05000483/FIN-2010006-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow the Corrective Action Program procedure |
| Description | The team identified a finding involving the licensees failure to follow the corrective action program procedure for assigning significance levels to Callaway action requests. This deficiency resulted in the licensees failure to adequately evaluate the cause and extent of condition for a number of issues, and in some examples resulted in recurrences of the issues. In one example the licensee identified a jacket water leak on Emergency Diesel Generator B in 2008. This significant condition adverse to quality was assigned a Significance Level 3 which only required a lower tier cause evaluation, when the procedure identified a significant condition adverse to quality as an example of a Significance Level 1. The team identified additional examples involving degraded safety-related equipment and security-related issues. As corrective action, the licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201010472. This issue was determined to be greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the issue could become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors determined that the issue involving Callaway Action Request 200812985, the failure of emergency diesel generator train B due to a leak in the jacket water system, was of very low safety significance because it was bounded by the significance of NCV 05000483/2009007-01, Failure to Ensure Suitable Replacement Parts Essential for Emergency Diesel Generator Train B. The team evaluated the issue involving Callaway Action Request 200810379, the failure of engineered safety feature power supply SA036E, using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This issue screened as very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. The team also evaluated several security-related examples of this finding that are described in Enclosure 2 of this letter. These security issues were also determined to be of very low security significance. Based on the sensitivity of security issues, Enclosure 2 is not publicly available because it contains security-related information. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the component of training because training was needed for the screening committee to better understand a significant condition adverse to quality and to better understand the significance of security issues. |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2010006 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Goldberg M Hay J Groom J Rollins Z Hollcraft |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2010006 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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