Similar Documents at Surry |
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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML18152B3591999-08-23023 August 1999 Revised Tech Specs Basis Pages for TS 3.1.B,deleting Reactor Vessel Toughness Data Duplicated in UFSAR & Includes Ref to Applicable UFSAR Section ML18152B6591999-04-28028 April 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re Refueling Water Chemical Addition Tank Min Vol ML18152A2131999-02-16016 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Consolidating AFW cross-connect Requirements by Relocation of Electrical Power Requirements from TS 3.16 to TS 3.6 ML18152B5451999-02-16016 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising Augmented Insp Requirements for Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels ML18152B6151998-11-0404 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 4.6.A.1.b,re EDG Start & Load Time Testing Requirements & TS 3.16 Bases Re EDG Ratings ML18153A3311998-09-24024 September 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Testing Requirements for Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker ML18153A3351998-09-24024 September 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Affected by Suppl to 960912 Resubmittal of Change Request Re Relocation of Fire Protection Requirements from TS to UFSAR ML18152B7551998-06-19019 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Establishing Requirements for Use of Temporary Supply Line (Jumper) to Provide Svc Water to Component Cooling Heat Exchangers ML18152A3651998-03-25025 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Station Mgt Titles to Reflect New Positions Approved by Vepc Board of Directors on 980220 ML18153A3481997-12-18018 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Clarifying Terminology Used for Describing Equipment Surveillances Conducted on Refueling Interval Frequency.Clarification Consistent W/Info Contained in Rev 1 to NUREG-1431 ML18153A1761997-11-0505 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Temporary Svc Water Supply Line to Component Cooling Heat Exchangers ML18153A3941997-11-0505 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Change for Increased Enrichment of Reload Fuel ML18153A5231997-04-24024 April 1997 Proposed Corrected Tech Specs Pages 6.1-3 & 6.1-8 Re Relocation of Fire Protection TS to Updated Final Safety Analysis Rept ML18153A5031997-03-18018 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Rev to Section 4.15 for Surry Power Station to Include Pp Inadvertently Omitted from 970203 Request for Amend to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37 ML18153A4921997-02-0303 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Deletion of Specific ASME Section XI Code Ref ML18153A6351996-11-26026 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Removal of Record Retention Requirements,Per GL 95-06 & Administrative Ltr 95-06 ML18153A0671996-09-12012 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Relocation of Fire Protection Requirements ML18153A6901996-04-15015 April 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Clarifying Applicability of Quadrant Power Tilt Ration Requirements ML18153A5391996-03-21021 March 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Charcoal Filter Testing Clarification ML18153A5271996-03-14014 March 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Permitting Use of 10CFR50 App J,Option B,performance-based Containment Lrt ML18153A5801996-01-30030 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Coolant Sys Liquid Sampling ML18153A6761995-11-20020 November 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re App J Option B,performance-based Containment Leakage Rate Testing ML18153A7141995-07-20020 July 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Establishing New Setpoint Limit for SG high-high Level & Provides More Restrictive Setting Limits for Certain Rps/Esfas Setpoints ML18153A6991995-07-14014 July 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Two H Allowed Outage Time for One RHR Pump to Accommodate Plant Safety,Emergency Power Sys Surveillance Testing & Permit Depressurizing SI Accumulators in Lieu of Accumulator Isolation ML18153A8371995-06-0808 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Revised Pressure/Temp Limits & Associated Ltops Setpoint That Will Be Valid to end-of-license ML18153B2301995-02-14014 February 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re App J Testing Requirements ML18153B2131995-01-24024 January 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying as-found Test Acceptance Criterion for Pressurizer Safety Valves ML18153B1621994-11-29029 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Implementing Zirlo Fuel Cladding ML18153B1581994-11-22022 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs,Deleting Unnecessary Descriptive Phrases Re Number of Cells in Station & EDG Batteries ML18153B1501994-11-10010 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Changes to TS Will Clarify SR for Reactor Protection & Engineered Safeguard Sys Instrumentation & Actuation Logic ML18153B0941994-10-11011 October 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Surveillance Frequencies for Hydrogen Analyzers ML18152A5061994-09-0606 September 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Mgt Safety Review Committee & Station Nuclear Safety & Operating Committee Responsibilities ML18152A1191994-08-30030 August 1994 Proposed Tech Specs to Accomodate Core Uprating ML18153B0061994-07-14014 July 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Changes Will Eliminate Remaining References to cycle-specific Parameters in Surry TS ML18152A1821994-06-0909 June 1994 Proposed TS Re Chemical & Vol Control Sys & Safety Injection Sys ML20065P6111994-04-19019 April 1994 Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying Control Rod Movement Surveillance Frequency ML18153A8821994-02-25025 February 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Surveillance Frequency of Nozzles in Containment & Recirculation Spray Sys ML18153B4321993-12-27027 December 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Reflecting Revised Review Responsibilities of Station Nuclear Safety & Operating Committee & Mgt Safety Review Committee ML18153B4081993-12-10010 December 1993 Proposed Tech Specs,Establishing Upper Limit on Allowable COLR Mtc Values ML18153B4021993-12-10010 December 1993 Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying Surveillance Frequency of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Pumps from Monthly to Quarterly Per Generic Ltr 93-05 & NUREG-1431 ML18153B4051993-12-10010 December 1993 Proposed Tech Specs,Updating Augmented Insp Program for Sensitized Stainless Steel by Incorporating Newer Code Requirements,While Maintaining Augmented Insp Philosophy ML18153B3751993-11-15015 November 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Implementing Revised 10CFR20,revising Frequency Radiological Release Repts from Semiannual to Annual & Clarifying Site Maps ML18153B3501993-10-19019 October 1993 Proposed Tech Specs for RSHX Svc Water Outlet Radiation Monitors ML18153B3321993-09-29029 September 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Required Insp Frequency of Low Pressure Turbine Blades to Permit Blade Insp to Be Performed Concurrent W/Disk & Hub Insp ML18152A0481993-07-20020 July 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Deleting Requirement for Station Nuclear Safety & Operating Committee & Audit Frequencies ML18153D3921993-07-16016 July 1993 Proposed Tech Specs for Operation W/Three Degree Increase in Svc Water Temp Limit for Containment Air Partial Pressures of 9.1,9.2 & 9.35 Psia ML18152A0461993-07-16016 July 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Implementing Revised 10CFR20,revise Frequency of Radiological Effluent Release Repts from semi-annual to Annual,& Clarify Site Maps ML18152A4511993-07-0202 July 1993 Proposed Tech Specs to Include COLR Which Presents reload- Specific Limits for Key Core Operating Parameters ML18153D3811993-07-0202 July 1993 Proposed TS Table 4.2-1 Re Miscellaneous Insps & Sensitized Stainless Steel Exams ML18153D3331993-05-0606 May 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Supporting Operation of Unit 2 w/100 Psi Reduction in RCS Nominal Operating Pressure Through End of Operating Cycle 12 1999-08-23
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML18152B3591999-08-23023 August 1999 Revised Tech Specs Basis Pages for TS 3.1.B,deleting Reactor Vessel Toughness Data Duplicated in UFSAR & Includes Ref to Applicable UFSAR Section ML18151A6641999-08-0606 August 1999 Rev 0 to Surry Unit 2 Cycle 16 Startup Physics Tests Rept. ML18152B6591999-04-28028 April 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re Refueling Water Chemical Addition Tank Min Vol ML18152A2131999-02-16016 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Consolidating AFW cross-connect Requirements by Relocation of Electrical Power Requirements from TS 3.16 to TS 3.6 ML18152B5451999-02-16016 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising Augmented Insp Requirements for Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels ML18151A5511999-02-10010 February 1999 to NE-1187, Surry Unit 1,Cycle 16 Startup Physics Tests Rept. ML18152B6151998-11-0404 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 4.6.A.1.b,re EDG Start & Load Time Testing Requirements & TS 3.16 Bases Re EDG Ratings ML18153A3351998-09-24024 September 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Affected by Suppl to 960912 Resubmittal of Change Request Re Relocation of Fire Protection Requirements from TS to UFSAR ML18153A3311998-09-24024 September 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Testing Requirements for Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker ML18152B7551998-06-19019 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Establishing Requirements for Use of Temporary Supply Line (Jumper) to Provide Svc Water to Component Cooling Heat Exchangers ML20249B9911998-05-0606 May 1998 Analysis of Capsule X Virginia Power Surry Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Matl Surveillance Program. W/Evaluation of Surry Unit 1 Surveillance Capsule X Results & Response to NRC RAI Re GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1 ML18151A1931998-05-0404 May 1998 Rev 1 to Summary of Changes to Surry Units 1 & 2 Third Interval IST Program. ML18152A3651998-03-25025 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Station Mgt Titles to Reflect New Positions Approved by Vepc Board of Directors on 980220 ML20199B0711998-01-0505 January 1998 Rev 0 to NE-1148, Surry Unit 2,Cycle 15 Startup Physics Test Rept ML18153A3481997-12-18018 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Clarifying Terminology Used for Describing Equipment Surveillances Conducted on Refueling Interval Frequency.Clarification Consistent W/Info Contained in Rev 1 to NUREG-1431 ML18150A4661997-12-16016 December 1997 ISI Plan for Third Insp Interval,Vol 2,Rev 9 for Components & Component Supports,940510-040510, for Surry Power Station,Unit 2 ML18153A3941997-11-0505 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Change for Increased Enrichment of Reload Fuel ML18153A1761997-11-0505 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Temporary Svc Water Supply Line to Component Cooling Heat Exchangers ML18150A4641997-10-27027 October 1997 Risk-Informed ISI (RI-ISI) Pilot Program Submittal. ML18151A3911997-10-16016 October 1997 Rev 8 to VPAP-2103, Odcm. ML18151A7231997-08-0707 August 1997 Rev 1 to Nuclear Safety Analysis Manual Part Iv,Chapter a Probabilistic Safety Assessment Products. ML20210J5031997-07-31031 July 1997 Rev 0 to NE-1132, Surry Unit 1,Cycle 15 Startup Physics Tests Rept ML18150A4441997-06-0909 June 1997 Vol 2,Rev 8 to ISI Plan for Third Insp Interval for Components & Component Supports,Oct 14,1993-Oct 13,2003. ML18153A5231997-04-24024 April 1997 Proposed Corrected Tech Specs Pages 6.1-3 & 6.1-8 Re Relocation of Fire Protection TS to Updated Final Safety Analysis Rept ML18153A5031997-03-18018 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Rev to Section 4.15 for Surry Power Station to Include Pp Inadvertently Omitted from 970203 Request for Amend to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37 ML18153A4921997-02-0303 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Deletion of Specific ASME Section XI Code Ref ML18153A6351996-11-26026 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Removal of Record Retention Requirements,Per GL 95-06 & Administrative Ltr 95-06 ML18153A0671996-09-12012 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Relocation of Fire Protection Requirements ML18151A9761996-08-13013 August 1996 Cycle 14 Startup Physics Test Rept. W/960830 Ltr ML20134J9861996-07-30030 July 1996 /Unit 2 Fuel Assembly Insp Program ML18152A4701996-06-13013 June 1996 Cycle 13 Control Rod Performance Test Results. ML18153A6901996-04-15015 April 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Clarifying Applicability of Quadrant Power Tilt Ration Requirements ML18153A5391996-03-21021 March 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Charcoal Filter Testing Clarification ML18153A5271996-03-14014 March 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Permitting Use of 10CFR50 App J,Option B,performance-based Containment Lrt ML18153A5801996-01-30030 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Coolant Sys Liquid Sampling ML18152A0571995-12-20020 December 1995 Startup Physics Test Rept,Surry Unit 1,Cycle 14. W/960111 Ltr ML18153A6761995-11-20020 November 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re App J Option B,performance-based Containment Leakage Rate Testing ML18151A6421995-08-0101 August 1995 Change 3 to Rev 0 to Third Interval IST Program ML18153A7141995-07-20020 July 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Establishing New Setpoint Limit for SG high-high Level & Provides More Restrictive Setting Limits for Certain Rps/Esfas Setpoints ML18153A6991995-07-14014 July 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Two H Allowed Outage Time for One RHR Pump to Accommodate Plant Safety,Emergency Power Sys Surveillance Testing & Permit Depressurizing SI Accumulators in Lieu of Accumulator Isolation ML18153A8371995-06-0808 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Revised Pressure/Temp Limits & Associated Ltops Setpoint That Will Be Valid to end-of-license ML20083C9951995-05-0808 May 1995 Rev 0 to Surry Unit 2,Cycle 13 Startup Physics Tests Rept ML18153B2301995-02-14014 February 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re App J Testing Requirements ML18153B2131995-01-24024 January 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying as-found Test Acceptance Criterion for Pressurizer Safety Valves ML18153B1621994-11-29029 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Implementing Zirlo Fuel Cladding ML18153B1581994-11-22022 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs,Deleting Unnecessary Descriptive Phrases Re Number of Cells in Station & EDG Batteries ML18153B1501994-11-10010 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Changes to TS Will Clarify SR for Reactor Protection & Engineered Safeguard Sys Instrumentation & Actuation Logic ML18153B0941994-10-11011 October 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Surveillance Frequencies for Hydrogen Analyzers ML18152A5061994-09-0606 September 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Mgt Safety Review Committee & Station Nuclear Safety & Operating Committee Responsibilities ML18152A1191994-08-30030 August 1994 Proposed Tech Specs to Accomodate Core Uprating 1999-08-06
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> a (1) ::l p.. a (1) ::l ..... z 0 :" *-* 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Functional Unit I TABLE 3.7-2 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTION INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS Minimum Total Number OPERABLE Of Channels Channels Channels To Trip AUXILIARY FEED WATER ( continued)
- e. Trip of main feed water pumps -2/MFW 1/MFWpump 2-1 each start motor driven pumps pump MFWpump f. Automatic actuation logic 2 2 1 LOSS OF POWER ; a. 4.16 kv emergency bus 3/bus 2/bus 2/bus undervoltage poss of voltage) b. 4.16 kv emergency bus 3/bus 2/bus 2/bus undervoltage ( degraded voltage) I NON-ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER ISOLATION
- a. Low intake canal level -Note A 4 3 3 b. Automatic actuation logic 2 2 1 ENGINEERED SAFEGAURDS ACTUATION INTERLOCKS
-Note B a. Pressurizer pressure, P-11 3 2 2 b. Low-low Tavl P-12 3 2 2 c. Reactor trip, P-4 2 2 1 RECIRCULATiON MODE TRANSFER a. RWST Level'-Low 4 3 2 b. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 2 1 and Actuatiort Relays Permissible Bypass Conditions
- Operator Actions 21 22 20 20 20 14 23 23 24 25 14 Note A -When the temporary Service Water supply jumper to the CCHXs is in service in accordance with the footnote to TS 3.14.A.2.b, two low intake canal level probes will be permitted to be in the tripped condition.
In this condition, two operable channels are required with one channel to trip. If one of the two operable channels becomes inoperable, the operating Unit must be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Note B -Engineered Safeguards Actuation Interlocks are described in Table 4.1-A 9806290177 980619 PDR ADOCK 05000280 p PDR ..., C/) w :....:i I N 0 TS 3.14-1 3.14 CIRCULATING AND SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS 1
- Applies to the operational status of the Circulating and Service Water Systems. Objective To define those limiting conditions of the Circulating and Service Water Systems necessary to assure safe station operation.
Specification A. The Reactor Coolant System temperature or pressure of a reactor unit shall not exceed 350° For 450 psig, respectively, or the reactor shall not be critical unless: 1. The high level intake canal is filled to at least elevation
+23.0 feet at the high level intake structure.
- 2. Unit subsystems, including piping and valves, shall be operable to the extent of being able to establish the following:
- a. Flow to and from one bearing cooling water heat exchanger . b. Flow to and from the component cooling heat exchangers required by Specification 3.13.
- 3. At least two circulating water pumps are operating or are operable.
- 4. Three emergency service water pumps are operable; these pumps will service both units simultaneously.
For the purpose of performing inspections, cleaning and repairs associated with the SW supply piping to the component cooling water heat exchangers (CCHXs), a temporary 30" seismic, non-missile protected pipe jumper will be provided to supply SW flow to the CCHXs required by TS 3 .13. The basis for using the temporary jumper is provided in the licensee's submittal dated June 19, 1998 (Serial No.98-327). The use of the temporary jumper as the sole SW supply to the CCHXs is permitted two times only for a duration ofup to 35 days during each of two Unit 1 refueling outages. If non-essential
- SW isolation is required during the pipe repair activities, it will -be accomplished consistent with design basis requirements by using operator (manual) action to close the SW isolation valve in the temporary jumper within the time constraints established by the Station Abnormal Procedures.
If the temporary jumper becomes inoperable as the sole SW supply to the CCHXs during either 35-day period, the requirements of Specification
3.0.1 shall
apply. Upon completion of the work associated with the second 35-day period, this footnote will no longer be applicable.
Amendment Nos.
- TS 3.14-4 including replacement of an Emergency Service Water pump without forcing dual unit outages, yet limits the amount of operating time without the specified number of pumps. When one Unit is in Cold Shutdown and the heat load from the shutdown unit and spent fuel pool drops to less than 25 million BTU/HR, then one Emergency Service Water pump may be removed from service for the subsequent time that the unit remains in Cold Shutdown due to the reduced residual heat removal and hence component cooling requirements.
A minimum level of + 17 .2 feet in the High Level Intake canal is required to provide design flow of Service Water through the Recirculation Spray heat exchangers during a loss-of-coolant accident for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If the water level falls below +23' 6", signals are generated to trip both unit's turbines and to close the nonessential Circulating and Service Water valves. A High Level Intake canal level of +23' 6" ensures actuation prior to canal level falling to elevation
+23'. The Circulating Water and Service Water isolation valves which are required to close to conserve Intake Canal inventory are periodically verified to limit total leakage flow out of the Intake Canal. In addition, passive vacuum breakers are installed on the Circulating Water pump discharge lines to assure that a reverse siphon is not continued for canal levels less than +23 feet when Circulating Water pumps are de-energized.
The remaining six feet of canal level is provided coincident with ESW pump operation as the required source of Service Water for heat loads following the Design Basis Accident.
To fac"ilitate inspection, cleaning and repair of the SW supply line to the CCHXs, a temporary, seismic, non-missile protected SW supply line Uumper) will be used as discussed in the temporary footnote to TS 3.14.A.2.b.
The temporary jumper is required since service water is supplied to the CCHXs by a single concrete-encased line. To remove the SW supply line from service for extended maintenance, an alternate temporary SW supply path is required to support the operation of the CCHXs during the maintenance activities.
The basis for using the temporary SW supply jumper to the CCHXs is provided in the licensee's submittal dated June 19, 1998 (Serial No.98-327). The use of the Amendment Nos.
.. *
- temporary jumper as the sole SW supply to the CCHXs is only permitted for a duration of up to 35 days during each of two Unit 1 refueling outages and shall be operated in accordance with the compensatory measures (including a Contingency Action Plan) provided in the letter referenced above and in the Operating License. The only automatic function in the normal supply line when Unit 1 is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN is provided by the SW supply MOVs which close on low Intake Canal level. If non-essential SW isolation is required during the time the jumper is in service, it will be accomplished consistent with design and licensing bases requirements by using operator (manual) action to close the SW isolation valve in the temporary jumper within the time constraints established by the Station Abnormal Procedures.
References:
UFSAR Section 9.9 UFSAR Section 10.3.4 UFSAR Section 14.5 Service Water System Circulating Water System Loss-of-Coolant Accidents, Including the Design Basis Accident Amendment Nos.
.. *
- Attachment 4 Significant Hazards Consideration
- Significant Hazards Consideration Virginia Electric and Power Company has reviewed the proposed changes against the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92 and has concluded that the changes do not pose a significant safety hazards consideration as defined therein. The proposed Operating License and Technical Specifications and Bases changes are necessary to allow the use of a temporary, seismic, non-missile protected jumper to provide service water (SW) to the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers (CCHXs) while maintenance work is performed on the existing SW supply line to the CCHXs. Since there is only one SW supply line to the CCHXs, an alternate SW supply must be provided whenever the line is removed from service. The temporary jumper provides this function.
The jumper will only be used for a 35-day period during each of two Unit 1 refueling outages. The use of the temporary jumper has been thoroughly evaluated, and appropriate constraints and compensatory measures (including a Contingency Action Plan) have been developed to ensure that the temporary jumper is reliable, safe, and suitable for its intended purpose. A complete and immediate loss of SW supply to the operating CCHXs is not considered credible, given the project constraints and the unlikely probability of a generated missile or heavy load drop. Existing station abnormal procedures already address a loss of component cooling, and the use of alternate cooling for a loss of decay heat removal, in the unlikely event that they are required.
Furthermore, appropriate mitigative measures have been identified to address potential flooding concerns.
The minor administrative changes merely correct a table format inconsistency-and update Basis section references.
Consequently, the operation of Surry Power Station with the proposed amendment and license condition will not: 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The SW and CC Systems will function as designed under the Unit operating constraints specified by this project (i.e., Unit 2 in operation and Unit 1 in a refueling outage), and the potential for a loss of component cooling is already addressed by Station Abnormal Procedures.
Therefore, there is no increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.
The possibility of flooding due to failure of the temporary SW supply jumper in the Turbine Building basement has been evaluated and dispositioned by the implementation of appropriate precautions and compensatory measures to preclude damage to the temporary jumper and to respond to a postulated flooding event. A flood watch will be present around-the-clock with authority and procedural guidance to isolate the jumper, if required.
Furthermore, the CCHXs serve no design basis accident mitigating function.
Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not increased.
1 of 2
---. * .. ' * * .,
- 2 . 3. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The SW and CC Systems' design functions and basic configurations are not being altered as a result of using a temporary SW supply jumper. The temporary jumper is designed to be safety-related and seismic with all of the design attributes of the normal SW supply line, except for the, automatic isolation function and complete missile and heavy load drop protection.
The design functions of the SW and CC systems are unchanged as a result of the proposed changes due to 1) required plant conditions, 2) compensatory measure,s, 3) a Contingency Action Plan for restoration of the normal SW supply if required, and 4) strict administrative control of the temporary SW isolation valve to preclude flooding or to isolate non-essential SW within the design basis assumed time limits. Unit 1 will be in a plant condition which will provide adequate time to restore the normal SW supply, if required.
Therefore, since the SW and CC systems will basically function as designed and will be operated in their basic configuration, the possibility of a new or different type of accident than previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced since an operable SW flowpath to the required number of CCHXs is provided, and Unit operating constraints, compensatory measures and contingencies will be implemented as required to ensure the integrity and the capability of the SW flowpath.
The use of the temporary jumper will be limited to the time period when missile producing weather is not expected, and Unit 1 meets specified Unit conditions.
Therefore, the temporary SW jumper, under the imposed project constraints and compensatory measures, provides the same reliability as the normal SW supply line. Furthermore, the Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Surry Power Station has been reviewed relative to the use of the temporary SW jumper. It has been determined that due to the SW restoration project's compensatory and contingency measures, as well as the configuration restrictions that will be imposed by the Maintenance Rule online risk matrix, the impact on core damage frequency is negligible . 2 of2