ML081690719
| ML081690719 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 02/15/2008 |
| From: | Constellation Energy Group |
| To: | David Silk Operations Branch I |
| Shared Package | |
| ML073040307 | List:
|
| References | |
| TAC U01633 | |
| Download: ML081690719 (39) | |
Text
D Scenario Outline Form FS-D-1 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of Facility:
Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 2008 Examiners: Operators:
Turnover:
Unit 1 was EOL at 100% for previous 9 months 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago power was reduced to 75% power to perform valve testing which was completed SAT.
11 & 12 charging pumps are running with boron equalization in progress.
CVCS makeup is aligned for direct.
No equipment out of service. Instructions for the shift is to return to 100% power. * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Taraet Quantitative Attributes
[Per Scenario:
See Section D.5.d) 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 2. 3. Abnormal events (2-4) Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4. Major transients (1-2)
- 5. EOPs enteredreauirina substantive actions (1-2)
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 7. Critical tasks (2-3) Actual Attributes II 11 I/ -+-I-- @ 3 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of SCENARIO OVERVIEW LOSS 22 DC BUS / ATWS Initial Conditions:
75% Rated Thermal Power, EOL, following valve testing last shift. Crew will begin raising power to 100% power following shift turnover The scenario starts with a trip of 11 component cooling pump, after the crew verifies no common mode failure 12 component cooling pump is started IAW AOP-7C. This will resume CC flow to all components.
LCO 3.7.5 should be entered due to both 12 & 13 CC pps's aligned to 14 480V bus. After switching the power supply for 13 CC pp the LCO can be exited. A loss of 22 125V DC bus occurs which will cause multiple alarms. The crew will implement AOP-7J for loss of the DC bus. The crew will de-energize ESFAS Channel ZG, AFAS Channel ZG, RPS Channel D. 11B RCP will trip due to a locked rotor, this will cause numerous alarms.
The crew should check RPS calling for a trip due to multiple alarms.
Once crew identifies that reactor should have tripped CRS will order a reactor trip.
The manual pushbuttons will not work causing the crew to perform alternate actions of de- energizing the CEDM MG sets. When the reactor trips one set of turbine valves will fail to go shut causing an overcooling of the RCS. Failure of SGIS to shut MSIV's will require the CRO to manually shut them. The crew should recognize the SGIS failure and hold Tcold constant at current temperature using ADV's. After completing EOP-0 the CRS will implement EOP-8 due to the loss of 22 DC bus. VA-1 will not be met in EOP-8 and CRO should immediately begin worlung that safety function causing the RO to assess the rest of the safety functions. After all safety functions are assessed the RO should be assigned PIC4 due to Pressure and Inventory Control not being met in EOP-0. The scenario ends when VA-1 is completed by CRO and he is assigned HR-2.
INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION
- 1. Reset to IC-?? 2. Perform switch check.
- 3. 4. Place simulator in FREEZE. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display.
- 5. Enter Trigger a. None 6. Enter Malfunctions a. Trip 11 CC Pump. CCWOOZ-01 on F1 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. b. Loss of 22 125V DC Bus 125V004 on F2 C. 11B RCP Locked Rotor RCS008 on F3 d. Auto Trip Failure & Manual Trip Failure RPSOO5 & RPS006 at Time Zero e. Stop Valve #1 & Control Valve #1 Fail As-Is TGOO5-01 at Time Zero f. SGIS A & B failure ESFAS012-01
& ESFAS012-02 at Time Zero Page of Enter Panel Overrides
- a. None Enter Remote Functions
/ Administrative
- a. Align CVCS makeup for direct.
(1-CVC-254 open, 1-CVC-256 shut) Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE. Give crew briefing.
- a. Present plant conditions: 75% load at EOL 17,500 MWDMTU b. Power history: C. Equipment out of service: None d. Abnormal conditions:
None e. Surveillances due:
None f. Instructions for shift: Raise power to 100%. 100% for 9 months, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago reduced to 75% for valve testing. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
Instructions for the Booth Operator.
Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: I. Page 4 of RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner.
If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
REQUEST 1. OWC/E&C investigate failure of 11 CC Pump TBO investigate loss of 11 CC Pump 2. 3 AB0 investigate loss of 11 CC Pump 4 5 OWC/E&C Investigate loss of 22 DC Bus OWC de-energize ESFAS ZG & AFAS ZG RESPONSE Acknowledge request. After 5 minutes report breaker tripped on overload.
Acknowledge request. After 3 minutes report breaker tripped on overload Acknowledge request. After 3 minutes report nothing abnormal at pump Critical Tasks Acknowledge request Acknowledge request, after 5 min de-energize ESFAS ZG, after another 3 minutes de-energize AFAS ZG 1. 2. 3. Evaluate common mode failure and start standby CC pump prior to reaching RCP temperature limits (thrust bearing 195", CBO 200"). Performs alternate actions for tripping reactor within 5 minutes of RCP trip. Recognize Turbine SV/CV still open, shuts MSIV's prior to AFAS actuation.
Dendix D Required Operator Actions Form -- Time Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Event
Description:
11 CCW Pump Trip (Evaluator's Cue) Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Page of CRO CRS Acknowledges 1C13 alarms. Observes CC pump is tripped. Informs CRS. Implement AOP-7C, make page announcement CRS/CRO Evaluate for common mode failure and start a standby CC pump prior to reaching RCP temperature limits (thrust bearing 195'. CBO 200') CRSRO CRS CRS/CRO CRS CRS
- Shading indicates Critical Task Monitors RCP temperatures including trip criteria Refers to T.S. 3.7.5 & 3.6.6 Declares 11 CC subsystem inoperable. Direct realignment of 13 CC pump to 11 480V Bus. Declares 11 CC subsystem operable. Exits T.S.
3.7.5 & 3.6.6 Informs maintenance of need to investigate and repair.
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page of Event
Description:
Loss of 22 DC Bus (Evaluator's Cue) I I
- Shading indicates Critical Task Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ I Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
Locked rotor on 11 B RCP (Evaluator's Cue)
~
- Shading indicates Critical Task Page 7 of 9 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
--- CRO/RO Announce multiple alarms CRSKRO CRS/RO CRO CRS CRS directs CRO to check RPS calling for a trip CRS directs RO to monitor primary Reports RPS is calling for a trip Directs Reactor trip, implements EOP-0 RO RO Attempts Reactor trip
@ 1C05 unsuccessfully Performs alternate actions for tripping reactor at 1C20 within 5 minutes of 1 1B RCP trip Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
-~~ Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Event
Description:
EOP-0 (After Reactor Trip)
CRO Page of Recognize Turbine SVlCV still open, shuts MSN's prior to MAS actuation All CRS/CRO RO CRO RO RO CRO CRO CRO or RO CRO or RO CRS CRS CRS Recognize SGIS failure Open ADV's to hold RCS temp constant Reports Reactivity Control is met Reports Vital Aux Safety Function not met due to 22 DC bus failure Verifies SIAS as part of PIC safety function Reports PIC not met due to low PZR lvl & press (may be met if temperature not held due to SGIS failure) Initiate AFW flow IAW HR alternate action Reports HR not met due to low RCS temp & S/G press (may be met if temperature not held due to SGIS failure) Reports Containment Environment is met Reports Rad Levels External to Containment is met End of EOP-0 brief Using EOP-0 flowchart determines EOP-8 is correct Implements EOP-8 due to loss of 22 DC bus I I I I
- Shading indicates Critical Task Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DP 1 I ALL RO CRO CRS/CRO CRS/RO RO CRS/RO CRO Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page of Event
Description:
~~ Evaluate Resource Assessment Table RC-1 Met, PIC-4 Met, VA-1 Not Met, Directs CRO commence VA- 1 Directs RO complete RAT HR-2 Met, CE-1 Met, RLEC-1 Met CRS directs RO to commence PIC-4 (RC-1 if PIC reported met in EOP-0) When all required actions taken for VA safety function are complete, notify CRS Time Position CRS/CRO CRS ~~ Direct CRO to commence working HR-2 Determines EAL H.A. 1.1.1 L I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event No. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Facility:
Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Malf. No. Event Event Type* Description AFWoo1-02 12 AFW Pump Failure RCS026-01 1 (RO) PZR Level X Transmitter Failure (Low) CEDS012-37 R (RO) CEA 37 Drop CEDS003 R (RO) CEDS Raise Relay sticks when CEA withdrawn RCS002 M (ALL) RCS Leak of 100 GPM RCS002 M (ALL) RCS Leak increases to 200 GPM Panel Override C (CRO) SIAS B Block Failure SIAS "B" Block Examiners:
Operators:
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 2. Malfunctions after EOP entrv (1-2) Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power at MOL. 12 AFW pump tagged out for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> into 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> maintenance window). 11 6 11 2 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4. Major transients (1-2) 5. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1-2) EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 6. 7. Critical tasks (2-3) II Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario:
See Section D.5.d) I Actual Attributes I -- I -- I -- 11 ~ 11 4 11 2 11 1 11 a 11 2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 SCENARIO OVERVIEW DROPPED CEA/RCS LEAK Initial Conditions: 100%
Rated Thermal Power, MOL, 12 AFW pump 00s for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> into 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> maintenance window). Scenario starts with Pressurizer level transmitter X instrument failinmg low.
After identification of instrument failure channel Y level controller will be placed in service and PZR heater cutout selected to Y only (vice WY). Common tap analysis should be consulted and other instruments checked to ensure no instrument line leak.
CEA 37 in Group 5 will drop completely causing multiple alarms.
CRS will implement AOP-lB, with CRO lowering turbine load to restore Tcold to program. CRS will also notify OWC of CEA drop to ensure E&C response.
When crew attempts to realign the CEA the outward motion relay will stick causing the CEA to continue withdrawing even after inholdout switch is released. CEDS will be placed in off stopping CEA motion. When crew realizes they cannot realign the CEA a power reduction to 70% power should be ordered. During the power reduction IAW OP-3 an RCS leak will begin in excess of 1 charging pump. AOP-2A will be implemented which will eventually lead to a reactor trip. After the trip the leak will increase in size to 200 gpm. EOP-5 will be entered after completing EOP-0. The crew will begin a cooldown and depressurization to minimize leakage, during this step the crew will be unable to block SIAS B. The scenario ends when the crew has throttled safety injection flow to prevent overfilling the pressurizer. CRS will declare EAL H.A.5.1.2.
- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION Reset to IC-24 Perform switch check.
Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display. Place simulator in FREEZE. Enter Trigger
- a. Enter Malfunctions
- a. T1: CEDS IdHoldOut switch moved PZRLevel X Transmitter Fails Low. RCS026-01 (Low) on Fl b. CEA37Drop CEDS012-37 on F2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. c. CEDS Raise Relay sticks when CEA withdrawn CEDSOO3 on T1 d. RCS leak of 100 gpm RCS002 lOOgpm on F3 e. 12 AFW Pump Failure AFW001-02 at Time Zero Enter Panel Overrides
- a. SIAS B Block Failure SIAS B Block keyswitch to normal at Time Zero Page 3 of 10 Enter Remote Functions
/ Administrative a. Place yellow tag on 12 AFW Pump trip pushbutton.
Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE. Give crew briefing.
- a. Present plant conditions:
100% load at MOL 10,885 MWDMTU b. Power history: 100% for 12 months C. Equipment out of service: d. Abnormal conditions:
None e. Surveillances due: None f. Instructions for shift: Maintain 100%
power 12 AFW Pump 00s (repairing overspeed trip linkage 6 hrs into 18 hr window) Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
Instructions for the Booth Operator.
- a. Activate Fl PZR Level X transmitter fails low when cued by the lead evaluator.
- c. Remove CEDSO12-37 After CEA fully inserted.
- e. f. Modify RCS002 Raise RCS leak rate to 200 gpm when reactor trips.
Block SIAS B Use panel override to give ESFAS door alarm then block SIAS B, 1 minute after requested of PWS.
Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 10 RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner.
If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
REQUEST RESPONSE 1. TBO check IC43 PZR level indication Acknowledge request. After 2 minutes report 216 inches. 2. OWC contact I&C to investigate PZR Level Acknowledge request. transmitter failure 3 NFM for Fxyt & Frt Report Fxyt is 1.023 and Frt 1.58,2 days ago 4 Chemistry sample both S/G's for activity Acknowledge request IAW CP-436 5 PWS block SIAS B locally at ESFAS cabinet Acknowledge request, After 1 minute give ESFAS door alarm then block SIAS B using panel override for block WS Critical Tasks 1. 2. Place CEDS panel to off prior to high power pretrip alarm Commence cooldown of RCS prior to subcooling lowering below 30".
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 5 of 10 Event
Description:
PZR Level X Transmitter Failure (Evaluator Cue) Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior --- I I I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
Group 5 CEA Drop (Evaluator Cue) RO Places CEDS to off RO CRS Refers to TS 3.1.4 CRS Enters LCO 3.1.4.A Informs CRS that CEA motion stops CRS/CRO CRS Calculates time to realign CEA is 30 minutes Directs power reduction to 70%
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ~ ~~ Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior -~~ Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
Power Reduction to 70% (Realignment Time Expiration)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ RO CRO RO CRO CRO CRS Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page of 10 Event
Description:
RCS Leak / AOPQA (After Power Lowered By 5%) Secure L/D (Shut I-CVC-515
& 516) Check for S/G tube leak (determines no tube leakage)
Detrmine if leak is on charging header Determine leak is in containment Starts all CAC's with max flow Determines leak not isolated, directs Rx trip Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 CRO CRS CRS Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
EOP-0 (After Reactor Trip) Perform Rad Levels External to Containment (Met)
Perform EOP-0 brief Implements EOP-5 Page of 10 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior pP ~ Report CE not met due to containment pressure & temp trends (may call met Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 5 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 10 of 10 Event
Description:
EOP-5 (After EOP-0) RO CRO Throttle HPST Flow CRS Determines EAL H.A.5.1.2 Depressurize RCS to maintain subcooling
~
- Shading indicates a Critical Task ndix D Scenario Outline Form ES -- D I Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) Scenario No.: 3 Pa g e __ 1 ofx Facility:
Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 2008 Examiners: Operators:
-- I Actual Attributes
-- __ It 5 Turnover:
Unit 1 is at 100% power, MOL equilibrium conditions.
13 HPSI pump tagged out for repair of excessive vibration during last STP 0-7B (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> into 36 hour4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> maintenance window) IAS LCO 3.5.2.A. 2. 3. Abnormal events (2-4)
Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor tI 1 It 3 4. Major transients (1-2)
- 5. 6. EOPs enteredhequiring substantive actions (1-2)
EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) It 1 It 1 It 0 7. Critical tasks (2-3)
It 3 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 11 SCENARIO OVERVIEW RCP SEALSRUBE LEAK Initial Conditions:
of excessive vibration during last STP 0-7B (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> into 36 hour4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> maintenance window) IAS LCO 3.5.2.A. 100% Rated Thermal Power, MOL, Eqilibrium conditions.
13 HPSI pump tagged out for repair Scenario starts with 12A RCP 1" stage seal failure.
The crew ensures only a single seal failed and notifies engineering.
Channel B RPS matrix power supply will fail causing multiple alarms at 1C05. After ensuring RPS is not calling for a trip the crew should enter LCO's 3.3.3.A
& 3.3.3.B. The CRS should call OWC to get I&C working on repairs to the power supply problem. After all LCO's determined calls made 12A RCP 3d stage seal will also fail. This second seal failure will require an expeditious shutdown IAW Alarm Manual. During the shutdown turbine valve CV-3 fails as is and turbine control becomes more difficult. The crew should recognize valve failure and implement AOP-7E. After crew stabilizes the plant a CIS B spurious actuation occurs which causes a loss of component cooling water to the RCP's. The crew will be unable to reset the CIS B and a reactor trip will be ordered. After verifying Reactivity control in EOP-0 the RCP's should be secured. After completing EOP-0 a transition to EOP-2 should occur. After a few steps are completed in EQP-2 a tube leak develops in 12 S/G causing the crew to transition to EQP-6. The scenario will end when the 12 S/G is isolated IAW EQP-6. CRS will declare EAL H.A.5.1.2 INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION
- 1. Reset to IC-24 2. Perform switch check. - 3. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display - 4. Place simulator in FlIEEZE. - 5. EnterTrigger
- a. None 6. Enter Malfunctions
- a. 12A RCP Lower Seal Failure RCSOl1-03 on F1 b. Channel B RPS Matrix Power Supply Failure RPS007-02 on F2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Page -& of 11 7. 8. - 9. 10. 11. 12. C. 12A RCP 3rd Stage Seal Failure RCSO13-03 on F3 d. Spurious CIS B Actuation ESFA009 on F4 11 S/G Tube Leak (2 Tubes)
MS002-01 at F5 e. f. CV-3 Fails AS-IS TG005 at Time Zero Enter Panel Overrides
- a. None Enter Remote Functions
/ Administrative
- a. Place yellow tag on 13 HPSI Pump WS in PTL. b. Place red dot on H20 "13 HPSI PP BKR L/U IMPR' Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE. Give crew briefing.
- a. Present plant conditions:
100% load at MOL 10,885 MWDMTU b. Power history:
100% for 9 months C. Equipment out of service: 13 HPSI Pump 00s (repairing excessive vibration during STP-0-7, 3 hrs into 36 hr window) d. Abnormal conditions:
None e. Surveillances due: None f. Instructions for shift:
Maintain 100% power Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
Activate F2 Channel B RPS Matrix Power Supply Failure when cued by lead evaluator. 12A RCP 3rd Stage Seal Failure when cued by lead evaluator. Activate F4 Spurious CIS B Actuation when cued by lead. Activate F5 11 S/G Tube Leak (2 Tubes) when cued by lead b. c. Activate F3 d. e.
Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner.
If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
- 1. 2. 3 4. 5. 6. REQUEST OWC contact Engineering about 12 A RCP lower seal failure OWC contact I&C to investigate loss of RPS matrix power supply OWC contact Engineering about 12 A RCP upper seal failure TBO/PPO check CV-3 OWC contact Engineering about CV-3 failing as-is PWS attempt reset of CIS B locally at ESFAS cabinet Critical Tasks RESPONSE Acknowledge request. Acknowledge request. Acknowledge request Acknowledge request, after 5 minutes report "nothing unusual except it appears more open then other 3 CV's" Acknowledge request Acknowledge request, After 2 minute give ESFAS door alarm then clear alarm after another 2 minutes. Call CR and report "unable to reset CIS B locally" 1. 2. 3. Recognize need for expeditious shutdown within 5 minutes of 2nd seal failure Secures all RCP's within 3 minutes of reaching RCP temperature limits.
Isolate 11 S/G prior to S/G filling solid and MSSV's open.
Dendix D Required Operator Actions Form FS -- Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO RO CRO Evaluate Alarm Manual CRS CRS Acknowledges 1C06
& computer alarms. Evaluates 12A RCP, determines lower seal failure Directs RO to monitor other RCP seals Notifies Engineering of seal failure II I I I w Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior --- Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page of 11 Event
Description:
Channel B RPS Matrix Power Supply Failure (Evaluator's Cue)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page of --J- Event
Description:
12A RCP 3rd Stage Failure (Evaluator's Cue) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior --- RO RO Acknowledges 1C06
& computer alarms. Evaluates 12A RCP, determines a upper seal failure CRO Evaluate Alarm Manual CRS Recognize need for expeditious shutdown to protect against RCS leak from RCP sv nf ?* salialwe .. CRS Directs an expeditious shutdown CRS Notifies Engineering of 2nd seal failure
- Shading indicates critical task Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Time ~ Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of > Event
Description:
Expeditious S/D with CV-3 fails As-Is (When Down Power Commenced)
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO RO RO CRO CRO CRS CRS CRS I Place all PZR Heaters to On Lowers PZR Press controllers to
-2200# Borate from RWT IAW OP-3 Lower turbine load using load set Recognizes CV-3 failing as-is Implements AOP-7E Directs RO/CRO to stabilize plant Notify Main Turbine Engineer Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page of 11 Event
Description:
Spurious CIS B (Evaluator's Cue) RO/CRO CRS CRO CRO CRS Announce CIS alarm Direct RO to monitor primary Evaluate CIS, determines spurious Attempts to reset CIS unsuccessfully at both lCl0 & ESFAS Holds short brief, then orders Reactor Trip Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DP CRO CRO CRO CRS CRS CRS Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 10 of & Event
Description:
EOP-0 (After Reactor Trip) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior --- CRS Directs EOP-0 Performs Core
& RCS Heat Removal (Not Met due to no operating RCP's) Performs Containment Environment (Met)
Perform Rad Levels External to Containment (Met) Perform EOP-0 brief Using EOP-0 flowchart determines EOP-2 is correct EOP Implements EOP-2 I ~
- Shading indicates critical task Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Event
Description:
S/G Tube Leak (EOP-6) (Evaluator's Cue after steps assigned in EOP-2) RO CRS Determines EAL H.A.5.1.2 Depressurize RCS to -25' Subcooling I I
- Shading indicates critical task Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) Scenario No.: 4 Pa g e __ 1 of 10 Facility: Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 2008 Examiners:
Operators: Actual Attributes
-- _- -_ I1 5 Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power, BOL, Equilibrium Conditions.
12 AFW pump tagged out for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> into 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> maintenance window). 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4. Major transients (1-2) Event ~ I1 2 11 2 I1 1 5. 6. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1-2) EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) I1 1 I1 0 7. Critical tasks (2-3) I1 3 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 10 SCENARIO OVERVIEW NI POWER SUMMERLOSS OF ALL FEED Initial Condition is steady state at 100% power with 12 AFW pump tagged out for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> into 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> maintenance window). After crew takes the watch a NI channel A power summer amp fails causing multiple alarms. Once crew identifies failed power summer amp NO-1-200 should be referenced and LCO's 3.3.1.A & 3.3.1.D should be entered. CRO will bypass channel A trip units 1,2,7,8,10. A failure of the 12 S/G Main FRV controller will cause the FRV to fail to the D/P controller in manual. AOP-3G should be implemented. After verifying a good setpoint signal the CRO will commence auto operation with the Main Feed Bypass valve. Once feedwater is in auto a loss of offsite power will occur concurrent with a fault on the 11 4KV bus. This will cause a loss of all A train components. During EOP-0 the CRO will need to start 12 CC pp to prevent a RCS leak from the RCP seals. During the wrap up brief for EOP-0 the 11 AFW pump will trip causing a loss of all feedwater. CRS should implement EOP-3.
During EOP-3 the crew will cool down the primary using available S/G inventory and commence once through core cooling when S/G level reaches
-350". CRS should direct tying MCC 114 to MCC 104 to maximize PORV flow. Scenario ends when crew has determined OTCC will be successful IAW EOP Attachments.
CRS will declare Alert based on either A.A.7.1.2 or H.A.5.1.2
- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION Reset to IC-24 Perform switch check. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display.
Place simulator in FREEZE. Enter Trigger
- a. None Enter Malfunctions
- a. Channel A NI Power Summer Failure NIOOll-01 on F1 b. 12 FRV Controller Failure FWO18-02onF2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 - 7. 8. 9. - 10. 11. 12. C. Loss of Offsite Power SWYD002 on F3 d. 11 4KV bus fault 4KVOO1-01 on F4 e. 11 AFW Pump Failure AFWOO1-01 on F5 f. 12 AFW Pump Failure AFWOO1-02 at Time Zero Enter Panel Overrides
- a. None Page of 10 Enter Remote Functions
/ Administrative
- a. Place yellow tag on 12 AFW Pump trip pushbutton. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE. Give crew briefing.
- a. Present plant conditions: 100% load at BOL 2545 h4WDMTU b. Power history: 100% for 2 months C. Equipment out of service: d. Abnormal conditions:
None e. Surveillances due:
None f. Instructions for shift:
Maintain 100% power 12 AFW Pump 00s (repairing overspeed trip linkage 6 hrs into 18 hr window) Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
Instructions for the Booth Operator.
- a. Activate F1 Channel A NI Power Summer Failure when cued by the lead evaluator.
C. Activate F3
& F4 Loss of Offsite Power & 11 4KV bus fault at same time when cued by lead evaluator.
- d. Activate F5 11 AFW Pump Failure when cued by lead evaluator Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Page of a RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner.
If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
- 1. 2. 3 4 5 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 1. 2. 3. REQUEST OWC contact IM for assistance for NI Power Summer OWC contact Engineering
& IM for FRV Controller Failure PWS tie 1Y09 to lYlO with lYlO supplying IAW local plaque TBO shift13 charging pump to 14 480V Bus ABOEPO check SWGR Ventilation in service ABO/PPO operate ADV's locally with chain operator OWC/TBO check 11 AFW pp U2 CRO align 23 AFW pp to supply U-1 OWC expedite return of 12 AFW pp to service ABO/PPO/PWS tie MCC-114 to MCC-104 RESPONSE Acknowledge Request Acknowledge Request Acknowledge Request, after 4 minutes tie lYO9 to lYlO Acknowledge Request, after 1 minute shift power supply Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes report SWGR Ventilation in service Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes open ADV's to requested position.
Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes report 11 AEW pp appears seized.
Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes report cross-connect valve will not open, OWC informed Acknowledge Request Acknowledge Request, after 5 minutes tie MCC's using Remote Function Critical Tasks Commence boration as alternate action fox inability to assess CEA position within 5 minutes of Starts 12 Component Cooling Pump prior to exceeding RCP temperature limits. (thrust bearing 195", CBO 200"). Commence OTCC within 5 minutes of both S/G's c-350" or Tcold rising 5"uncontrollably (must be commenced prior to CET temperature reaching 560°F. trip.
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page __ of - Event
Description:
Channel A NI Power Summer Failure (Evaluator's Cue) Time I Position RO CRO CRO/RO CRS CRO CRS RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1cos w Verifies FWS not calling for a trip Recognize power summer failure on channel A Reference NO-1-200 matrix for T.S. applicability Bypass T/U 1,2,7,8,10 on Channel A Enter LCO's 3.3.1.A & 3.3.1.D Evaluate Alarm Manual for compensatory actions Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page __ of __ Event
Description:
12 FRV Controller Failure (Evaluator's Cue)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page __ of - Event
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power & 11 4KV bus fault, EOP-0 (Evaluator's Cue) - CRS Implement EOP-0 RO Commence boration as alternate action for inability to assess CEA position within 5 min of trip II RO I I I Reports Reactivity Control (Met)
CRO Performs Turbine Trip (Met) CRO Starts 12 Component Cooling Pump prior to reaching RCP temperature limits (thrust bearing 195", CBO 200') CRO CRO CRO CRS Performs Containment Environment (Met). (May call Not Met unable to assess) Secures Blowdown due to not able to assess Rad Levels Reports Rad Levels External to Containment (Not Met)
Contact PWS to tie 1Y09 to 1Y 10 IAW local plaque
- Shading indicates Critical Task Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page - of - Event
Description:
Loss of 11 AFW Pump (Evaluator's Cue, z 3 minutes after pump started)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page - of __ Event
Description:
EOP-3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRO CRO Block SGIS CRS RO Commence rapid cooldown to 465°F Contact maintenance for AFW pp's & 1A DG(if not done during EOP-0) Prepares for Once Through Core Cooling (Starts HPSI, charging pumps, etc) CRO Prevent dryout of SIG's CRS CRS CRS EAL A.A.7.1.2 or H.A.5.1.2 Direct tying MCCll4 to MCC 104 Direct initiation of SIAS A6 & B6 t 1 I
- Shading indicates Critical Task