ML080360186

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Usnrc 2007 Peach Bottom Augmented Inspection Team Congressional Brief
ML080360186
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/23/2008
From: Gamberoni M K, Trapp J M
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I
To:
References
FOIA/PA-2008-0018
Download: ML080360186 (15)


Text

a. ": 2007 Peach Bottom Augmented Inspection Team (AIT)Congressional Brief Marsha K. Gamberoni, Director James M. Trapp, Team Leader Division of Reactor Safety NRC Region I SV= (IM'.&R['I

ýFI-*i"fi AIT Process AIT Objectives

> Conduct timely and systematic inspection related to significant operational events) Assess health and safety significance of the event I Collect and analyze facts associated with the event to determine causes and circumstances 01 :' AIT Process AIT Process Overview SFormal investigation process conducted for the purpose of g athering facts and determining findings and conclusions r significant operational events> Implemented for significant operational events that pose an actual or potential hazard to public health and safety, property, or the environment IInspection teams consist of technical experts from the Regions augmented by specialists from NRC Headquarters IF 2K j'N KF] ~~ Ii ~9k~ ~ fd~AIT Process AIT Basis for Peach Bottom Multiple occasions in which several security officers at Peach Bottom were observed to be inattentive between March and August 2007

"\& a n 'A Mks 4 .Z /ur nuv'Event Background SNRC (New made aware of videos through WCBS-TV York City).reporter on September 10, 2007 NRC began enhanced oversight of security on September 10, 2007> NRC viewed videos on September 19, 2007, which showed multiple occurrences of security officers inattentive to duty in the "ready room" of the plant between March and August 2007> NRC commenced AIT on September 21, 2007

"~X~~ L ..Team Objectives

>Independently review the facts surrounding inattentive security officers>Assess security plan impact> Identify probable causes),Assess corrective and compensatory actions>Review extent of security officers' inattentiveness

>Assess effectiveness of management oversight>Assess Behavioral Observation Program)>Identify generic aspects of the event C 9M& C !i' K lu M AIT Results Extent of Security Officers' Inattentiveness

> All security officers were interviewed at least once by either NRC or ExelonBased on videos and interviews conducted,, all security officers identified as inattentive were working on Security Team No. 1 a t.-)c S. C0. sk-e~aw-ti 6L~ ayep t6 .c) ~, ka-1!

~LY2L~~3~)i.rAIr Results Security Plan Impact> Security at Peach Bottom was not significantly degraded as a result of this event> Security at the plant providedhigh assurance that the health and safety of the public was adequately protected at all times> Inattentive security officers did have an adverse impact on elements of the defense-in-depth security strategy&.0. H =

  • C: , -_

' N N Qzc:. '\\~' ~'.AIT Results Probable Causes> Adverse behavior developed on Security Team No.1> Ready room not accessible for adequate supervisory oversight

-SManagement failed to effectively communicate and reinforce station attentiveness expectations

-'3 -) Security supervisors failed to addreds"ncerns involving inattentive security officers Management failed to address poor environmental 0 " ," "- L .-Z -" .C ,,-y conditions in the ready room -.> Management failed to provide adequate attentivene,, stiM UlIi --.,-I -

L ~)ij~1 V AIT Results Compensatory and Corrective Actions> Prompt compensatory and corrective actions -implemented by Exelon were appropriate

.--LL, -,.. ,_.feAy3 t , A.Enhanced oversight by Exelon and Wackenhut

-' %C;'. # '.continues 4 -s- r ý-bc)eA , g, / = ,.> Corrective actions prior to September 2007 were -ineffective for addressing unacceptable security officer behavior

[ 7xLL M4 3Az -'I 1AjL4::VO C AIT, Results Management.and Supervisory Oversight Ineffective security supervisory oversight had a direct adverse impact on this event SSecurity supervisor discouraged the bringing forward of safety concerns I ..AIT Results Behavioral Observation Program; Multiple opportunities existed for security officers to report inattentive behavior> Security organization was not effective in enforcing the Behavioral Observation Program Vk .... MAIT, 2 1 AIT Results Generic Communications SExelon has shared lessons learned with the Exelon fleet and the industry-15-->. r=-;:> r-j e n- -,V--I NRC has issued a security advisory to the industry on inattentive security officer behavior

~ ~zj AIT ConcluSions Security officers were inattentive on multiple occasions> The level of security was not significantly degraded as a result Of inattentive security officers> Supervisors failed to correct inattentive behavior> Peach Bottom's prompt corrective actions were appropriate T -I ,a, .letterr toL- Exlno cobr4 07 NRC Actions SIssued a letter to Exelon on October 4, 2007, regarding inattentiveness concerns I Issue an AIT inspection report> Perform an AIT follow.up inspection

> Consider enforcement actions following completion of NRC review