ML13234A341

Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - After Action Report/Improvement Plan

ML13234A341
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	07/30/2013
From:	May M P Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	McCree V M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC/RGN-II
References
Download: ML13234A341 (65)

Text

Department of Homeland SecurityRea-on IV3003 Charnblee-Tucker Road-~A7,, *. Atlanta.

Georia 30341~ FEMAJuly 30, 2013Victor M. McCree, Regional Administrator

-RIINuclear Regulatory Commission One Marquis Tower245 Peachtree Center Avenue, Suite 1200Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. McCree:

Enclosed is a copy of the final after action report for the April 30-May 1, 2013, Harris Nuclear PlantIngestion Pathway exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific to theHarris Nuclear Plant. This report addresses the evaluation of the plans and preparedness thatencompasses six Core Capabilities:

Operations Coordination; Public Information and Warning;Environmental Response/Health and Safety; On-Scene Security and Protection; Critical Transportation; and Mass Care. The participating agencies of the State of North Carolina and the affected risk andingestion counties of the Harris Nuclear Plant 50-mile ingestion pathway zone are listed in the reportprepared by the staff of Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV. Copies of this reportwill be forwarded to NRC Headquarters, FEMA Headquarters, and the State of North Carolina.

FEMA did not identify any Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA). A previousARCA (08-10-4.c.

l-A-03) identified during the 2010 Brunswick Nuclear Plant exercise concerning the operational status of the High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Gamma Spectrometer and how it failedto correctly identify the isotopes in the Counting Standard.

This ARCA was successfully cleared bythe Radiation Protection Section (RPS) Mobile Radiological Laboratory's demonstration during thisexercise.

The participation of both NRC and FEMA representatives at the State Emergency Operations Centeradded realism to the exercise and demonstrated a commitment to keep the residents of NorthCarolina informed during an emergency.

There was continued strong leadership in direction andcontrol even with a recent change-over in the State Director position.

The State of North Carolinaand the risk and ingestion pathway counties have dedicated emergency response staffs as well asnumerous volunteers that participated in this exercise who are serious and professional in executing their duties.Based on the results of the April 30-May 1, 2013, exercise and FEMA's review of North Carolina's Annual Letter of Certification for 2012, the offsite radiological emergency response plans andprocedures for the State of North Carolina and the affected local jurisdictions specific to the HarrisNuclear Plant can be implemented and are adequate to provide a reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. The Title 44 CFR, Part 350, approval of the State of North Carolina offsiteradiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to the Harris Nuclear Plant,granted on April 29, 1989, will remain in effect.Should you have questions, please contact Conrad Burnside at 770/220-5486.

rely ,,Major P. May,Regional Administrator Enclosure cc: Ms. Vanessa E. Quinn, Branch ChiefFederal Emergency Management Agency Headquarters Radiological Emergency Preparedness Branch -NP-TH-RP1800 56uth Bell StreetAr gton, Virginia 20598-3025

,RC Headquarters Document Control DeskU. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantAfter Action Report/Improvement PlanExercise Date -April 30, 2013Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program*FEMAFublished July i0, 2U13 Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantAfter Action Report/Improvement PlanExercise Date -April 30, 2013Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program* FEMAPublished July 30, 2013 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/hmprovement PlanShearon Harris Nuclear PlantThis page is intentionally blank.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantShearon Harris Nuclear PlantAfter Action Report/Improvement PlanPublished July 30, 2013ContentsExecutive Summary 3Section 1: Exercise Overview 51.1 Exercise Details 51.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership 51.3 Participating Organizations 6Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 102.1 Exercise Purpose and Design 102.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities 102.3 Scenario Summary 11Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 133.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results 133.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation 133.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries 153.3.1 North Carolina Jurisdictions 153.3.1.1 State of North Carolina 153.3.1.2 Wake County 263.3.1.3 Chatham County 303.3.1.4 Harnett County 343.3.1.5 Lee County (NC) 37Section 4: Conclusion 40Appendix A: Exercise Timeline 41Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders 42Appendix C: Acronyms and Abbreviations 43Appendix D: Extent of Play Agreement 461 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement PlanShearon Harris Nuclear PlantThis page is intentionally blank.2 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantEXECUTIVE SUMMARYOn April 30 and May 1, 2013, the Department of Homeland

Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region IV, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)Program staff evaluated an Ingestion Pathway exercise in the 10 mile emergency planning zone(EPZ) and the 50 mile ingestion pathway zone (IPZ) around the Harris Nuclear Plant (HINP).Also included in this report are the out of sequence (OOS) activities evaluated during the weekof April 22, 2013. These activities included:

traffic control points; protective actions for schools;reception and congregate care centers; emergency worker and equipment monitoring anddecontamination; and waterway warning.

FEMA's overall objective of the exercise was to assessthe level of state and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency.

FEMA Region IV has identified a set of Core Capabilities correlating to the REP Demonstration Criteria so that regional REP exercise evaluations using HSEPP exercise documents may occur.The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise

results, identify strengths to be maintained andbuilt upon, identify potential areas for further improvement, and support development ofcorrective actions.

This exercise was conducted in accordance with FEMA's policies andguidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans andprocedures.

The previous federally evaluated exercise was conducted on November 29, 2011.The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted February 28, 1987.Participating State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency responseplans and procedures and successfully implemented them. FEMA did not identify anyDeficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) during this exercise.

The strength ofthe working relationships between the various Federal, State and local response agencies in theirmission planning and execution abilities throughout all phases of the exercise was obvious, andconfirmed the success of the Harris Task Force organizational structure.

The Harris Task Force,co-chaired by representatives from both North Carolina Emergency Management and DukeEnergy, has proven to be an excellent example of public and private agency cooperation.

Officials and representatives from the State of North Carolina; the risk counties ofWake,Chatham, Harnett and Lee, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region II, U.S.Department of Energy's (DOE) Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center(FRMAC),

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) and Duke Energy as well as numerous volunteers participated in this exercise.

FEMA3 Unclassified IRadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantRegion IV also played in the exercise by providing response liaison personnel to the State ofNorth Carolina, which contributed to exercise realism.

The cooperation and teamwork of the 3participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made the exercise a success.During the Ingestion Pathway exercise the State of North Carolina along with riskcounties ofWake, Chatham, Harnett and Lee demonstrated good coordination and implementation onprotective action decisions which provided for the safety of the general public and emergency workers.

They also demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. The activities of the Federal players enabled the State ofNorth Carolina to gain a better understanding of the types of resources the various Federalagencies would bring and how they would integrate with the States' emergency responseorganizations in response to a radiological event.The SERT and risk counties also successfully demonstrated their relocation procedures and thereturn of evacuated individuals and families via the tabletop exercise.

During the IPZ portion of ithe exercise, the involved agencies along with the State of North Carloina, provided an excellent opportunity for IPZ counties to participate in the exercise which better prepared them for a 3radiological event. There was continued strong leadership in direction and control even with arecent change-over in the State Director position.

.An ARCA identified during the 2010 Brunswick Nuclear Plant REP exercise which concerned the operational status of the High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Gamma Spectrometer.

was :Isuccessfully cleared by the Radiation Protection Section (RPS) Mobile Radiological Laboratory's demonstration during this exercise.

34 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantSECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW1.1 Exercise DetailsExercise NameShearon Harris.Nuclear PlantType of ExerciseIngestion Exercise DateApril 30, 2013ProgramDepartment of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness ProgramScenario TypeRadiological Emergency 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership Kevin KeyesFederal Evaluator Federal Emergency Management AgencySection Chief3003 Chamblee Tucker RdAtlanta,

Georgia, 30341770-220-5378 Kevin. Keyes@fema.dhs.gov Robert NashFederal Evaluator Federal Emergency Management AgencySite Specialist 3003 Chamblee Tucker Rd5 Unclassified URadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantAtlanta,

Georgia, 30341770-220-3176 Robert.Nash3

@fema.dhs.gov IElaine WathenDeputy DirectorNorth Carolina Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management Deputy Director1636 Gold Star DriveRaleigh, North Carolina, 27607919-825-2287I elaine.wathen@ncdps.gov Carolyn FreitagExercise ManagerNorth Carolina Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management Exercise Program Manager4713 Mail Service CenterRaliegh, North Carolina, 27699919-825-2267 Carolyn.Freitag@ncdps.gov 1.3 Participating Organizations Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the ShearonHarris Nuclear Plant exercise:

State Jurisdictions Department of Public Safety (DPS), Division of Emergency Management Department of Public Safety (DPS), State Highway Patrol IDepartment of Health and Human Services, Division of Health Service Regulation, Radiation Protection Section (RPS)Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Wildlife Resources Commission, Law Enforcement 6

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantDepartment of Agriculture Department of Transportation Risk Jurisdictions Wake County Board of Commissioners Wake County Emergency ServicesWake County Sheriffs OfficeWake County Emergency Medical Services (EMS)WakeCounty Health Department Wake County Environmental ServiceWake County Social ServicesWake County SchoolsWake County Animal CenterApex Police Department Cary Fire Department Raleigh Fire Department Chatham County Board of Commissioners Chatham County Emergency ServicesChatham County Sheriff's OfficeChatham County Emergency Medical Services (EMS)Chatham County Health Department Chatham County Social ServicesChatham County SchoolsBonlee Fire Department Siler City Fire Department Silk Hope Fire Department Harnett County Board of Commissioners Harnett County Emergency ServicesHarnett County Sheriffs OfficeHarnett County Emergency Medical Services (EMS)Harnett County Health Department Harnett County Social ServicesHarnett County Animal ControlBuies Creek Fire Department and Emergency Medical Services (EMS)Deep River Volunteer Fire Department 7

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantLee County Board of Commissioners Lee County Emergency ServicesLee County Sheriffs OfficeLee County Emergency Medical Services (EMS)Lee County Health Department Lee County Social ServicesSupport Jurisdictions IAlamance CountyCaswell CountyCumberland CountyDurham County 3Franklin CountyGranville CountyGuilford CountyHoke CountyJohnston CountyMontgomery CountyMoore County 3Nash CountyOrange CountyPerson CountyRandolph CountyRobeson County 3Sampson CountyVance County 3Wayne CountyWilson CountyPrivate Organizations Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES)American Red Cross (ARC) 3Salvation ArmyFederal Jurisdictions 3Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)Department of Energy (DOE), Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)83 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantDepartment of Agriculture (USDA)Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atomspheric Administration (NOAA), National Weather Service (NWS)U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)9 Unclassified URadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Timprovement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantSECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY2.1 Exercise Purpose and DesignThe Department of Homeland Security.(DHS)

Federal.

Emergency Management Agency(FEMA) administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program pursuant to theregulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) parts 350, 351 and 352. 44 CFR350 codifies 16 planning standards that form.the basis for radiological emergency responseplanning for licensee, State, tribal and local governments impacted by the .emergency planningzones (EPZs) established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 setsforth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of State, tribal and local government Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures byDHS/FEMA.

One of the.REP Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsiteresponse capabilities.

During these exercises affected State, tribal and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health andsafety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.The results of this exercise together.with review.of the RERPs, procedures and verification ofthe periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-I through the Annual Letter ofCertification and staff assistance visit enables FEMA to provide a statement with thetransmission of this final After Action Report (AAR) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that the affected State, Tribal and local plans and. preparedness are (1) adequate to protectthe health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of aradiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

32.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities Core Capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exerciseobjectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using 3the Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program (HSEEP) methodology, the exerciseobjectives meet the REP Program requirements and encompass the REP Program's Emergency Preparedness Evaluation Areas. These elements and sub-elements were derived and negotiated with the State of North Carolina, Wake, Chatham, Harnett and Lee Counties.

The corecapabilities include operational coordination, public information and warning, environmental response/health and safety, on-scene security and protection, critical transportation and mass10 I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Plantcare. These core capabilities when successfully demonstrated meet the exercise objectives.

Theobjectives for this exercise were as follows:-Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide emergency operations center (EOC)management including direction and control through the State and counties EOC Multi-Agency Coordination Center System (MACCS).-Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State andcounty emergency workers and the general public through exercise play and discussions of plansand procedures.

-Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically'implement protective actions for State andcounty emergency workers and the general public through exercise demonstration.

-Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System usingthe North Carolina Alert and Notification System through exercise play.-Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the JointInformation Center (JIC) for joint (public and private sector) emergency information communications.

-Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to conduct independent dose assessment, management offield teams, and mobile or fixed laboratory analysis in response to a radiological release;-Objective 7: Demonstrate the ability to provide and implement protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers(EW)and residents concerning

Recovery, Reentry and Relocation of radiological affected areas.2.3 Scenario SummaryUnit 1 at 0915 with a 150 gallon per minute leak from the reactor coolant system intocontainment.

At 0930 the reactor is manually tripped with two control rods stuck out of the core.At approximately this time, an Alert is declared due to the potential loss of the reactor coolantsystem barrier.

At 1132, containment pressure exceeds 10 pounds per square inch gauge (PSIG)with a failure of the containment spray system.11 Unclassified URadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantAt 1147, a Site Area Emergency (SAE) emergency classification level (ECL) is declared due toloss of reactor coolant system and potential loss of containment barrier.ý At 1245, the reactorcoolant system leak suddenly increases, followed by pipe ruptures, and a sudden depressurization of the reactor coolant system. Fuel failure begins and containment high range radiation monitorsindicate 150 R/hour at 1315. At 1330, a General Emergency (GE) ECL is declared due to loss ofthe fuel clad barrier, loss of the reactor coolant system and potential loss of contaihment barrier.GE Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) include evacuation of Subzones A, D, and K (2miles around and 5 miles downwind) and sheltering of all other Subzones (B, C, E, F, G, H, I, J,M, L, and N). At 1400, containment pressure-rises to 25 PSIG and a hydrogen explosion'causes the Equipment Hatch to fail, resulting in a release to the environment from a hole in containment.

Containment high range radiation monitors indicate 400 R/hour. Dose assessment results " "indicate that a PAR change is required.

At 1415, the PARs are revised to evacuate Subzones A,B, C, D, H, I, K, (5 miles around and 10 miles downwind) and shelter all others (E, F, G, J, M,and N). This PAR includes a recommendation for potassium iodide (KI). The release continues for two hours until containment volume is cycled out.IIIIII12I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantSECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and ResultsThis section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that.participated in the April 30 -May 1, 2013 Ingestion Phase exercise and Out ofSequence (QOS) activities.

Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status ofthose criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:" Met (No Deficiency orARCA(s) assessed and no unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise)

" ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from previous exercises S.Deficiency assessed" Plan Issues" Not Demonstrated 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation, See section 3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries for the associated Capability Summaries for eachjurisdiction.

13 IUnclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement PlanShearon Harris Nuclear PlantTable 3.1 -Summary of Exercise Evaluation CDATE: 2013-04-30

=SITE: Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, NC = U uM: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated U .1Emergency Operations Management Alert and Mobilization lal M M M M MFacilities IbIl MDirection and Control Icl M M M M MCommunications Equipment Idl M M M M MEquipment and Supplies to Support Operations lel M M M M MProtective Action Decision MakingEmergency Worker Exposure Control 2al M M M M MDose Assessment

& PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event 2b1 MDose Assessment

& PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event 2b2 M M M M MPADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs 2cl M M M MRadiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposuie Pathway 2d1 M M M M MRadiological Assessment

& Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, 2el M M MM MReentry, and ReturnProtective Action Implementation Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 3al M M M *M MImplementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public 3b1 M M M M MImplementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs 3cl M M M MImplementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs 3c2 M M M MImplementation of Traffic and Access Control,.

3d] M M M MImplementation of Traffic and Access Control 3d2 M M M MImplementation oflIngestion Pathway Decisions 3el M M M M MImplementation oflIngestion Pathway Decisions 3e2 M M M M MImplementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation.

Reentry, and Return Decisions 3f1 M M M M MField Measurement and AnalysisRESERVED 4alPlume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 4a2. MPlume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 4a3 MPost Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling 4b1 MLaboratory Operations 4cI MEmergency Notification and Public InfoActivation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5al M M M M MRESERVED 5a2Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5a3 M M M MActivation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5a4Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media 5b1 M M M M MSupport Operations/Facilities Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees 6al M M MMonitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles 6bl M MTemporary Care of Evacuees 6cl M M MTransportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals 6dIIIIII14 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Reportl/mprovement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries 3.3.1 North Carolina Jurisdictions 3.3.1.A State of North CarolinaOperational Coordination:

State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC):The North Carolina State Emergency Response Team (SERT) effectively demonstrated thestate's emergency response actions during a simulated radiological incident involving the HarrisNuclear Planlt (HNP). The SERT Team Leader provided commendable leadership in hisdirection and control of the multiple-agency staff personnel manning.

the SEOC, the CentralBranch Office (CBO) Regional Response Center (RRC), and the various field locations of theactivated SERT. The SERT members were knowledgeable of their responsibilities andsuccessfully coordinated necessary actions with the risk counties of Wake, Chatham, Harnett,and Lee, as well as the participating Federal agencies which included the NRC, FEMA and DOE.Periodic status briefings and conference calls fully involved the various agencies and:professionally addressed the concerns and recommendations of the county emergency management directors while achieving concurrence on key decisions.

All personnel wereknowledgeable of their responsibilities and successfully performed their assigned actions.Central Branch Office (CBO):The CBO demonstrated the capability to effectively activate and manage the RRC through theactivation and deployment of selected staff to liaise with Duke Energy, support the jointinformation effort, and coordinate jurisdictional response requirements.

The Branch Managerconsistently held briefings with key staff personnel and considered their input in his resourcemanagement decisions.

The Branch Manager successfully provided direction and control to theassembled staff and also performed in a response assurance role for SERT actions.Emergency Operation Facility (EOF):State personnel from North Carolina Emergency Management and North Carolina Department of15 Unclassified nRadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantHealth and Human Services (DHHS) Division of Health Service Regulation Radiation Protection Section (RPS) assigned to the EOF worked closely with Duke Energy personnel.

They providedthe SERT and county decision makers with timely information on plant conditions, ensured theutility was aware of state and county actions, and helped to coordinate state and utility fieldsurvey team movements.

Operational Coordination

-Ingestion Pathway (Day 2) iThe State of North Carolina successfully demonstrated this capability during the 2013 HNP REPIngestion Pathway Zone (IPZ) Exercise.

The assembled SERT effectively and decisively

.responded to an extended emergency situation at the HNP. Key leaders and supporting staffwere present and actively engaged during the second day of activities.

Key leadership included.

the SERT Leader, the Operations Chief, the Plans Chief, REP Technical

Advisor, CBO Manager,RPS Chief, and Duke Energy Liaison.

The exercise was attended by emergency management personnel from both the 10-mile EPZ counties and all the 50-mile IPZ counties.

The SERT operated in accordance with the State RERP, and included liaison personnel from thefollowing agencies:

RPS, Department of Transportation (DOT), North Carolina WildlifeResources Commission (NCWRC),

North Carolina State Highway Patrol (NCSHP),

PublicWater, State Energy Office American Red Cross, Salvation Army, NRC, DOE, EPA and FEMA.RPS staff at the EOC provided the necessary verification and field monitoring simulations.

Stateand various county officials cooperated and readily accomplished the mutual goals of performing accurate radiological assessments to allow reentry and return of the citizens to their homes andbusinesses, or if not possible, then relocation from affected areas.The SERT used effective procedures to respond to the simulated incident and emergency ipersonnel maintained continuous contact and coordination with appropriate

Federal, State andlocal agencies throughout the exercise.

The GE ECL declared by the Duke Energy EOFremained in effect throughout the day, and the State of North Carolina retained direction andcontrol of the emergency from the Day 1 activities.

The SERT Leader clearly remained incontrol, but was extremely conscientious in gaining the concurrence of the risk and ingestion pathway counties when making key decisions.

The SERT Leader's focus on activities was primarily directed at determining which areas had i16 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Plantnot been contaminated during the release, but had been evacuated during the first day. Afterdetermining which zones were safe to allow return (based on the extensive radiological dataavailable from the variety of Federal, State, and. Duke Energy sources),

the SERT Leaderdirected the SERT.staff to determine readily-identifiable natural boundaries (such as roads and.waterways) be used to determine the areas which would remain closed. He directed that thisinformation be provided in the first scheduled press conference, and emphasized complete andtotal accuracy in providing information to the media and the general public.Theday's actions were primarily concerned with determining

-the. radiological consequences of.the accident, and determining the appropriate.protective action decisions (PADs). RPS personnel successfully compared analytical results with .EPA Protective Action Guidance (PAG) criteria.

Impact on the area road network was heavily studied, and alternative routes determined tominimize the adverse impact on traffic flow:Ensuring an appropriate level of safe radiation exposure by the general public was a key elementin the SERT Leaders guidance and decision-making.

A high priority was placed on meetingswith SERT members, agencies and county officials to determine the protective action guidance.

"SERT personnel demonstrated excellent knowledge of radiation exposure conditions, appropriate maximum exposure limits and KI issue to emergency workers (EWs) and the general public.Follow-on activities involved further refinement of determining the precise boundaries of thecontaminated areas in the county, and stabilizing those sites to prevent cross-contamination.

Aheavy emphasis continued on providing information to farmers and food processors.

The SERTleadership waskeenly aware of the economic impact their decision-making had, both on thelocal citizens as well as the rest of the state and the nation.The SERT then developed an overall strategy for authorized reentry of individuals into therestricted zone, to include maximum exposure limits; the maintenance of essential services (suchas fire and police protection);

the care for farm animals; and the retrieval of important possessions.

The State of North Carolina successfully demonstrated the availability and appropriate use ofprotective actions regarding food, milk, water supply and agricultural production within the IPZ.In the event of a release, the agricultural community to include home gardeners, livestock owners, farmers, food processors and water supply agencies within the 50-mile IPZ of the HNPwill be notified of areas that may be contaminated and advised of protective actions necessary to17 Unclassified URadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP.)After Action Report/Improvement Plan

• Shearon Harris Nuclear Plantreduce the risk of contamination to farms andlivestock, agricultural

products, and watersupplies..'

' ' .nPrecautionary measures coordinated between the State and counties included limitingconsumption of food and water, stored feed and water for animals and restricting access tocontaminated areas. Protective actions implemented bythe State and coordinated with thecounties included relocation of the affected.

population, withholding contaminated milk and Iwashing produce to remove surface contamination.

Recommendations were discussed to ingestKI on second and third day down wind and beyond the EPZ for affected, populations based uponradiological surveys.Appropriate measures and strategies for implementing protective actions for.contaminated water,food, milk and agricultural production were demonstrated~as well. Samples from -area farms -*were takento identify the degree of contamination to food, livestockfeed, and watersupplies.

lBased on readings, controls on food were implemented and continued past .seven days.. Daily,weekly and monthly sampling was instituteduntil the area could be cleared.

Return wouldinvolve deposition clearance on roadways and infrastructure before a phased move-in processcould begin. Prior to commencement of recovery and reentry activities, the State Director ofEmergency Management will confer with local government officials to determine when therecovery and reentry operations should begin. Agricultural brochures and one-page flyers wereavailable in digital format through the. County Cooperative Extension Services Offices.Decisions regarding controlled

reentry, relocation and return were successfully implemented.

Asampling plan was created with support from Federal assets. The State Agricultural Commission implemented an embargo for the affected area including a 20-mile boundary around the plumefootprint.

To accomplish this, the State-needed to create re-entry points within affected countiesso the public and farmers could care for their property.

County extension offices and publicinformation support were necessary to ensure accuracy of information and specifics concerning Iindividual counties.

IPublic Information and Warning:The lead Public Information Officer (PIO) and assistant used established protocols to formulate, Hprocess and gain approval of one press release prior to activation of the Joint Information Center(JIC). They further coordinated activities for information regarding PADs and coordination 18 Unclassified Radiological EmergencyPreparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Plantbetween the state and risk counties along with the dissemination of information to the media andpublic, successfully demonstrated their ability to disseminate public information in a timelymanner.The SEOC PIO was apprised of all, rumors and their disposition through updates from the JIC,kept the staff abreast of changing conditions, provided situational awareness and aided in greaterdecisionmaking.

Although public information wasdemonstrated at the JIC, the SEOC has aseparate work area that is adequately sized and equipped to accommodate media operations toinclude external media broadcasts outlets.The activation of the Alert and Notification System (ANS) was conducted by the State WarningPoint (SWP) from the SEOC. Upon notification of the.Alert ECL at HNP, the SWP_ simulated alert and notification of the automated calling system for the SEOC staff. In accordance withplans, the SWP maintained situational awareness and direct, communication with Duke Energythroughout the exercise...

...Pre-scripted Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages were coordinated with the sounding ofsirens and dissemination of those messages over EMNet and the National Weather Service(NWS) was completed in a timely fashion.The demonstration of waterway warning and clearance of Lake Jordan,.Lake Harris,.

the. Deepand Haw Rivers was demonstrated by representatives of the NCSHP, NCWRC, North CarolinaParks and Recreation, the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Wake County. Sheriffs Office..All were well versed in their mission assignments and personal radiological safeguards.

TheCaptain of the NCWRC quickly established effective incident

command, assuming the role ofthe Incident Commander (IC), issued equipment and launched the assigned boats per plans. .NCSHP aviation assets also participated, flying a pre-designated pattern over the waterways.

Allthe law enforcement officers were versed in their mission requirements and fully demonstrated the ability to perform the roles assigned to them; thusly, this coordinated deployment of teamssuccessfully demonstrated waterway clearance.

Joint Information Center:Once operational, the JIC is designed as the focal point for the distribution of news releases andpresentation of press briefings by the utility and jurisdictions.

The JIC was activated at the Alert19 Unclassified URadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvemnent Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantECL, and in accordance with the Extent of Play Agreement (EOPA), the state participants responded upon notification while county participants were pre-positioned...

All press releases conformed to protective action decisions and precautionary measures instituted by the jurisdictions.

A total of 66 press releases (14 in Spanish) were distributed in the JICduring the exercise.

Spanish translation is not required per FEMA guidelines;however,'the jurisdictions instituted a proactive practice of translation.

Four media briefings were also Iconducted during the plume portion of the exercise.

Prior to each briefing the'spokespersons gathered to discuss and coordinate their message for. the briefing:

The spokespersons answeredall questions asked of them and were able to discuss what actions had been taken by theirorganizations.

IThe JIC had a robust communications capability and sufficient equipment and supplies to. *support emergency operations.

Communications included dedicated commercial telephones supplemented by cell phones, computers,.satellite phone and 800 MHz radio. Additionally, theJIC had adequate external communication capabilities to support the media. Primary and backupcommunications systems were fully functional at the commencement of the exercise and therewere no failures during the exercise..

.IMedia Monitoring was performed at two locations; in the JIC workroom and from the DukeEnergy Corporate Headquarters Building.

Both the State and the Duke Energy Public Inquiryfunction were coordinated in the JIC with the State's public hotline coordinators successfully responded to rumors concerning terrorism, earthquakes, impact of wildlife, fatalities at the plant,and need for evacuation.

Based on the above, representatives from the State of North Carolina and the risk counties Hlocated at the HNP JIC successfully demonstrated the Public Information and Warning corecapability and performed their roles in accordance with their published plans and procedures.

Public Information and Warning -Ingestion Pathway (Day 2)The JIC for the IPZ portion of the 2013 HNP exercise was located within the SEOC of the NorthCarolina Emergency Management Division office building.

JIC participants included the PIOs from the State of North Carolina, the risk counties of Wake,20 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Han-is Nuclear PlantChatham, Harnett and Lee along with the ingestion counties of Cumberland, Johnson and Moore.The PIOs maintained situational awareness of the IPZ tabletop exercise (TTX) via an internalclosed circuit TV. Based upon the IPZ TTX information that was being discussed the PIOsgenerated 15 news releases in support of their respected agencies.

The process for preparing, coordinating and distributing news releases was identical to the process demonstrated during theplume phase exercise..

Pre-printed agriculture information and instructions were available in both print and electronic formats and were readily available for reproduction..

These materials were created and updatedby the NC Department of Agriculture.

and distributed by the extension agents of each county.The materials were originally created over 17 years ago and updated within the last 10, however,the representative participating in the TTX stated the materials were current and valid forimplementation.

.. ..The HNP IPZ Counties demonstrated the availability and proper use of acceptable information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the HNP IPZ plaimingzone for implementation of protective actions..There were. two time jumps; a three day time jumpand a seven day time jump; each concentrating on reentry and return of personnel..

Relocation was briefly discussed but the majority of the IPZ Counties implementation discussions focusedon reentry and return.Environmental Response

/ Health and Safety:This core capability was demonstrated successfully by RPS. In accordance with the approvedEOPA personnel were prepositioned and all positions were quickly filled and operational shortlyafter the Alert ECL notification from HNP. The Dose Assessment staff including the Field TeamCoordinator (FTC), two field teams and the Mobile Radiological Lab (MRL) participated in theexercise.

During the course of the exercise the dose assessment staff demonstrated protective action decision recommendations (PAR) by monitoring both live plant data obtained over theEmergency Response Data System (ERDS) and copies of the plant Dose Assessment printouts versus their own dose projections.

When the GE was declared by Duke Energy based upondegrading plant conditions the RPS Director recommended to the SERT Leader Protective Actions to evacuate subzones A, D and K and shelter the remaining 10 mile EPZ. After furthermonitoring of the plant conditions and based upon the radiation levels inside the containment structure the RPS Director conferred with the SERT Leader and the State Health Director and21 Unclassified mRadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Plantdetermined a PAD for EWs to ingest KI.During the exercise, the RPS Dose Assessment Leader noted that the rising containment pressuresuddenly dropped to zero, an indication of a catastrophic failure of the containment building.

Dose projections were run and compared with the Duke Energy projections.,

and both the DukeEnergy and State projections demonstrated a good agreement much less than a factor of 10. NewPADs were agreed upon and issued by the State and risk counties involved.

Due.to the extreme mconditions at the plant, numerous additional scenarios were discussed basedupon wind shifts andlonger duration radiological releases from the facility to ensure all potential areas wereaccounted for in the protective actions for the general public.The FTC effectively demonstrated leadership and use of a decision making process to ensure thatfield monitoring teams were-correctly positioned downwind and moved inand out of the area as.safely as possible.

based on radiological conditions.

The FTC utilized both 800 MHz radio and mcell phones to contact the field teams, mobile lab and sample courier.

He conducted a pre-deployment briefing using a~briefing checklist and kept all personnel updated on the latest plantand weather conditions throughout the exercise.

The field teams were managed to. obtainsufficient information that helped characterize the release while protecting the field team mmembers.The field teams had sufficient equipment to conduct adequate andeffective radiological msampling to identify the radiological plume boundaries and strength.

They were well trained andutilized their procedures to effectively carry out the requests from the FTC andreported requested field data and also personnel exposure throughout the exercise.

They successfully demonstrated conducting radiation surveys and air samples and correctly recording-and reporting the data back to the FTC.The MRL and the Sample Control areas were set up to receive field samples for preparation and Ianalysis.

Upon completion of sample preparation the samples were transferred, along with the.chain of custody forms, to the MRL. Appropriate contamination controls were used throughout the sample receipt and preparation process to reduce the potential spread of contamination.

Mostof the preparatory time was for the background, standards and quality control measurements required for operation of the gamma spectroscopy system. The MRL area was adequately equipped and capable of supporting their emergency response function of sample receipt,Ipreparation, and radiological analysis of field samples.22 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantPrior to sample analysis in the MRL, the Technical Analyst in the gamma spectroscopy van wasinterviewed to determine the equipment calibration methodology and the procedure forconducting daily background and quality control checks. The technician performed a dailybackground count and quality control check. for.each of the sample geometries (0.5 literMarinelli, 1.0 Marinelli, particulate filter, and face loading iodine sample cartridge).

Uponcompletion of quality control checks, he performed a long background count to be used tosubtract from the total count in order to determine the sample count. Based on available documentation, all daily checks were determined to be within the recommended parameters forsystem operation, and calibration sources were National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) traceable.

The Technical Analyst logged the air, vegetation, and soil samples on a"Logbook for the Mobile Radiological Lab" form.. One vegetation sample was counted for 15minutes and analyzed for demonstration purposes.

The- Technical Analyst stated that the externalexposure rate on the sample container could be entered into .the gamma spec system, and that thisvalue would be .used.to determine the Minimum Detectable Activity.

(MDA) and establish thesample counting time. This method meets the detection criteria of Environmental Protection Agency's derived intervention limits and effectively reduces counting times, .enabling the lab tocount more samples per hour. This method would also provide sample results in a timelymanner to dose assessment personnel to confirm or formulate protective actions.Based upon-the above, a previous ARCA from the 2010 Brunswick Nuclear Station REPexercise,.08-10-4.c.

l-A-03 was cleared..

This ARCA concerned the High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Gamma Spectrometer in the RPS MRL not being operational.

During that exercise thedevice could not correctly identify the isotopes in the Counting Standard used to calibrate thesystem and, therefore, could not be used to count sample media during the exercise.

Environmental Response

/ Health and Safety -Ingestion Pathway (Day 2)Although the SERT maintained direction and control of the incident

response, the SERT Leaderemphasized throughout the exercise that decisions on relocation,

reentry, and return would bemade in a collaborative process with the affected counties.

For instance, when return of the.public to previously evacuated areas was discussed, the SERT Leader looked to the counties todelineate the areas of return using appropriate landmarks and to determine if the properinfrastructure and services were in place to allow the return. Similarly, although it was the StateDepartment of Agriculture and Consumer Services which had the authority to place embargoes 23 Unclassified 1Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Planton agricultural

products, they coordinated with SERT and affected counties in determining theembargo areas.There is current information on permanent agribusiness facilities to include:

dairies, meat andpoultry producers, fisheries, fruit and vegetable

growers, grain producers, food processing plants,surface water supplies, and water supply intakes.

However, some IPZ counties had not receivedthe NC Agriculture pamphlet but were promised to receive it by the end of the day by the IAgriculture representative.

Coordination.between several counties that share water usagediscussed implementation for shutting water intakes as a precautionary.

measure to preventcontamination.

The discussion was informative and perceived as an excellent implementation method. .FRMAC displayed four maps: Predicted Relocation Areas; Aerial Measuring System (Fixed,Wing); Worker Protection Areas (exposure rate PAG); and Areas of Concern for Mature Produce(FDA Guidelines for CS,-134/.137 and 1-131). They were useful in determining embargoboundaries, precautionary measures and protective actions; It was discussed among stateandcounty participants that the maps could be used to establish initial transportation monitoring routes and checkpoints into and out of the embargoed areas. The map products were an excellent visual depiction of deposition and initiated a fair amount of discussion among participants.

Once Reentry Access Points are established, all persons reentering the evacuated or restricted areas are considered EW's and will be treated as EW's for exposure control and personalprotection concerns.

Radiation levels in evacuated areas must be below radiation protection criteria for relocation before the evacuees can return to their homes. Emergency Management Offices will follow the procedures to ensure utilities, infrastructure,

schools, and emergency services are operational in areas set for return.This core capability was demonstrated successfully by Dose Assessment personnel working in Ithe RPS. Key leaders and supporting staff were present and actively engaged during the secondday of activities.

RPS staff at the EOC provided the necessary verification and field monitoring simulations to analyze the sample data results and verify the areas that exceeded the Food andDrug Adminstration (FDA) food and livestock PAGs. State and various county officials cooperated and readily accomplished the mutual goals of performing accurate radiological assessments to allow reentry and return of the citizens to their homes and businesses, or if notpossible, then relocation and or reentry to restricted areas to feed livestock and or retrieve24 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Plantbelongings.

FRMAC presented two. maps for Predicted Areas of Concern for Mature Produceand Predicted Areas of Concern for Milk Products.

These maps showed the areas exceeding..

FDA Guidelines for 1-131 and Cs-134/137, and FRMAC stated that these were predicted areas ofconcern.

These maps were overlaid with known foodproducers,.then field teams were contacted and dispatched to take soil and vegetation samples in those areas.: The samples were delivered tothe MRL, processed for counting and sample results returned to Dose Assessment staff. TheDose Assessment staff used an RPS computer equipped with a calculation spreadsheet from datagenerated by the Mobile .Lab from soil and vegetation samples.

They determined first-year, second-year, and fifty-year doses based upon soil sample data. They then utilized specialspreadsheets to determine ifthe contamination levels exceeded any FDA Derived Intervention, Levels (DIL). Sample analysis identified areas that exceeded the EPA 50 year relocation PAG.and the dairy and vegetation samples were utilized to establish embargo areas in the Ingestion Pathway.

.The field teams were assigned to take milk, soil, water and vegetation

samples, and were madeup of one RPS technician and 'two agriculture personnel.

The teams completed an inventory, operational equipment

.checks, obtained appropriate dosimetry and completed doserecord forms.When dispatched the teams located their assigned locations, and following their procedures correctly obtained milk, water, soil and vegetation samples.

in accordance with their procedures.

Chain of custody forms were completed for each sample and the samples were transferred to acourier.

The chain of custody forms were signed upon the transfer and the courier delivered thesamples to the MRL technical.

analyst..

Appropriate contamination controls were usedthroughout the .sample receipt and preparation process to reduce the potential spread ofcontamination.

The MRL and Sample Control area were adequately equipped and capable of supporting the IPZresponse function of sample receipt, preparation, and radiological analysis of field samples.

TheMRL was also capable of providing communication support and field team coordination operations, as needed. The Technical Analyst performed a daily background count and qualitycontrol check for each of the sample geometries.

Upon completion of quality control checks heperformed a long background count to be used to subtract from the total count in order todetermine the sample count. Samples were counted for 15 minutes and analyzed, the externalexposure rate on the sample container could be entered into the gamma spec system, and thisvalue would be used to determine the (MDA) and establish the sample counting time. TheSample Control and MRL personnel conducted their sample receipt, preparation, and analysis25 Unclassified URadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan .Shearon Harris Nuclear Plantfunctions in a competent, professional manner in accordance with their procedures.

On-Scene Security and Protection

-Traffic Control Points (TCPs):NCSHP troopers successfully demonstrated the capability to provide a coordinated traffic imanagement plan and related security protection operations for people and communities locatediwithin the affected areas of HNP.TCP interviews were conducted out of sequence with representatives from the NCSHP. Eachtrooper was issued a dosimetry kit which included both a Self Reading Dosimeter (SRD) andPermanent Record Dosimeter (PRD). The kits also included KI, (simulated) and included writteninstructions for its use, limitations, and possible side effects.

Enabling traffic flow is a typicaldaily duty for the patrolmen; as such, they are more than capable to facilitate traffic movementout of the affected area or to authorize reentry as necessary for citizens and authorized Iemergency workers.

Each trooper interviewed was knowledgeable and capable of completing the duties associated with traffic routing and impediment removal of the TCPs within Chatham,Harnett and Lee Counties, as well as dosimetry, KI, turn back values, and exposure recorddocumentation.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:a. M ET: l.a. l, 1.c. 1, I.d. 1, L.e. 1, 2.a. l, 2.b. 1, 2.b.2, 2.d. l, 2.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.d. l, 3.d.2,3.e.1, 3.e.2, 3.f.l, 4.a.2, 4.a.3, 4.b.1, 4.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b;1.b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Nonec. DEFICIENCY:

Noned. PLAN ISSUES: Nonee. NOT DEMONSTRATED:

Nonef. PRIOR ISSUES -RESOLVED:

Noneg. PRIOR ISSUES -UNRESOLVED:

None i3.3.1.2 Wake CountyOperational Coordination:

IThe Wake County Emergency Operation Director and EOC staff successfully demonstrated theirability to maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process whileappropriately integrating all critical stakeholders as well as their ability to protect the safety of its26 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Plantcitizens in the event of an incident at HNP. The communications function was seamless andthere were no incidents which prevented the primary system from functioning properly.

Therewere redundant systems which would have allowed continued operations had there been a failurein communications.

The EOC had sufficient maps, monitors, equipment, computers, phones,faxes, printers and supplies to support their operations.

The Director successfully demonstrated excellent direction, control and coordination of responseactivities at the EOC. He effectively demonstrated the decision-making process which includedrelevant factors and appropriate coordination to ensure that an exposure control system,,including the use of KI, was in place for EWs and the. general public within the 10-mile EPZ.The Director used expert knowledge and there was considerable coordination and discussion between Wake County, the state and the three additional risk counties to make appropriate PADsfor the general public, as well as timely PADs for persons:

with disabilities and special.

needs.Wake County was the leadcoordinator for information.

regarding PADs, siren activations andEAS messagesl Staff personnel were khowledgeablej professional and performed their dutiesproactively and in accordance with established plans and procedures.

Public Information and Warning:The Wake County Director, EOC staff and the PIOs successfully demonstrated the capability to:develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and'emergency information to the media andthe public prior to an impending emergency and activate warning systems to notify those mostat-risk in the event of an emergency.

The PIO consistently provided documentation to the EOCManager for review and approval prior to release to the JIC.The Director coordinated information regarding protective action decisions, siren activations andEAS messages.

After successful siren activation of the county alert and notification system, theEOC staff demonstrated actions required for siren failure.

Law enforcement officers clearlyunderstood the actions to take upon notification of a siren failure in the county. Maps werebased on current Geographic Information System (GIS) points which identified the sirencoverage area, routes the officers would need to cover, and how many units would be necessary to complete the route within 45 minutes.

Wake County can successfully cover all routes intheevent of siren failure.Additionally, the Apex Fire Department demonstrated Backup Alert and Notification.

They had27 Unclassified HRadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Ithe ability and knowledge to conduct and coordinate and provide to the public information andwarning to the people in a timely manner. During the exercise the sirens were sounded at SAEECL and there was a failure of siren W33. Through interview they explained the process of howthey would inform the public, the routes they would take, and the message .that would be playedover the public address (PA) system. Once the notification is completed they would provide.feedback to the Area Command Post and Staging Area Command.

This activity would becompleted in a timely manner and within the targeted 45 minute time limit. The Apex FireDepartment has enough vehicles, public address equipment, and personnel to adequately covereach individualroute within the allotted 45 minutes.

They were familiar with the IR R.administrative limit, and the 5R turnback limit. They were aware of the significance of the limits.They also understood the use of KI. The EW knew how to use dosimeters, when to take readings, and reporting procedures.

Environmental Response/Health and Safety:.

Emergency Worker and Vehicle Decontamination I(EWD)Wake County successfully demonstrated the ability and resources to address and supportresponder operations thru emergency worker/vehicle monitoring and decontamination by theCity of RaleighFire Department's (RFD) out of sequence demonstration.

Alert and notification was simulated, however mobilization and EWD activities were observed.

The EWD site wassetup and appropriately marked to conduct EWD operations.

Team members were pre- Ipositioned and assembled on site where they received a radiation mission brief by the WakeCounty EMA staff and a safety brief from the Assistant Fire Chief. Two team members under*guidance of the Safety Officer issued, recorded and documented survey instruments andprotective equipment issued to personnel.

All EWs received directions on exposure andcontamination

control, and the use of KI. All team members were familiar with the purpose,scope, setup, equipment and conduct of the EWD site and professionally performed their duties.The site was well prepared, laid out and marked in a fashion that was clear, functional and Ieffective in processing personnel and equipment while protecting the health and safety ofemergency workers and team members.

Team members monitored and decontaminated twovehicles and two emergency workers with proper procedures, techniques and timeliness.

I283 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantOn- Scene Security.and Protection

-Traffic Control Points (TCPs):The Apex Police Department successfully demonstrated the capability to provide a coordinated-traffic management plan and related security protectionoperations for people and.communities.

located within the affected areas of Wake County. The ability to effectively establish andmaintain traffic control points was demonstrated during the HNP exercise.

The officers wereaccordingly well versed in the law enforcement aspects related to TCP establishment andmanagement to include removal of impediments.

The officers were well trained and exhibited sufficient knowledge of dosimetry, personal protective

measures, and the pertinent aspectsrelated to the ingestion of potassium iodide; They similarly were equipped with information that.could assist them in responding to queries from evacuees regarding shelters and reception centers.Critical Transportation

-Protective Actions for. Schools:The Wake County Public School System demonstrated its ability to execute protective measuresfor schools through interviews with the staffs of Apex High. School, Apex Elementary, Apex.Middle School;,

Lufkin Road Middle School, and Baucom and Olive Chapel Elementary Schools.Additionally, there were representatives from WCPSS Transportation

Division, WCPSS. RiskManagement, Wake County Emergency Management Agency, NorthCarolina Division ofEmergency Management, and the utility.

All participants were extremely familiar with plans andprocedures and provided adetailed description of how they would execute their responsibilities..

They understood the similarities between HNP .emergency response measures and otheremergency challenges they may face.Mass Care -Reception and Congregate Care Center (RCCC):The capability to provide life-sustaining services to an affected population was successfully demonstrated with the out of sequence demonstration for the Wake County RCCC. Alert andnotification was simulated, while reception center operations were observed.

Personnel wereprepositioned at Sanderson High School, which served to facilitate and adequately accommodated RCCC operations.

The monitoring and decontamination team was staffed withpersonnel from Wake County EMA, Public Health, City of Raleigh Police and Fire Departments, Wake County EMS and was augmented with staff assistance from the Wake County AnimalCenter and State Department of Agriculture.

29 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantThe Operations Section Chief and Safety Officer provided briefings and along with the WakeCounty EMA, reviewed procedures and responded to staff questions.

EW were equipped withequipment and supplies for monitoring and decontaminating evacuees and wore personalprotective equipment at strategic locations.

They conducted preoperational checks of survey andmonitoring equipment, all of which was serviceable and appropriately calibrated with calibrationi dates and range .of readings stickers affixed to the instruments.

Portal monitors were alsoavailable for conducting evacuee monitoring.

Equipment was issued and tracked by the SafetyOfficer, who provided guidance on the .use,exposure

control, call back values, turn back values,exposure limit values, distribution and use of KI.All team members were familiar with the purpose, scope, setup, equipment and conduct of theRCCC site and their roles and responsibilities.

Decontamination team members knew how toinstruct evacuees to perform decontamination activities, monitor evacuees, and.what actions to ltake if they could not be decontaminated.

Additionally,the State.Department of Agriculture andWake County Animal Center provided guidance for procedures for accommodating companion pets/animals who accompany evacuees or who might be housed at the site.In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:a. M ET: L.a.l, 1.c.l, I.d.1, I.e.l, 2.a.l, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 2.d.l, 2.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.l, 3.c.1, 3.c.2,i.3. d. 1, 3. d. 2, 3. e. 1, 3. e,2, 3. f.1, 5. a. 1, 5. a. 3, 5. b. 1, 6. a. 1, 6. b. 4, 6. c. 1..b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Nonec. DEFICIENCY:

None 3d. PLAN ISSUES: Nonee. NOT DEMONSTRATED:

None 3f. PRIOR ISSUES -RESOLVED:

Noneg. PRIOR ISSUES -UNRESOLVED:

None3.3.1.3 Chatham CountyOperational Coordination:

iChatham County Emergency Management personnel and the EOC staff successfully idemonstrated the capability to establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrated all critical stakeholders and supported theexecution of core capabilities.

30 I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantThe Emergency Operations Director and Deputy successfully

.instituted their plans and.procedures to manage emergency operations.

Although most EOC staff personnel were pre-positioned.

in accordance with the EOPA, the normal EOC staff callout procedure was.demonstrated.

The warning point received the initial emergency notification form (ENF) from.the HNP and notified the Director of the notification receipt through normal procedures..

He thenhad the County reverse 911 typesystem activated to alert and mobilize EOC staff.During the exercise the' Director and Deputy demonstrated the proper use, of their primary andsecondary communication systems and alternate methods.

All communications systems operatedproperly throughout the exercise.

The EOC had 10 mile EPZ and 50 mile IPZ maps displayed onwalls and other maps and logs, could be displayed on a large screen in front of the EOC asnecessary..

Each EOC staff position was supplied with a Position Notebook that contained checklists for the staff to complete for each ECL. The notebooks also contained appropriate standard operating guides, telephone

numbers, paper, messaging notepaper, and other ,information or instructions pertinent to the position.

The EOC also had. sufficient support.equipment such as facsimile

machines, copiers, telephones, etc. to support emergency operations.

The Director and Deputy demonstrated the ability to make and implement PADs and coordinate actions and implementation with other counties and the SEOC. The Director and Deputyprovided direction and control throughout the exercise.

They conducted numerous EOC staffbriefings as ECLs changed or when he received new information.

They also coordinated theactions of the EOC staff in preparing for an escalation in emergency levels .by providing plansand procedures and having the agencies be proactive in developing emergency actions.

Theseactions included relocating a school and special needs individuals early in the event to ensurethey were safe if conditions continued to degrade.

The Director coordinated lake clearing withother counties and informed them when they were relocating schools.

He also coordinated withthe NCSHP in establishing the county's TCPs and removal of impediments.

The Director coordinated with the Radiological Officer (RO) and the Fire Marshal to ensure allEWs were issued dosimetry and KI when they were deployed.

The Director tasked the RO totrack emergency worker exposure and determine if they needed additional radiological equipment.

When the order was received for EWs to ingest KI the Fire Marshal insured that allworkers were informed to ingest KI and followed-up to ensure they had ingested their KI andtrack the personnel who had ingested KI. When the order was received for the general public to31 Unclassified 1Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan .Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Iingest KI the Director coordinated the announcement with the Public Health representative in theEOC. Once the order was confirmed, the Director had the Health Department notify personnel atreception centers and the PIO issued a press release concerning the general public's need toingest KI..Public Information and Warning:The Chatham County EOC staff successfully demonstrated the capability to deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community..

The PIO used clear,consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relayinformation regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate.

The director and PIO staff demonstrated professional skills in assuring timely warnings andrelated public information was generated to support emergency events in the county. The staffactively coordinated with the SEOC and Wake County for activations of the Sirens, EAS andNWS tone alert radios to implement protective action decisions.

The PIO assured the PublicInformation activity supported those decisions with appropriate mediareleases for the affectedpublic. The PIO interacted with the EOC staff to assure media releases reflected both timely andcorrect information through the issuance of news releases.

The county PIO at the JIC (onceactivated) and the Director approved all news releases.

The PIO fielded many public inquiries and logged each on a Communications Log form. Sheobtained and recorded accurate information for callers; referred them.to the appropriate information

sources, and referenced the HNP Information Brochure.

The Chatham County Fire Marshal indicated that backup route alerting EWs could .be mobilized Uand deployed to any route where siren failures could occur. Announcements using a pre-scripted message would be made over the vehicle's PA system as they drove the routes. He stated Ialerting could be performed within a reasonable time, usually within 45 minutes.

It was alsostated that the clearing of Lakes Harris and Jordan could be accomplished in a timely manner.Critical Transportation

-Protective Actions for Schools:This capability to provide transportation for the relocation of schools was successfully demonstrated by the Moncure Elementary school staff. This was done during an out of sequence I32 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Plantinterview with the Principal and her staff in which their ability to safeguard

students, staff and.faculty in the event of an -incident involving HNP was discussed.

All knew their plans andprocedures thoroughly on coordinating a school relocation or shelter in place. MoncureElementary School has sufficient buses to relocate their students in a timely manner and therelocation facility is prepared to accept the students and assist in their supervision and eventualrelease to parents/guardians.

Moncure Elementary School staffs have specific tasks and these areaddressed during annually scheduled school training throughout the school year.Mass Care -Reception Congregate.

Care Center (RCCC)Chatham County demonstrated the capability.to provide life-sustaining services to an affected, population with the establishment of the Jordan Mathews High School RCCC Facility in supportof HNP. The Chatham County Departmentof Social Services (DSS) assisted by the First HelpEmergency Medical Services (EMS), Health Department, County Fire Departments, theChatham County Schools, Sheriffs.Office,.

Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES), andEmergency Management provided

• effective management.

and staffing of the facility.

The Lee-Chatham Chapter of the' ARC provided staffing and additional resources to. support this facility.

The setup and establishment was in accordance with the Annex A, of the Standard Operating Guideline (SOG) for the Reception Center and Congregate Care Facility Operations in Supportof the Harris Nuclear Plant, dated January 2011 and the EOPA. The facility was well equippedwith appropriate signage-and clearly marked paths.' A two-step process is incorporated formonitoring of evacuees.

This includes initial screening using portal monitors and then secondary monitoring using hand held survey meters if contamination is detected bythe portal monitor..

Sixsimulated evacuees were processed through the RCCC. It took about 52 seconds per evacuee toprocess them through the portal monitor.

The estimated population assigned to this location is12,599, 20% of the population is about 2,520; the plan states that three portal monitors will beused. Processing at the rate demonstrated the expected population of evacuees could beprocessed within the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> requirement.

Chatham County would prepare to open this facility at SAE ECL, and open the shelter toevacuees at GE ECL.In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:33 Unclassified 1Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report!Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Ia. M ET: 1.a. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 2.a. 1, 2.b.2, 2.c. 1, 2.d. 1, 2.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.c. 1, 3.c.2,3.d. 1, 3.d.2, 3.e. 1, 3.e.2, 3.f.l, 5.a. 1, 5.a.3, 5.b. 1, 6.a. 1, 6.c. 1.,b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Nonec. DEFICIENCY:

Noned. PLAN ISSUES: Nonee. NOT DEMONSTRATED:

NoneIff. PRIOR ISSUES -RESOLVED:

Noneg. PRIOR ISSUES -UNRESOLVED:

None * .'3.3.1.4 Harnett County.Operational Coordination:

Harnett County successfully demonstrated their ability .to maintain a unified and coordinated..

operational structure and process while appropriately integrating all critical stakeholders..

Theydemonstrated their ability to effectively alert, notify, and mobilize staff. Multiplecommunication systems were tested between all stakeholders without fail. Equipment andsupplies in the EOC were sufficient to support county response operations.

Protective action decision making is provided by the Harnett County Emergency ServicesDirector in consultation with the County Commissioners, the State of North Carolina, and thethree other risk counties.

Protective action decisions for the public were closely considered andcoordinated by the director.

The director conducted staff briefings and round table discussions for.each emergency notification form received from the utility.

This insured that all EOC staff.members were aware of incident conditions and the actions being taken by others. Positioninstruction books are provided for each member of the EOC staff. These books contained specific instructions and tasks for each position based on the county plans and SOGs. Byutilizing the position instruction books, the staff members were always aware of the actions theywere to take based on the emergency classification level. During the round table discussions, thedirector maintained direction and control of the incident by listening to the staff describe thetasks they were carrying out and providing guidance only where needed. This proved to be anefficient and effective method of maintaining control and situational awareness of theimplementation of all protective action decisions.

The Harnett County RO maintained exposurecontrol for emergency workers through close monitoring of direct reading dosimeters.

Duringthis exercise, all response actions were sufficiently coordinated with local and outsideorganizations and executed in accordance with county plans and procedures.

34 I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantPublic Informnation and Warning:Harnett County successfully demonstrated their ability to provide accurate and timely publicinformation and warning to its citizens.

The primary means for alert and notification of thepublic in Harnett County consists of the Duke Energy fixed siren system, EAS messages, andNWS Alerts. Activation of the siren system primarily lies with Wake County; however,,

controlpanels are also located in the County E-9l1 Center and Duke Energy's EOF. .This system wassuccessfully demonstrated using a silent test and was activated three times during the exercise.

Siren sounding, EAS, and NWS broadcast times were agreed upon on the decision line with theEAS messages being sent to the primary radio station by the SEOC. Emergency vehicles withsirens and public address systems demonstrated route alerting and would be utilized if any or allof the siren system failed. Harnett County emergency personnel satisfactorily demonstrated ordiscussed how these systems could be activated and what actions they would take if any part ofthe system failed.The County PIO and members of the rumor control staff demonstrated the ability to provideinstructional follow up messages to the public in a timely manner and handle public inquiries.

The EOC PIO processed three public news releases prior to the activation of the JIC and sixadditional releases once the JIC was activated:

The news releases provided the necessary instructions needed to keep the public informed and were released in a timely manner. The.rumor control information gathered was passed and shared with the:PIO and Director.

With eachcall received, the staff provided accurate information or referred the caller to the appropriate source. The rum6r control staff utilized the HNP Safety Brochure and county news releases tohelp aide in their response to the calls.Environmental Response/Health and Safety -Emergency Worker and Vehicle Decontamination (EWD)The Angier-Black River Fire Department successfully demonstrated the ability and resources toaddress and support responder operations thru emergency worker and vehicle monitoring anddecontamination (EWD) out of sequence.

Alert and notification was simulated, howevermobilization and EWD activities were observed.

The fire station was setup and marked toconduct EWD operations.

Team members were pre-positioned and assembled in the fire stationwhere they received a radiation mission brief by a member of the County EMA and a safety brief35 Unclassified mRadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Ifrom the Assistant Fire Chief. The Team Leader issued, recorded and documented radiation andprotective equipment issued to personnel, with directions and its use, exposure control,the use ofKI and answered team member questions regarding the mission.

All team members werefamiliar with the purpose, scope, setup, equipment and conduct of the EWD site and performed their duties well. The site was well prepared, laid out and marked clearly.

It was functional andeffective in processing personnel and equipment while protecting the health and safety of EWsand team members.

Team members monitored and decontaminated one vehicle and two EWs,employing proper procedures, techniques and timeliness.

All procedures.

were consistent withestablished plans and procedures.

Mass Care -Reception and Congregate Care Center (RCCC)Harnett County demonstrated the capability to provide life-sustaining services to an affectedpopulation with the establishment of the Harnett Central Middle School RCCC Facility insupport of the HNP. The setup and establishment was in accordance with the Annex B, of theSOG for the Reception Center and Congregate Care Facility Operations in Support of HNP,dated January 2011 and the EOPA. The facility was well equipped with an abundance of signageand clearly marked paths. Six simulated evacuees were processed through the monitoring point.It took approximately 45 seconds per evacuee toprocess them through the portal monitor.

Theestimated population assigned to this location is 3,948, 20% of the population is approximately 790; the plan states that four portal monitors will be used. Processing at the rate demonstrated Ithe expected population' of evacuees would be processed well within the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> requirement.

IThrough the exercise, the emergency workers were questioned about proper wear of dosimetry, frequency requirements for reading and recording personal dosimetry

readings, actions to take ifa reading of 1R, 5R and 25R, were read, and the principles of As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA);

all questions were answered correctly.

It was obvious the members of theteam were well trained and ready for an actual event.The shelter registration process was clearly designed to place priority on the health and safety ofthe general public needing congregate care. Personnel staffing the medical, mental health, andclient Services support rooms were professional and well versed in their responsibilities.

Allwere prepared to use available county resources and rapidly reach back to parent organizations for supplemental assistance.

The DSS Shelter manager was very proficient and prepared toassume her responsibilities, as were all the other key staff members.36 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantIn summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:a. M ET: 1.a. 1, 1.c.1, 1.d. 1, L.e. 1, 2.a. 1, 2.b.2, 2.c. 1, 2.d. 1, 2.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.c. 1, 3.c.2,3.d.1, 3.d.2, 3.e.1, 3.e.2, 3.f.1, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1.b. -AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Nonec. DEFICIENCY:

Noned. PLAN ISSUES: None .e. NOT DEMONSTRATED:

Nonef. PRIOR ISSUES -RESOLVED:

Noneg. PRIOR ISSUES -UNRESOLVED:

None3.3.1.5 Lee County (NC)Operational Coordination:

The LeeCounty Emergency Management Agency successfully demonstrated their ability tomaintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process while appropriately integrating all critical stakeholders.

Key staff were alerted and mobilized in response to anincident at HNP in accordance with county plans and the extent of play agreement.

The Lee County Sheriffs Office Warning Point received the initial notification of Alert andsuccessfully authenticated the message with IHNP after which the Lee County Director ofEmergency Services (LCDES) activated the county EOC and staff. The EOC has multiple directlines, cell phones, and internet service.

The direct lines were the Selective Signaling System(SSS) and HNP direct lines; primary and alternate respectively.

All communications equipment was operational and fully functional; no communication failures were observed.

This is a newEOC facility with back up power and with .a spacious laid out and sufficient equipment,

supplies, and communications to support emergency response operations.

The LCDES successfully accomplished direction and control and made timely decisions.

Aninitial EOC staff briefing was conducted prior to EOC activation and upon receipt of each ENFmessage thereafter.

Response activities were coordinated between agencies and authorized bythe LCDES in a timely manner with a public safety focus. Throughout the exercise, the LCDESconfidently discussed and provided concurrence for all PADs and EAS messages.

The LCDESconsistently tracked coordination of KI to EW's and the General Public with the Lee CountyHealth Department; each ensuring distribution and ingestion PADs were timely. Subsequent 37 Unclassified URadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantPADs were based on available HNP and State radiological data and implemented in a judicious fashion.

The LCDES and assistant are sound leaders with a very capable EOC staff, leadership qualities and subject matter expertise were abundant and. exhibited throughout the exercise.

Public Information and Warning:Lee County successfully demonstrated their ability to provide accurate and timely public Iinformation and warning to its citizens.

The initial siren and EAS activation for Lee County wasinitiated in Wake County through a mutual agreement with the risk counties.

The initialinstructional message contained all the necessary elements in accordance with FEMA guidance.

The LCDES and Sanford Fire Department Chief coordinated the demonstration of initial backuproute alerting following a siren failure during the initial siren and EAS activation.

Backup routealerting was accomplished well within 45 minutes by members of the Deep River Volunteer Fire IDepartment.

An additional backup route alerting was conducted at the GE ECL in accordance with Lee County plans and procedures.

Sanford Fire representatives sufficiently demonstrated that the siren failure area could be identified and alerted within the required time.The Lee County PIO successfully demonstrated the capability to receive and disseminate Haccurate press release to the media and the public in a timely manner by modifying, gainingapproval and releasing pre-scripted messages.

All thirteen press releases were generated and Ireviewed for accuracy by the LCDES, and were followed by a Spanish press release prepared bythe EOC translator.

The rumor control representative successfully demonstrated the capability totrack and clarify rumors from the public, none of which was trending.

Rumor control was able toquell all incoming rumors and answer questions from the general public utilizing information from the EOC staff.In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

Ia. M ET: L.a. I, .b. 1, 1.c. 1, .d. 1, L.e. 1, 2.a. 1, 2.b.2, 2.c. 1, 2.d. 1, 2.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.c. 1,3.c.2, 3.e. 1, 3.e.2, 3.f.l, 5.a. 1, 5.a.3, 5.b. 1.b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Nonec. DEFICIENCY:

Noned. PLAN ISSUES: Nonee. NOT DEMONSTRATED:

None38 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement PlanShearon Harris Nuclear Plantf PRIOR ISSUES -RESOLVED:

Noneg. PRIOR ISSUES -UNRESOLVED:

None39 Unclassified URadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantSECTION 4: CONCLUSION'.

Officials and representatives from the State of North Carolina; the risk counties of Wake,Chatham, Harnett and Lee .Counties, who participated in this exercise demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. FEMAdid not identify any Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA). A previousARCA (08-10-4.c.

l-A-03) identified during the 2010 Brunswick Nuclear Plant REP exercise' which concerned the operational status of the High Purity Germanium (HPGe) GammaSpectrometer was successfully cleared by the Radiation Protection Section (RPS) MobileRadiological Laboratory's demonstration during this exercise.

The participation of both NRC and FEMA representatives at the State Emergency Operations Center added realism to the exercise and demonstrated a commitment to keep the residents ofNorth Carolina informed during an emergency.

There was continued strong leadership indirection and control even with a recent change-over in the State Director position.

The Stateand risk counties demonstrated strong knowledge of their emergency response plans andprocedures and successfully implemented them. The strength of the working relationships between the various Federal, State and local response agencies in their mission planning andexecution abilities throughout all phases of the exercise was obvious, and confirmed the successof the Harris Task Force organizational structure..

The Harris Task Force, co-chaired byrepresentatives from both North Carolina Emergency Management and Duke Energy, has provento be an excellent example of public and private agency cooperation..

During the Ingestion Pathway table top exercise the involved agencies along with the State ofNorth Carolina and the risk counties provided an excellent opportunity for the IPZ counties tobecome better prepared for a radiological event. All demonstrated good coordination andimplementation on protective action decisions which provided for the safety of the general publicand emergency workers.

The SERT and risk counties also successfully demonstrated theirrelocation procedures and the return of evacuated individuals and families.

The State of North Carolina, the risk and ingestion pathway counties have dedicated emergency response staffs as well as numerous volunteers that participated in this exercise who are seriousand professional in executing their duties. FEMA wishes to acknowledge those efforts as well asthose of the many other individual who participated and made this exercise a success.40 II Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement PlanShearon Harris Nuclear PlantAPPENDIX A: EXERCISE TIMELINETable 1 -Exercise TimelineDATE: 2013-04-30, SITE: Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, NCEmergency Classification Level orEvent o U o5) E05Cs Cs 5E U ___.Unusual Event N/A .N/A N/A N/A N/A N/AAlert 0923 0936 0940 0935 0943 0933Site Area Emergency 1143 1148 1152 1149 1149 1150General.

Emergency 1249 1257 ......1257 1257 1303 1259Simulated Rad. Release Started.

1330 1346 .1345 1349 1406 1347Simulated Rad. Release Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing OngoingTerminated Facility Declared Operational 0953 0944 0945 1019 0943Exercise Terminated 1518 1429 1511 N/A 1501Declaration of Emergency:

State ' 1205 1205 1205 1235 N/ADeclaration of Emergency:

Local N/ZA 1204. 1245 1214 1300Early Precautionary Actions:

Early Release N/A 1212 1130 1238 1235Early Precautionary Actions:

Special Populations N/A 1154 1138' 1240 N/AEarly Precautionary Actions:

Clear Lakes Harris 1045 '1045 .1045 1029. *N/Aand JordonI st Protective Action Decision:

Public Warning 1200 ' 200 1200 1200 1200lst Siren Activation 1215 1215. 1215 1215 12151 st EAS Message (Stay Tuned): 'Message A' 1220 1220 1220 1220 1220I st NWS Message (Stay Tuned) 1225 1225 1225 1225 12252nd Protective Action Decision:

Evacuate Zones 1325 1328 1328 1328 1328-A, B, C, D, G, H, I, J, K, L; Shelter in PlaceZones: E, F, M, N2nd Siren Activation 1335 1335 1335 1335 13352nd EAS Message:

'Message C' 1340 1340 1340 1340 13402nd NWS Message 1345 1345 1345 1345 13453rd Protective Action Decision:

KI for General 1416 N/A N/A N/A 1416Public3rd Siren Activation 1425 1425 1425 1425 14253rd EAS Message:

'Message E' 1430 .1430 1430 1430 14303rd NWS Message 1435 1435 1435 1435 1435KI Administration Decision:

Emergency 1328 1328 1328 1328 1328WorkersKI Administration Decision:

General Public 1416 1416 1416 1416 141641 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement PlanShearon Harris Nuclear PlantAPPENDIX B: EXERCISE EVALUATORS ANDTEAM LEADERS..... ,.-- ,t.,_q,.

J.,;-,..

......".. ........ .....,. .... -. ":.".DATE: 2013-04-30, SITE: Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, NCLOCATION EVALUATOR AGENCYState of North Carolina JT Acknrnann FEMA*Michael Dolder FEMA-NP-Keith Earnshaw TH-REPJohn Fill ICFIMichael Henry FEMAJill Leatherman ICFIBart Ray -* .ICFILisa Rink ICFIAlex Sera FEMA R4Od'is Spencer FEMABruce Swiren FEMAICFIWake County Walt Cushman.

' FEMA-NP-John Fill TH-REPGerald Mclemore FEMARobert Nash FEMA*Lisa Rink FEMAAlex Sera FEMA R4Odis Spencer FEMAFEMAChatham County John Fill FEMA*Joe Harworth FEMAGerald Mclemore FEMARobert Nash FEMALisa Rink FEMA R4Alex Sera FEMARonald Shaw FEMARobert Spence FEMA-NP-TH-REPHarnett County *Matthew Bradley FEMAWalt Cushman FEMA-NP-Michael Dolder TH-REPJohn Fill FEMA-NP-Gerald Mclemore TH-REPLisaRink FEMAAlex Sera FEMARobert Spence FEMA R4Odis Spencer FEMAFEMA-NP-TH-REPFEMALee County (NC) John Fill FEMAQuintin Ivy FEMA RIV*Gerald Mclemore FEMALisa Rink FEMA R4Alex Sera FEMA* Team LeaderIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII42 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Imprqvement PlanShearon Harris Nuclear PlantAPPENDIX-C:

ACRONYMS ANDABBREVIATIONS AAC After Action Conference AAR After Action ReportARC American Red CrossARCA Areas Requiring Corrective ActionARES Amateur Radio Emergency ServicesCFR Code of Federal Regulations CMC Corporate Media CenterDENR Department of Environmental Natural Resources DHS Department of Homeland SecurityDOC Department of CommerceDOE Department.of EnergyDOI Department of the InteriorDOT Department of Transportation DPH Department of Public HealthDRD Direct Reading Dosimeter DSS Department of Social ServicesEAL Emergency Action LevelEAS Emergency Alert SystemECL Emergency Classification LevelEEG Exercise Evaluation GuideEMA Emergency Management AgencyEMD Emergency Management DirectorEMNET Emergency Management Information Tracking SystemEMS Emergency Medical ServicesEOC Emergency Operations CenterEOF Emergency Operations FacilityEOPA Extent of Play Agreement EPA Environmental Protection AgencyEPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPZ Emergency Planning ZoneER Emergency RoomERC Emergency Response Coordinator ERDS Emergency Response Data SystemERP Emergency Response Plan43 IUnclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement PlanShearon Harris Nuclear PlantESF Emergency Support FunctionEW Emergency WorkerEWD Emergency Worker Decontamination EXPLAN Exercise PlanFEMA Federal Emergency Management AgencyFEOC Forward Emergency Operations CenterFMT Field Monitoring TeamFOUO For Official Use OnlyFRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment CenterGE General Emergency GIS Geographic Information SystemGM Geiger-Muller (detector)

GPS Geographic Positioning SystemHAZMAT Hazardous Materials HNP Harris Nuclear PlantHO Health OrderHsQEP Headquarters HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation ProgramIC Incident Commander ICS Incident Command SystemIMT Incident Management TeamIP Improvement PlanIPZ Ingestion Pathway ZoneIRG Information Response GroupIRIS Internet Routed Information SystemJIC Joint Information CenterKI Potassium IodideLP- 1 Local Primary -IMOC Mobile Operations CenterMOU Memorandum of Understanding

,mR milliroentgen mR/h milliroentgen per hourNC North CarolinaNCEM North Carolina Emergency Management NCWRC North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission NGO Non-Governmental Organization NIMS National Incident Management SystemNOUE Notification of Unusual EventNPP Nuclear Power PlantNRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission IIIIIII44 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement PlanShearon Harris Nuclear PlantNUREG- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of0654 Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of NuclearPower Plants,"

November 1980NWS National Weather ServiceOOS Out-of-Sequence ORO Offsite Response Organization PA Public Announcement PAD Protective Action DecisionPAG Protective Action GuidePAR Protective Action Recommendation PIO Public Information OfficerPPE Personal Protective Equipment PRD Permanent Record Dosimetry R RoentgenR/h Roentgen(s) per hourRAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency ServiceREA Radioactive Emergency AreaREM Roentgen Equivalent ManREMO Radiation Emergency Management Organization REP _Radiological Emergency Preparedness REPP Radiological Emergency Preparedness ProgramRERP Radiological Emergency Response PlanRO Radiological OfficerRPS Radiation Protection SectionSAE Site Area Emergency SEOC State Emergency Operations CenterSHP State Highway PatrolSIMCELL Simulation CellSIP Shelter-in-Place SMRAP Southern Mutual Radiological Assistance PlanSOG Standard Operating GuideSOP Standard Operating Procedure SRD Self-Reading Dosimeter SSS Selective Signaling SystemTCL Target Capabilities ListTCP Traffic Control PointTHD Technological Hazard DivisionTLD Thermoluminescent dosimeter USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture VFD Volunteer Fire Department 45 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantAPPENDIX D: EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT UNORTH CAROLINAEXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT Harris Nuclear PlantINGESTION PLUME PHASE FULL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

.April. 30-May 1, 2013All activities

.will be demonstrated fully in accordance.with respective plans and procedures asthey would be in an actual emergency (FEMA must receive these plans, guides and procedures NLT 60 days before the exercise).

This Extent of Play agreement, is written by exceptionm If it is Inot listed as an exception it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard operating guides (SOGs) and/or procedures (SOPs). Any issue or discrepancy, arising during'exercise playmay be re-demonstrated if allowed by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chairman(FEMA Region IV) or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted ifitvis not, disruptive toexercise play and is mutually agreed to by the Offsite Response Organization (ORO) Controller and FEMA Evaluator.

CORE CAPABILITY:

Operational Coordination Definition:

Establish and maintain a unified and /coordinated operational structure and processthat appropriately integrates:

ill critical stakeholders andsupports the execution of corecapabilities.

CAPABILITY TARGET: Emergency.Operations Management

.Performance Measure:

Procedures to alert and notify personnel will be demonstrated andpersonnel will respond only upon notification.

Identified communications will be operational.

Equipment, monitoring instruments and dosimetry must be available and will be 'operational Iwhich includes an affixed current calibration and range of readings sticker if applicable,;

quantities.

of Potassium.

Iodide (KI) and expirations will be .verified.

Critical Task: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in atimely manner (NUREG-0654/

FEMA,REP-1, A. 1..a, e; 4.3,4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.I, 2; F.1, 2 H.3, 4; Criterion 1.a.1).All participating state and local government personnel will be pre-positioned in the areaand will respond as the scenario dictates.

Alert rosters will be provided to FEMAevaluators.

Critical Task: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates Iproperly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-1, F.1, 2; Criterion l.d.1). 46 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement PlanShearon Harris Nuclear PlantState and county decision makers will:use a conference bridge line to conduct protective action discussions/decision making.Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments,.dosinmetry, KI, and othersupplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-1, H.-7, 10;1.7, 8, 9; J.10.a,b,'e; J.11l 12; K.3.a; K.5.b;Criterirn l.e." 'Quantities of KI will be verified during'Staff Assis'tance Visits (SAVs).Quantities of equipment, their calibrationi/testing will be verified during SAVs.SAVs will b6 conducted in:Staff Assistance VisitsChatham County.,Date and Time: Monday, April 22, 2013 at 1:00 p.m.Location:

297 West Street, Pittsboro, NC 27312Harnett County ,Date and. Time: Thursday, March, 28, 2013 :following the Task Force. meeting.:

Location:

1005 Edwards lBrothers Driv~e,.Lillington, NC 27546. .Lee CountyDate and Time: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 at 1:00 p.m.Location:

Elm.Street,

Sanford, NC 27330Wake CountyDate and Time:' Tuesday, April 23, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. .Location:

Wake County Public Safety Center, 331 South McDowell Street, Raleigh, NC27601CAPABILITY TARGET: Protective Action Decision Making (PAD)Performance Measure:

Key personnel with leadership roles will provide direction and control;protective action decision making 'will be demonstrated by the OROs. Following activation ofthe ICP, staff and organize the ICP in accordance with the comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) and the requisite

policies, procedures, and directives.

Critical Task: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control tothat part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654 A. 1 .d;A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6; Criterion 1.c.1). 47 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantIWake County will be the lead-coordinating county, for the Harris Counties until Site Area:Emergency.

Following the "Silent Test" sounding of sirens and issuance of the first PADrecommendations to the public, Wake County will request the State assume directionand, control..

Critical Task: OROs use a decision-making

process, considering relevant factors and .appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is inplace forEWs including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs), (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP- 1, C.6; J. 1 O.e, f K.4;Criterion 2.al). ... ...... -. .Radiation Protection and Public Health will analyze technical data and makerecommendations to SERT Leader who in' turn will make recbmmendations

.to th6 CountyEM Coordinators and Public Health Directors.

..._...........

NCritical Task: :A decision-makingproc~ss involving consideration of appropriate factors and'necessary coordinatidn; is used to mak- PADS for the general public (including the ,recommendation for the uise f KI, if ORO policy) (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-l, A.3; C.4, 6;D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m; Criterion 2.b.2). 3'Demonstration of KI distribuition' for the General Puiblic Will be accomplished during Off-Scenario activity by local Public Health officials through discussion and with 3' :presentation of distribution documentation to the Federal Evaluator.

(Demonstration willbe during the Staff Assistance Visits.):

Distribution

.of KI to institutionalized individuals, who cannot be evacuated, will be discussed with the Federal Evaluator:.

No actual distribution of KI will, be accomplished in .this;exercise.

Critical Task: PADs are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities andaccess/functional needs (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, D.4; J.9; J. IO.d, e; Criterion 2.c. 1).In accordance with plans and procedures Critical Task: Protective action decisions are made,, as appropriate, for groups of persons withdisabilities,and access/functional needs (NUREG-.0654 D.4; J.9; J.1O.d, e; Criterion 2cl).Critical Task: Radiological consequences for. the ingestion pathway are assessed andappropriate PADs are made based on the ORO planning criteria (NUREG-0654 A.3, C. 1, 4; D.4;J.9, 11; Criterion 2dlI).Critical Task: Timely post-plume phase relocation,

reentry, and return decisions are made andcoordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of radiological conditions and criteria in theORO's plan and/or procedures (NUREG-0654 4hO; J.9; K.3.a; M. 1; Criterion 2e1).

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantCAPABILITY TARGET: ProtectiVe Action. Implementation Performance Measure::

Demonstrate the bapability to implement emergency worker exposurecontrol; K! decision for institutionalized individuals and the general public; protective actionsfor persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, schools; traffic and access control andimpediments to evacuation.

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure'to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures.

EWs.periodically and at the end of :each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record, orchart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3.a.1).This task will -be evaluated based on ORO plans and procedures based on exercisescenario progression.

Critical Task: KI and appropriate:

instructions are available if a decision to. recommend useofKI is made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of K .for institutionalized individuals.

(not general public) is maintained (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-i, J. I0.e, f; Criterion 3.b.i)..KI distribution and record keeping for institutionalized individuals will be discussed atthe county EOCs. -,Critical Tdsk: Prbtective action decisions are implermented for:persons with disabilities andaccess/functiontal teeds other than schools-within areas subject to protective actions (NUREG-0654 J.0O.c, d, e, g; Criterion..3.c.1).

Chatham, Harnett, Lee and, Wake, Counties will discuss their plans and procedures tosatisfy this criterion.

A list of potential special population citizens will be provided forthe FEMA evaluator to review.............

Critical Task: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-I, J.10.c, d, e, g; Criterion 3.c.2).A"school representative or appropriate county official will be prepared to discuss theirplans and procedures to satisfy this criterion based on exercise scenario progression Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is established.

Accurate instructions areprovided to traffic and access control personnel (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, A.3; C. 1, 4;J.0O.g, j; Criterion 3.d.1)Traffic Control Points (TCP) are predetermined.

Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation are i4gntified and resolved (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, J.10.k; Criterion 3.d.2).

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantIActions to identify and remove impediments to evacuation will be by discussion with-theresponsible law enforcement; agency. at each county EOC, as .scenario dictates.

Critical Task: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequateinformation regarding water, food supplies, milk, .and agricultural production within. theingestion exposure pathway; emergency planning zone for implementation

of protective actions(NUREG-0654 A.3; C.1, 4; J.l 1; Criterion 3e1).In accordance with plans and procedures

.. ...... 3Critical Task:: Appropriate measures; strategies, and pre-pritited instructional material aredeveloped for implementing PADs for contaminated water, food products, milk,, and agricultural Iproduction (NUREG-0654 G. 1, J.9, 11; Criterion 3e2).In accordance with plans and procedures ..Critical Task: Decisions regarding, controlled reentry of emergency workers.

and relocation andreturn of the public during the post-emergency phase are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented (NUREG-0654 E.7; J.10.j; J:12; K.5,b; M.1, 3;.Criterion

.3fl).In accordance with plans and procedures CORE CAPABILITY:

Public: Information.

and:Warning

.Definition:

Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable infornmation.to the wholecommunity through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relayinformation regarding any.threat or hazard and, as Iappropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

CAPABILITY TARGET: Emergency Notification and Public Information 3Performance Measure.

Sirens and the EAS System will be activated in a timelv manner to alertthe general public along with, waterway warnihg and back up route alerting in case of failure qf Uthe primaty alert and notification system. ;In accordance with plans and procedures 3Critical Task: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public arecompleted in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency Iofficials to notify the public of an emergency situation.

The initial instructional message to thepublic must include as a minimum the, elements required by current FEMA REP.guidance (Timely:

The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the iappropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (NUREG-0654 /FEMA REP-I, E.5, 6, 7; Criterion 5.a. 1).050I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantCritical Task:. Backup alert and notification of .the'public is completed within. a reasonable timefollowing the: detection; by the ORO ofa .failure of the primary alert and notification system(NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c; Criterion 5.a.3).* Following the sounding 6f the sirens (tusing-the "silent test") andthe first PADrecommendations to the public, Wake County will request the state.to talke overdirection and control.* Wake County will be the "Lead County" and will coordifnate the simulatedsiren activation.

An actual silent test will be conducted to simulate the sounding of sirens.Inithe event of a siren.failure,:procedures to address siren failures will be discussed with.federal evaluators.

' ,* EAS messages will be in accordance with Part 11 of FCC Rules and Regulations, previously approved for North Carolina by-:FEMA.

PAD' messages and news releases will be coordinated:

by the state and, counties-

.. An actual silent test' will be conducted.

Afeedba'ck.sheet will show if a siren hasfailed and if backup route alerting around the failed siren would be necessary.

• If a siren is deemed to have failed, back-up alerting will be discussed with the federalevaluator for a pre-determined zone (siren failure Simulated).

Chatham County; ,.Date and Time: Monday, April 22, 2013 at 7:00 p.m.Location:,

1318 Old Hwy 1, Moncure, NC 27559Agencies:

Moncure Fire Department, Station #8Harnett CountyDate and Time: Monday, April 22, 2013 at 6:00 p.m.Location:

6056 Christian Light Road, Fuquay Varina, NC,27526Agencies:

Northwest Harnett Fire Dept. and Summerville Fire Department Discussion on Back-up Waterway Warning will take placepriorito demonstration of Back-up Route AlertingLee CountyDate and Time: Tuesday; April 23, 2013 at 5:30 p.m.(Demonstration 6:45 p.m.)Location:

5107 Deep River Road, Sanford, NC 27330Agencies:

Deep River Fire Department 51Wake County Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant1Date -and Time:. On-scenario

-Location:'

Apex Command, Cary Fire Station 5, 2101 High House Road, Cary,NC 27513Agencies:

Apex Fire Dept., Apex Police Dept., Town of Apex Staff, WakeCounty Fire/Emergency Management.

' " ' ' , .', 3Critical.

Task: Waterway warning is completed

-within 45 minutes' following the 'initial decisionby authorized offsite emergency officials'tonotify the public of an emergency situation!

(NUREG-0654

/FEMA REP- 1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c; Criterion.

5.a.4).Waterwayi Warning will be demonstrated during this exercise.,,

Chatham County' 'Date and Time:; Thursday, April 25, 2013 at,1:00p.m..;

Location:

Park Training Room, State Park Road, Apex, NC 27523Agencies:

NCWildlife; Army Corps of Engineers,,

ChathamEM',

State Parks, SHP Aviation.',

' Aviation assets will be evaluated.

". : jWake CountyDate and Time: Thursday, April 25, 2013 atl2:30 p.m.; demonstration at 1:00 p.m.;'Location:

Harris Lake, Harris Phlnt Boat'Storage Sh'eltei, Training Avenue, New.Hill, NC 27562 a .. ... ...Agencies:

Wake County Sheriffs Office Boait:Team

' L ' 'Critical Task: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to thepublic and the news media in a timely manner. The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of' Iurgency and without.

undue delay (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c;Criterion 5.b.1).The State, Chatham,

Harnett, Lee, and Wake Counties will demonstrate the ability todisseminate accurate information and instructions, to the public and news media through theJoint Information Center (JIC).Public inquiry for the state will be demonstrated at the Duke/Progress Energy JointInformation Center (JIC) located at 160 Rush Street Raleigh, NC 27603-3594.

County Ipublic inquiries will demonstrated at the respective county EOCs. Public inquiry personnel will provide the FEMA evaluator with a call log. ICORE CAPABILITY:

Environmental Response/Health and Safety52 3 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/hIprovement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantDefinition:

Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address~all.,hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and- natural disasters in support of theresponder operations and the affected communities.

CAPABILITY TARGET: Protective Action Decision MakingPerformance Measure:

OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure:

pathway EPZ must demonstrate a capability to assess and control the radiation exposure

....received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in pldce, as specified.

in the ORO 's_..plans/procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specificmissions.

As appropriate,..

OROs must demonstrate the. capability to make .decisions on thedistribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for emergency workers.

OROsmust have the capability to independently project integrated dose from PIojected or actual doserates and compare these estimates to the PA Gs. OROs must have the capability to choose,among a range of protective

actions, those most appropriate in a given..emergency.-..

Critical Task. OROs use a'decision-making.process, considering relevant factors andappropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is inplace for EWs, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure:in excess of administrative limits or PAGs (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-1, C.6; J.0O.e, f, K.4 Criterion 2.a.1).DHEC personnel onlyCritical Task.-. Appropriate PARs are basedonsavailable

,information on plantcondition, fieldmonitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge.ofoonsite andoffsite environmental conditions (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP- 1,. I. 10;0 Supp. 3;,Cr.iterion 2.b. 1).In accordance with plans and procedures

• Critical Task: A.decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors andnecessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the.....

,.recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy) (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-l, A.3; C.4, 6;D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m; Criterion 2.b.2)..In accordance with plans-and procedures:

Critical Task: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed andappropriate, PADs. are made.based on the-ORO planning criteria (NUREG-0654A.3.;

C. 1, 4; D.4;J.9, 11; Criterion 2dl)..In accordance with plans and procedures Critical Task: Timely post-plume phase relocation,

reentry, and return decisions are made andcoordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of radiological conditions and criteria in theORO's plan and/or procedures (NUREG-0654 580; J.9; K.3.a; M. 1; Criterion 2e1).

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantIIn accordance with plans and. procedures CAPABILITY TARGET: Protective Action Implementation

.Performance Measure:

'OROs must demonstrate the- capability to provide emergency Workers(including supplemental resources) with the'appropriate direct-reading and permanent.

record,dosimetry, dosimeter

chargers, Kl,. and instructions on the use of these, items.Critical Task. OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures; and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures.

EWs periodically and at the end ofeach mission'read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record-or chart. OROS maintain appropriaterecord-keeping of the administration, of KI to EWs (NUREG-,0654/FEMA REP-i, J.l0:e,K.3.a,b, K'4;Criterion 3.a.l). .. .This task will be discussed with dose assessment personnel as the scenario dictates.

ICritical Task. KI and appropriate instructions are 'available if a decision to'recommend use of-KI is made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized

,individuals and the general public is maintained (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP- 1, J. 1 O.e, f;Criterion 3.b.l)..

." 'This task will be discussed with dose assessment personnel as the scenario dictates.

Critical Task::The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate

.information, regarding water,:-food

supplies,

Inilk, and agricultural production within theingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions(NUREG-0654 A.3; C. 1, 4; J. 11; Criterion 3e 1).In accordance with plans and procedures Critical Task: Appropriate

measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material aredeveloped for implementing PADs for contaminated water, food-products, milk, and agricultural production (NUREG-0654 G. 1, J.9, 11; Criterion 3e2). IIn accordance with plans andprocedures,'

.-Critical Task: Decisions regarding, controlled reentry of emergency!

workers:

and relocation andreturn of the public during the post-emergency phase are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented (NUREG-0654 E.7; J. I0.j; J. 12; K.5.b; M. l, 3; Criterion 3f2). IIn accordance with plans and procedures.

Capability Target: Field Measurement and Analyses54I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantCritical Task: Field teams (two or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to helpcharacterize the release and to control radiation exposure (NUREG C. 1; H. 12; 1.7, 8, 11; J. 10.a;Criterion 4a2).Critical Task. Ambient radiation measurementsare made and recorded at appropriate locations,:

and radioiodine.

andparticulate samples are collected.

Teams will move to an appropriate low-background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in-the plan and/or,.

..procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media (NUREG C. 1; 1.8,9; H.1.2; J.10.a;.Criterion 4a.3)., .. "Critical.

Task:, The field teams (two or more) demonstrate-the capability to. make appropriate, measurements and collect samples (e..g:, food crops, milk, water., vegetation, and soil) to supportadequate assessments and protective action decision-making (NUREG-0654C..I; 1.8;..J.

1'l;Criterion 4b 1).* .- ' :: ' '. .. ., .i , ,I I..i " "" :'- .'.. .." .I, I. , -' ..Critical Task: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to supportPADs (NUREG-0654 C.-; 3; J.I 1.; Criterion.

4c 1).Clearing ARCA: 08-10-4.c.1-A-03..

.North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Health ServiceRegulation, Radiation Protection Section.The High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Gamma Spectrometer in the Radiation Protection Section(RPS) Mobile Laboratory was not operational device could.not correctly identify.

the- -,isotopes in theF Counting Standard

.used .to ,calibrate ithe system and,'therefore, could not be usedto count sample media during: the.exercise.,

.Capability Target: Support Operations and Facilities Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and othersupplies-are sufficient to: support emergency operations (NUREG-0654 H.7, 10;. 1.7, 8,9;"110.a, b, e; J.ll;.12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion lel).Critical Task. OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures,.

EWs periodically.and at the.. end ofeach mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record orchart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of:the administration of KI to EWs (NUREG-0654 J.0O.e,.K.3.a, b, K4; Criterion 3al).Critical Task: KI and appropriate instructions are made available in case a decision torecommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI forinstitutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained (NUREG-0654 J. 1O.e, f,Criterion 3bl).55 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantICritical Task: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, andtrainedpersonnel

-to provide, monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees(NUREG-0654 A.3; G4; J.l0.h; J112; Criterion 6al)..,.One portal monitor will; be demonstrated.

at, each reception

.center.

,.. 3* Six evacuees will be monitored; two (1 male and 1 female) will be found to becontaminated.

, -.-, ... 3* Evacuee decontamination procedures will be via discussion and walk through offacilities (No actual or simulated decontamination of evacuees)

• Two emergency workers per county will be monitored.

• Emergency-Worker decontamination procedures will be Via discussion.and walkthrough of facilities (No actual decontamination of workers).

', " ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.................

" ... ;' ".......

• " .......

..

• One emergency vehicle per county will be decontaminated (simulated only,; water Iwill not be used)* One vehicle will be monitored and decontaminated (simulated) at each of thefollowing times and locations.,

If inclement:weather occurs a discussion will beperformed by the evaluator and the participants:

..-* Monitoring and decontamination of animals will be by discussion.

Critical Task: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish lmonitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and-their equipment.

and'vehicles (NUREG-0654 K.5.a, b; Criterion 6bl).0 Water will not be used during this demonstration.

Procedure will be discussed byinterview with Federal evaluators e PRD will be simulated using clothespins or other type of item 3Core Capability:

On-Scene Security and Protection Definition:

Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related securityand protection operations for people and communities located within affectedareas and also forall traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining Ioperations.

Capability Target: Protective Action Implementation iCritical Task: Equipment (to include communications),

maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient Usupport emergency operations (NUREG-0654 IH.7, 10; 1.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.1 1, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion lel).I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantCritical Task:. OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, land procedures, andmanage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plang/procedures.

EWs periodically and at the end of.each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record orchart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI.to EWs (NUREG-0654 J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3aI).Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is established.

Accurate instructions areprovided to traffic and access control personnel (NUREG-0654 A.3; C.1, 4; J. 10.g, j; Criterion 3dl).:Chatham CountyDate and Time: Thursday, April 25, 2013 at 12:00 p.m.Location:

?Park!Training Room, Slatet Park Road; Apex, NC 27523.Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (NUREG-0654 J. 10.k;Criterion 3d2).,'CORE CAPABILITY:

Critical Transportation Definition:

Provide trdnsportation (including.

infrastructure access and-accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives,'including the evacuation of people and animals, andthe delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.CAPABILITY TARGET: Protective Action Implementation Performance.

Measure:

• Demonstrate the ability to implement PADs.for schools..

Critical Task. OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-I1, J.10.c, d, e, g; Criterion 3.c.2).School evacuation procedures and interviews will be demonstrated via discussion with key school staff members, including school bus drivers, off scenario.

Chatham County:Moncure Elementary School600 Moncure School Road.Moncure, NC 27559Date and Time: Wednesday, April 24, 2013 at 9:00 a.m.Wake County:Apex High School 571501 Laura Duncan Road, Media Center Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantI':Apex,,NC 27502"'Date and Time: Tuesday, April 23, :2013. at 3:45 p.m.Schools:

Wake County Public Schools Security, Transportation; Apex High, Middle,and Elementary Schools; Lufkin Road Middle, Baucom and Olive-Chapel Elementary Schools; St. Mary Magdalene Catholic School; Thales AcademyLaw enforcement agencies illf discuss school bus escort procedures during theirtraffic and access control interviews' as described in 3.d.:Core Capability:

Mass Care,'. " ' , " ,'. ., " " ..' " ." " ; ' "Definition:

Provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with a focus on hydration, feeding and shelteringto those who have the most need as well as support for reunifying,,

families.

ICapability Target: Support Operations and Facilities Critical Task: KI and appropriate instructions are made available in case a decision torecommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration:

Of KIforinstitutionalized individuals and the general public 'is maintained (NUREG-0654 JA.IO.e,,

f;-*Criterion 3b 1).Critical Task: Managers of congregate care facilities'demonstrate' that the centers have,resources to provide services and accommodations consistent:.with-plaining guidelines.

-Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored forcontamination and have been decontaminated, as appropriate before entering congregate carefacilities (NUREG-0654; J. 10.h; J. 12; Criterion 6c1).* The shelter portion of thecongregate care facilities may demonstrate setup of thefacility by using a "sampler" approach to the repetitive setup requirements.

Exampleswould include such things as cots, bedding, chairs, etc.* Monitoring and decontamination of animals will be by discussion.

3Chatham County: .Date and Time: Thursday, April 25, 2013 at 7:00 p.m,Location:

Jordan-Matthews High School, 910 East Cardinal Street, Siler City, NC27344Harnett CountyDate and Time: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 at 7:00 p.m.Location:

Harnett Central Middle School, 2529 Hamett Central School Road, Angier,NC 27501 58 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement Plan Shearon Harris Nuclear PlantAgencies:

Buries Creek Fire Department, Coats Fire Department, Harnett Dept. ofSocial Services, Harnett County Health Department.

.,Wake CountyDate and Time: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 at 7:00 p.m.Location:

Sanderson High School,.

5500 Dixon: Drive, Raleigh, NC 27609,Agencies:

Wake Co. Environmental

Services, Wake Co., Human Services, Raleigh FireDepartment, Raleigh Police Department CORE CAPABILITY:

Public Health and Medical ServicesDefinition:

Provide lifesaving medical.

treatment via emergency medical services and relatedoperations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health andmedical support and products to all people in need within the affected area.CAPABILITY TARGET: Support Operations and Facilities Performance, Measure:.

Demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated iihjuredindividuals to medical-facilities and provide medical services.

Critical Task. Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, K1, and othersupplies are sufficient to support emergencyoperations (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-I, H,7, 10;1.7, 8, 9; J.10.a,.b, e;.J.11,,

12;K.;3,a;,K.5.b;-.Criterion

.1.eJ) .Wake Medical Services Drill willf be conducted on;August 28, 2013.Critical Task. OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures.

EWs periodically and at the end ofeach mission read their dosimeters and record, the readings on the appropriate exposure record orchart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (NUREG-0654 J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3.a.1).Critical Task. The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trainedpersonnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services.to contaminated injured individuals (NUREG-0654

/FEMA REP-1, F.2; H. 10; K.5.a, b; L. 1, 4;Criterion 6.d.1).59 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)After Action Report/Improvement PlanShearon Harris Nuclear PlantThis page is intentionally blank.60