ML18011B146: Difference between revisions

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                                                                                 ..XN SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED        (Ill                                                  EXPECTED MONTH      DAY    YEAR SUBMISSION DATE (15)
                                                                                 ..XN SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED        (Ill                                                  EXPECTED MONTH      DAY    YEAR SUBMISSION DATE (15)
YES  /If yet, complete  EXPECTED SCII/htISSIOH DATE/                          X    NO ABSTRACT /Limit to 1400 tpecet, I.r., oppress/metrly I/Item t/nprr.tpece typrwr/tten liner/ (16)
YES  /If yet, complete  EXPECTED SCII/htISSIOH DATE/                          X    NO ABSTRACT /Limit to 1400 tpecet, I.r., oppress/metrly I/Item t/nprr.tpece typrwr/tten liner/ (16)
The La Crosse                        Boiling Mater Reactor (LACBMR) Technical Specifications (T.S.) 4.4.5 states, "The fir e hose stations in the following
The La Crosse                        Boiling Mater Reactor (LACBMR) Technical Specifications (T.S.) 4.4.5 states, "The fir e hose stations in the following locations shall be operable." This statement is followed by a list of five stations that includes the "Containment Building Basement."
              -
locations shall be operable." This statement is followed by a list of five stations that includes the "Containment Building Basement."
This requirement is applicable at all times. The action step of this T.S. states. "Mi th a hose station inoperable, establish a 1-hour fire watch. or route an additional hose of equivalent capacity to the unprotected area within one hour." On April 12, 1995,                                                                          it      was noted by a LACBMR staff member that the High                                                    Pressure        Service                Mater          to the Containment Building, which supplies water pressure to the Containment Building Basement hose station, was isolated.
This requirement is applicable at all times. The action step of this T.S. states. "Mi th a hose station inoperable, establish a 1-hour fire watch. or route an additional hose of equivalent capacity to the unprotected area within one hour." On April 12, 1995,                                                                          it      was noted by a LACBMR staff member that the High                                                    Pressure        Service                Mater          to the Containment Building, which supplies water pressure to the Containment Building Basement hose station, was isolated.



Latest revision as of 19:53, 3 February 2020

LER 95-001-00:on 950417,noted That HPSW to Containment Building Isolated.Caused by Momentary LOP Due to Operational Test of 1A Edg.Procedures for Test Being Modified to Include Instructions to Verify Value Being open.W/950420 Ltr
ML18011B146
Person / Time
Site: La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date: 04/20/1995
From: Berg W, Green W
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LAC-13480, LER-95-001, LER-95-1, NUDOCS 9505080020
Download: ML18011B146 (5)


Text

RIORITY 1 ~

ACCELERATED RIDS PROCI'.SSliC)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9505080020 DOC.DATE: 95/04/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET N FACIL:50-409 La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor, Dairyland Power Coop 05000409 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION GREEN,W.R. Dairyland Power Cooperative BERG,W.L. Dairyland Power Cooperative RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 95-001-00:on 950412,noted that HPSW to containment building isolated. Caused by momentary LOP due to operational test of 1A EDG.Procedures for test being modified to include instructions to verify value being open.W/950420 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED'LTR TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(1/28/75).

i ENCL l SIZE'3 05000409 Conversion App 5/25/72. FCLB/Gaskin,C. 1cy.

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ONDD PD 1 1 FAIRTILE,M 1 1 INTERNAL: ~O BRD/RAB 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 aM wRmz 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1

/DE/EEL 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DISP/PIPB 1 1 NRR/DOPS/OECB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/S PS B/B 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN3 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTES: 1 1 VOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP I.'S TO REDUCE iVASTE! CONTACT'I'IIE DOCL'iIEYTCONTROL DES~K. ROON! Pl-37(EAT. 504-2033 ) TO FLIC!I%ATE 0'01'R iAi!I: PROil DISTRIBUTION LIS'I S I:OR DOC!.'iIEi'I'S 5'OU DOi "I'l I'.I)!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 27 ENCL 27

OA/RYLANO t7 COOPERATIVE 3200 EASTAVE. SO. ~ PO. BOX817 ~ LACROSSE, WISCONSIN54602-0817 (608) 788-4000 FAX NO. (608) 787-1420 WILLIAML. BERG General Manager April 20, 1995 In reply, please refer to LAC-13480 DOCKET NO. 50-409 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR)

Possession-Only License No. DPR-45 Licensee Event Re ort No.95-001

REFERENCES:

(1) 10 CFR 50.73 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, attached is Licensee Event Report No.95-001.

Ifthere are any questions, please contact us.

Sincerely, DAIRYLANDPOWER COOPERATIVE William L. Berg, General Manager WLB:WRG:dh cc: John Martin, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III Morton Fairtile, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9505080020 950420 PDR g

ADOCK 05000409 WA i@~ i

NRC Form 365 e UA. NUCLEAR AEOULATOAYCOMMISSION (043 I APPROVED OMB NO. 31600(BI EXPIRES: 6/31/SS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA E FACILITY NAME (I)

LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR LACBWR 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 9 1 OF 0 2 TITLE (i)

LOSS OF CONTAINMENT BUILDING BASEMENT FIRE HOSE STATION OPERABILITY EVFNT DATE (SI LEA NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)

BEOUBNT/AL AX S MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 0 4 12 95 95 001 00 04 17 9 5 of the follorflnP) (11 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFA (): /Cher/t onr or more OPERATINO MODE (6) 20A02(B) 20A05(cl 60.73(e) (2) (Iv) 73.7((B)

POWER 20A05(e) (I I (ll 50.35(c) (I ) 50.73(e) (2)(v) 73.71(cl LEYEL 0 0 0 20A05(e) (I l(QI 50.36 (c) (2) 50.73(el(2) (ril) OTHER ISprclfy In Ahttrrct IN/ow rnd In Text, HRC Form r .". Ã%% 60.73(e) 12)(rill)IA) JEEAI 20A05(e) (1)(illI 50.73( ~ )(2)(ll r 20AOS(e) (I l(lv) 50.73(e)(2)(ll) 60.73(el(2)(vill) (6)

,?..Ã4<'..... '.

Nn :.. 20A05(el(1 )(vl 50.7 3 4 H2) (Ill) 60.73(e) l2) (x I LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE WILLIAM R. GREEN, TECHNICAL SUPPORT ENGINEER 6 0 8 689- 4 210 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OESCRISEO IN THIS REPORT (13)

{ ".N CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU FAC. CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT EPOATABLE TURER I'M TURER TO NPADS

.? .

B MAM ..erne...'ANUFAC PN

..XN SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (Ill EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES /If yet, complete EXPECTED SCII/htISSIOH DATE/ X NO ABSTRACT /Limit to 1400 tpecet, I.r., oppress/metrly I/Item t/nprr.tpece typrwr/tten liner/ (16)

The La Crosse Boiling Mater Reactor (LACBMR) Technical Specifications (T.S.) 4.4.5 states, "The fir e hose stations in the following locations shall be operable." This statement is followed by a list of five stations that includes the "Containment Building Basement."

This requirement is applicable at all times. The action step of this T.S. states. "Mi th a hose station inoperable, establish a 1-hour fire watch. or route an additional hose of equivalent capacity to the unprotected area within one hour." On April 12, 1995, it was noted by a LACBMR staff member that the High Pressure Service Mater to the Containment Building, which supplies water pressure to the Containment Building Basement hose station, was isolated.

'j~ ~

NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (9431 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150&)06 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (3) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (31 SEQUENTIAL PP'EVISION NUMBER NUM ER LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR o s o o o 409 0 0 1 0 0 0 2oFO 2 TEXT /I/moro E/Nco lr rrr/rorL vro a%I/E/rvN//Y/IC Frvm SEBA'r/ (17)

The La Crosse Boiling Mater Reactor (LACBWR) Technical Specifications (T.S.) require that several fire hose stations be operable at all times. Included in the list of hose stations is the Containment Building Basement hose station.

On the morning of Wednesday, April 12, 1995, a LACBWR operator discovered the High Pressure Service Mater (HPSM) Containment Building automatic isolation valve shut. which render ed the Containment Building hose station inoperable. At the time of this discovery, the operators on duty were unsure of when the isolation had occurred, or what caused the isolation. The shift super visor was informed and the valve was opened.

Further investigation of the incident revealed that the valve had probably closed on the morning of Apriltransfer 10, 1995. On this date we had performed an operational test of the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) which caused momentary loss of power to the 120 VAC regulated bus during the Power Supply . This caused a momentary loss of control power to the HPSW auto isolation valve and caused the valve to fail closed. This condition went unnoticed until April 12, 1995. Portions of the operational test of the 1A EDG were repeated on April 18, 1995, to confirm our analysis of this incident.

The effect of this situation in Plant Safety was minimal. Numerous fire extinguishers are located throughout the Containment Building to be used in the event of a fir e. The HPSM auto isolation valve had the capability of being unisolated in the event of d fire and routine tours (every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) are conducted in the Containment Building to identify possible hazardous conditions such as fire hazards.

To ensure this situation doesn't occur again, the procedure for the operational test of the 1A EDG that was performed on April 10, 1995, is being modified to include a statement that instructs operators to verify open, and reopen as necessary, the HPSW auto isolation valve during this procedure.