05000247/FIN-2012005-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Corrective Actions regarding operational controls of the steam generator blowdown valve radiation bypass switch |
Description | The inspectors identified a Green, NCV of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, because Entergy personnel did not adequately identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with maintenance procedures and activities that adversely impact the steam generator (SG) safety function to remove decay heat. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not implement adequate corrective actions to address existing procedure deficiencies regarding operational controls on the steam generator blowdown (SGBD) valve radiation bypass switch. Entergys corrective actions included identifying and placing a hold on instructions directing use of the radiation bypass switch; implementing operator training; and identifying previous occurrences of the condition which resulted in the plant being placed in an unanalyzed condition. Entergy personnel entered this issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as CR-IP2-2013-0191. This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency could lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, maintenance procedures inappropriately allowing operation of the SGBD valve radiation bypass switch could adversely impact the SG safety function to remove decay heat. The inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design of a mitigating system that maintained its functionality. Specifically, failure of the SGBD isolation valves to close would cause loss of SG water level because the remaining motor driven auxiliary boiler feedwater pump would exceed its design flow rate. However, given the time available, existing procedures, and operator training on isolating the SGBD flowpaths, either from the control room or locally, SG decay heat removal functionality was maintained. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program because Entergy staff did not thoroughly evaluate this problem such that the resolutions address the causes and extent of condition. Specifically, Entergy staff did not properly evaluate the use and impact of the radiation bypass switch for the SGBD isolation when considering allowable configurations of the auxiliary feedwater system. |
Site: | Indian Point ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000247/2012005 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Burritt J Furia O Ayegbusi P Presby S Mccarver T Ziev |
CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000247/2012005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
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