Information Notice 1986-60, Unanalyzed Post-LOCA Release Paths: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:L lSSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-60 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:L   lSSINS                           No.: 6835 IN 86-60
                                    UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


OFFICE OF INSPECTION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT


===AND ENFORCEMENT===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 28, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-60:   UNANALYZED POST-LOCA RELEASE PATHS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 28, 1986 IE INFORMATION
 
NOTICE NO. 86-60: UNANALYZED
 
POST-LOCA
 
RELEASE PATHS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
All nuclear power reactor facilities
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a
 
holding an operating


license or a construction
construction permit.
 
permit.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
: This information
:
This information notice is being provided to alert recipients to a potentially


notice is being provided to alert recipients
significant problem pertaining to substantial possible leakage of radioactive


to a potentially
water flowing in pipes outside containment after a loss-of-coolant accident


significant
(LOCA). The NRC expects that recipients will review this notice for applica- bility to their facilities. Suggestions contained in this notice do not


problem pertaining
constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response


to substantial
is required.


possible leakage of radioactive
Reference:
      NUREG-0737: "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"
      November 1980. Item III.0.1.1: Integrity of Systems Outside


water flowing in pipes outside containment
Containment Likely to Contain Radioactive Material for Pressurized- Water Reactors and Boiling-Water Reactors.


after a loss-of-coolant
==Description of Circumstances==
 
:
accident (LOCA). The NRC expects that recipients
On August 2, 1985, the licensee at Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant reported to
 
will review this notice for applica-bility to their facilities.
 
Suggestions
 
contained
 
in this notice do not constitute


NRC requirements;
the NRC that two potential post-LOCA release paths from containment had been
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Reference:
NUREG-0737: "Clarification


of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980. Item III.0.1.1:
identified:
Integrity
1.   The following potential post-accident release path resulted from TMI


of Systems Outside Containment
Action Plan modifications completed in 1981. The release path can come


Likely to Contain Radioactive
about in two ways (Figure 1):
      a.    When the charging system is running and normally aligned, borated


Material for Pressurized- Water Reactors and Boiling-Water
water is injected from the volume control tank (VCT) to the reactor


Reactors.Description
coolant pump (RCP) seals past the thermal barrier and into the


of Circumstances:
reactor cooling system (RCS). Some of the seal injection water flows
On August 2, 1985, the licensee at Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant reported to the NRC that two potential


post-LOCA
through the Number 1 seal and returns through a filter and the seal


release paths from containment
water heat exchanger to the charging pump suction. Because a charg- ing pump is operating, the seal water return header does not pressur- ize. In the post-LOCA situation, the system operates essentially the


had been identified:
8607240023
1. The following


potential
IN 86-60
                                                                  July 28, 1986 same except the injection water is drawn from the refueling water


post-accident
storage tank (RWST) rather than the VCT and the charging pumps will


release path resulted from TMI Action Plan modifications
automatically start only if normal power is available. To preserve


completed
for the operator the option of running the RCPs after an accident, the licensee removed automatic safety injection and containment


in 1981. The release path can come about in two ways (Figure 1): a. When the charging system is running and normally aligned, borated water is injected from the volume control tank (VCT) to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals past the thermal barrier and into the reactor cooling system (RCS). Some of the seal injection
isolation signals to the isolation valves for the RCP auxiliaries


water flows through the Number 1 seal and returns through a filter and the seal water heat exchanger
[i.e., seal water (valve A in Figure 1), thermal barrier, and oil


to the charging pump suction. Because a charg-ing pump is operating, the seal water return header does not pressur-ize. In the post-LOCA
cooler returns]. These isolation valves remain remotely operable


situation, the system operates essentially
from the control room.


the 8607240023 IN 86-60 July 28, 1986 same except the injection
Under post-accident conditions, if offsite power is lost, the charg- ing pumps stop and are not automatically restarted. With no operator


water is drawn from the refueling
action, the unisolated RCP seal water return line will pressurize


water storage tank (RWST) rather than the VCT and the charging pumps will automatically
from the seal leakage that is normally routed to the charging pump


start only if normal power is available.
suction. This line relieves to the VCT at 140 psig; eventually the


To preserve for the operator the option of running the RCPs after an accident, the licensee removed automatic
VCT will overflow to the waste treatment system. If no action is


safety injection
taken to stop the seal water leakage, a flow path for highly radioac- tive fission products to the plant stack would eventually exist


and containment
through the waste treatment system. Manual isolation of the seal


isolation
water return header (closure of valve A in Figure 1) to the VCT or


signals to the isolation
manual start of a charging pump would terminate the scenario.


valves for the RCP auxiliaries
b.    At some time after a LOCA when 100,000 gallons have been pumped from


[i.e., seal water (valve A in Figure 1), thermal barrier, and oil cooler returns].
the RWST, the ECCS will take suction from the containment sump


These isolation
(recirculation mode). If the RCS pressure exceeds the shutoff head


valves remain remotely operable from the control room.Under post-accident
of the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps, the charging system will be"->
          manually aligned to take a suction on the RHR system and discharge to


conditions, if offsite power is lost, the charg-ing pumps stop and are not automatically
the RCS at a higher pressure. In this mode of operation, if the seal


restarted.
return header isolation valve (valve B in Figure 1) downstream of the


With no operator action, the unisolated
relief valve to the VCT were to be manually closed or to fail closed


===RCP seal water return line will pressurize===
(for example, on loss of control air), the seal water return header
from the seal leakage that is normally routed to the charging pump suction. This line relieves to the VCT at 140 psig; eventually


the VCT will overflow to the waste treatment
would again pressurize to the point of safety relief at 140 psig.


system. If no action is taken to stop the seal water leakage, a flow path for highly radioac-tive fission products to the plant stack would eventually
The licensee informed plant operators of these potential post-accident release


exist through the waste treatment
pathways, of expected indications, and appropriate actions to stop the leakage


system. Manual isolation
(either start a charging pump or isolate the return line, based on operator


of the seal water return header (closure of valve A in Figure 1) to the VCT or manual start of a charging pump would terminate
judgment).


the scenario.b. At some time after a LOCA when 100,000 gallons have been pumped from the RWST, the ECCS will take suction from the containment
2.  The second release path is related to the post-LOCA recirculation mode.


sump (recirculation
The licensee had considered only RHR system leakage outside containment as


mode). If the RCS pressure exceeds the shutoff head of the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps, the charging system will be"->manually aligned to take a suction on the RHR system and discharge
a source of radioactive release during sump recirculation. Because the


to the RCS at a higher pressure.
charging system may also be used in this recirculation, it could be moving


In this mode of operation, if the seal return header isolation
highly radioactive water outside containment. Previously, the licensee


valve (valve B in Figure 1) downstream
was monitoring RHR system leakage to assure that it was below the Techni- cal Specification, but not the charging system leakage. The licensee has


of the relief valve to the VCT were to be manually closed or to fail closed (for example, on loss of control air), the seal water return header would again pressurize
now expanded its surveillance to include both systems.


to the point of safety relief at 140 psig.The licensee informed plant operators
I


of these potential
IN 86-60
                                                                  July 28, 1986 Discussion:
  These release paths are associated with low frequency events, but because the


post-accident
associated offsite doses may be significant, licensees may want to consider


release pathways, of expected indications, and appropriate
these release paths and other release paths that may be unique to their plants


actions to stop the leakage (either start a charging pump or isolate the return line, based on operator judgment).
in post-LOCA analyses. Such release paths are related to the referenced TMI


2. The second release path is related to the post-LOCA
Action Plan item for a program to reduce to as-low-as-reasonably-achievable


recirculation
(ALARA) levels the leakage from systems outside containment that would or could


mode.The licensee had considered
contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident.


only RHR system leakage outside containment
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.


as a source of radioactive
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional


release during sump recirculation.
Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.


Because the charging system may also be used in this recirculation, it could be moving highly radioactive
wa    .    an, Director


water outside containment.
Divi  n of Emergency Preparedness


Previously, the licensee was monitoring
and Engineering Response


RHR system leakage to assure that it was below the Techni-cal Specification, but not the charging system leakage. The licensee has now expanded its surveillance
Office of Inspection and Enforcement


to include both systems.
===Technical Contact:===


I IN 86-60 July 28, 1986 Discussion:
===Vern Hodge, IE===
These release paths are associated
                      (301) 492-7275 Attachments:
  1. Figure 1
  2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices


with low frequency
F- RELIEF VALVE


events, but because the associated
CHECK VALVE


offsite doses may be significant, licensees
PIC


may want to consider these release paths and other release paths that may be unique to their plants in post-LOCA
75 fWAStE


analyses.
NORMALLY OPEN                                                                                    -              TREATMENT


Such release paths are related to the referenced
SYSTEM


TMI Action Plan item for a program to reduce to as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) levels the leakage from systems outside containment
-*4-   NORMALLY CLOSED


that would or could contain highly radioactive
SIS-- SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL                                    140 PSIG


fluids during a serious transient
4<1- AIR-OPERATED VALVE9                                                                                      V)
C      MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE                                                                                  )
        FILTER                                                                                                  3SIS TO


or accident.No specific action or written response is required by this information
CLOSE


notice.If you have any questions
#1 SEAL WATER RETURN


about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator
A __7                                                                          SEAL WATER


of the appropriate
SIS TO                                                                              HEATEXCHANGER


regional office or this office.wa .an, Director Divi n of Emergency
CLOSE


===Preparedness===
Il SEAL    NRCP
and Engineering


Response Office of Inspection
LEAKOFF


and Enforcement
_CHAGlNG                    RECIRCULATION


Technical
CHARGI/G                                                              RHR HEAT


Contact: Vern Hodge, IE (301) 492-7275 Attachments:
EXCHANGER
1. Figure 1 2. List of Recently Issued IE Information


Notices
INSIDE CONTAINMENT


F- RELIEF VALVE CHECK VALVE 75 PIC fWAStE NORMALLY OPEN -TREATMENT SYSTEM-*4- NORMALLY CLOSED SIS-- SAFETY INJECTION
TO OTHER OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT                                                                              RWST


SIGNAL 140 PSIG 4<1- AIR-OPERATED
THROTTLE              L OPS


VALVE9 V)C MOTOR-OPERATED
VALVE                                                                            CHARGING                    OPEN


VALVE )FILTER 3SIS TO CLOSE#1 SEAL WATER RETURN A __7 SEAL WATER SIS TO HEATEXCHANGER
PUMP


CLOSE Il SEAL NRCP LEAKOFF_CHAGlNG RECIRCULATION
SEAL WATER                                                                                C+C+
                                                FLOW CONTROL                                                                          < co b


CHARGI/G RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INSIDE CONTAINMENT
VALVE                                                                            co 0 3
                                                                                                                                      *  OaD


TO OTHER OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT
Figure 1 Chemical and Volume Control System Seal Water Supply (SImpIlfled-


RWST THROTTLE L OPS VALVE CHARGING OPEN PUMP SEAL WATER C+C+FLOW CONTROL < co b VALVE co 0 3* OaD Figure 1 Chemical and Volume Control System Seal Water Supply (SImpIlfled- Attachment
Attachment 2 IN 86-60
                                                              July 28, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


2 IN 86-60 July 28, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION
IE INFORMATION NOTICES


NOTICES Information
Information                                     Date of


Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-31 Sup. 1 86-59 86-58 86-57 Unauthorized
Notice No.     Subject                         Issue   Issued to


Transfer And 7/14/86 Loss Of Control Of Industrial
86-31          Unauthorized Transfer And       7/14/86 All NRC general


Nuclear Gauges Increased
Sup. 1          Loss Of Control Of Industrial          licensees that possess


Monitoring
Nuclear Gauges                          and use industrial


Of 7/14/86 Certain Patients With Implanted
nuclear gauges


Coratomic, Inc.Model C-100 and C-101 Nuclear-Powered
86-59            Increased Monitoring Of        7/14/86  All NRC licensees


===Cardiac Pacemakers===
Certain Patients With                  authorized to use
Dropped Fuel Assembly 7/11/86 Operating


Problems With 7/11/86 Solenoid Operated Valves At Nuclear Power Plants Reliability
Implanted Coratomic, Inc.              nuclear-powered


Of Main Steam 7/10/86 Safety Valves Delayed Access To Safety- 7/10/86 Related Areas And Equipment During Plant Emergencies
Model C-100 and C-101                  cardiac pacemakers


Criminal Prosecution
Nuclear-Powered Cardiac


Of A 6/27/86 Former Radiation
Pacemakers


Safety Officer Who Willfully
86-58            Dropped Fuel Assembly          7/11/86  All power reactor


Directed An Unqualified
facilities holding


Individual
an OL or CP


===To Perform Radiography===
86-57            Operating Problems With        7/11/86  All power reactor
86-56 All NRC general licensees


that possess and use industrial
Solenoid Operated Valves At              facilities holding


nuclear gauges All NRC licensees authorized
Nuclear Power Plants                    an OL or CP


to use nuclear-powered
86-56            Reliability Of Main Steam      7/10/86  All PWR facilities


cardiac pacemakers
Safety Valves                            holding an OL or CP


All power reactor facilities
86-55          Delayed Access To Safety-      7/10/86  All power reactor


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
Related Areas And Equipment              facilities holding


holding an OL or CP All PWR facilities
During Plant Emergencies                an OL or CP


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
86-54          Criminal Prosecution Of A      6/27/86 All holders of NRC


holding an OL or CP All holders of NRC license authorizing
Former Radiation Safety                  license authorizing


the possession
Officer Who Willfully Directed          the possession of


of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material All power reactor facilities
An Unqualified Individual To            byproduct, source, Perform Radiography                      or special nuclear


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
material


holding an OL or CP 86-55 86-54 86-53 86-52 Improper Installation
86-53           Improper Installation Of Heat 6/26/86  All power reactor


Of Heat 6/26/86 Shrinkable
Shrinkable Tubing                      facilities holding


Tubing Conductor
an OL or CP


Insulation
86-52            Conductor Insulation Degrada- 6/26/86  All power reactor


Degrada- 6/26/86 tion On Foxboro Model E Controllers
tion On Foxboro Model E                 facilities holding


OL = Operating
Controllers                            an OL or CP


License CP = Construction
OL = Operating License


Permit}}
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 03:03, 24 November 2019

Unanalyzed Post-LOCA Release Paths
ML031250042
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date: 07/28/1986
From: Jordan E
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-86-060, NUDOCS 8607240023
Download: ML031250042 (5)
v • d • e


L lSSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-60

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 28, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-60: UNANALYZED POST-LOCA RELEASE PATHS

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a

construction permit.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert recipients to a potentially

significant problem pertaining to substantial possible leakage of radioactive

water flowing in pipes outside containment after a loss-of-coolant accident

(LOCA). The NRC expects that recipients will review this notice for applica- bility to their facilities. Suggestions contained in this notice do not

constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response

is required.

Reference:

NUREG-0737: "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"

November 1980. Item III.0.1.1: Integrity of Systems Outside

Containment Likely to Contain Radioactive Material for Pressurized- Water Reactors and Boiling-Water Reactors.

Description of Circumstances

On August 2, 1985, the licensee at Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant reported to

the NRC that two potential post-LOCA release paths from containment had been

identified:

1. The following potential post-accident release path resulted from TMI

Action Plan modifications completed in 1981. The release path can come

about in two ways (Figure 1):

a. When the charging system is running and normally aligned, borated

water is injected from the volume control tank (VCT) to the reactor

coolant pump (RCP) seals past the thermal barrier and into the

reactor cooling system (RCS). Some of the seal injection water flows

through the Number 1 seal and returns through a filter and the seal

water heat exchanger to the charging pump suction. Because a charg- ing pump is operating, the seal water return header does not pressur- ize. In the post-LOCA situation, the system operates essentially the

8607240023

IN 86-60

July 28, 1986 same except the injection water is drawn from the refueling water

storage tank (RWST) rather than the VCT and the charging pumps will

automatically start only if normal power is available. To preserve

for the operator the option of running the RCPs after an accident, the licensee removed automatic safety injection and containment

isolation signals to the isolation valves for the RCP auxiliaries

[i.e., seal water (valve A in Figure 1), thermal barrier, and oil

cooler returns]. These isolation valves remain remotely operable

from the control room.

Under post-accident conditions, if offsite power is lost, the charg- ing pumps stop and are not automatically restarted. With no operator

action, the unisolated RCP seal water return line will pressurize

from the seal leakage that is normally routed to the charging pump

suction. This line relieves to the VCT at 140 psig; eventually the

VCT will overflow to the waste treatment system. If no action is

taken to stop the seal water leakage, a flow path for highly radioac- tive fission products to the plant stack would eventually exist

through the waste treatment system. Manual isolation of the seal

water return header (closure of valve A in Figure 1) to the VCT or

manual start of a charging pump would terminate the scenario.

b. At some time after a LOCA when 100,000 gallons have been pumped from

the RWST, the ECCS will take suction from the containment sump

(recirculation mode). If the RCS pressure exceeds the shutoff head

of the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps, the charging system will be"->

manually aligned to take a suction on the RHR system and discharge to

the RCS at a higher pressure. In this mode of operation, if the seal

return header isolation valve (valve B in Figure 1) downstream of the

relief valve to the VCT were to be manually closed or to fail closed

(for example, on loss of control air), the seal water return header

would again pressurize to the point of safety relief at 140 psig.

The licensee informed plant operators of these potential post-accident release

pathways, of expected indications, and appropriate actions to stop the leakage

(either start a charging pump or isolate the return line, based on operator

judgment).

2. The second release path is related to the post-LOCA recirculation mode.

The licensee had considered only RHR system leakage outside containment as

a source of radioactive release during sump recirculation. Because the

charging system may also be used in this recirculation, it could be moving

highly radioactive water outside containment. Previously, the licensee

was monitoring RHR system leakage to assure that it was below the Techni- cal Specification, but not the charging system leakage. The licensee has

now expanded its surveillance to include both systems.

I

IN 86-60

July 28, 1986 Discussion:

These release paths are associated with low frequency events, but because the

associated offsite doses may be significant, licensees may want to consider

these release paths and other release paths that may be unique to their plants

in post-LOCA analyses. Such release paths are related to the referenced TMI

Action Plan item for a program to reduce to as-low-as-reasonably-achievable

(ALARA) levels the leakage from systems outside containment that would or could

contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

wa . an, Director

Divi n of Emergency Preparedness

and Engineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contact:

Vern Hodge, IE

(301) 492-7275 Attachments:

1. Figure 1

2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

F- RELIEF VALVE

CHECK VALVE

PIC

75 fWAStE

NORMALLY OPEN - TREATMENT

SYSTEM

-*4- NORMALLY CLOSED

SIS-- SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL 140 PSIG

4<1- AIR-OPERATED VALVE9 V)

C MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE )

FILTER 3SIS TO

CLOSE

  1. 1 SEAL WATER RETURN

A __7 SEAL WATER

SIS TO HEATEXCHANGER

CLOSE

Il SEAL NRCP

LEAKOFF

_CHAGlNG RECIRCULATION

CHARGI/G RHR HEAT

EXCHANGER

INSIDE CONTAINMENT

TO OTHER OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT RWST

THROTTLE L OPS

VALVE CHARGING OPEN

PUMP

SEAL WATER C+C+

FLOW CONTROL < co b

VALVE co 0 3

  • OaD

Figure 1 Chemical and Volume Control System Seal Water Supply (SImpIlfled-

Attachment 2 IN 86-60

July 28, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

86-31 Unauthorized Transfer And 7/14/86 All NRC general

Sup. 1 Loss Of Control Of Industrial licensees that possess

Nuclear Gauges and use industrial

nuclear gauges

86-59 Increased Monitoring Of 7/14/86 All NRC licensees

Certain Patients With authorized to use

Implanted Coratomic, Inc. nuclear-powered

Model C-100 and C-101 cardiac pacemakers

Nuclear-Powered Cardiac

Pacemakers

86-58 Dropped Fuel Assembly 7/11/86 All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

86-57 Operating Problems With 7/11/86 All power reactor

Solenoid Operated Valves At facilities holding

Nuclear Power Plants an OL or CP

86-56 Reliability Of Main Steam 7/10/86 All PWR facilities

Safety Valves holding an OL or CP

86-55 Delayed Access To Safety- 7/10/86 All power reactor

Related Areas And Equipment facilities holding

During Plant Emergencies an OL or CP

86-54 Criminal Prosecution Of A 6/27/86 All holders of NRC

Former Radiation Safety license authorizing

Officer Who Willfully Directed the possession of

An Unqualified Individual To byproduct, source, Perform Radiography or special nuclear

material

86-53 Improper Installation Of Heat 6/26/86 All power reactor

Shrinkable Tubing facilities holding

an OL or CP

86-52 Conductor Insulation Degrada- 6/26/86 All power reactor

tion On Foxboro Model E facilities holding

Controllers an OL or CP

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit


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