ML18106A945

LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr

ML18106A945
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	10/30/1998
From:	Bakken A, Knieriem R Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-97-004, LER-97-4, LR-N980497, NUDOCS 9811030207
Download: ML18106A945 (6)

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• Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit OCT 2 2 1998 LR-N980497 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 311/97-004-01 SALEM GENERA TING STATION - UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERA TING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-311 Gentlemen:

This Supplemental Licensee Event Report entitled "Failure To Comply With Technical Specification Action Statement, Diesel Generator Start, And Inadequate Surveillance Testing" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) &

10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

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eneral Manager

• Salem Operations Attachment

/rbk C Distribution LER File 3.7 9811030207 981030 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR Tht* pomT is in your hands.

95-2168 REV 6/94

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NRC FORM 366 U.S. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION EXPIRES 06/30/2001 (6-1q98)

-t LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear (See reverse for required number of Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, digits/characters for each block) DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMS control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

I 'ACIUTY NAM* l'I Salem Unit 2 Ioocm """"' '"

05000311 OF 5 TITLE (4)

Failure to Comply With TS Action Statement, Diesel Generator Start, and Inadequate Surveillance Testing EVENT DATE (51 LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DA TE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (81 MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME Salem Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 05000272 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER nil OR 0'7 0'7 - nnLt - n1 10 30 98 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or morel (11 I OPERATING 5 MODE (9) 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50. 73(a) (2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (101 000 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iiil 73.71

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i*f'>: <'**>* *. '*.". ;* ' ' 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v)

, *; <.\ "' :* * '3 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)  ! ~:~~~ ~:r~b;~~~ below or LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (121 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) r Robert B. Knieriem, Licensing Engineer 609 339-1782 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (131 REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO EPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO EPIX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED I v~

(If ves, comolete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

1x NO SUBMISSION DATE(151 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (161 At 1306 April 8, 1997, station personnel discovered that the 2A and 2C AC electrical bus trains were inoperable for longer than allowed by TS 3.8.2.2. The operating shift initiated actions to establish Containment Integrity as required by TS 3.8.2.2, and restored the 2C AC electrical bus train to operable. TS 3.8.2.2 was exited at 1600 on April 8, 1997. Further, during investigation of the occurrence two additional reportable issues were identified. The.

2A DG started unexpectedly and ran for approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and the Surveillance Test for TS 4.8.2.2 was discovered to be inadequate.

The cause of the TS 3.8.2.2 violation is attributed to inadequate tracking of inoperable equipment by shift personnel. Corrective actions include a review of the TS Action Tracking Log for improvements, and a review of this event with Operations personnel for lessons learned. The cause of the 2A DG start has not been determined. The cause of the inadequate Surveillance Test is attributed to inadequate controls over maintenance of TS surveillance procedures This condition was previously identified and described in LER 311/95-008.

Corrective actions include procedure revisions to ensure TS 4.8.2.2 is properly addressed.

This supplemental LER reports that a manufacturer's evaluation of the Safeguards Equipment 1 Controller (SEC) did not identify the cause for the unexpected start of the 2A DG.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications, and 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv), any condition that results in an Ennineered Safetv Feature actuation.

NAC FOAM 366 (6-1 998)

NRC FORM 366A .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 16-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET (2)

FACILITY NAME (1) NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL I REVISION YEAR I NUMBER NUMBER SALEM UNIT 2 05000311 97 - 004 01 2 OF 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Form 366AJ (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Emergency Onsite Power Supply System - Diesel Generators (EK/DG)

DC Power (EJ/)

Low-Voltage Power System - Class lE (EB/)

• Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear in the text as (SS/CC)

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of identification, Salem Unit 1 was shutdown and defueled, while Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 5. Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 is applicable in Modes 5 & 6.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE At 1306 April 8, 1997, station personnel discovered that the 2A and 2C AC electrical bus trains were inoperable for longer than allowed by TS 3.8-2.2. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B) any condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. Further, during the investigation into this event, two additional reportable issues were identified. First, the 2A DG unexpectedly started. This even~ is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv) any condition that resulted in an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation. Second, an inadequate Surveillance Test was identified. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B) any condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 states: "As a minimum, two AC electrical bus trains shall be OPERABLE and energized from sources of power other than a diesel generator but aligned to an OPERABLE diesel generator with each train consisting of:

1 - 4 kvolt Vital Bus 1 - 460 volt Vital Bus and associated control centers 1 - 230 volt Vital Bus and associated control centers 1 - 115 vo~t Instrument Bus energized from its respective inverter connected to its respective DC Bus Train-"

At 2301 on April 7, 1997, to support taking the 2C 125 VDC {EJ/--} bus out of service, Operations personnel on the 1900-0700 shift swapped the 2C Vital Instrument Bus to its alternate AC source_ Tracking of Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS) 3.8.2.2 was initiated upon ~stablishing the off normal power lineup of the 2C Instrument Bus.

However, the TSAS tracking log entry for TSAS 3.8.2.2 was combined with the TSAS 3.8_2.4 entry for the 2C 125 VDC Bus. The tracking log entry listed the 2C 125 VDC Bus as inoperable equipment but did not include the 2C Vital Instrument Bus.

NRC FORM 366A 16-1998)

NRC FORM 366A .- . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET (2)

FACILITY NAME (1 I NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER SALEM UNIT 2 05000311 97 004 01 3 OF 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Form 366A) ( 17)

Description of Occurrence (cont'd)

The 2C DG was subsequently locked out, cleared and tagged as part of the 2C 125 voe bus outage. At 0103, on April 8, a trouble alarm for the 2A Safeguards Equipment Controller (SEC) was received due to the 2A SEC going into Auto fault_ Troubleshooting activities determined that the 2A SEC was inoperable which rendered the 2A DG inoperable. The cause of the 2A SEC Auto fault was unrelated to either the violation of TSAS 3.8.2.2, or the 2A DG start. TSAS 3.8.2.2 was entered based on both the 2A and 2C AC electrical bus trains being inoperable, and actions were immediately initiated to restore the 2C DG and establish Containment Integrity as required by the TSAS. The shift became focused on returning the 2C DG to service and overlooked the fact that having the 2C Vital Instrument Bus selected to its alternate source also resulted in the 2C AC electrical bus train being inoperable.

Upon restoring the 2C Diesel Generator, the shift inappropriately exited TS 3.8.2.2 without returning the 2C Vital Instrument Bus power supply to the required alignment.

During the 0700~1900 shift on April 8, 1997, an NRC Resident Inspector questioned a Nuclear Control Operator (NCO) about the requirements of TS 3.8.2.2 with respect to the inverter for the 115 volt Instrument Bus. At 1306, while responding to the Resident Inspector's questions, the NCO recognized that the requirements of TS 3.8.2.2 were not satisfied due to the inoperable 2A Diesel Generator and the off-normal alignment of 2C Vital Instrument Bus for greater than eight hours. The Nuclear Shift Supervisor was immediately notified, and efforts were initiated to establish Containment Integrity, in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.8.2.2, and return the 2C Instrument Bus to its normal alignment. The 2C Instrument Bus was transferred to its inverter at 1438, and upon completion of surveillance testing, TSAS 3.8.2.2 was exited at 1600. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B) any condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

During the investigation of this event two other reportable issues were identified. First, the 2A DG unexpectedly started at 1706 April 8, 1997. The DG started, but the output breaker did not close because the 2A Vital Bus had adequate voltage. The DG was secured at 1915 on April 8, 1997. This is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv), any automatic Engineered Safety Feature actuation.

The second instance was the discovery of an inadequate TS surveillance test (ST). Unit 2 TS 4.8.2.2, which is applicable in Modes 5 & 6, requires verification that the buses and inverters described in TS 3.8.2.2 are OPERABLE.and energized from AC sources other than the diesel generators at least once per 7 days. The ST to demonstrate the operability of the AC Electrical Trains (TS 4.8.2.2) did not demonstrate that the inverter was powered from an AC source. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73 {a) (2) (i) (B) any condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the failure to comply with TS 3.8.2.2 Action Statements is attributed to inadequate tracking of inoperable equipment by shift personnel. A TS Action Statement tracking log entry which addressed the 2C 125 VOC Bus was used for tracking TS 3.8.2.2. A separate entry for the 2C Instrument Bus should have been made.

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)

-'*

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)

• .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET (2)

FACILITY NAME (1 l NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL I REVISION YEAR I NUMBER NUMBER SALEM UNIT 2 05000311 97 - 004 01 4 OF 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AJ (17)

Cause of Occurrence (cont'd)

The cause of the 2A DG automatic start haB not been determined. The automatic start signal was generated by the 2A SEC, but the investigation activities have not been able to determine why a start signal was generated. The 2A SEC chassis was removed and examined, and the cause of the 2A DG start could not be determined by PSE&G. Therefore, it is concluded that this was an intermittent failure that could not be re-created or identified.

The 2A SEC was restored to service using a spare SEC chassis. The SEC chassis that was in service at the time 2A DG started was sent to the manufacturer for additional evaluation.

This testing included a full inspection of the chassis as well as an evaluation of chassis operation and sequencing. The manufacturer's evaluation did not identify any degraded components and testing revealed that the chassis was performing as designed.

The cause of the inadequate ST is attributed to inadequate controls over maintenance of Technical Specification surveillance procedures. This condition was previously identified in LER 311/95-008. A review of historical procedure revisions for Unit 2 indicates that prior to 1993, TS 4.8.2.2 was properly addressed by the surveillance procedure. A 1993 procedure upgrade project revised the Unit 1 surveillance procedure to eliminate the requirement to verify the inverter was powered from its normal AC source. The Unit 1 surveillance procedure implements the Unit 1 TS requirements; however, there is a slight difference in the Unit 2 TS requirements. The Unit 1 upgraded procedure was copied for Unit 2. This difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS requirements was not recognized, and the Unit 2 procedure did not implement the Unit 2 requirements.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs issued in the last 2 years identified the following occurrence related to inadequate tracking of inoperable equipment:

LER 272/95-019 describes an occurrence involving the transition from Mode 5 to Mode 6 with inoperable containment purge valves.. The cause was attributed in part to inadequate tracking of inoperable equipment. Corrective actions;included revisions to the process for tracking Technical Specification Action Statements.

A review of LERs issued in the last 2 years identified the following occurrences related to the automatic DG start:

LER 311/96-014 describes an occurrence of a defective component causing an inadvertent DG start.

A review of LERs issued in the last two years identified 18 LERs (272/95-004, 272/95-019, 272/96-004, 272/96-005, 272/96-016, 272/96-024, 272/97-026, 272/96-035, 272/97-039, 272/97-040, 272/97-004, 272/97-006, 311/95-006, 311/95-008, 311/96-007, 311/96-010 and 311/96-013, 311/97-016) where surveillance requirements were not performed adequately because of procedure problems. The identification of this programmatic issue, along with other related issues, resulted in the initiation of the Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) described in LER 311/95-008. The TSSIP should ensure that Technical Specification surveillance requirements are adequately implemented.

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)

-

NRC FORM 366A .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET 121 FACILITY NAME (1) NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER SALEM UNIT 2 05000311 97 - 004 01 5 OF 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Form 366AJ (17)

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The safety consequences of the violation of TS 3.8 .. 2.2 were minimal. While containment integrity was not established within eight hours, containment closure was completed (with the exception of the Containment Airlocks) five days before this occurrence.

Administrative controls were in place to limit activities that could impact containment closure. In addition, 2A DG was available and the 2C inverter could have been restored in a short ~eriod of time. Sufficient electrical power was available to support safe plant operations.

The safety consequences of the DG start were minimal. The DG started and responded as designed. The 2A SEC failure was limited to the A Vital Bus.

The safety consequences of the inadequate surveillance procedures were minimal. The surveillance procedure as written and performed satisfied the intent of the Westinghouse Improved Technical Specifications Bases.* These Bases require that operable inverters require the associated vital bus to be powered by the inverter with output voltage and frequen.cy within tolerances, and power input to the inverter from a station battery.

Alternatively, power supply may be from an internal AC source via a rectifier as long as the station battery is available as the uninterruptible power supply. The surveillance pr6cedures met this intent; however, the unique words of the Salem TSs could not be demonstrated by the surveillance test.

Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected. There was no radiological safety impact associated with this occurrence. Therefore, the safety significance attributed to these occurrences is considered minimal.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. This event and the lessons learned were discussed with Operations personnel. The appropriate personnel have been held accountable in accordance with PSE&G policies.

2. The process for Technical Specifications Action Tracking has been improved. Additional enhancements will be developed and implemented by July 15, 1997.

3. The 2A SEC cabinet was replaced. An investigation into the 2A DG start was initiated.

The investigation was unable to determine the cause of the DG start; therefore, it is concluded that this was an intermittent failure that could not be re-created or identified. An indep.endent investigation on the SEC chassis by the manufacturer was also conducted. This investigation did not identify a cause for the 2A DG start.

4. The inadequate surveillance procedures for TS 4.8.2.2 have been revised to properly address the AC power alignment to the Instrument Bus inverters.

5. The Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSI.P was previously described in LER 311/95-008-00. The TSSIP review is expected to be completed by December 31, 1997.

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)