Letter Sequence Response to RAI |
---|
CAC:MF8931, Administratively Control Containment Penetrations, Deletion of E BAR Definition and Revision to RCS Specific Activity Tech Spec (Approved, Closed) |
|
|
Similar Documents at Cook |
---|
Category:Letter
MONTHYEARAEP-NRC-2024-62, Unit 2 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Registration of Dry Spent Fuel Storage Cask2024-08-0808 August 2024 Unit 2 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Registration of Dry Spent Fuel Storage Cask AEP-NRC-2024-47, Form OAR-1, Owners Activity Report2024-07-30030 July 2024 Form OAR-1, Owners Activity Report ML24183A0162024-07-25025 July 2024 Review of Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Capsule W Technical Report ML24169A2142024-07-25025 July 2024 Issuance of Amendment No. 362 Regarding Change to Technical Specification 3.4.12, Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System IR 05000315/20240022024-07-24024 July 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000315/2024002 and 05000316/2024002 ML24197A1262024-07-15015 July 2024 Unit 2 - Request for Additional Information (RAI) for License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Completion Time for Inoperable AC Source - Operating ML24191A0692024-07-0909 July 2024 Operator Licensing Examination Approval - Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, July 2024 AEP-NRC-2024-56, Unit 2, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Registration of Dry Spent Fuel Storage Cask2024-07-0808 July 2024 Unit 2, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Registration of Dry Spent Fuel Storage Cask AEP-NRC-2024-48, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) for License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Completion Time for Inoperable AC Source - Operating2024-07-0202 July 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) for License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Completion Time for Inoperable AC Source - Operating ML24176A1012024-06-21021 June 2024 57143-EN 57143 - Paragon Energy Solutions - Update 1 (Final) - 10CFR Part 21 Final Notification: P21-05242024-FN, Rev. 0 AEP-NRC-2024-45, Report Per Technical Specification 5.6.6 for Inoperability of Post Accident Monitoring Neutron Flux Monitoring2024-06-13013 June 2024 Report Per Technical Specification 5.6.6 for Inoperability of Post Accident Monitoring Neutron Flux Monitoring ML24163A0132024-06-12012 June 2024 Request for Information for the NRC Age-Related Degradation Inspection: Inspection Report 05000315/2024012 and 05000316/2024012 AEP-NRC-2024-23, Core Operating Limits Report2024-05-23023 May 2024 Core Operating Limits Report ML24141A2162024-05-20020 May 2024 —Information Request to Support the NRC Annual Baseline Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection AEP-NRC-2024-40, Unit 2 - Supplement to License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Completion Time for Inoperable AC Source - Operating2024-05-16016 May 2024 Unit 2 - Supplement to License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Completion Time for Inoperable AC Source - Operating AEP-NRC-2024-41, Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2024-05-15015 May 2024 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report AEP-NRC-2024-26, Transmittal of Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Emergency Plan Revision 492024-05-14014 May 2024 Transmittal of Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Emergency Plan Revision 49 IR 05000315/20244012024-05-14014 May 2024 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000315/2024401 and 05000316/2024401 AEP-NRC-2024-07, Unit 2 - Transmittal of Report of Changes to the Emergency Plan2024-05-14014 May 2024 Unit 2 - Transmittal of Report of Changes to the Emergency Plan IR 05000315/20240012024-05-14014 May 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000315/2024001 and 05000316/2024001 ML24115A2152024-05-0707 May 2024 LTR: CNP Non-Acceptance with Opportunity TS 3-8-1 AEP-NRC-2024-24, Form OAR-1, Owners Activity Report2024-05-0707 May 2024 Form OAR-1, Owners Activity Report ML24116A0002024-05-0202 May 2024 – Regulatory Audit in Support of Review of the Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors AEP-NRC-2024-35, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2024-01 Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2024-04-30030 April 2024 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2024-01 Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations AEP-NRC-2024-28, 2023 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2024-04-29029 April 2024 2023 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report AEP-NRC-2024-31, Annual Report of Individual Monitoring2024-04-24024 April 2024 Annual Report of Individual Monitoring AEP-NRC-2024-29, (CNP) Unit 2 - Request for Relief Related to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case N-729-6 Supplemental Examination Requirements, ISIR-5-072024-04-0303 April 2024 (CNP) Unit 2 - Request for Relief Related to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case N-729-6 Supplemental Examination Requirements, ISIR-5-07 AEP-NRC-2024-02, Unit 2 License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Completion Time for Inoperable AC Source - Operating2024-04-0303 April 2024 Unit 2 License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Completion Time for Inoperable AC Source - Operating AEP-NRC-2024-19, Annual Report of Property Insurance2024-04-0101 April 2024 Annual Report of Property Insurance IR 05000315/20230042024-01-31031 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000315/2023004 and 05000316/2023004 ML24004A1582024-01-19019 January 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0039 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) AEP-NRC-2024-01, Emergency Plan Revision 482024-01-0808 January 2024 Emergency Plan Revision 48 AEP-NRC-2023-56, Report Per Technical Specification 5.6.6 for Inoperability of Unit 1 Post Accident Monitoring Reactor Coolant (Loop 3 Cold Leg) Wide Range Temperature Recorder Thermal Sensor2023-12-20020 December 2023 Report Per Technical Specification 5.6.6 for Inoperability of Unit 1 Post Accident Monitoring Reactor Coolant (Loop 3 Cold Leg) Wide Range Temperature Recorder Thermal Sensor ML23352A3502023-12-19019 December 2023 Dc. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program Inspection and Request for Information ML23338A2642023-12-0505 December 2023 Confirmation of Initial License Examination AEP-NRC-2023-45, Unit 2 - Schedular Exemption for Enhanced Weapons, Firearms, Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-11-16016 November 2023 Unit 2 - Schedular Exemption for Enhanced Weapons, Firearms, Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation IR 05000315/20234042023-11-0606 November 2023 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000315/2023404 and 05000316/2023404 ML23310A1152023-11-0606 November 2023 Notification of the NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information, Inspection Report 05000316/2024002 IR 05000315/20234032023-09-19019 September 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000315/2023403 and 05000316/2023403 IR 05000315/20230112023-08-31031 August 2023 Functional Engineering Inspection - Commercial Grade Dedication Report 05000315/2023011 and 05000316/2023011 ML23242A1832023-08-30030 August 2023 Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information; Inspection Report05000315/2023004 AEP-NRC-2023-40, Annual Report of Loss-of-Coolant Accident Evaluation Model Changes2023-08-29029 August 2023 Annual Report of Loss-of-Coolant Accident Evaluation Model Changes IR 05000315/20234022023-08-11011 August 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000315/2023402 and 05000316/2023402 AEP-NRC-2023-34, Supplement to Request for Approval of Change Regarding Neutron Flux Instrumentation2023-08-0202 August 2023 Supplement to Request for Approval of Change Regarding Neutron Flux Instrumentation IR 05000315/20230022023-07-24024 July 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000315/2023002 and 05000316/2023002 ML23178A2422023-06-28028 June 2023 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch III IR 05000315/20230122023-06-22022 June 2023 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000315/2023012 and 05000316/2023012 IR 05000315/20235012023-06-21021 June 2023 Emergency Preparedness Biennial Exercise Inspection Report 05000315/2023501 and 05000316/2023501 AEP-NRC-2023-29, Core Operating Limits Report2023-06-19019 June 2023 Core Operating Limits Report ML23159A0192023-06-13013 June 2023 Information Meeting with a Question and Answer Session to Discuss NRC 2022 End-Of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 2024-08-08
[Table view] Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARML24197A1262024-07-15015 July 2024 Unit 2 - Request for Additional Information (RAI) for License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Completion Time for Inoperable AC Source - Operating AEP-NRC-2024-48, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) for License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Completion Time for Inoperable AC Source - Operating2024-07-0202 July 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) for License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Completion Time for Inoperable AC Source - Operating AEP-NRC-2022-03, Final Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-022022-01-20020 January 2022 Final Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02 AEP-NRC-2021-68, Response to Request for Additional Information on Requested Change Regarding Containment Water Level Instrumentation2021-12-16016 December 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information on Requested Change Regarding Containment Water Level Instrumentation AEP-NRC-2021-43, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Relief Request for Limited Coverage Examinations Performed in the Fourth 10-Year Inspection Interval2021-07-21021 July 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Relief Request for Limited Coverage Examinations Performed in the Fourth 10-Year Inspection Interval AEP-NRC-2021-16, Unit 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding CFR 50.55a Request Associated with the Fifth Ten-Year Inservice Testing Interval2021-02-25025 February 2021 Unit 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding CFR 50.55a Request Associated with the Fifth Ten-Year Inservice Testing Interval AEP-NRC-2021-18, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of the Containment Type a Leak Rate Testing Frequency2021-02-18018 February 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of the Containment Type a Leak Rate Testing Frequency AEP-NRC-2020-50, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of the Containment Type a Leak Rate Testing Frequency2020-07-0909 July 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of the Containment Type a Leak Rate Testing Frequency AEP-NRC-2019-56, Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Response to Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic2019-11-0404 November 2019 Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Response to Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic AEP-NRC-2019-32, Unit 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Unit 2 Leak-Before-Break Analysis and Deletion of Containment Humidity Monitors for Unit 1 and Unit 22019-08-22022 August 2019 Unit 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Unit 2 Leak-Before-Break Analysis and Deletion of Containment Humidity Monitors for Unit 1 and Unit 2 AEP-NRC-2019-40, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Address NSAL-15-1, Rev. 02019-07-30030 July 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Address NSAL-15-1, Rev. 0 AEP-NRC-2018-81, Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Approval of Application of Proprietary Leak-Before-Break Methodology for Reactor Coolant System Small Diameter Piping2018-11-27027 November 2018 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Approval of Application of Proprietary Leak-Before-Break Methodology for Reactor Coolant System Small Diameter Piping AEP-NRC-2018-82, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the Alternative Request for Elimination of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Threads in Flange Examination2018-11-20020 November 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the Alternative Request for Elimination of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Threads in Flange Examination AEP-NRC-2018-64, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Approval of Application of Proprietary Leak-Before-Break Methodology for Reactor Coolant System Small Diameter Piping2018-09-27027 September 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Approval of Application of Proprietary Leak-Before-Break Methodology for Reactor Coolant System Small Diameter Piping ML18334A2722018-09-18018 September 2018 LTR-SDA-II-18-41-NP, Revision 1, Responses to NRC Questions on the Expanded Scope Leak-Before-Break Evaluations for D.C. Cook, Units 1 and 2. AEP-NRC-2018-45, Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning 2017 Decommissioning Funding Status Report2018-08-0909 August 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning 2017 Decommissioning Funding Status Report AEP-NRC-2018-01, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-012018-05-25025 May 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01 AEP-NRC-2018-23, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Decommissioning Funding Plan2018-04-11011 April 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Decommissioning Funding Plan ML18092A0842018-03-28028 March 2018 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Supplemental Information Regarding the Reactor Vessel Internals Aging Management Program ML17346A7662017-12-0808 December 2017 Enclosures 2 & 3 to AEP-NRC-2017-56 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Action Levels and EAL Technical Basis Manual AEP-NRC-2017-56, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Action Levels2017-12-0808 December 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Action Levels AEP-NRC-2017-30, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.9.3, Containment Penetrations2017-05-26026 May 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.9.3, Containment Penetrations AEP-NRC-2017-16, Submittal of Focused Evaluation in Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Regarding Near- Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Flooding2017-05-11011 May 2017 Submittal of Focused Evaluation in Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Regarding Near- Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Flooding AEP-NRC-2017-09, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request for the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program2017-02-27027 February 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request for the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program AEP-NRC-2016-81, Unit 2 - Supplemental Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTP-425, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies Program to Licensee Control-Risk Informed ...2016-11-0303 November 2016 Unit 2 - Supplemental Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTP-425, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies Program to Licensee Control-Risk Informed ... AEP-NRC-2016-80, Response to NRC Generic Letter 2016-01: Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools2016-10-31031 October 2016 Response to NRC Generic Letter 2016-01: Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools AEP-NRC-2016-79, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2016-10-12012 October 2016 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident AEP-NRC-2016-69, Follow-up Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies Program to License Control-Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force.2016-09-0909 September 2016 Follow-up Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies Program to License Control-Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force. AEP-NRC-2016-56, Response to Seventh Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term2016-07-12012 July 2016 Response to Seventh Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term AEP-NRC-2016-48, Unit 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies Program to Licensee-Control...2016-06-16016 June 2016 Unit 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies Program to Licensee-Control... AEP-NRC-2016-54, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force Initiative 582016-06-16016 June 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force Initiative 58 ML16169A1152016-05-0606 May 2016 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Response to Sixth Request for Additional Information the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term AEP-NRC-2016-24, Response to Fifth Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term2016-02-19019 February 2016 Response to Fifth Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term AEP-NRC-2016-14, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation2016-01-21021 January 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation AEP-NRC-2015-11, Response (Part 2) to Fourth Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term2015-12-17017 December 2015 Response (Part 2) to Fourth Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term ML15323A4342015-11-16016 November 2015 Response (Part 1) to Fourth Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term ML15323A4332015-11-16016 November 2015 Supplemental Response to Request for Additional Information on the Application for Amendment to Restore Normal Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Consistent with Previously Licensed Conditions. AEP-NRC-2015-98, Supplemental Response to Follow-Up Request for Additional Information Concerning the Reactor Vessel Internals Aging Management Program2015-10-30030 October 2015 Supplemental Response to Follow-Up Request for Additional Information Concerning the Reactor Vessel Internals Aging Management Program AEP-NRC-2015-99, Response to Request for Additional Information Re License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Section 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirements 3.8.1.10, 3.8.1.11 and 3.8.1.152015-10-30030 October 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information Re License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Section 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirements 3.8.1.10, 3.8.1.11 and 3.8.1.15 ML15308A0932015-10-15015 October 2015 Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group (Pwrog), 15066-NP, Revision 1, Responses to Follow-Up NRC RAI 2 on the D.C. Cook, Units 1 and 2, Reactor Internals Aging Management Program. AEP-NRC-2015-86, Supplemental Response to Request for Additional Information on the Application for Amendment to Restore Normal Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Consistent With. Previously Licensed Conditions.2015-09-18018 September 2015 Supplemental Response to Request for Additional Information on the Application for Amendment to Restore Normal Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Consistent With. Previously Licensed Conditions. AEP-NRC-2015-80, Response to Third Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term2015-08-28028 August 2015 Response to Third Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term AEP-NRC-2015-75, Response to Second Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term2015-08-24024 August 2015 Response to Second Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term AEP-NRC-2015-88, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code, Section XI Repair Requirements2015-08-24024 August 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code, Section XI Repair Requirements AEP-NRC-2015-69, Response to Follow-Up Request for Additional Information Concerning the Reactor Vessel Internals Aging Management Program2015-08-0606 August 2015 Response to Follow-Up Request for Additional Information Concerning the Reactor Vessel Internals Aging Management Program ML15223A4362015-07-28028 July 2015 PWROG-15066-NP, Revision 0, Responses to Follow-Up NRC RAI 2 on the DC Cook Units 1 and 2 Reactor Internals Aging Management Program. AEP-NRC-2015-63, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding 2014 Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Inspection2015-07-17017 July 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding 2014 Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Inspection AEP-NRC-2015-64, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term2015-07-17017 July 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term AEP-NRC-2015-60, Response to a Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Section 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirements 3.8.1.10, 3.8.1.11, and 3.8.1.152015-07-0909 July 2015 Response to a Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Section 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirements 3.8.1.10, 3.8.1.11, and 3.8.1.15 AEP-NRC-2015-66, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Exigent License Amendment Request Regarding Technical Specification 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation2015-07-0202 July 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Exigent License Amendment Request Regarding Technical Specification 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation 2024-07-02
[Table view] |
Text
B IN DIANA MICHIGAN POWER A unit of American Electric Power May 26, 2017 Docket Nos.: 50-315 50-316 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A TIN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2 Indiana Michigan Power Cook Nuclear Plant One Cook Place Bridgman, Ml 49106 lndianaMichiganPower.com AEP-NRC-2017-30 10 CFR 50.90 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.9.3, Containment Penetrations
References:
- 1. Letter from Q. S. Lies, Indiana Michigan Power Company (l&M), to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, License Amendment Request Regarding Technical Specification 3.9.3, Containment Penetrations," dated December 14, 2016, Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 16351A198.
- 2. Email from A. W. Dietrich, NRC, to H. L. Kish, l&M, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2 -"Request for Additional Information for the License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.9.3, Containment Penetrations," dated April 19, 2017, ADAMS Accession No. ML 17112A033.
This letter provides Indiana Michigan Power Company's (l&M), the licensee for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Units 1 and 2, response to the Request for Additional Information (RAI) by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regarding a License Amendment Request (LAR) to amend Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.3, "Containment Penetrations," by revising the Note regarding applicability of the Limiting Condition for Operation.
By Reference 1, l&M submitted a request to amend the TS to CNP Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating Licenses DPR-58 and DPR-74. l&M proposes to revise the Note for TS 3.9.3, "Containment Penetrations," to allow containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere that do not pass through the auxiliary building vent to be open under administrative control. By Reference 2, the NRC transmitted an RAI regarding the LAR submitted by l&M in Reference
- 1. A telephone conference was held between NRC staff and l&M on April 19, 2017, to clarify the information requested.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 AEP-NRC-2017-30 Enclosure 1 to this letter provides an affirmation statement.
Enclosure 2 to this letter provides l&M's response to the RAI contained in Reference
- 2. Enclosures 3 and 4 to this letter provide CNPs TS Bases pages marked to reflect the proposed change for Unit 1 and 2, respectively (for information only). Copies of this letter are being transmitted to the Michigan Public Service Commission and Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91. There are no new regulatory commitments made in this letter. Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Michael K. Scarpello, Regulatory Affairs Manager, at (269) 466-2649.
l;;,ane Lies Site Vice President RAW/kmh
Enclosures:
- 1. Affirmation
- 2. Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.9.3, Containment Penetrations
- 3. CNP Unit 1 TS Bases Pages Marked to Show Proposed Changes (For Information Only) 4. CNP Unit 2 TS Bases Pages Marked to Show Proposed Changes (For lnformat_ion Only) c: R. J. Ancona, MPSC J. K. Rankin, NRC, Washington, D.C. MDEQ -RMD/RPS NRC Resident Inspector C. D. Pederson, NRC, Region Ill A J. Williamson, AEP Ft. Wayne, w/o enclosures Enclosure 1 to AEP-NRC-2017-30 AFFIRMATION I, Q. Shane Lies, being duly sworn, state that I am the Site Vice President of Indiana Michigan Power Company (l&M), that I am authorized to sign and file this request with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on behalf of l&M, and that the statements made and the matters set forth herein pertaining to l&M are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. Indiana Michigan Power Company . ane Lies Site Vice President SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS \.() DAY OF \'l'\.c:N---\ , 2017 )\". :,,\) ! "f' f ll Nata blic My Commission Expires (J '-\ -D'=-1 DANIELLE BURGOYNE Notary Public, State of Michigan County of Berrien My Commission Expires Acting In the County or'* ct...t'V' Enciosure 2 to AIEP-NRC-2017-3!0 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.9.3, Containment Penetrations By letter dated December 14, 2016 (Reference 1), Indiana Michigan Power Company (l&M), the licensee for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Units 1 and 2, submitted a License Amendment Request (LAR). This amendment proposes to revise the Note for Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.3, "Containment Penetrations," to allow containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere that do not pass through the auxiliary building vent to be open under administrative control. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is currently reviewing the submittal, and has determined that additional information is needed in order to complete the review (Reference 2). The text of the request for additional information (RAI) and l&M's response are provided below. RAl-1 Based on the AST accident analysis for the fuel handling accident (FHA) in containment, the LAR proposed to revise the TS 3.9.3 LCO note to remove a restriction and allow containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere that do not pass through the auxiliary building vent to be open under administrative control. The NRG staff reviewed its safety evaluation associated with CNP license amendment Nos. 332 for Unit No. 1, and 314 for Unit No. 2, (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16242A111), to determine if the confirmatory dose calculations for the AST FHA indicate acceptable radiological consequences.
CNP TS 3.9.3 allows the personnel air lock to be open during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, and thus establishes a flow path from containment through the personnel airlock into the adjacent auxiliary building.
The AST FHA analysis did not analyze this flow path. Fol/owing an FHA in containment, there exists a pathway for activity to migrate from the open containment airlock into the adjacent building and eventually into the control room. Explain how the potential contribution to the control room dose through the containment airlock is accounted for in, or bounded by, the AST FHA dose consequence analysis of record. l&M Response to RAl-1: The FHA dose consequence analysis of record outlined in RWA-1313-015, Revision 1 (Enclosure 5 of Reference 3), models the most limiting credible dose release-receptor pair for a FHA occurring inside containment.
The auxiliary building is procedurally maintained at a negative pressure with respect to atmospheric pressure to ensure adequate exhaust through Enclosure 2 to AEP-NRC-2017-30 Page 2 the plant vent. Therefore, for releases from containment into the auxiliary building (including those through the containment airlock), the only credible release point for radionuclide transport is the plant vent. As stated in Section 3.2 of RWA-1313-015, Revision 1 (Enclosure 5 of Reference 3), the dose consequence analysis of a FHA inside containment modeled a release which was assumed to be a point on the external containment surface closest to the control room intakes. As shown in Table 2.3-3 of RWA-1313-015, Revision 1 (Enclosure 5 of Reference 3), the corresponding containment "closest point" atmospheric dispersion factors are limiting in comparison to the atmospheric dispersion factors derived for the release from the plant vent. As the most limiting atmospheric dispersion factors (containment "closest point") were utilized in the analysis, a release resulting from a FHA in containment released into the auxiliary building with eventual release from the plant vent would be bounded by the analysis outlined in RWA-1313-015, Revision 1 (Enclosure 5 of Reference 3). RAl-2 Based on the AST accident analysis for the FHA in containment, the LAR proposed to revise the TS 3.9.3 LCO note to remove a restriction and allow containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere that do not pass through the auxiliary building vent to be open under administrative control. The NRG staff reviewed its safety evaluation associated with CNP license amendment Nos. 332 for Unit 1, and 314 for Unit 2, (ADAMS Accession No. ML16242A111) to determine if the confirmatory dose calculations for the AST FHA indicate acceptable radiological consequences.
Removing the restriction from the TS 3.9.3 LCO note would allow containment penetrations that do not exit through the auxiliary building vent but are in the auxiliary building to be open. For example, as stated in the LAR, the component cooling water system containment building penetrations that do not exit through the auxiliary building vent could be opened during fuel movement in containment.
The AST FHA analysis does not analyze these flow paths. Following an FHA in containment, these penetrations provide a pathway for activity to migrate from the containment into the adjacent auxiliary building and eventually into the control room. " Explain how the potential contribution to the control room dose through containment penetrations that do not exit through the auxiliary building vent but are in the auxiliary building are accounted for in, or bounded by, the AST FHA dose consequence analysis of record. l&M Response to RAl-2: As stated in the response to RAl-1, the only credible ultimate release point for radionuclide transport for a FHA inside containment released into the auxiliary building is the plant vent. The FHA dose consequence analysis of record outlined in RWA-1313-015, Revision 1 (Enclosure 5 of Reference 3), models the most limiting credible dose release-receptor pair for a FHA Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2017-3 Page 3 occurring inside containment, which is assumed to be a point on the external containment surface closest to the control room intakes. There are no new containment penetration allowances introduced by this License Amendment that exit through the Auxiliary Building Vent. Refer to the response to RAl-1 for further clarification.
RAl-3 The NRG staff reviewed its safety evaluation associated with CNP license amendment Nos. 259 for Unit No. 1, and 242 for Unit No. 2, dated November 21, 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML012770113), to determine if commitments were made from the licensee to implement administrative procedures that ensure that the open containment penetrations can and will be promptly closed in the event of an FHA. As stated in the safety evaluation, the capability to isolate the containment penetrations in the event of an FHA is desirable in the interest of defense-in-depth.
This is captured in Footnote 3 of RG 1.183, Appendix B, which contains the NRG staff's guidance to licensees on acceptable assumptions for evaluating the radiological consequences of a FHA. RG 1. 183, Appendix B, Footnote 3, applies to FHAs within an open containment, and states: The staff will generally require that technical specifications allowing such operations include administrative controls to close the airlock, hatch, or open penetrations within 30 minutes. Such administrative controls will generally require that a dedicated individual be present, with necessary equipment available, to restore containment closure should a fuel handling accident occur. Radiological analyses should generally not credit this manual isolation.
As discussed in the safety evaluation associated with license amendment Nos. 259 and 242, the licensee committed to implement these administrative controls.
The Bases for TS 314.9.4 were revised to state that appropriate personnel are aware of the open status of the penetration flow path during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel in containment, and that specified individuals are designated and readily available to isolate the flow path in the event of an FHA. The safety evaluation states that the NRG staff found this commitment to be acceptable.
The LAR dated December 14, 2016, does not contain a discussion of this past commitment or explain if the new proposed penetration allowances will be added to, or included in, the past commitment.
Nor does the LAR contain a discussion of the AST FHA analysis' consistency with RG 1. 183, Appendix B, Footnote 3. 0 Describe the relationship of the past commitment to the new penetration allowances requested in the LAR, and explain how the AST FHA analysis is consistent with RG 1. 183, Appendix B, Footnote 3. l&M Response to RAl-3: The past commitment to allow containment penetrations to be opened while applying administrative controls as described in TS Bases 3.9.3 will apply to the new penetration allowances requested by the LAR. As described in Attachment 1 to Reference 4, l&M previously Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2017-3 Page 4 committed to implement administrative controls by revising the bases for then T/S 3/4.9.4, which is currently TS Bases 3.9.3. By Reference 5, the NRC approved l&M's commitment to incorporate the requirement for administrative controls into l&M's licensing basis by revising the TS Bases. This license amendment is not requesting a change in this previous commitment and will retain the TS Bases language, but will be modified to reflect the proposed change to the TS 3.9.3 Note. The TS Bases pages marked to show proposed changes for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are included in Enclosures 3 and 4, respectively, to refiect the proposed change to TS 3.9.3 Note and to show the commitment that is currently reflected in the TS Bases 3.9.3. These administrative actions are not credited by the FHA analysis as described in Reference 3 and are thusly consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix B, Footnote 3. REFERENCES
- 1. Letter from Q. S. Lies, Indiana Michigan Power Company (l&M), to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 a.nd 2, License Amendment Request Regarding Technical Specification 3.9.3, Containment Penetrations," dated December 14, 2016, Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 16351A198.
- 2. Email from A W. Dietrich, NRC, to H. L. Kish, l&M, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2 -"Request for Additional Information for the License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.9.3, Containment Penetrations," dated April 19, 2017, ADAMS Accession No. ML 17112A033.
- 3. Letter from Q. S. Lies, l&M, to NRC, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2 Response to Sixth Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490 and Implement Alternative Source Term," dated May 6, 2016, ADAMS Accession No. ML 16169A 115. 4. Letter from M. W. Rencheck, l&M, to NRC, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 -License Amendment Request -Technical Specification Change for Inoperable AC. or D.C. Distribution Systems in Modes 5 & 6 and for Containment Penetrations During Refueling," dated May 15, 2001, ADAMS Accession No. ML011380084.
- 5. Letter from J. F. Stang, NRC, to R. P. Powers, l&M, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 -Issuance of Amendments (TAC Nos. MB1973 and MB1974)," dated November 21, 2001, ADAMS Accession No. ML012770113.
Enclosure 3 to AEP-NRC-2017-30 CNP Unit 1 TS Bases Pages Marked to Show Proposed Changes (For Information Only)
BASES LCO (continued)
APPLICABILITY ACTIONS Containment Penetrations 8 3.9.3 and exhaust valve closure times specified in the UFSAR can be achieved and, therefore, meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis to ensure that releases through the valves are terminated, such that radiological doses are within the acceptance limit. The LCO is modified by a Note allowing penetration flow paths with direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere via the auxiliary building vent to be unisolated under administrative controls.
Administrative controls ensure that 1) appropriate personnel are aware of the open status of the penetration flow path during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, and 2) specified individuals are designated and readily available to isolate the flow path in the event of a fuel handling accident.
The containment personnel air lock doors may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment provided that one door is capable of being closed in the event of a fuel handling accident.
A designated individual shall be available at all times during movement of irradiated fuel to close an air lock door if required.
Cables or hoses transversing the air lock shall be designed to allow for removal in a tim.ely manner (e.g., quick disconnects).
Should a fuel handling accident occur inside containment, one personnel air lock tjoor will be closed following an evacuation of containment.
The containment penetration requirements are applicable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is a potential for the limiting fuel handling accident.
In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.1. In MODES 5 and 6, when movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment is not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist. Therefore, under these conditions no requirements are placed on containment penetration status. If the containment equipment hatch, air locks, or any containment penetration that provides direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere is not in the required status, including the Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust System not capable of automatic actuation when the purge supply and exhaust valves are-open, the unit must be placed in a condition where the isolation function is not needed. This is accomplished by immediately suspending movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
Performance of these actions shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.
Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 8 3.9.3-3 Revision No. 0 Enclosure 4 to AEP-NRC-2017-30 CNP Unit 2 TS Bases Pages Marked to Show Proposed Changes (For Information Only)
BASES LCO (continued)
APPLICABILITY ACTIONS Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 and exhaust valve closure times specified in the UFSAR can be achieved and, therefore, meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis to ensure that releases through the valves are terminated, such that radiological doses are within the acceptance limit. The LCO is modified by a Note allowing penetration flow paths with direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere via the auxiliary building vent to be unisolated under administrative controls.
Administrative controls ensure that 1) appropriate personnel are aware of the open status of the penetration flow path during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, and 2) specified individuals are designated and readily available to isolate the flow path in the event of a fuel handling accident.
The containment personnel air lock doors may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment provided that one door is capable of being closed in the event of a fuel handling accident.
A designated individual shall be available at all times during movement of irradiated fuel to close an air lock door if required.
Cables or hoses transversing the air lock shall be designed to allow for removal in a timely manner (e.g., quick disconnects).
Should a fuel handling accident occur inside containment, one personnel air lock door will be closed following an evacuation of containment.
The containment penetration requirements are applicable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is a potential for the limiting fuel handling accident.
In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.1. In MODES 5 and 6, when movement of irradiated fuel assemblieswithin containment is not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist. Therefore, under these conditions no requirements are placed on containment penetration status. If the containment equipment hatch, air locks, or any containment penetration that provides direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere is not in the required status, including the Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust System not capable of automatic actuation when the purge supply and exhaust valves are the unit must be placed in a condition where the isolation function is not-needed.
This is accomplished by immediately suspending movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
Performance of these actions shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.
Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 B 3.9.3-3 Revision No. 0