AP-TURBA, Loss Of Condenser Vacuum, and refer to
AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction They will reduce turbine load in an attempt to stabilize condenser vacuum, and to get out of the "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure.

When the BOP initiates load reduction he will discover the EH control panel will not respond in OPER PAN, and will reduce turbine load manually. The team will be unable to stabilize condenser vacuum. Once the 5 minute "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure limit is met, the crew will trip the turbine or a trip on low vacuum will occur. If the crew reduced power to less than 50% to get less than P-9 (Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip interlock), when the turbine is tripped manually a reactor trip will occur due to the failure of the P9 interlock Upon reactor trip, a failure of the 4KV Auto Bus Transfer and a loss of Bus 14 will occur. Additionally, the TDAFW Pump speed control is failed to zero and the 'B' MDAFW pump will trip on start. The team will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. With steam dump unavailable, SG pressure will rise rapidly causing SG ARVs and SG Safeties to open. Two SG safeties associated with 'B' SG will fail full open in conjunction with a MSLB on the 'A' SG inside containment. These events will cause a significant cooldown, RCS depressurization, and SI signal. The team will recognize that SI failed to actuate automatically and will manually actuate SI. At step 9 the team will transition to FR-H.1, Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are unavailable. "C" SBAFP has no power. Depending on SG level, the team will either go to step 13 for Bleed &Feed, or attempt to align and start "0" SBAFP. If there is time for the SBAFP start, the SRO will determine feed requirements per Attachment 22.0, Attachment Restoring Feed Flow (attempt to feed at max rate [225 gpm]). "0" SBAFP will trip when they try to start it. When less than or equal t0120 [160] inches wide range SG level is reached in both SGs, the team will go to step 13 for Bleed & Feed. The team will perform Attachment 12.0, Attachment N2 PORVs to operate the PORVs. Subsequently, Bus 15 will be energized by cross-tie to Bus 16, and instrument air will be aligned to the PORVs. After Bleed and Feed is established (PORVs open and SI flow verified), at the Lead Examiner's discretion, the SRO will be notified from the WCC that the "B" MDAFP is available. The team will establish AFW flow per the guidance of step 3. Terminate the scenario when auxiliary feed flow is established. Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Critical Manually actuate at least one train of 81 before transition to Safety Significance: The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analyses are predicated on the assumption that, at the very least, one train of safeguards actuates. If SI is not actuated, the FSAR assumptions and results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to manually actuate at least one train of SI (when it is possible to do so) constitutes a violation of the license condition. Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip with valid SI required but not automatically actuated.

2. SI can be manually actuated from the control room. Scenario Conditions:

1. Loss of Condenser vacuum causes a forced crew trip of the turbine, once the 5 minute "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure limit is met or a trip on low vacuum will occur. crew to trip the turbine trip which causes a reactor trip (P-9 present).

Upon reactor trip, steam flow through the SG safeties will be sufficient to cause a valid 81 signal prior to the team completing E-O step 4. 2. Manual SI is available. Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 FR-H.1--F Initiate RCS Bleed so that the ReS depressurizes sufficiently for RCS Feed (SI injection) to occur. Safety Failure to initiate RCS Bleed & Feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the head of the SI pumps results in significant and sustained core Required Plant

1. Reactor trip. 2. No AFW available.

3. Secondary heat sink required.

4. RCS pressure below PRZR PORV setpoint.

Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR DRIVER INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-27 70% power MOL D At T=O, insert: MALF FDW11B, MDAFW Pump 'B' trip MALF FDW15B, SAFW Pump 'D' trip MALF FDW12 [0], TDAFW speed control failure MALF SIS02A [Man Avail], SI Train A failure MALF SIS02B [Man Avail], SI Train B failure Make a schedule file as follows: Set T-30 conditional on "Reactor Trip Signal from Either Logic Train (1/2)" Set to Event 29 conditional to "x05i098d", Turbine manual trip PB Set to event 29, OVR-D.I.-RPS03, [True], manual Rx Trip pushbutton Set to event 29, MALF A-RPS12, [Off], D-1 MCB alarm Set to event 29, MALF, A-TUR01, [On],D-24 MCB Alarm Run schedule file while simulator in run. Insert the following: MALF PZR02D [2500], on T-2 (PT -449 failure) OVR-DO-IND-RPS07BK [OFF], on T-2 (B/S status light failure MALF PZR05B [7.4], on T-3 (PORV-431C leakage) REM CND50 [0.04] on T -4, (Condenser vacuum leak) MALF-A-MIS49, [ON, 120 sec delay], AR-K-30, Turbine Plant Sampling Rack Touble OVR-DI-TUR05BD [False], on T -4 ('GO' pushbutton failure) MALF STM09A [100%], on T-30 (Safety valve fails open on 'B S/G) MALF STM09C [100], on T-30, (Safety Valve fails open on 'B' S/G) MALF STM11A, [2E+6, 120 second Ramp], on T-30 (MSLB on 'B' S/G inside CNMT) MALF EDS08 [BOTH], on T-30 (4KV Auto Bus Transfer) MALF EDS04A, on T-30 (Loss of 480V Bus 14) Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 o Prior to Crew RUN Briefing o To take 'B' CS pump OOS: Pull stop the 'B' CS Pump II Place CAUTION tag on 'B' CS Pump Place PROTECT tags per Hang Protective Tags per Place Black Dot on MCB Annunciator J-28 and 25 Crew Briefing Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. Conduct Pre-job Brief using marked up copy of 0-6.9.2, Section 6.4 marked up as follows: o All steps in Sections 6.4.1 are marked NA o All steps in Sections 6.4.3 are marked NA T-O Begin Familiarization 0 Period At direction of Event 1 0 examiner At direction of Event 2 examiner Trigger #2 PZR02D RPS07BK At direction of Event 3 0 examiner Trigger#3 PZR05B OVR-D.0.-PZR03B, [OFF] Shift Electric Plant PT -449 fails High 2500, No Ramp PORV-431C leakage >10 9pm requiring closing of IVIOV-515 '7.4 % open with open indication light override Scenario Event Description 2012 NRC Scenario 3 At direction of 0 examiner At direction of 0 examiner Continued 0 from Event 5 Continued 0 from Event 5 Continued 0 from Event 5 Continued 0 from Event 5 o Event 4 Trigger#3 REM CND50 [0.04] OVR-D.l-TURB05D [False] Event 5 Trigger #30 STM09A STM09C STM11A EDS08 [BOTH] EDS04A Event 6 T=O SIS02A SIS02B Event 7 T=O FDW11B Event 8 T=O FDW12 Event 9 T=O Loss of Condenser Vacuum with loss of auto EH control No ramp Upon Reactor Trip [Conditional T -30]: S/G safety for B S/G lifts (2) Steam line break in CNMT Failure of 4KV Auto Bus Transfer Loss of Emergency Bus 14 SIS Train A and B failure to NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T = AUX Feedwater Pump 1 B NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T = TDAFW Speed Control NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T = Standby AFW pump D fails to NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted in the IC at T = Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ____ Page 11 of 67 Event

Description:

Shift Electric Plant Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will shift the Electric Line-up from 50/50 to 10010 in accordance with 0-6_9.2, Establishing andlor Transferring Offsite Power to Bus 12A112B, section 6.3. Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA 0-6.9.2, ESTABLISHING AND/OR TRANSFERRING OFFSITE POWER TO BUS 12A1BUS 12B BOP (Step 6.3.1) ESTABLISH Offsite Power to 12B Bus using Circuit 767 as follows: (1.) MARK BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM 7T, 52/12AY, BREAKER INITIAL POSITION. Note: Closed (2.) VERIFY CLOSED CIRCUIT BKR 76702 34 KV BUS. (3.) TURN ON BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767, 52/12BY SYNCHROSCOPE Note: BOP reviews expected alarms with CRS. AR-J-6: 4KV MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP AR-L-20: 12A XFMR or 12A BUS TROUBLE (4.) CLOSE BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767,52/12BY. (5.) IF BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM Note: Marks N/A 7T, 52/12AY, was initially OPEN, THEN VERIFY breaker is OPEN AND RESET (Green light ILLUMINATED, White Light EXTINGUISHED). OTHERWISE, MARK this step N/A. Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # --:...____ Page 12 of 67--'----I Event

Description:

Shift Electric Plant BOP (6.) IF BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM 7T, 52/12AY was initially CLOSED, THEN PERFORM the following: IF NOT, THEN MARK this Substep N/A a. VERIFY breaker OPENED (Green light ILLUMINATED, White light ILLUMINATED).

b. PLACE BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM 7T, 52/12AY Control switch to the TRIP position AND THEN to AUTO c. VERIFY breaker is OPEN AND RESET (Green light ILLUMINATED, White light ILLUMINATED).

(7.) IF BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM NOTE: 52/12AY is OPEN. 7T, 52/12AY, is not OPEN, Marks step N/A THEN IMMEDIATELY PERFORM Attachment 1, 7T/Bus 12A Circulating Current Contingency Action, OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A (8.) VERIFY BUS 12A VOLTMETER 4160V indicates approximately 4000 VOLTS (9.) TURN OFF BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767, 52/12BY SYNCHROSCOPE AND REMOVE the handle. SIM DRIVER: Use REM EDS49 to clear 12A transformer alarm L-20 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ...;2=--____ Page 13 of _6';";"'---11 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) Following the electrical lineup swap, the Pressurizer (PRZR) controlling pressure channel 449 will fail high, causing PRZR spray valves to open and disabling the PRZR heaters. Channel IV indication will show a high indication, whereas actual pressure is lowering due to spray. Prompt RO action is required to place the Master PRZR controller in Manual to close the spray valves and stabilize pressure. With no operator action, a reactor trip and SI will occur on low pressure. The team will respond per: AR-F-2, Pressurizer HI PRESS 2310 psi AR-F-10, Pressurizer Lo Press 2205 psi; AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure and ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrument Loop Failure When the BOP defeats the failed channel, bistable status light TC408C will fail to light, which indicates that the channel may not be in the tripped condition. The SRO will notify the WCC, Operations Management, and possibly IIC to investigate further to ensure ITS requirements are met. (Sometimes the SRO will contact IIC directly, and sometimes he will request that the WCC contact IIC. Either communication is acceptable.) The SRO will refer to ITS 3.3.1 and TRM TR 3.4.3 (he will determine ITS 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 are not applicable). Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #2 Indications Available: AR-F-10, Pressurizer Lo Press 2205 psi AR-F-2, Pressurizer HI PRESS 2310 psi AR-F-10, Pressurizer Lo Press 2205 psi BOP 1. Perform a channel Note: HCO will take 431 K to manual and restore PRZR CRS pressure per A-503.1. CRS 2. Go to applicable NOTE: The CRS will go to INST.1, may refer to AP-TURB.2, if turbine load rejection has occurred. AP-PRZR.1 and at exit at AP-PRZR.1, if presence is step 1. abnormal for plant conditions. ER-INST.1, if channel failed. AP-RCS.1, If RCS leak is indicated. CRS o Refer to ITS LCO 3.4.1 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No .. N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ...;2=--____ Page 14 of _6;;.,;7_-lI Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) ITS 3.4.1, ReS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) lCO RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperatufe. and RCS total flow rate shall be Withm the limits specified in theCOLR. -NOTE-Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during pressure transients due to: a. THERMAL POWER ramp> 5% RTP per minute; or b. THERMAL POWER step> 10% RTP. MODEl ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME One or more RCS DNB A1 Restore RCS DNS 2 hours parameters not within parameter(s) to within limit limits. Required Action and S.1 Be In MODE 2. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _2"--____ Page 15 of _6;;;.;7_..,1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) CRS 3. Notify the NOTE: The CRS may notify the WCC or request STNSM SM perform notifications. I&C Booth Instructor: as wee,WCC acknowledge. AR-F-2, Pressurizer HI Press 2310 psi BOP 1. IF RCS pressure is high, THEN go to Note: Should go to AP-PRZR.1 PRZR.1 due to controlling channel failure. CRS If due to instrument failure, THEN refer to ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrument Loop Failure AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HCO (Step 1) Check PZR Pressure: All 4 narrow range channels -Note: Channel 449 failed high APPROXIMATELY EQUAL All 4 narrow range channels TRENDING (Step 1 RNO) If one pressure deviates significantly from the other 3, perform the

a. IF the controlling PRZR pressure channel Note: HCO may have has failed, THEN place controller 431 Kin previously have taken 431 K to MANUAL and adjust output to restore PRZR manual and restore PRZR pressure.

pressure per A-503.1. b. Refer to ER-INST.1 Reactor Bistable Defeat After Instrument Loop HCO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power -STABLE Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ...,;2;;.... ____ Page 16 of 67""";';--11 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) (Step 3) Check PRZR Pressure: Pressure -LESS THAN 2235 PSIG Pressure -GREATER THAN 2000 PSIG (Step 4) Check PRZR Heater Status: PRZR proportional heater breaker PRZR heater backup group-ON HCO (Step 5) Verify Normal PRZR Spray valves -NOTE: The Spray Valves CLOSED should be CLOSED now, but were previously opened. AOV-431A AOV-431B (Step 6) Check PRZR Pressure Controller, NOTE: The 431 K Output is at 431 K, Demand -LESS THAN 50% 100% (at time of failure). (Step 6 RNO) Place 431 K in MANUAL and NOTE: This may have already lower output to restore PRZR pressure to been accomplished, per the 2235 psig. Guidance of A-503.1. (Step 7) Check PZR PORVs: PORVs -CLOSED Annunciator F-19, PRZR OUTLET HI TEMP

Go to Step 9.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.. N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ____ Page 17 of .....;6;.;,.7--1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) ER-INST.1 REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLE AFTER INSTRUMENT LOOP (Step 6.1.1) Identify the failed instrument channel by observation of the status light board, MCB and the MCB meteri (Step 6.1.2) WHEN a failed loop and/or channel has been THEN refer to the appropriate section of this procedure listed below: PRZR Pressure Channel Failures Sect 6.3 (Step 6.3.1) (IF the controlling PRZR NOTE: The HCO may already Pressure channel has failed (normally have taken HC-431 K to PT -449, but PT -429 may be selected as manual previously and controlling channel), THEN place HC-controlling RCS pressure 431K in MANUAL at about 50% and manually. control ure manual (Step 6.3.2) IF PT-430 OR PT-431 has NOTE: N/A failed closed THEN CLOSE block valve:

PT-429: MOV-516
PT-431:MOV-515 (Step 6.3.3) IF hot leg streaming has been NOTE: N/A but should causing single channel II T runback evaluate.

signals, THEN perform step 6.3.4.1. IF NOT, THEN go to step 6.3.5. 1. IF reactor power is greater 98.5%, THEN reduce reactor power approximately 98.5% RTP to the possibility of reactor trip due to leg streaming. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ....;2=--____ Page 18 of Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) CRS (Step 6.3.4) Refer to the appropriate Note: Refers to PI-449 attachment to defeat the associated YELLOW CHANNEL control functions: Attachment PRZR PRESSURE PI-429 RED CHANNEL PRZR PRESSURE PI-430 WHITE CHANNEL PRZR PRESSURE PI-431 BLUE CHANNEL PRZR PRESSURE PI-449 YELLOW CHANNEL ER-INST.1 Attachment 8, YELLOW CHANNEL-PRZR PRESSURE PI-449 Note: Operator will obtain data per step 4.0 to prepare for the instrument defeat brief and to determine expected status of proving lights during the defeat Directs CO review attachment and hold channel defeat Reviews Attachment-8 and notes expected plant response for conditions and when ready hold brief for defeating PI-449. Once brief is complete, directs CO to perform defeat. NOTE: The CO will request a peer checker during the defeat brief. Expected alarms/Indications during defeat: AR-F-23, RCS OTAT Channel Alert Bistable Lights: PC449A Lo Press Trip TC408COTAT Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 3 Event # .....;2"-- ____ Page 19 of 67""';;";"---i Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) BOP (Step 1.0) IF PRZR pressure channel NOTE: N/A failure resulted in a runback, THEN verify the Rod Control selector switch (MCB) is in MANUAL until the defeat is completed. (step 1.1) Ensure Rod Control Select Switch (MCB) in MANUAL until the defeat is (Step 2.0) NOTE: Places P/429A to In the PLP PRZR PRESS AND LEVEL DEFEAT-1. rack, check the PRZR pressure DEFEAT switch P/429A position. IF P/429A is in NORMAL, THEN place P/429A to DEFEAT IF P/429A is NOT in THEN notify the Shift BOP (Step NOTE: Places T/405F DELTA T DEFEAT switch to LOOP B In the RIL INSERTION LIMIT rack, UNIT2.PLACE T/405F DELTA T switch to LOOP B UNIT While PT-449 defeat is in progress, a 20 gpm leak will occur PORV-431C [Event #3] when directed by Lead Examiner. This will be completed after PORV-431C event is (Step 4.0) Determine the expected light status for the post defeat condition (Step 4.1) RECORD the following Data: PRZR Pressure PI-449__PSIG LOOP 18-2 A TEMP TI-408B __oF OTilT SP1 LOOP 1B-2TEMP TI-408A__oF Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # Page 20 of _6;;;,;7_-11 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) (Step Determine the expected post defeat proving light status and circle thEl status in the table 408 LOOP 8*2 OVERTEMP TRIP Light OFF !E TI4088 TI408A 449 CHANNEL 4 LOW PRESS TRIP Light OFF lie PI449 < t873 psig Expected Proving Post DE'feat light Bistable Light Status (Circle) Verified 408 LOOP 8*2 ON OFF OVERTEMP TRIP 449 CHANNEL 4 ON OFF LOW PRESS TRIP (Step 5.0) In the (YELLOW) Y1 PROTECTION CHANNEL 2 rack, PLACE the following bistable proving switches to DEFEAT (UP) and VERIFY the proving light status is correct per the table above. 408 LOOP 8-2

OVERTEMP TRIP 449 CHANNEL 4
LO PRESS TRIP BOP (step 6.0) PLACE the PRZR pressure recorder transfer switch (MCB) to position 1-3. BOP (Step 7.0) Verify the bistable status lights listed above are lit. Note: Expected proving lights: [ON] [OFF] AR-F-23, RCS OT T Channel Alert NOTE: Takes PRZR pressure recorder transfer switch (MCB) to position 1-3. NOTE: Bistable TC408C not lit and informs the CRS.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ____ Page 21 of _6.;;.,;7_ .... Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) Notes that TC408C Bistable light is not Informs the SM and I&C. Directs the CO continue with the defeat if not Step (8.0-8.15) Deletes 404/408 from processing in PPCS: o Select "Group Update" display o Select "List Server Groups" o Select 404_408 from the pick list TURN "OFF" scan processing, then click the "SET SCAN Processing" button o Answer prompts Select the "Sub/Delete/Restore" display o Select Point ID T0404 o TURN "ON" scan processing Select "Change" o Answer prompts Select the "Sub/Delete/Restore" display o Select Point 10 P0449 o TURN "OFF" scan processing. o Select "Change" o Answer prompts (Step 9.0) Informs CRS that defeat is completed and next attachment directs to go to step 6.3.5 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ....;2=--____ Page 22 of ....,;6::..:.,7----4 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) (Step 6.3.5) Restores systems to automatic:

PRZR Pressure Control o HC 431K o PRZR Spray Valves o PRZR Heaters o PRZR Level Control o Rod Control o Steam Dump o Turbine EH control (Step 6.3.7 Open any PORV Block Valve closed in step 6.3.2. (Step 6.3.8) Check the following ITS Sections for LCO's: 1. Section 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-'1, Functions 5, 7a and 7b (7b not required for PT -449) 2. Section 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-'1, Function 1 d (not required for PT -449) 3. Section 3.3.3, Table 3.3.3-'1, Functions 1 and 6 Note: Only controls in manual. Note: N/A Note: ITS 3.3.1: Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation ITS 3.3.2: Engineering Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation ITS 3.3.2: Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _2=--____ Page 23 of Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

3.3.1 Reactor

Trip (RS) Instrumentation

3.3.1 Reactor

Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation LCO The RTS instrumentation fOr each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE According to Table 3.3.1-1. ACTIONS -NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions with one channel inoperable. A.l Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 for the channel(s). Immediately Two source range channels inoperable. Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 24 of _6;;,;7_-1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) Table 3.3.1-1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR ornER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS!a)

1. Manual ReaclOrTrip 1,2, 3 ib 1, 4fb1, 5,b) 2 S,C SR3.3.1.11 NA 2. Power Range Neutron Flux a. High 1,2 4 D,G SR 3.3.1.1 SR3.3.1.2 SR3.3.U SR3.3.UO :;;109.27%

RIP b. low 1(0), 2 4 D,G SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.10 RTP 3. Intermediate Range Neulron Flux 1 (Cl, 2 2 E,G SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.10 (a) 4. SOurce Range Neutron Flux ;2!"1 2 F,G SR3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.B SR3.3.1.10 (a) 3ib), 4(b), 5(b) 2 H,I SR3.3.1.1 SR3.3.1.7 SR3.3.1.10 (a) 3in, 4(1), Si"fl 1 J SR3.3.U SR3.3.1.10 NA 5. OVertemperaiure aT 1,2 4 D,G SR 3.3.1.1 SR3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 SR3.3.1.10 Refer to Note 1 6. Overpower aT 1,2 4 D,G SR3.3.1.1 SR3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 Refer to Note 2 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # Page 25 of _6;;..;7_-1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR LIMITING OTHER SAFETY SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS SETTINGS'*)

7. Pressurizer Pressure a. Low 4 K,L SR 3.3.1.1 21791.3 SR 3.3.1.7 psig SR 3.3.1.10 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3. Post accident (PAM) Instrumentation LCO The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

MODES 1, 2, and 3. ACTIONS -Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. -NOTE Not applicable to Functions 3 and 4. Restore required channel to OPERABLE status. 30 days One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ....;2=--____ Page of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) Table 3.3.3-1 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation REQUIRED CONDITION CHANNELS 1. Pressurizer 2 F 2. Pressurizer 2 F 3. Reactor Coolant System (ReS) Hot Leg F 4. Res Cold Leg 1 per loop F 5. Res Pressure (Wide 2 F 6. Res SUtxooling 2 F (step 6.3.9) Note: N/A Check TRM 3.4.3, Anticipated Transients Without Scram TW ation. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _2;;;;.... ____ Page 27 of 67"';;';--11 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) TECHNICAL Requirements Manual Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) TR 3.4.3 Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigation TR 3.4.3 ATWS Mitigation shall be OPERABLE as follows: Each PORV shall be capable of automatic actumon and each block valve shall be open; Manual rod insertion shall be OPERABLE; and ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AM SAC) shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 > 45% RTP. ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I A One or more PORV A.1 Declare ATWS mitigating automatic flow path capability Manual rod AMSAC inopemble (step 6.3.10) Note: IF turbine run back has occurred rods are in THEN verify Rod Control is available by stepping Rods IN THEN OUT. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ____ Page 28 _6;;;.,;7_-1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure channel 449 fails low (2500#) (step 6.3.11) Note: N/A Restore AUTO Rod Control if desired. (Step 6.3.12) Go to Step 6.15 (Step 6.15) Performs Follow Up Actions instrument defeated is completed following after the PORV-431C failure (Event #3), per Lead Examiner, commence event # 4

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 29 of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE) While the PT-449 defeat is in progress, a 21 gpm leak will occur on PORV 431C. The PORV will indicate in the throttled open position. The team will respond per:

AR-F-19, PRZR PORV Outlet Hi Temp 145°F
AP-PZR.1, Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure The crew will attempt to close PORV-431C, but fails to close and will isolate the leak by closing associated block valve MOV-515, SRO will refer to ITS section 3.4.11 (Pressurizer PORVs) and 3.4.13 (RCS Operational Leakage).

Per 3.4.11, "A PORV with a leakage rate >10gpm must also be declared inoperable (Block valve closed and power removed) per this LCO." (Restriction based on the possible need to use this PORV during accident mitigation, and if the block valve then failed to close with greater than 10gpm leakage, the PORV leakage would be outside the accident analysis assumptions. >> Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 Indications Available:

AR-F-10, Pressurizer LO Press 2205 PSI
AR-F-19, PRZR PORV Outlet Hi Temp 145°F
PPCS Indications and alarms AR-F-19. PRZR PORV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F CRS (Step 1) IF Pressurizer pressure is lowering, NOTE: The HCO will THEN GO TO AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL recognize that PZR Pressure is lowering because of the Open PORV. AR-F-10, Pressurizer LO Pressure 2205 psi, ITS LCO 4.3.1

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 30 of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE) (Step 2) Check PRZR PORV outlet NOTE: The HCO may attempt temperature, TI-438. to close PCV-431C, in accordance with A-503.1. Upon recognizing that 431C did NOT close, the HCO will close MOV-515. (Step 3) Check PRT parameters .. (Step 4) Check Containment temperature. (Step 5) Start OR swap Containment Recirc Fans per Shift Manager directions. CRS (Step 6) Refer to ITS LCO 3.4.11 and Note: ITS 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) ITS 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 31 of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE) CRS Declares PORV-431C inoperable and informs SM. Note; This nay be performed in AP-PZR.1 Note: When block closed and CRS directs AO to open breaker for MOV-515, (MCC D pos 6c), which removes form MOV-515 and makes PORV-431C INOPERABLE to meet ITS 3.4.11. SIM Driver INSERT the following: OVR-D.O-PZR04A, [OFF], MOV-515 closed green light PZR04D, [False], MOV-515 open signal PZR04C, [True], MOV-515 close signal AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER HCO (Step 1) Check PZR Pressure: All 4 narrow range channels APPROXIMATELY EQUAL All 4 narrow range TRENDING TOGETHER HCO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power -STABLE HCO (Step 3) Check PRZR Pressure: Pressure -LESS THAN 2235 PSIG Pressure -GREATER THAN 2000 PSIG Note: If PORV-431C closed previously, all pressures are rising except PT -449 which is failed high and defeat in progress.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 32 of Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE) HCO (Step 4) Check PRZR Heater Status: a. PRZR proportional heater breaker b. PRZR heater backup group -ON Note: Depends how quickly PORV-431C is isolated. Steps 4b RNO may be required. HCO (Step 5) Verify Normal PRZR Spray valves -NOTE: The Spray Valves CLOSED should be CLOSED now, but were previously opened.

AOV-431A
AOV-431B HCO (Step 6) Check PRZR Pressure Controller, NOTE: 431 K in manual 431 K, Demand -LESS THAN 50% previously during PT -449 failure HCO (Step 7) Check PZR PORVs: a. PORVs Closed a. (RNO) Manually close PORVs. Note: May have previously closed MOV-515 IF any valve can NOT be closed, manually close the associated block
MOV-516 for PCV-430
MOV-515 for PCV-431C HCO Closes MOV-S15 HCO 7b. Annunciator F-19 PRZR PORV OUTLET Note: Alarm response actions HI TEMP 145"F-EXTINGUSHED may have been completed previously.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 33 of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE)

b. (RNO) IF PORV leakage is indicated THEN perform the following:

1) Close PORV block valves one at a time AND check if pressure stabilizes.

MOV-516 for PCV-430 MOV-515 for PCV-431C 2) If a leaking PRZR PORV identified, THEN open any non leaking PORV block valve and go to Step 8. (Step 8) Attempt to reseat any leaking any leaking PORV a. Verify affected PORV block CLOSED
MOV-516 for PCV-430
MOV-515 for PCV-431C b. Cycle the leaking PORV open and closed. c. Open affected PORV block valve d. Verify leakage has stopped. e. Go to step 11. (step 11) Check PRZR Pressure Control restored a. Pressure-Trending to 2235 b. Go to Step 16 Note: MOV-515 should be closed and RCS pressure rising. Note: Only MOV-515 closed. Note: MOV-515 is closed Note: PORV-431C does not operate due to failure. Note: Since PORV-431C does not operate, they may not open associated block valve. Note; Leakage is stopped with block shut and PORV-431C failure

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12.1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 34 of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE) (step 16) Check PRT indications

a. level-Between 61-84% b. Pressure-Approximately Stable 1.5 PSIG and Stable c. Temperature-At CNMT temperature and (step 17) Establish PRZR pressure Control a. Verify 431 K in Auto a. (RNO) Place 431 K in AUTO if desired Note: Maintains in manual due to PT -449 failure b. Verify PRZR spray in AUTO c. Verify PRZR heaters restored: PRZR proportional heaters breaker closed PRZR backup heaters breaker reset in AUTO (Step 18) Evaluate MCB Annunciators (Step 19) Notify higher supervision (Step 20) Notify Reactor Engineer Transient Monitoring Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Even1:# 3 Page 35 of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE) RCS Pressure. Temperature, and FIO'III' Departure from Nudeate Boiling (DNB) Limits LCO RCS DNB parameters for p"*,surizer pressure, Res average temperature, and RCS tctaJ flow rate shall be within the limits specified in theCOLR. -NOTE-Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during pressure transients due to: a. THERMAL POWER ramp"> 5% RTP per minute; or b. THERMAL POWER stoep"> 10% RTP. MODE 1. ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME One or more Res DNB A.t Restom RCS DNB 2 parameters not within to within Required Action and B.l Be in MODE 2. 6 associated Time not SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SR Verify pressurizer pressure is within limit specified in 12 SR Verify Res average temperature is within limit 12 specified in the Annunciator F-19, PRZR PORV OUTLET HI TEMP EXTINGUISHED CRS

Go to Step 9.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario 3 Evenll # 3 Page 36 of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. ACTIONS -NOTE 1. Separate entry into Condition A is allowed for each PORV. 2. Separate entry into Condition C is allowed for each block valve. REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME One or both PORVs A.1 ClOSE! and maintain power 1 OPERABLE and not to associated bloCK capable of automatically controlled. Place aSSOCiated PORV in 1 hour manual control. One PORV inoperable.

8.1 Close

associated block 1 AND Remove power from 1 hour aSSOCiated block valve. AND Restore PORV to 72 hours status. One block valve C.1 Place associated PORV in 1 inoperable. manual AND I I Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 37 of 67 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV-431C leakage (PORV INOPERABLE) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION RCS Operational 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to: d. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and I d_ 150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG). APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I I A. RCS operational A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within 4 LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons than pressure LEAKAGE or primary secondary Required Action and 6.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 assodated Time not B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours RCS pressure LEAKAGE Primary to LEAKAGE not within I At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 38 of 67 Event

Description:

Lowering main condenser vacuum After the SRO has had an opportunity to identify the ITS I TRM requirements associated with the PT -449 failure and the PORV leakage, a loss of condenser vacuum will occur. (The loss of vacuum will be ramped over 12 minutes so that the crew will trip the turbine when meeting the 5 minute backpressure DO NOT OPERATE region criteria or a turbine trip will occur on low vacuum.) The team will respond per:

AR-H-7, Condenser Hi Pressure 25.5" HG,
AR-K-30, Turbine Plant Sampling Rack Trouble
AP-TURB.4, Loss Of Condenser Vacuum, and refer to
AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction They will reduce turbine load in an attempt to stabilize condenser vacuum, and to get out of the "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure.

When the BOP initiates load reduction he will discover the EH control panel will not respond in OPER PAN, and will reduce turbine load manually. The team will be unable to stabilize condenser vacuum. Once the 5 minute "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure limit is met, the crew will trip the turbine or a trip on low vacuum will occur. If the crew reduced power to less than 50% to get less than P-9 (Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip interlock), when the turbine is tripped manually a reactor trip will occur due to the failure of the P9 interlock. Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #4 Indications Available:

AR-H-7, Condenser Hi Pressure 25.5" HG, and
AP-TURB.4, Loss Of Condenser Vacuum, and refer to
AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction
Numerous secondary plant PPCS alarms Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ____ Page 39 of _6;..,;7_-11 Event

Description:

Lowering main condenser vacuum CRS BOP Upon PPCS alarms may refer to AP-FW.1 until load rejection or lowering vacuum is noted. Note to Examiner: Depending on indications diagnosed, the crew will commence AP-FW.1 until a more applicable AP entered. Crews during validations did steps in AP-FW.1 AP-TURB.2, Load Rejection AP-TURB.4, Loss of Condenser Vacuum SIM Driver: AR-K-30, Turbine Plant Sampling Rack will alarm and after 2 minutes after sent to investigate as Chem. Tech, report alarm due to high Condensate Dissolved Oxygen and investigating cause. AP-FW.1, ABNORMAL MFW FLOW or NPSH (Step 1) Check MFW requirements:

a. Power -GREATER THAN 50% . Both MPW pumps running . Go to Step 3 CRS (Step 3) Check S/G Status:

MFW flows> Steam flows
S/G levels stabilizing or returning to program BOP (Step 4) Verify At Least 2 Condensate Pumps -RUNNING NOTE: The B Condensate Pump may automatically START. BOP (Step 5) Verify Both HDT Pumps -RUNNING NOTE: The A Heater Drain Pump has tripped.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 40 of 67 Event

Description:

Lowering main condenser vacuum (Step 6) Check Condensate Booster Pumps Note: Power at 70% and not running required. (Step 6 RNO) Ensure power less than and continue with step BOP (Step 7) Check hotwell Note: Hotwell levels and temperatures are rising due to hotwell recuirc valve open Hotwell Level Controller in AUTO Controller demand less than 70% Hotwell Level at setpoint (Step 7 RNO) Take manual control of hotwell level (Step 8) Check MFW Pump Both MFW pump suction pressures GREATER THAN 200 PSIG Annuciator H-17, FEED PUMP NET POSITIVE SUCTION EXTI NGU ISH ED (Step 9) Verify adequate MFW flow A MFW flow-GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO A STEAM FLOW B MFWflow-GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO B STEAM FLOW (Step 10) Check Status of MFW System: a. Both MFW pumps -RUNNING Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _4.;.....____ Page 41 of Event

Description:

Lowering main condenser vacuum b. Verify condensate pump recuirc valve Note: Valve is open due to AOV-4238-CLOSED (PPCS V4:238) opening to provide more cooling water to the air ejectors due to lowering vacuum. AP-Turb.2 Load Rejection BOP (Step 1) Monitor RCS NOTE: May enter AP-Turb.4 directly.CRS

Tavg GREATER THAN 545'F Tavg LESS THAN 579°F (Step 2) Check Turbine valves: Turbine stop valves and steam Turbine control valves-ALL AT APPROXIMATEL Y THE (Step 3) Check Steam Dump Status (Step 4) Verify Tavg-TRENDING TO TREF (Step 5) Monitor PRZR Pressure-TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG AUTO (Step 6) Monitor MFW regulatin RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO (Step 7) Monitor PRZR Level-TRENDING TO PROGRAM IN AUTO Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _4_____ Page 42 of ....;6;.;.,.7--1 Event

Description:

Lowering main condenser vacuum (Step 8) Check Turbine Runback: Criteria: Any D.T annunicator -LIT BOP (Step 9) Check condenser Back Pressure-NOTE: May send AO to CRS PBACK LESS THAN 3 INCHES AND investigate lowering vacuum STABLE IF loss of main condenser vacuum SIM DRIVER: as AO, indicated THEN go to AP-TURB.4 acknowledge, and report that all normal, still monitoring. AP*Turb.4 Loss of Condenser Vacuum (Step 1) Check condenser circulating Water sytem: CW pump discharge CW pumps -BOTH RUNNING (Step 2) Check condenser Indications: NOTE: BOP/HCO may be monitoring back pressure on CRS

Turbine back pressure-EACH PPCS and may be in DO NOT CONDENSER WITHIN THE OPERATE REGION already. SATISFACTORY OPERATING (PPCS Warnings and clock REGION OF FIG-13.0 FIGURE started)BACK PRESSURE Condenser vacuum-STABLE CRS (Step 2) IF in the avoid region, THEN adjust BOP turbine load to return to the SATISFACTORY OPERATING REGION. CRS (Step 2) While continuing with procedure BOP reduce load per AP-TURB.5 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 43 of 67 Event

Description:

Loss of automatic EH control They will reduce turbine load in an attempt to stabilize condenser vacuum, and to get out of the "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure. When the BOP initiates load reduction he will discover the EH control panel will not respond in OPER PAN, and will reduce turbine load manually. The team will be unable to stabilize condenser vacuum. Once the 5 minute "Avoid" region in condenser backpressure limit is met, the crew will trip the turbine or a trip on low vacuum will occur. If the crew reduced power to less than 50% to get less than P-9 (Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip interlock), when the turbine is tripped manually a reactor trip will occur due to the failure of the P9 interlock. Booth Operator Instructions: None (inserted on initial setup Indications Available:

AR-H-7, Condenser Hi Pressure 25.5" HG, and
AP-TURB.4, Loss Of Condenser Vacuum, and refer to
AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction
Numerous secondary plant PPCS alarms AP-Turb.5-Rapid Load Reduction Perform a load reduction brief per A-503.1 (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction
Verify rods in AUTO
Reduce turbine load in Auto as follows: BOP Place Turbine EH Control in PAN., IMP PRESS IN, if
Select desired rate on thumbwheel
Reduce the setter to the desired load
Depress the GO Note: No response in AUTO Reports that there is a failure of AUTO Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 44 of 67 Event

Description:

Loss of automatic EH control Directs the CO to take manual control of EH NOTE: The load reduction will and reduce load on continue till loss of vacuum trip or meeting the 5 minute time limit on AVOID region and manual trip is initiated. HCO Initiate boration at the rate determined in NOTE: The HCO will initiate a OPG-REACT1VITY-CALC. boration. Place PRZR backup heaters switch (*Step 2) Monitor RCS Tavg Tavg -GREATER THAN 545°F T avg -LESS THAN 579°F (Step 3) Adjust Boric Acid Addition Rate Necessary To (refer to Maintain rods above the insertion limit Match Tavg and Tref NOTE: The CRS will return to the body of the procedure. Compensate for Xenon (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR NOTE: Pressurizer Pressure is TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO trending down. (Step 4 RNO) Control PRZR pressure by one of the following: 431 K in MANUAL Manual control of PRZR heaters If PRZR pressure can NOT be controlled manually, THEN refer to AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _5=--____ Page 45 of Event

Description:

Loss of automatic EH control (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves -Note: Continue with load RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO reduction till trip (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level-TO PROGRAM IN AUTO Note: The next events automatically start upon the Reactor Trip Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 3 Event # ...,;6=--____ Page 46 of I Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4K auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink V Upon reactor trip, a failure of the 4KV Auto Bus Transfer and a loss of Bus 14 will occur. Additionally, the TDAFW Pump speed control is failed to zero and the 'B' MDAFW pump will trip on start. The team will respond per E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. With steam dump unavailable, SG pressure will rise rapidly causing SG ARVs and SG Safeties to open. Two SG safeties associated with 'B' SG will fail full open in conjunction with a MSLB on the 'A' SG inside containment. These events will cause a significant cooldown, ReS depressurization, and SI signal. The team will recognize that SI failed to actuate automatically and will manually actuate SI. At step 9 the team will transition to FR-H.1, Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are unavailable. "e" SBAFP has no power. Depending on SG level, the team will either go to step 13 for Bleed &Feed, or attempt to align and start "D" SBAFP. If there is time for the SBAFP start, the SRO will determine feed requirements per Attachment 22.0, Attachment Restoring Feed Flow (attempt to feed at max rate [225 gpm]). "D" SBAFP will trip when they try to start it. When less than or equal t0120 [160] inches wide range SG level is reached in both SGs, the team will go to step 13 for Bleed & Feed. The team will perform Attachment 12.0, Attachment N2 PORVs to operate the PORVs. Subsequently, Bus 15 will be energized by cross-tie to Bus 16, and instrument air will be aligned to the PORVs. After Bleed and Feed is established (PORVs open and SI flow verified), at the Lead Examiner's discretion, the SRO will be notified from the wee that the "B" MDAFP is available. The team will establish AFW flow pE;r the guidance of step 3. Terminate the scenario when auxiliary feed flow is _________--i Booth Operator Instructions: Entered at T -0, occurred on trip Indications Available:

Numerous alarms on trip Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Evenl# 6 Page 47 of 67 Event Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: At least one train of reactor trip breakers -OPEN Neutron flux -LOWERING MRPI indicates

-ALL CONTROL SHUTDOWN RODS ON (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves (Step 3) Verify Both trains of AC Bus 14 and Bus 18 Note: The BOP notes that Bus 14 is not energized (L-5, SAFEGUARD BUS MAIN BREAKER OVER CURRENT) TRIP is illuminated. Bus 16 and Bus 17 Notes status of Emergency DIG's HeOI (Step 4) Check if SI is Any SI Annunciator -LIT SI sequencing -BOTH Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6.;;...-____ Page 48 of _6;;.;7_-IJ Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink HCO (Step 4 RNO) Manually actuate SI and CI Critical Manually actuate at least one train of 51 before transition to Safety The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analyses are predicated on the that, at the very least, one train of safeguards actuates. If SI is not actuated, the FSAR assumptions and results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to manually actuate at least one train of SI (when it is possible to do so) constitutes a violation of the license condition. Required Plant Conditions:

1. Reactor trip with valid SI required but not automatically actuated.

2. SI can be manually actuated from the control room. HCO (*Step 5) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required:

Annunciator A-27, CNMT SPRAY Note: Continuous action step when CNMT pressure rises to setpoint
CNMT pressure -LESS THAN 28 PSIG Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # ____ Page 49 of _6..;.,;7_-1 Event Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink CRS Directs HCO to perform Att-27.0 NOTE: The CRS will hand off ATT-27.0 to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in E-O. Examiner following operator performing ATT-27.0 continue below. Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue at page 53. E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION (Step 1) Verify SI and RHR Pumps Running: All SI pumps -RUNNING
Both RHR pumps RUNNING (Step 2) Verify CNMT RECIRC All fans RUNNING Charcoal filter dampers status lights -EXTINGUISHED i I (:::>lteo;;

} (;heck If Main Steamlines Should Any MSIV -OPEN Check CNMT pressure -THAN 18 Check if ANY main should be Low Tavg (545°F) AND high steam flow (O.5x10 6 Ib/hr) from either S/G OR --Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # _6;;...____ Page 50 of _6;;.,;7_-11 Event Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink High-High steam flow (4.4x10 6 Ib/hr) from either S/G * (Step3c RNO) Go to Step HCO (Step 4) Verify MFW

MFW pumps -HCO
MFW Isolation valves -S/G A, AOV-3995 S/G B, AOV-3994 S/G blowdown and sample valves CLOSED (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps (Step 6) Verify CI and CVI: CI and CVI annunciators

-LIT NOTE: MOV-313 and 813 Status light is NOT bright. Fail to close due to loss of MCC-C/Bus 14 power. rs to Attachment-3.0 to isolate OV-813 locally with Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 51 of 67 Event Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink ATT-3.0-A IT ACHMENT CI/CVI HCO Dispatches AO to isolate MOV-313 by SIM DRIVER: as Primary AO, closing: acknowledge and Close V-265 [CVC15] to simulate V-315A V-315A and V-315C and report that V-315C those valves are closed. [3 min delay] HCO Dispatches AO to isolate locally close MOV-SIM DRIVER: as Primary AO, 813 acknowledge and locally close MOV-813: -CLG63 [Disengaged] -CLG64: Report that MOV-813 is closed [5 min E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION HCO (Step 6 Continued) CNMT RECIRC coolers SW outlet valve status lights FCV-4561 FCV-4562 Letdown orifice valves -CLOSED

AOV-200A
AOV-200B
AOV-202 HCO (Step 7) Check CCW System Status: Verify CCW pump -AT LEAST Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Event

Description:

I.

Scenario # 3 Event # _6.;.....____ Page 52 of _6;;.,;7_-1 Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink 8) Verify SI And RHR Pump Flow: I flow indicators

-CHECK FOR FLOW RHR flow indicator -CHECK FOR LOW (Step 8b RNO) IF RCS pressure less than 150 psig manually start pumps and align valves. IF NOT, THEN go to Step 9. Appendix D Operator Action Form Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ____ Page 53 of _6..Event Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink (Step 9) Verify SI Pump And RHR Emergency RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge -OPEN MOV-8S2A MOV-8S2B Verify SI pump C -RUNNING Verify SI pump A -RUNNING Verify SI pump B -RUNNING Verify SI pump C discharge valves OPEN MOV-817A MOV-817B (Step 10) Verify CREATS Actuation: At least one damper in each flowpath CLOSED Normal Supply Air Normal Return Air Lavatory Exhaust Air CREATS fans -BOTH RUNNING Performs a Status update and informs of status of E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue at HERE. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # ____ Page 54 of Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink HCO (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW Pumps RUNNING (Step 7 RNO) Manually start both MDAFW pumps. IF less than 2 MDAFW pumps are running, THEN manually open TDAFW pump steam supply valves. MOV-3505A MOV-3504A Notes that this a total loss of Heat Sink and continues with E-O to Step 9. * (Step 8) Verify AFW Valve Alignment: AFW flow -INDICATED TO BOTH S/G(s) AFW flow from each MDAFW pump LESS THAN 230 GPM NOTE: A MDAFW pump has no power (Bus 14) and B MDAFW pump tripped. NOTE: The CO notes that the TDAFW pump is not operating. Note: AFW not available. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # _6;...-____ Page 55 of Event Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Sus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink (*Step 9) Monitor Heat Sink: Check S/G narrow range level Note: Adverse CNMT GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse CNMT] in any S/G RNa-Verify total AFW flow THAN Notes that no AFW flow and go to H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS SECONDARY HEAT FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK (Step 1) Check If Secondary Heat Sink RCS pressure-GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE Check RCS cold leg temperature GREATER THAN 350°F BOP (*Step 2) Monitor Secondary Heat Note: Adverse CNMT. In RNa to go to step 3 initially. Verify either S/G level-WIDE RANGE GREATER THAN 120 inches [160 inches adverse CNMT] Verify PRZR pressure-LESS THAN 2335 PSIG HCO (Step 3.a) Try to Establish AFW Flow To Least One Intact a) Check Slowdown and Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12*1 Scenario # 3 Event # ____ Page 56 of .....;6;.,;..7---1 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink (Step 3.a RNO) Place Blowdown and sample valve switches to CLOSE BOP (Step 3.b) Verify 2 MDAFW AVAILABLE (Step 3.b RNO) Perform the IF the TDAFW is available THEN ..... IF SBAFW is available THEN go to Step (Step 4) Stop Both set SI if Actuated BOP (Step 6) Try and Establish SAFW Flow To At Least One Intact S/G: a) Perform the following: Align SAFW system for operation (Refer to ATT-5.1, ATTACHMENT SAFW) NOTE: The TDAFW Pump is NOT available, however, the SBAFW System is available. NOTE: The CRS will hand off A TT-5.1 to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in FR-H.1. Examiner following operator performing ATT -5.1, continue below. Examiner following operator NOT performing A TT -5.1 continue at page 58 ATTACHMENT-S.1, ATTACHMENT SAFW NOTE: The CO will attempt to align Train Busing D SBAFW pump to feed the B SG. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # ____ Page 57 of .....;6;.;..7----i1 Event Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink (Step C) Align SAFW Pump D to S/G as

1) Ensure SI 2) Ensure the following valves MOV-9701 B, SAFW PUMP D DISCHARGE MOV-4615, AUX BLDG SW ISOL VLVS MOV-9704B, SAFW PUMP D ISOL VLV MOV-9746, SAFW PMP D EMERG DISCH VLV 3) Open MOV-9629B, SAFW PUMP D SUCTIONVLV

4) Verify at least 1 SW pump running 5a) To feed S/G B, go to step 6) Restore SAFW flow as directE!d procedure in NOTE: The CO will report that the D SBAFW Pump is ready to be started. FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK CRS/ (Step 6.a.2) Determine SAFW flow NOTE: The CRS will direct the BOP requirements per ATT-22.0, ATI"ACHMENT CO to use ATT-22.0 to RESTORING FEED FLOW determine the allowable rate of feed flow to the B SG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 58 of 67 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink ATT-22.0, ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED BOP 1. Initiate Feed flow as follows: NOTE: The CO will determine a) b) Bleed and Feed initiated or required. IF feedwater flow to affeGted S/G greater than 50 gpm OR affected SG level greater than 50 inches (100 inches adverse CNMT), THEN fill that the B SG can be filled as desired to restore Narrow Range Level to > 25%. when a Feedwater flow source is restored. as desired to restore narrow range greater than 7% (25% adverse CNMT) and go to step 2 of this attachment.

2. Check RCS Loop Hot Legs-BOTH HOT LEG TEMPERATURES LOWERING Return to step 1 of this attachment.

FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT BOP (Step 6.a.3) Start selected SAFV-J pump(s) a. IF greater than 215 gpm total SAFW flow can NOT be established. THEN go to Step 7 NOTE: The D SBAFW Pump will fail to start. CRS Notes that the SBAFW pump trips and might order second attempt before continuing on in FR-H.1 CRS (Step 6.a RNO) If greater than 2"15 gpm total SAFW flow can NOT be established. THEN go to Step 7 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # .,.;6::.....-____ Page 59 of ...,;6;;.;..7---1 Event Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink BOP (Step 7) Try to Establish MFW Flow to at Note: B FP is OOS and power Least One S/G not available to A FP.

RNO-Go to Step 8 (Step 8) Establish conditions to Feed S/G's from condensate System.
RNO-Go to Step 8 (Step 8) Establish Conditions to Feed S/G's with Condensate System
Any Condensate pumps running CRS RNO-Power not available, go to step 12. Note: Power not available due. CRSt (Step 12) Verify Secondary Heat Sink BOP a) Check S/G wide range levels Note: CRS will return to step one and continue attempts to both LESS THAN 120 INCHES restore Heat Sink until the[160 inches adverse CNMT] requirements for BLEED AND FEED met.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # _6;;;...-____ Page 60 of _6;;;,.;7_-11 Event Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink CRITICAL TASK Initiate RCS Bleed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for RCS Feed (SI injection) to occur. Safety Significance: Failure to initiate RCS Bleed & Feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the shutoff head of the SI pumps results in significant and sustained core uncovery. Required Plant Conditions: Reactor trip. No AFW available. Secondary heat sink required. RCS pressure below PRZR PORV setpoint. HCO (Step 13) Actuate SI and CI HCOI (Step 14) Verify RCS feed path: CRS Check SI pump status-All running a) RNO Manually start pumps and align valves as necessary b) If at least 2 SI piumps running, GO to Step 15. Appendix Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6;;.....____ Page 61 of _6;;.,;7_-11 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink HCOI (Step 15) Establish RCS Bleed Path: CRS a) Open both PRZR PORV block valves Opens MOV-515 closed earlier clue to Note: Opens available PORV, crew may choose open block valve of INOPERABLE PORV to get additional bleed flow. If power was removed from block valve, then directs AO to restore power. SIM Driver Remove the following: OVR-D.O-PZR04A, [OFF], MOV-515 closed green light PZR04D, [False], MOV-515 open signal OVR-D.I-OVR-PZR04C, [True], MOV-515 close signal b) Place both PORV switches c) Align RCS overpressure system open both PRZR PORVs per 12.0 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # ____ Page 62 of _6;;;.,;7_-11 Event Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink ATT-12.0: ATTACHMENT N2 PORVS (Step A) Select a PORV with block valve, obtain a key for the RCS pressurization system and perform appropriate step HCOI a) Verify block valve OPEN AND OPERABLE b) Place ACCUM TO SURGE TK VLV SOV-8616B to OPEN HCOI a) Verify block valve OPEN AND OPERABLE b) Place ACCUM TO SURGE TK VLV SOV-8616A to OPEN B) To depressurize the RCS in with the guidance provided by the EOP perform the PCV-431C, place over pressurization system arming switch, N2 ARMING VLV 8619B, to ARM PCV-430, place over pressurization system arming switch, N2 ARMING VLV 8619A, to ARM Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # _6;.....____ Page 63 of _6.;.,;7_-11 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink HCO (Step 15d) Verify PORVs-BOTH OPEN HCOI (Step 16) Check if SI can be Check SI blocked status light is EXTINGUISHED b) Check the following: PRZR pressure-LESS THAN 1750 PSIG OR Either steamline pressure LESS THAN 514 PSIG Reset SI HCO (Step 17) Reset CI a. Depress CI reset pushbutton

b. Verify annunciator A-26, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION-EXTINGUISHED SIM DRIVER: Once SBAFW pump failed and Bleed and Feed is established, AND at the Lead Examiner's discretion, remove [MALF FDW11B], B MDAFW Trip and report as wee that B MDAFW pump is available to start.

Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # ____ Page 64 of 67 Event Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink Note: CRS refers back to step 3 to start MDAFW pump and A TT-22.0 for feed requirements. (Step 3c) Check MCB indications for of AFW

1) Verify CST level -GREATER THAN 2) Verify busses supplying power to MDAFW pumps -ENERGIZED Bus 14 Note: Bus 16 is energized and B MDAFW pump is avilable

Bus 16 3) Determine AFW Flow requirements per ATT-22.0 ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED FLOW Directs starting MDAFW pump and limits per ATT-22.0, ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED FLOW
CRSI (Step 2) Initiate Feed flow as follows: NOTE: The CRS will BOP determine that the B SG can a) Bleed and Feed initiated or required.

be filled as desired to restore b) Check if RCS temp stable or Narrow Range Level to > 25%, lowering when a Feedwater flow source c) Establish less than or equal to 100 is restored. gpm feed flow to affected S/G. WHEN S/G level greater than 50 inches (100 inches adverse CNMT, THEN fill as desired to restore narrow range greater than 7% (25% adverse CNMT) Starts B MDAFW pump and feeds at rate of (235 Appendix Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # _6;;......- ____ Page 65 of _6,;;..;7_-11 Event Reactor Trip with Steam Safety opening with a steam leak in containment, SI fail to actuate, loss of Bus 14 and failure of 4KV auto transfer, TDAFW pump failure, Loss of Heat Sink BOP Notes rising wide range level of B S/G. CRS Continues with FR-H.1 while S.G water level Examiner NOTE: Terminate is restored. the Exam at the discretion of the Lead Examiner. FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK BOP (Step 18) Verify Adequate SW flow: a. Verify at least two SW pimps-RUNNING

b. Verify AUX BLDG SW isolation valves-AT LEAST ONE SET OPEN

MOV-4615 and MOV-4734
MOV-4616 and Mov-4735 BOP (Step 19) Establish IA to CNMT: a. Verify non-safeguards buses from off-site Terminate the Exam at the discretion of the Lead Examiner

Crew Turnover Sheet for 2012 NRC Scenario #3 UNIT STATUS: Power Level: 70% RCS [B] 1075 ppm BAST [B]: 14000 ppm Power The Plant is at 70% power (MOL), Core Burnup: 10000 MWD/MTU for four days. INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT: The plant is at 70% power (MOL). The plant power was reduced several days ago due to a malfunction on the B Main Feedwater Pump. Corrective Maintenance has been completed, and the MFW pump is running and is being observed for two more days at present power level, then raise power to 100%. RG&E Energy Control Center has requested that the electric plant be aligned to a 10010 configuration on circuit 767 to allow the RG&E personnel to perform an insulator inspection on the 7T Line. Evolution should occur immediately after crew assumes the watch to adhere to planned work schedule. Per Chemistry direction, Normal Letdown is at 40 gpm. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B Containment Spray Pump has been out of service for bearing replacement since 0800 yesterday.

OPG-Protected Equipment signs are hanging. Expected return to service is tomorrow. A-52.4 for ITS 3.6.6.A, 72 hours LCO. has been submitted. The crew has been directed to shift the electric: plant be aligned to a 10010 configuration on circuit 767 to allow the RG&E personnel to perform an insulator inspection on the 7T Line. Evolution should occur immediately after crew assumes the watch to adhere to planned work schedule. A-52.4 Equipment Date Time Reason Required Actions Required Required Action not met Completion DatefTime B Containment .../.../12 0800 Bearing ITS 3.6.6 72 hours from ITS 3.6.6 Spray Pump Replacement Enter Condition A 0800 yesterday. Enter Condition C Required Action A.1: Restore CS Required Action C.1: Be in Mode 3 Train to OPERABLE Status in 72 in 6 hours hours. AND Required Action C.2: Be in Mode 5 in 84 hours}}

ML12332A110

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2.1.5 Alternate

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6.9. Standard

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6.1.9 20121LT

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3.6.6 Containment

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