ML20141D426

From kanterella
Revision as of 01:11, 22 July 2020 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Safety Evaluation Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.3 & 3.2.3, Post-Maint Testing (Program Description & Procedure). Tech Specs Incorporating post-maint Testing of Reactor Protection Sys Components Should Be Proposed
ML20141D426
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 03/31/1986
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20141D423 List:
References
GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8604080013
Download: ML20141D426 (3)


Text

pur g jo UNITED STATES 8 'g n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h .

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

%*...+/

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION GENERI LETTER 83-28, ITEMS 3.1.3 AND 3.2.3 - POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING ,

(PROGRAM DESCRIPTION AND PROCEDURE)

GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-219 I. INTRODUCTION On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signcl from the reactor protection system. This incident occurred during the plant start-up and the reactor was tripped manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers has been determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip sianal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up. In this case, the reactor was tripoed manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trio. Followina these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (ED0), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inouiry into the generic implications of l the Salem unit incidents are reported in '!UREG-1000, " Generic Implications of ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Commission (NRC) requested (by Generic letter 83-28 dated July 8,1983) all licensees of operatina reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to certain aeneric coc.:arns. These concerns are in four areas:(1) Post-Trip

Review, (2) Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface, (3) Post-Maintenance Testing, and (4) Reactor Trip System Reliability Improvements.

The third action item, Post-Maintenance Testing, consists of Action Item l 3.1.3, " Reactor Trip System Components," and 3.2.3, "All Other Safet.r-Related Components." These items reauired licensee's to identify any pcst-maintenance test requirements in existing Technical Specifications (TS) Wich can be demonstrated to degrade rather than enhance safety. The licens es were request a in GL 83-28 to submit to the staff appropriate l chanae s to these test requirements with supporting justification.

1 This safety evaluation addresses Action Items 3.1.3 and 3.2.3 only.

[

, 9604000013 860331

! PDR ADOCK 05000219 P PDR l

l

O II. REVIEW GUIDELINES Generic Letter 83-28 (Ref.1) describes intermediate term actions to be taken ,

by licensees and applicants to address the generic issues raised by the t a ATWS events that occurred at Unit 1 of Salem Nuclear Power Plant.

This report is an evaluation of the responses submitted by GPU Nuclear Corporation, the licensee for Oyster Creek, for Items 3.1.3 and 3.2.3 of the Generic Letter. The actual documents reviewed as part of this evaluation are listed as references 2 and 4 in the References Section at the end of this report.

The requirements for these two items are identical with the exception that Item 3.1.3 applies these requirements to the Reactor Trip System (RTS) components and Item 3.2.3 apolies them to all other safety-related components.

Recause of this similarity, the responses to both items were evaluated together.

Licensees and applicants were requested to identify, if applicable, any post-maintenance test reautrements in the existing TS which can be demonstrated to degrade rather than enhance safety. Appropriate changes to these test re-quirements, with supporting justification, were reauested to be submitted for staf# approval.

III. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION The licensee for Gyster Creek responded to these requirements initially with a submittal dated November 14, 1983 (Ref. 2). The NRC staff requested additional information on April 5,1985, (Ref. 3) to which the licensee responded on October 23, 1985 (Ref. 4). Items 3.1.3 and 3.2.3 were inspected and reported on by Region I/NRC in Section 2.4 of Inspection Report 50-219/84-31 dated January 17, 1985 (Ref. 5). The conclusion of the Inspection Report was that the licensee was strengthening its post-maintenance testing program.

The licensee stated in these submittals that there were no post-maintenance testino requirements in Technical Specifications for either the reactor trip system or other safety-related components which degraded safety. Based on the licensee's statement, we find the licensee's responses acceptable for Items 3.1.3 and 3.2.3 of Generic Letter 83-28.

The licensee also stated in its submittals that the Oyster Creek TS do not require post-maintenance testing for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) components. The licensee stated that it incorporates the post-maintenance testing requirements for these components into station procedures as were discussed by the licensee in Inspection Report No. 50-219/84-31 (Ref. 5).

The staff concludes, however, that the TS should require post-maintenance testing of RPS components and requests the licensee to propose appropriate technical specifications requiring such testing. These specifications should be proposed before the restart from the Cycle 11 Refueling Outage scheduled for April to October 1986.

i 8 3-IV. REFERENCES

1. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, .

Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits,

" Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8, 1983.

2. GPU Nuclear Corporation letter, P. B. Fiedler to Director, Division of Licensing, NRC, "0yster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Docket No.

50-219, Generic Letter 83-28," November la, 1983.

3. NRC letter, J. A. Zwolinski, Chief, Division of Licensing, to Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, P. B. Fiedler, " Request for Additional Information Followino Preliminary Staff Review of Licensee Responses to Generic Letter 83-28," April 5,1985.
4. GPU Nuclear Corporation letter, P. B. Fiedler to J. A. Zwolinski, Division of Licensing, NRC, "0yster Creek Nuclear Generatina Station, Docket No. 50-219, Generic Letter 83-28," October 23, 1985.
5. Region I, NRC, Inspection Report, Division of Engineering and Technical Programs, T. T. Martin to P. B. Fiedler, GPil Nuclear, " Inspection No.

50-719/84-31," January 17, 1985 (NRC Accession No. 8501290664).

V. ACKNOWLEDGMENT This evaluation was prepared by A. Toalston and J. Donohew.

Dated: March 31, 1986 l

l l

l l

__ _ - _.