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Category:QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
MONTHYEARML17311A7921995-04-10010 April 1995 Descriptions & Justification for Proposed Changes to PVNGS QA Program Description. ML17306B1501992-04-29029 April 1992 Reissued Coversheet for PVNGS Operations QA Plan. ML17298B8271985-01-0909 January 1985 QA Program for Fire Protection. 1995-04-10
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17300B3811999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 991007 Ltr ML17300B3271999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3 ML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0611999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990810 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17300B3151999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990714 Ltr ML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys ML17313A9731999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990608 Ltr ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A9201999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990512 Ltr ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999 Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee. ML17313A8801999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990412 Ltr ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207H7471999-03-10010 March 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 99-E-AEV-03003 ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A8501999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.With 990311 Ltr ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML17313A8061999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990218 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A7381998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990113 Ltr ML20206H2101998-12-31031 December 1998 SCE 1998 Annual Rept ML17313A7031998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Pvngs,Unit 1,2 & 3. with 981209 Ltr ML17313A6701998-11-0404 November 1998 Rev 2 to PVNGS Unit 2 Colr. ML17313A6741998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 981109 Ltr ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A6561998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for PVNGS Units 1,2 & 3.With 981007 Ltr ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML20151S0941998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 6 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 3 ML20151S0861998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 1 ML20151S0901998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 1 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 2 ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML17313A5401998-08-13013 August 1998 Special Rept:On 980715,declared PASS Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Offgas Flush/Purge Control Handswitch HS0101. Handswitch Replaced & Post Maintenance Retesting Was Initiated ML17313A5301998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Pvgns,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980812 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A5791998-07-0707 July 1998 to PVNGS SG Tube ISI Results for Seventh Refueling Outage Mar & Apr 1998. ML17313A5001998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980710 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4521998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 5 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4501998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A4211998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980609 Ltr ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3691998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for PVNGS.W/980412 Ltr ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 1999-09-30
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DESCRIPTIONS AND JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE PVNGS QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM DESCRIPTION PROPOSED CHANGE'PS proposes to change UFSAR Section 17.2.4.2.1.7 from: "Quality-related work authorizing documents shall be reviewed by the Quality Assurance organization to determine the need for and annotation of independent inspection to be performed by the Quality Control Department." to: "Selected quality-related work authorizing documents shall be reviewed by the Nuclear Assurance organization to determine the need for and annotation of additional attributes requiring independent inspection." REASON(S)FOR THE CHANGE The reason for changing wording to"selected quality-related work" is to clarify this statement to reflect the program as defined in Section 17.2.4.3.1.3 which states in part"...Documents that define programs or establish administrative controls...shall be reviewed and concurred with by the QA organization prior to implementation.
Review of lower tier procedures and other documents shall be.performed on a graded approach...or on a sample basis." Making this change will remove conflicting wording between Sections 17.2.4.2.1.7 and 17.2.4.3.1.3 and allow Nuclear Assurance to implement a graded/sample basis approach when reviewing work control documents.
BASIS FOR CONCLUSION THAT THE REVISED PROGRAM CONTINUES TO SATISFY THE CRITERIA OF 10 CFR 50 APPENDIX B AND THE PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM COMMITMENTS The following is the basis for concluding that the revised program, incorporating the changes as described, continues to satisfy the criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and quality assurance program description commitments previously accepted by the NRC.-Page 1 of 3 9504140155 950410 PDR ADOCK 05000528 P.PDR
~I~P A A comprehensive Quality Verification Program has been established at PVNGS and implemented to provide verification that Quality Plan requirements are implemented.
Although a clarification in wording has been made.within Section 17.2.4;2.1.7, the following requirements of the FSAR remain unchanged.
Included is an explanation of how the implementation of these requirements will be conducted in the future.17.2.4.2.1
-Requirements 17.2.4.2.1.2
-The Engineering organization is responsible for the identification of attributes that require independent inspection.
The Nuclear Assurance organization may elect to identify additional attributes requiring independent inspection based on quality history,.trending, and quality engineering reviews that indicate the need for increased independent inspection.
Explanation:
Currently Nuclear Assurance reviews qualify relafed correcfive maintenance work aufhorization documents to insert requiredinspection holdpoints (identified by other organizations) into work documenfs and to identify additional independentinspection as sfatedin 17.2.4.2.1.2 above.Nuclear Assurance resources have been used fo support acfivities fhat are more appropriately conducfed by organizations that perform work plan developmenf.
As the responsibility forinserfion of inspection poinfsis fumed over to the organizafionsinitiating fhe work documents, Nuclear Assurance'will monitor fhe fransifion to assure compliance with regulatory and code requirements
'7.2.4.2.1.7-Independent Inspections Independent inspection is performed on activities in which a high degree of independence is desired to assure correct performance was accomplished or when required by code, standard, or regulatory commitment.
Independent inspection is performed by ANSI N45.2.6 certified inspectors, by individuals in organizations authorized by the Nuclear Assurance organization to perform those activities and who meet the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6, and by NDE personnel certified in accordance with ASNT Recommended Practice No.SNT-TC-1A.
Inspectors (including NDE personnel) shall be qualified in accordance with applicable codes, standards, and PVNGS training programs and their qualification and/or certification shall be maintained current and documented.
Page 2 of 3 4
~~~~'[Modifred stafement-Selected quality-related work authorizing documents shall be reviewed by the Nuclear Assurance organization to determine the need for and annotation of additional attributes requiring independent inspection.]
Explanation:
Work authorizing documents are lower tier documents and may be reviewed using a graded approach as statedin Section 17.2.4.3.1.3 below.Nuclear Assurance will use this gradedlsample basis approach as one of the means for monitoring successfulimplemenfation of Section 17.2.4.2.1.2.
When independent inspection hold points have been established, either contractually by procurement, or internally by plant procedures, work may not proceed beyond the hold point until either the inspection is performed satisfactorily or waived by Nuclear Assurance.
Explanation:
Independent Inspections will confinue to be performed as identified in the current program.17.2.4.3.1.3-Document Reviews.A program for reviewing documents that implement quality related activities shall be established to verify incorporation of the requirements of this Plan.7 Documents that define programs or establish administrative controls (upper tier)shall be reviewed and concurred with by the Nuclear Assurance organization prior to implementation.
Reviews of lower tier procedures and other documents shall be performed on a graded approach as part of verification activities or on a sample basis.Page 3 of 3
~~p~'I C ENCLOSURE 2 AFFECTED UFSAR PAGES FOR PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE PVNGS QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
PVNGS UPDATED FSAR~~~, I'C QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING THE OPERATIONS PHASE 17.2.4.2.1.7 Inde endent Ins ections Independent inspection is performed on activities in which a high degree of independence is desired to assure correct performance was accomplished or when required by code, standard, or regulatory commitment.
Independent inspection is performed by ANSI N45.2.6 certified inspectors, by individuals in organizations authorized by the Nuclear Assurance organization to perform those activities and who meet the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6, and by NDE personnel certified in accordance with ASNT Recommended Practice No.SNT-TC-1A.
7I 7I 7I Inspectors (including NDE personnel) shall be qualified in" accordance.
with applicable codes, standards, and PVNGS training programs and their qualification and/or certification shall be aint'd current and documented.
Selected uality related work authorizing documents shall be reviewed by the Nuclear Assurance organization to determine the need for and annotation of independent,,inspection.
additional attributes requiring When independent inspection hold points have been es a z.shed, either contractually by procurement, or internally by plant procedures, work may not proceed beyond the hold point until either the inspection is performed satisfactorily or waived by Nuclear Assurance.
For modification and nonroutine maintenance, independent inspections shall be conducted in a manner similar (frequency, type, and personnel performing such inspection) to that associated with construction phase activities.
Where independent inspection is being performed on previously accepted lots, sampling inspection shall be representative and shall be applied only to the extent necessary to assure adequacy of control.The sampling plan shall be established by 7J the Nuclear Assurance organization.
Inspection personnel shall March 1995 17.2-76 Revision 7 i%~k I I