05000483/FIN-2011002-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Containment Spray Test Procedure Potentially Creates an Unanalyzed Condition |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for failure to provide adequate procedural guidance for testing of containment spray pumps. The inspectors reviewed a licensee evaluation of the acceptability of their existing containment spray pump testing procedure and found that it failed to adequately address the underlying technical issues because it relied on operators recognizing the diversion flow path and focused on the operability of the containment spray system and not the ability to maintain the long term cooling function of the emergency core cooling system. Additionally, the inspectors identified that the procedure would have provided a diversion flow path of post-accident sump fluids back to the refueling water storage tank exceeding those currently analyzed in the Callaway licensing bases. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201011233 and the licensee implemented procedure changes to address the potential for post-loss of coolant accident containment sump fluids being injected back to the refueling water storage tank. This finding was determined to be greater than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened to a Phase 2 significance determination because it involved a potential loss of safety function. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed a bounding Phase 3 significance determination and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The very short exposure period coupled with the availability of equipment needed for other initiating events (other than small and medium loss of coolant accidents) helped to mitigate the significance. The dominant core damage sequences included small and medium break loss of coolant accidents, and the failure of emergency core cooling pumps in the recirculation mode. This finding was determined not to have a crosscutting aspect since the performance deficiency is not reflective of current performance (Section 1R15). |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2011002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Dumbacher P Elkmann G Miller J Groom |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2011002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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