Information Notice 2002-14, Ensuring a Capability to Evacuate Individuals, Including Members of the Public, from the Owner-Controlled Area: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, DC 20555APRIL 8, 2002NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-14:ENSURING A CAPABILITY TO EVACUATEINDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
 
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 APRIL 8, 2002 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-14:               ENSURING A CAPABILITY TO EVACUATE
 
INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE


PUBLIC, FROM THE OWNER-CONTROLLED
PUBLIC, FROM THE OWNER-CONTROLLED
Line 21: Line 27:


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, including those who have ceasedoperations but have fuel on site.
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, including those who have ceased
 
operations but have fuel on site.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to informaddressees of inspection findings concerning a licensee's capability to evacuate individuals, including members of the public, from the owner-controlled area in the event of an emergency.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform
 
addressees of inspection findings concerning a licensees capability to evacuate individuals, including members of the public, from the owner-controlled area in the event of an emergency.


The NRC expects recipients to review the information for applicability to their facilities and
The NRC expects recipients to review the information for applicability to their facilities and


consider taking actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, the suggestions
consider taking actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, the suggestions


contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements and, therefore, no
contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements and, therefore, no


specific action or written response is required.BackgroundTitle 10, Section 100.3 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 100.3) defines an"exclusion area" for power reactors and §100.11(a)(1) prescribes how to determine the
specific action or written response is required.


boundary of the exclusion area.  Specifically, §100.3 states that "- residents shall be subject to
Background


ready removal in case of necessity. Activities unrelated to operations of the reactor may be
Title 10, Section 100.3 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 100.3) defines an
 
exclusion area for power reactors and §100.11(a)(1) prescribes how to determine the
 
boundary of the exclusion area. Specifically, §100.3 states that  residents shall be subject to
 
ready removal in case of necessity. Activities unrelated to operations of the reactor may be


permitted in an exclusion area under appropriate limitations, provided that no significant
permitted in an exclusion area under appropriate limitations, provided that no significant


hazards to the public health and safety will result."  Exposure to more than routinely permitted
hazards to the public health and safety will result. Exposure to more than routinely permitted


concentrations of radioactive material could result in a significant hazard to the health and
concentrations of radioactive material could result in a significant hazard to the health and


safety of the public. Section 20.1003 defines several terms applicable to this discussion:
safety of the public.
A member of the public is any individual, except when he or she is receiving anoccupational dose. Occupational dose is the dose received by an individual in the course of employment inwhich the individual's assigned duties involve exposure to radiation or radioactive
 
Section 20.1003 defines several terms applicable to this discussion:
*      A member of the public is any individual, except when he or she is receiving an
 
occupational dose.
 
*      Occupational dose is the dose received by an individual in the course of employment in
 
which the individuals assigned duties involve exposure to radiation or radioactive


material from licensed and/or unlicensed sources of radiation, whether in the possession
material from licensed and/or unlicensed sources of radiation, whether in the possession


of the licensee or another person. Occupational dose does not include the dose
of the licensee or another person. Occupational dose does not include the dose
 
received from background radiation, from any medical administration the individual has
 
received, from exposure to individuals who have been administered radioactive material
 
and released in accordance with §35.75 [10 CFR 35.75], from voluntary participation in


received from background radiation, from any medical administration the individual has received, from exposure to individuals who have been administered radioactive materialand released in accordance with
medical research programs, or as a member of the public.


§35.75 [10 CFR 35.75], from voluntary participation inmedical research programs, or as a member of the public.  Public dose is the dose received by a member of the public from exposure to radiationor radioactive material released by a licensee, or any other source of radiation under the
*      Public dose is the dose received by a member of the public from exposure to radiation


control of a licensee. Public dose does not include occupational dose or the dose
or radioactive material released by a licensee, or any other source of radiation under the
 
control of a licensee. Public dose does not include occupational dose or the dose


received from background radiation, from any medical administration the individual has
received from background radiation, from any medical administration the individual has
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received, from exposure to individuals who have been administered radioactive material
received, from exposure to individuals who have been administered radioactive material


and released in accordance with
and released in accordance with §35.75, or from voluntary participation in medical
 
research programs.
 
*      The owner-controlled area is an area outside of a restricted area, but inside the site
 
boundary, to which the licensee can limit access for any reason.


§35.75, or from voluntary participation in medicalresearch programs. The owner-controlled area is an area outside of a restricted area, but inside the siteboundary, to which the licensee can limit access for any reason.10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) states that
10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) states that Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis


"Information is made available to the public on a periodic basison how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g.,
on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g.,
listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with
listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with


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of information to the public are established.
of information to the public are established.


"The planning standard, §50.47(b)(10), states that
The planning standard, §50.47(b)(10), states that A range of protective actions has been


"A range of protective actions has beendeveloped for the plume exposure pathway EPZ [emergency planning zone] for emergency
developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ [emergency planning zone] for emergency


workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to
workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to


evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide
evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide


(KI), as appropriate. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the
(KI), as appropriate. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the


ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.
ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.


"The importance of protecting individuals, including members of the public, in the owner-controlled area is reflected in the emergency preparedness cornerstone of the NRC
The importance of protecting individuals, including members of the public, in the owner- controlled area is reflected in the emergency preparedness cornerstone of the NRCs reactor
 
oversight process (ROP). The ROP identifies the planning standard as a risk-significant
 
planning standard (RSPS).
 
The following section describes one licensees failure to adequately meet the requirements of
 
the planning standard defined by §50.47(b)(10). That failure prevented the licensee from


's reactoroversight process (ROP).  The ROP identifies the planning standard as a risk-significant
ensuring protection of the public in the owner-controlled area.


planning standard (RSPS).The following section describes one licensee
Description


's failure to adequately meet the requirements ofthe planning standard defined by
The facility owned by a certain licensee has two partially completed nuclear power reactors


§50.47(b)(10).  That failure prevented the licensee fromensuring protection of the public in the owner-controlled area.DescriptionThe facility owned by a certain licensee has two partially completed nuclear power reactorswithin the exclusion area of an operating reactor. Construction of these units has been
within the exclusion area of an operating reactor. Construction of these units has been


suspended and they have been in a maintenance regime for several years. No nuclear fuel or
suspended and they have been in a maintenance regime for several years. No nuclear fuel or


other significant radioactive sources are stored at the inactive sites. The staff at the operating reactor did not exercise oversight responsibility for the incompleteplants.  This responsibility had been transferred to a separate business unit in the licensee
other significant radioactive sources are stored at the inactive sites. The staff at the operating reactor did not exercise oversight responsibility for the incomplete


'scorporate organization after construction was suspended. The business unit maintains an
plants. This responsibility had been transferred to a separate business unit in the licensees


office in the area. The business unit has been leasing space in otherwise unused buildings
corporate organization after construction was suspended. The business unit maintains an


(primarily vacant offices and warehouses originally constructed to support the inactive plants)
office in the area. The business unit has been leasing space in otherwise unused buildings
to various general businesses without the direct involvement of staff at the operating reactor.As reported in Inspection Report 50/397/01-008 (Accession Number ML 012880417), the NRCinspected this site in July 2001. The inspection revealed weaknesses in the licensee


's ability tonotify and evacuate members of the public (lessee employees) from the exclusion area, to
(primarily vacant offices and warehouses originally constructed to support the inactive plants)
to various general businesses without the direct involvement of staff at the operating reactor.
 
As reported in Inspection Report 50/397/01-008 (Accession Number ML 012880417), the NRC
 
inspected this site in July 2001. The inspection revealed weaknesses in the licensees ability to
 
notify and evacuate members of the public (lessee employees) from the exclusion area, to


monitor the evacuating people for radioactive contamination, and to decontaminate them as
monitor the evacuating people for radioactive contamination, and to decontaminate them as


necessary. The NRC determined that these weaknesses constituted a violation of
necessary. The NRC determined that these weaknesses constituted a violation of §50.54(q),
which requires, in part, that a licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power


§50.54(q),which requires, in part, that
reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in


"a licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear powerreactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in
§50.47(b), and a violation of the planning standard, §50.47(b)(10), which requires that a range


§50.47(b)," and a violation of the planning standard, §50.47(b)(10), which requires that
of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway emergency


"a rangeof protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway emergency
planning zone for emergency workers and the public. The violation was determined to be


planning zone for emergency workers and the public.
safety-significant because members of the public could be exposed to radiation and/or


"  The violation was determined to besafety-significant because members of the public could be exposed to radiation and/or
radioactive material in the event of an emergency if appropriate protective actions were not


radioactive material in the event of an emergency if appropriate protective actions were not
taken.
 
The licensee stated that lessees would be notified of an exclusion area evacuation by external


taken.The licensee stated that lessees would be notified of an exclusion area evacuation by externalaudible sirens and security sweeps; additional methods were available to notify licensee and
audible sirens and security sweeps; additional methods were available to notify licensee and


licensee contractor personnel. One of the sirens was under the direct control of the staff at the
licensee contractor personnel. One of the sirens was under the direct control of the staff at the


operating reactor; others would have to be locally activated at the inactive sites. Signs along
operating reactor; others would have to be locally activated at the inactive sites. Signs along


the plant access roads would inform people how to respond to the sirens. The licensee also
the plant access roads would inform people how to respond to the sirens. The licensee also


expected that the business unit representative would contact each lessee by telephone when
expected that the business unit representative would contact each lessee by telephone when


notified of an evacuation decision. General procedures were in place to establish security
notified of an evacuation decision. General procedures were in place to establish security


roadblocks along plant access roads during an exclusion area evacuation and to perform
roadblocks along plant access roads during an exclusion area evacuation and to perform


limited sweeps of the exclusion and owner-controlled areas.The licensee had established a pre-designated assembly and decontamination center at acompany location outside the EPZ for use by licensee and licensee contractor personnel
limited sweeps of the exclusion and owner-controlled areas.


following an evacuation.  Licensee and licensee contractor personnel received initial and
The licensee had established a pre-designated assembly and decontamination center at a


refresher training on expected actions for evacuation, offsite assembly, radiological monitoring, and personnel decontamination.  However, the licensee did not provide similar training and
company location outside the EPZ for use by licensee and licensee contractor personnel


information to the members of the public within the owner-controlled area.The NRC and the licensee agreed that (1) lessee operations were permitted under
following an evacuation. Licensee and licensee contractor personnel received initial and


§100.3,   (2) lessee employees in the exclusion area were members of the public, (3) the licensee was
refresher training on expected actions for evacuation, offsite assembly, radiological monitoring, and personnel decontamination. However, the licensee did not provide similar training and
 
information to the members of the public within the owner-controlled area.
 
The NRC and the licensee agreed that (1) lessee operations were permitted under §100.3,
(2) lessee employees in the exclusion area were members of the public, (3) the licensee was


responsible for promptly evacuating lessee employees as necessary, (4) the licensee was
responsible for promptly evacuating lessee employees as necessary, (4) the licensee was
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within about 15 minutes of the evacuation decision, and (5) the licensee was responsible for
within about 15 minutes of the evacuation decision, and (5) the licensee was responsible for


providing radiological monitoring to lessee employees and decontaminating them as required.The NRC identified the following weaknesses in the licensee
providing radiological monitoring to lessee employees and decontaminating them as required.
 
The NRC identified the following weaknesses in the licensees ability to effectively notify, evacuate, monitor, and decontaminate lessee personnel: *      Licensee test data indicated that the external sirens could not be heard inside some
 
lessee buildings, and the primary siren was out of service for 13 consecutive months.
 
*      The licensee had not prepared written procedures for activating the business unit call- tree, and the process relied on someone to answer a specific telephone in the lessees
 
office.


's ability to effectively notify,evacuate, monitor, and decontaminate lessee personnel: Licensee test data indicated that the external sirens could not be heard inside somelessee buildings, and the primary siren was out of service for 13 consecutive months.The licensee had not prepared written procedures for activating the business unit call-tree, and the process relied on someone to answer a specific telephone in the lessee
*      The licensee had no detailed written procedures for security sweeps, had not identified


'soffice.The licensee had no detailed written procedures for security sweeps, had not identifiedthe locations of occupied spaces, had given security officers little or no training on the
the locations of occupied spaces, had given security officers little or no training on the


exclusion area evacuation process (including performing sweeps), and had not tested
exclusion area evacuation process (including performing sweeps), and had not tested


the effectiveness of sweeps by drills or other means.Although the licensee gave lessees a copy of an emergency plan specific to theincomplete reactor units, the plan mainly covered industrial accidents and pertained only
the effectiveness of sweeps by drills or other means.
 
*      Although the licensee gave lessees a copy of an emergency plan specific to the


to licensee and licensee contractor operations.  The plan did not address radiological
incomplete reactor units, the plan mainly covered industrial accidents and pertained only


monitoring or decontamination. Specifically, the licensee did not give lessees
to licensee and licensee contractor operations. The plan did not address radiological


information on the evacuation route and the assembly area. The NRC interviewed
monitoring or decontamination. Specifically, the licensee did not give lessees
 
information on the evacuation route and the assembly area. The NRC interviewed


employees at several lessee sites and found that only half knew about the proper
employees at several lessee sites and found that only half knew about the proper


response to an emergency siren. The licensee did not ensure that lessee employees received training on emergency planrequirements, the expected response to a notification siren, evacuation routes, the
response to an emergency siren.


offsite assembly area, or radiological monitoring and decontamination.Some members of the emergency response organization at the operating reactor werenot aware of the presence of lessees (members of the public) within the exclusion area
*      The licensee did not ensure that lessee employees received training on emergency plan


boundary.  As a result, key decision makers may have been unaware of the need to
requirements, the expected response to a notification siren, evacuation routes, the


protect the lessees and their employees.The licensee stated that it would establish a security roadblock along the access road tothe inactive construction sites to inform lessee employees of the emergency and direct
offsite assembly area, or radiological monitoring and decontamination.


them to the offsite assembly area for radiological monitoring. However, the licensee
*      Some members of the emergency response organization at the operating reactor were
 
not aware of the presence of lessees (members of the public) within the exclusion area
 
boundary. As a result, key decision makers may have been unaware of the need to
 
protect the lessees and their employees.
 
*      The licensee stated that it would establish a security roadblock along the access road to
 
the inactive construction sites to inform lessee employees of the emergency and direct
 
them to the offsite assembly area for radiological monitoring. However, the licensee


acknowledged that there might be circumstances in which the single roadblock would be
acknowledged that there might be circumstances in which the single roadblock would be


delayed or not established, thereby delaying evacuation of the exclusion area.The licensee had not evaluated or exercised the capability to evacuate members of thepublic from the owner-controlled area as part of the licensee
delayed or not established, thereby delaying evacuation of the exclusion area.
 
*      The licensee had not evaluated or exercised the capability to evacuate members of the


's drill program.
public from the owner-controlled area as part of the licensees drill program.


DiscussionThe evaluation criteria for the planning standard
Discussion


§50.47(b)(10) are based, in part, on   NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency ResponsePlans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Section II.J.1.: "Each licensee shall establish the means and time required to warn or advise            onsite individuals and individuals who may be in areas controlled by the operator, including:a.Employees not having emergency assignments;
The evaluation criteria for the planning standard §50.47(b)(10) are based, in part, on
b.Visitors;
c.Contractor and construction personnel; and


d.Other persons who may be in the public access areas on or passing through thesite or within the owner controlled area.
NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response


"The term owner-controlled area, as used in NUREG-0654, encompasses all areas contiguousto the reactor site property that is owned or leased by the licensee (or by any of its associated
Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Section II.J.1.: Each licensee shall establish the means and time required to warn or advise


business units) over which the licensee exercises control. The owner-controlled area is usually
onsite individuals and individuals who may be in areas controlled by the operator, including:
        a.      Employees not having emergency assignments;
        b.      Visitors;
        c.       Contractor and construction personnel; and


larger than, and encompasses, the exclusion area.The planning standard and the evaluation criteria in NUREG-0654 provide a basis for licenseeactions that are necessary to protect the health and safety of members of the public who are in
d.       Other persons who may be in the public access areas on or passing through the


the owner-controlled area. The range of actions may include, but is not limited to, evacuation, sheltering, decontamination, and the use of potassium iodide (KI) for those licensees in States
site or within the owner controlled area.


that have adopted its use for members of the public. Situations that could have individuals, including members of the public, in a licensee
The term owner-controlled area, as used in NUREG-0654, encompasses all areas contiguous


's owner-controlled area include the following examples:visitors at the visitor center or media centeremployee and family recreational facilities or areasvisitors in physical fitness centerlessee employees in leased buildingshunters or fishermenindividuals using biking or walking trailsindividuals making deliveries or providing services (catering, filling drink machines, etc).This list is not intended to be all-inclusive but to indicate the potential scope of situations thatrequire adequate planning.  Inclusion of these situations in the licensee
to the reactor site property that is owned or leased by the licensee (or by any of its associated


's emergencypreparedness drill and exercise program can provide valuable insights regarding the quality and
business units) over which the licensee exercises control. The owner-controlled area is usually


capability of the planning effort.Furthermore, the planning standard, §50.47(b)(7), requires licensees to provide members of thepublic, in the owner-controlled area and beyond the site boundary, with information on how they
larger than, and encompasses, the exclusion area.


will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency.  Section II.G of
The planning standard and the evaluation criteria in NUREG-0654 provide a basis for licensee


NUREG-0654 establishes the related evaluation criteria. Effective integration of licensees
actions that are necessary to protect the health and safety of members of the public who are in


' onsite plans with State and local plans can ensure thatessentially all members of the public will be notified of protective actions to be taken and that
the owner-controlled area. The range of actions may include, but is not limited to, evacuation, sheltering, decontamination, and the use of potassium iodide (KI) for those licensees in States


the actions can be implemented in a timely manner.This information notice does not require any specific action or written response.  If you haveany questions about this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or the
that have adopted its use for members of the public.


appropriate project manager in the NRC
Situations that could have individuals, including members of the public, in a licensees owner- controlled area include the following examples:
*        visitors at the visitor center or media center


's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)./RA/William D. Beckner, Program Director
*        employee and family recreational facilities or areas
 
*        visitors in physical fitness center
 
*        lessee employees in leased buildings
 
*        hunters or fishermen
 
*        individuals using biking or walking trails
 
*        individuals making deliveries or providing services (catering, filling drink machines, etc).
 
This list is not intended to be all-inclusive but to indicate the potential scope of situations that
 
require adequate planning. Inclusion of these situations in the licensees emergency
 
preparedness drill and exercise program can provide valuable insights regarding the quality and
 
capability of the planning effort.
 
Furthermore, the planning standard, §50.47(b)(7), requires licensees to provide members of the
 
public, in the owner-controlled area and beyond the site boundary, with information on how they
 
will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency. Section II.G of
 
NUREG-0654 establishes the related evaluation criteria. Effective integration of licensees onsite plans with State and local plans can ensure that
 
essentially all members of the public will be notified of protective actions to be taken and that
 
the actions can be implemented in a timely manner.
 
This information notice does not require any specific action or written response. If you have
 
any questions about this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or the
 
appropriate project manager in the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).
 
/RA/
                                      William D. Beckner, Program Director
 
Operating Reactor Improvements Program


===Operating Reactor Improvements Program===
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs


Office of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:Thomas B. Blount, NRRGail M. Good or Paul Elkmann, RIV301-415-1501817-860-8215 or 817-276-6539 Email: txb1@nrc.govE-mail: gmg@nrc.gov or pje@nrc.govAttachmentList of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical Contacts:   Thomas B. Blount, NRR                Gail M. Good or Paul Elkmann, RIV
 
301-415-1501                          817-860-8215 or 817-276-6539 Email: txb1@nrc.gov                  E-mail: gmg@nrc.gov or pje@nrc.gov
 
Attachment
 
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
 
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\REXB\RAB1\IN-EVAC8.WPD                                *See previous concurrence
 
OFFICE    RSE:OES:DRIP        Tech Editor  IOLB:DIPM      RIV          (A)SC:OES:DRIP PD:RORP:DRIP
 
NAME      RABenedict*        PAG*          GMTracy*        GMGood*      TKoshy*          WDBeckner*
DATE      03/28/2002          03/25/2002    04/03/2002      03/28/2002  04/05/2002        04/08/2002
 
Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


DOCUMENT NAME: G:\REXB\RAB1\IN-EVAC8.WPD*See previous concurrenceOFFICERSE:OES:DRIPTech EditorIOLB:DIPMRIV(A)SC:OES:DRIPPD:RORP:DRIPNAMERABenedict*PAG*GMTracy*GMGood*TKoshy*WDBeckner*DATE03/28/200203/25/200204/03/200203/28/200204/05/200204/08/2002
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
______________________________________________________________________________________OL = Operating License


CP = Construction PermitAttachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information                                        Date of


_____________________________________________________________________________________InformationDate of
Notice No.              Subject                    Issuance  Issued to


===Notice No.        SubjectIssuanceIssued to===
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________2002-13Possible Indicators of OngoingReactor Pressure Vessel Head
2002-13          Possible Indicators of Ongoing  04/04/2002  All holders of operating licenses


Degradation04/04/2002All holders of operating licensesfor pressurized water nuclear
Reactor Pressure Vessel Head                for pressurized water nuclear


power reactors, except those who
Degradation                                  power reactors, except those who


have permanently ceased
have permanently ceased
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has been permanently removed
has been permanently removed


from the reactor.99-28, Supp 1Recall of Star Brand FireProtection Sprinkler Heads03/22/2002All holders of licenses for nuclearpower, research, and test
from the reactor.
 
99-28, Supp 1    Recall of Star Brand Fire        03/22/2002  All holders of licenses for nuclear
 
Protection Sprinkler Heads                  power, research, and test
 
reactors and fuel cycle facilities.
 
2002-12          Submerged Safety-Related        03/21/2002  All holders of operating licenses
 
Electrical Cables                            or construction permits for


reactors and fuel cycle facilities.2002-12Submerged Safety-RelatedElectrical Cables03/21/2002All holders of operating licensesor construction permits for
nuclear power reactors


nuclear power reactors2002-11Recent Experience withDegradation of Reactor
2002-11          Recent Experience with          03/12/2002  All holders of operating licenses


Pressure Vessel Head03/12/2002All holders of operating licensesfor pressurized-water reactors
Degradation of Reactor                      for pressurized-water reactors


(PWRs), except those who have
Pressure Vessel Head                        (PWRs), except those who have


permanently ceased operations
permanently ceased operations
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been permanently removed from
been permanently removed from


the reactor.2002-10Nonconservative Water LevelSetpoints on Steam
the reactor.


Generators03/07/2002All holders of operating licensesfor nuclear power reactors, except those who have
2002-10          Nonconservative Water Level      03/07/2002  All holders of operating licenses
 
Setpoints on Steam                          for nuclear power reactors, Generators                                  except those who have


permanently ceased operations
permanently ceased operations
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been permanently removed from
been permanently removed from


the reactor.2002-09Potential for Top NozzleSeparation and Dropping of
the reactor.


===Certain Type of Westinghouse===
2002-09          Potential for Top Nozzle        02/13/2002  All holders of operating licenses
Fuel Assembly02/13/2002All holders of operating licensesfor nuclear power reactors, and


non-power reactors and holders
Separation and Dropping of                  for nuclear power reactors, and


of licenses for permanently
Certain Type of Westinghouse                non-power reactors and holders
 
Fuel Assembly                                of licenses for permanently


shutdown facilities with fuel
shutdown facilities with fuel


onsite.}}
onsite.
 
______________________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License
 
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 04:24, 24 November 2019

Ensuring a Capability to Evacuate Individuals, Including Members of the Public, from the Owner-Controlled Area
ML020980006
Person / Time
Issue date: 04/08/2002
From: Beckner W
NRC/NRR/DRIP/RORP
To:
Robert Benedict, 415-1157
References
IN-02-014
Download: ML020980006 (11)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 APRIL 8, 2002 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-14: ENSURING A CAPABILITY TO EVACUATE

INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE

PUBLIC, FROM THE OWNER-CONTROLLED

AREA

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, including those who have ceased

operations but have fuel on site.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform

addressees of inspection findings concerning a licensees capability to evacuate individuals, including members of the public, from the owner-controlled area in the event of an emergency.

The NRC expects recipients to review the information for applicability to their facilities and

consider taking actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, the suggestions

contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements and, therefore, no

specific action or written response is required.

Background

Title 10, Section 100.3 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 100.3) defines an

exclusion area for power reactors and §100.11(a)(1) prescribes how to determine the

boundary of the exclusion area. Specifically, §100.3 states that residents shall be subject to

ready removal in case of necessity. Activities unrelated to operations of the reactor may be

permitted in an exclusion area under appropriate limitations, provided that no significant

hazards to the public health and safety will result. Exposure to more than routinely permitted

concentrations of radioactive material could result in a significant hazard to the health and

safety of the public.

Section 20.1003 defines several terms applicable to this discussion:

  • A member of the public is any individual, except when he or she is receiving an

occupational dose.

  • Occupational dose is the dose received by an individual in the course of employment in

which the individuals assigned duties involve exposure to radiation or radioactive

material from licensed and/or unlicensed sources of radiation, whether in the possession

of the licensee or another person. Occupational dose does not include the dose

received from background radiation, from any medical administration the individual has

received, from exposure to individuals who have been administered radioactive material

and released in accordance with §35.75 [10 CFR 35.75], from voluntary participation in

medical research programs, or as a member of the public.

  • Public dose is the dose received by a member of the public from exposure to radiation

or radioactive material released by a licensee, or any other source of radiation under the

control of a licensee. Public dose does not include occupational dose or the dose

received from background radiation, from any medical administration the individual has

received, from exposure to individuals who have been administered radioactive material

and released in accordance with §35.75, or from voluntary participation in medical

research programs.

  • The owner-controlled area is an area outside of a restricted area, but inside the site

boundary, to which the licensee can limit access for any reason.

10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) states that Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis

on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g.,

listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with

the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency (including the physical

location or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination

of information to the public are established.

The planning standard, §50.47(b)(10), states that A range of protective actions has been

developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ [emergency planning zone] for emergency

workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to

evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide

(KI), as appropriate. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the

ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.

The importance of protecting individuals, including members of the public, in the owner- controlled area is reflected in the emergency preparedness cornerstone of the NRCs reactor

oversight process (ROP). The ROP identifies the planning standard as a risk-significant

planning standard (RSPS).

The following section describes one licensees failure to adequately meet the requirements of

the planning standard defined by §50.47(b)(10). That failure prevented the licensee from

ensuring protection of the public in the owner-controlled area.

Description

The facility owned by a certain licensee has two partially completed nuclear power reactors

within the exclusion area of an operating reactor. Construction of these units has been

suspended and they have been in a maintenance regime for several years. No nuclear fuel or

other significant radioactive sources are stored at the inactive sites. The staff at the operating reactor did not exercise oversight responsibility for the incomplete

plants. This responsibility had been transferred to a separate business unit in the licensees

corporate organization after construction was suspended. The business unit maintains an

office in the area. The business unit has been leasing space in otherwise unused buildings

(primarily vacant offices and warehouses originally constructed to support the inactive plants)

to various general businesses without the direct involvement of staff at the operating reactor.

As reported in Inspection Report 50/397/01-008 (Accession Number ML 012880417), the NRC

inspected this site in July 2001. The inspection revealed weaknesses in the licensees ability to

notify and evacuate members of the public (lessee employees) from the exclusion area, to

monitor the evacuating people for radioactive contamination, and to decontaminate them as

necessary. The NRC determined that these weaknesses constituted a violation of §50.54(q),

which requires, in part, that a licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power

reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in

§50.47(b), and a violation of the planning standard, §50.47(b)(10), which requires that a range

of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway emergency

planning zone for emergency workers and the public. The violation was determined to be

safety-significant because members of the public could be exposed to radiation and/or

radioactive material in the event of an emergency if appropriate protective actions were not

taken.

The licensee stated that lessees would be notified of an exclusion area evacuation by external

audible sirens and security sweeps; additional methods were available to notify licensee and

licensee contractor personnel. One of the sirens was under the direct control of the staff at the

operating reactor; others would have to be locally activated at the inactive sites. Signs along

the plant access roads would inform people how to respond to the sirens. The licensee also

expected that the business unit representative would contact each lessee by telephone when

notified of an evacuation decision. General procedures were in place to establish security

roadblocks along plant access roads during an exclusion area evacuation and to perform

limited sweeps of the exclusion and owner-controlled areas.

The licensee had established a pre-designated assembly and decontamination center at a

company location outside the EPZ for use by licensee and licensee contractor personnel

following an evacuation. Licensee and licensee contractor personnel received initial and

refresher training on expected actions for evacuation, offsite assembly, radiological monitoring, and personnel decontamination. However, the licensee did not provide similar training and

information to the members of the public within the owner-controlled area.

The NRC and the licensee agreed that (1) lessee operations were permitted under §100.3,

(2) lessee employees in the exclusion area were members of the public, (3) the licensee was

responsible for promptly evacuating lessee employees as necessary, (4) the licensee was

required to have the capability to effectively notify lessees of an exclusion area evacuation

within about 15 minutes of the evacuation decision, and (5) the licensee was responsible for

providing radiological monitoring to lessee employees and decontaminating them as required.

The NRC identified the following weaknesses in the licensees ability to effectively notify, evacuate, monitor, and decontaminate lessee personnel: * Licensee test data indicated that the external sirens could not be heard inside some

lessee buildings, and the primary siren was out of service for 13 consecutive months.

  • The licensee had not prepared written procedures for activating the business unit call- tree, and the process relied on someone to answer a specific telephone in the lessees

office.

  • The licensee had no detailed written procedures for security sweeps, had not identified

the locations of occupied spaces, had given security officers little or no training on the

exclusion area evacuation process (including performing sweeps), and had not tested

the effectiveness of sweeps by drills or other means.

  • Although the licensee gave lessees a copy of an emergency plan specific to the

incomplete reactor units, the plan mainly covered industrial accidents and pertained only

to licensee and licensee contractor operations. The plan did not address radiological

monitoring or decontamination. Specifically, the licensee did not give lessees

information on the evacuation route and the assembly area. The NRC interviewed

employees at several lessee sites and found that only half knew about the proper

response to an emergency siren.

  • The licensee did not ensure that lessee employees received training on emergency plan

requirements, the expected response to a notification siren, evacuation routes, the

offsite assembly area, or radiological monitoring and decontamination.

  • Some members of the emergency response organization at the operating reactor were

not aware of the presence of lessees (members of the public) within the exclusion area

boundary. As a result, key decision makers may have been unaware of the need to

protect the lessees and their employees.

  • The licensee stated that it would establish a security roadblock along the access road to

the inactive construction sites to inform lessee employees of the emergency and direct

them to the offsite assembly area for radiological monitoring. However, the licensee

acknowledged that there might be circumstances in which the single roadblock would be

delayed or not established, thereby delaying evacuation of the exclusion area.

  • The licensee had not evaluated or exercised the capability to evacuate members of the

public from the owner-controlled area as part of the licensees drill program.

Discussion

The evaluation criteria for the planning standard §50.47(b)(10) are based, in part, on

NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response

Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,Section II.J.1.: Each licensee shall establish the means and time required to warn or advise

onsite individuals and individuals who may be in areas controlled by the operator, including:

a. Employees not having emergency assignments;

b. Visitors;

c. Contractor and construction personnel; and

d. Other persons who may be in the public access areas on or passing through the

site or within the owner controlled area.

The term owner-controlled area, as used in NUREG-0654, encompasses all areas contiguous

to the reactor site property that is owned or leased by the licensee (or by any of its associated

business units) over which the licensee exercises control. The owner-controlled area is usually

larger than, and encompasses, the exclusion area.

The planning standard and the evaluation criteria in NUREG-0654 provide a basis for licensee

actions that are necessary to protect the health and safety of members of the public who are in

the owner-controlled area. The range of actions may include, but is not limited to, evacuation, sheltering, decontamination, and the use of potassium iodide (KI) for those licensees in States

that have adopted its use for members of the public.

Situations that could have individuals, including members of the public, in a licensees owner- controlled area include the following examples:

  • visitors at the visitor center or media center
  • employee and family recreational facilities or areas
  • visitors in physical fitness center
  • lessee employees in leased buildings
  • hunters or fishermen
  • individuals using biking or walking trails
  • individuals making deliveries or providing services (catering, filling drink machines, etc).

This list is not intended to be all-inclusive but to indicate the potential scope of situations that

require adequate planning. Inclusion of these situations in the licensees emergency

preparedness drill and exercise program can provide valuable insights regarding the quality and

capability of the planning effort.

Furthermore, the planning standard, §50.47(b)(7), requires licensees to provide members of the

public, in the owner-controlled area and beyond the site boundary, with information on how they

will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency.Section II.G of

NUREG-0654 establishes the related evaluation criteria. Effective integration of licensees onsite plans with State and local plans can ensure that

essentially all members of the public will be notified of protective actions to be taken and that

the actions can be implemented in a timely manner.

This information notice does not require any specific action or written response. If you have

any questions about this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or the

appropriate project manager in the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).

/RA/

William D. Beckner, Program Director

Operating Reactor Improvements Program

Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Thomas B. Blount, NRR Gail M. Good or Paul Elkmann, RIV

301-415-1501 817-860-8215 or 817-276-6539 Email: txb1@nrc.gov E-mail: gmg@nrc.gov or pje@nrc.gov

Attachment

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\REXB\RAB1\IN-EVAC8.WPD *See previous concurrence

OFFICE RSE:OES:DRIP Tech Editor IOLB:DIPM RIV (A)SC:OES:DRIP PD:RORP:DRIP

NAME RABenedict* PAG* GMTracy* GMGood* TKoshy* WDBeckner*

DATE 03/28/2002 03/25/2002 04/03/2002 03/28/2002 04/05/2002 04/08/2002

Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

_____________________________________________________________________________________

2002-13 Possible Indicators of Ongoing 04/04/2002 All holders of operating licenses

Reactor Pressure Vessel Head for pressurized water nuclear

Degradation power reactors, except those who

have permanently ceased

operations and certified that fuel

has been permanently removed

from the reactor.

99-28, Supp 1 Recall of Star Brand Fire 03/22/2002 All holders of licenses for nuclear

Protection Sprinkler Heads power, research, and test

reactors and fuel cycle facilities.

2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related 03/21/2002 All holders of operating licenses

Electrical Cables or construction permits for

nuclear power reactors

2002-11 Recent Experience with 03/12/2002 All holders of operating licenses

Degradation of Reactor for pressurized-water reactors

Pressure Vessel Head (PWRs), except those who have

permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has

been permanently removed from

the reactor.

2002-10 Nonconservative Water Level 03/07/2002 All holders of operating licenses

Setpoints on Steam for nuclear power reactors, Generators except those who have

permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has

been permanently removed from

the reactor.

2002-09 Potential for Top Nozzle 02/13/2002 All holders of operating licenses

Separation and Dropping of for nuclear power reactors, and

Certain Type of Westinghouse non-power reactors and holders

Fuel Assembly of licenses for permanently

shutdown facilities with fuel

onsite.

______________________________________________________________________________________

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit


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