05000247/FIN-2012009-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Protect Safe Shutdown Equipment from the Effects of Fire |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green), involving a cited violation of lndian Point Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.Kto implement and maintain all aspects of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, ENO failed to protect required post-fire safe shutdown components and cabling to ensure one of the redundant trains of equipment remained free from fire damage as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section lll.G.2. In lieu of protecting a redundant safe shutdown train, ENO utilized unapproved operator manual actions to mitigate component malfunctions or spurious operations caused by postulated single fire-induced circuit faults. ENO submitted an exemption request (M1090770151) on March 6, 2009, in which it sought exemption from requirements of Paragraph lll.G.2, to permit the use of OMAs upon which it had been relying for safe-shutdown in a number of fire areas. However, several OMAs within the exemption request were denied because ENO failed to demonstrate that the OMAs were feasible and reliable, or to appropriately evaluate fire protection defense-in-depth. ENO\\\'s performance deficiency delayed achieving full compliance with fire protection regulations and adversely affected post-fire safe shutdown. ENO has entered this issue into the corrective program for resolution. The inspectors found the manual actions in addition to roving fire watches in all affected areas to be reasonable interim compensatory measures pending final resolution by ENO. ENO\\\'s failure to protect components credited for post-fire safe shutdown from fire damage caused by single spurious actuation is considered a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to an external event to prevent undesirable consequences in the event of a fire. Specifically, the use of operator manual actions during post-fire safe shutdown is not as reliable as normal systems operation which could be utilized had the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section lll.G.2 been met and, therefore, prevented fire damage to credited components and/or cables. The inspectors used IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 and a Senior Reactor Analyst conducted a Phase 3 evaluation, to determine that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding does not have a cross cutting aspect because the performance deficiency occurred greater than three years ago when the exemption request was submitted to the NRC on March 6, 2009, and is not indicative of current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000247/2012009 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | Violation: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Orr J Lilliendahl J Rogge W Schmidt |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000247/2012009 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
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